Digital technologies as a means of repression and social control
State governments were concerned about how the measures might prejudice security relations with many countries. They were also reluctant to forego lucrative surveillance technology contracts. A majority of Member States worked to dilute the Commission proposals and leave their digital elements relatively modest. For several years, several various Member States undercut the Commission’s efforts to limit EU companies’ exports of digital surveillance equipment likely to harm human rights 328. Member States’ opinions began to shift, however, as the scale of digital problems became apparent and also as the United States moved towards far stricter controls, putting pressure on European governments to tighten their own export controls. The use of surveillance against pro-democracy protestors in Hong Kong in 2020 shone a spotlight on digital repression. In this case, the EU did move to prevent companies providing surveillance equipment that could be used against democracy protestors 329. In 2019, Member States reached an agreement in support of the Commission’s proposals and more constructive negotiations on the details of a new regulation began with the EP playing a vital role as co-legislator. The Recast Dual-Use Regulation strengthens human rights criteria and explicitly stipulates cybersurveillance equipment as a dual-use good. Human rights violations are now a justifiable reason for placing controls on the export of such equipment. The regulation also adds some categories of cyber-surveillance equipment beyond those already covered by multilateral dual-use controls 330. There is still much debate over important details within this regulation, particularly relating to exactly what kinds of equipment shall fall within its remit. Some Member States want a wider scope to include facial recognition technology and other innovations, while others have requested a narrower, more focused approach. Officials acknowledge that compromises have been made and that much will depend on the political will to take the regulation forward. The key factor will be how the EU assesses whether regimes are, in fact, using European technology for repressive ends, and whether such assessments should be made public 331.
4.3
Dialogues and multilateral engagement
4.3.1
Human rights dialogues
The EU often stresses the need to exert pressure through political dialogue. It currently has 45 human rights dialogues with partner countries. Formally structured dialogue is a vital part of the EU’s human rights and democracy toolbox. Officials interviewed for this report generally acknowledged that the EU’s human rights dialogues were relatively slow to hone-in on digital concerns, but stressed that they have begun to do so – knowledge and appreciation of the scale of this problem has gradually caught up with trends around the world. The human rights dialogues that have in recent years come to include a focus on digital rights include those with China, Ethiopia, the Gulf states, and Uzbekistan. In 2021, digital rights and repression will be on the agenda of all EU human rights dialogues. Still, some states have effectively resisted even discussing digital concerns within these dialogues; Russia is a prime example of this 332. The EU approaches its dialogue on digital issues mainly through a freedom of expression prism, although it has begun to include a focus on surveillance and privacy rights. The EU most commonly uses its formal dialogue forums to raise the cases of individuals suffering human rights abuses, including through digital means. The EU has increasingly focused on regimes’ online smear campaigns and repression against
Interview with key informant interviewee 01, under full anonymity, 24 November 2020. Politico, ‘EU to limit export of ‘sensitive’ tech in response to Hong Kong security law’, 28 July 2020. 330 European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘Review of dual-use export controls’, January 2021. 331 Interview with key informant interviewee 01, under full anonymity, 24 November 2020; see also Amnesty International, ‘Out of Control: Failing EU Laws for Digital Surveillance Export’, London, 2020, p. 12; G. Gressel. ‘Protecting Europe against hybrid threats’, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 2019, p. 114. 332 Interview with representatives of the EEAS, 2 December 2020. 328 329
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