Big Jumps in Women’s Presence in Parliaments: Are These Sufficient for Improving Beliefs in Women’s by Advancing Women in Leadership Journal

Advancing Women in Leadership Vol. 35, pp. 82-97, 2015 Available online at http://advancingwomen.com/awl/awl_wordpress/ ISSN 1093-7099

Full Length Research Paper

Big Jumps in Women’s Presence in Parliaments: Are These Sufficient for Improving Beliefs in Women’s Ability to Govern? Amy C. Alexander (Ph.D.) Amy Alexander: Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg, email: amy.catherine.alexander@gmail.com Accepted September 29, 2014

In this article, I examine whether sudden, big jumps in women’s presence in parliament are sufficient for improving beliefs in women’s ability to govern in the two cases with pre and posttest data: Iraq and Spain. I explain why big jumps lend themselves to tests of sufficiency, defend the theory confirming advantages of this analytic approach and discuss the advantages of the Iraqi and Spanish comparison. The Iraqi and Spanish tests of sufficiency include pre and posttest models of the effect of the big jump using ordinal regression analysis. The analyses are run over 5026 Iraqi respondents and 2411 Spanish respondents to surveys administered before and after the big jumps. The analysis confirms that big jumps are sufficient for improvement of beliefs in women’s ability to govern in Iraq and Spain. Keywords: Women, descriptive representation, symbolic representation Introduction Since the mid-1990s, across the globe, quota legislation has fostered a breakthrough pattern in women’s representation. Upon adopting quotas for women in national parliaments, more than twenty countries have made a historic leap, establishing what has been termed the “big jump pattern” (Paxton and Hughes 2013: 75)1. These countries have seen exceptional spikes in women’s representation with an average increase of 16 percent in women’s presence in parliaments from one or two elections to the next2. This spike is unmatched, for instance, among countries with the most consistent improvements in women’s presence over the last 50 years3. This article builds on the symbolic effects literature with a unique test of big jumps on beliefs in women’s ability to govern. For the first time, I subject the relationship between change in women’s presence in parliament and change in beliefs in women’s ability to govern to a test of sufficiency. Tests of sufficiency assume that “when a sufficient cause is present, the outcome will always also be present” (Mahoney 2000: 392). I evaluate whether an increase in beliefs in women’s ability to govern is present after a big jump in two key cases for which the pre and posttest attitudinal data from thousands of individuals are available: Iraq and Spain4. This focus has three benefits. First, more cross-national, longitudinal evidence is needed to confirm the effect of change in women’s presence on beliefs in women’s ability to govern. Second, the big jump pattern has key methodological

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advantages. In this pattern there is a powerful increase in what was in some cases stagnate or in other cases slow, sequential growth in women’s descriptive representation from one or few elections to the next in the same country. Thus, we are in a unique position to ‘naturally’ isolate the effect of the jump on the belief in women’s ability to govern and conduct a sufficiency test through longitudinal within case comparisons across several thousand individuals. Third, this article’s focus has important policy implications. Confirming this sufficiency test across any cases with the big jump pattern is valuable for international and national policymakers interested in improving women’s political leadership. The big jump pattern is largely driven by the adoption of policies that aggressively, effectively target gender gaps in parliaments. Indeed, several big jump countries have seen the adoption of female quota legislation prior to their jumps. Thus, the question of whether big jumps are sufficient for improvements in beliefs in women’s ability to govern forms part of a broader line of research that tries to understand the effects of women’s quota legislation on a variety of forms of political representation (descriptive, symbolic, substantive). I analyze the Iraqi and Spanish cases with multivariate models run on the responses of 5026 Iraqis and 2411 Spaniards to surveys administered over the two points in time: pre and post jump. Before turning to the analysis, I discuss the symbolic representation literature, introduce theories that rival symbolic

representation as an explanation of beliefs concerning women’s ability to govern, and describe my sample, data, methods and results. The Literature Review The Symbolic Effects of Women’s Presence in Parliaments A key mode of gender socialization is role-modeling. According to Bussy and Bandura (1999: 685), “A great deal of genderlinked behavior is exemplified by models in one’s immediate environment such as parents and peers, and significant persons in social, educational and occupational contexts.” Male and female role models send powerful signals on what is possible given one’s gender. Depending on the gender equality or inequality in modeled behaviors, individuals develop weaker or stronger sex-typed expectations that govern their perception of their ability to perform those behaviors. In cases of gender inequality, a sheer lack of role models perpetuates a vicious, supportive exchange between sexist beliefs and inequality in role models that maintains or even strengthens the discouragement of one of the genders from participation. One extremely visible, powerful behavior that has operated in this fashion to the exclusion of women in every country in the world is governing. For this reason, women and politics scholars focus their attention on the importance of increasing female role models in political leadership (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Sapiro 1981; Williams 1998; Young 2000). An increase in the sheer number of female representatives –what is referred to in the literature as ‘descriptive representation’ –can create “a social meaning of ability to rule for members of a group in historical contexts where that ability has been seriously questioned” (Mansbridge 1999: 2). This sort of inclusion is necessary “for reversing previous histories of exclusion and the way these constituted certain kinds of people as less suited to govern than the rest” (Phillips 1995: 40). Indeed, the literature agrees that women’s historical exclusion from positions of political representation and their continuing underrepresentation make them and their male counterparts susceptible to the belief in women’s inferiority in governing in every country in the world. By fostering greater gender equality among those who achieve and model positions of governance, descriptive representation challenges the notion that women are unfit to govern and begins reversing the norm of politics as a man’s game. ‘Cues’ in the political environment that support these psychological barriers begin to change (Atkeson 2003; Hansen 1997). If men react to these gains egocentrically, viewing the gains as a threat to their own groups’ political success, then support for women’s ability to govern will improve only or considerably more among women. However, there is no reason to assume that men will not react to the change from a sociotropic perspective. According to Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005: 412), “While egocentric models reflect the traditional belief that individuals operate “selfishly” and are motivated largely by individual selfinterest, sociotropic models assume a more “enlightened” selfinterest in which individuals recognize that their personal

