RPI FALL 2012
Oil & Democracy: Do They Mix? By Allan La Grenade-Finch
Oil Politics Professor Steve Breyman December 7th, 2012
This paper examines the relationship between oil wealth and democracy by incorporating current events and historical evidence to provide context for the complex link between the two. Questions like “Does oil hinder democracy?” and “How do authoritarian governments retain control in an increasingly democratic world?” will be discussed and addressed.
Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 3 Limited Resources ..................................................................................................................................... 3 Democracy’s Spread ................................................................................................................................. 4 Thesis ........................................................................................................................................................ 5 Lessons of the Arab Spring ........................................................................................................................... 6 Origins ...................................................................................................................................................... 6 Results ....................................................................................................................................................... 7 Trends ....................................................................................................................................................... 8 Historical Significance of Oil & Developing Countries ............................................................................... 8 Pre 1970s Oil Economy ............................................................................................................................ 8 Nationalization of Oil Companies............................................................................................................. 9 OPEC Formation .................................................................................................................................... 10 Modernization Theory ............................................................................................................................. 11 Rise of a New Petro-Political Class ........................................................................................................ 12 Barriers to Changes in Governance ............................................................................................................ 13 Social Welfare ......................................................................................................................................... 13 Lack of Transparency ............................................................................................................................. 15 The Best Army Money Can Buy .............................................................................................................. 17 Threats to Authoritarian Rule ..................................................................................................................... 17 The Internet & Online Social Media ....................................................................................................... 17 Al-Jazeera ............................................................................................................................................... 18 Oil Market Uncertainty ........................................................................................................................... 19 Solutions to Change the Status Quo............................................................................................................ 19 Curbing the Global Oil Thirst................................................................................................................. 19 Oil Market Transparency ........................................................................................................................ 20 In Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 20
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Introduction Limited Resources
The current state of affairs surrounding oil and its affect on the countries that have it in abundance has been given a number of descriptors over the last century. Cast in a positive light, historians and geopolitics experts have described oil’s effects as “transformative” and “the backbone of an industrialized society.” However, academics like Michael T. Klare and Michael L. Ross describe it as a “curse” and place it in the context of a global “natural resource war.” They have dedicated their primary research efforts to this query, publishing books and coining new geopolitical terms along the way. Their justifications for their descriptions stem from an analysis of economic and political data surrounding the oil trade and the citizens affected by it. Ross notes that while data would suggest that developing countries have been increasing in wealth and stability since 1980, this trend did not also apply to countries with real oil wealth. For example, in oil-rich Venezuela and Iraq, per capita incomes fell by 6 percent in Venezuela and 85 percent in Iraq from 1980 to 2006 (Ross, Curse 1). In addition, Iraq, Sudan, Nigera and others have been embroiled in various Civil Wars over the same time period. This socioeconomic peril and difficulty expose the flaws in the governments presiding over these countries with vast reserves of oil. Indeed, the last few decades have demonstrated a curious link between the rise of oil wealth and the governments that control it.
