Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies
oversight 68, it increases the risk of extending over governments’ capability to exploit citizens’ data, and also provides private corporations with more opportunities to monetise it. Furthermore, sudden proliferation of pandemic-related apps may contribute to ‘normalisation’ of widespread digital surveillance, especially as many opaque systems of information collection and predictive analytics have been implemented under the guise of emergency measures, with very little public scrutiny or debate, limiting public awareness of their potential negative and long-term implications69.
2.3
Digital tools of information control
Government-imposed restrictions on electronic communication, such as network disruptions, the shutting down of internet connectivity, bans on entire social networks and applications, or suspension of telephone services, as well as more targeted censorship (like individual website blocking or filtering specific content), are on the rise globally and continue to be an alarming threat to human rights 70. While they affect freedom of expression, in particular (just as in the case of widespread surveillance), they also interfere with multiple other rights, such as the right to association and peaceful assembly, public participation, privacy, and nondiscrimination. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted their impact on economic, social and cultural rights, as online access to healthcare, education and other essential services, for many people, has become the only viable option. Internet shutdowns 71 remain one of the most common tools for digital repression, continuing to be used by many governments in different parts of the world to silence dissenting voices, often during critical events, such as protests and demonstrations, elections, or armed conflicts 72. Internet shutdowns dominate in developing and/or non-democratic countries, where relevant protective legal provisions are non-existent or limited and rarely acted upon 73. Overall, at least 213 shutdowns were documented in 2019 in 33 countries (India being the current evident ‘leader’, with at least 385 shutdowns ordered since 2012 74, followed by Venezuela, Yemen and Iraq 75). This number stands in stark contrast to 2015, when ‘only’ Guidelines ensuring transparency and adequate assessment of the human rights impact of any public-private partnerships specifically during COVID-19 have been developed by civil society actors. See: Access Now, Article 19, Association for Progressive Communications (APC), Chinese Human Rights Defenders, CIVICUS, International Service for Human Rights, Ranking Digital Rights, Safeguard Defenders, ‘Joint civil society open letter to the UN on public-private partnerships’ , 2020.; Open Government Partnership, ‘A Guide to A Guide to Open Government and the Coronavirus: Privacy Protections’ , 2020. 69 Csernatoni, R. 'New states of emergency: normalizing technosurveillance in the time of COVID-19’, Global Affairs, 6, 2020.; Interview with Diego Naranjo, Head of policy, European Digital Rights, 08 January 2021. 70 De Gregorio, G. and Stremlau, N., ‘Internet Shutdowns and the Limits of Law’, International Journal of Communication, 14(202), 2020. 71 While there is no academic unanimity on the definition of the term ‘internet shutdown’ and many sources use it interchangeably with ‘network shutdown/disruption’ or ‘blackout’, for the purpose of this study we will use a definition developed by Access Now, one of the main advocacy organizations monitoring this problem across the world, which has defined it as ‘an intentional disruption of internet or electronic communications, rendering them inaccessible or effectively unusable, for a specific population or within a location, often to exert control over the flow of information’. Access Now, 'Keep It On Report 2019', 2020, p. 2. 72 In 2019, the most commonly observed causes were protests, military actions (mostly in India), communal violence, political instability, religious holidays or anniversaries, and elections, with an aim to undermine collective reaction to those events; Ibidem, p. 13. Interestingly, the evidence suggests that the ‘effectiveness’ of shutdowns is questionable at best – i.e. that shutdowns are frequently followed by an escalation in the momentum of pre-existing protest, and that activists and citizens use a combination of strategies to continue mobilising. See: Rydzak, J., Karanja, M. and Opiyo, N., 'Dissent Does Not Die in Darkness: Network Shutdowns and Collective Action in African Countries’, International Journal of Communication, 14(2020), 2020, p. 4281. 73 Rydzak, J., 'Disconnected: A human rights-based approach to network shutdowns', Global Network Initiative, 2018, pp. 67. 74 Human Rights Watch, 'End Internet Shutdowns to Manage COVID-19', 31 March 2020. 75 There is, however, a significant gap between leading India and – next on the list – Venezuela, which was reported to have blocked access to social media platforms at least 12 times in 2019, equal to 86% of internet shutdowns in Latin America (the remaining 14% was attributed to Ecuador). Access Now, op. cit., pp. 2-3. 68
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