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fortunes depend on the fortunes of the group.” Sociotropically, men could see these improvements as indicative of gains in the democratic quality of their political systems, signaling a system of more fair political competition not only for women, but for all members of society. In this case, men’s support of women’s leadership would also grow with increases in women’s descriptive representation. There is convincing evidence both from research on the United States and a handful of comparative studies that increases in women’s presence in political office strengthen women’s involvement in politics5. To the contrary, the evidence that this equally strengthens both women and men’s political involvement is more limited (see, however, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). However, beyond measures of political involvement, when it comes to whether gains in women’s descriptive representation improve the belief in women’s ability to govern, there is serious neglect in the existing literature. In fact, Alexander (2012) conducts the only comparative, longitudinal analysis of the relationship between women’s presence in parliaments and the belief in women’s ability to govern and finds that an increase in the percentage of women in parliament contributes to an increase in women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern. There is no indication that men change positively. Ultimately, the analyses show that the most accurate portrayal of the relationship between women’s presence in parliament and women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern is a virtuous cycle of mutually reinforcing changes in women’s empowerment as political leaders. Through a different, but complimentary methodological strategy, I take advantage of the natural discontinuities behind the big jump pattern in women’s leadership presence and build on Alexander’s (2012) research. I examine whether the sudden, big jumps in women’s presence in parliament in Iraq and Spain are sufficient conditions for significant gains in beliefs in women’s ability to govern. I test the following hypotheses in the analysis of these cases: H1, Women’s Improvement Thesis: In Iraq and Spain, there is an increase in women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern in the female big jump sample when compared to the female pretest sample. H2, Impacting Women Thesis: Women are significantly more supportive of women’s ability to govern than men in the big jump sample when compared to the pretest sample. H3, The Sociotropic Thesis: Both women and men are significantly more supportive of women’s ability to govern in the big jump sample when compared to the pretest sample. Rival Explanations In addition to the big jump, it is possible that country-level changes in development, religiosity, democratization and conflict may occur and also affect beliefs in women’s ability to govern. Yet, with this study’s limit to just two cases, we cannot effectively rule these changes out if we focus on the country-

level. An alternative strategy, however, is to consider the individual-level mechanisms through which competing countrylevel changes exert their effects on beliefs in women’s ability to govern. This is a workable strategy, because country-level change in attitudes ultimately operates through change in an individual’s resources or experiences. Thus, I tailor the following review of change in countries’ level of development, religiosity, democratization and conflict to this micro-based strategy. Development. The level of societal development in a country is strongly linked to gender equality values, including support for women’s political leadership (Alexander and Welzel 2011a; Inglehart and Norris 2003: 127-146). In their groundbreaking book, Inglehart and Norris conclude that “egalitarian attitudes toward women in office are more widespread in postindustrial societies, reflecting broad patterns of socioeconomic development and cultural modernization” (144). Societal modernization, particularly forms that improve equality of opportunity in human capabilities (see Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999), erodes conditions and traditional authority structures that perpetuate women’s public exclusion. As a major consequence, there is growth in the public’s support for women’s political involvement and leadership. Thus, in less developed democracies, with agrarian and industrial economies, the level of societal development creates a cultural barrier to the development of gender egalitarian orientations and the practice of gender equality. The belief in women’s ability to govern and gender equality in women’s recruitment and presence in national parliaments are among these views and practices (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Increases in the level of a countries’ development bring about these positive changes in attitudes towards gender equality by improving individuals’ cognitive and material resources. This improves individuals’ autonomy and increases support for equality and diversity (Alexander and Welzel 2011a; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013). Thus, from this perspective, resources and values are key individual-level mechanisms through which gains in societal levels of development improve support for female leaders. Charting individual gains in resources is straightforward. Typically, scholars consider individuals’ level of education and employment status. We can therefore turn to the variation in educational level and employment status at the individual level as a micro-based strategy for ensuring that any post jump gains in support for women’s leadership are not driven by development as opposed to the increase in women’s presence in parliaments. As opposed to access to resources, charting value change is trickier. One frequently used strategy is to proxy age as an individual-level instrument for evaluating value change. Young people are more likely to absorb the positive experiential change driven by societal development and, consequently, make greater leaps in the development of progressive values (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013). In this

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case, we can use information on individuals’ age to be sure that the reasons for improvement in support for women leaders is not simply that development drove positive changes in young adults’ values. Religious beliefs. Religion is a primary agent of gender role socialization in every society in the world (Franzmann 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003). Religious organizations from all religious faiths support traditional and subordinate roles for women (Alexander and Welzel 2011b; Inglehart and Norris 2003). And, indeed, cross-national studies link religious beliefs to fewer women in parliaments (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Paxton and Hughes 2013). Unlike societal development, religious belief is not a countrylevel measure. When presented as such, this is based on an aggregation and summary of the attitudes and/or behaviors of individuals throughout a given country. Thus, evaluating change in religiosity within countries at the individual-level is a straightforward way to deal with a larger secularization trend that may compete with the big jump. Level of democracy. Through the provision of political liberties and civil rights, democracy enhances political participation and social representation. The impartial institutionalization of these liberties and rights establishes norms that support human autonomy and tolerance of social diversity. This creates a political climate conducive to gender egalitarian attitudes and women’s formal representation. Thus, many of the crossnational studies in the literature include a measure of countries’ level of democracy in the analysis of the importance of symbolic representation for women (see, for instance, Karp and Banducci 2008; Norris and Krook 2009). Like societal development, democratic institutionalization is a country-level attribute. Yet, insofar as democratic institutionalization affects attitudes related to gender equality the effect will be indirect, through an internalization of democratic norms. Hence, evaluating individual support of democracy creates another micro-based strategy for isolating the effect of the big jump from other competing country-level changes. Conflict. There is some evidence that civil conflict politicizes women and mobilizes them to support more women in positions of political leadership (Hughes 2009). Iraq is investigated over a period of conflict from 2004-2006, and research notes this conflict’s role in mobilizing women’s groups in support of the quota policy that led to the big jump in Iraq (Dahlerup and Nordlund 2004; Krook, O’Brien and Swip 2010). These scholars are clear on the role of women’s organizations in mobilizing the policy adoption, but tests to determine whether this as opposed to the big jump was a catalyst for increased support of women’s ability to govern in the general population is not tested. Value research has, however, looked at the impact of the Iraqi conflict over this period on the general population’s support for women’s ability to govern (Inglehart, Moaddel and Tessler 2006). These researchers saw the conflict as a key test of the xenophobic, discriminatory value implications of experiences

with extraordinarily high levels of existential insecurity. Working with Iraqi public opinion data from the World Values Surveys, Inglehart et al. (2006: 495) note that over the period that Iraq sees the jump, “the Iraqi public has the highest level of xenophobia found in any of the 85 societies for which data are available” and confirm a consequent “strong tendency to reject other out-groups, such as women and homosexuals.” I consider both perspectives on the conflict in Iraq and support for women’s ability to govern plausible and supported by convincing evidence. On the one hand, evidence suggests that the case of Iraq is a bad case for testing the effect of the big jump given the conflict; if conflict mobilizes support for female leaders, I run the risk of selecting on the dependent variable with the Iraqi case. On the other hand, evidence suggests that the case of Iraq is a critical case for testing the effect of the big jump since the conflict’s effect on the general Iraqi public suggests that we are least likely to see an improvement in the tested outcomes. To speak to one or the other perspective in literature, I apply Hughes’ (2009) theoretical work on the role of conflict in behind female mobilization and support for women’s leadership in the analysis of Iraq. Hughes (2009) see conflict as leading to positive outcomes for female leadership when 1) conflict is transformative of the political structure and exposes individuals to alternative, less traditional models of leadership; 2) conflict increases individuals’ links to supportive international organizations; and 3) conflict confronts traditional gender roles in a way that is broadly transformative of female inclusion across various public roles. Following these theoretical possibilities, I look at whether there is increased rejection of religious authorities as leaders from the pre to the posttest sample. In addition, I look at whether there is increased confidence in the United Nations among Iraqis from the pre to the posttest sample. Finally, I look at whether there is change in support for female university education from pre to the posttest sample. Sample, Data and Methods Sample: Big Jumps and the Cases of Iraq and Spain What constitutes a big jump in women’s presence in parliaments? Working with Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) data on the percentage of women in parliaments spanning from 1945 to 2005, Paxton and Hughes (2013: 70-80) identify five historical patterns of representation that depict the pace of change in women’s parliamentary representation in countries throughout the world. These are: 1) big jumps, 2) increasing, 3) low increasing, 4) plateau and 5) flat6. Countries in the big jump category “experience extremely large gains in women’s representation in short periods of time” (Paxton and Hughes 2013: 75). In fact, the average gain of all big jump cases from the beginning to the end of their big jumps is 16 percent (see Appendix A). As highlighted earlier, even in comparison to the pattern of the highest achievers in North Western Europe, temporally speaking, these spikes are

