Democracy.cn

Democracy.cn The web 2.0 and its "surrogate democracy function" in China

MA Chinese Studies Final paper Andrea Fenn 0818747

Introduction Civil society. Political expression. Democracy. Philosophers and academics have debated these terms for centuries, but none have come to a decisive definition of what these concepts really mean, or how they should be concretely applied to a political system. Nonetheless, there seems to be a certain consensus among western scholars around the idea that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) lacks a developed civil society and platforms for free and comprehensive political expression, and therefore cannot be considered as a “truly democratic country” like its western counterparts.

Since the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping, China has undergone radical economic and social transformations, which have substituted the former planned system with a relatively unrestricted market, where goods and services are priced through the relation between demand and supply; consequently, a middle class has emerged, composed of private entrepreneurs and white-collar employees of the companies operating in this new market. Despite these enormous transformations, the political configuration of the country has not changed significantly throughout the years, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is still solidly in power as the only legitimate force in a monocratic political system; apart, perhaps, from a brief parenthesis during the demonstrations on Tiananmen Square in 1989, it never seemed that the authority of the CCP suffered serious challenge from any external political or social force.

To explain this political persistence in times of socioeconomic ferment, students of China in the west have normally referred to the fact that China’s government, while liberalizing the market and allowing free economic enterprise, has maintained strict control over political expression, information, and private association, and that this has constituted the key to the CCP’s endurance in power1. For this reason, when the Internet entered China for the first time in 1994, it was not just regarded as a technological breakthrough: it seemed clear to the west that connection to the web was to bring an inevitable transformation of the country’s communication and information systems, and perhaps have a consequent impact on the CCP’s power maintenance in China2.

As a consequence, starting from the latter half of the 1990s, western scholars have debated vivaciously about the advent of the Internet in China, and on the effects that this new information 1 2

Saich (2001) Bi (2001)

technology would have on its political system. The first reaction to these changes was of enthusiastic optimism, as many scholars expected that the potential of market liberalization and communication expansion connected to information technology and Internet usage would naturally promote democracy and freedom. This is what Milton Mueller and Zixiang Tan defined as the expectation of convergence: the idea that “as countries like China modernize and reform, their political and economic institutions will naturally converge toward Western-style democracy3”. Among the various modernization policies adopted by China at the end of the 20th century, the introduction of Internet information was though to have a particular importance in encouraging democratization of the country, thanks to the market liberalization and political liberation that the web was thought to provide4. Besides, others observed the substantial transformations that the Internet was bringing about in the world of Chinese mass media, introducing a gradual loosening and marketization that would diminish the importance of ideology and the effectiveness of governmental control on information, hence resulting in democratic change in the country5. Some, as for instance Jianhai Bi, went even further in asserting the imminence of an “Internet revolution” in a democratic sense in China6.

After the initial wave of enthusiasm subsided, abated by the fierce repression of the Falun Gong movement and its online activities in 1999, observers realized that the Chinese government had started implementing strategies of regulation and control towards the web, and that the link between Internet and democracy might not be so direct. Some scholars underlined the policy of controls of the web and suppression of political dissent online operated by the CCP, and the consequent limits that such controls posed on democratic change in the country7. On one hand, governmental control on the Internet was thought to slow down, but not to entirely quell, democratization in China: as Chase and Mulvenon suggested, "the Internet [...] will probably not bring 'revolutionary' political change to China, but instead will be a key pillar of China's slower, evolutionary path toward increased pluralization and possibly even nascent democratization”8. On the other hand, scholars became more disillusioned about democratic evolution in China, and skeptical about the effects of the Internet on 3

Mueller & Tan (1997), p.7 Gompert (1998) 5 Zhao (1998) 6 Bi (2000) 7 Chase & Mulvenon (2002); Kalathil & Boas (2003); Shie (2004) 8 Chase & Mulvenon (2002), p. 90 4

the Chinese political system: in the words of Kathleen Hartford, "as Internet use and applications expand in China [...] we may well find that its greatest impact lies in intensifying existing social contradictions"9.

