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WATCH THIS SPACE The ADF has big plans in space

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EDITORIAL

EDITORIAL

SPACE WATCH THIS SPACE

ADF in the race to secure a sovereign slot in orbit

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BY MAX BLENKIN

In a future conflict, vital space-delivered services – communications, navigation, and surveillance – could be the very first casualties. Without them, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) would be fighting pretty much as it did in 1945.

This vulnerability is well-recognised and applies almost equally across the board – to allies and potential adversaries alike. Nor is it a problem exclusive to Defence. Any conflict that impacts Defence space assets would also impact civil space services.

Navigation systems, which use the same

US GPS (global positioning system) satellite constellation as the military, would likely be the first to go. So, no more Google Maps, satellite TV or all other useful capability we take for granted, beamed from objects in orbit.

The 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU) – which was released on July 1 – acknowledges that assured access to space is critical for the ADF’s warfighting effectiveness, situational awareness, and delivery of real-time communications and information.

To that end, there are big plans afoot with investment in space capabilities over the next decade of about $7 billion. “This includes plans for a network of satellites to provide an independent and sovereign communications network and an enhanced space control program,” the DSU reads.

This is a significant advance on the 2016

Defence White Paper in recognising that space is central to warfighting, not just an adjunct.

Further, the accompanying 2020 Force

Structure Plan (FSP) says Defence will need capabilities that directly contribute to warfighting outcomes in the space domain, using terrestrial and/or space-based systems. Australian Strategic

Policy Institute (ASPI) senior analyst Malcom

Davis says this shows the ADF accepts that space is contested.

In a statement accompanying the DSU and FSP release, Defence Minister Senator Linda Reynolds said, “… we are enhancing our sovereign capabilities to assure our access to space. That means Australian forces being able to control what we see and when we see it. This is crucial to the safety and capability of our deployed forces.

“The Morrison Government is taking the first step towards introducing Australia’s first fully-owned and controlled military satellite-communications constellation,” she added. “In addition, we will strengthen our sovereign capability by building upon existing plans to develop overhead imagery capability by 2035. This will provide a greater understanding of the IndoPacific.” This sounds ambitious, and it is. It means being in total control of our own space assets, and may also mean building our own satellites and launching them on our own rockets. But Australia’s starting point is a long way short of the goal. So, what do we have now in the way of our own sovereign space-related assets? The answer is ground infrastructure, but – as far as actual assets in space are concerned – not much more.

Australia owns a communications payload aboard the Optus C-1 satellite which was launched in 2003. With a projected lifespan of about 15 years, C1 is pretty much ‘running on fumes’. But with an adjustment to its orbit it is hoped it will remain operational to 2027.

In 2009, the ADF also signed a 15-year deal for access to 20 channels on a UHF communications payload on commercial satellite Intelsat IS-22. That asset was launched in 2012 and provides coverage of the Indian Ocean region.

Through an agreement in which Australia funded the sixth WGS (Wideband Global SATCOM) satellite, Australia also has access to the other satellites of the US WGS network. “The (US) Air Force saw

a ‘win-win’ opportunity to partner with Australia to gain much needed additional capability while also satisfying Australia’s SATCOM requirements,” then Deputy Under Secretary of the USAF for Space Programs, Gary Payton said in a November 2007 statement when the contract was signed.

This is Australia’s go-to SATCOM capability, with vast, reliable capacity to meet insatiable communications demands, particularly of deployed forces. And we have privileged access; having funded WGS-6, we have proportional use of the network.

The first WGS satellite was launched in 2007, providing the same capability as all 14 satellites of the previous generation DSCS network. And, as more WGS satellites have been launched, they have further improved.

The USAF considered the WGS constellation complete at 10 and sought no more satellites, but it is getting more, nonetheless. In 2018 the US Congress inserted US$605m (A$843m) funding into the US defence budget for WGS-11 and WGS-12, with Boeing contracted to deliver WGS-11.

This one satellite could be double the capacity of earlier WGS satellites, thus eliminating the need for WGS-12. The USAF has asked Boeing to recruit international partners for WGS-11 so Australia might be asked to contribute.

WGS-6 isn’t Australian, however. It is run by the USAF and there are other international partners in the constellation including Canada, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and New Zealand. So, in times of conflict the network could get very congested, especially as any adversary surely appreciates the importance of WGS. It is likely the WGS network could be degraded, or access wholly denied, early in any near-peer conflict.

That wouldn’t necessarily leave the ADF wholly without communications thanks to its legacy HF (high frequency) network, a sovereign capability steadily modernised over time. But it doesn’t have anywhere near the capacity of SATCOM.

So just where is the ADF heading?