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exceptional. On average, the high achievers in North Western Europe took a slow but steady 40 years to reach their first 15 percent (from 1945-1985), and, in sync with gains in women’s educational attainment and labor force entry, another average 10 years to reach their first 30 percent (Paxton and Hughes 2013: 73). This perspective on countries’ historical trajectories in change in women’s presence in parliaments powerfully supports “big jumps” as key anomalies. Yet, the evidence of big jump discontinuity is not just temporal; after the jump, these cases are typically outliers when compared to the overall inclusion of women in parliaments in their regions. For instance, after their jumps, the Iraqi and Spanish average is over 20 percent higher than the average percentage of women in parliaments in their regions (see Appendix B). Importantly, these within region comparisons hold other antecedents such as culture and development at a similar level, further evidencing the big jump as a significant accelerant. Thus, the big jump pattern is uniquely exploitable for the purposes of establishing sufficiency for improvement in women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern. The pattern entails an atypical acceleration by patterns of time and space in women’s presence in parliaments. These turning points, through disruptions, anomalies or discontinuities, are considered key phenomena for exploiting natural variation to improve causal inference (Dunning 2008, 2010; Grzymala-Busse 2011: 1287; Sekhon 2009). The Iraqi and Spanish samples. Due to current mass survey data availability, just the cases of Iraq and Spain allow a pre and posttest of the effect of the jump on women’s ability to govern. Appendix A shows the universe of big jump cases and the limits of available public opinion data for a pre and posttest. As for big jump cases in addition to Iraq and Spain, either these countries were not surveyed during the wave before or after the big jump or the question on women’s acceptability as political leaders was not asked in the survey before or after the big jump7. There are nevertheless reasons to consider Iraq and Spain a good pair for testing the theory. According to Table 1, Iraq and Spain vary culturally. Iraq is predominately Muslim and Spain is predominantly Roman Catholic. They also vary in their level of human development. Compared on two commonly used measures of development, the United Nation’s Development Program’s Gender Inequality Index8 and Human Development Index9, Iraq has a significantly higher level of gender inequality and lower level of human development. The table also compares Iraq and Spain on their level of democratic institutionalization. Using Freedom House’s Freedom Rating measure, we see that democratic institutionalization is significantly lower in Iraq compared to Spain. Finally, Iraq is in a grave state of existential insecurity due to the US-Iraq war over the big jump period while existential security is high in Spain. This is evident through the comparison of male and female adult mortality rates.

Table 1: Differences in Iraqi and Spanish Country Characteristics Average Over the Big Jump Periods Iraq 20042006

Spain 1995-2005

Country Characteristics Cultural Characteristics Religion Development Characteristics Gender Inequality Index

97 percent Muslim

99 percent Roman Catholic

.50

.12

.60

.86

5.83

1.25

0 (best) – 1 (worst) Human Development Index 1 (best) – 0 (worst) Democratic Institutionalization Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Freedom House) 1 (best) – 7 (worst)

women parliamentarians dropped only slightly to 25 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union, Elections Archive 2012). Thus, over one election cycle from the pre-conflict election of the Iraqi Council of Representatives in 2000 to the post-conflict Iraqi Council of Representatives (officially established in December of 2005) there was a gain of 18 percent of women in Iraq’s national parliament. Based on this sudden gain, Paxton and Hughes (2013: 76) classify Iraq as falling into the big jump pattern of representation. The big jump in Spain. The Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) has played the largest role in the big jump in women’s presence in parliaments in Spain (Threlfall 2007; Valiente 2007). Women’s rise in parliament started with the PSOE’s adoption of a 25 percent quota for women in 1988. Over the following decade, the importance of women’s inclusion diffused across the Spanish party system and culminated in impressive party-wide gains in the 2004 elections (Threlfall 2007: 1076; Valienta 2007: 131). The significant gains over such a short period have been described by Valiente (2007: 129) as remarkable and Threlfall (2007: 1068) as “the biggest surge in female participation in parliament and of all Western democracies since the 1970s.” And, indeed, Paxton and Hughes (2013: 76) identify Spain as a big jump country, noting in particular the period between 1996 and 2004 as the big jump period. Over the 1996, 2000 and 2004 elections women’s presence grew from 16 percent to 36 percent after the 2004 election. Thus, Spain saw an increase of 20 percent women in parliaments. Data

Existential Security Mortality Rate Adult Males

218 per 1,000

135 per 1,000

Mortality Rate Adult Females

117 per 1,000

55 per 1,000

Note: Sources include the CIA World Factobook, United Nation’s Development Program’s Gender Inequality Index and Human Development Index, Freedom House’s Freedom Rating and Indexmundi.10 The big jump in Iraq. The jump in women’s parliamentary representation in Iraq happened over one election cycle. In 2000, the last election before the US invasion in 2003, just 7.2 percent of women was elected to the Council of Representatives. The next election, in January of 2005, established the Transitional National Assembly where women captured 31 percent of the seats. According to Coleman (2006: 4) “in the run-up to the January 2005 elections, political parties were required to field electoral slates on which every third candidate was a woman.” As a result, 87 women won seats in the interim national assembly, making up 31 percent of the total seats (Brown and Romano 2006: 63). Through the transition phase from the Transitional National Assembly (established January 2005) to the Council of Representatives (established December 2005) the percentage of

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Core variables. Change in the belief in women’s ability to govern is measured with World Values Survey (henceforth WVS) data. Respondents are asked the following question: “For the following statement I read out, can you tell me how strongly you agree or disagree. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?” Response categories range from 1 (strongly agree) – 4 (strongly disagree). Then the item reads: “On the whole men make better political leaders than women do”11. Thus, for each respondent, a higher score indicates greater disagreement with the statement that men make better political leaders than women and, thus, greater support for women’s ability to govern. This is widely used as a measure of individuals’ beliefs in women’s ability to govern (Alexander 2012; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Paxton and Hughes 2013; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). The time period that covers the change in attitudes is chosen so the earlier measure of attitudes (the pretest group) is before the country’s ‘big jump’ and the later measure of attitudes (the posttest group) is after the country’s big jump12. I look at change from wave 4 to 5 for Iraq and 3 to 5 for Spain (See footnote 12). Data to determine whether respondents have been treated with the big jump or not are based on Paxton and Hughes’ (2013: 7080) classification of IPU archival data on women in the lower house of national parliament. For both countries the population is surveyed before and after the big jump (see footnote 12 and