Western academic debate about the Internet in China has mostly developed around these two standpoints, which focused either on the democratic potential of the Internet within the political system, or on the controls and filters operated by the government, which has frustrated political opposition and systemic change in the country. Alas, up to now it seems that none of these two positions has been proved right by historical facts. In fact, after fifteen years of Internet connection in the country, the Chinese political system has not undergone any substantial institutional transformation in a democratic sense: the Communist Party is still firmly in power as the only authorized political force, and there have been no notable reforms for the introduction of institutions and representational mechanisms that should be present in a western-style democracy. On the contrary, some analysts have noticed how the diffusion of online mass media has helped the Chinese government broadcast and propagate unifying messages and nationalist sentiments, thus reinforcing the notion of an “imagined Chinese community”, linked economically to, but separated politically and culturally from, the global world10. Also thanks to the Internet, authorities have managed to create a “nationalist glue”, which ultimately reinforces the position and the legitimacy of the Communist Party11. In this sense, the expectation of convergence has proven false.

Notwithstanding this, those who foresaw increasing suppression of usage and freedom of the Internet in China have also been contradicted by events. Internet access has kept growing at fast-paced and constant rates since its first appearance in the country12; besides, the diffusion of the Internet among the population has been encouraged and stimulated by the government, which has progressively attempted to eliminate technological and economic barriers to web access13. Even the darkest predictions concerning control and censorship of the Internet by the authorities have not been realized. As a matter of fact, it has been documented how the government has progressively loosened its ideological and political claims regarding new media, and how direct control of online information 9

Hartford (2000), p. 19 Weber (2003) 11 Li, Xuan & Kluver (2003) 12 CNNIC (2009) 13 Zhang (2006) 10

flows that was exercised in the first period of the Internet has been substituted by a subtler and less invasive form of indirect guidance of the web by the political actor, and by mechanisms of selfregulation by websites14. Lokman Tsui has pointed out how the Soviet-like idea of censorship that westerners have concerning China’s policy towards the Internet leads to blind spots and shortcomings in understanding the real situation of the Internet, and neglects the fact that Chinese netizens are often given the freedom to communicate and to create information outside the grip of the state15. All this is to say that the Chinese government has not at all been able to control and repress information flows on the web, and that the Internet has increasingly grown as a powerful force of freedom outside the domain of the state.

My research is situated at this stalling point of the western academic research about the Internet in China, and aims at rejoining the two extreme positions of the debate on Chinese democratization, trying to make sense of the previous research, historical evidence and the latest phenomena and developments of the online world in China. Hence, the question I intend to answer in my paper is: if the Internet has not brought democracy in a strict sense, and on the other side has not tightened the grip of the state on the Chinese people, what has it actually brought?

The hypothesis I will try to prove is that the Internet is currently fulfilling a “surrogate democracy function” within the Chinese political system16. By “surrogate democracy function”, I mean an action of expansion of the freedom of individuals vis-à-vis the state, which renders the political system more democratic. This democracy function develops out of the institutional framework that is generally deemed as quintessential of a western-like democratic political system –it does not stem from representational organs or mechanisms, but rather from a technological instrument, the Internet, that was not necessarily envisaged for that purpose. In this sense, it cannot be defined as “institutional”, but is to be regarded as “surrogate”. Despite being surrogate, Internet platforms lead to transformations –such as a greater influence of public opinion on political actors, the creation of a less monopolistic and more multilateral information system, the development of interest

14

Xu (2005), Weber & Jia (2007) Tsui (2008) 16 The concept of “surrogate democracy function” has been borrowed from Chan & So (2005), in Romano & Bromley (eds.), who have used it to refer to the function fulfilled by the relatively free media system within the authoritarian political framework of Hong Kong 15

groups with political agendas– that have substantial democratic characteristics, and thus have a concrete impact on the Chinese political system.

According to my model, the surrogate democracy function of the Internet is unlikely to give way to further “non-surrogate” democratic transformation, but rather helps the formation of a sociopolitical equilibrium in the country. This equilibrium is a direct consequence of the positive democratic –yet surrogate– effects the Internet has on the political system; in this sense, it can be defined as a surrogate democratic equilibrium, or equilibrium with quasi-democratic characteristics.

