Deep Dive Series #1 January/February 2022
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
We're very happy to announce our partnership with Pacific Forum as we head into 2022! Founded in 1975, the Pacific Forum is a non-profit, foreign policy research institute based in Honolulu, Hawaii. The Forum’s programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic and business issues and works to help stimulate cooperative policies in the Indo-Pacific region through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region’s leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas.
ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMED UNDERSTANDING OF INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY
7
SOUTH KOREA THE QUAD’S NEXT MEMBER?
40
THE RULES OF WAR
FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR JENNY DOMINO
EDITORIAL BOARD AND STAFF PUBLISHER SWi Analytics, LLC EDITOR Mark Payumo DEPUTY EDITOR Alyssamae Nuñez MANAGING EDITORS Diana Alarde-Jordan Jacob Morrell Bryner Las Rio Pacit LAYOUT EDITOR Jayrald Vasquez WEB EDITOR Philip Carpentero CONTRIBUTING WRITER Rob York ANALYZING WAR MAGAZINE www.analyzingwar.org SUBSCRIBE Inside the magazine or issuu LETTERS TO THE EDITOR editor@analyzingwar.org
Photos on these pages via Wikimedia Commons in the public domain in the U.S.: 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, and 36. All others via Shutterstock.
4 January/February 2022
is Director for Regional Affairs at Pacific Forum in Honolulu, Hawaii, where he directs the Forum’s publications and fellowship programs. Prior to joining Pacific Forum, he served as a production editor at the South China Morning Post and as chief editor of NK News. He is a PhD candidate in Korean history at the University of Hawaii.
5 January/February 2022
CONTRIBUTO
ROB YORK
FOREWORD This is the first installment of Analyzing War’s Deep Dive Series of 2022, part of our effort to deliver on the promise we made to our readers and supporters to harness technology in order to mainstream high-quality discussions on Indo-Pacific security. While it may be logical to think that bite-sized commentary caters to this generation’s short attention span, we determined that encouraging a more nuanced discourse aligns more with our advocacy as we look to see how this will further impact the security debates that we are having in the region. In Manila, for instance, there is now a noticeable replication of our online presence by at least one entity that purports to be an online strategic forum in the Philippines, which is a good thing as it validates that our leadership in this space is headed towards the right direction, and that we’re already achieving some of the goals we set out to do through the power of the internet. We also consider the Philippine military’s acquisition of the BrahMos cruise missiles as a direct outcome of this advocacy after my two-hour Zoom presentation to the Philippine Army in May 2021 vis-à-vis an article that I wrote to argue for an anti-access/area denial defense posture;1 it was apparently circulated among their officers. In addition, we are also proud to announce that Pacific Forum, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit think tank in Honolulu, Hawaii, entered into a partnership agreement with Analyzing War that came into full effect toward the end of 2021. Hence, this shift in the delivery of our content through the digital magazine makes us curious how it will contribute in broadening awareness of international security issues beyond the traditional set of personalities, such as academics and members of Asian national security bureaucracies. Furthermore, we revamped our website that now incorporates separation between long-form analysis and on-the-ground developments, something we intend to do without departing from our inclusive aspirations between the learned and those who are hungry to learn. We therefore welcome feedbacks via publishers[at]analyzingwar[dot]org as we lean into these tasks that are not necessarily easy but undoubtedly consequential. Again, we don’t do something because it’s easy, but because it’s hard. Finally, we begin this year’s deep dive series with South Korea’s prospective membership to the Quad. As it is expected to shore up the partnership’s evident anti-China stance, Japan’s own membership to the grouping unfortunately stirs a lot of historical baggage from World War II. Understanding the nuances of these power reconfigurations before our very eyes is important, even as ASEAN, for instance, would like to stand firm on the centrality of its non-interference principle. Meanwhile, we introduce our featured security scholar, Jenny Domino, who is a human rights lawyer and a Senior Policy Officer of Meta’s Oversight Board (formerly Facebook). We chose her because we would like to drive home the point that advancing the cause of freedom means respecting human rights, and that is just non-negotiable especially in this age of digital misinformation. Mark Payumo Mountain View, CA 1
Mark Payumo, “How the Philippine Army Can Find Its Place in the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, September 30, 2020. 6 January/February 2022
SOUTH KOREA THE QUAD’S NEXT MEMBER? Rob York
7 January/February 2022
I
n my discussions with individuals in the security community—almost all of them being experts, just on subjects other than the Korean Peninsula—I have frequently been asked about the possibility of South Korea joining
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or “Quad”) consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. Among those interested in the preservation of liberal democracy—or at least a rules-based order—in Asia and the surrounding region, the rise of the People’s Republic of China has provoked widespread concern. The Quad is seen as an especially promising development for countering that rise, given the size and collective attributes of countries involved, and the recent initiatives promised by its members seem especially relevant amid our present pandemic and a looming climate crisis. 8 January/February 2022
South Korea, for reasons we will cover soon, might seem an especially promising candidate for joining the Quad (or, to please the pedants, expand it into a “Quint”), both for ideological reasons and to expand its economic and technological capabilities. South Korea’s rapid rise to middle power status by the end of the Cold War is an inspiring story, which other countries have looked to for advice; this ascension is also why Seoul is widely believed to have potential add-on value for the Quad countries. South Korea, however, brings a new meaning to the term “middle power,” sandwiched as it has been between feuding regional powerhouses that have frequently left it scarred and distrustful. The factors that fueled that rise will determine the participation in the Quad in the near term, and quite possible beyond. City skyline in South Korea.
