MASSACRE at Malmedy during battle of the BULGE
Also interesting / 41
TheSoviet-American arms race
MILITARY Journal
2017 April
Bimonthly
magazine
Theme story/ 15
Issue 07 April-June
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THE COLD WAR ERA Free Digital Magazine publication
*INDEPENDENT & MUCH DISCUSSED Offers you as reader
MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
*HISTORICAL AND MODERN MILITARY ISSUES
CONTENTS 2542-4858 Editor in Chief Rob Vaneker
Creative director Robert Wilbrink
Editors Note / 03
Editor research Hans Hollestelle
Battle of Malplaquet 1709 / 04 Hitler's Bunkers in Northern France / 11
Columnist
Diverse contributions and different authors
Graphics & Design MASSACRE At Malmedy during BATTle of the BULGE / 15
Robert Wilbrink
Contributors The division of Germany / 27 The soviet-american arms race / 41 Sponsor advertisers / 55
Theo van Loohuizen-Jan Grefhorst-Dik Winkelman-Robert Farley
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Editor’s Note ON THE VISOR The Cold War Both the United States and the USSR did much to prevent the Cold War from escalating, as both countries knew how devastating a nuclear war would be. Truman, for example, kept the Korean War limited by refusing to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and China, aware that doing so would force the USSR to retaliate. President Dwight D. Eisenhower kept his distance from the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, knowing full well that the USSR would not tolerate interference in Eastern Europe. Likewise, the Soviet Union made sacrifices to keep the war “cold” by backing down from the Cuban missile crisis. Many Cold War historians believe that both countries worked hard to keep conflicts limited and used tacit signaling techniques to communicate goals, fears, concerns, intensions, and counteractions. The question as to whether the United States or the USSR was more to blame for starting the Cold War has produced heated debate among twentieth-century historians. For years, most historians placed blame squarely on Soviet shoulders and helped perpetuate the notion that Americans wanted merely to expand freedom and democracy. More recent historians, however, have accused President Truman of inciting the Cold War with his acerbic language and public characterization of the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to the free world. Although conflict between the two powers was arguably inevitable, the escalation into a full “hot” war and the attendant threat of nuclear annihilation might have been avoidable.<
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Your Editor in Chief, Rob Vaneker
BATTLE OF MALPLAQUETÂ 1709 Story by: Rob.E. Vaneker
Historical Background Date of the Battle of Malplaquet: 11th September 1709.Place of the Battle of Malplaquet: In Northern France near the Belgian border..Combatants at the Battle of Malplaquet: British, Dutch, Austrians, Hanoverians,Prussians and Danes against the French and Bavarians. Scots, Irish, Swiss and Germans fought in the battle on both sides. It is said that every European nationality was represented in the battle.
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Generals at the Battle of Malplaquet: The Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy against Marshal Villars and Marshal Boufflers. Size of the armies at the Battle of Malplaquet: The two armies were about the same size at around 100,000 men. The French are said to have deployed 130 battalions of foot, 260 squadrons of cavalry and 80 guns. The allies are credited with 129 battalions, 252 squadrons and 101 guns. MAGAZINE â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
Uniforms, arms and equipment at the Battle of Malplaquet: The British Army of Queen Anne comprised troops of Horse Guards, regiments of horse, dragoons, Foot Guards and foot. In time of war the Department of Ordnance provided companies of artillery, the guns drawn by the horses of civilian contractors. These types of formation were largely standard throughout Europe. In addition the Austrian Empire possessed numbers of irregular light troops; Hussars from Hungary and Bosniak and Pandour troops from the Balkans. During the 18th Century the use of irregulars spread to other armies until every European force employed hussar regiments and light infantry for scouting duties.
Infantry regiments fought in line, for the new British Army Churchill to have the status of armed with flintlock musket and established after the Restoration Duke of Marlborough to enable bayonet, orders indicated by the in 1685. The regiments that took him to exercise decisive influence beat of drum. The field unit for the field were the forebears of over the fractious foreign officers infantry was the battalion powerful Victorian institutions; he had to work with and over comprising ten companies, some of his own nationality. each commanded by a In reality his status as duke, Horse and dragoons carried swords and captain, the senior company while probably of greater short flintlock muskets. Dragoons had being of grenadiers. Drill significance than his military largely completed their transition from was rudimentary and once rank of Captain General, mounted infantry to cavalry and were battle began formations was insufficient to enable formed into troops rather than companies as had been the practice in the past. quickly broke up. The him to act as a true However they still used drums rather than practice of marching in step commander-in-chief rather trumpets for field signals. was in the future. than as quasi-chairman of a committee of Dutch, The paramount military Austrian and British Foot Guards, King’s Horse, force of the period was the generals. Royal Dragoons, Royal Scots, French army of Louis XIV, the Buffs, Royal Welch Fusiliers, Sun King. France was at the The uniform of the British Cameronians, Royal Scots apex of her power, taxing to the Regiments was the long red coat Fusiliers and several other utmost the disparate groupings turned back at the lapels and prestigious corps. of European countries that cuffs to show the facings of the struggled to keep the Bourbons Britain fell behind its continental regimental colour; dark blue for on the western bank of the Rhine enemies and allies in many guards and royal regiments; and north of the yellow, green, white or buff for respects. There was no formal Pyrenees.Marlborough and his many of the others. The Royal military education for officers of Horse Guards wore blue the Army, competence coming uniforms; as did the artillery, an from experience on the field of battle. Commissions in the horse, organization not yet dragoons and foot were acquired incorporated into the army proper. by purchase, permitting the wealthy to achieve often Prince James Francis Edward Stuart, the Old unmerited promotion. Pretender: Battle of Malplaquet 11th September
John Churchill Duke of Marlborough: Battle of Malplaquet 11th September 1709 War of the Spanish Succession
British regiments acted as an uncertain mortar in keeping the edifice of the Imperial cause in Flanders intact.
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The War of the Spanish Succession was an early outing
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Support services were not formally established and depended on the commander. A major contributing feature to the Duke of Marlborough’s success in the field was his concern that his soldiers be properly supplied and by his consummate ability to organise and administer that supply. While every army had formal and explicit rank structures the realities of command and influence were still largely decided by social standing, particularly between armies of different nationality. It was a matter of necessity for John
1709 War of the Spanish Succession: picture by Alexis Simon Belle
Background to the Battle of Malplaquet:
Lord Orkney: Battle of Malplaquet 11th September 1709 War of the Spanish Succession
In the spring of 1709 King Louis XIV informally approached the Duke of Marlborough with a view to ending the war that was proving so disastrous for France. The terms Marlborough was instructed to put to Louis were unacceptable even with French fortunes at a low ebb and the war continued.By the summer of 1709 the French commander-in-chief in Flanders, Marshal Villars, commanded a large army, reinforced with regiments taken from other theatres. Nevertheless Marlborough took the fortress city of Tournay and advanced on Mons.Villars moved to protect Mons, taking up a position between the villages of La Folie and Malplaquet in an extensive gap in the forests that covered the area.
On 29th August 1709, the allied and Franco/ Bavarian armies lay within striking distance of Headgear was the tricorne hat, except for the each other. Marlborough was for an immediate company of grenadiers in each battalion of foot, attack, but was held back by a consensus among the Horse Grenadier Guards, the Royal North the senior allied generals and the Dutch deputies, British Dragoons (Scots Greys), the three regiments of fusiliers (Royal, Royal North British who wielded great influence that the army should and Royal Welch) and the drummers of dragoons await the further detachments that were hurrying and foot, all of whom wore the mitre cap.For the to join it.Villars army was actively fortifying its position and used the additional time to great infantry a cross belt carried the cartridge case effect. The arrival in camp of the old Marshal, the hanging on the right hip. A second cross belt Duc de Boufflers, boosted the morale of the carried the bayonet and hanger sword. French troops.On 30th August 1709 the Dutch Ammunition, carried in the cartridge case, deputies insisted on putting off the attack for comprised cartridges of paper wrap containing another day, giving the French yet more time to the ball and gunpowder. build a formidable position. For the other European armies national uniforms were in their infancy. The Danish infantry wore grey coats and breeches with green stockings. Some Danish cavalry regiments wore the old buff coats. Hanoverian regiments had taken to wearing red coats. The Prussian army wore dark blue. The Dutch army wore a motley of uniforms although the Guards wore blue and were referred to as the Blue Guards. The native French regiments wore white coats. The foreign regiments in French service, the Scots, Irish and Swiss wore red coats.
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Winner of the Battle of Malplaquet: the Duke of Marlborough and his allies although not conclusively.
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Account of the Battle of Malplaquet: The French and Bavarian army lay with its right flank embedded in the Forest of Lagnières. Their lines, covered by log abattis fronted with redoubts, stretched for some three miles into the Forest of Taisnières. At the left end of the French line a fortification jutted forward from the main line onto a hill in the forest. It was here that the decisive fighting on the left wing would take place.
specifically commanded not to make a full assault unless ordered to.The allied cavalry was distributed in support of these various forces.At 7.30am, the mist cleared and the battle began with an artillery bombardment. The two columns of foot moved forward towards each of the French flanks.
Villars massed his cavalry behind the French line. Breaking through such a strongly fortified line gave the allied troops a daunting task, but the defender’s ability to manoeuvre and shift forces from one place to another was severely restricted and the French and Bavarian cavalry could take no part in the battle until the line was pierced and the allies broke through.president of police in Munich.In the centre and on the left, woods gave the opportunity for allied troops to approach the French positions unseen.Marlborough and Prince Eugene resolved to make use of the inflexibility of Villars’ position by making a feint attack on the French right and threatening the French centre, but delivering the true attack on the French left and enveloping the French left flank. It was decided to direct a force commanded by General Withers that was hastening up to reinforce the army to march straight around the French left flank and assault the village of La Folie. Once the line had been pierced the Allied cavalry would sweep through and break up the French/ Bavarian army.11th September 1709 dawned with a thick mist concealing the opposing armies from each other. The allies brought up batteries of heavy guns to bombard the flanks of the French army. The rest of the guns were distributed along the line.Generals Lottum, Schulenburg and Lord Orkney commanded a substantial force of German and British foot for the assault on the French fortified left wing in the Forest of Taisnières. General Withers with five British battalions, fourteen foreign battalions and several regiments of cavalry moved around the French left flank towards the village of La Folie.
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Thirty-one mainly Dutch battalions commanded by the Prince of Orange formed up for the fight towards the French right. The Prince was MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
First Foot Guards at the Battle of Malplaquet 11th September 1709 War of the Spanish Succession
The Prince of Orange halted and that of General Schulenburg marched on to begin the attack on the fortifications in the Forest of Taisnières. It took much bitter fighting for the Allied foot to force the French infantry back from the first line of abattis: the regiments of Picardy and Champagne particularly distinguishing themselves in the French line, while the Buffs struggled through a marsh to deliver their attack.At this point Villars called for reinforcements from the right flank commanded by the venerable Marshal Boufflers. But Boufflers was unable to comply as he was under heavy attack.The Prince of Orange failed to comply with his orders. Instead of presenting a threat to the French right flank the Prince launched an all-out assault on the French positions in and around the Forest of Lagnières. The initial attack, led by the Prince, comprised Scottish regiments in the Dutch service, Tullibardine’s and Hepburn’s and the Dutch Blue Guards. Other regiments pressed forward, supported by Hanover bataljons.