Appendix A). Thus, the big jump is instrumented by survey wave. All respondents surveyed after the big jump are given a 1, since they have been exposed to the increase in women in parliaments, and all respondents surveyed before the big jump a 0. Measuring individual-level mechanisms of confounding country-level changes. The following country-level changes potentially co-occur with the jump in women’s presence in parliament and confound its effect on the observed outcomes: societal development, secularization, democratic institutionalization, and, in the case of Iraq, conflict. To establish that one of these country-level changes is not driving the relationship between the big jump and change in beliefs in women’s ability to govern, I measure the individuallevel mechanisms through which the country-level variables are expected to exert their effects. The literature identifies resources and age as key individuallevel mechanisms of growth in societal development. Resources are measured by the level of education and experience in the labor force. Age is measured as years since birth. All measurement is based on data from the respective waves of the WVS. Education is measured by whether respondents’ have a university education (scored 1) or not (scored 0). Labor force participation is measured by whether respondents have ever been employed (scored 1) or not (scored 0). Age is measured based on respondents’ answer to the question of which year they were born. Secularization is measured by respondents’ level of religiosity. This is based on answers to the question, “how important is God in your life,” 1 (not at all important) – 10 (very important). This measure is widely used by the literature as a measure of religiosity (Alexander and Welzel 2011b; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004) Democratic institutionalization operates individually through the internalization of democratic norms. I measure this internalization through respondents’ rating of a democratic political system as 1 (very good) – 4 (very bad). Several studies use this measure as a measure of support for democracy (Dalton 1999; Klingemann 1999; Norris 2006) All variables for controlling for the possibility that conflict increased support for women’s ability to govern in Iraq are also measured with WVS data. To measure exposure to more modern, less patriarchal alternatives to political leadership, I use data on respondents’ answers to the question of whether they 1(agree strongly) – 5 (strongly disagree) that it is better if more people with strong religious beliefs hold public office13. This indicator has not been used in prior research to predict support for women’s ability to govern. Thus, as a validity check, I looked at the strength and direction of the bivariate correlation between support for religious leaders and support for women leaders across the time pooled Iraqi dataset. The two correlate significantly with a coefficient of .15 at the p≤.001 level. Thus, Iraqis who disagree that it is better if more people with strong

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religious beliefs hold public office are more likely to disagree that men make better political leaders than women. This lends evidence to the assumption that this data measures individual support for modern less, patriarchal support for political leaders. To measure increased confidence in the United Nations, I use data from respondents’ answers to the question of whether they have 1 (a great deal) – 4 (none at all) confidence in the United Nations. This indicator has also not been used in prior research to predict support for women’s ability to govern. Therefore, I also looked at the strength and direction of the bivariate correlation between this and support for female leaders across the polled Iraqi sample. Again, we see empirical validation. The two correlate significantly with a coefficient of .17 at the p≤.001 level. Those with more confidence in the UN are more likely to disagree that men make better political leaders than women. Finally, to measure support for female education, I use data from respondents’ answers to the question of whether they 1 (strongly agree) – 4 (strongly disagree) that a boy has more right to a university education than a girl. Support for female university education has been correlated widely with support for women’s ability to govern in the literature (Inglehart and Norris 2003). In fact, this is such a strong correlate that it often has been included along with support for women’s ability to govern in a gender egalitarian values index first introduced by Inglehart and Norris (2003). Methods As a first methodological strategy, I evaluate if there is a significant gain in support in women’s ability to govern among women in the big jump sample compared to women in the pretest sample. Based on both theory and the comparative evidence, at the very least, we would expect the big jump to improve women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern. I conduct this comparison with the female dataset from each country. Second, testing the possibility for a more general influence, I evaluate if women are significantly more supportive than men of women’s ability to govern in the big jump sample compared to the pretest sample. This comparison is run across the pooled female and male dataset for each country. In both analyses, I control the influence of the big jump on support for the individual-level mechanisms with ordinal regression analysis. Ordinal regression is appropriate for modeling the ordinality in the outcome variable. Respondents were given just four ordinally ranked answer categories for response to the statement that men make better political leaders than women do14. As a final step, I test whether my outcomes do not occur across a set of “never treat” countries (Sekhon 2009: 494-502): China, India, South Korea and Turkey. These countries have a flat pattern of change in women’s presence in parliaments up through the big jump period and data is available for a similar attitudinal test across time points. I evaluate whether there is

change in my outcomes over the same time points that test the effect of the big jump. I conduct the comparison across the pooled female and male dataset.

Table 2: Ordinal Regressions Testing the Women’s Improvement Thesis

Results

DV: Disagreement Men Make Better Political Leaders Among Women

Evaluating The Women’s Improvement Thesis, H1

Strongly Agree -‐ Strongly Disagree Men Make Be4er Poli6cal Leaders

The Women’s Improvement Thesis expects a significantly greater positive change in women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern when comparing the pretest female sample to the big jump female sample in Iraq and Spain. As a first basic step, we can evaluate whether women are significantly more supportive in the sample that has experienced the big jump compared to those in the pretest sample.

Figure 1: Change in Women's Beliefs in Women's Ability to Govern 3.5 3,37*** 3.4 3.3 3.2 3,00*** 3.1 3.02 3 2.9 2.77 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.4 Iraqi 2.3 Women, N 2.2 = 2487 2.1 Iraqi Men, 2 N = 2379 1.9 1.8 Spanish 1.7 Women, N 1.6 1,49** = 1149 1.43 1.5 1.41 1,37 Spanish 1.4 Men, N = 1.3 1107 1.2 1.1 1 Pretest Sample Big Jump Sample

Figure 1 displays these results. In both countries, women’s support of women’s ability to govern improves from the pretest sample to the big jump sample. In addition, the increase is significant. When I correlate being a respondent from the big jump sample with support for women’s ability to govern the correlation is positive and significant across both countries.15 With the Women’s Improvement Thesis confirmed through this basic step, we can move forward to see if the results hold under more sophisticated controls and modeling. We identified several key

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Model 1: Iraq

Model 2: Spain

IVs

Coeff.

Odds Ratio

Coeff.