The three major fields of impact of the Internet on the Chinese political system are: 1) the creation of a public sphere in a western sense; 2) the erosion of the monopolistic media and information system, and the creation of more multilateral, state-independent channels of information diffusion; 3) the creation of a space for different interest groups with political agendas and opinions to coexist and fight for attaining the support of Chinese netizens. For each of these points, which will be treated separately in three different chapters, I shall analyze the surrogate democracy function the Internet fulfills within the socio-political apparatus, and point out the way it contributes to a sociopolitical equilibrium –an equilibrium with quasi-democratic characteristics.

In this essay I attempt to analyze the Internet as a phenomenon in its entirety, yet I will have particular regard for the effects that the web 2.0 has on China. In order to elucidate the concept of web 2.0, I borrow the definition given by Tim O’Reilly on his weblog: web 2.0 is the revolution in the computer industry caused by the move to the Internet as an interpersonal platform for sharing, cooperating, collaborating, exchanging information. It makes use of collective intelligence, i.e. it is based on “applications that harness network effects to get better the more people use them”17.

In China, the most manifest and successful utilizations of the web 2.0 are bbs –bulletin boards or forum platforms where users can leave their comments about a selected topic and join an open discussion with the other participants– and weblogs –or blogs, personal web pages that show a chronological record of all the posts written by the keeper, and of the comments made by the readers.

Since their first appearance on the Chinese web, forums and blogs have been a stunningly popular phenomenon, and communication and information based on these interpersonal platforms has gained

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O’Reilly (2006)

large recognition within society, by the media and even by the political actor18. In light of the importance of these phenomena, I will consider the content of forums and blogs as a more or less faithful reflection of the trends and opinions of Chinese netizens. In this essay, the words web 2.0, interpersonal platforms and interpersonal networks are used as synonyms.

In order to prove my hypothesis, I employ the core literature produced in the West and in China about the Chinese Internet and its socio-political effects –which, as I have previously noticed, has been quantitatively abundant and qualitatively diverse– as well as original research on the Chinese web. In fact, between September 2008 and May 2009, I have constantly followed the mechanisms of functioning and the dynamics of the Internet in China, and monitored hundreds of forum pages and personal blogs; when not footnoting other studies, comments and analyses are based on the results of my personal investigation. In particular, the beginning of my research coincided with the outbreak of the Sanlu incident in September 2008, which allowed me to witness in real time the evolution of the scandal and the reaction on the Chinese web; details about the Sanlu case will be given in the second chapter.

This article is composed of three main chapters, each of which focuses on one particular effect the Internet has in fulfilling a surrogate democracy function and maintaining a socio-political equilibrium. The first chapter deals with the emergence of a public sphere on the web, the second chapter describes the impact of the Internet on information diffusion and traditional media, while the third pays attention to online interest groups in the country. At the end of the essay, a short conclusion will summarize the conclusions reached throughout this article, albeit recognizing how this can only be considered as an exploratory paper, and that further studies can and should be conducted on this matter before clearly comprehending the intricate relation between the Internet and democracy in China.

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Tian (2008)

The Internet and the public sphere in China In this chapter, I intend to show how the Internet –with particular regard to interpersonal networks– contributes to the creation and efficiency of a public sphere in China, and how the online public sphere fulfills a “surrogate democracy function” within the socio-political system. Since the Chinese reform of the end of the 1970s, western scholars have been widely discussing about the emergence of a public sphere and of a consequent civil society in China. Most of the studies produced in that early period took account of the dissenting opinions that intellectuals and students had been raising throughout the reform era and, comprehensibly, paid particular attention to the students’ demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989, which was elevated to the foremost demonstration of the existence of opposition within and against the Chinese regime19. Other scholars, instead, focused on the structural consequences of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms: despite being designed for easing tensions within the system, these reforms were thought to open up spaces for opposition, thus facilitating the emergence of an embryonic public sphere and civil society in urban China20.

