Forlorn hope for Zimbabwean voters as yet another election looms

Our Special Correspondent looks at the dynamics of Zimbabwe's electoral landscape, examining the strengths and weaknesses of the presidential candidates, the state of the economy's influence, the role of foreign powers, and the historical context of disputed elections, shedding light on the recurring challenges that have marred the country's democratic progress

ZIMBABWE, a nation grappling with economic hardships and political challenges, is on the brink of another crucial election that could determine the country's future trajectory. The upcoming elections, set against a backdrop of a legacy of disputed electoral history, hold the potential to reshape the country’s political landscape and offer a choice between continuity and change.

Zanu-PF, the former national liberation movement that has been in power since independence from Britain in 1980, remains in power 43 years on and is seeking to extend its vice grip on the levers of State for another five years. After ousting longtime strongman, President Robert Mugabe, in a military coup in November 2017, his erstwhile deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, has struggled to steady the country’s economy since taking over, but believes a second and final term at the helm is well deserved.

In Zimbabwe's highly anticipated elections, which are scheduled for August 23 this year, President Mnangagwa and opposition Citizen’s Coalition for Change (CCC) leader Nelson Chamisa emerge as the main contenders, offering contrasting visions for the country's future. Other bit part players include Douglas Mwonzora, who wrestled the MDC Alliance party brand associated with the late veteran opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, from Chamisa through a legal battle in the courts. While Mwonzora managed to make off with the party’s name, its soul and following remains with Chamisa and it goes without saying that the CCC presidential candidate has retained the following of the same democratic change movement that was inaugurated by Tsvangirai in 1999.

Bizarrely, Mwonzora has failed to field a single candidate in local and parliamentary elections, and will run as his party’s only candidate.

Another pretender in the presidential election fray is former Mugabe loyalist and cabinet minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, who belonged to Zanu-PF’s G-40 faction that was aligned to Mugabe’s wife Grace, and whose members fled into exile following the 2017 military coup. Kasukuwere successfully filed nomination papers to run as an independent candidate, but in a case brought against him by a Zanu-PF functionary, the High Court ruled him out of contention. At the time of writing, the South Africa-based Kasukuwere’s appeal was yet to be heard in a constitutional case that has significant implications for the Zimbabwe diaspora’s participation in national elections – a right provided for in the country’s constitution.

Mnangagwa’s spooked reaction to Kasukuwere’s entry into the presidential race betrays his unease with the unfinished factional contestations within Zanu-PF. While the 2017 coup swept Mnangagwa into power and pre-empted Zanu-PF’s elective congress that could have produced a post-Mugabe leadership, the true popularity of the G-40 faction within the ruling party remained an untested factor. This is why Mnangagwa has been rattled by Kasukuwere’s presidential bid. In 2018, Mnangagwa’s sliver of a majority amounted to less than 50,000 votes, and the fear within Zanu-PF is that Kasukuwere could throw Mnangagwa’s re-election hopes into a tailspin if he manages to secure the same number of votes or more.

As the incumbent, Mnangagwa benefits from name recognition, experience, and the support of the ruling Zanu-PF party. He has implemented a modicum of economic reforms since taking office and attempted to open up the country to foreign investment through his “Zimbabwe is open for business” agenda. Key infrastructure projects such as the Beitbridge border post refurbishment, a new terminal at the Robert Gabriel Mugabe International Airport, a roads and highways refurbishment programme, and moves towards establishing a lithium processing plant, have all counted in Mnangagwa’s favour.

But policy inconsistencies and a lack of political will to address political and governance reforms called for by the West have robbed him of traction with European and American investors and left him in the arms of his default bosom buddies – the Chinese, Russians and Belarussians.

Zimbabwe still faces significant economic challenges, including high unemployment, inflation, and a lack of foreign investment. A new exodus of educated young Zimbabweans has gripped the country, bleeding it of finite and essential human resources as they flock to distant lands, including to the former colonial power Britain, where they are taking up jobs predominantly in the health and social care sector. Those left behind and without options are seething with resentment for Mnangagwa's government. Human rights concerns, such as crackdowns on political dissent and the jailing on trumped up charges of prominent opposition politicians such as CCC’s Job Wiwa Sikhala, could also affect Mnangagwa’s reputation and support among certain segments of the population.