Odds Ratio

Big Jump Sample

.33*

.14

1.40

.84***

.13

2.32

University Edu

.33

.20

1.40

.18

.21

1.20

Employed

.11

.18

1.12

.34**

.14

1.40

Age

-.01**

.00

.99

-.01***

.00

.99

Religiosity

-.14

.11

.87

-.98***

.22

.38

Most Support Democracy

-.20

.32

.83

.24

.56

1.27

Most Reject Religious Leaders

1.38***

.26

3.98

Most Confidence UN

.33

.24

1.40

Most Support Female Education

.85

.19

2.34

Chi-Square Model Fit

156.9***

172.35***

Nagelkerke R2

.12

.17

1446

1226

Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. The analysis is based on Ordinal Regression. Coefficients are logits. Odds ratios are calculated by taking the exponent of the logits. Threshold coefficients reported below. These coefficients represent the intercepts, specifically the point in terms of a logit, where respondents might be predicted into the higher categories of the dependent variable. For the ordinal, categorical controls (support for democracy) I report only the coefficients for the most supportive response category. Threshold 1

.61

1.14

1.84

-4.09***

.49

.02

Threshold 2

1.94

1.14

6.96

-2.32***

.47

.10

Threshold 3

3.46***

1.14

31.8

-.28

.47

.76

individual-level controls based on the literature. All are included in the multivariate models. Table 2 displays the results of the two ordinal regression models for Iraq and Spain. In both models, women in the big jump sample are significantly more supportive of women’s ability to govern. According to the Odds Ratio (OR), women in the big jump sample

are 1.40 times more likely to support women’s ability to govern in Iraq and 2.32 times more likely in Spain. This concludes the tests of the Women’s Improvement Thesis. All tests confirm the expected outcomes. Under key controls, women’s support for women’s ability to govern improves with their experience of the big jump in women’s presence in parliament. We can now evaluate whether experience with the big jump more strongly improves women’s support when compared to men. Evaluating the Impacting Women Thesis, H2 and the Sociotropic Thesis, H3 The Impacting Women Thesis expects women to be significantly more supportive of women’s ability to govern than men in the big jump sample when compared to the control sample. To the contrary, the Sociotropic Thesis expects a general improvement among both women and men. Before moving to the multivariate analysis, I refer back to Figure 1 focusing this time on the simple comparisons of female and male means in the pretest and big jump samples. This gives us a basic look at whether women are more supportive and further apart than men in the big jump sample in both countries. Under these simple comparisons, for both Iraq and Spain, there is a larger more significant difference between women and men in the big jump sample. This is a simple confirmation of the Impacting Women Thesis. We now examine whether the results hold with multivariate analysis. To test whether the big jump has a stronger effect on women, I model the big jump interacted with female and run ordinal regressions to explain support across the pre and posttest, male and female, samples for each case. I control the effect of the big jump interacted with female for the theoretically relevant individual-level variables. Table 3 presents these results. The Iraqi model confirms the Impacting Women Thesis, while the Spanish model confirms the Sociotropic Thesis. In the Iraqi model, the big jump interacted with female is positive and significant. According to the OR, women in the big jump sample are 1.88 times more supportive of women’s ability to govern when compared to men in the big jump sample. Thus, for Iraq, the interaction that is displayed graphically in Figure 2 holds under the individual-level controls. This is not the case for Spain. In the Spanish model, the big jump interacted with female is not significant, but the main effect of the big jump is positive and highly significant. Thus the evidence tells us that exposure to the big jump in women’s presence in parliament positively improves both women and men’s support of women’s ability to govern. According to the OR, respondents in the big jump sample are 1.98 times more supportive of women’s ability to govern. In this case, we have evidence to confirm the Sociotropic Thesis in Spain. This finding makes an important contribution to what was found in Alexander’s (2012) research and has implications for future research. Alexander (2012:456) found that “change in the percentage of women in parliament improves women’s beliefs, but not men’s beliefs, in women’s ability to govern.” The finding here of a significant impact on men in Spain but not in Iraq suggests that the

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Table 3: Ordinal Regressions Testing the Impacting Women Thesis and Sociotropic Thesis DV: Disagreement Men Make Better Political Leaders (Female and Male Dataset) Model 1: Iraq Model 2: Spain IVs Coeff.. SE Odds Coeff. SE Odds Ratio Ratio Big Jump -..33** .12 .72 .68*** .12 1.98 Sample Female

-.02

.13

.81

.79***

.12

2.20

Big Jump * Female

.63***

.16

1.88

.16

1.17

University Edu

.02

.12

1.02

.40*

.14

1.49

Employed

.16

.10

1.17

.31***

.09

1.36

Age

-.00

.00

1.00

-.01***

.00

.99

Religiosity

-.20***

.05

.82

-.88***

.13

.42

Most Support Democracy

.13

.26

1.14

.33

.34

1.30

Most Reject Religious Leaders

1.44***

.18

4.22

Most Confidence UN

.58***

.17

1.79

Most Support Female Education

1.14***

.13

3.13

Chi-Square Model Fit

436.82***

317.05***

Nagelkerke R2

.15

N 3259 2411 Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. The analysis is based on Ordinal Regression. Coefficients are logits. Odds ratios are calculated by taking the exponent of the logits. Threshold coefficients reported below. These coefficients represent the intercepts, specifically the point in terms of a logit, where respondents might be predicted into the higher categories of the dependent variable. For the ordinal, categorical controls (support for democracy) I report only the coefficients for the most supportive response category. Threshold 1 .99 .58 2.69 -2.58*** .36 .08 Threshold 2

2.40***

.58

Threshold 3

3.94***

.59

11.0 2 45.1 6

-.74*

.35

.48

1.29***

.35

3.63

effect of change in women’s presence in parliaments on men’s beliefs is conditional. Given the differences between Spain and Iraq,

we can speculate that this may be conditional on countries’ cultural climate, level of development, level of democracy or level of existential security. This is a question for future research. Test of No Change across the “Never Treat” Cases Figure 2: Change in Women and Men's Average Support for Women's Ability to Govern across the "Never Treat" Countries (China, India, South Korea and Turkey)

Stongly Agree -‐ Strongly Disagree Men Make Be4er Poli6cal Leaders

2.90

As a final test, we must treat seriously the possibility of a “regression to the mean” effect. To rule this out, there should be no change in support for women’s ability to govern across the same time points as the pretest/big jump time points in a set of countries that did not experience a big jump in women’s presence in parliament. Taken together, our “never treat” sample includes China, India, South Korea and Turkey. All of these countries have a flat pattern of change in women’s presence in parliament over the time period examined in this study. Figure 2 displays these results. Across the three sets of time points, the change in beliefs in women’s ability to govern whether among men or women is small and insignificant. This establishes that the “never treat” countries do not improve. With the “never treat” test confirmed, we can conclude that the big jump in women’s presence in parliament in Iraq and Spain is sufficient for improving women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern. In addition, in Spain, women’s support not only grows in the big jump sample, but men also become more supportive.