“The vision is for a sovereign-owned and controlled SATCOM system, consisting of our own satellites for long-range communications capability that is more resilient, flexible and agile,” the RAAF’s Director-General of Air Defence and Space, AIRCDRE Philip Gordon told ADBR.

“Defence has invested a significant amount of time and effort into building our ground infrastructure into the current SATCOM capability. Defence will seek to leverage that investment by modifying and enhancing it, in line with moving to develop a sovereign capability.

“Defence will continue cooperation with international partners and share some of what we have in exchange for access to their capabilities for global reach, and will continue to use commercial SATCOM contracts to supplement and augment our capability where required.”

Under Joint Project (JP) 9102, up to $3 billion will be spent to enhance SATCOM capability out to 2029. This project will succeed the multi-decade, multi-phase, multiple-contractor JP 2008 which has delivered ground infrastructure in Australia, and the agreement with the US for access to WGS.

SATCOM is vital and so are other satellitedelivered services – surveillance, navigation, mapping, and precision timing. All are on the agenda. AIRCDRE Gordon said Defence acquired satellite imagery through international and commercial partners. In practice, that means from satellites operated by the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), plus commercial operators.

Defence is working to improve access to commercial satellite imagery through the $500 million Project DEF 799 Phase 1 which emerged from the 2016 Defence White Paper.

“The acquisition stage of the project is complete with three antenna sites built that enable direct tasking of imaging satellites,” AIRCDRE Gordon said. “This project is now supporting Defence operations and was used extensively during Operation Bushfire Assist.

“The recent DSU announced investment in sovereign space-based imagery to build Australia’s self-reliant geospatial-information and intelligence capability to support strategic intelligence requirements and precision guided weapons,” he said.

A follow-on DEF 799 Phase 2 envisages possible acquisition of a sovereign geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) space surveillance system, and this will be preceded by a two-year study into costs and options.

Then there’s GPS – initially developed for the US military in the 1980s but now available to anyone with a smartphone – which remains, in common with many other nations, the ADF’s primary source of positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) data. This is a vital capability and some nations have invested vast sums to create their own sovereign networks – China’s Beidou, Russia’s Glonast, and Europe’s Galileo.

“Defence is investigating in alternate capabilities to GPS that would help it to access necessary PNT data when operating in a contested environment,” AIRCDRE Gordon said.

Australia has a payload aboard the Optus-C1 satellite launched in 2003, which had an expected lifespan of 15 years. It is hoped this can be extended to 2027 with an orbital adjustment. OPTUS

Australia has privileged access and proportional use of the WGS-6 satellite, However, it remains a USAF asset. BOEING SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS There is one other area where Australia has already made a substantial investment with more to come – space situational awareness, now termed as space domain awareness (SDA). Put simply, it means providing information on what’s ‘out there’, which is a lot and ever-changing.

It is well known that there is a vast amount of space debris, especially in low earth orbit (LEO), ranging from functioning and defunct satellites, spent rocket components, and even slag from solid fuel rocket engines. There are about 20,000 items of a trackable size but millions more which are not. Even a paint chip moving at several kilometres per second can cause damage.

If that wasn’t a big enough problem, more satellites are arriving all the time. Elon Musk’s Starlink plans a constellation of up to 12,000 to deliver global internet services. There are already more than 500 of these in orbit, with a further 60 at-a-time launched every few weeks. Other companies are planning smaller constellations offering similar services.

The upshot us that traffic management is an important SDA capability – with notice, satellite operators can adjust orbits to minimise collision risk. At the same time there is advantage in keeping track of what others are doing with new satellites, including any suspicious manoeuvres.

In February 2020, US officials described a Russian satellite in low Earth orbit (LEO) as manoeuvring to ‘stalk’ the US’s spy satellite USA 245. In space, close is relative – the two satellites were still more than 100 kilometres apart but close enough to raise US concerns.

There are very real concerns about the consequences of war in space. The objective would be to destroy or deny enemy satellite capability. There there are various ways that could be achieved, among them cyber attack, laser blinding of sensors, or the most effective, and perilous, use of kinetic anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). The US, Russia, China, India, and possibly others possess viable ASAT systems featuring ground or air-launched missiles. But they come with the huge associated risk that destruction of a satellite would produce a blizzard of fast moving debris which could strike other satellites producing even more debris. The worst possible outcome would be what is termed the Kessler

Syndrome, named after NASA scientist Donald Kessler who posited a chain reaction of collisions each producing more debris. Conceivably that could make space inaccessible to everyone, potentially for centuries.

Fortunately, most satellites and objects in LEO will de-orbit and burn up of their own accord because of atmospheric drag. Depending on satellite design, at 400 kilometres altitude the nominal life of a satellite is about one year without orbital adjustment. At 500 kilometres that extends to 10 years, while at 900 kilometres it can be 1,000 years.

Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee guidelines established in 2002 say operators should de-orbit their satellites within 25 years of end of mission, but there’s a growing international view that any new satellite should feature a capability to deliberately de-orbit at end of mission.

Australia is already an important part of a global SDA network, hosting a pair of systems: a USAF C-Band Space Surveillance Radar which reached full operational capability in 2017, and a Groundbased Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) telescope. Both are located at Naval Communications Station, Harold E Holt at Exmouth in Western Australia.

The GEODSS was relocated from the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, and has been installed in a purpose-built facility under Project AIR 3029 Phase 2. It is set to reach full operational capability (FOC) in 2021.

Reports from the US suggest it would like more SDA capability Down Under, possibly another telescope system at Coonabarabran in NSW and another Space Fence radar akin to the system on the pacific island of Kwajalein Atoll, maybe also at Exmouth. A spokesman said Defence could not comment on Space Fence or the development of the system, as these were matters for the US Government and Lockheed Martin.

But it seems you can never have enough SDA, and Australia is looking to develop a sovereign capability by acquiring a suite of multi-technology SDA sensors to detect, track, identify, and characterise space objects.

“Variety of sensors is required to achieve a complete and resilient capability to detect objects of interest from low Earth orbit all the way to geosynchronous orbit – different sensors have different strengths and weaknesses. Only through diversity can we achieve a credible capability,” AIRCDRE Gordon said. These will be acquired through JP 9360, a brand new project acquiring an entirely new capability.

An RFP released by Defence on July 20 reads: “The Department of Defence Space Domain Awareness (SDA) Project JP 9360 will provide the ADF with an ability to characterise threats to Australian and allied space-based capabilities, monitor debris (human-made and natural), and identify space weather events.”

The RFP closes in October, but funding is yet to be approved.

Defence says SDA underpins all other space missions, providing the ability to identify, characterise, and understand factors affecting the space domain. “Effective SDA will enable Australia to make considered decisions as to what objects constitute a threat and how to counter that threat,” a spokesman said.

“The Government’s plans include the development of options to enhance Defence’s ability to counter emerging space threats to Australia’s free use of the space domain, and assure our continued access to space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.”

In 2012, Defence stood up The Australian Space Operations Centre (AUSSpOC) within headquarters Joint Operational Command (JOC) near Canberra. AUSSpOC has a staff of 14 and provides Defence with the ability to command and control space operations in support of joint activities. It also provides the Chief of Joint Operations with expert knowledge on space operations, space intelligence support and contributes to planning for joint operations.

Importantly, AUSSpOC works closely with partner nations through the Combined Space Operations Centre (CSpOC) at Vandenberg US Air Force Base in California. CSpOC is a is a strategic partnership between the US, Australia, Canada, and UK, working in collaboration with France, Germany, and New Zealand. This is the peak international defence body for SDA information.

READY TO LAUNCH? While Australia is not yet a satellite launching nation it looks to be getting closer in line with the government’s push to expand national space capability and the creation of the Australian Space Agency (ASA), officially established in July 2018.

When the need arises, Defence could choose from three possible commercial launch sites – Southern Launch in South Australia, Equatorial Launch Australia in the Northern Territory, or a new site the Queensland government has proposed for Abbott Point near Bowen in North Queensland.

Queensland firm Gilmour Space Technologies is developing a hybrid design using solid and liquid propellant, a combination that evades the complexity of liquid propellant-powered rockets while allowing output to be throttled. The company conducted a successful low altitude trial in 2016, but a planned sub-orbital launch last year failed to get off the ground when a component failed. More recently, Gilmour conducted successful long duration ground test burns.

In May, Gilmour signed a strategic agreement with the Defence Science and Technology (DST) group for research on propulsion, materials, and avionics technologies to help develop a three-stage hybrid rocket. PAYLOADS MATTER But as important as the launch process is, it is still just a means to get a payload into space and those payloads are the subject of considerable research. In no other area of Defence activities will industry large and small, and research bodies, public sector organisations, and universities, be as deeply engaged in furthering the ADF and the national space agenda through development of advanced technologies.

A key vehicle is the Adelaide-based SmartSat Cooperative Research Centre, a consortium of universities and research organisations partnered with industry that has been funded by the Commonwealth to develop advanced satellite technology.

DST – which lists space technology high in its research priorities – is a core partner, as are defence primes Airbus and BAE Systems, and universities including UNSW Canberra.

It is not broadly appreciated that the ADF already has a number of research satellites out there, with the most recent launch on June 15 when a Rocket Lab rocket blasted off from New Zealand carrying, among other satellites, M2 Pathfinder (M2PF), a joint project of UNSW Canberra Space and the RAAF. So far, M2PF is looking very successful with operators achieving contact and steadily commissioning the various home-grown subsystems on board.

