UPHEAVAL IN THE ARAB WORLD: A (CLOSE) CALL FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION by Africa Newsit

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UPHEAVAL IN THE ARAB WORLD: A (CLOSE) CALL FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION by Ana Palacio

March 2011. www.ec.europa.eu Reproduced by The European House-Ambrosetti for the Forum “Developing the Regions of Africa and Europe”, Taormina, October 6 and 7, 2011.

Upheaval in the Arab World: a (Close) Call for the European Union Ana Palacio Former Foreign Affairs Minister of Spain Former MEP Former Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the World Bank Group Upheaval in the Arab world is an on-going process, and as such it leaves more open questions than answers. However, one outcome, and a positive one, is that this upheaval turned our pre-conceived ideas about the region on their head, leaving us to face our prejudices and to drown in our age-long contradictions. Until now, the West has nurtured two distinct communities: the development community and the democratic community. More often than not, the former harbored no consideration of the latter, dealing comfortably with dictators and democracies alike, in the understanding that prosperity can be boosted by working exclusively on economic leverages. This is not untrue, but it does not assure a redistribution of wealth which is the precondition for prosperity.1 It is almost a commonplace to highlight the contradiction between our interests and principles. I have always believed that there is no bigger long-term interest for any government in the transatlantic community than being surrounded by prosperous, stable, democratic societies. In any case, the gap that has existed between the rhetoric of bi-lateral EU treaties – signed “based on respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights”2 – and the real situation in the South Mediterranean has been closed. Now, in the most critical region for Europe’s geo-strategic policy and security, our values and interests are one, and the long-term has shrunk. Now is a unique opportunity for the Atlantic community, and the European Union in particular, to support our neighbors transition from revolutionary upheavals to democratic governments. We need to help countries like Egypt and Tunisia transition to democracy and at the same time promote the evolution of other regional regimes to inclusive participatory democracies which respect human rights and civic freedoms. Today, this divorce of development policies from the promotion of the rule of law, human rights and democracy interpellates the transatlantic community. As the recent UN Security Council debates have shown, of the countries which can influence the flow of events, neither Brazil, nor China, nor Russia will be the first to stretch a helping hand to the struggling movements of the 1

While this article was being written, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy published Joint Communication “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.” This document indicates a shift in the EU approach to the Mediterranean region, obvious in particular in the announced ENP review, and should no doubt be spread not only within the European Institutions, but among our Southern interlocutors as well. 2 Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States on the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt on the other part, September 30, 2004, Official Journal of the European Union, Treaties Office Database, http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=t rue&treatyId=231.

Mediterranean. Brazil barely uttered a reaction to the events, 3 while little taste in Russia and China for die-hard sanctions against Libya is clear given their own autocratic styles of government.4 This paper focuses on the past failures of the European policies in the region and the needed changes for future success. Now is a rare opportunity for European leadership. To lead, the EU has to review its recent policy lessons learned in the Arab world. It is my understanding that this reassessment can be equally applied to the transatlantic community. Until now, the revolutionaries in our Southern neighborhood have been clear about what they are fighting against. But the objectives of their struggle, sculpted in broad concepts of dignity, justice and freedom,5 still have to take a concrete, attainable shape. If these noble goals are to lead the Arab countries toward a better future, they should strive to achieve prosperity, good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.6 From its start in 1995, the Barcelona Process has been criticized for not linking financial aid to democratic reform, as well as for prioritizing immigration, security, and anti-terrorist aspects of cooperation over others. As a result, the realization of the Euro-Mediterranean vision has been lagging behind its original goals.7 Europe should shift the long-time focus of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, now the European Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean, ENP and UfM) from the current fixture on immigration and security to the original objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, emphasizing investment in democracy, human rights, and education.8 Those objectives of 3