2.70

Conclusion 2.47 2.47 2.46 2.50 2.46 2.43 2.43

2.30

2.29 2.23

2.29 2.28

2.28 2.23

2.10

Earlier Time Point

1.90

Later Time Point

1.70

The cases of Iraq and Spain present a new opportunity for evaluating whether big jumps in women’s presence in parliaments are sufficient for improvement in beliefs in women’s ability to govern. Tests of both cases show that the big jump is sufficient for improvement among women. Men also improve in Spain but not Iraq. While this is an important addition to the evidence base confirming the symbolic effects of descriptive representation, future research must do more. These cases are in the top half of the big jump distribution. To improve, future research must ‘travel’ the test of sufficiency down the ladder of quota induced gains in women’s descriptive representation. Perhaps, at one level, the sufficiency test is negative and it is necessary to consider accommodating mechanisms, such as a concurrent bottom-up strategy in women’s education or employment. Such assessment would require more complex, interactive modeling strategies that reveal which policies we must bundle with quotas to change public support of women as political leaders. Similarly, we also need to ‘travel’ the test of sufficiency across the additional categories of attitudinal and behavioral effects that women’s presence in positions of political power might confer to women citizens. Future research must also examine the sufficiency of big jumps for improvement in women’s political engagement and participation.

1.50

References

Note: Bars represent the average support for women’s ability to govern based on respondent’s answers to the question, “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Men make better political leaders than women do.” Response categories range from 1 (strongly agree) – 4 (strongly disagree). The source of the data is the World Values Surveys. Total number of respondents for Wave 3: 6168, for Wave 4: 7041, and for Wave 5: 5874. Waves/Time points cover the big jump time periods in the tests of Iraq and Spain.

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Abbott, A. (2001). Time matters. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Alexander, A. C. (2012). Change in women’s descriptive representation and the belief in women’s ability to govern: a virtuous cycle. Politics and Gender 8: 1-28. Alexander, A. C., & Welzel, C. (2011a). Empowering women. European Sociological Review 27: 364-384.

__________________________.(2011b). Islam and patriarchy. International Review of Sociology 21: 249-276.

Franzmann, M. (2000). Women and religion. New York: Oxford University Press.

Atkeson, L. R. (2003). Not all cues are created equal. The Journal of Politics 65 (4): 1040-1061.

Grzymala-Busse, A.. (2011). Time will tell? Temporality and the analysis of causal mechanisms and processes. Comparative Political Studies 44: 1267-1297.

Atkeson, L. R. & Carrillo, N. (2007). More is better. Politics and Gender 3 (1): 79-101. Barnes, T. & Burchard, S. (2010). The impact of descriptive representation on women’s political participation in SubSaharan Africa. APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.

Hakim, C. (2000). Work-lifestyle choices in the 21st century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hansen, S. (1997). Talking about politics. Journal of Politics 59 (February): 73-103.

Burn, S. (2005). Women across cultures, 2nd Ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

High-Pippert, A. & Comer, J. (1998). “Female Empowerment.” Women and Politics 19 (4):53-66.

Burns, N., Schlozman, K., & Verba, S. (2001). The private roots of public action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hughes, M. (2009). Armed conflict, international linkages and women’s parliamentary representation in developing nations. Social Problems 56: 174-204.

Burrell, B. (1994). A woman’s place is in the house. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Bussy, K., & Bandura, A. (1999). Social cognitive theory of gender development and differentiation. Psychological Review 106: 676-713. Carroll, S. J. (1985). Women as candidates in American politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Coleman, I. (2006). Women, Islam and the new Iraq. Foreign Affairs January/February. Dahlerup, D. (ed.), (2006). Women, quotas and politics. London: Routledge. Dahlerup, D., & Freidenvall, L. (2005). Quotas as a ‘fast track’to equal representation for women: why Scandinavia is no longer the model. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 7(1), 26-48. Dahlerup, D., & Nordlund, A. (2004). Gender quotas: a key to equality? A case study of Iraq and Afghanistan. European Political Science summer: 2004. Dalton, R. (1999). Political support in advanced industrial societies. In Critical Citizens, Pippa Norris (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A., & Weldon, S. (2009). The individualinstitutional nexus of protest behavior.” British Journal of Political Science 40: 51-73. Desposato, S. & Norrander, B. (2009). The gender gap in Latin America. British Journal of Political Science 39 (1): 141162. Dolan, K. (2006). Symbolic mobilization? American Politics Research 34 (6): 687-704. Dunning, T. (2008). Improving causal inference: the strengths and limitations of natural experiments.” Political Research Quarterly 61: 282-293.

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Ingelhart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, R., Moaddel, M. & Tessler, M., (2006). Xenophobia and in-group solidarity in Iraq: a natural experiment on the impact of insecurity. Perspectives on Politics 4: 495-505. Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2003). Rising tide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural change and democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Inter Parliamentary Union (2013). Archive for the Percentage of Women in Parliament. http://www.ipu.org/wmne/world.htm Johnson, D., Kabuchu, H. & Kayonga, S. V. (2003). Women in Ugandan local government. Gender and Development 11 (3): 8-18. Karp, J. & Banducci, S. (2008). “When politics is not just a man’s game.” Electoral Studies 27 (1): 105-115. Kenworthy, L. & Malami, M. (1999). Gender inequality in political representation. Social Forces 78 (1): 235-268. Kittilson, M. C. (2005). In support of gender quotas. Politics and Gender 1(4): 638-644. Kittilson, M. C. & Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie. (2010). “Engaging citizens.” Journal of Politics 72 (4): 990-1002. Klingemann, H.D. (1999). Mapping political support in the 1990s: a global analysis. In Critical Citizens, Pippa Norris (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Koch, J. (1997). Candidate gender and women’s psychological engagement in politics. American Politics Quarterly 25 (January): 118-33. Krook, M. L., O’Brien, D. Z. & Swip, K. (2010). Military invasion and women’s political representation. International Feminist Journal of Politics 12: 66-79.

Lawless, J. (2004). Politics of presence? Political Research Quarterly 57(1): 81-99. Mahoney, J. (2000). Strategies of causal inference in small-N analysis. Sociological Methods and Research 28: 387-424. Mansbridge, J. (1999). Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women? Journal of Politics 61(3): 628-57. Matland, R. (2002). Enhancing women’s political participation: Legislative recruitment and electoral systems.” In Women in parliament: Beyond the numbers, ed. A. Karam. Stockholm, Sweden: IDEA. 65-90. Norris, P. (2006). Support for democratic governance: Multidimensional concept and survey measures.” Paper prepared for the LAPOP-UNDP Workshop, Center for the Americas at Vanderbuilt, Nashville, May 5-6th. ___________. (1993). conclusions: Comparing legislative recruitment.” In Gender and party politics, eds. Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris. Newberry Park, CA: Sage. 309-330. Norris, P. and Inglehart, R. (2004). Sacred and secular. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norris, P. and Krook, M. L. (2009). “One of us.” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association’s Annual Meeting, 2009. Norris, P., Lovenduski, J., and Campbell, R. (2004). Research report. London: The Electoral Commission (UK). Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paxton, P. & Hughes, M. (2013). Women, politics and power, 2nd Edition. London: Pine Forge Press. Paxton, P., Hughes, M., & Green, J. (2006). The international women’s movement and women’s political representation, 1893-2003. American Sociological Review 71(6): 898.