M2PF and its predecessor M1 followed the launch of Buccaneer in November 2017, a joint project of DST and UNSW Canberra. None of these was intended to deliver actual capability, but rather to develop skills and give the ADF satellite experience while performing some useful research. This trajectory to orbit illustrates Australia’s growing space capability and vision, plus the challenges inherent in the space business.

Other Australian universities have space research programs with growing capabilities, but UNSW Canberra Space at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) Canberra has the lead. “When it comes to a fully professional space engineering team that covers all the disciplines and able to develop new technologies and even spin those technologies out, we are currently it,” Director of UNSW Canberra Space, Professor Russell Boyce told ADBR.

“What we are trying to do with our group, what we believe, and … consistent with the shift in global thinking (about) the future for space, is not in more satellites,” he added. “It’s in intelligent satellites and ultimately intelligent constellations of intelligent satellites. So our space team has been undergoing a transformation to become an artificial intelligence group that does its AI in space.”

“The M2PF mission is significant because we have onboard processing capabilities which are quite powerful and which represent a building block towards in-orbit artificial intelligence.”

Buccaneer – referred to as ‘Bucky’ but officially dubbed Buccaneer Risk Mitigation Mission – was

Underway ... the launch of a WGS satellite payload from Cape Canaveral in 2015. US AF

conducted by UNSW Canberra Space and DST, and launched from Vandenberg in November 2017. Bucky’s primary purpose was to flight-prove a deployable antenna able to detect transmissions from the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) in the ionosphere to gain a better understanding of the physics of high frequency (HF) radio propagation.

For this, Bucky needed a deployable antenna able to receive HF signals. DST’s solution was a length of steel tape measure coiled tightly in a can and which successfully unfurled into a 3.4 metre bow tie-shaped array. Bucky was operated from RAAF Edinburgh and UNSW Canberra, giving valuable experience in operating a small satellite. The launch was conducted through the NASA’s ELANA program which supports cubesat launches by universities and even high schools.

The follow-on Buccaneer Main Mission which is under development by DST and Adelaide-based Inovor Technologies, has yet to launch.

Following the success of Bucky, UNSW Canberra Space and the RAAF developed and flew the M1 mission which launched in December 2018. M1 comprised UNSW-developed and off-the-shelf components.

“It was meant to demonstrate some softwaredefined radio-based maritime surveillance capability, basically listening for ships’ AIS beacons,” Professor Boyce told us. “It was also meant to demonstrate agility in terms of how fast a professional cubesat mission could be developed from concept to launch, and we certainly did that.”

While M1 successfully reached orbit, it hasn’t been heard from since. It’s still out there and is possibly functional, but it’s just not communicating. Professor Boyce said they have suspicions about what went wrong, and UNSW Canberra Space has used that for a very intensive lessons learned exercise.

“What we concluded was there were aspects of our development process that needed more maturity, including the extent of our testing process,” he said. “We learnt from that and do things very differently now.”

M2PF was launched in June aboard a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket from Vandenberg AFB and, so far, it’s looking good. Technically, M2PF is a carton-sized cubesat intended to serve as a risk mitigator for the M2 mission which is under development and set for launch early next year. M2PF features the M2 platform sub-systems but not the M2 payloads.

M2 will actually comprise two satellites intended to separate and fly in formation. Each features radios and antennae for VHF and UHF able to receive ship AIS and aircraft ADSB beacons, as well as an optical telescope with five-metre ground resolution. “We will demonstrate potential maritime and aviation surveillance and onboard processing and other capabilities to the RAAF,” Professor Boyce said.

Why two satellites? For experiments in satellite networking and in formation flying. The will also be in radio communication with each other.

SATURATED Given the vast numbers of satellites out there and many more planned, the radio frequency spectrum is becoming increasingly saturated. As the future of satellite-to-satellite and satellite-to-ground comms is via laser, greater satellite stability will be required to ensure the laser continues to point where it’s supposed to.

“One of the demonstrations we hope to perform with M2 is an inter-satellite link as part of improving pointing stability,” Professor Boyce said. “Optical communications is a form of secure communications that is also setting us up to be able to pursue a mission we have been developing very slowly in the background for a quantum communications demonstration.”

The objective would be to exchange quantum encryption keys between two satellites. This is an alluring capability at the frontiers of physics, with promise for totally secure communications.

In a paper published in Nature in June, Chinese researchers claim to have succeeded in using a satellite to simultaneously transmit secret quantum keys to two ground stations more than 1,000 kilometres apart to establish a direct secure link.

UNSW Canberra Space has been researching this very subject. “That’s something we have been doing with the National University of Singapore,” Professor Boyce said. “It’s a science experiment where they provide the quantum part and we provide the spacecraft and the optics.”

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