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Battle of Malplaquet 11th September 1709 War of the Spanish Succession: Blenheim Palace Tapestry MAGAZINE â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
The assault was met with heavy artillery fire and a resolute defence directed by Marshal Boufflers. Determined though the Prince of Orange’s attack was, it was repelled with some 6,000 casualties.The Prince of Orange’s attack was in breach of his specific orders and contrary to the allied plan, but it ensured that Marshal Boufflers was unable to release reinforcements to Villars’ left flank.Schulenburg’s assault with his Prussian, Austrian and British foot was pressing the French hard, pushing them out of their fortifications in the forest, while Withers moved around the French flank, attacking the village of La Folie. Villars called the Irish Brigade up from the French centre and launched it in reckless assault on the Prussian foot. After an initial success the Irish became dispersed in the woods and the
allied advance resumed.During the desperate hand to hand fighting Prince Eugene was wounded in the head but continued in action. Marshal Villars received a severe leg wound and left the field, incapacitated. The French foot continued to resist but without guidance.The allied battery moved forward and began a heavy bombardment of the main line of redoubts which was now assaulted by Lord Orkney’s British reserve. The Prince of Orange renewed his attack and took the abattis that faced the allied left.
Marlborough brought up the Prussian cavalry from the right flank. More French regiments joined the fray, but so did the Dutch horse, the struggle continuing until Boufflers was forced to draw off the French cavalry and retreat, joining the already withdrawing French foot.
Allied cavalry poured through the broken French line to be met by Marshal Boufflers leading the French Household cavalry, comprising the Mousquetaires, the Gens D’Armes and the Garde du Corps, and driven back. Orkney’s foot fought off the Gens D’Armes and
French and Bavarian casualties were 15,000. The allied casualties were 17,000. The French lost 16 cannon in the battle with many standards and colours.
The allied army had forced the French positions and won the battle, but at terrible cost and with the Franco/Bavarian army leaving the field in good order. Casualties at the Battle of Malplaquet:
Follow-up to the Battle of Malplaquet: The fortress of Mons surrendered to the allied armies in the following month.
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Marlborough was heavily criticised for the terrible casualties at Malplaquet. His enemies said he was more concerned with his own advancement than with the lives of his soldiers.Malplaquet was the Duke of Marlborough’s last field battle. Following the siege and capture of Bouchain, another important French fortress, Marlborough was recalled to England finally brought down by the plotting of his enemies and the collapse of relations between Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough and Queen Anne.Marlborough only returned to royal favour with the accession of the Elector of Hanover as King George I.<
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Map of the Battle of Malplaquet 11th September 1709 War of the Spanish Successioni: map by John Fawkes
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HITLER'S BUNKERS IN NORTHERN FRANCE Story by: Hans Hollestelle
Atlantikwall pillbox
38cm Siegfried guns were placed near the little village of Haringzelle. These enormous guns weighted 111 tonnes (109 ST), were 18m (724 in) long and could fire every 30 seconds a 800kg (1800 lb) shell. The same type of gun was also used on the Bismarck-class battleships.
This article will take you to some of the biggest bunkers in France. These bunkers can be found in The Nord-Pas-de-Calais region. This French region is (like the name mentions) the most northern region in France. It is well known for its Channel tunnel and the ferry connections to Great-Britain but that’s about all. You also won’t find many tourists over here; they go to more popular vacation regions like the Provence and the Mediterranean in the South. For those who are interested in World War II however, this region has a lot to offer. Because the Germans thought that the D-Day landing would take place near Calais (where the Channel has its smallest part) and not in Normandy, the whole region is filled with bunkers and gun positions that were part of the Atlantikwall defense line. We’ll take a closer look at those defenses, and what’s left of them today. Batterie Todt
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When the Germans had conquered France, they started building crossChannel guns on the French coast. These were long range coastal artillery pieces which were intended to bombard enemy ships in the Channel and also English coastal towns and military installations. Four MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
Normally these guns were placed in open concrete gun positions, relying on their armor for defense. But Hitler thought that was not enough protection for these massive guns since they were so close to the enemy. He ordered reinforced concrete casemates 3.5m (11 ft) thick and 10m (33ft) high built over and around the mounts. These casemates were built in a little forest patch and also camouflaged. Today, all four giant casemates are still standing with their guns removed. One of them (casemate n°1) is turned into a museum, to show how people lived within these bunker. Continued on page 13
Cap Gris-Nez radar installation
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Le Blockhous below
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Although the four guns of battery Todt provided an enormous amount of firepower, the Germans brought in another toy. A K5 railway gun was positioned a few miles away from the Battery Todt. This gun was also used to bombard the English coast, and proved successful at this task. The railway gun is now moved next to casemate n°1 and can be visited.
Batterie Todt Casemate no 4
Cap Gris-Nez radar installation A few kilometers north of the battery Todt and 1km south of Cap Gris-Nez, you can find some
Krupp K5 Railway Gun
was incrementally raised 22m (72ft) high by hydraulic jacks and then supported by walls to become the roof. This principle was used to protect the workers during the allied bombing raids. Despite the bombings, the south part of the gigantic bunker still stands and can be visited for 9€. The north part was partially destroyed. You can still see the holes that the bombs made in the bunker. A German V1-lauch rail and a small submarine can also be seen at the site. La Coupole
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strange concrete structures. Three concrete pillars flanked by two casemates. These are the remains of a German radar installation. A giant antenna of 10m high and 30m long (100- by 33foot) was mounted on these pillars. This Mammut-type radar could detect ship movements in the Channel, and was used to warn the Kriegsmarine defenses about them.At cap GrisNez itself, Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring stood watching across the Channel to GreatBritain after their armies had conquered France in 1940.
Close to Wizernes we find another giant bunker: La Coupole (The Dome in English). It was a V2 rocket assembly and launch site. Work on this structure started at the end of 1943 because other V2 construction sites like Le Blockhaus had been damaged by heavy bombing.A reinforced concrete dome 71m (232ft) in diameter and 5m (16ft) thick was built over a limestone quarry. The dome weighs an estimated 55.000 tons. After this bomb-proof shelter was finished, the construction facility was excavated beneath. A 35 m (117ft) diameter by 21m (68ft) high room was excavated to house the rocket production facility. Le Blockhaus After final assembly and fueling of the rockets, they were moved outside to the launch facility Le Blockhaus is one of the biggest bunkers the Germans constructed in France. It would serve as trough two tunnels which were protected by 1,5m (5ft) steel doors. Because of heavy bombing, a V2 rocket launching facility, but was never construction was halted after nine months, with completed because the Germans started using the dome and most of the tunnels ready.Today La mobile launching facilities to avoid Coupole is a museum about France during the bombing.Located in the forest of Eperlecques, war, Germany’s secret weapons and the Cold construction started in March 1943. The south War. It took several weeks of drilling into the section of the building was constructed by reinforced dome to create an entry for the initially constructing a 5 meter (16ft) thick concrete plane weighing about 37.000 tons, which visitors< MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
Blockhous interior
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La Coupole below
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MASSACRE AT MALMEDY DURING BATTLE OF THE BULGE THEME STORY
Story by: Martin Reynplds
The delightful Belgian town of Malmédy will forever be associated with the most infamous massacre of American troops in World War II. And yet, but for the presence of an Associated Press correspondent there in early January 1945, it is doubtful that this terrible incident would have ever achieved international notoriety. ‘Nazis Turned Machine Guns on GI POWs wrote Hal Boyle in his January 1945 Stars and Stripes article, and from that first graphic account sprung a plethora of books and articles about the so-called Malmédy Massacre. Few of these accounts are based on fact, and most are embellished and inaccurate.
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It is unlikely that we shall ever know the precise sequence of events at the Baugnez crossroads, near Malmédy, on December 17, 1944, or the reasons for them. The secret lies with the guilty and MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
the dead. Nevertheless, many corroborated facts are known and a careful analysis of these facts can bring us closer to the truth of what happened. On reaching the VIII Corps artillery headquarters at 0900 on the 17th, Scarborough was told to check in with the 16th Field Artillery Observation Battalion for a survey and other data relating to his new area of operations. He was then to report to the 4th Infantry Division artillery headquarters in Luxembourg. He left instructions for his battery to be redirected to join him. Battery B left Schevenhutte at 0800 on the 17th. The convoy consisted of 30 jeeps, weapons carriers and two-and-a-half-ton trucks, and was divided into two serials–the first led by Lieutenant Virgil Lary and the second by Lieutenant Perry Reardon. For reasons unknown, the battalion’s
executive officer, Captain Roger Mills, accompanied the battery and traveled in the lead jeep with Lary. Two other members of Headquarters Battery, a technical sergeant and a medical corporal, were also attached to Battery B. Why Lary and not Lieutenant Ksidzek led the convoy is a mystery. Ksidzek traveled in one of the trucks at the rear of the column. The initial part of the journey lay through Eynatten and Eupen, and then, just to the north of Malmédy, the battery passed through the Baraque Michel, a high moorland area that was the designated drop zone for a German parachute operation designed to disrupt American reinforcements from the north. This operation, known as Greif, was commanded by the famous Colonel Friedrich von der Heydte.
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Corps beside a road during the battle
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It is sadly ironic that had the paratroopers landed as planned and not been dispersed over a wide area, Battery B would have been forced to take a different route and the massacre would never have happened. As it was, the battery reached Malmédy without incident at about 1215 and found various serials of Combat Command R of the 7th Armored Division crossing the town from north to south on their way to St. Vith. The Battery B route-marking truck had already passed through. At the east end of Malmédy on the main N-23 St. Vith road, the leading jeep was stopped by an engineer, Lt. Col. David Pergrin. His 291st Engineer Combat Battalion had been stationed in the area since early November, and while most of the troops in Malmédy had bugged out to the west in the face of the German offensive, Pergrin had decided to stay and defend the vital road center until reinforcements could arrive. He had only one company of engineers available to him. The rest of his battalion was scattered throughout the northern Ardennes on various winterization duties. His appeals for reinforcements had fallen on deaf ears.Pergrin had no idea of the extent of the enemy’s strength, but one of his own jeep patrols had warned him that a German armored column was approaching the area to the southeast of Malmédy.