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Specifically in the Middle East, the governments of most oil-rich nations tend to be more authoritarian in nature, whether the specific government is described formally as a monarchy, a dictatorship, or a hybrid blend of citizen participation and ruling political elitism. Of the top ten countries in the world ranked as having the most oil available in reserves, six of them are located in the Middle East (CIA Factbook). Figure 1 details the Arab countries with the greatest amount of oil reserves:
Figure 1- Chart of selected Middle East proven oil reserves
Most of the governments of the above countries are ruled by monarchies or autocrats. Only Iraq is truly experimenting with a new democratic system (and then only at the behest of the United States). Iran supports a hybrid system of theocracy and limited participation democracy that is mostly ineffectual at garnering a truly representative vote and view from the public. Democracy’s Spread
Despite the unrepresentative political realities of oil-rich nations, democracy has made great strides in its adoption and implementation across various countries around the world. Only
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30 percent of the world's governments were democratic in 1980 and approximately 60 percent are today (Ross, Drown 1). However, in most of the countries in which democracy has spread, there is little oil to be found. Countries producing less than $100 per capita of oil each year were three times as likely to democratize as countries that produced more. Countries like Bahrian, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have never converted from authoritarian, autocratic styles of government to a democracy on their own. And even in countries like oil-rich Venezuela, which was a part of the sweeping changes from dictatorships to free elections in 1958, leaders like Hugo Chavez have engaged in corrupt behavior as a result of their easy access to windfall oil revenues. The corruption of even this supposed democracy has earned Venezuela the description as “a symptom of broader institutional weaknesses in Latin America” by the 2011 Democracy Index Report (25). Thesis
The relationship of the weakening (or absence) of institutional democracy and the governance of oil wealth is the subject of this paper. There is undoubtedly a trend between the presence of oil wealth and the lack of representative democracy in the host country’s government. The following research questions whether the relationship is coincidental or in fact directly comparable in a cause-and-effect fashion. Utilizing the recent Arab Spring series of mid-east revolutions as a cultural starting point, the case will be made that while oil wealth does not directly hinder the possibility of democracy, it certainly catalyzes and enables authoritarianstyle rule in the face of a world engaged in a growing resource war. There are three primary methods used by leaders to support their rule: extending social welfare, denying financial transparency, and providing generous support to a military security force. And, while this
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system has proven to be quite adept at keeping autocrats in power, threats do exist that could crack the armor and open up the chance for changes to the status quo to be made.
Lessons of the Arab Spring
Origins
In 2011, the Middle East seemed to explode with a common call for revolution and drastic change in governance and civil rights. Accountability was the concept on the tip of everyone’s tongue, started by the public suicide of a young Tunisian man humiliated and fed up with bleak economic realities (Gardner 1). Mohamed Bouazizi quickly became a symbol of the indignity and injustice felt by many in the country. His frustration and extreme reaction as a result were exactly the right combination for his viral spread across the internet among young people in the Middle East. Protests and riots were founded on the idea that government-- local and state-wide-- were unaccountable and that elite political classes were engaged in financial fraud and unjust human rights abuses (Zweynert). According to the 2011 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Report released by the United Kingdom (UK) Secretary of State, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region suffers from the challenges of a growing young population, rising prices, and unemployment. More than half of the population was under the age of 25 in 2010 and many of them lived in poverty. Economic growth could not keep up with population growth, and regional youth unemployment stood at 23 percent in 2011 (Foreign Commonwealth Office 13). In direct contrast to the difficulties shared by many in these countries, the ruling political elites were seen as channeling public resources for private gain and engaging in other corrupt activities at the expense of the
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population at large. Along with cries for the end of corruption also came the demand for greater political freedoms as well. Results
Figure 2- Map indicating the results of the Arab Spring protests
As of 2012, governments have been overthrown in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen. Large protests occurred in Lebanon, Iraq, and Algeria. Smaller-scale protests sympathetic to the revolutionary spirit were carried out in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon. And, the governments of Morocco, Jordan, and Oman, and Kuwait responded to the protests with some governmental changes. The world does not yet know what the long-term effects of the protests will be. The countries that either overthrew previous rulers or influenced their government to change are still engaged in a delicate dance of negotiation and retooling after two years of dazzling protests and calls for change.
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Trends
However, as much democratic progress was made, the majority of nations with vast amounts of oil wealth remained immune to the waves of change. In fact, of the major oil countries in the Middle East, only Libya’s government fell, and even then, only with the aid of NATO forces (Chivers). Powerful oil monarchies clamped down on pro-democracy protests by introducing new laws further criminalizing freedom of expression and assembly while also promoting the increase of economic benefits by $130 billion U.S. dollars (Human Rights Watch). The Arab Spring served as an experiment with only one independent variable: the possibility of political change in light of a demanding public. The inability of the protests to affect the majority of oil rich nations in the Middle East proved just how powerful the wealthy, oil-backed governments were while being surrounded on all sides by revolution and demands for greater accountability.
Historical Significance of Oil & Developing Countries
Pre 1970s Oil Economy
The existence of oil wealth has not always been such a direct aid to power-hungry autocracies. Today, oil-producing countries are 50 percent more likely to be governed by autocrats and more than twice as likely to be consumed by Civil War (Ross, Curse 1). However, before the early 1970s, oil-producing countries were not any more likely to be less democratic than other non-oil states (Ross, Drown 2).