9 January/February 2022
FROM QUAD TO QUINT
T
o understand why Korea might not be the most natural fit for Quad membership, one must first understand the nature of the Quad and why it has been revived recently. Some commentators have noted that
the grouping has its roots in the aftermath of the devastating Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of 2004,1 with the four Asia-Pacific (now Indo-Pacific) democracies of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India coming together as part of the Tsunami Core Group to distribute aid amid criticisms that the U.S. response to the disaster had been slow.2 The group quickly disbanded, however, and folded into broader UN efforts to respond to the disaster, although it did not die completely: in 2007 then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan proposed a revived “Quadrilateral Initiative” that would establish an “Asian Arc of Democracy” in the region. It, too, was short-lived, as the development was seen as a “Washington-centric” initiative encircling China that drew a stern protest from Beijing. Before 2007 was over Abe would be ousted as Japan’s prime minister, as would the right-of-center government in Canberra. Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in 2004.
10 January/February 2022
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi in the 2014 U.S.-China EcoPartnerships Signing Ceremony.
PRC objections resonated with the new Labor Party government in trading partners in Australia, and the initiative was quickly aborted.3 Contrary to popular opinion, concerns in Washington about the PRC eventually rivaling the U.S. did not begin with the Trump administration—see George W. Bush’s declarations that the PRC was a “strategic competitor” as far back as 1999,4 almost two decades before Trump’s administration did the same. However, following the event of 9/11 the U.S. of the mid-aughts was far more concerned with developments in the Middle East, and Beijing was seen as a partner; hence, when Canberra backed out of the deal concerted efforts were not made to revive it. 11 January/February 2022
International Tourism and Central Business District on Guoxing Road, China
By 2017, however, concerns about the PRC’s ascent suddenly outweighed those of the spread of democracy between in and around the Fertile Crescent. Representative of the Quad nations began meeting again, at the initiative of Tokyo, led by the same prime minister—Abe Shinzo, back in power following a stint in the political wilderness—who had proposed the initiative a decade earlier. This was the same year that the Trump administration revived the “strategic competitor” label for the PRC (and Russia), signaling a much greater openness to confrontation with Beijing. Even so, at the time there was much reason to question the Quad’s longevity. 12 January/February 2022
For one, despite its long-standing alliance with the U.S., Australia’s economic dependence on the PRC had only grown5 in the years since the first iteration of the Quad. For another, while India has historically had troubled relations with the PRC, its Cold War-era ties with the U.S. were only marginally better, owing to its friendliness with the Soviet Union, while Delhi has traditionally eschewed formal alliances in general.6 In addition, while the Trump administration signaled a greater willingness to confront the PRC from its early days, it also struggled with maintaining alliances and partnerships, including with countries essential to that effort. Trump’s pronouncement to “put America first,” November 2, 2020
13 January/February 2022
Then came 2020 and the rise of Covid-19. The novel coronavirus directly impacted relations between Beijing and Canberra, as the latter called for an investigation into the virus’ origins in China—the implication being that the PRC’s handling lacked transparency and that it bore blame for the virus’ impact upon the rest of the world. Beijing’s retaliation was swift, taking the form of recriminations and, more consequentially, economic penalties7 that all but shoved Canberra into closer cooperation with Washington and Tokyo. The impact on India was less direct, but some analysts suggest the sudden escalation in the Ladakh border dispute in spring 2020 was part of a broader pattern of belligerent behavior by the PRC after Covid’s onset,8 suggesting that the regime needed to change the narrative, either for domestic or international audiences, by asserting itself more aggressively (though others disagree9). One result was a clash on their shared border that left 20 dead on the Indian Army side (and an unconfirmed number of deaths on the People’s Liberation Army).
14 January/February 2022
HMAS Parramatta with Japanese warships in May 2019.
This, accompanied by a change in administrations in Washington to one that promised to counter the PRC rise explicitly through regional partnerships, and Quad meetings are suddenly increasing in frequency and substance beyond mere mentions of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Coordination includes vaccine response, shoring up supply chains (including in the vital sector of semiconductors), and technology promotion—not to mention annual quadrilateral naval exercises. 15 January/February 2022
WHY KOREA? As the Quad’s institutionalization proceeds apace, so has speculation as to its phases of growth. Were it to expand into a Quint, or even a Sext, who would be the logical candidates to join them? The most natural candidates would seem to be the countries that join the original four in the “Quad+3” arrangement: South Korea, but also Vietnam and New Zealand. Vietnam is a rapidly growing economy that looks set to benefit from the shift of supply chains out of the PRC, and which, like India, has a history of territorial disputes with Beijing (maritime, in their case10). However, it also shares India’s distrust of alliances11 and has resisted closer relations to the U.S. Furthermore, the Quad is a grouping of four Indo-Pacific democracies—some of their democracies are stronger than others, of course, but Vietnam is a one-party state. It is not Vietnamese parade of the great thousand years of Thang Long - Hanoi
16 January/February 2022
a democracy by any reasonable standard, and extending membership could lead to tension within the Quad over its direction, as well as pressure on Hanoi to enact reforms—if a non-democracy with tense relations with Beijing were admitted, the idea of the Quad as anything but anti-China initiative might be even harder to defend. New Zealand, on the other hand, is a democracy, and one considered a model. It is an ally of the U.S. and Australia under the ANZUS treaty of 1951, and it has also raised concerns about PRC behavior especially regarding the suppression of Hong Kong’s democracy movement and the Xinjiang Uyghurs. Its concerns, however, are muted in comparison to Australia’s, and it eschews even the limited military that the official Quad members have participated in.12
Parliament Buildings in Wellington, New Zealand.
17 January/February 2022
South Korea, unlike Vietnam, is both a democracy and a treaty ally of the U.S. Its military, long overshadowed by its northern neighbor’s threatening displays and larger numbers of conscripts, has actually been a more advanced fighting force than the North’s for decades—currently the sixth-largest in the world, in fact13—and shows signs of growing exponentially in the years to come.14 As the Quad is not an alliance, much less a military one, South Korea’s economic and technological progress may be even more relevant to the Quad, as it is the world’s tenth largest economy15—ahead of Australia—and its enormous progress of recent decades rests on its technological know-how, something Quad members are eager to address given the vulnerability of semiconductor supply chains. Its ties with Australia have shown signs of growth as well, culminating in the December signing of a $700 million defense deal and providing Australia’s military with Korean-made weapons and equipment.16 Some combination of all of these factors probably motivates the question I keep getting: “Will South Korea join the Quad?” And yet my answer is always “No.” Or, at least, “Not yet.” Defense Secretary Jim Mattis meets with the Minister of National Defense for the Republic of Korea, Han Min-goo at the Ministry of National Defense in Seoul, South Korea, Feb. 3, 2017.
18 January/February 2022
Japanese mountain troops in the 1920's.
THE COLONIZER THAT WAS The four-ton Asian elephant in the room regarding Korea’s Quad participation would have to be Seoul’s perpetually strained relations with Tokyo. While there have respites in bilateral tensions—President Kim Dae-jung (19982003) successfully improved relations for a time17—the disputes between the two can be traced all the way back to the post-war period. Though both are democracies, treaty allies with the U.S., and regular targets of North Korean threats and provocations, flare-ups between Tokyo and Seoul are a regular occurrence due to their differing interpretations of historical events, exacerbated by domestic politics in both countries. 19 January/February 2022
The most direct cause of Seoul and Tokyo’s distrust for one another is Imperial Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945. Koreans point to the suppression of their language and culture; the exploitation of their land, labor, and resources; and the empire’s conscription of Koreans as wartime cannon fodder, forced laborers, or even sex slaves for Japanese troops. After Korea’s liberation at the end of World War II, efforts by the U.S. to form a united East Asian anti-communist front repeatedly fell through due to disagreements between the two. Even with relations finally established in 1965, a backlash among the Korean general public ensued, forcing Seoul to keep Tokyo at arm’s length.
Japanese Infantry Regiment in the 1920's.
20 January/February 2022
Liancourt Rocks, also known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan.
Today, issues between the two countries are consistently rocky due mostly to the same set of issues: the compensation for Korean victims of wartime forced labor and sexual slavery, as well as sovereignty over the islets that lie in between the Japanese Isles and Korean Peninsula, which the latter call Dokdo and the former call Takeshima. The disputes between the two countries are more than a historical matter, though, as tensions between them have had security-related repercussions. For instance, 2012’s aborted effort at an intelligence-sharing deal between Japan and a Korean administration that was relatively soft-line on Tokyo; the public outcry was so swift and harsh that the agreement fell apart soon after it was announced.18 Another one is the 2015 deal on the “Comfort Women” (as wartime victims of Japan’s sexual slavery are referred to) that the U.S. cajoled both Japan and a different Korean government into entering—this agreement was abrogated in 2018 by Korea’s incumbent Moon Jae-in government.19 There is also Japan’s objections to Korea participating in the summer G7 summit in an observatory role.20 21 January/February 2022
If it seems these disagreements are long-standing and yet appear to be reaching a crescendo, you are not wrong. The ill-fated agreements over intelligence-sharing and Comfort Women compensation were reached by the conservative governments of Lee Myung-bak (2007-2012) and Park Geun-hye (2012-2017), the former of which was not above using the Dokdo issue for political gain but which otherwise sought good relations with Japan, and the latter of which mostly sought to avoid the subject of Japan so as to neither inflame the anti-Japanese bloc21 nor Korea’s American allies. The progressive Moon administration, however, has presided over the worst relations between Korea and Japan since the Asian Financial Crisis (if not liberation). Lowlights include the court order allowing the Korean assets of a Japanese company to be seized in order to compensate victims of forced labor,22 the end of the Comfort Women agreement, and Japan’s removal of Korea from its “whitelist” of preferential trade partners.23 Moon has also frequently made reference to the need to rid the country of “the vestiges of pro-Japanese collaborators.”24 At times, the two allies of the U.S. have appeared on the verge of an international incident, such as when Japan’s defense ministry accused Korea of locking its targeting radar onto a Japanese plane in 2018,25 and the nearcollapse of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2019.26 South Korea Seoul Cheong Wa Dae (Blue House)
22 January/February 2022
Prospects for improved relations post-Moon can be found if one looks hard enough, but seem unlikely to result in Korea as the country that turns the Quad into the Quint. The March elections to succeed Moon27 will come down to either the progressive Lee Jae-myung or the conservative Yoon Seok-youl, both of whom have said that they want to improve ties with Tokyo. Lee, however, rejects the notion of an alliance between Korea, Japan, and the U.S., citing Japanese designs on Dokdo28 and its past colonization of Korea as reasons to be distrustful.29 Yoon certainly appears more open to collaboration,30 and does not have past Korean conservatives’ affiliations with Japan to be used against him as a political cudgel; as president, however, he would almost certainly have to react forcefully to Japan’s claims to the islets (something Tokyo consistently expresses in state-approved textbooks) and statements by Japanese politicians downplaying imperial mistreatment of Koreans during colonization. To not do so would leave him open to accusations that he has a collaborator’s heart. 23 January/February 2022
THE HEGEMON IN WAITING The relations between Korea and Japan are not the only obstacle to Seoul’s increased integration into the Indo-Pacific pro-democratic security architecture. Much as the counties involved in the grouping might stress the Quad’s informal, positive, and non-traditional security orientation, there is little doubting that its revival in 2017 and acceleration in 2020 have been prompted by the rise of the PRC and its revisionist aims for the global order. Beijing has not stopped decrying the Quad as an “anti-China” initiative,31 even if the Quad countries prefer to stress what the arrangement upholds, rather than what it combats. Any country that did seek to become the fifth member of the IndoPacific democracies club would surely feel Beijing’s wrath—something South Korea already knows intimately.
President Xi Jinping of China.
24 January/February 2022
First, however, it is worth mentioning how Seoul became so vulnerable to Beijing’s economic coercion. The two governments, of course, fought on different sides in the Korean War and did not officially recognize each other while the Cold War was underway. As the contest between liberal democracy and international communism wound down, however, relations thawed and both sides began to reevaluate one another. South Korea had, as mentioned, rapidly modernized throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, from an impoverished former Japanese colony and site of a destructive civil war, to a technological marvel that vastly outperformed its North Korean rivals and, in the aftermath of their hosting the 1988 Summer Olympics, won the recognition of the entire Eastern European communist contingent. Beijing, by the early 1990s, had more to appreciate than most regarding South Korea’s growing economic and diplomatic clout: Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening project in the late 1970s was not dissimilar to South Korea’s own modernization process—seeking expertise from abroad, supporting the development of highvalue industries, taking advantage of a large population of industrious but low-paid laborers to promote low-cost exports. By 1992 Communist China and “free” Korea could deny their common course no longer, and they normalized relations. 25 January/February 2022
By 2003 the PRC displaced the U.S. as Korea’s primary trading partner.32 As of 2020 the PRC accounted for $132.6 billion in trade volume with South Korea, more than the next two countries—Washington and Vietnam—combined (Japan ranked fifth).33 However, while access to the vast Chinese consumer market has certainly been to Korea’s economic benefit, in recent years, it has become increasingly clear that this has not translated into a shared vision of the future of the region. Awareness of the downside to this economic entanglement is growing in the South Korean government. This became evident in 2016 and 2017, when South Korea, concerned over North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear and missile programs, decided to accept the U.S. offer of a THAAD antimissile battery. This decision had not been undertaken lightly: the South Koreans, particularly under the Park Geun-hye administration, sought PRC support for encouraging North
26 January/February 2022
Korea’s denuclearization and the unification of the peninsula,34 but Beijing refused to take strong measures to curb it, concerned about the possibility of destabilization in the northern half of the peninsula and what that could mean for them.35 Though they had long been frustrated by Beijing’s hands-off approach to North Korea’s illicit weapons programs, the South Koreans resisted U.S. offers of THAAD batteries before 2016. The change in their outlook came not just from Pyongyang’s alarming weapons tests, but reportedly from Seoul's gradual realization that the PRC’s refusal to take a more active role in the area stemmed from their opposition to Korean unification. Perhaps Beijing assumes a united Korea would more closely resemble South Korea in economics and governance, and therefore tilt toward the U.S.; whatever their reasoning, this realization on South Korea’s part led to a shift.
U.S. Soldiers with the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Regiment.
27 January/February 2022
When the THAAD decision was announced, Beijing did not officially levy measures on South Korea. Yet, within months Koreans whose livelihoods depended on the PRC would face a variety of penalties, ranging from the closing of stores owned by Korean conglomerates (ostensibly for code violations) to the banning of Chinese tour groups to Korea to new restrictions on Korean cultural products (including music, TV, film and gaming). While this dispute would fade, it never officially ended, and some restrictions (including on Korean game developers seeking to operate in China) never ended.36 Part of the reason it has faded from view is that it has largely been overshadowed in the Moon Jae-in years by the Seoul administration’s feud with Tokyo—seen in the previous section—its ill-fated outreach to North Korea and its wrangling with the U.S. over troop burden-sharing. The rift had not been forgotten by the South Korean public, evidently, as the fallout from Covid-19’s origins in Wuhan (and the Moon administration’s decision not to restrict entry of Chinese into the country)37 brought such sentiment back to the fore. South Korean approval of the PRC has fallen precipitously, now languishing far behind that of the U.S., but also below Japan and North Korea.38 Republic of Korea Prime Minister Jeong Sye-kyun visits Covid-19 hit Daegu Metropolitan City.
28 January/February 2022
So, have the PRC’s heavy-handed tactics on THAAD and less-than-transparent handling of Covid pushed Seoul into the Quad’s arms? Not so fast—while South Koreans resent PRC treatment of them in the THAAD case, there may be latent concern about U.S. reliability as a partner even after the Trump administration’s departure, namely that the U.S. did not support Korea during the THAAD ordeal—which started in 2016, meaning Trump’s team cannot take full blame. Were Koreans to step out on a limb and seek entry into the Quad, there would be little confidence that such help would be forthcoming against the retaliation to come. Also, the Seoul government’s view of Beijing has not caught up with that of the general public, and might not for some time. Moon’s decision to accept THAAD may have put him on Beijing’s hit list, but neither Moon nor his assorted ministers have betrayed much in the way of frustration with Beijing publicly. The day may come when Korea departs from the balance between its security relationship with the U.S. and its economic partnership with the PRC, but Moon has indicated that he will not be the leader to do it. 29 January/February 2022
There is, however, a chance that Moon’s view will not be shared by the next president. The conservative Yoon Seok-youl has criticized the PRC on a number of occasions, even as he speaks positively of working with Japan and the U.S., and he even recently declared that “most South Koreans, especially young people” dislike China.39 This brought a swift denunciation from the progressive camp, which stressed Beijing’s importance as a partner (never mind that polling data bears it out, including the generational differences involved). The progressive Lee Jae-myung has also indicated continuity with Moon on most foreign policy questions, including by stating that Korea will not and should not have to choose between the U.S. and the PRC.40 It is therefore safe to say that South Korea’s relations with the PRC, as well as the U.S., may tilt depending on the March election.
30 January/February 2022
President Joe Biden poses for a photo before the Quad Leaders' Summit with, from left, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, India Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, September 24, 2021.
But a tilt is one thing; entry into an (unofficially) “anti-China” bloc is quite another. As the previous section indicated, better Korea-Japan ties under Yoon remain uncertain, nor is it clear Yoon will be in a mood to pick a fight with Beijing should he be inaugurated, considering all the attendant economic fallout. Koreans are unhappy with the PRC, and may not care for how Moon has taken Beijing’s slings and arrows in stride. They overwhelmingly vote based on livelihood issues, however, and Yoon might not be able to count on their support if he provokes a costly confrontation (which, given his numerous gaffes as a candidate, could happen unintentionally). 31 January/February 2022
Korea’s political system does not reward risk-taking among presidents—who serve just five years, tend to be punished in local and legislative elections midway through, and are then pushed to the side as their party starts to focus on who will represent them in the next presidential election. Accession to the Quad would also likely be a step-by-step process, one that could easily unravel in the face of domestic discontent with the president leading the process. WHAT TO DO Korea’s traditional tensions with its former colonizer and wariness of the hegemon-in-waiting to their east are not the only obstacles. The Trump administration shook Koreans’ confidence in the U.S. alliance, and there is good reason for continued skepticism: Trump’s popularity was driven by deep discontent among Americans with the U.S.-led system of alliances in general, which many Americans feel has not benefitted them.41 Deputy Secretary Blinken and Ambassador Lippert poses for a photo with prominent South Korean experts.
32 January/February 2022
Yet despite the previously mentioned concerns, Korea has shown an interest in engaging with, if not joining, the Quad. Pandemic response has been among the major initiatives the grouping has sought to address, both in terms of producing and distributing vaccines, but also in preparing for the next pandemic. For resource-poor, export-reliant South Korea the restrictions imposed in the pandemic’s aftermath remain cause for concern, even though the country has performed relatively well compared to its neighbors.42 The Quad’s September Leaders Summit produced a statement prioritizing not only pandemic response but other issues Seoul may engage with: climate change mitigation, emerging technology, cybersecurity, space, and the Indo-Pacific’s infrastructure needs.43 33 January/February 2022
Korea, therefore, has reason to work with the Quad and may do so without provoking either the PRC or their own anti-Japan contingents.44 Near-term options for South Korea include: • Engage with Quad countries individually. Despite their differences on North Korea and the PRC, the Moon and Biden administrations have had a productive relationship so far on Covid response and military preparations, and Korea’s recent deal with Canberra is good news. India is a country Korea can more productively engage with, including by leveraging positive assessment of Korean cultural products in India to expand economic, and even defense, ties that have thus far not met their potential.
Australian, South Korean and U.S. sailors on HMAS Hobart in November 2019.
34 January/February 2022
U.S., Japan, and South Korea trilateral meeting during the UN General Assembly.
• Seek realistic goals for Japan relations. It would be difficult for any South Korean leader to set back relations with Japan more than Moon Jae-in did. The damage done under Abe was so extensive that neither of Abe’s successors has officially met with Moon: Abe and Suga Yoshihide crossed paths at the G7 in June 2021, but Japan declined any formal meeting on the summit’s sidelines,44 and Kishida Fumio appears to not consider meeting Moon necessary given Seoul’s pending change in leaders. A diplomatic breakthrough under Moon’s successor may be unlikely, but the next president can at least “normalize” them by not overreacting on the issue of Dokdo and historical questions, seeking membership in the Japan-led CPTPP, and concluding the trade whitelist issue—which was never formally resolved. 35 January/February 2022
• Embrace non-controversial aspects of the Quad. The Quad summit fact sheet produced in September 2021 included a number of measures that it would be difficult to argue with, including the need to prepare for the next pandemic, meeting climate-friendly goals on clean shipping and clean hydrogen, and to nurture next-generation STEM talent. For Korea to embrace and assist in these initiatives will likely not change Beijing’s assessment of the grouping—they still likely claim it is “doomed to fail”45— but a heavy-handed approach seems less likely than participation in military coordination with Quad members.
President Joe Biden, joined by Vice President Kamala Harris, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and White House Staff, participates in the virtual Quad Summit with Australia, India, and Japan, March 12, 2021.
36 January/February 2022
For the Quad, as it seeks to engage not only Seoul but other governments unsure of how closely to engage the grouping, recommendations include: • Identify means for other regional actors to cooperate in their initiatives without joining. Quad+3 countries will not be the only states to appreciate such a step: ASEAN members, along with the European Union and UK will as well. • In the long-term, spell out the conditions under which the Quad might grow into a larger entity with more members. Will they be democratic? Will they need to have specific attributes beneficial to the grouping as a whole? Will they have to favor specific conduct in the maritime sphere? Taken together, these efforts may do more than assuage the concerns of countries that, like South Korea, view the Quad pensively. They may even spell out areas, such as climate, where cooperation with the PRC may proceed – something it still shows interest in coordination on. 37 January/February 2022
NOTES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15
16 17
18 19
20 21
“The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’” War on the Rocks, November 16, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/ rise-fall-rebirth-quad/. “Tsunami ‘core Group’ of Relief Nations Disbanded - Myanmar,” ReliefWeb, accessed January 4, 2022, https://reliefweb. int/report/myanmar/tsunami-core-group-relief-nations-disbanded. Ibid “Bush Makes Clinton’s China Policy an Issue,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ politics/campaigns/wh2000/stories/chiwan082099.htm. “Australia Exports to China - 2022 Data 2023 Forecast 1988-2020 Historical,” accessed January 4, 2022, https:// tradingeconomics.com/australia/exports/china. “Why India Avoids Alliances | The Economist,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.economist.com/the-economistexplains/2018/06/01/why-india-avoids-alliances. Tenny Kristiana, “PacNet #43 – First Korea, Now Australia: China’s Carrot-and-Stick Diplomacy Is Not New,” July 29, 2020, https://pacforum.org/publication/pacnet-43-first-korea-now-australia-chinas-carrot-and-stick-diplomacy-is-not-new. Prabhash K. Dutta New Delhi May 29, 2020UPDATED: May 29, and 2020 14:30 Ist, “Did Xi Jinping Create Tension in Ladakh to Mask Domestic Troubles, Strengthen Grip on Hong Kong?,” India Today, accessed January 4, 2022, https:// www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/india-china-border-row-ladakh-tension-xi-jinping-coronavirus-unemploymenthong-kong-law-1683192-2020-05-29. Derek Grossman, “Chinese Border Aggression Against India Likely Unrelated to Pandemic,” July 6, 2020, https://www. rand.org/blog/2020/07/chinese-border-aggression-against-india-likely-unrelated.html. “Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea,” Global Conflict Tracker, accessed January 4, 2022, https://cfr.org/globalconflict-tracker/conflict/territorial-disputes-south-china-sea. “Vietnam Releases Defense White Paper, Reaffirming No Military Alliance,” hanoitimes.vn, accessed January 4, 2022, https://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-releases-defense-white-paper-reaffirming-no-military-alliance-300279.html. Alexander Gillespie, “Without Evidence of Real Progress, NZ’s Foreign Policy towards China Looks Increasingly Empty,” The Conversation, accessed January 4, 2022, http://theconversation.com/without-evidence-of-real-progress-nzs-foreignpolicy-towards-china-looks-increasingly-empty-158946. “2021 South Korea Military Strength,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-militarystrength-detail.php?country_id=south-korea. “South Korea Proposes 4.5% Increase in 2022 Defence Budget,” Janes.com, accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.janes. com/defence-news/news-detail/south-korea-proposes-45-increase-in-2022-defence-budget_19960. IANS, “S. Korea’s Economy Expected to Rank 10th Largest for 3 Straight Yrs: IMF,” Business Standard India, December 27, 2021, https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/s-korea-s-economy-expected-to-rank-10th-largest-for-3straight-yrs-imf-121122700055_1.html. “Australia, South Korea Sign $717m Defence Deal | Military News | Al Jazeera,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/13/australia-south-korea-sign-680m-defense-deal. “A Missed Opportunity to Commemorate a Positive Moment in Korea-Japan Relations,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/missed-opportunity-commemorate-positive-moment-korea-japanrelations. K. J. Kwon, “South Korea and Japan Put Military Intelligence Pact on Hold after Outcry,” CNN, June 29, 2012, https://www. cnn.com/2012/06/29/world/asia/south-korea-japan-pact/index.html. Seulki Lee Gramer Sophia Jones, Robbie, “The Legacy of Wartime Atrocities Still Looms Over Asian Alliances,” Foreign Policy (blog), accessed January 4, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/21/koreas-comfort-women-lost-did-u-sdiplomacy-win/. “Japan Told U.S. It Opposes South Korea Joining G7, in Move Likely to Anger Seoul | The Japan Times,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/28/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-objection-south-korea-g7/. Park’s government was especially sensitive to allegations of coziness with Japan because Park Geun-hye’s father, the military dictator Park Chung-hee, not only reached the much-maligned 1965 normalization treaty with Japan but even served as an officer in the Imperial Japanese army during the colonization period.
38 January/February 2022
22 “S. Korea Orders Seizure of Japan Assets over Forced Labor,” AP NEWS, January 9, 2019, https://apnews.com/ article/7b9c0d803b4f466d9c16ab5a8b919272. 23 A.B.C. News, “Japan Removes South Korea from Trade ‘Whitelist,’” ABC News, accessed January 4, 2022, https://abcnews. go.com/International/japan-removes-south-korea-trade-white-list/story?id=64728582. 24 “Address by President Moon Jae-in on 100th March First Independence Movement Day,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Speeches/128. 25 “Japan Accuses South Korea of ‘extremely Dangerous’ Radar Lock on Plane,” Reuters, December 21, 2018, sec. Aerospace and Defense, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-southkorea-idUSKCN1OK11O. 26 “South Korea to Continue Intelligence-Sharing Pact with Japan - BBC News,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.bbc. com/news/world-asia-50526883. 27 Korean presidents are constitutionally limited to a single term of five years. 28 Much as Japan may dispute the designation, and the US may profess neutrality, we will use the Korean name for them, if only because Korea currently administers control over them. 29 “‘Is Japan Trustworthy?’: South Korean Politician Rejects 3-Way Defence Alliance,” South China Morning Post, November 10, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3155540/dangerous-south-korea-enter-defence-alliancejapan-and-us. 30 “Yoon Vows Not to Exploit Seoul-Tokyo Tensions for Political Gain | Yonhap News Agency,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211125005700315. 31 “Quad Mechanism Turning into ‘Sinister Gang of Indo-Pacific’: Global Times Editorial - Global Times,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234988.shtml. 32 “South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30566. html. 33 “South Korea’s Top Trading Partners 2020,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.worldstopexports.com/south-koreastop-import-partners/. 34 Jin Kai, “3 Stages of Park Geun-Hye’s China Diplomacy,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2016/12/3stages-of-park-geun-hyes-china-diplomacy/. 35 “Four Reasons Why China Supports North Korea,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/theinterpreter/four-reasons-why-china-supports-north-korea. 36 Daniel Mitchum, “Issues & Insights Vol. 21, WP15 — More Harm than Good: Why Chinese Sanctions over THAAD Have Backfired,” December 15, 2021, https://pacforum.org/publication/more-harm-than-good-why-chinese-sanctions-overthaad-have-backfired. 37 Justin Fendos, “Covid-19 Puts Korean Universities in Anti-Chinese Crossfire,” Times Higher Education (THE), March 23, 2020, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/blog/covid-19-puts-korean-universities-anti-chinese-crossfire. 38 “Anti-China Sentiment and South Korea’s Presidential Race,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://thediplomat. com/2021/09/anti-china-sentiment-and-south-koreas-presidential-race/. 39 “Yoon Faces Criticism for Saying ‘Most S. Koreans Dislike China,’” accessed January 4, 2022, http://m.koreaherald.com/ view.php?ud=20211229000568. 40 “South Korea Doesn’t Need to Pick between US and China, Says Presidential Candidate Lee Jae-Myung | South China Morning Post,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3161488/south-koreadoesnt-need-pick-between-us-china-says-presidential. 41 Rob York, “The Status Quo and Its Discontents: The Legacy of Donald Trump’s ‘America First’ and the Future of the US– Korea Relationship,” in The Future of the Korean Peninsula (Routledge, 2021). 42 “COVID-19 Has Crushed Everybody’s Economy—Except for South Korea’s,” accessed January 4, 2022, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/16/coronavirus-covid-economic-impact-recession-south-korea-success/. 43 “Fact Sheet: Quad Leaders’ Summit,” The White House, September 25, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2021/09/24/fact-sheet-quad-leaders-summit/. 44 Friendly relations with Japan are, of course, a goal worth pursuing, but the politically savvy must recognize that too swift of an embrace may spark a populist-nationalist firestorm that undoes the progress. 45 “Japan Nixed Meeting between Suga, Moon at G7,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://koreajoongangdaily.joins. com/2021/06/14/national/diplomacy/KoreaJapan-Moon-Jaein-Yoshihide-Suga/20210614170506843.html. 46 “Quad Alliance Countering China Doomed to Fail Due to Member’s ‘all-for-Self’ Attitudes - Global Times,” accessed January 4, 2022, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202103/1217756.shtml. 39 January/February 2022
THE RULES OF WAR
FEATURED SECURITY SCHOLAR JENNY DOMINO
Mark Payumo
Human rights hold a crucial place in warfighting. It may not be considered as a critical pillar in achieving military victory, but it certainly shaped the manner by which wars are fought. These reconfigurations manifest themselves on paper as well as on real military power. The rules of war, or otherwise known as the international humanitarian law, have at their core The Geneva Conventions. Meanwhile, precision-guided munitions and surgical strike missions—such as the one that removed Osama Bin Laden from the battlefield—have dramatically reduced the amount of collateral damage in warfare. Oftentimes, however, these policy and power reconfigurations were written in blood, utilizing verbiage that serves as a lesson in history as well as a reminder to draw on our humanity. As a consequence, they hold warfighters to account particularly professional militaries and going to war in general as an extension of policy. Hence, it does take a certain amount of conscious effort for the ordinary soldier to stand by these rules when the horrors of war become very real. 40 January/February 2022
41 January/February 2022
One could only imagine, for instance, how the entire Jordanian military felt when one of their F-16 pilots was captured by ISIS in 2015 following a downed aircraft incident in Syria. His captors then took a video of him in a cage as they began to burn him alive for all the world to see. It can be a real test of resolve for the warfighter and their civilian leaders when faced with such a challenge to your capacity and will to fight. It also poses questions whether your values (or character) are durable enough to choose to fight a just war. For Jordan, however, the response was swift as both rage and sorrow gripped the entire nation: It galvanized its otherwise fragile relations with the U.S. while executing two jihadist prisoners, including one whose freedom was reportedly sought by ISIS. Indeed, it is ultimately a matter of choice and ISIS chose to be on the wrong side of history, hastening their isolation that significantly reduced their ability to pose a threat beyond their immediate area of operations in the Middle East. But since the devil is in the details, questions remain whether Jordan genuinely made the right choices on the operational and tactical levels for them to pass the test. This makes the rules of war global in scope, transcending space and time to question whether China’s 1979 assault on Lang Son in Northern Vietnam was a learning experience for Beijing in the same manner that the U.S. Army was embarrassed by the 1968 massacre of Mai Lai. These are important questions to ponder because smaller states logically model great power behavior, which brings to mind the systematic extermination of those affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party from 1965 to 1966 allegedly with “active support” from Washington.