In contrast, Chamisa, a charismatic and youthful opposition leader, appeals to the desire for change and promises economic reforms and job creation. His relative youthfulness and dynamic speaking skills enable him to connect with voters and rally support. Chamisa leads the Citizens Coalition for Change and benefits from opposition unity, which consolidates support against the ruling Zanu-PF party. However, his limited political experience compared to Mnangagwa raises concerns about his ability to govern effectively. Chamisa may face challenges in garnering support from a wider range of demographics and regions across the country. Already, he faces criticism over his decision to not formally constitute his party and by adopting a constitution to institutionalise the opposition party, complete with organisational structures and a professionalised internal governance system.

As it stands, Chamisa is the sole authority within his structureless party, and this apparent centralisation of power in a single personality in the absence of a constitution has invited criticism of dictatorial tendencies in the youthful opposition leader. The CCC leader launched his party’s presidential campaign on July 16 in central Zimbabwe sans a manifesto or policy blueprint. Apart from the rhetoric, there is as yet nothing substantive by which to assess Chamisa’s offer to Zimbabwean voters. He has claimed that his informal approach to party organisation and policy proposition are reflective of his doctrine of “strategic ambiguity”, apparently intended to wrongfoot Zanu-PF and and foil intrusion by state intelligence operatives on behalf of Zanu-PF.

Key CCC figures Tendai Biti and Professor Welshman Ncube, who were finance minister and industry and international trade minister, respectively, under Tsvangirai’s premiership during the 2009-2013 inclusive government, are conspicuous by their absence from Chamisa’s 2023 campaign. Chamisa faces accusations of side-lining founding members of the democratic opposition under Tsvangirai in order to project CCC as an entirely new party of his own making. His closest allies are eloquent upstarts Fadzayi Mahere, a University of Zimbabwe law lecturer who serves as the party’s spokesperson, and her deputy, Gift Ostallos Siziba, who is currently a doctoral studies student.

Zanu-PF's long history of electoral dominance, coupled with lingering irregularities in the electoral system, pose challenges for Chamisa's campaign and his ability to ensure a fair and transparent election. His party’s campaign rallies are summarily banned by the Zimbabwe Republic Police on flimsy pretexts, while Zanu-PF campaigns freely across the country.

Of significant concern to the opposition are the results of a recent Afrobarometer opinion poll, which found that if elections were held a day after the survey, which was released on July 10, 27 per cent of respondents would vote for Chamisa against 35 per cent for Mnangagwa.

“This means that the CCC leader’s support base has decreased by 6 per cent since June 2022. This marks the first decline in Chamisa’s vote since he became leader of the opposition,” observed Dr Phillan Zamchiya, senior researcher with South Africa’s Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies.

“Also of significance is that Chamisa’s vote used to be far ahead of his party but the gap has closed to 1 per cent. On the other end, the survey shows that Mnangagwa’s support base has increased by 5 per cent since June 2022,” Zamchiya added.

However, the survey also reveals a paradox: although Mnangagwa leads Chamisa in the survey, a majority of respondents (65 per cent) say the country is going in the wrong direction.

“A large majority (69 per cent) say the economy is bad and 62 per cent say the living conditions are bad and this constitutes an equal proportion from both the urban and rural areas. An overwhelming majority (85 per cent) say the government has performed badly in addressing key issues such as unemployment, corruption, the economy and managing the economy,” Zamchiya observed.

The survey also showed that a majority of respondents refused to reveal their voting choices, a fact from which the opposition could draw some comfort in the hope that they could sway these voters to their side on August 23.

“The good news for CCC though is that this base of potential voters is huge enough to swing the vote in their favour and win both at parliamentary and presidential level, that is if they do the right things and the environment becomes relatively free and fair,” Zamchiya said.