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For the majority of the twentieth century, control of oil production and profits could be found in the hands of Western oil companies. Companies involved included Gulf Oil, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil Company of New York, Texaco, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Called the “Seven Sisters,” these giant companies expanded their domestic operations into a global enterprise, utilizing their accrued petroleum profits to invest in oil production within the borders of foreign countries. The “producing consortia” of these international companies enabled them to command a great deal of bargaining power with respect to the national governments. Profits went directly into the hands of these Western oil companies, with little-to-none of the windfall profits reaching the host countries’ governments and even less making it to the citizens. Nationalization of Oil Companies
Nationalist sentiment grew in the developing world after the wave of decolonization that took place in the 50s and 60s. Foreign resource-mining companies carried with their exploits the stench of colonial rule, and the nationalization of industries was a way to clearly distinguish newly-independent nations as deserving and capable of their newfound economic freedom. From the 1960s into the 1970s, national governments began to assume ownership of their country’s oil production. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Muhammad Mussadiq, Iraq nationalized the Anglo-Iranian oil company in 1950 to boycotts and protests from other international oil companies (Luciani 85). However the benefits of nationalization (including the elimination of exploitative production contracts and complete control over revenues) were soon apparent and other countries like followed suit, including Iraq in 1961, and Saudi Arabia in 1980.
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Nationalizations brought massive influxes of wealth and prosperity nearly overnight. Countries had far greater control of their assets and the profits that came along with them. Prices were raised to record levels, with the profit margins ushering in an unprecedented transfer of wealth from oil-importing states to the oil-exporting ones (Ross, Curse 8). The finances of exporting oil-rich states were stabilized, and the size of national government grew. It was no longer imperative to collect taxes and royalties from international oil companies. Government funding could be wholly financed through the sale of oil. The revolution in energy markets made the oil-rich governments larger, richer, and more powerful than ever before. OPEC Formation
Upon nationalizing their oil companies, country leaders in the Middle East sought a means by which to control oil flow and pricing relative to each other. Five founding countries, including Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait, formed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Their primary purpose consisted of the coordination of mutually-beneficial economic policies that would lead to shared prosperity in the form of oil profits (Dumon). According to OPEC itself, their allegiance grew out of a need to secure the sovereignty of newly independent states (OPEC.org). Whatever the founding reasons truly were, the end result of the coalition led to their leverage over the old multinational oil companies and further legitimized their nationalized operations. OPEC ensured the long-term prosperity of individual oil-producing states by agreeing on an efficient production pace, controlling global oil prices (although to a lesser degree nowadays), and managing public relations in the face of a Western world more concerned about the negative effects of carbon dioxide produced by oil production (Dumon).
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Modernization Theory
This oil wealth was supposed to only bring greater prosperity and civil rights to the people of developing countries. Beginning in the 1950s, economists and geopolitical analysts predicted that the resource wealth would help, not hurt them. The central issue of developing countries was thought to be the uneven balance of available labor and lack of starter investment capital to develop the economy. Oil sale profits would also allow for country leaders to begin making serious investments in national infrastructure, building roads, bridges, and schools among other capital improvements (Ross, Curse 2). Basic social welfare was also to be possible, ensuring the well-being of citizens and building good will between the people and the government. In addition to capital improvements, political scientists believed in the modernization theory as a solution to the political unrest of developing nations. This theory—the prevailing view of 1950s and 1960s political development—surmised that increases in a country’s income per capita would lead to improvements in almost every dimension of its political health, including the effectiveness of its government, the government’s accountability to its people, and the promotion of various human rights (Ross, Curse 2). This prevailing conventional wisdom was true for much of the next three decades, but changed once nationalization began to spread. However, while nationalization made oil-exporting countries richer and their governments stronger, the newfound prosperity was a mixed bag for citizens. Wealth and power was now held firmly under the thumb of local politicians who, as will be detailed later, were greatly influenced by the new wealth in unsavory ways.