It was only after the acceleration of socio-economic reforms, and the concurrent arrival of Internet connections in China, that scholars became bolder in claiming the existence of a western-style public sphere within the authoritarian framework of the PRC. Despite the concerns about the undemocratic features of the state, it is nowadays generally acknowledged that the Internet has had –and is still having– a pivotal role in shaping a public sphere in China.

According to the classical definition by Jürgen Habermas, public sphere is defined as “a domain of our social life in which such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is open in principle to all Citizens”21. The public sphere should present the following features: (1) publics composed of autonomous individuals that engage in rational debate; (2) spaces where publics may freely assemble for such debate; and (3) media of communication, such as newspapers and books22. By making use of this theoretical perspective, several scholars have argued how the Internet and participation based on it have contributed to the creation of a public sphere conforming to Habermas’ definition.

19

For a general overview of the 1970s and 1980s studies on the public sphere in China, see Xin Gu (1993), pp.

38–52 20 Whyte (1992) 21 Habermas (1989) 22 Habermas (1989, 2)

Firstly, the Internet has offered a new platform where netizens can communicate in a free and autonomous way, and at the same time can access an unprecedented amount of information coming from more and more diverse sources. This has substantially augmented the degree of social and political awareness of Chinese Internet users, because the public has increasingly been able to compare different views and news in order to attain a personal understanding of facts; as a consequence of deeper political understanding, netizens find it easier to engage in a rational debate about political issues. As noted by Zheng and Wu, surveys comparing civic participation in various countries have shown how Chinese Internet users have acquired greater interest and knowledge about politics thanks to the web. The incidence of this beneficial effect decreases when analyzing netizens of countries with a more longstanding and institutionalized public opinion –first South Korea, then Japan, and finally the United States: this demonstrates how the Internet has been used by many Chinese as a means to give way to political needs that did not have a channel of expression in the past23.

Secondly, the Internet has considerably increased the opportunities for citizens to assemble in social organizations not under the direct control or influence of the state. As a matter of fact, prior to the arrival of the Internet, some scholars had already noted a timid resurgence of private associations in China, as the government progressively opened spaces for non-governmental organizations during the 1990s, and this was thought to produce a stimulus to civil society in the country24. Nevertheless, in order to escape the control of the State, these organizations were forced to engage in wearisome strategies of negotiation and circumvention with the authorities, which limited the visibility and the impact these private associations had on public life and on the social fabric25.

The connection of China to the web has reinforced this trend, providing an incentive for private association and social participation, and at the same time has increased visibility for non-governmental organizations, providing new channels for promotion and publicity. Guobin Yang has indicated how the number of NGOs has increased in China since the advent of the Internet, and how most of these NGOs

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Zheng & Wu (2005) In China, the term “non-governmental organizations� (NGO) includes both social organizations (shehui tuanti), which have long existed under the system of social organization of the PRC, and private non-enterprise entities (minban feiqiye danwei), which instead have been legally recognized only in 1998, and respond more precisely to the western definition of non-governmental organizations. For a more accurate definition of private non-enterprise entities, see www.ln.gov.cn/wsbs1/wsbsbgxz/qybsbgxz/slbgbgxz/200801/P020080131512241038499.doc 25 Saich (2000) 24

maintain stable websites, or even base their entire activity on the web26. Official statistics indicate that since the end of the 1990s, whereas the number of social organizations has remained practically unchanged over time, private non-enterprise entities have increased steeply, and that the Internet has been a driving factor in this increase27: this, in a sense, shows the growth of private organizations outside the scope of the state, and their use of the Internet as the most prominent channel of action.

Access to the Internet does not intrinsically mean that NGOs have a more pervasive impact or following, but it certainly makes it easier for them to acquire visibility and avoid the control of the state28.