He therefore warned Captain Mills and Lieutenant Lary not to proceed in that direction, and advised them to turn around and go to St. Vith via Stavelot, Trois Ponts and Vielsalm. But the artillery officers would not listen. They had their orders, their place on a designated route and, perhaps most important of all, they knew that two of the men with the route-marker truck were farther down that route and that they were due to pick them up. Ignoring Pergrin’s warning, the battery proceeded on its way. However, four vehicles at the rear of the convoy did not follow immediately. Owing to the sickness of a corporal who appeared to have food poisoning, Ksidzek in the battery commander’s car, the battery maintenance and wire trucks and the route markers’ pickup truck diverted to the 44th Evacuation Hospital in Malmédy to obtain medical treatment. These four vehicles carried a total of 27 men. Preceding the Battery B convoy on the N-23 was an ambulance of the 575th Ambulance Company, returning to its base in Waimes after a visit to the 44th Evacuation Hospital. Following it were four more ambulances, three from the 575th and one from the 546th Company.
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The junction of the N-23 and N-32, less than two miles southeast of Malmédy, was known locally as the Baugnez crossroads. Since it was the junction of five roads, the Americans called it Five Points. Standing at the crossroads at MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
about midday on December 17 was a Battery B route marker and a military policeman whose job was to direct the remaining serials of the 7th Armored Division. The only buildings near the crossroads in those days were the Café Bodarwé, on
premier in the Waffen SS, together with its twin, the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, had been given the honor of spearheading the Sixth Panzer Army’s attack toward the Meuse River. They were the only formations in the Wehrmacht to bear the Führer‘s name, and they enjoyed a fearsome reputation–both had already been accused of various war crimes and of killing prisoners in cold blood.
The commander of KGr. Peiper was the southwest side of the junction with two farms beyond SS Lt. Col. Joachim Peiper, a former adjutant to Heinrich it, another farm on the north side and two small houses on the Himmler and holder of the Knight’s Cross with Oak east side of the N-23–one 150 Leaves. Through his service in yards and the other just over half a mile south of Five Points. France and on the Eastern Front he was renowned as a At about 1245 the military brilliant soldier and commander, policeman and route marker but on this particular day he was waved Mills and Lary’s jeep tired and frustrated. Due to through Five Points in the tougher than expected direction of Ligneuville and St. opposition by the U.S. 99th Vith. The visibility was good, Infantry Division against the the temperature just above zero formations ordered to create a and there was no snow on the gap for his 117 tanks, 149 ground except for a light armored personnel carriers, 24 covering in places untouched by artillery pieces and some 40 the sun. Shortly after this, with anti-aircraft guns, he was the lead jeep about half a mile already more than 12 hours south of the crossroads and the behind schedule. Peiper had so last vehicle of the battery just far suffered few casualties, but short of the Café Bodarwé, the his lead element, under the column came under fire from command of SS Lieutenant two German tanks some 800 to Werner Sternebeck, had been 1,000 yards to its east. These reduced from its original seven tanks were the point of tanks and a platoon of engineers Kampfgruppe (KGr.) Peiper, the in halftracks to two leading formation of the 1st SS Panzerkampfwagen (PzKw.) Panzer Division Leibstandarte Mk. IV tanks and two Adolf Hitler. This division, the halftracks.
Belgian civilians executed by German soldiers of the 6th SS Panzer Army Kampfgruppe Peiper, part of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS
It was an inviting target, and he immediately opened fire with his own 75mm gun and ordered his accompanying tank to do the same. Each tank fired about five or six rounds and then, on Peiper’s order, moved as fast as possible to Bagatelle, where they
vehicles along the road is unknown, but many were fit enough for use by the Germans after the incident.great Messines offensieve.After turning onto the N-23 Sternebeck’s PzKw. Mk. IV moved south, pushing abandoned vehicles out of the way and firing
As Sternebeck moved north on the road from Thirimont to Bagatelle on the N-32, he saw the Battery B convoy moving south on the N-23 to his left
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turned left and proceeded to Five Points, then turned left again onto the N-23. There they were confronted by the abandoned vehicles of the American convoy– some burning, some shot up, others in the ditch or crashed into each other. The exact number of MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
its machine guns at the ditches in which most of the Americans had taken cover. Sternebeck told the author that he did this to encourage the GIs to surrender and, since the Americans had no heavy weapons at their disposal, the tactic soon worked. He then
waved his arm in the usual manner to indicate to the surrendering Americans that they were to march back down the road toward Five Points, and halted his tank near the head of the convoy to await further orders. These were not long in coming. Peiper was furious at the delay the incident had caused, and, after transferring to his infantry commander’s halftrack, he drove up to Sternebeck and ordered him in no uncertain terms to move on toward Ligneuville. Then, together with a PzKw. Mk. V Panther tank and the halftracks of the 11th SS Panzergrenadier Company, Peiper followed Sternebeck. The time was about 13.30 hours.
While the survivors of Battery B were being assembled in a field immediately adjacent to, and south of, the Café Bodarwé, three trucks from Company B of the 86th Engineer Battalion came up the hill from Malmédy and, after halting behind the ambulances at the rear of Battery B, were fired on by the Germans. Five of the men in these trucks managed to get away, although one of them was wounded and a sixth was captured. The last four Battery B vehicles under the command of Ksidzek, having dropped off the sick corporal, also approached Baugnez at about this time, but they heard the shooting and realized they were running into trouble. Ksidzek wisely turned around and got back to Malmédy without loss.
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By about 1400, 113 Americans had been assembled in the field by the Café. They included 90 members of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (all except three from Battery B), 10 men from the five ambulances, the military policeman who had been on traffic duty at Five Points, the 86th Battalion engineer and 11 men who had been captured by KGr. Peiper before reaching Baugnez–eight from the 32nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, two from the 200th Field Artillery Battalion and a sergeant from the 23rd Infantry Regiment. In addition to these 113 prisoners, a further 26 men were involved in this tragic meeting with KGr. Peiper. The most fortunate were five members of Battery B who managed to escape from the front of the convoy, and another from the last truck who succeeded in hiding until he was able to make a safe getaway. Four more, plus three men from the 32nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, were forced to drive some of the serviceable American vehicles for the Germans and became POWs. However, 11 Battery B men were killed either during the initial clash or in unknown circumstances–their bodies were not found until February and April 1945–and in addition, two men from the 197th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion were killed when their jeep, which was presumably in front of the Battery B convoy, ran into Sternebeck’s vehicles just to the east of Five Points. According to a young Belgian boy who witnessed the incident, they were shot in cold blood after being ordered out of the ditch in which they were hiding. MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
At approximately 1415, soldiers of KGr. Peiper opened fire on the American prisoners in the field next to the Café. The entire episode lasted no more than about 15 minutes. While the shooting was taking place, vehicles of the Kampfgruppe continued to drive past on the N-23. By 1500 Baugnez was quiet, and it was shortly after this, and certainly before 1600 hours, that 61 Americans who somehow were still alive in the field of death next to the Café attempted their escape. Unfortunately, there were still a few Germans in the vicinity, and they opened fire as the escapees ran to the west and northwest. At least 15 were killed. Three more died later, and one was never seen again.
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LIEUTENANT COLONEL PERGRIN Sometime around 15.00 hrs he decided to make a reconnaissance toward Baugnez to investigate the noise. After passing through one of the eight roadblocks his men had mounted on all the approaches into Malmédy, Pergrin and one of his sergeants dismounted from their jeep at Geromont and continued on foot in a southerly direction. Suddenly they encountered three of the escapees from Five Points. They were hysterical and kept shouting, The Germans killed everybody! Pergrin rushed them back to Malmédy, and at 1640 sent a message to the chief engineer officer at First Army headquarters saying there had been some sort of massacre of American prisoners near Malmédy. The bodies of those who had died at Five Points on December 17 lay in what became a virtual no man’s land from that day until January 14, 1945. Despite the fact that there was clear evidence from the many survivors that some sort massacre had taken place, the Americans made no attempt to recover the bodies before the 30th Infantry Division retook the area.
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By a strange quirk of fate it was one of Pergrin’s engineer companies that, with the aid of mine detectors, uncovered the snow-covered bodies of 71 victims of the massacre. Then, between January 14 and 16, Major Giacento Morrone, Captain Joseph Kurcz and Captain John Snyder, all doctors at the 44th Evacuation Hospital, carried out autopsies on the bodies, which were frozen stiff and fully clothed on arrival at the hospital.
MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
EASTERN MALMÉDY,
1500 tanks!
Lieutenant Colonel Pergrin heard, standing outside his headquarters in a house in eastern Malmédy, the firing by Sternebeck’s tanks and guessed that that little FAOB outfit must have run into that column of German tanks.
The vast majority still had rings, watches, money and other valuables on them, which contradicts the statements of most survivors who said the Germans stole everything worthwhile from them before they were driven into the field. An analysis of the reports, all extremely disturbing to read, shows that 43 of the bodies had gunshot wounds to the head, at least three had suffered severe blows to the head, three had been crushed, two had received some form of first aid before death and nine still had their arms raised above their heads. It should be noted, however, that both before and during the American advance from MalmĂŠdy in January 1945, artillery from both sides hit the Baugnez area, and the autopsies confirm that at least 15 of the bodies had been hit by shell and mortar fragments after death. here is also evidence to show that in at least five cases eyes had been removed from their socketsâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;and in one case the report suggests that the man was still alive when this happened. While anything is possible, it seems unlikely that even the most depraved or crazed soldier would carry out such an act and, as often happens when bodies are left for long periods in the open, crows or similar birds of prey were the more likely culprits. What is certain is that terrible and usually fatal injuries were administered to the victims at close range.
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An American GI runs with a machine gun during the Battle of the Bulge, Ardennes, Belgium, World War II, January 1945. (Tony Vaccaro/Getty Images) MAGAZINE â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
Today there are 84 names on the Belgian memorial at the Baugnez crossroads. Some are misspelled, and Private Louis Vairo’s name was mistakenly deleted a few years ago. The name of Private Delbert Johnson of the 526th Armored Infantry Battalion appears on the memorial, but this is also a mistake–he was not present at Five Points on December 17, but was killed in the same area during an attack toward Hedomont on January 3, 1945. Not surprisingly, when his body was found on January 14 it was assumed that he was a victim of the massacre. This mistake and the fact that men from seven units other than the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion were recovered from Five Points have led to the suggestion that bodies unconnected with this incident were deliberately placed in the field by U.S. authorities after December 17. This is one of a number of spurious arguments presented by Nazi apologists over the years in their efforts to prove that no massacre took place or that, at the very least, the Americans tried to make the incident look much worse than it really was.