Gabriel Elizondo, “Brazil’s business in Libya,” AlJazeera, February 21, 2011, http://blogs.aljazeera.net/americas/2011/02/21/brazils-business-libya. 4 Elizabeth Economy, “Libya: China’s New Middle East Conundrum,” CFR, February 23, 2011, http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/02/23/libya-china%E2%80%99s-new-middle-east-connundrum/; Dmitrii Medvedev, speech on the meeting of the National Antiterrorist Commission, Vladikavkaz, February 22, official website of the President of Russia, http://kremlin.ru/news/10408; James Blitz, Daniel Dombey, Delphine Strauss “Alarm over plans for Libya no-fly zone,” The Financial Times, March 1, 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/27198084-43fe-11e0-8f2000144feab49a.html#axzz1FQiKIMwi. 5 This is a pervasive outcry of the young people of the Arab world, as expressed by Al-Iskander Rekik, President of The National Alliance for Peace and Prosperity Party in Tunisia, one of the inspiration-drivers of the Tunisian revolution, PowerPoint presentation “The Tunis-Ami of MENA: Challenges and Opportunities for the EU,” Seminar of European Ideas Network and centre-right Think Tanks and Political Foundations in Europe, “Revolt in the Arab World: Challenges and Opportunities for a joint Transatlantic Policy,” March 22, 2010, Madrid. 6 Specifically, Senior Editor of the Cairo weekly Watani Adel Guindy suggested that, without interfering in the process, the EU can push for “an unambiguous reference to full and unconditional respect of the universal human rights values [in Egyptian constitution] as expressed in international conventions. While such a text will be no guarantee that the human rights are respected, its absence will be a guarantee (as is the case today) that human rights will NOT be respected.” Similar idea can be applied to Tunisia. Seminar of European Ideas Network and centre-right Think Tanks and Political Foundations in Europe, “Revolt in the Arab World: Challenges and Opportunities for a joint Transatlantic Policy,” March 22, 2010, Madrid. 7 Richard Youngs, “Ten years of the Barcelona Process: A Model for Supporting Arab Reform?” FRIDE, January 2005, http://www.fride.org/publication/57/ten-years-of-the-barcelona-process:-a-model-for-supporting-arab-reform?; Richard Youngs and Kristina Kausch, “The end of the ‘Euro-Mediterranean vision,’” FRIDE, September 24, 2009, http://www.fride.org/publication/653/the-end-of-the-euro-mediterranean-vision. 8 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication: “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,” COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels, March 8, 2011, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf.

advancing “a comprehensive partnership,” political reform and creating “a common area of peace and stability”9 with a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area formed the basis of the EMP. The EMP funding mechanism (MEDA) specifically included the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights. This crucial link between security, democracy, and human development has since been broken and needs to be restored through investment in good governance, regional development, and education. In 2004, the EMP evolved into the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) framework and seemed to have further lost focus on democratic development of the region. The European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which replaced MEDA as the main financial mechanism in 2007, put human rights related funding for the region into the National Indicative Program (NIP) encompassing 17 countries: 10 from the South and seven from the East of Europe.10 Although good governance and human rights remained among the ENP goals, the Policy continued to emphasize security and border control.11 The same lost sense of purpose is found in the transformation in January 2007 of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, originally part of MEDA, into the European Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). This new instrument was decoupled from the Barcelona Process and from the MED region and became part of the EU budget for promoting democracy and human rights around the world.12 The instrument’s allocation to the South neighborhood in 2010 was €5.55 million for “promoting human rights and democratic reform” in Country-Based Support Schemes (about 8% of nearly €144 million total EIDHR budget for 2010). This fraction of funds had to be distributed among Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen.13 One last example of our lack of focus is the National Indicative Program (NIP), which allocated €1.9 billion for Euro South in 2011-13, supporting, along with good governance and democracy reforms, economic competitiveness and productivity, environmental sustainability, transport, energy, security reform, trade, investment development, financial and regulatory stability, and fight 9

Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, November 27-28, 1995, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf. 10 European Commission, EuropeAid, Development, and Cooperation, updated in 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/index_en.htm; European Commission, European Neighborhood Policy, updated 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm. 11 Communication from the European Commission, European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM(2004)373, May 12, 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf; Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2010)207, “Taking Stock of the European Neighborhood Policy,” May 12, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/com10_207_en.pdf. 12 Summaries of EU legislations, Human rights in non-EU countries, European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (2000-2006), http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/human_rights_in_third_countries/r10110_en.htm; Summaries of EU legislations, Human Rights, Human rights in non-EU countries, A financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights in the world (2007 – 2013), http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/human_rights/human_rights_in_third_countries/l14172_en.htm. 13 Commission Decision on the Annual Action Program 2010 for the European Instrument for the promotion of Democracy and Human Rights worldwide (EIDHR), 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/humanrights/documents/aap_2009_en.pdf.