Virtual private assembly on the Internet has not only taken the form of legally recognized organizations but, most importantly, it has also developed through spontaneous debates that have given space to opinions of individual citizens. The innumerable bbs platforms have offered a new space for netizens to engage in discussions on political themes, to structure mobilization, and even to develop public protest. Internet forums –as well as blogs, interpersonal networks, and all the different Internet platforms that fall under the labeling of web 2.0– have been acknowledged as a fundamental part of the public sphere, because they enlarge the possibilities for the public to assemble, and to take part freely in public discussion. Giese suggests that Internet platforms, being places where individuals meet aside from their family and professional life to discuss and exchange information in an informal setting, are not much different from the other “third places” defined by Oldenburg in his milestone work on community hangouts29. In sum, just like cafés, coffee shops or bookstores, forums and blogs provide a comfortable and relaxed space for social interaction, laying the foundation for public discussion and democracy at the grassroots level30.

Initial studies have been skeptical about the effects of the Internet on the shaping of a public sphere and on civic engagement. Putnam, for instance, has underlined the increased isolation of Internet users, who tend to spend hours in front of the screen instead of with family and friends, reducing time devoted to community activities and to civic engagement31. In addition, Lynch has doubted that the web could

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Yang (2003, 2) See the “Bulletin on the Development of Civic Institutions 2007” (latest available), at http://cn.chinagate.cn/ reports/2008-05/05/content_15072719.htm 28 Zheng & Wu (2005) 29 Oldenburg (1999) 30 Giese (2005) 31 Putnam (2000) 27

actually bring a real public sphere in reformed China: according to his view, the Internet emphasizes chaotic and a-political discussion, which is unlikely to benefit an independent civil society32.

Nonetheless, further research on the issue has shown how these positions are actually unfounded. In an exhaustive empirical study on digital citizenship in the United States, Mossberger et al have come to the conclusion that the Internet enhances civic participation. Firstly, because the bigger and more diverse quantity of information Internet users are exposed to increases awareness, political interest and, as a consequence, political participation; and secondly, because online discussions have proved to be more egalitarian than face-to-face ones, reducing the risks that gender, race, age, or economic discrimination could exclude certain social groups from the public discussion33. Similar empirical findings, albeit in different national situations, have been reached in the specific case of China: according to the reports of the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), there is an increasing consensus among the populace that the Internet leads to a better understanding of political life; besides, the majority of Chinese citizens thinks that the Internet will allow them to better raise their opinions, and force public officials to be more aware of the common people’s views34.

I have so far illustrated the beneficial effects the Internet has had in shaping and developing a public sphere that adheres to Habermas’ model. The interrelation between the web and public sphere has been recognized by a large group of scholars, who have recognized the similarity of online debates on the Internet with discussions conducted in the traditional “third places” of western democracies.

Furthermore, the Internet seems to have an even more pronounced effect in China, where an online public sphere that hosts an active and relatively free public opinion moderates the lack of conventional platforms of democratic expression –political parties or free traditional media that are present in western countries.

The Chinese online public sphere greatly responds to the prerequisites set by Habermas in his 32

Lynch (1999) Mossberger et al. (2008) 34 In this study I avail myself of the CNNIC reports on Internet usage in China, edited by Gao Liang (editions 2003, 2005 and 2007), and of the 2009 CNNIC Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China.

According to the surveys, the percentage of people who agreed with the statement “Thanks to the Internet people like you can understand more about politics” grew from 71,7% in 2003 to 75,1% in 2007. Agreement with statements like “Public officials will care more about what people like you think” and “People like you will have more say about what the government does”, although in slight decline since 2003, is still widespread. The reports are available at http://www.markle.org/.

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definition of the public sphere. Firstly, it is open to virtually all citizens, who find it increasingly easy to access the Internet and to take part in online discussion, as is demonstrated by the astonishing growth of the Chinese Internet market and of the number of Chinese websites and blogs35. Secondly, it presents the features suggested by Habermas: a considerable number of well-informed, politically aware citizens who engage in the public discussion; spaces –such as forums, blogs, interpersonal networks– where these individuals can meet and interact for such discussion; a new, dynamic and multiform means of communication, the Internet, which interacts with the traditional media, influencing them and rendering communication freer and more varied36.

In Habermas’ view, a developed public sphere is an important precondition and stimulus for a free and mature public opinion, and fulfills a democratic function within a political system37. As I have described, in China a western-style public sphere is mostly developed on the Internet, on communication platforms taking the place of institutions –traditional media, political groups etc.– that in western countries are purposely designed for giving voice to the public. Because of its non-institutional character, the democracy function that the online public sphere fulfills is to be regarded as “surrogate”.

Let us now analyze what kind of “surrogate democracy function” the Internet fulfills in China, and in what way it produces an equilibrium within the socio-political system.

Lagerkvist has noted the increasing importance that forums, and online public opinion based on them, have in setting the public agenda: in his words, “when a significantly large critical mass of upset chat room postings makes something an issue for everybody to take seriously, it enters the traditional media as well”38. In a sense, the Chinese Internet has overturned the mechanism of agenda setting usually found in the west –where the efforts of traditional media to seek the truth often precede the attention given by public opinion. In China, state-controlled media are unable to engage in missions to seek the truth, and this often paralyzes their willingness and efforts to give voice to opinions of citizens; for this reason, Internet platforms have replaced traditional media as an alternative means of agendasetting, spontaneously defining the priorities of public discussion, and influencing traditional media with

35

According to CNNIC, the average yearly growth of the Chinese Internet market since 1997 has been more than 41% (CNNIC 2009, p. 2) 36 Gillmor (2004) 37 Habermas (1989; 1989, 2) 38 Lagerkvist (2005), p. 127

their choices and opinions39.

Setting the public agenda through the online public sphere has clear “surrogate” democratic implications. It remedies the shortcomings of the traditional public opinion –the one based on statecontrolled or state-influenced media– reducing the distance between the public debate and the issues that are of real concern for the people; besides, it conveys an image of a more responsive and more caring government, because participation in public debate seems to have a more direct effect on governmental choices. As I have mentioned, the majority of Chinese believes that thanks to the Internet, “Public officials will care more about what people think” and “People will have more say about what the government does”40. Participation in online public opinion, thus, increases the degree of satisfaction towards the government, and it is likely to ameliorate the relationship between the public and officials, creating a political equilibrium within the system.

Another democratic factor that the online public sphere brings into the Chinese system is the revival of channels of contact between citizens and public officials. Scholars have called attention to the fact that since the first diffusion of the Internet at the end of the 1990s, most local governments through out the country have availed themselves of Internet sites, where they provide useful information for citizens, online bureaucratic services, and a window of contact with local authorities; some local governments have even introduced live reporting of official meetings on their websites41. These websites, although mostly promoting the official stance and official discourse about China and its polity, have been progressively reliable in the information released, and increasingly open to sound out the positions and demands of the populace42. According to some, e-government could be seen as a sign of e-democracy, because it increases the information of the citizenry, and allows free dialogue between population and officials43; at the same time, it improves openness, accountability and effectiveness of the political actors44. Even those who have been more wary in claiming the possibility of e-government to bring edemocracy to China have recognized the positive effects that online bureaucracy has in fighting

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Lagerkvist (2005) CNNIC Report (2003, 2005, 2007) 41 Zhang (2008) 42 Xia (2006) 43 Watson & Mundy (2001) 44 Xia (2006), Zhang (2008) 40

corruption, and in improving the image of local governments in the eyes of citizens45.

It has been documented how, thanks to e-government, citizens have been able to express their protest against abuse of power by local officials, and how in several cases such spontaneous action on the Internet has received prompt response by the State. Most sites of local governments in China feature “Governor’s boxes”, mail boxes where the citizens are encouraged to express their judgment towards the governmental machine, and towards the performance of single officials; it is not rare that protests of citizens in “Governor’s boxes” could lead to punishment of corrupt officials or in substantial adjustments of public policies46. The first and most renowned case of successful communication between netizens and public officials occurred in September 2002, when the Internet user “crazy for her” published an article on a governmental website, in which he condemned the mismanagement of the city of Shenzhen in southern China, as many institutions and productive units were being transferred to Shanghai, with considerable loss of occupation and prestige for the city. The article in question, “Shenzhen, who are you being abandoned by?”, attracted the attention of traditional media, and the matters treated in it soon became subject of discussion in the local public opinion; as a response, the mayor of Shenzhen publicly invited “crazy for her” to sound out his opinions in detail, and even included some of his suggestions in the new governmental policies47. At that moment, the Internet had allowed a breach in the formal protocol of Chinese politics unimaginable before; after that, similar cases of contact between citizens and politicians through the online public sphere have become increasingly frequent48.