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The Malmédy Massacre continues to provoke as much argument today as it did during the subsequent war crimes trial at Dachau in 1946. Most Americans take the view that it was probably a premeditated act or at best a spur of the moment shooting of defenseless men. Those Germans who were involved and others who take an interest in the affair, and various pro-Nazi American and European writers, naturally attempt to provide some sort of justification for the shooting.Twenty-one American survivors made statements to U.S. authorities in Malmédy on December 17, the same day as the massacre, and on the following day–long before there was any possibility of collusion or anybody putting ideas into their heads. They all told essentially the same story: After surrendering to a German armored column and being disarmed, they were assembled in a field just south of the crossroads. The Germans then opened fire on them with machine guns and rifles. In most cases, the survivors mentioned two pistol shots before the main shooting started. They said that soldiers then entered the field and shot anyone who showed any signs of life and that many of the bodies were kicked or prodded in order to get a response. Following this, the German column continued to drive past, with some of the vehicle crews taking potshots at the bodies lying in the MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
field. All but one of the survivors insisted that no attempt to escape had been made before the Germans opened fire, and that the escape attempt came at a much later stage when they thought the Germans had left the area. Media interest in the affair, particularly in later years, has led to this relatively simple story being embellished, even by some of the victims. One survivor told the author in 1989 that he saw SS General Josef Sepp Dietrich, commander of the Sixth Panzer Army, goose-stepping past the massacre field as the Americans stood there. And the only surviving officer, Virgil Lary, talked of Tiger tanks, 88mm guns and large numbers of tanks forcing his men to surrender. Such exaggerations inevitably played into the hands of those who wished to cast doubt on the survivors’ original version of events. Apart from some minor inconsistencies, such as Lieutenant Lary saying on December 18 that after escaping from the field he got a lift into Malmédy in a truck, but later changing his story to one of two Belgian women helping him to get there on foot aided by a makeshift crutch, the only real point in contention is whether or not there was any attempt to escape that might have caused the Germans to open fire.Peiper himself, as previously stated, had allegedly left the Baugnez area before the shooting started. After the war he described how he had seen three groups of Americans before he moved on to Ligneuville–those with their hands up, those lying on the ground and in the ditches either dead or pretending to be dead, and a third group who, after pretending to be dead, got up and tried to run to nearby woods. He said his men fired warning shots at the latter two groups.
Most German apologists, and certainly many former members of Leibstandarte, subscribe to the explanation given by Peiper’s adjutant, Hans Gruhle, who said that there was a gap of about 10 minutes between Sternebeck and the command group leaving Baugnez and the arrival of the first elements of the main body of the Kampfgruppe
Normal POW’s During this time the Americans were left to their own devices and, since they were not marching toward the east as would have been expected of normal POWs, the newly arrived elements mistook them for a combat unit and opened fire. How Gruhle could have known what happened on that tragic afternoon, however, is a mystery since he was allegedly traveling at or near the rear of the column! With the passing of time this story, too, has been embellished to a point where the surrendered Americans, having recovered their weapons, actually opened fire on the main body of the Kampfgruppe. It is hard to comprehend how supposedly intelligent people can advance a theory that green and terrified soldiers who had already surrendered would pick up their rifles and pistols–they had nothing larger–which hardened Waffen SS soldiers had left lying around, in order to engage tanks and halftracks.
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On the other side of the coin, many Americans subscribe to the theory that orders had been issued at the highest level that no U.S. prisoners were to be taken and that the offensive was to be conducted in a wave of terror. This latter point is correct. Hitler used those words in an address to MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
his senior commanders only four days before the attack. However, the fact that Peiper’s men sent scores of prisoners to the rear in the normal manner during their advance earlier on the 17th belies the no-prisoners theory, and attempts by the Americans to produce written evidence of such an order for use at the Dachau war crimes trial came to nothing. It has to be noted that Peiper’s men faced a very real problem in deciding what to do with the large number of prisoners taken in the Baugnez area. According to all German reports, Peiper was in a hurry to get to Ligneuville and capture the U.S. headquarters there, and he ordered the rest of the Kampfgruppe to follow up as quickly as possible. Faced with mounting delays and an irate commander, what were those at the crossroads to do with the prisoners? Armored columns had no spare manpower to look after POWs, and none of the follow-up infantry formations were anywhere near Five Points at the time. More than 100 men, even if they have surrendered and been disarmed, cannot be left to their own devices for long. Nor could they be ordered to start marching to the rear into captivity, as is usual in such circumstances, because there was a simple problem of geography.
Top: Leibstandarte Division had a capable commander since November 1943 in Joachim Peiper. The bold advance of his Kampfgruppe in Ardennes with the results ...
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Peiper had penetrated the American lines on a very narrow front–a single road–and this meant that as far as the Germans were concerned the enemy lay along the N-23 to the northwest in Malmédy, the N-32 to the northeast in Waimes and the N-23 to the south in Ligneuville. There was therefore no road along which they could order the prisoners to set off. And it was more than possible that American combat units would move south out of Malmédy at any moment. A combination of all these factors–an angry SS lieutenant colonel in a hurry, no spare men to guard the prisoners, no easily available route to the rear and the possibility of American combat troops arriving at any moment–must have created a nightmare scenario for the officer in charge. It is therefore quite possible that he decided to take the simplest and most practical way out of his dilemma by giving an order to shoot the prisoners. And it is certainly possible that Peiper himself gave such an order before he moved on. But if it was not Peiper, who could it have been? Among those present at Baugnez at the relevant time, there are several possibilities: Major Werner Poetschke, picture above,commander of Peiper’s 1st SS Panzer Battalion; Lieutenant Erich Rumpf, commander of the 9th SS Panzer Pioneer Company; Lieutenant Franz Sievers, commander of the 3rd SS Pioneer Company; and, in view of his later statements about
events at the crossroads, it would be unwise to exclude Peiper’s adjutant, Gruhle. There are even some, such as Lieutenant Friedrich Christ, commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Company, and a Sergeant Beutner of the 3rd SS Pioneers, who were later accused by
soldiers in front of me were standing still and I walked slowly southwardly towards the fence at the south end of the field, more or less using the men in front as concealment. I know that Sergeant Stabulis and Pfc Flack were behind me. About two-thirds of the way towards the fence there were no more men to provide concealment so when I reached this point I ran towards the fence as hard as I could, crawled through it and turned to my right and headed for the woods west of the field as fast as I could. Machine gun fire was opened up at me but I was lucky enough to make it to the woods without getting hit and was picked up by the 30th Division a couple of days later….I would like to add that as I came out from behind the crowd into the clear and their headed for the south fence, two own single shots were fired, which comrades of having given orders were either pistol or rifle in my to open fire on the prisoners. opinion.Flack’s body was found But what of the possibility that in the field with a bullet hole in the Germans opened fire on the the head. Stabulis’ body was not prisoners because there was an found until April 15, 1945, but since it was more than half a escape attempt? It is after all mile south of the field, his initial legal to shoot at escaping POWs, and there is evidence to escape bid was presumably support this theory. In October successful. 1945 one of the American It would seem therefore that survivors, in a sworn statement there was a minimum of one countersigned by one of the successful escape from the field chief prosecuting officers, before the main shooting Lieutenant Raphael started, in addition to the five Schumacker, and witnessed by men who got away from the Sergeant Frank Holtham, said: I front of the Battery B convoy decided to try to get away and soon after it came under fire walked slowly northwardly, but from Sternebeck’s tanks. upon reaching a little dirt road or lane decided not to cross the Continued on page 26 lane or go around it. Sergeant Stabulis, Flack and I were together on this proposition. We turned around, slowly retraced our steps….The group of
Battle of the Bulge 16 December 1944.to 28 Jan.1945
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German POWs carrying body of American soldier killed in Battle of Bulge through snowy Ardennes field
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American officer shouting It is also clear from various survivors’ testimonies that there was quite a lot of movement and jostling in the field before the shooting started, and that once the first pistol shots rang out, several men attempted to push their way to the rear of the group. A number of survivors mentioned an American officer shouting, Stand fast!In summary, it can be said that there is no evidence to support the idea of a premeditated massacre–particularly in view of the fact that over half the Americans in the field survived both the main shooting and the administration of coup de grâce shots by the Germans who entered the field. Nor is it reasonable to suggest that the main body of the Kampfgruppe mistook the men in the field for a fresh combat unit, or that there was a mass escape attempt that caused the Germans to open fire. So how do we explain the shootings at the Baugnez crossroads on December 17, 1944? There seem to be only two reasonable explanations. The first is that it started in response to a specific escape attempt. Someone saw two or three Americans make the break described in a sworn statement made to Lieutenant Schumacker in October 1945; that person then opened fire and this in turn caused a commotion in the field as some of the prisoners tried to push through their comrades to the west. But this movement, and the fact that at least one and probably two Americans had by then escaped from the field, only exacerbated the situation, and other Germans in the vicinity then fired. Even if this theory is accepted, however, it in no way excuses the deliberate killing of wounded prisoners by those Germans who then entered the field.
their comrades. This explanation would then require that, after the main shooting, it was necessary to send soldiers into the field to finish off the survivors. On May 16, 1946, Peiper and 70 members of his Kampfgruppe, plus his army commander, chief of staff and corps commander, were arraigned before a U.S. military court in the former concentration camp at Dachau, charged that they did willfully, deliberately and wrongfully permit, encourage, aid, abet and participate in the killing, shooting, ill treatment, abuse and torture of members of the armed forces of the United States of America. The location chosen for the trial and the number of defendants was clearly significant, and it surprised no one when all the Germans were found guilty. The court of six American officers presided over by a brigadier general took an average of less than three minutes to consider each case. Forty-three of the defendants, including Peiper, Christ, Rumpf, Sievers and Sternebeck, were sentenced to death by hanging (Poetschke had been killed in March 1945), 22 to life imprisonment and the rest to between 10 and 20 years. The Law of the Victors, as it has been called in postwar Germany, had prevailed. But none of the death sentences was ever carried out, and all the prisoners had been released by Christmas 1956. Peiper was the last to leave prison. Sadly, incomplete and rushed investigations, suspicions about the methods used to obtain confessions, and inadequate or flawed evidence ensured that guilty men escaped proper punishment, and there can be little doubt that some innocent men were punished during the trial. In the final analysis, justice itself became another casualty of the incident.<
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The other explanation is that faced with the problem of what to do with so many prisoners, someone made a deliberate decision to shoot them. And it is significant that the majority of the American survivors spoke of a single German taking deliberate aim with his pistol and then firing two shots at the prisoners. The sheer number of Americans in the field and the fact that they were standing in a group meant that many were physically shielded by the bodies of Sepp Dietrich-SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
THE DIVISION OF GERMANY During 1945, the Allies began organising their respective occupation zones in Germany. The Americans occupied the South, the British the West and North, France the South-West, and the Soviets Central Germany. The Berlin Blockade The Eastern part was administered by Poland, except the town of KĂśnigsberg (renamed Kaliningrad) and its surrounding area, which were annexed by the USSR. On 30 August 1945, the Inter-Allied Control Council was founded. Berlin was divided into four sectors and placed under the administrative control of the Allied Kommandatura. In 1946, the main war criminals were tried in Nuremberg by Allied judges. In the same year, the fate of the German satellite states and of Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Finland was determined in Paris by separate peace treaties.