against extremism.14 Unless we shift our priorities in the region toward good governance, democracy and human rights, and let our funding reflect those priorities, we risk losing momentum to support regional reforms.15 In 2008, the EMP was “re-launched” under the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with a political emphasis. However, in a “realism” exercise, the UfM watered down the thrust of the EMP, replacing the former priorities of regional democratization and economic integration with several “initiatives,” such as “de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, prevention of man-made disasters, solar energy plan, a Euro-Mediterranean University, and Business Development Initiative.” For all its high language the UfM turned to be an empty shell. Due in part to bad timing – the launch of the UfM coincided with the beginning of the Gaza War – it failed to gather a high-level political impulse (it held no ministerial-level meeting for a long time). Its education initiative or a EuroMed university looks like posturing, and its biggest investment initiative – Mediterranean Solar Plan – has failed to take off the ground, while its private equivalent, Desertec project, which also seeks to bring solar energy from North Africa to the EU, has 17 partners and 22 associate partners from over seven countries. It took the UfM over two years just to set up a secretariat. Attaining any of the EMP goals, such as governance reform or free trade area with the South neighborhood, remains beyond its limits.16 To implement the original far-reaching Barcelona vision for the region, the ENP has to revisit the distribution of financial support, rebalancing funding for the East and South neighborhoods and assigning greater importance to democracy, civic freedoms, and human rights, enshrined in one of the three baskets of the Barcelona Process.17 Otherwise, the sense of its purpose is lost behind the complexity of its instruments. The European Investment Bank (EIB) was designed not simply as an investment mechanism, but as a bank with a purpose similar to that of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in Eastern Europe: “improvements in the living standards of people” and the need for “environmental and social conditions [to] reflect peoples’ needs.” 18 However, the EIB, which has been providing €10.7 billion of economic and infrastructure development funds to the region

ENPI Info Centre: Euro East 2011-13, http://www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?lang_id=450&id_type=2&id=361; ENPI Info Centre: Euro South 2011-13, http://www.enpi-info.eu/main.php?id=88&id_type=3. 15 European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Communication: “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,” COM(2011) 200 final, Brussels, March 8, 2011, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/docs/com2011_200_en.pdf. 16 Matthias Ruchser, „Desertec or the Mediterranean Solar Plan – whose sun is shining brighter?” Europe’s World, August 4, 2010, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/1689/language/enUS/Default.aspx. 17 The three baskets of the Barcelona Process are: Political and Security; Economic and Financial; and Social, Cultural and Human baskets. The Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, updated March 3, 2011, http://www.barcelona.com/barcelona_news/the_barcelona_process_or_euro_mediterranean_partnership. 18 EBRD Mission Statement, updated April 6, 2010, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/what/mission/transition.shtml.

through the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) in 2007-13,19 does not emphasize human rights and democracy, while the EBRD implicitly does.20 Most of the money is infrastructure investment, with Egypt and Tunisia the biggest recipients in 2010, despite their poor humanitarian and reform record. With only €2.6 billion of €72 billion of the total EIB investment dedicated to the Mediterranean countries, FEMIP’s financial limitations are apparent.21 The EU would do well to link the EIB investment with the EU policy goals in the region, as well as to direct a substantive part of the EBRD funds to MENA, changing the Bank’s exclusive focus on the East neighborhood.22 EU investment support in economic and infrastructure development is crucial for the prosperity in the region, and no doubt, prosperity will play a role in achieving good governance and the consolidation of the democratic process. However, the former does not automatically generate the latter. Thus, the ENPI dedicated €6.107 billion to 10 countries in the region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia) between 2007 and 2013 for infrastructure projects and promotion of economic reforms.23 While the Commission strategy argues that the EU funds are allocated to encourage the countries’ progress on democratic reform and good governance, in reality European money comes with no strings attached.24 Education remains a key area where the EU can contribute to the development of the South neighborhood, especially when young people are making up the majority of the region’s population.25 Although Arab states increased the quantity of the education, opening new schools and universities and allowing more private education institutions to flourish, the quality still leaves much to be desired. Religion remains a compulsory subject throughout the university program. 26 Inquisitiveness, critical thinking and objective analysis are discouraged. Instead, state and religious 19

