JOINT DATA ADF datalink projects

ADF JOINT DATA NETWORK PROGRAM JOINT DATA

The ADF is modernising the datalinks that carry information between aircraft, ships, vehicles and ground nodes in a decade-long project costing up to $1 billion

BY MAX BLENKIN

Australia recognises that the changing threat environment, and the growing capability of peer and near-peer adversaries, could erode a longstanding advantage – the secure real-time transfer of tactical data by way of Link 11, which operates in the high frequency (HF) band, and Link 16, which operates in the ultra-high frequency (UHF) band.

While these datalinks are the focus of Joint Project 9347 Phase 1, Defence takes a broader view. BRIG Warren Gould, Director-General for Joint Command and Control, prefers the term Joint Data Network rather than datalinks.

“Joint Data Networks is one of five lines of activity occurring in the Joint C4 program,” BRIG Gould told ADBR. “Joint Data Networks is fundamentally machine-tomachine formatted messaging … in the battlespace that we seek to automate to give us a decisive edge when on operations. Some of the examples out there include Link 16, Link 11, Integrated Broadcast Service and others.”

Link 11 and Link 16 are not actual hardware, rather they are protocols for transfer of data. Link 11 was developed in the 1950s and is mostly used in the HF band, though it can also function in UHF. The HF band gives Link 11 its major advantage – the ability to transmit data long-range, beyond-line-ofsight – a useful capability should the ADF ever need to operate in a satellite-denied environment. But Link 11 is also regarded as a legacy system that needs replacing. The better-known Link 16 operates line-of-sight in the UHF band, specifically between 960 and 1,215 Megahertz, and is the primary datalink for the US military, ADF and many others. It provides jam-resistant, fast digital data transfer, enabling secure situational awareness and integrated fire control and command and control capabilities across a range of platforms.

For the ADF, these platforms include combat aircraft such as F-35A, F/A-18F Super and F/A18A/B classic Hornets as well as P-8A Poseidon, E-7A Wedgetail, MH-60R Romeo and C-130J. It is also installed on the Navy’s new Hobart class Aegis destroyers and will be a key enabler of Army’s new LAND 19 Phase 7B NASAMS short-range ground-based air defence system.

Integrated Broadcast Service (IBS) is a satellite-based service. It was developed in the 1990s in the US to replace legacy intelligence broadcast systems with a single system to transmit data to tactical users as quickly as possible. In Australia, IBS was delivered through Joint Project 2065 to disseminate tactically significant information and blue force tracking directly to deployed forces by way of the US Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) constellation, in which Australia is a partner.

That data is produced by Australian and allied intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. The next stage of IBS is to extend the capability, installing it on those ships where it’s not already in place. ‘The US remains extremely sensitive about this technology...’

Both Link 11 and Link 16 have proved to be highly effective, although their age is showing. In order to maintain a high level of interoperability, Australia must follow the US and move to next generation systems. Under JP 9347 Phase 1, Link 11 will be upgraded to Link 22 and Link 16 to Enhanced Link 16.

US INTEROPERABILITY A PRIORITY Little has actually been disclosed, and much may never be, about weaknesses – real or perceived – that justify the very expensive upgrade program the US has mandated across its platforms and, by extension, on the platforms of every ally wanting to work with the US.

It would follow that both Link 11 and Link 16 have been around long enough for potential adversaries within our region to have developed a good understanding of them and, potentially, countermeasures – despite the complexity of the task. Data transmitted on these systems is encrypted, while Link 16 systems are frequency-agile with frequency changing continuously according to a pre-set pattern to minimise the risk of interception and jamming.

The US remains extremely sensitive about this technology and, occasionally, reports emerge to indicate just how sensitive. In 2013 it was said that the Chinese military was using stolen US secrets to develop a capability to jam Link 16.