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On 28 July 1946, the United States proposed a plan for economic unification of the occupied zones. Faced with the refusal of France and the Soviet Union, the British and Americans decided to unite their zones economically and, in December of the same year, created the Bizone. On 1 August 1948, the French occupation zone joined the Bizone, which then became the Trizone. Gradually, relations between the Allies deteriorated, and the quadripartite structures MAGAZINE â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
Story by: Robert Farley
became unmanageable. In March 1948, the Inter-Allied Control Council ceased to operate, as did, in June 1948, the Kommandatura. Germany rapidly became a sparring ground for the Cold War. After having politically reorganised their occupation zones in defeated Germany, the British and Americans wanted to revive the German economy, which implied radical monetary reform. On 20 June 1948, the Western Allies introduced a new unit of account. The German mark, the Deutsche Mark (DM), was introduced in all the Western zones and replaced the Reichsmark, which had lost all its value. This monetary reform enabled the shops to be filled once again with goods that had, until then, only been obtainable on the black market. While the Communists took over nearly all the command posts in the Eastern zone, the ideas of the former Allies about the economic and political organisation of Germany became more at odds with each other every day.
Blockade Airlift Berlin
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The city lay in the Soviet zone, but the Americans, the British and the French were established in their respective occupation zones. Access to Berlin by road, rail and water was impossible until 12 May 1949. Food supplies and electricity were cut. The introduction of the DM in the Western sectors of Berlin was the official cause, but the Soviet Union probably wanted to capture the capitalist island in its occupation zone by making the British, French and Americans leave Berlin. The latter reacted swiftly: the Allied airlift, introduced by General Lucius D. Clay, was to be the appropriate American counter-measure. Each day, thousands of aircraft (more than 270 000 flights in total) brought food, fuel and other essential goods to the beleaguered city. In all, over 13 000 tonnes of goods were delivered every day. Berlin became one of the main theatres of confrontation between East and West. The division of Europe into two blocs was confirmed. The city became a symbol of freedom for the West. The inhabitants of the city were no longer thought of as former Nazis to be punished but as victims of the Soviet threat. When Stalin decided to lift the blockade on 12 May 1949, the political division of the city was firmly established. Two municipal administrations were put in place, and the Soviets began to merge the Social Democratic and Communist Parties. In contrast, democratic elections were held in West Berlin in December 1948. The outcome was a victory for the anti-Communist Social Democratic Party. The success of the Berlin Airlift enabled MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
Western opinion to accept the inevitable partition of Germany. On either side of the Iron Curtain, the divided city of Berlin became the showcase for the Western and Soviet models. Confronted with the Soviet threat, the idea of German rearmament and the country’s integration into a united European structure became more and more vital in Western eyes. The foundation of the FRG On 2 December 1946, the British and Americans decided to merge their respective occupation zones. With the addition of the French zone in 1948, West Germany became the Trizone. From 20 April to 2 June 1948, the three powers met in London to discuss the future of the country and decided to call a constituent assembly, the German Parliamentary Council. Its members were appointed by the parliaments of the federal states, the Länder. These federal entities were created by the occupying
provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Its adoption after a referendum gave rise to the first legislative elections for the entire Trizone. Bonn was chosen ahead of Frankfurt to be the provisional capital. The city of West Berlin became a Land but remained under Allied control. West Berlin had to be shown to be part of the FRG in spite of its special status. Economic development was encouraged by the granting of subsidies to companies and civil servants who decided to move there.Even if the right of supervision enjoyed by the Western Allied powers limited German sovereignty, the FRG was seen as the only rightful heir to the German Reich, dissolved in 1945 when Germany unconditionally surrendered. The election of the Bundestag in August 1949 confirmed the victory of the Christian Democrats (CDU) over the Socialists (SPD) led by Kurt
Hoping to keep Berlin united in the heart of the Soviet zone, and denouncing what it called the Anglo-American policy of acting without consultation, the USSR reacted to this initiative on 24 June 1948 by imposing a total blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin. powers, on more or less historical lines. For example, whilst the State of Prussia was abolished by the Allies, Bavaria was retained. On 1 September 1948, the Parliamentary Council started work in Bonn. It elected a Christian Democrat, Konrad Adenauer, to lead it and formulated the Basic Law which was promulgated on 23 May 1949. This Law became the
Schumacher, whose Marxist tendencies scared the Western occupying powers. The Communists and the Liberals made few gains. The CDU, led by Konrad Adenauer, confirmed its role as the champion of a return to a free-market economy. Adenauer, who was the preferred partner of the Americans, became the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The foundation of the GDR As a response to the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in Bonn, in October 1949 the USSR encouraged the proclamation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in Berlin. East Berlin became the capital of the GDR. The West refused to recognise this State which, following the example of the FRG, presumed to speak for all of Germany. The Communist Wilhelm Pieck became President of the GDR and Otto Grotewohl, a former Social Democrat, was made head of the government. However it was Walter Ulbricht, leader of the Communist Party, who played the crucial role. Since 1946, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of the Soviet zone had had to merge with the Communist Party (KPD) to form the Socialist Unity Party (SED). This Stalinist party, led by Communists, dominated the political scene in the GDR until the end of the Communist era in 1989. On 22 January 1948, Ernest Bevin,see picture right below, British Foreign Secretary, gave an address in the House of Commons in which he denounced the Soviet threat. He affirmed his resolve to develop Britain’s cooperation with France and the Benelux countries within a
against a potential German threat but to prevent any armed aggression in Europe.This treaty was amended by the Paris Agreements of 23 October 1954, founding Western European Union (WEU) shortly after the failure of the proposed European Defence Community (EDC).The five European signatories to the Brussels Pact soon realised that alone they would be incapable of mounting any effective resistance to an attack from the USSR. On 11 June 1948, the US Congress passed the Vandenberg resolution, which put an end to American isolationism by authorising the United States to be involved in international alliances even in peacetime. This paved the way for the Atlantic Alliance. On 4 April 1949, twelve Foreign Ministers signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, thereby establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Five of Western Union were joined by the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal. The creation of a Euro-American alliance was strongly contested by Communists across the world. Negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty were marred by threats and barely veiled intimidation from the Kremlin towards the Western powers. But the climate of fear surrounding the ratification of the accession
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Communist Wilhelm Pieck Western Union.A few days later, the coup d’état in Prague on 25 February 1948, in which the Communists took power in Czechoslovakia by force, heightened the climate of international tension and danger that prevailed during the Cold War. On 17 March 1948, in Brussels, five countries signed the Treaty establishing Western Union, which aimed no longer merely to guard MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
treaties by the Western Parliaments only served to speed up the process. The North Atlantic Treaty came into force on 23 August 1949 and established a transatlantic framework for the defence of Western Europe.
In 1953, the new US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, see picture right above, extended the Truman Doctrine by introducing the ‘rollback’ policy, which aimed not merely to contain Communism but to actively drive it back. This required the formation of military alliances with countries threatened by Communist expansion. The early 1950s were characterised by a phenomenon termed ‘pactomania’. Several treaties similar to the North Atlantic Treaty were signed: the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) in 1951, SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The USSR responded in 1955 with the creation of the Warsaw Pact. Following the FRG’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty on 9 May 1955, the Socialist countries of Eastern Europe also united to form a military alliance. The members of this mutual defence pact to counter aggression were the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania.
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From peaceful coexistence to the paroxysms of the Cold War (1953–1962) After the death of Stalin in March 1953, his successors adopted a more conciliatory attitude to the West. From 1955, Nikita Khrushchev, the new First Secretary of the CPSU, developed a policy of peaceful coexistence. Boosted by the advances that it had made in MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
thermonuclear power and the space race, the USSR wanted to use the new climate of peace in the world to take the rivalry between itself and the United States onto a purely ideological and economic level.In the United States, President Eisenhower had to make allowance for the risk of escalation and the hazards of direct nuclear confrontation with the Soviets.In 1953 he opted for the so-called ‘new look’ strategy. This combined diplomacy with the threat of massive retaliation. To complicate matters further, the United States was no longer the only country with nuclear weapons. It had to come to terms with technological progress made by the Soviet Union, which tested its first atomic weapon in 1949, with the first hydrogen bomb following in 1953.The first tangible consequence of the new Soviet policy was the agreement on Austria in May 1955. The Austrian State Treaty officially put an end to the war in the Alpine country and gave it back its independence, subject to its permanent neutrality. But despite certain encouraging signs, the distrust and ideological opposition between the two blocs continued. In Central and Eastern Europe, the populations of several satellite states attempted to cast off the Russian yoke, and the Cold War reached its peak in the early 1960s.
In Europe, the status of the city of Berlin remained a major stumbling block for the two superpowers. The construction of the Berlin Wall in the summer of 1961 closed the last crossing point between West and East. Elsewhere in the world, the tension surrounding Cuba culminated in a trial of strength played out between John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev in October 1962 over the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles on the island.By the mid-1950s, EastWest relations had certainly evolved and were characterised by the principle of peaceful coexistence, but the Cold War was not over and the ideological tensions between the two blocs prevailed. The agreement on Austrian neutrality On 15 May 1955, the USSR, together with the three Western powers occupying Austria (USA, Great Britain and France), signed a treaty which officially put an end to the state of war in the Alpine country. Post-war Austria often served as a forward post for the Americans and the Soviets when they wanted to prove their readiness to talk to one another. In accordance with the new State Treaty, the Austrian Government had to proclaim the country’s military neutrality in exchange for the withdrawal of the occupation forces. The Soviet occupation zone in eastern Austria, together with Finland, northern Norway and the Danish island of Bornholm, was the only region in Europe from which the Red Army finally agreed to withdraw. That same year, Austria joined the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe.
Other signs that hinted at this desire for peaceful coexistence included the visit of FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to Moscow in 1955, the trip by Khrushchev to the United States in 1959 and his meeting with US President John F. Kennedy in Vienna in 1961. But despite these encouraging signs, the distrust and ideological opposition between the two blocs continued.
Vorsitzende des Staatsrates der DDR, Walter Ulbricht
The ‘Geneva spirit’
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From 18 to 23 July 1955, the Heads of Government of the four Great Powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the USSR) met in Geneva. It was their first summit meeting for ten years. The negotiations focused on European security, disarmament and East-West relations. Although the four powers did not reach agreement, especially as far as the fate of Germany was concerned, the meeting closed in a climate of détente between the various protagonists. There was even talk of a new ‘Geneva spirit’, referring to the peaceful climate which had inspired the League of Nations in the interwar years. MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
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The repression of the Hungarian Uprising
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In Central and Eastern Europe, with the death of Stalin and the start of deStalinisation launched by the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, picture left, the populations of several satellite states attempted to free themselves from Soviet rule. In Poland, despite several violent clashes in Poznan, Władysław Gomułka, the former General Secretary of the Workers’ Party, was rehabilitated after being arrested in 1951. In October 1956 he became the new First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party. He managed in extremis to prevent a Soviet military intervention aimed at suppressing riots by workers and an attempted takeover in October 1956.The situation in East Germany and Hungary was very different. The Soviet military intervened in both countries — in June 1953 and November 1956 respectively — Moscow being determined to crush the popular uprisings and reassert full control over its satellite states. In Hungary, intellectuals and students embittered by the Communist regime demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the organisation of free, multi-party elections. In the 1950s, the people began to protest more and more openly against the fall in their standard of living and the renunciation of national independence. MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
In late October 1956, following the news of the Polish rebellion against Soviet hegemony, Hungary’s political opposition also demonstrated its discontent by marching peacefully through the streets of Budapest before organising armed conflict. Some members of the Hungarian army fought on the side of the rebels. A new Hungarian government, led by Imre Nagy, supported the rebels. It called for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and abolished the one-party system before announcing Hungary’s unilateral withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and proclaiming the country’s neutrality. On 1 November 1956, the Red Army seemed to be withdrawing. In reality, however, it continued to keep an eye on the country, which was foundering in a ‘counter-revolution’. Between 4 and 8 November 1956, Nikita S. Khrushchev ordered the Red Army to put down the Hungarian Uprising by force. Soviet troops attacked en masse and abolished the independent national government. Hungary was immediately subjected to merciless repression, and hundreds of thousands of Hungarians fled to the West. The new Hungarian Government, bankrolled by Moscow, restored a dictatorial regime in the country and closed all the borders again. This forceful intervention, which trampled democracy underfoot, resulted in the USSR’s standing in the countries of Western Europe falling to its lowest level since the Second World War. But the moment chosen by the Soviets was very favourable to them because the Western powers were deeply divided and weakened by the Suez Crisis, which was happening at the same moment. The West was in no position to react appropriately and was forced to stand helplessly by as the Russians returned to Hungary.