EIB, Finance contracts signed –Mediterranean Countries, 2007-2011, http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/regions/mediterranean-countries/index.htm. 20 Part of EBRD’s mission is “to promote market economies that function well – where ... household incomes reflect rising employment and productivity, and where environmental and social conditions reflect peoples’ needs.” The EBRD website, mission statement, updated 2010, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/what/mission.shtml. 21 European Investment Bank, Projects Financed 2010, updated in 2011, http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/index.htm. 22 EBRD, Country Factsheets, updated 2011 (Armenia €85.2mm; Azerbaijan €232mm; Georgia €81mm; Moldova €57.3mm; Ukraine €1.1bn), http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/factsheets.shtml. 23 Charles Milhaud, High-Level Working Group appointed by the President of France, “Final Report: The Financial of Co-Development in the Mediterranean,” May 2010, http://www.minefe.gouv.fr/directions_services/dgtpe/publi/rap_milhaud1009_en.pdf. 24 “The ENP … conditionality element … is an additional incentive to pursue political and economic reform.” Communication from the European Commission, European Neighborhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM(2004)373, May 12, 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf. The Joint Communication by the European Commission and High Representative “A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” particularly seeks to tie future EU aid to reforms in the ENP review. 25 Homeland Security News Wire, “Crisis in Egypt: Disaffected youth, stagnation, poverty threaten Mideast regimes,” February 2, 2011, http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/disaffected-youth-stagnation-poverty-threaten-mideastregimes. 26 The Economist, “Education in the Arab world: Laggards trying to catch up,” October 15, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14660446.

interpretations of history, science, politics, and values are hammered in.27 Result: according to Pew Global Attitudes Survey of Muslim populations in 2010, 95% of Egyptians think it good for Islam to play a large role in politics, 82% of Egyptians are in favor of stoning for adultery, 77% support hand cutting for theft, and 84% approve death for apostasy.28 The Davos Forum called inadequately educated workforce one of the five “problematic factors for doing business” and a significant barrier to growth.29 Yet, the EU funding for education remains limited, reflecting the lack of emphasis on this area. Education is one of nine sectoral cooperation areas of the ENPI, together with freedom and security, justice, energy, and health.30 Although 13% of UfM funds in 2009 went toward education and training, the UfM does not outline education among its priorities. The Euro-Mediterranean University looks more like a window-dressing project than a true effort to push for deeper education reform in the South Mediterranean.31 Of nine regional countries, only Egypt channeled a large proportion of the 2007-13 ENP funds, nearly 50%, toward education.32 Higher education programs, like TEMPUS and Erasmus-Mundus have been popular and successful, but they target primarily the region’s intellectual elite, while bypassing the majority of the population who will determine broader regional development. Finally, Europe’s aid and investment directed toward education in the region is scattered through interregional, regional, national, and thematic programs. It is difficult to see how funds allocated in so many directions may be well accounted for. Europe has to draw conclusions from this merger of values and interests and the disappearance of the line between short- and long-term interests in the South Mediterranean. Infrastructure investment and economic reform are necessary for the region’s development. However, they cannot transform the region without a parallel emphasis on democracy, rule of law, human rights, and education. To advance both, the EU has to link its investment and aid programs to concrete results in democratic reform and press for more accountability from the region’s education reform. 27

Marwan Muasher, “The Arab World in Crisis: Redefining Arab Moderation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 27, 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Muasher_Outlook_Jan11_ArabWorldInCrisis_Word.pdf; Marwan Muasher, The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation, Chapters 9 & 10. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. Along the same lines, the EPP President and former Prime Minister of Belgium Wilfried Martens said: “The West is not at war with Islam. Christianity is not at war with Islam. And neither is democracy. All three, however, are incompatible with a certain interpretation which claims that the Scripture is the basis upon which to build a state.” Seminar of European Ideas Network, “Revolt in the Arab World: Challenges and Opportunities for a joint Transatlantic Policy,” on March 22, 2010, in Madrid. 28 Pew Global Attitudes Survey of Muslim Populations, December 2, 2010, http://pewglobal.org/2010/12/02/muslimsaround-the-world-divided-on-hamas-and-hezbollah/. 29 Charles Milhaud, May 2010. 30 Andrew Jacobs, “Opportunities for the private sector in Neighborhood countries,” EuropeAid Cooperation Office, Seminar “Water supply and wastewater treatment in EU External Aid Programs,” Brussels, November 24, 2010, http://agora.mfa.gr/agora/images/docs/rad7159DOPPORTUTNITIES%20IN%20NEIGHBOURHOOD%20COUNTRIES.pdf. 31 Instead, as Senior Editor of the Cairo weekly Watani and President of the Coptic Solidarity NGO Adel Guindy suggested, the EU would do better to found a “real”, affordable European university, free from nepotism and propaganda, “with international admission standards, educational methods” cultivating “freedom of thought.” Such university would attract and cultivate future leaders of these societies based on merit, and not class or origin. Seminar of European Ideas Network, “Revolt in the Arab World: Challenges and Opportunities for a joint Transatlantic Policy,” on March 22, 2010, in Madrid. 32 Charles Milhaud, May 2010.