Then, in 2019 the US cut Turkey from the F-35 program over its insistence on proceeding with acquisition of a Russian S-400 air defence system. The US Air Force Times said at the time that, for the Turkish Air Force to operate the F-35, it would need to integrate an IFF and Link 16 interrogator into the S-400 which could open the way for all Link 16 and IFF tactical datalink equipment to be compromised. How would we know if the Link series tactical datalinks had been compromised? Maybe not until ‘Hour One’ of a conflict when advanced systems which had worked perfectly well the day before suddenly did not. But the potential for a technologically-advanced adversary to develop a capability to jam or spoof a tactical datalink appears to be realistic enough to justify the need to upgrade.

WATCHING BRIEF “We keep watching briefs of our potential adversaries and their capabilities against our current capabilities,” Joint Project 9347 desk officer Mick Coad told ADBR. “We, in our assessment would need to counter that emerging effort and make sure we can still operate in our areas of operations. That fundamentally means maintaining the ability to communicate in a contested environment and, if signals are detected or intercepted, that the security of the messaging is protected.”

The new Link 22 will deliver enhanced cryptographic security and greater capacity for non-line-of-sight communications without the use of satellites.

In the meantime, Enhanced Link 16 will provide greater cryptographic security and enhanced capacity. But the basic architecture – with data transmitted in discreet chunks called messages – makes it ill-suited to transmission of streaming data such as ISR imagery or live video feeds. It was developed that way to gain maximum use of limited

bandwidth. Therefore, it will remain best-suited to situational awareness functions, command and control, low data rate ISR, and weapon guidance. Defence is adopting a programmatic approach to the update, seeking funding and rolling it out in two-year tranches. The government recently gave the go-ahead for tranche one, along with approving (unspecified) funding.

The 2016 Defence White Paper indicates the government’s vision for Defence’s vast and diverse communications and data networks. It says, ‘Modern secure and highly effective information and communications technology is critical to maximise the combat effects of an integrated and networked ADF. This includes the dispersed, fixed, deployable and mobile networks that underpin ADF operations and the information that enables intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, logistics, command and control and enterprise management.’

But under-investment in information and communications technology over the past decade, coupled with lack of a coherent enterprise-level strategy for Defence’s complex and rapidly evolving information and communications requirements, had led to a serious degradation across Defence’s information and communications capabilities.

‘Key capabilities need urgent remediation’, the White Paper says. ‘Defence networks will be made more secure and key information management and operational communications and command and control systems will be upgraded. Priority will be given to strengthening the resilience and redundancy of satellite-based communications.’ MODERNISATION The 2016 Defence Integrated Investment Plan nominated an overall cost of $750 million to $1 billion over the period 2016-2031. Tranche one will involve some equipment acquisition, but no contractors have yet been chosen.

But for key components, there’s little choice. Just two US companies – Viasat and DLS – make the key boxes for Enhanced Link 16, while only Raytheon makes the Link 22 cryptographic device. This technology is rigorously controlled under the US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITARS), and is only supplied through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

BRIG Gould told us that installing this across the ADF would be a platform-by-platform process. “On some platforms it will be box-in, box-out and a very easy integration effort into the existing battle management system,” he said.

“Others will require some software coding changes within the platform to meet the new message sets with that particular device. The coordination matrix across platforms is quite detailed and it is a function of the program to coordinate that effort across all the platforms. We then need those radio systems to be sustained and we would seek industry involvement in sustaining those devices in Australia rather than being

excessively reliant on a long US tail.” In practice, that means minimal work on some platforms, more on others. For example, the new F-35 aircraft will require no work whatsoever as it comes from the factory with the necessary software enhancements already in place.

F-35 is also equipped with the Northrop Grumman Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL), a secure directional high-throughput link to other F-35s, and can also provide targeting information to warships equipped with the latest Baseline 9 Aegis combat system. Australia’s three Hobart class destroyers are planned to be upgraded to this standard, while the new Hunter class frigates will be from the outset.

For some other ADF platforms the datalink upgrade process will be straightforward as the initial integration task will be performed for the US military. That would apply to RAAF Super Hornets and Growlers, and Navy’s Romeo helicopters.