BUILDING THE BERLIN WAL
Konrad Hermann Joseph Adenauer was a German statesman who served as the first post -war changelor of West Germany untill 1963
HISTORY COLD WAR
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1947 0r ’48 ?
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During the 1950s, the City of Berlin was still divided into a Western zone, consisting of the American, British and French sectors, and a Soviet zone. Berlin constituted a thermometer during every international crisis, registering the degree of seriousness of the crisis. The Western Allied powers were determined to uphold their rights in the former capital of the Reich. For the Communist Government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), West Berlin was a constant provocation, as it was an easy escape route for many East Germans who wanted to flee the country.
. In 1953, production levels in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were poor. In order to stimulate production, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), led by the Stalinist Walter Ulbricht, imposed increasingly severe working conditions on the workforce. However, he did not offer in exchange any prospect of an improvement in the people’s standard of living. East Berliners noted with envy the ever-increasing economic prosperity in the Western sectors. On 16 and 17 June 1953, strikes broke out in East Berlin and spread rapidly throughout East Germany. These uprisings, however, were brutally put down by Soviet troops, leaving many dead and injured. The defeat of the June 1953 riots resulted in several hundred thousand East Germans fleeing to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). More than two million people had crossed from East to West in less than ten years..
In order to stop this mass exodus, which particularly weakened the country’s economy, the GDR finally prevented people crossing to the West. During the night of 12 to 13 August 1961, East German workers, flanked by soldiers, built a wall between East and West Berlin that made passage impossible.The Western powers, resigned, could only register their verbal protests. During a visit to Berlin on 26 June 1963, US President John F. Kennedy expressed his sympathy for West Berlin by declaring ‘Ich bin ein Berliner’.In practice, it was virtually impossible to cross the ‘wall of shame’. This closed border became the most tangible symbol of the Cold War and the division of Europe.
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Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik The year 1969 marked a turning point in the political life of West Germany. For the first time since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the Christian Democrats were excluded from the government. The Social-Liberal coalition headed by Willy Brandt from October of that year sought a new direction for foreign policy and to break the existing taboos. The major powers were keeping a close eye on the East-West rapprochement policy pursued by the new Chancellor, but they did not intervene.The balance therefore began to shift, though existing alliances were MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
never called into question. The main architects of the new German policy in favour of détente in Europe were the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, and his senior diplomatic adviser, Egon Bahr. On 28 November 1969, the FRG signed the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty with the USSR. This policy of normalising relations and openness towards the East, known as ‘Ostpolitik’, was established within the overall context of East-West détente and sought to restore the economically powerful West Germany to its rightful place on the international stage. The key to the East-West rapprochement lay in the treaties with the East, the Ostverträge, of which the first was concluded between the FRG and the USSR in Moscow on 12 August 1970. This treaty formed the basis for the Ostpolitik by opening the way for diplomatic relations and confirming the peacetime territorial status quo. It ruled out any use of force between the two states and stipulated respect for territorial integrity and the existing borders. It was rapidly followed by a number of trade agreements — the FRG was the largest Western importer of Soviet goods — and the leaders of the two countries began to meet more and more frequently.On 3 September 1971, a quadripartite Allied agreement between the United States, France, the USSR and the United Kingdom laid down
conditions for travel by West Berliners and the Allies on the transit routes.West Germany subsequently recognised the new western borders of Poland, known as the OderNeisse Line, which it had hitherto rejected. After the signing of the treaty with the USSR, the FRG went on to sign a treaty with Poland in Warsaw on 10 December 1970 which included a clause allowing Polish nationals of German origin to settle in the FRG.The treaty with Czechoslovakia posed more difficulties, mainly because of the disputes arising from the Munich Agreements of 1938 and the deportation, immediately following the Second World War, of a German minority settled in the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia.On 21 December 1972, in East Berlin, the two Germanys signed the Basic Treaty in which the two states recognised one another and established normal political and trade relations. The diplomatic status quo and the inviolability of the border dividing the two German states were recognised, although reunification remained a longterm goal. This opened the way for recognition of the GDR by the Western countries, and both Germanys were admitted to the United Nations (UN) in September 1973.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE GDR AND THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL
Nevertheless, there was a growing wave of opposition, supported by the Protestant churches, which in the autumn of 1988 called for a ‘society with a
GDR and the liberal capitalism of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This, they claimed, would ensure the survival of East Germany rather than its
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Whilst Gorbachev was liberalising the Soviet regime and the movements opposed to Communism were gathering strength in Central and Eastern Europe, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) appeared to be an invincible fortress, solidly constructed by the Communist Party, which was supported by the army and the secret police, the leaders of which were set against any change and counted on the support of the Soviet troops stationed in the GDR. human face’, and subsequently in 1989 for a liberalisation of the regime. Large numbers of opponents gathered for ‘Monday prayers’, protesting against the police state and calling for democracy. Reform groups advocated ‘Socialism with a human face’, a third way between the Stalinist Socialism of the MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
absorption into West Germany. However, the reformers soon found themselves overtaken by events. A series of vast demonstrations took place, calling for freedom of thought, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly. The people wanted more than simply a reform of the GDR and Socialism; they wanted
a share of the prosperity enjoyed by West Germany, which had seen a massive influx of refugees from East Germany. They demonstrated in favour of a united Germany. The East German Government, led by Erich Honecker, see pictures,was counting on Soviet support to save the regime. But Gorbachev, wary of compromising his policy of rapprochement with the West, refused any sort of military intervention, and confirmed the fact to Helmut Kohl when he visited Bonn on 13 June 1989. Gorbachev tried to persuade the East German leaders to proceed with reforms, along the lines of perestroika. On 18 October, Honecker, who refused to yield, was stripped of his post and replaced as leader of the Communist Party by Egon Krenz, with Moscow’s approval. Hans Modrow, who was in favour of the reforms, became Head of Government.
But it was too late. On 4 November, the new leaders were booed by a crowd of a million people gathered on Alexanderplatz in East Berlin. On 9 November, this led to the decision to authorise travel abroad. Immediately, thousands of people wanted to cross through the frontier posts in Berlin, which were forced to open up to the crowd. The demonstrators started to demolish the ‘Wall of Shame’. Several million East Germans visited West Berlin, the ‘shop window of the West’.The following day, 10 November, the leaders of the GDR promised that ‘free and secret elections’ would take place in May 1990. However, continuing demonstrations forced them to bring the elections forward to 18 March. The Socialist reformers were defeated and the Christian Democrat Lothar de Maizière became Head of Government of the GDR, which on 12 April declared itself in favour of a unified Germany within NATO and the European Community. Reunification then took place swiftly by the simple expansion of the FRG to include the territory of the former GDR through the application of Article 23 of the Basic Law, which provided for the accession of new Länder. As early as 31 August 1990, the Unification Treaty was signed in Berlin. The political and administrative regime of the FRG was extended to the five Länder of the GDR, with some adjustments to the borders (Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia), with Berlin as capital. The Treaty came into force on 3 October.
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President of the GDR Erich Honecker MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
The creation of new alliances The collapse of Communism within the Eastern bloc and the break-up of the Soviet Union put an end to the Cold War. The new regimes soon declared their intention to turn to the countries of Western Europe for the necessary economic aid and assistance to facilitate the transition. The aspiration for ownership and modernity embodied by the European Union was a driving force behind the transformation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs). But the European Union, tasked with this historic mission, also had to work to offer these states the prospect of access to its area of peace and prosperity, along with the means and method that would open up this area for them. The fall of the iron curtain also paved the way for the reunification of Germany and then of the whole of Europe. Europe’s infrastructures also had to be enlarged and transformed so that they would be better suited to the new political order in Eastern Europe. From the end of the 1990s, the two former Cold War enemies embarked on a process of disarmament. The negotiations led to the signing of agreements for the progressive reduction of the number of conventional and nuclear weapons on European soil. Relations between the United States and the Russian Federation also began to normalise and the two countries embarked on bilateral negotiations on strategic arms reduction.
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Finally, on 1 July 1991 in Prague, the seven member countries of the Warsaw Pact (USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia) decided to dissolve the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact. With the collapse of the Communist camp, which strengthened the conversion to Western values (political pluralism, market economy, the primacy of law), the role of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) could increase. At the request of Mikhail Gorbachev, a revival took place that was intended to consolidate democracy and accelerate disarmament. The Summit of the Heads of State or Government held in Paris on 19–21 November 1990 adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, recalling the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. The Charter welcomed the end of an ‘era of confrontation and division’ and proclaimed the desire to ‘build, MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government’. It was decided at the Summit to make the CSCE into a permanent institution, without extending its powers and responsibilities. This would be achieved at the CSCE Council in Budapest in December 1994 with the creation of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).The Visegrad Group was created with the aim of moving away from Communism and implementing the reforms required for full membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions. It was established on 15 February 1991 at a meeting attended by József Antall, Prime Minister of Hungary, Lech Wałęsa, President of Poland, and Václav Havel, President of Czechoslovakia, in the Headquarters Allied Control Council during the Cold War era
Hungarian town of Visegrád. Following the division of Czechoslovakia into two separate States on 1 January 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia became the third and fourth members of the group. The ‘Visegrad Triangle’ (Budapest, Prague and Warsaw) therefore became the ‘Visegrad 4’ or ‘V4’ (Budapest, Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw). These four countries developed close political and economic cooperation so that they would be better equipped to defend their common interests at European level. The concerted action of V4 rapidly contributed to the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of Comecon and the consolidation of the transition to democracy. One of the aims of the Visegrad Group was to stimulate trade between the signatory States. To this end, on 21 December 1991 in Kraków, the Heads of State or Government signed the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which came into force on 1 March 1993.
