Book Review
By Wg Cdr Rich Milburn, RAF
The RAF and Tribal Control: Airpower and Irregular Warfare between the World Wars By Richard D. Newton Publisher: University Press of Kansas, 2019, 264 pages Unquestionably my favorite airpower quote is Thomas Keaney and Eliot Cohen’s satirically eloquent observation, “airpower is an unusually seductive form of military strength because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer the pleasures of gratification without the burdens of commitment.” I first saw this quoted nearly five years ago in Stephen Wrage’s Immaculate Warfare, an excellent book about the Kosovo air war, read it in its original articled form last year, and encountered it anew in Richard Newton’s, The RAF and Tribal Control. This quote has framed my airpower thinking since I first read it, as it accurately reflects how governments feverishly brandish airpower like a magic wand, expecting results to flow as day follows night. This blind trust in airpower is not entirely the fault of these aforementioned governments. Generations of airpower thinkers and writers have overstated airpower’s independent utility, beginning with Trenchard, Mitchell et al., and more recently Colonel John Warden. One of the primary case studies used to illustrate the mystical power of the air weapon is the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) interwar use of “air control” to quell tribal problems in the British Empire and Mandates. In the shortened, and somewhat erroneous version of events, strategic bombing of the tribes worked like a charm, saving the British government millions of pounds and ensuring peace and security throughout the galaxy. The short version of the story has airborne bombing as a lone agent, its moral and physical effects bringing the tribes to heel. The proliferation of this myth is not entirely surprising, as it is the tale Trenchard wished to tell. As Newton describes admirably, the RAF’s air control doctrine was a means to fight for the survival of the independent service, amid a climate of bitter inter-service rivalry. Faced with swingeing defense cuts and a political policy of “No War for Ten Years” the RAF needed an independent mission, or would face being re-absorbed www.aircommando.org
into the senior Services. The RAF did everything it could to succeed in this mission during the inter-war period, but Trenchard, for organizational reasons, highlighted the accuracy of bombing and diminished the role of any ground forces in his reporting to Whitehall. The full story of air control has not been told, until now. The RAF and Tribal Control is an important addendum to airpower’s history, as it tells the true story of how the RAF won success. Crucially, this was not merely a victory for strategic bombing alone, nor was it an unequivocal triumph. Coercive theories of airpower’s historical success have focused on the morale effects (and latterly physical effects, too) of a punishment campaign. Newton, by contrast, identifies with the writings on coercion of Karl Mueller, who postulated that success comes about through a combination of capability, credibility, and communication. The first two of these are ubiquitous in the literature, and reflect Carl von Clausewitz’s observation that the power of an enemy’s resistance is the product of, “the sum of available means and the strength of his will”. The importance of communication, or perception as Newton rebadges it, is hugely underappreciated. This is where Newton’s story is centered, with communication, and the untold story of the RAF Special Service Officers (SSOs), who lived among the tribes, gaining an understanding of their strengths, weaknesses, languages and culture. What Newton goes on to explain is that the SSOs were no mere harbingers of doom for the tribes. In fact, they had an extremely nuanced diplomatic, cultural, and military role little recognized until now. Certainly, the RAF SSOs gave meaning to the actions of their winged comrades. They warned the tribes of the consequences of non-compliance with governmental edict. However, Newton points out that the SSOs were present to understand what the tribes valued, to ensure not only that governmental demands had been understood, but sometimes to mediate between the two entities. This role required the SSOs have an intimate knowledge of the tribes, and an innate sense of justice to resolve inter-tribal squabbles. SSOs often adopted tribal dress and manners to be more readily accepted. They learned the languages and customs of the tribes, and listened first-hand to their problems, using a leadership-centric approach. Newton relates the experiences of John Bagot Glubb, an early SSO, who was sent out to inform a tribe near Baghdad that bombing would start if taxes were not paid. He learned through two days of talks Vol 9, Issue 1 │ AIR COMMANDO JOURNAL │ 49
