2. Examples of “interference”

may be treated as equivalent to “home” within the meaning of Article 8 (National Federation of Sportspersons’ Associations and unions (FNASS) and Others v. France, § 158). 424. Whilst the Court has acknowledged the existence of a “home” in favour of an association complaining of surveillance measures (Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v.Bulgaria), an association cannot itself claim to be a victim of a violation of the right to respect for one’s home on account of pollution (Asselbourg and Others v. Luxembourg (dec.)). 425. The Court has laid down certain limits on the extension of the protection of Article 8. It does not apply to property on which it is intended to build a house, or to the fact of having roots in a particular area (Loizidou v. Turkey (merits), § 66); neither does it extend to a laundry room, jointly owned by the coowners of a block of flats, designed for occasional use (Chelu v. Romania, § 45); an artist’s dressingroom (Hartung v. France (dec.); land used by the owners for sports purposes or over which the owner permits a sport to be conducted (for example, hunting, Friend and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.), § 45); industrial buildings and facilities, such as a mill, bakery or storage facility used exclusively for professional purposes (Khamidov v. Russia, § 131 and compare and contrast Bostan v. the Republic of Moldova, § 19 and Surugiu v. Romania) or for housing farm animals (Leveau and Fillon v. France (dec.)). Similarly, a building that is not inhabited, empty or under construction may not be qualified as a “home” (Halabi v. France, § 41). 426. Additionally, where “home” is claimed in respect of property in which there has never been any, or hardly any, occupation by the applicant or where there has been no occupation for some considerable time, it may be that the links to that property are so attenuated as to cease to raise any issue under Article 8 (Andreou Papi v. Turkey, § 54). The possibility of inheriting title to property is not a sufficiently concrete link for the Court to conclude that there is a “home” (Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (dec.) [GC], §§ 136-137). Moreover, Article 8 does not extend to guaranteeing the right to buy a house (Strunjak and Others v. Croatia (dec.)) or imposing a general obligation on the authorities to comply with the choice of joint residence elected by a married couple (Mengesha Kimfe v. Switzerland, § 61). Article 8 does not in terms recognise a right to be provided with a home (Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], § 99; Ward v. the United Kingdom (dec.); Codona v. the United Kingdom (dec.)), let alone a specific home or category of home – for instance, one in a particular location (Hudorovič and Others v. Slovenia, § 114). An intrusion into a person’s home can be examined in the light of the requirements of protection of “private life” (Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, § 107). 427. The Court has accepted material such as documents from the local administration, plans, photographs and maintenance receipts, as well as proof of mail deliveries, statements of witnesses or any other relevant evidence (Prokopovich v. Russia, § 37), as examples of prima facie evidence of residence at a particular property (Nasirov and Others v. Azerbaijan, where the applicant did not submit any evidence in order to support the existence of sufficient and continuous links with an apartment, §§ 72-75).

2. Examples of “interference”

428. The following can be cited as examples of possible “interference” with the right to respect for one’s home:

 deliberate destruction of the home by the authorities (Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, § 86;

Akdivar and Others v. Turkey [GC], § 88; Menteş and Others v. Turkey, § 73) or confiscation (Aboufadda v. France (dec.));  refusal to allow displaced persons to return to their homes (Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], § 174) which may amount to a “continuing violation” of Article 8;  the transfer of the inhabitants of a village by decision of the authorities (Noack and Others v. Germany (dec.));

 police entry into a person’s home (Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, § 217) and search (Murray v. the United Kingdom, § 86);  searches and seizures (Chappell v. the United Kingdom, §§ 50-51; Funke v. France, § 48), even where the applicant has co-operated with the police (Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, § 38) and where the offence giving rise to the search had been committed by a third party (Buck v. Germany), and, more generally, any measure, if it is no different in its manner of execution and its practical effects from a search, regardless of its characterisation under domestic law (Kruglov and Others v. Russia, § 123);  home visits of public officials without permission, even when no search is carried out and the visit does not lead to a seizure of documents or other objects (Halabi v. France, §§ 5456);  occupation or damaging of property (Khamidov v. Russia, § 138) or expulsion from home (Orlić v. Croatia, § 56 with further references therein), including an eviction order which has not yet been enforced (Gladysheva v. Russia, § 91; Ćosić v. Croatia, § 22). 429. Other examples of “interference” are:  changes to the terms of a tenancy (Berger-Krall and Others v. Slovenia, § 264);  loss of one’s home on account of a deportation order (Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], § 96);  impossibility for a couple, under the immigration rules, to set up home together and live together in a family unit (Hode and Abdi v. the United Kingdom, § 43);  decisions regarding planning permission (Buckley v. the United Kingdom, § 60);  disturbance to the peaceful enjoyement of one’s home by public authorities such as, for instance, noise and other nuisances emanating from the everyday activities of a police station and temporary detention facilities situated in the basement of the applicant’s apartment building (Yevgeniy Dmitriyev v. Russia, §§ 33 and 53);  compulsory purchase orders (Howard v. the United Kingdom, Commission decision) and an order to companies to provide tax auditors with access to premises and to enable them to take a copy of data on a server (Bernh Larsen Holding AS and Others v. Norway, § 106).  an order to vacate from land caravans, cabins or bungalows that had been illegally stationed there for many years (Winterstein and Others v. France, § 143) or illegal makeshift homes (Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, § 104) and compare and contrast, Hirtu and Others v. France, § 65);  displacement from home as a result an attack motivated by anti-Roma sentiment (Burlya and Others v. Ukraine, § 166);  a person’s inability to have their name removed from the register of permanent residences (Babylonová v. Slovakia, § 52);  obligation to obtain a licence to live in one’s own house and imposition of a fine for unlawful occupation of own property (Gillow v. the United Kingdom, § 47). The Court has also found that the inability of displaced persons, in the context of a conflict, to return to their homes amounted to an “interference” with the exercise of their rights under Article 8 (Chiragov and Others v. Armenia [GC], § 207; Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan [GC], § 260). 430. Conversely, the mere fact that construction or reconstruction carried out by an applicant’s neighbour may not have been lawful is not sufficient grounds for asserting that the applicant’s rights under Article 8 have been interfered with. For Article 8 to apply, the Court must be convinced that the difficulties caused by the neighbour’s construction were serious enough to affect adversely, to a sufficient extent, the applicant’s enjoyment of the amenities of her home and the quality of her private and family life (Cherkun v. Ukraine (dec.), §§ 77-80).