The countries of the former Warsaw Pact, concerned about the stability of their frontiers because of the revival of nationalism in Central Europe and a possible resurgence of Russian imperialism, needed a credible guarantee and found it not in the OSCE or in the European Union but in NATO and, through it, the United States. The Visegrad Group countries also asked to be formally integrated into NATO and affirmed, on 6 May 1992, that ‘their long-term objective was full membership of NATO’.
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But there was no question of expanding the Atlantic Alliance towards Eastern Europe, since that would upset Russia. NATO adopted a new strategic concept. There was no longer a global military threat in Europe. The danger now lay in regional conflicts arising from economic, social and political issues as well as from those concerning defence. This resulted in the need, while still maintaining the potential for collective defence, to develop dialogue and cooperation in order to contribute — along with the other organisations — to the peaceful resolution of the crises which were threatening European security. This resulted in the creation, on the initiative of the United States and Germany, of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which, on 20 December 1991, began to organise periodic meetings of ministers, ambassadors and military experts to discuss defence and security issues. The number of Member States began at 25 (the 16 from NATO, Russia representing the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the three Baltic states). It expanded with the inclusion, in March 1992, of 11 other republics from the new Commonwealth of Independent States, to which were added Albania and Georgia. There were 38 members in total. Cooperation developed in all areas and intensified against the background of the Partnership for Peace (11 January 1994), which aimed to establish military cooperation with NATO (planning, joint exercises) in order to improve the capacity to successfully carry out United Nations and CSCE/OSCE peacekeeping missions, through the setting up of combined joint task forces at MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
The stand of Checkpoint Charlie international level. This partnership, it was hoped, would play a crucial role in the process for the enlargement of NATO as now envisaged by the Alliance governments. This enlargement was to take place progressively, several years later. On 27 May 1997, in Paris, the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian
Federation was signed, creating the NATORussia Permanent Joint Council. All these events clearly demonstrated that the struggle between East and West was a thing of the past and that the Cold War between the two superpowers had come to an end. < See also You Tube trailer about Berlin Blokkade :https://youtu.be/hsdcY16iIqM
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The stand of Checkpoint Charlie in 1961
THE SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS RACE
Story by: Rob.E. Vaneker
The destruction of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by American atomic weapons in August 1945 began an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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This lasted until the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty of November 1990. An entire generation grew up under the shadow of imminent catastrophe. There were widespread fears that humanity could not survive. A single reckless leader, or even a mistake or misunderstanding, could initiate the extinction of mankind. Stockpiles of fearsome weapons were built up to levels far beyond any conceivable purpose, and only seemed to add to the uncertainty and instability of the age. Did Cold War leaders act irrationally through fear and distrust? Or was there a degree of rationality and reason behind the colossal arms build-up? MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
A New Superweapon? The rapid surrender of Japan in 1945 certainly suggested that the United States possessed the most decisive of weapons. Indeed there is reason to suspect that the real purpose in using them was less to force a Japanese defeat than to warn the Soviet Union to be amenable to American wishes in the construction of the postwar world. As an aid to American diplomacy, however, the possession of atomic weapons proved of little value. The Soviet leadership quickly realised their limitations.The Americans, it was clear, would use them in defence of Western Europe in the face of a Soviet invasion – a step Joseph Stalin never seems to have seriously contemplated – but no American government could justify their use in order to force political reforms on Eastern Europe. Arguably Right.
The test explosion of an American nuclear bomb in the Marshall Islands. John Swift examines a vital element of the Cold War and assesses the motives of the Superpowers. Soviet leaders became even more intransigent in negotiations, determined to show they would not be intimidated. Also, it was certain that the Soviet Union would develop atomic weapons of their own, and as rapidly as possible. This, the Americans assumed, would take between eight and 15 years, given the wartime devastation the Soviet Union had suffered.
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This left the Americans to ponder the problems of security in an atomicallyarmed world. A single weapon could destroy a city. Also wartime experience had shown that there had been no defence against German V2 rockets. If, therefore, a warhead could be mounted on such a rocket, it would surely provide instant victory. Additionally, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had taught that the surprise attack was the tool of aggressors. Peace-loving democracies would be terribly vulnerable. In consequence, some thought was given to international controls, under the auspices of the United Nations, to prevent any nation possessing these weapons. This was the basis of the Baruch Plan. In 1946 American financier, and presidential adviser, Bernard Baruch proposed the dismantling of American weapons, international prohibition on the production of any more, and international cooperation in developing atomic energy for peaceful use under the strict supervision of an international body. But the Soviet Union would have to submit to that inspection regime, and the United States would not share its weapons technology. It is unclear how seriously president Harry S. Truman and his administration took these proposals. They sounded pious, and when MAGAZINE â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
without international controls, the only defence seemed to be to threaten retaliation in kind if an atomic attack was ever made on the United States or its allies. As it proved extremely difficult to develop long-range missiles that were sufficiently reliable and accurate, initially that deterrence was provided by B36 bombers stationed in Britain and the Far East. But the Soviet Union tested its first atomic weapon in 1949, far earlier than had been expected. The shock of this made American stockpiles of nuclear bombs seem unconvincing.
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Truman, therefore, authorised the development of thermonuclear weapons, or hydrogen bombs. These yielded explosions of ten megatons (equivalent to 10,000,000 tons of TNT, whereas the bomb used on Hiroshima yielded the equivalent of 12,500 tons). But by 1953, the Soviet Union had caught up again. Meanwhile the United States began building its first effective long-range missile force. These included the Atlas and Titan ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), the Jupiter and Thor IRBMs (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) and the Polaris SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile). The Americans maintained a technological lead over the Soviet Union, but this did not always appear to be the case. In October 1957 the Soviets launched Sputnik 1, the world’s first artificial satellite. This shocked the American public, who were unused to the thought of being within range of Soviet weapons, which they now seemed to be. The Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, made much of his nation’s technological prowess. In fact the technological lead and the strategic balance remained very much in America’s favour – but that did not prevent the American public believing in the existence of a ‘missile gap’ in favour of the Soviet Union. This in turn led John F. Kennedy, when he became president in 1961, to expand American missile forces much further. Kennedy’s presidency also saw the world stand on the brink of nuclear war during the Cuba Missile Crisis of October 1962. In its wake his Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, moved to the strategy of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction). This was intended to provide a degree of stability by accepting the complete destruction of both sides in an atomic exchange. Nothing could be done to prevent a devastating nuclear attack; but the retaliation would still be launched, and both sides would suffer equally. This idea of mutual deterrence did have some advantages. If ICBMs were dispersed to hardened silos, and the SLBM fleet sufficiently undetectable, then enough would survive to retaliate. A surprise attack would benefit nobody. Also it would render it unnecessary to keep building ever more missiles, just to retain a degree of parity. It would thus surely make some form of negotiated limits on missile numbers possible.
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Picture above: After October 4, the observable reality of Sputnik, blinking its way across the American sky, made Soviet missile superiority undeniable. Picture below:Admiral Hyman Rickover on "Man's Purpose in Life"
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Criticism of Mutual Deterrence
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Peace campaigners had other concerns. MAD seemed to offer only a perpetual threat of war. They feared that in such circumstances, war could not be avoided permanently. Despite the best intentions of political leaders, a mistake or an accident must at some point push the world over the edge. Also there were arguments that deterrence did not keep the peace, but caused war. Deterrence required not only ability (the possession of the weapons), it also needed the perception of resolve (the other side must believe in the willingness to actually launch the missiles if necessary). This in turn required both sides to show resolve. The best way to show willingness to launch death and destruction on a world scale, was to launch it on a smaller scale. Thus many of the wars of the Cold War, it was argued, such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, were caused, at least in part, by the deterrence strategy. Peace campaigners were also among those who addressed the question of how much deterrence was needed. During the Cuba Missile Crisis, Kennedy had the option of launching air-strikes to destroy the missiles in Cuba. But when he learned that a handful of them were likely to survive, he rejected that option for fear they might be launched. A little deterrence obviously can go a long way. Yet by the mid 1970s peace research groups, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, were variously reporting that enough atomic weaponry had been stockpiled to exterminate humanity 690 times. At the same time, work on chemical and MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
biological warfare (CBW) was making rapid progress. Diseases such as anthrax and glanders, which could kill virtually everyone who contracted them, could easily be spread. Other biological agents could target livestock or crops to cause famine. The risks of an epidemic destroying its originators merely added to the inherent horrors of such weapons. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) That some form of agreement over missile numbers would have to be found was obvious. The greater the stockpiles of weapons, the more horrifying the potential consequences of escalating confrontations became. Even the development of small-yield, tactical, or battlefield nuclear weapons did little to suggest that even a limited nuclear engagement would be less than catastrophic. In the 1950s the
disease, the survivors would envy the dead. Some steps to ease tensions had been taken. Badly shaken by their nearness to disaster during the Cuba Missile Crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev had installed a hotline (in reality a teletype line connecting the Whitehouse and the Kremlin, so that both leaders could act quickly to diffuse crises). They also agreed on a Partial Test Ban Treaty, moving test detonations of nuclear weapons underground, which did something to reduce atmospheric radioactive contamination from such tests. Furthermore they agreed not to station nuclear missiles in space or on the seabed, which neither had the technology to do anyway. Also, to prevent those countries that did not already possess nuclear weapons gaining them, in 1968 the Non Proliferation Treaty was signed. By this, nations who either lacked the technology or
There were aspects of MAD that many found objectionable. Future president Ronald Reagan felt it was defeatist, and held that the United States should be defended, whereas proponents of MAD insisted it could only work if deterrence was mutual and both sides remained equally vulnerable. United States Army undertook military exercises, such as operations Sage Brush and Carte Blanche, to see if such weapons could be used to defend West Germany from Soviet invasion. The conclusion reached was that they might – but only after West Germany had virtually ceased to exist. As early as the mid 1950s it was generally accepted that in a nuclear war the concept of a victory was ludicrous. There developed a widespread pessimism that in a post-nuclear war world, suffering destruction, chaos, nuclear fallout, famine and
the desire to own them, agreed not to build nuclear weapons and to allow international inspection of their nuclear facilities – providing, that is, that the nuclear powers undertook to completely disarm at the earliest opportunity. Other nations who had (or hoped to gain) the technology, and had the will, such as North Korea, Israel, Pakistan and India, either refused to sign or subsequently withdrew from it. All soon gained nuclear weapons that threatened to begin regional arms races. Continued on page 46
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But a solid agreement between the two main Cold War protagonists limiting the stockpiles of nuclear weapons proved very difficult to find. President Eisenhower, in 1955, had urged an agreement on ‘open skies’. By this, both sides would be free to over-fly each other’s military bases. This would allow the verification that both were adhering to a future arms control agreement. The Soviets promptly rejected the idea. They did not possess the aircraft to over-fly US bases, and saw it as an American attempt to legitimise spying. To the Americans, strict verification of Soviet compliance remained fundamental to any agreement. Herein lay a basic problem. Both sides were convinced of their own moral superiority. It was the other side who could not be trusted, and they reacted with astonished outrage when their own good intentions were questioned. But simply building ever more weapons was futile, costly and dangerous. By 2000 it is thought that there had been over 30 ‘broken arrows’, or accidents involving nuclear weapons, and perhaps six warheads had been lost at sea and never recovered. Also during the 1960s a new technological development arose that threatened whatever stability MAD offered. This came from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system. This defensive system was designed to intercept and destroy ICBMs in flight. Despite being in its infancy and having very MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
limited reliability, it might tempt a reckless leader to gamble on surviving retaliation and launch a surprise attack. Deterrence would only work if it was mutual, and if both sides were sure the other could not survive a nuclear exchange. Yet ABM would require sophisticated radar systems and its missiles would have to be deployed in huge numbers to defend a nation, and it promised to be impossibly expensive. It would also result in a new surge in constructing missiles in order to have the ability to swamp the enemy ABM system. By 1967 therefore US president Lyndon Johnson and Soviet premier Alexey Kosygin were ready to open negotiations. The American position was that both sides should agree to abandon ABM systems, so that both would remain defenceless and deterrence would continue to be mutual. This was not easy for the Soviet negotiators to accept. They felt they had a duty to defend their citizens, and that defensive weapons were moral, while offensive weapons were immoral. It took five years to negotiate the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit themselves to two ABM sites each, when there was only one, around Moscow, in existence. This was subsequently reduced to one each, and the Soviets chose to defend Moscow, while the Americans defended an ICBM site. It was further agreed there would be no new land-
based ICBMs beyond agreed numbers and no new missile submarines beyond those under construction. Superficially this might have seemed a considerable step forward, but the agreement was reached as newer technology was being deployed. With the introduction of Multiple Independentlytargeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV), a single missile could carry several warheads and attack several separate targets – up to 12 in the case of some American missiles. There was no limit on modernising or replacing existing missiles to carry MIRV (and later MARV, or Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle, which could change target in flight.) In fact SALT I allowed for a major expansion of nuclear weapons, and the signing of SALT II in 1979, which was ultimately to lead to a limit of 2,250 delivery systems (missiles, aircraft and submarines), did little to alter this. Even then the US Congress refused to ratify the latter Treaty, arguing that the Soviet Union had gained too much advantage in the agreement. Both sides, however, indicated they would adhere to the terms, as long as the other did. Even then, the development of cruise missile technology, which produced cheap, easily transportable and concealable weapons, opened new problems for verification measures.