Sapiro, V. & Connover, P. (1997). The variable gender bias of electoral politics. British Journal of Political Science 27 (4): 497-523. Sanbonmatsu, K. (2003). Gender-related political knowledge and the descriptive representation of women. Political Behavior 25 (4): 367-388. Sekhon, J. (2009). Opiates for the matches: Matching methods for causal inference. Annual Review of Political Science 12: 487-508. Sen, A. (1999). Development as freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schwindt-Bayer, L. and Mishler, B. (2005). An integrated model of women’s representation. Journal of Politics 67: 407-428. ThrelFall, M. (2007). Explaining gender parity representation in Spain: The internal dynamics of parties. West European Politics 30: 1068-1095. Tripp, A. M. & Kang, A. (2008). The Global Impact of Quotas. Comparative Political Studies 41: 338-361. Tripp, A. M., Konaté, D., & Lowe-Morna, C. (2006). Sub-Saharan Africa. In Women, Quotas and Politics, ed. Drude Dahlerup. London: Routledge. United Nations Development Program (2008). Human Development Reports. http://www.undp.org/ Valiente, C. (2007). Women in Parliament: The Effectiveness of Quotas. In Women and Legislative Representation. Manon Tremblay (ed.). New York: Palgrave. _____________. (2008). How Spanish Women Gained Thirty-Six Percent of Parliamentary Seats? Paper Presented Midwest Political Science Association’s Meeting, April 3-6. Verba, S., Schlozman, K. & Brady, H. (1995). Voice and equality Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Paxton, P. & Kunovich, S. (2003). Women’s political presence. Social Forces 82 (1): 87-114.

Wide, J. (2002). Women’s political representation around the globe. Paper for Presentation at the Commonwealth Conference on Educational Administration and Management. Umea, Sweden, September 23-25.

Phillips, A. (1995). The politics of presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, M. S. (1998). Voice, trust and memory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Reingold, B. & Harrell, J. (2009). The impact of descriptive representation on women’s political engagement: Does party matter?” Political Research Quarterly 63 (2): 280-294.

Wolbrecht, C. and Campbell, D. E. (2007). Leading by example. American Journal of Political Science 51(4): 921-939.

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Wolchick, S. & Meyer, A. eds. (1985). Women, state and party in Eastern Europe. Durham: Duke University Press.

Appendix A: Attitudinal Data Availability Country

Big Jump Election Period

Gain in the Percentage of Women in Parliament

Comparative Public Opinion Databases Consulted

Pre-Election Attitudinal Data Availability

Post-Election Attitudinal Data Availability

Years and Elections between Pre-Test Data and the Big Jump

Years and Elections between Posttest Data and the Big Jump

Senegal*

2012

Afrobarometer

None

Afrobarometer 2013

Nicaragua*

2011

21.74

Latino

Latino barometer 2006

None, but could become available with Latino barometer 2012

Barometer

Kyrgyzstan

20062007

25.6

World Values Survey and Asia barometer

None

Algeria

20112012

23.4

World Values Survey and Arab barometer

Arab barometer 2009,2010

None but could become available with 3rd wave Arab barometer

Andorra

20042005

14.3

World Values Survey and European Values Survey

None

World Values Survey 2005

Iraq

2005

World Values Survey and Arab Barometer

World Values Survey 2004

World Values Survey 2006

1 year

No elections

South Africa

1994

World Values Survey and Afro Barometer

None

World Values Survey 1996

Rwanda

20022003

23.1

World Values Survey and Afro Barometer

None

Pakistan

19992002

18.8

World Values Survey and Asia Barometer

World Values Survey 1997 and 2001

None

Monaco

19971998

16.6

World Values Survey and European Values Survey

None

Argentina

1993 1995

20.2

World Values Survey and Latino

None

World Values Survey 1999, 2006

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Barometer Costa Rica

20012002

15.8

World Values Survey and Latino Barometer

None

Spain

1996, 2000, 2004

World Values Survey and European Values Survey

World Values Survey 1995

World Values Survey 2005

1 year before the start of the big jump cycle

1 year after the big jump cycle

19971998

13.7

World Values Survey and Latino Barometer

None

13.4

World Values Survey, Eastern and Central Barometer and Asia Barometer

None

Ecuador

Turkmenistan

19931994

No elections

Australia

19931998

12.8

World Values Survey

None

World Values Survey 2005

Rwanda

19961997

12.8

World Values Survey and Afro Barometer

None

Croatia

19972000

13.6 (19.9%)

World Values Survey and European Values Survey

World Values Survey 1996

None

Laos

19961997

11.8

World Values Survey and Asia Barometer

None

Singapore

20002001

11.7

World Values Survey and Asia Barometer

None

Tunisia

20032004

11.3

World Values Survey and Arab Barometer

None

Namibia

19931994

11.2

World Values Survey and Afro Barometer

None

Belgium

19981999

10.6

World Values Survey and European

None

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Values Survey Macedonia

19982006

World Values Survey and European Values Survey

World Values Survey 1998

None

Bosnia and Herzegovina

20012002

9.6

World Values Survey and European Values Survey

World Values Survey 1998

None

United Kingdom

19961997

8.7

World Values Survey and European Values Survey

None

1998 World Values Survey

Sources: Paxton and Hughes 2013: 76, Inter Parliamentary Union’s Parline Database 2013, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, and various comparative public opinion surveys. The question on women’s acceptability as political leaders is asked by the World Values Surveys in wave 3, wave 4, and wave 5. In terms of Barometers, it is asked by the Afrobarometer in round 3 (2005-2006) and round 5 (20112012). The question is asked by the Arabbarometer in wave 1 (2009), wave 2 (2010) and, since the data is not released, it is unclear whether this is asked in wave 3 (2013-14). The question is asked by the Latinobarometer in 2004 and 2009. This question is not asked in the Eurobarometers (a full text search of the terms “women and leaders” turned up no hits through Eurobarometer question and variable retrieval http://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/topics-trends/question-retrieval/). The question is also not asked in the Central and Eastern European Barometers, the Asiabarometer or the European Values Study. Countries with an asterisk (*) were added as big jump cases by author’s own research.