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Rise of a New Petro-Political Class
Leaders who supported nationalization of domestic oil reserves gained incredible amounts of political capital as revenue wealth began to pour into the country. Officials like Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya rose to prominence and strengthened their power, respectively, by being involved and supportive of the nationalization efforts. Political capital was granted to each man based upon the influx of wealth they were responsible for creating within their countries. Saddam Hussein’s rise to power stemmed from his realization of the value of oil nationalization to the financial fortunes of Iraq. As a leading member of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, Saddam pushed for the nationalization of Iraqi oil. Vast in abundance, cheap to extract, and valuable on the global energy market, Saddam knew of the political capital to be gained by flushing an impoverished Iraq with oil wealth. Biographer Con Coughlin described Sadaam’s relationship with oil and party politics in his book “Saddam: His Rise and Fall:” “No one was more aware of the revolutionary implications of Iraq’s oil nationalization than Saddam, who wasted no time making sure he received the lion’s share of the credit for the takeover, while also ensuring that, in so doing, he did not detract from the standing of President Bakr. Saddam had, after all, conducted the crucial negotiations both with the Soviets and the IPC. Having fully discussed the available options with Bakr, Saddam had personally conceived the ultimatum that was made to the IPC in the full knowledge that they would refuse, thereby giving the government no alternative other than to proceed with nationalization ... Saddam’s personal involvement
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in the nationalization of the IPC provides a telling insight into how, even as early as 1972, he had acquired a range of highly sophisticated political skills” (107-108). As Iraqi president al-Bakr grew ill in his old age, Saddam used his intra-governmental muscle to force al-Bakr to resign, threatening the elderly man with violence if he did not agree (Coughlin 185). Saddam’s accession to the presidency was politically-savvy and the good will he built up with the Iraqi people provided him with the foundation upon which he could build a strong and accepted political career. Barriers to Changes in Governance Earlier in this paper, the Arab Spring was used as a case study into the potential for governments in the Middle East and around the world to change to a more open and outright democracy. However, sweeping acceptance and implementation of democracy has largely been resisted by oil-rich, authoritarian governments over the last few decades. Why is change so hard to affect in these countries? Well, control of oil revenue has assisted and abetted authoritarian regimes in three primary ways. First, the revenues are used to buy the support of citizens through extended social welfare programs. Second, funneling oil revenues into national finances maintains the secrecy of the spending and investment activities of the government. Third, autocrats heavily support the armed forces and its related endeavors in exchange for the suppression of rebellion, stabilization of the population, and the protection of the political elite. Social Welfare Autocrats can “buy off” citizens by not only providing a great deal of services, salary increases, education, and housing subsidies to its people, but also by granting all of these privileges and more with little-to-no taxation. Michael Ross takes note of the historical La Grenade-Finch 13
relationship between taxation and representation by detailing the circumstances surrounding the American Revolution: “In colonial America, frustrated subjects revolted against Great Britain in part because they had to pay taxes even though they were unrepresented in the British parliament. In the Middle East today, oil-funded leaders typically respond to demands for greater accountability by offering new handouts, lowering taxes, or both -- and this usually works” (Ross, Drown 3). From this historical example, it can be concluded that nontax revenue encourages weak accountability in exchange for an increase in free perks funded by a seemingly-bottomless pit of cash. All wealthy authoritarian governments engage in this exchange of support-for-benefits. Oil wealth is especially conducive to this practice due to the enormity of its value. For example, Algeria announced plans to invest $156 billion in new infrastructure in 2011 at the height of the Arab Spring. Similarly, Saudi Arabia presented $136 billion toward increasing public sector wages, housing subsidies, and unemployment benefits (Ross, Drown 3). Kuwait also gave $3,600 dollars of cash directly to citizens. However, the most extreme example of petrodollar bribery can be found among the citizens of Qatar. The 250,000 Qatari are some of the richest people in the world with a very high standard of living. Qatar itself is the richest country in the world as a function of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Greenfield). Services and benefits of being a citizen include free education, free clothing for school children, free healthcare, housing subsidies, and more—all without income tax. During a CBS News interview with the Emir of Qatar, Bob Simon remarked that:
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“The Arab revolution keeps spreading, leaving chaos and turmoil in its wake. But one country has been untouched by all that: The tiny speck of a nation called Qatar, wedged between Saudi Arabia and Iran. There have been no protests or demonstrations there. That might be because the 250,000 Qatari citizens are the richest people in the world and there are no taxes. There isn't much democracy either, but Qataris don't seem to mind. The same family has ruled them for 150 years and life couldn't be much better. Today, Qatar is not only wealthy; it's powerful, admired or feared by everyone in the Middle East.” Qatar’s extreme social welfare not only serves as a show of strength with respect to the potency of Qatari’s natural resources, but also provides insight as to why citizens under authoritarian rule, too busy enjoying the “high life,” do not spend more time demanding accountability from their government. Lack of Transparency All autocrats stand to gain from secrecy because it allows them to fool citizens into misjudging the actual size of oil revenues. Accountability, however, is also difficult to come by in authoritarian governments due to a lack of information about the way the government is run and how it exactly manages its finances. Oil revenues are especially troubling, due to their high value, unusual source, lack of stability, and secrecy (Ross, Curse 27). Oil rich autocracies, like Algeria and Saudi Arabia, release almost nothing about their oil revenue-related finances. However, autocracies with little oil, like Egypt and Morocco, do release some information (Ross, Drown 3).
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“Off-budget” accounts are used to keep a large fraction of spending concealed by funneling transactions through the private finances of national oil companies. For example, during Saddam Hussein’s reign, more than half of the budget was concealed in the secret budget of the Iraqi National Oil Company. The transactions concealed within these budgets could be fairly benign, but they could also be used to use state money for personal endeavors or political ones, as well. Indonesia’s president used the national oil company to covertly distribute benefits to his supporters in 1998 (Ross, Curse 60). Embezzlement has occurred even in Western National Oil Companies, too. A 400 million Euro embezzlement scandal surrounding France’s national oil company ensnared thirty-seven people, including former government ministers and the presidents of Germany, the Congo and Gabon (Ross, Curse 61). Michael Ross explains the susceptibility of oil revenue secrecy in his book, “The Oil Curse:” “If benevolent accountants ran governments, the unusual qualities of oil revenues might not matter. But governments are ruled by self-interested politicians, who are deeply influenced by the kinds of funds at their disposal. States whose revenues are massive, unstable, opaque, and do not come from taxes, tend to have some strange qualities” (62). If these examples of financial mismanagement were made apparent to citizens of autocracies, distracting them from demanding further accountability would become far more difficult with clear evidence of fraud at their disposal. Greater transparency would probably lead to democratic uprisings in response to leaders squandering the nation’s petroleum wealth (Ross, Curse 71).
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The Best Army Money Can Buy Authoritarian governments run with a high amount of risk. With an acute lack of transparency in government operations and secrecy of probable corruption, the possibility of the whole system collapsing due to increased internal scrutiny or unrest is great. As information surfaced about economic strife and government corruption in late 2010, the juxtaposition of the two issues sparked outrage among youth which resulted in the Arab Spring protests. The regime turnover and government changes that arose as a result are the precise reason why an authoritarian regime prefers a strong military to keep order and to protect themselves from potential violence. As a result, autocrats with oil take deliberate measures to fund and support their military organizations. For example, oil-rich Algeria spent $141 per capita on its armed forces in 2008. In Tunisia, where expansive oil reserves do not exist, $53 per capita was spent on the armed forces. Globally, oil rich nations spend 1 percent more than average on their militaries (Kurczy). President Ahmadinejad of Iran has even given billions of dollars in no-bid contracts to various businesses associated with the Revolutionary Guards. Notice that only minor Arab Springrelated protests were had in oil-rich nations like Saudi Arabia and Oman. This is due to the very effective military intimidation of and intervention within the citizens who attempted to demonstrate (Ross, Drown 3). Threats to Authoritarian Rule The Internet & Online Social Media In 2009, Iran made headlines for blocking the internet on the eve of student demonstrations scheduled to take place all across the country (AP). Students, angry about the La Grenade-Finch 17
recent election results, took to websites, forums, and social media sites to organize themselves in effective protest against a government they viewed as illegitimate and corrupt. Web applications like Twitter are extremely attractive tools for those looking to organize and speak freely about various topics, including the government. Free, mobile, personal, and dynamic, these tools fly in the face of authoritarian regimes by encouraging transparency, providing a place for free speech to occur, and linking people across various physical divides to each other in seconds. Qaddafi disabled internet and international phone access in mid-February of 2011— during the height of the Arab Spring protests. Service was spotty for the next few days as access was occasionally restored for short periods of time, with varying connection quality (Tsotsis). In countries that did not suspend full internet access, internet censorship continued to be standard. Bloggers like Zakariya Rashid Hassan al-Ashiri in Bahrain were arrested for online postings involving human rights and pro-democracy thoughts. Al-Jazeera Founded by the Emir of Qatar in 1996, Al-Jazeera is known in the Arab world as being the leading alternative to Arab state-run television news that actually reports the news. The network’s raw coverage of the protests of the Arab Spring allowed for revolutionaries to protest and see themselves doing so live on a video feed of Al-Jazeera at the same time. Coverage of the government protests by an Arab news network backed by the monarchy of Qatar was of course unprecedented and provided evidence that the network was truly interested in Western-style coverage of current events. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has praised the network for the integrity of its coverage (Gornall). Al-Jazeera brings the concept of free press right to the
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backdoor of many authoritarian regimes. It is probably only a matter of time before the network kicks the door down. Oil Market Uncertainty The volatility of the global energy market ensures that autocrat’s government funds are subject to oscillations of the price of oil. These fluctuations in value are dangerous because of the possibility that social welfare may not be consistently maintainable in the event that value drops significantly. Also, government mismanagement or corruption of the oil revenues could force cutbacks to incentives for businesses, foreign investment, and domestic perks. Any disruptions of consistency in the financial system could invite scrutiny of the international community and suspicion of mismanagement from domestic citizens. Solutions to Change the Status Quo Curbing the Global Oil Thirst As the developed world considers weaning themselves from foreign oil dependency and oil in general, the geopolitical value of doing so should not be underestimated. Currently, oil wealth provides the necessary financial backing of autocracies in the Middle East. As long as oil prices remain high, the ability for funds to be used to finance patronage networks will remain and opposition groups will continue to struggle to organize effectively to challenge the political establishment (Ross 4). However, this solution could be undermined by the rising demand for petroleum in developing countries like China even as the United States reduces consumption (Rapier).
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Oil Market Transparency The United States and other major petroleum importers should push for greater transparency in oil markets. Requiring greater disclosure of finances and business operations would disrupt the current practice of funneling portions of the government budget into national oil companies and make clear the fiscal policies of these authoritarian governments. This can be done through independent organizations like former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Similar transparency can be achieved by encouraging national oil companies to open themselves up to foreign investment. Such an investment would be subject to rules and regulations set by organizations like the U.S. Securities and Exchange Comission (SEC), which asks for registered companies to disclose what they pay to governments for access to oil, gas, and other minerals. This action would increase the amount of information about the management of oil-exporting countries’ revenues and encourage authoritarian regimes to be accountable—if not exactly to their own people, but instead to the world. In Conclusion Democratic revolutions like the 2011 Arab Spring have given rise to representative governance all across the globe for the last thirty years. Curiously, oil-wealth seemed to correlate strongly with authoritarian styles of governance, and democratic waves of change had left these regimes largely unchanged. However, oil wealth did not directly hinder and block change from affecting these governments. Rather, oil wealth empowered and enabled autocrats to stay in power. This wealth allowed authoritarian leaders to hang on to power by bribing the local population, hiding government finances within national oil companies, and providing
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generous funding for a strong, stabilizing military force. Their rule has not been carried out without contest, however. New tools like the internet and old ones like the existence of a rigorous, free press have made dents in autocrats’ armor. The potential for future change and greater accountability from these regimes ultimately depends on greater international calls for financial transparency and the shifting of US Petrodollars from foreign oil to domestic sources of alternative energy.
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Ross, Michael L. The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2012. Print. Ross, Michael L. "Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring?" Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign Relations, Sept.-Oct. 2011. Web. 13 Sept. 2012. Tsotsis, Alexia. "Libya Finds New Way To Cut Off Internet." TechCrunch. N.p., 4 Mar. 2011. Web. 07 Dec. 2012. Zweynert, Astrid. "Arab Spring Is "emphatic Rejection of Corruption" - UN Official." TrustLaw. Reuters, 24 Oct. 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2012.
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