The task will be more challenging on other platforms. The RAAF’s E-7A Wedgetail might feature a US airframe and radar, but many of the onboard command and control and sensor interface systems were developed in and for Australia, while the same principle applies to Navy’s ANZAC frigates and the Hobart class DDGs which have Australian-unique tactical interfaces. Integration of the technology with European platforms such as the RAAF’s Airbus KC-30A tankers will be complex.

A similarly complex integration scenario would accompany an Army decision to retain its Airbus Tiger Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters with ‘Key capabilities need urgent remediation...’

DEFENCE

greater battlefield connectivity delivered via Enhanced Link 16.

“Clearly there are going to be some difficult platforms for us, which is the subject of the risk reduction activities we are doing with this first tranche of work,” BRIG Gould said. “We have identified where we see the more difficult platforms to integrate, and we will use this next period of time to get after those solutions.”

He said this was a platform-by-platform calculation. While some are ready now, “others you would see some prototyping over the next two years and then installation beyond two years, from 2022-23.” BRIG Gould said the Army has its own battle management system developed by Israeli firm Elbit and its own data network, and is not reliant on Link for its command and control. But it would need Link to connect to the air and maritime environments, particularly for joint fires. “We have to work with Army to see what their solution is,” he said. “It wouldn’t be required for every vehicle.”

He said the program will require very close coordination with the System Project Offices (SPOs) within Defence’s Capability, Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG). “Almost all SPOs are touched with this and the solution within each SPO and their platform may vary.

“The governance over this is quite strong,” BRIG Gould added. “It needs to be … so that we can have a clear understanding of the solution required for each platform, the cost for each platform, and the timeline for the implementation. It is a whole-of-Defence undertaking to get this done, it is not just the JP 9347 project office.”

To this end, Defence has already had talks with industry. “We have done a few presentations on this particular project,” BRIG Gould said. “We have also released a request for information last year, for which we received responses.

“And the next step we are progressing towards an RFT for some element of work for the next two years. Industry, I would assess, is fully aware of this particular project and the activities that we are after. They are well prepared for us to start engaging them on those activities.”

SMART BUYER A further element of the Joint Data Network is the need to create an overall network management system. “Currently we don’t do that particularly well so one of the lines of activity is to bring a mature network management system into place so that we can, as a joint force, coordinate all of the joint data networks across a deployed joint taskforce,” BRIG Gould said.

The objective is to create a mature capability that is not US-dependent. “I would like to see our domestic capability in this space be expanded, and we would offer that opportunity to industry to pursue,” he added.

One proposal under consideration is the creation of a new organisation called the Joint Network Integration Centre to replace the current system of centres attached to each service – for example, the Land Network Integration Centre (LNIC).

BRIG Gould said this would be an integration and testing laboratory for future technologies to ensure they properly integrated into the joint force. A feasibility study is underway, but the process is in its earliest stages. No location for the LNIC has been chosen, but it would likely involve Defence and industry personnel.

Once fully implemented, the Link upgrades will allow full interoperability with US forces. But how about with other allied forces? BRIG Gould said all our coalition partners operated joint data networks. “It might involve Link, it might involve other families, but if they do use the Link family they will all be undertaking this effort to upgrade.”

ITERATIVE APPROACH Meanwhile, it is accepted that, despite significant investment in upgrading the ADF datalinks, it won’t fully future-proof the ADF. This is simply because potential adversaries will continue to react to any technological changes.

“If we employ a new technology or a new method, of course our adversaries would seek to gain their own advantage over that,” BRIG Gould said in closing. “And when a threshold is met, we would then need to look at adjusting our technologies.

“We are talking about computer processing power and software,” he added. “The analogy of how frequently you refresh your processing power and those applications in your home is not unlike what we are dealing with.”

He said this was exactly the reason Defence was using a program approach and rolling out JP9347 in two-year tranches. “It allows us to go back to government every two years and have a conversation about the assessed threat and what is it we need to address in the next two years of priorities.

“Projects of old would forecast out 10 years and do a big bang approach. We are taking a tranche iterative approach that is then able to respond to the threat environment we are facing.”