Start of Arms Race: Picture’s above and below Excesses of the Nuclear Arms Build-Up The question addressed by peace campaigners, of how much deterrence was needed, was addressed by government and military institutions on both sides. An American study considered how many 100 megaton thermonuclear weapons would be needed to utterly destroy the Soviet Union. It found that after 400 or so detonations there would be nothing left worth attacking. Further detonations would be ‘making the rubble bounce’, or targeting isolated shepherds. Unquestionably the Soviets performed a similar study and reached a very similar conclusion. Of course the situation was a little more complicated. Some missiles would be destroyed in a surprise attack. Others would be intercepted or simply miss their targets. Others would fail to launch or be undergoing routine servicing. A degree of redundancy was needed, say four-fold. By this logic, neither side needed to go beyond the expense and inherent risks of producing more than 1600 warheads. But by 1985 the United States could deliver nearly 20,000 and the Soviet Union well over 11,000. Why did such an irrational state of affairs come about?
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From the 1970s there was a considerable amount of research studying this question, and a number of factors have been suggested that might explain this degree of overkill. One is the competition between and within the armed services of a state. Any major arms programme carries with it prestige and resources and also secures careers for the service responsible for it. With nuclear weapons obviously intended as the mainstay of American defence strategy for decades, if not generations to come, all services campaigned to win a role in their deployment. Thus the United States Navy insisted on the superiority of the SLBM to prevent the United States Air Force gaining a monopoly over missile deployment. The United States Army, for its part, clamoured for battlefield nuclear weapons so as not to be excluded. Also within the army, for example, different sections demanded either nuclear artillery shells or ground launched cruise missiles. MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
All services lobbied government for a larger slice of the pie. But this does not necessarily explain why the size of the pie kept growing. Governments were not obliged to concede every demand made upon them by their own military.
A similar argument can be used when addressing the issue of bureaucratic politics, where a similar process of competition for the resources, prestige and careers made available by the arms race existed between government agencies and departments.
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us and ussr nuclear stockpiles
Governments, it has been suggested, used the arms race to fuel fears of a foreign threat to enhance patriotism, national unity and their own authority. The arms race could be seen as a cynical exercise in social control. Both Soviet and American
A similar degree of caution should be used when ascribing the arms race to the militaryindustrial complex. This assumes that the arms manufacturers have a common interest in fostering a climate of fear to increase sales to the military. They are assumed to
Another possible factor explaining the nuclear buildup lies within the nature of the political and social systems involved. The fears and uncertainties of a nation can be exploited.
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observers often accused their Cold War opponents of such squalid motives. But it remains a conspiracy theory based on intuition rather than fact, and should be treated with considerable caution. MAGAZINE â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
foster moral panics of the kind that followed the launch of Sputnik, so that the public will clamour for military expansion.In the United States most major weapons systems are produced by about eight large corporations. Between them they represent a
huge investment in productive capacity and expertise. They are seen as vital and irreplaceable national assets, and cannot be allowed to go bankrupt. If in trouble, the US government will always be tempted to bail them out with hefty orders. Also, within research laboratories, the development of new weapons had become the norm, and the arms race had developed a measure of organisational momentum. They represent great investments that make it difficult to justify halting. But how does this work in the Soviet Union, where the profitability of arms manufacturers was no great issue? Continued on page 50
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increasingly unlikely. But could a state take the risk of ignoring the possibility? When in 1983 Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), which envisaged a network of orbiting lasers, particle beams and intercepting darts to destroy ICBMs in flight, it was widely treated with derision in the United States, where the press jeeringly referred to it as ‘Star Wars’, after the science fiction film. But could the Soviet Union afford to assume it would never work and ignore it? It certainly caused Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev considerable anxiety.
Electoral politics can, perhaps, supply another explanation. The claim that the nation was in danger, and that the incumbent administration was imperilling the United States by allowing a ‘missile gap’ to develop was certainly used to great effect by Kennedy in the 1960 presidential elections. It was a simple message, easily grasped by the electorate, accompanied by a simple solution – spend more money on defence. Once in office Kennedy found there was no ‘missile gap’, but expanded America’s missile forces in part, at least, to prevent a future opponent levelling similar accusations against him. At a lower level, congressmen of constituencies where warships, for instance, are constructed will constantly stress the Soviet naval threat. The more warships built, the more local jobs, and the more votes that might be won. This is perhaps a more convincing argument. But how could it be applied to the Soviet Union? As an explanation it is at best only partial.
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Also, it is simply logical to respond to the actions of a potential enemy to negate any possible advantage they might gain. Thus if deterrence was to be the strategy, then the risk posed by ABM needed to be countered by MIRV and then MARV, to swamp or outfox it. Furthermore there was always the tantalizing possibility that research might find the ultimate weapon, or the impenetrable defence. As the arms race progressed the chances of this happening became MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
Added to this was the simple fact that, in the arms race, the United States had the much stronger economy. Part of the logic of proceeding with SDI was that, eventually, the arms race would cripple the Soviet economy. This is in fact what was happening. By the 1980s the strain of keeping abreast in the arms race was causing unsustainable strains on the Soviet Union, paving the way for a complete re-alignment of East-West relations. Continued on page 52
Thomas K. Jones an American arms negotiator, he believed the Soviets were better prepared for a nuclear strike. *Credit Associated Press
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Cold War Picture below:Terrain of the Fulda Gap - topografic Picture above: V Corps deployment in 1952
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A final, perhaps even more attractive, point comes if the arms race is viewed as a measure of political will. The fact that it existed was not necessarily a sign that war must come, but simply proof that both sides were competing. It might even be seen as a relatively low risk form of competition. Competing by building weapons is, after all, a much better than competing by using them. But it must be said, even from such a perspective, had some error or mishandled crisis ever led these weapons to be used, the consequences for the world would have been too terrible to contemplate. Arguably by confining their competition to the sports field, or not competing at all, both sides would have served humanity far better. Issues to Debate • Why did an arms race between the USA and the USSR begin after 1945? • How sane was the policy of MAD?
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• What factors sustained the arms race for so long?
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General Curtis LeMay was Commander-in-chief of the Strategic Air Command when the SAC Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959 was prepared. [Photo source: U.S. National Archives, Still Pictures Division, RG 342B, Box 507 B&W]
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04. • References for the Battle of Malplaquet:
27.
• Marlborough as military commander by David Chandler • Fortescue’s History of the British Army Volume 1. • Grant’s British Battles. • Sullivan’s Irish Brigades in the Service of France. • The previous battle of the War of the Spanish Succession is the Battle of Oudenarde • The next battle in the British Battles series is the Battle of Dettingen • To the War of the Spanish Succession index
15. • Cole, Hugh M. (1965). "Chapter V: The Sixth Panzer Army Attack" . The Ardennes. United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History. • MacDonald, Charles (1984). A Time For Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge. Bantam Books. ISBN 0-553-34226-6. • Émile Engels, ed. (1994). Ardennes 1944-1945, Guide du champ de bataille (in French). Racine, Bruxelles. • a Gallagher, Richard (1964). Malmedy Massacre. Paperback Library. pp. 110–111. • Kershaw, Alex (October 30, 2005). The Longest Winter: The Battle of the Bulge And the Epic Story of World War II's Most Decorated Platoon. Da Capo Press. p. 330. ISBN 0-306-81440-4.
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• Cavanagh, William (2005). The Battle East of Elsenborn. City: Pen & Sword Books. ISBN 1-84415-126-3.
MAGAZINE ‘MILITARY JOURNAL APRIL-JUNE 2017
• Bark, Dennis L., and David R. Gress. A History of West Germany Vol 1: From Shadow to Substance, 1945–1963 (1992); ISBN 978-0-631-16787-7; vol 2: Democracy and Its Discontents 1963–1988 (1992) ISBN 978-0-631-16788-4 • Berghahn, Volker Rolf. Modern Germany: society, economy, and politics in the twentieth century (1987) ACLS E-book online • Bernhard, Michael. "Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal." Comparative Politics 33#4 (2001): 379-400. in JSTOR • Bessel, Richard. Germany 1945: From War to Peace (Harper Collins Publishers, 2009) ISBN 978-0-06-054036-4 • Davis, Franklin M., Jr. Come as Conqueror: The United States Army’s Occupation of Germany, 1945-49 (Macmillan, 1967). • Hanrieder, Wolfram F. Germany, America, Europe: Forty Ye a r s o f G e r m a n Fo re i g n Po l i c y ( 1 9 8 9 ) I S B N 0-300-04022-9 • Jarausch, Konrad H.After Hitler: Recivilizing Germans, 1945–1995 (2008) • Junker, Detlef, ed. The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War (2 vol 2004), 150 short essays by scholars Codering 1945-1990
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