Appendix B: Percent of Women in Parliament in Iraq and Spain After their Big Jumps Compared to their Regional Averages Country (date) and Percentage of Women in Parliament After the Big Jump

Region (date) and Percentage of Women in Parliament

Difference in Percentage between Big Jump Country and Regional Average

Iraq (2005) 31.6

Arab States (2005) 6.7

24.9

Spain (2004) 36

Europe excluding the Nordic Countries (2004) 15.6

20.4

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In addition to being called big jump cases, these cases have also been categorized as examples of the ‘fast-track’ to women’s representation and contrasted with the ‘incremental-track’ more characteristic of trajectories in north Western Europe (Dahlerup and Friedenval 2005). 2 See Appendix A for a list of big jump countries and data on their increases in women’s presence in parliaments. 3 These cases include: Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, see Paxton and Hughes (2013:73). 4 A review of all relevant comparative public opinion surveys shows that while over twenty countries have been classified as big jump countries, the pre and posttest attitudinal data that match the big jump periods are only available for Iraq and Spain. This is discussed in more detail in the section on sample selection (see page 85; see also Appendix A). 5 Studies on the US evaluate the impact of increases of women in legislatures on women and girl’s political discussion and political activity (Wolbrecht and Campbell 2008), women’s political engagement and activity (Atkeson 2003; Burns et al. 2001; Hansen 1997; High-Pippert and Comer 1998; Koch 1997; Norris and Krook 2009; Reingold and Harrell 2009; Sapiro and Conover 1997), women’s entry into the political arena (Carroll 1985), women’s campaign volunteerism and women’s turnout (Norris, Lovenduski and Campbell 2004). The studies tend to show that women are more knowledgeable, engaged and participatory when they see women running for and occupying public office. There are, however, a few important exceptions. Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer’s (2010) comparative research on the gendered effects of political structures does not confirm a consistent, positive effect of women’s presence in parliaments on the gender gap in political engagement or participation. In their research women’s presence in parliaments is modeled as one possible mechanism through which inclusive political structures plausibly have an indirect influence. Lawless (2004) examines pooled National Election Studies (NES) data from 1980-1998 and finds that while women represented by women in Congress offer more positive evaluations of their members of Congress, the evidence does not extend to support additional symbolic effects on women’s political attitudes and behaviors. In addition, Dolan (2006) examines NES data from 1990-2004 and finds little evidence that women candidates have an influence on voter attitudes and behaviors. In the comparative literature, women’s presence in parliaments is shown to positively influence women’s political engagement, political interest and participation. Importantly, these findings hold across samples of culturally and developmentally diverse nations under control for countries’ level of development and democracy (Barnes and Burchard 2010; Desposato and Norrander 2008; Norris and Krook 2009). 6 Countries with an increasing pattern reflect a slow, truly reciprocal pattern of change in women’s presence in parliaments and women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern, which plausibly follows patterns of societal development and modernization. Examples of countries that follow this pattern are

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Denmark, Germany and Canada (Paxton and Hughes 2013: 73). These cases are poor candidates for a test of sufficiency because of the difficulty separating earlier changes from later changes as well as the processes of societal development. Low increasing countries have probably seen too little improvement over the time period for there to be an observable effect on women’s beliefs in women’s ability to govern. Moreover, the gains are slow and sequential, making it more difficult to isolate the change in women’s presence in parliaments from other covariates. Examples of countries that follow this pattern are Brazil, Chile and France (Paxton and Hughes 2013: 78). In contrast, plateau countries climbed rather abruptly to a level of women’s descriptive representation –some a rather exceptionally high level-, maintained that level over a longer period and then saw an abrupt drop. The countries that fall into this category are the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as countries that are not formerly communist but had Leftist authoritarian governments. Examples include Hungary, Romania and Poland (Paxton and Hughes 2013: 79). On its face, this pattern looks promising because it also follows abrupt, nonsequential developments in women’s representation. Yet, there is a problem. The pattern clearly overlaps, nearly perfectly, with the emergence, persistence and fall of a sociopolitical regime whose doctrine emphasized gender equality in public roles. Thus, as with the increasing pattern, this pattern fails to escape the problem of confoundedness. Flat countries have seen no change in women’s parliamentary presence since 1945. These are the opposite of big jump countries and therefore, clearly, control cases - they lack the treatment all together, making them good examples of never-treat units. It is from this category of countries that I draw my sample of “never treat” cases: China, India, South Korea and Turkey. All of these countries have a flat pattern of change in women’s presence in parliaments from 1945 through the periods covered by the big jumps. They are also the only flat countries for which data on my outcomes are available over all big jump periods. 7 Two additional cases to Iraq and Spain may become available for subjecting the theory of symbolic representation to new tests of sufficiency: Algeria and Nicaragua (see Appendix A). This depends on whether the questionnaires of the newest waves of the Arab and Latino barometers include the question on women’s acceptability as political leaders in their surveys of these countries, which at the time of writing, is not yet clear. 8 The United Nation Development Program’s Gender Inequality Index captures the loss of female achievement in society due to gender inequality the dimensions of reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market participation. The measure ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1.0 (total inequality). 9 The United Nation Development Program’s Human Development Index captures the level of development by assessing education, life expectancy wealth and standard of living. Countries are measured on a scale of 0 (low human development) to 1.0 (high human development).

Data on religion for Iraq and Spain come from the CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/. Data for development related gender inequality and human development and the mortality rate for Iraq come from the United Nation Development Program’s Human Development Data for Arab States, http://www.arabhdr.org/data/profiles/IRQ.aspx, The Iraqi Gender Inequality Index data are based on the only data available: 2005. The Iraqi HDI data and mortality rate data are based on the 2005/2006 average. Data is not available for 2004. The Spanish gender and human development data come from the United Nation’s Development Program https://data.undp.org/dataset/Human-DevelopmentIndex-HDI-value/8ruz-shxu. The Spanish Gender Inequality Index data are also based on the 2005 data due to data availability. The Spanish HDI data are based on the 2000/2005 average. Data are not available for 1996-1999 or 2001-2004. The Iraqi democratic rights data are based on the Freedom House’s Freedom Rating in the reports from 2004-2006, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/iraq. The Spanish democratic rights data are based on the Freedom House’s Freedom Rating for 1999, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. The data for 1996-1998 and 2000 are not available, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/spain. The Spanish mortality rate data was retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/spain/mortality-rate. 11 A description of the surveys, variables and sampling procedures per wave per country can be found at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org. 12 For Iraq, the earlier measure of women in parliament is based on the election of members to the lower house in 2000. The earlier (wave 4) measure of attitudes is based on data from 2004. The later measure of women in parliament is based on the election of members to the lower house in 2005. The later (wave 5) measure of attitudes is based on data from 2006. For Spain, the earlier measure of women in parliament is based on the election of members to the lower house in 1993. The earlier (wave 3) measure of attitudes is based on data from 1995. The later measure of women in parliament is based on the election of members to the lower house in 2004. The later (wave 5) measure of attitudes is based on data from 2007. 13 An even stronger question for gauging whether the conflict modernized Iraqis views of political leadership was asked in Wave 5 but not Wave 4 so it cannot be included in the regressions. Respondents were asked whether it is 1 (very good) – 4 (very bad) to have an Islamic government where religious authorities have absolute power. This positively, significantly correlates with the indicator I use at a .61 across 2034 Iraqi respondents surveyed in the fifth wave. This is a powerful correlation at the individual level and, therefore, a good validity check. 14 For categorical variables (dichotomous and ordinal) entered into the ordinal regression model, the category with the lowest value is chosen by default as the reference category. In this case, I rescaled all dichotomous and categorical independent variables so

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that the appropriate reference category would be selected for results to reflect the theoretically expected direction. For example, the big jump variable was rescaled so that respondents in the big jump sample were scored 0 and respondents in the pretest sample were scored 1. 15 Due to the scale-level of the two variables this is based on Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients.