In addition, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has explained that the term “to take part” includes the components of participation in, and access and contribution to, cultural life.85 Accessibility is a necessary condition for the full realization of this right and includes “the right of everyone to seek, receive and share information on all manifestations of culture in the language of the person’s choice, and the access of communities to means of expressions and dissemination”.86 If any measure limits the right to take part in cultural life, the state has to prove it is justified in taking that measure, including that the measure is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, is strictly necessary, and is in compliance with other human rights laws and standards.87 The CESCR has further explained that the promotion and respect for cultural rights is essential for human dignity and the interaction between individuals and communities.88 The duty to protect cultural property and heritage is of such a fundamental nature that states have long agreed to exercise special care even during armed conflict, based on the principle that damage to the cultural property of any people means “damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind” and it is a rule of customary international law.89
2.2 WITNESS ACCOUNTS OF RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND CULTURAL PRACTICE According to China’s constitution and other laws, citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” and the state protects “normal religious activities.”90 The government, however, has not explicitly defined which activities qualify as “normal”. Muslims in Xinjiang have faced severe restrictions on their religious freedom for decades. In 2017, these restrictions became significantly more severe. In March 2017, highly discriminatory De-extremification Regulations were adopted that further restricted certain Islamic religious practices, both in law and in effect.91 Open or even private displays of religious or cultural affiliation, including growing an “abnormal” beard, wearing a veil or headscarf, regular prayer, fasting, avoidance of alcohol, or possessing books or articles about Islam or Uyghur culture could be considered “extremist” under the regulations. After these regulations were promulgated, many religious figures, intellectuals, and academics were detained in Xinjiang merely for exercising their rights to freedom of religion and expression.92 In conjunction with these regulations, government brochures describing “75 manifestation of religious extremism” were widely distributed.93 The alleged signs included wearing beards or face coverings; interference with family-planning policies; constructing religious buildings without approval; participating in Next page: Chinese unapproved pilgrimages; making minors fast, pray, or study scripture; government officials ceasing to drink or smoke or to participate in regular social activities; removing religious and cultural buying or storing large amounts of food; and buying too much gasoline, artefacts from a muslim home. 85 CESCR General Comment No. 21, para 15. 86 CESCR General Comment No. 21, para 16. 87 CESCR General Comment No. 21, paras 19, 46, 65. 88 CESCR General Comment No. 21, paras 1, 6, 48, 49(b). 89 Customary international law refers to international legal obligations that arise from established international practices, as opposed to written conventions and treaties – for a form definition see: Legal Information Institute, “Customary International Law, “https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/ customary_international_law” www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law; Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954); Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 (1999); AP I, Article 53, and AP II, Article 16, to the Geneva Conventions (1977); ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 38. 90 The National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” Article 36, available at: www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm 91 See XUAR Uyghur autonomous region regulations on de-extremification, “Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulations on DeExtremification,” China Law Translate, March 30, 2017, www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/xinjiang-uyghur-autonomous-region-regulation-onde-extremification/; Amnesty International, “China: Families of up to one million detained in mass “re-education” drive demand answer”, 24 September 2018, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/09/china-XUAR-families-of-up-to-one-million-detained-demand-answers/ 92 This includes Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur economist, writer and professor who was sentenced to life in prison in 2014 and Tashpolat Teyip, former president of XUAR University who was sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve in 2017, both on charges of “separatism”; See Amnesty International, “China: Civil Society & Scholars Call on China to Immediately Release Uighur Professor Ilham Tohti Five Years After Arrest,” 15 January 2019, www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa17/9690/2019/en/; Amnesty International, 9 September 2019, “Uyghur academic faces execution in China,” www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1710062019ENGLISH.pdf 93 See Cia Siqi, Global Times, “Xinjiang counties identify 75 forms of religious extremism”, 25 December 2014, www.globaltimes.cn/content/898563.shtml
“LIKE WE WERE ENEMIES IN A WAR” CHINA’S MASS INTERNMENT, TORTURE AND PERSECUTION OF MUSLIMS IN XINJIANG Amnesty International
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