42 January/February 2022
43 January/February 2022
As the Philippines prepares for another transition of power, it is worth noting that human rights issues that surfaced under the Duterte administration hearken back to the rules of war. For one, it is common knowledge that the Philippine National Police, the law enforcement agency that’s at the tip of the spear in prosecuting Manila’s war on drugs, is heavily militarized. While this does not necessarily mean that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is complicit in these accusations, it knows too well how the violation of public trust emanating from these rules swelled the ranks of terrorist organizations in the Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s, a function of the AFP’s flawed response when initially confronted with guerrilla tactics that placed the legitimacy of the Philippine government in serious doubt. Given the New People’s Army’s deeply entrenched organizing efforts across multiple sectors of the Philippine society, this counter-narcotics policy deserves some recalibration. 44 January/February 2022
This problem of distrust persists today and is exacerbated by 21st-century disinformation and misinformation on social media. Hence, we look to experts like Jenny to chart a just and appropriate path forward. A Senior Policy Officer of Meta Platforms Inc.’s Oversight Board (formerly Facebook), she is a 2018 alumna of Harvard Law School and will share her thoughts with us in the months ahead here on Analyzing War regarding misinformation, social media, and human rights. For now, we consider it both an honor and a privilege to have her as our featured security scholar. AW: What sparked your interest in focusing on human rights as a lawyer? Jenny: It all happened quite coincidentally. I started out as a corporate lawyer. There was no conscious decision to shift to human rights. I had been interested in human rights and international law as a law student at the University of the Philippines, but like many, I decided to work in a big law firm after taking the bar exam. I don’t regret it; I appreciate the opportunity to have done transactional and litigation work. I find it useful even now as a human rights lawyer. But at one point I felt like something was missing. So on a whim, I applied for a six-month unpaid internship at the International Criminal Court. I got the internship, and then sold my car so I can live in The Netherlands for that long without compensation. When I returned to Manila in 2017, the “war on drugs” was already happening and killings were taking place throughout the country. The Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines, the country’s national human rights institution, needed help with the investigations. I thought the opportunity would make the best use of my ICC internship and so I took the job. I reported directly to the late chairperson, Chito Gascon, an inspiring boss who dedicated his life 45 January/February 2022
to advancing human rights in the Philippiines. It was an honor to have worked with him. I’ve been in the human rights field ever since. AW: What is the most challenging part of working in human rights law as applied in the digital space? Jenny: Law and technology is a really exciting area because of the rapid developments in the field and the pandemic world forcing us to rely on technology more than ever. However, I am resistant to the idea that technology alone will solve many of humanity’s problems, as many people would like to believe. A purely techno-centric approach will not solve the existing racism, sexism, and structural inequality pervasive around the world, and these power dynamics can just as easily seep into the technology that we develop. Online speech regulation requires open collaboration globally, yet the world has never been more divided than it is now. This fragmentation seriously impedes potentially great work and collaboration. Certain narratives, perspectives, and voices are privileged more than others, and it can be pretty frustrating at times to simply get your ideas across. AW: With political misinformation becoming more prevalent online in the Philippines, what advice would you give to the Gen Zs who are more familiar with technology? 46 January/February 2022
Jenny: Read actual books! The performative ‘content’-driven culture we live in, thanks to social media and the many influencers that enable it, does not encourage self-love and critical thinking. It’s all about branding, manufacturing, and selling a story, including political narratives. Reading not only helps me think deeply about the issues I care about, it also cultivates discernment. Never stop learning. The best investment I ever made is in myself and my education. I mean this literally and figuratively. I took out loans to fund my postgraduate studies at Harvard Law School, and almost four years since commencement, that investment has paid off. I doubt my career would have progressed as rapidly and significantly as it did otherwise. Studying at Harvard was such 47 January/February 2022
an amazing intellectual experience. Education also gives you a degree of confidence that nothing else can. You need that to be able to resist a world that is constantly trying to sell you something – whether a product, service, or story. AW: What are your personal practices for optimum social media security? Jenny: I always try to be situationally aware—how visible my laptop/phone screen is to others, not taking a call where I can be overheard, etc. I am also particular about what I post on social media. AW: What was the last book you read? What is your all-time favorite book? Jenny: The last book I read was Silvia Moreno-Garcia’s Mexican Gothic. I liked it. I am a gothic literature fan and the book was faithful to the genre. It also connects the horror in the story to the fact of colonial exploitation, which was a horror in itself. My all-time favorite would probably be Fyodor Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. The breadth of the book was worth the read. The book tackles big questions — life, love, motivation, religion, family. I empathize with the character Dmitry, he is so tragically human! Dostoevsky writes so well. My favorite part of the book was an inconsequential scene plot-wise, but the way Dostoevsky captured the human emotion in that fraught scene was just masterful. Reading the book was like studying a painting. 48 January/February 2022
When evil men plot, Good men must plan. When evil men burn and bomb, Good men must build and bind. When evil men shout ugly words of hatred, Good men must commit themselves to the glories of love. Where evil men would seek to perpetuate an unjust status quo, Good men must seek to bring into being A real order of justice. Martin Luther King, Jr.