Ghana’s dilemma: Life or debt?

The issue of Africa’s sovereign debt, that is debt carried by an African state, has been of growing importance as various countries struggle to meet their domestic and international financial commitments. This struggle has fed into economies, perhaps most notably in Ghana where the country’s independent power producers (IPPs) are adamant that debts owed to them by government must be paid in order for them to continue supplying power.

According to the IPPs, shutting down power plants remains the only viable option if the debts are not settled, and the state’s power company has resorted to cutting power to those entities that did not meet their debts. This even threatened the power supply to Ghana’s parliament until a last minute arrangement was reached.

The Ghana government has attempted to restructure this debt with a proposal to the IPPs to honour its debt-servicing obligation to both domestic and external creditors this year. The projected interest payments on loans could cost the state about GH₵53bn ($5bn) putting government in a parlous fiscal position.

A $3bn bailout package from the IMF was reached at a staff level and was contingent on a to central bank finance for the government. The fund also asked Ghana to make progress on restructuring its domestic debts.

Ghana’s Minister of finance, Ken Ofori-Atta claims the fund’s conditions had been met. “Those are literally all done, so we are pretty much there,” he said. “We have done what is required.” Its restructuring talks are being closely watched by other low and middleincome countries who are in, or at risk of, default.

However, the IPPs have stubbornly refused to reschedule the bulk of Ghana’s domestic debt. An added difficulty has been that the debt has been denominated in US dollars. The US currency has steadily appreciated against the Ghanaian Cedi.

Additionally, the initial power purchase agreements (PPAs) stipulated a take-or-pay clause, i.e. that an off-take levy was payable whether or not the power was utilised.

mammoth debt operation exercise.

The IMF’s support is dependent on Ghana meeting a string of conditions, such as raising revenues through hiking the rate of value added tax, tariff increases on public utilities and an end

In 2018, excess generation capacity contracted under take-or-pay PPAs cost the government $320m in capacity charges, which was projected to hit $620m annually with the addition of new plants in 2019, Today there are over 30 PPAs operating in the country and the country’s energy sector generates a debt burden of about $1bn and excess capacity charges of $500m annually. At the end of 2021, when Ghana’s debt GDP ratio reached an unprecedented 80% threshold, IPP payments were a major factor, but sovereign debt was also a significant problem.

There is a strong argument that Ghana’s debt woes began with its first issuance of a Eurobond in 2007 when the discovery of off-shore oil sparked a surge in economic optimism.

The country’s debut bond of $750m was followed up by the issuance of two additional Eurobonds totaling $2bn in 2013 and 2014. Other countries in Africa soon followed suit.

In 2011, Zambia obtained its first sovereign credit rating from Fitch that enabled the country to issue two Eurobonds in 2012 and 2014. This increased Zambia’s external debt by an incredible 300% in three years. Kenya likewise jumped on the bandwagon, issuing three Eurobonds between 2014 and 2019 that totaled around $5.5 billion.30

According to the World Bank’s International Debt Statistics handbook, the stock of Eurobond debt for sub-Saharan Africa grew from about $32bn in 2010 to $135bn in 2020, a 322% rate of increase. Despite their name, Eurobonds are denominated in US dollars. In mid-April, during the annual IMF-World Bank meetings, the Paris Club met. Ghana’s sovereign debt was high on the agenda. The hope was that the Paris Club group, which is essentially a consortium of countries such as the US, EU and UK (but not China) that have lent to developing countries, would coordinate their response to requests for debt rescheduling.

Ghana had reached an agreement with the IMF for a $3bn support package in December.

But the Fund required bilateral lenders to provide assurances they will restructure its debt as a condition of signing off on the loan. Ghana’s finance minister said that official creditor financial assurances were expected by May, and that the country’s domestic debt exchange programme would yield 38 billion cedis ($3.16bn) of debt service savings in 2023. He also confirmed that $20bn of external debt was eligible for restructuring, 66% of the external debt stock. Of that, $5.4bn in official creditor debt will be restructured. An understanding with official creditors and an agreement in principle on Eurobond restructuring is expected in July, with the 2030 Eurobond (partially guaranteed by the World Bank) included in the restructuring, the minister said.

He added that Ghana needs a $1.5bn financial stability fund to ensure appropriate solvency and liquidity. “The World Bank has fortunately agreed to support this fund with a quarter of a billion and government, looking at the space we have, also committing about $500m to that,” Ofori-Atta said at the virtual press briefing following the Paris Club meeting. Ghana’s net foreign exchange reserves fell sharply in 2022 and are currently $2.6bn, Ghana’s central bank governor Ernest Addison said at the briefing.

Stephen Williams

Access to financial ser vices has been a major policy focus since the Bank of Ghana was established. Numerous policy inter ventions to achieve inclusive access to financial ser vices subsequently led to the establishment of several non-bank financial institutions, including savings and loans companies, microfinance institutions, as well as rural and community banks. The late 2000s marked a notable change in the focus of the Bankʼs financial inclusion strategy towards Digital Financial Ser vice (DFS), on account of significant penetration of mobile telephony across the countr y

In 2018, the Government issued a five-year National Financial Inclusion and Development Strategy (NFIDS) to fur ther drive Ghanaʼs financial inclusion effor ts in a coherent and coordinated manner. Being the overarching policy document on financial inclusion, the NFIDS was developed through broad stakeholder collaborative effor ts and benefited extensively from rich diverse views. The strategy effectively

The growing use of a Bank of Ghana approved crowdfunding product in recent times by religious groupings, associations, and corporate bodies for economic, social, health and environmental purposes reflect the timeliness and usefulness of this policy intervention in the financial sector.