Digital technologies as a means of repression and social control
2.5
Transnational dimensions of digital repression
Another very serious challenge, which has emerged in recent years, is proliferation of a so-called ‘transnational digital repression’ 124. It has become apparent that regimes with restrictive domestic internet policies and advanced digital surveillance have been increasingly ‘extending’ these practices beyond their borders to affect targets living in foreign countries. In particular, development of new information and communication technologies has facilitated targeting regime opponents living in the diaspora 125. Even though transnational repression has been a long-standing problem for diasporas with ties to authoritarian sending-states, digital tools have allowed such governments to control, silence, and punish dissent across borders with greater scope, speed and at reduced cost, transcending traditional barriers, such as territorial jurisdiction and physical distance. The rise of new digital and information technologies, services and tools, as well as playing a central role in the targeting of activists based abroad 126, has enabled more effective identification and tracking of dissident networks, including monitoring of their activities, hacking of their social media accounts and websites, the planting of malware, phishing for confidential information, online harassment, and disinformation campaigns. Not only has this facilitated long distance forms of repression targeted directly at those residing abroad, but also ‘coercion-by-proxy’ – exerting control and inducing fear via relatives still in the country. This is because new methods of digital surveillance make it easier for authoritarian states to identify ties between activists living in diaspora and family members or acquaintances ‘back home’ 127. It has also been established that, in response to activists’ attempts to protect themselves using methods like encryption, the authoritarian regimes have been applying even more aggressive measures of targeted surveillance (in addition to still in place ‘traditional’ mechanisms of repression, such as arrests or physical harassment) 128. The most prominent examples of digital transnational repression are the deployment of cyberespionage campaigns by China against Tibetan diaspora or pro-democracy groups in Hong Kong 129, Saudi Arabia’s deployment of spyware on the mobile devices of Saudi political activists living in Canada or the United Kingdom 130, and disruption operations of media and opposition websites based abroad, including defacement and DDoS campaigns by hackers affiliated with Syrian or Iranian regimes 131. Digital transnational repression practices have also affected targets living in EU countries. It was revealed, for example, that Turkey, known for its current widespread repressive campaign against suspected opponents abroad (including, in particular, mobility controls, detentions and illegal renditions), developed a
Defined as activities undertaken by states ‘seeking to exert pressure - using digital tools - on citizens living abroad in order to constrain, limit, or eliminate political or social action that threatens regime stability or social and cultural norms within the country’. See: Al-Jizawi, N., Anstis, S., Chan, S., Senft, A. and Deibert, R. J., 'Annotated Bibliography. Transnational Digital Repression', Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, 2020. 125 Dalmasso, E., Del Sordi, A., Glasius, M., Hirt, N., Michaelsen, M., Mohammad, A. S., and Moss, D., 'Intervention: Extraterritorial Authoritarian Power’, Political Geography, 2017.; Michaelsen, M., 'The Digital Transnational Repression Toolkit, and Its Silencing Effects', Freedom House, 2020. 126 It has been established that ‘for diaspora activists engaging for political change in their country of origin, digital technologies are key to communicate with contacts at home, maintain professional relations, and advocate against rights violations’. This activity makes them particularly ‘exposed to monitoring and surveillance from regime authorities’. See Michaelsen, M., ibidem. 127 Adamson, F.B. and Gerasimos, T., 'At Home and Abroad: Coercion-by-Proxy as a Tool of Transnational Repression', Freedom House, 2020. 128 Michaelsen, M., op. cit. 129 Kleemola, K., Crete-Nishihata, M. and Scott-Railton, J., 'Targeted Attacks against Tibetan and Hong Kong Groups Exploiting CVE-2014-4114', Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, 15 June 2015. 130 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN experts call for investigation into allegations that Saudi Crown Prince involved in hacking of Jeff Bezos’ phone, 22 January 2020; Marczak, B., Scott-Railton, J., Senft, A., Abdul Razzak, B. and Deibert, R.,'The Kingdom Came to Canada. How Saudi-Linked Digital Espionage Reached Canadian Soil', Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, 1 October 2018. 131 Al-Jizawi, N., et. al, op. cit. 124
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