Mervinskiy 407

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Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies

the guidance does represent a pertinent means of soft persuasion over the private sector. Those Member States that are part of the FOC have also used this forum as an avenue for dialogue with private sector actors on internet freedoms. At each of these levels, the focus has been on positive encouragement, and there has been little EU appetite to wield punitive sanctions against companies attached to mandatory due diligence requirements 344. Policymakers acknowledge that engagement with the private sector is one of the areas where progress has been most modest so far. The EU has gradually begun to redress this situation, although diplomats recognise it is an area that still lags behind the focus on state-to-state relations or the more standard diplomatic channels of foreign policy. The EU has started to arrange several NGO forums with private sector involvement, seeking to position itself as a ‘bridge-builder’ between civil society and private companies. A growing number of such dialogues are focusing on human rights CSOs working with companies to achieve stronger protection of safe online spaces for human rights defenders in autocratic states. Many decision makers believe that the EU is well-positioned to foster this kind of dialogue-based approach with human rights CSOs and businesses, rather than favouring highly punitive approaches, for instance on due diligence (even though on this last issue, some degree of support is growing across different EU institutions and member states for firmer action). Incipient dialogues tend to include social media platforms and aim to get them working with human rights groups. They have not yet aimed to apply concrete pressure on IT companies to actively resist internet shutdowns 345. Still, notwithstanding these advances, the EU’s contacts, dialogues and coordination with the private sector have so far focused overwhelmingly on internet regulations within Europe itself. Our interviews revealed that the EU has not yet reached out in any concerted way to tech companies in relation to the rights concerns outlined in Chapter 3. There is concern that the spill-over of internal policies into external EU policies has been largely negative; this is because national Member State laws, such as Germany’s NetzDG, have been used by regimes around the world as a template for their own restrictive rules on the internet. Private sector representatives highlight that EU policymakers have been interested in working together to prevent influence operations from third countries having an impact inside Europe, but not to deal with the effects of digital repression within third countries themselves. As revealed during the interviews, private sector (EU-based and US platform) representatives support the EU’s efforts to develop standards at the multilateral level, but are also concerned that the EU can rather overstate the potential of such guidelines and generic principles. These do not deal with immediate compliance challenges and, in relation to these platforms, some companies do not feel there has been adequate EU diplomatic support, dialogue, or action – often for cross-cutting geopolitical reasons. Since the EU has sought to bring stakeholders together from the private sector, civil society, and governments to coordinate domestic policies, as mentioned earlier, this is gradually being replicated at a broader, international level. One case of untapped potential relates to a possible internationalisation of the Rapid Alert System on which the EU and platforms cooperated for the EU elections in 2019. This kind of coordination is still sporadic in relation to digital manipulation in elections outside Europe, occurring in some countries but not in others, and is not subject to consistent global rules 346.

4.4

Funding

The EU has gradually increased the funds it allocates directly to democracy and human rights policies. It funds such projects through multiple instruments and budget lines. This makes it impossible to put a single, precise figure on the magnitude of the funding. It is certainly the case, however, that these funds have gained importance within the EU’s overall democracy and human rights toolbox. The EU is currently

Interview with representative of an EU institution, 27 November 2020. Interview with representative of an EU institution, 27 November 2020. 346 Interview with private sector representative, 20 January 2021. 344 345

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4.6 EP instruments and contributions

3min
page 73

4.7 Conclusions assessment of the toolbox s evolution

20min
pages 74-80

List of consulted stakeholders

11min
pages 99-106

4.5 Overlaps with cyber security and influence operations

3min
page 72

4.4 Funding

16min
pages 67-71

4.3 Dialogues and multilateral engagement

9min
pages 64-66

4.1 General evolution of the EU toolbox

9min
pages 57-59

4.2 Restrictive measures and conditionality

12min
pages 60-63

3.6 Conclusions

13min
pages 53-56

3.4 Disruptions to free flow of information online

14min
pages 46-49

3.5 Human rights and private actors

10min
pages 50-52

3.3 Surveillance in a digital age

10min
pages 43-45

3.2 AI and algorithmic decision making systems

15min
pages 38-42

3.1 Introduction

5min
pages 36-37

2.4 Next generation repression toolkit

12min
pages 28-31

2.3 Digital tools of information control

15min
pages 23-27

2.5 Transnational dimensions of digital repression

6min
pages 32-33

2.6 Conclusions

7min
pages 34-35

2.2 Emergence of public health surveillance systems

5min
pages 21-22

algorithmic decision making

13min
pages 17-20

1.1 Objectives and scope of the study

2min
page 12

1.3 Note on methodology

1min
page 16
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