Communication between online citizens and public officials has also taken place through Internet interpersonal platforms, such as blogs and forums. Starting from the end of 2005, most governmental offices have begun keeping collective blogs as an important means of communication with the public49; in addition, an increasing number of top-level politicians have opened personal blogs in the VIP areas of blog-providing sites like people.com.cn, sina.com.cn or sohu.com, where they engage in regular

45

See, for instance, Blakely & Matsuura (2001) or Wong & Welch (2004) Xia (2006) 47 !h!t!t!p!:!/!/!w!w!w!.!h!u!d!o!n!g!.!c!o!m!/!w!i!k!i!/深圳，你被谁抛弃？ 48 For a list of successful communications between citizens and officials since 2002, see http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/21963/22062/2252447.html 49 Xie (2006) 46

dialogue with citizens and other politicians about political issues50. It would be hard yet interesting to know how many of these politicians actually write their blogs in person; notwithstanding, it is undeniable that single politicians have used the net more and more to establish direct contact with the public.

At the same time, Chinese politicians have progressively acknowledged the importance of Internet forums as mirrors of the emerging well-educated, well-off urban public opinion, and consequently have started participating in forum debates and interacting with forum users. The apotheosis of this trend occurred, of course, when in June 2008 the President of the PRC Hu Jintao took part into a forum discussion on “Strong Nation Forum”, the forum of the party newspaper People’s Daily, one of the most visited interpersonal platforms51. Albeit being a limited and highly monitored experiment of direct democracy, Hu’s visit to an Internet forum mostly inhabited by youngsters and students undoubtedly reflects the willingness of the government to establish contact with the Internet public opinion and its netizens, and the increasing importance of forums in setting the agenda within the system. Given the prominence of the “special visitor” of the forum, media have given ample coverage and reflection upon the event; and yet, as a matter of fact, lower-level politicians were already starting to engage in online discussions, even before Mr. Hu set the prestigious example52.

I have already noted that an effective communication between the ruling class and the subordinate citizen has important democratic implications, because it makes the government more aware and more sensitive to the will of the population, tangibly increasing its performance and its image in the eyes of the people53. Online government-citizen communication not only instills a surrogate democracy element in the Chinese system; it also contributes to maintaining a socio-political equilibrium, thanks to its beneficial effects on governmental performance and on the relation between citizens and rulers. As Blakely and Matsuura correctly point out, e-government has a critical impact on increasing transparency of the bureaucratic machine and, as a consequence, on reducing the opportunity for corruption. With corruption being a major source of frustration of citizens and a potential instigator of unrest and protest, by reducing risks of corruption, e-government initiatives contribute to maintaining social order and 50

Wang (2007) http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/7406621.html 52 Hong (2007) 53 Watson & Mundy (2001); Xia (2006); Wang (2007) 51

preserving the current political system54. In addition, the new citizen-government interfaces created by the Internet can be used by the ruling class to promote the standpoint of government on political issues in a new and more appealing guise, to create consensus around public policies and decisions and thereby reduce political discontent55.

The third and last manner in which the online public sphere fulfills a surrogate democracy function is in favoring mobilization and protest with political purposes. The Internet naturally encourages mobilization and collective action, because its interpersonal dynamics promote collective identity and social interaction56. Furthermore, Chinese netizens perceive bbs, forums and blogs as places where political discussions can be conducted in a more unrestrained way; for this reason, online platforms have since their first appearance been the stage of a more radical form of public debate, often treating issues that would be neglected by the official media in a bolder and more direct way57. Anonymity on forums and blogs certainly incites more extreme standpoints, and risks to render discussions into loud and confused skirmishes; nevertheless, as Giese has noticed, netizens increasingly tend to reveal their identity while using the Internet, and have started regarding encounters on the web as real and effectual experiences rather than occasions for unleashed rants58.

The most staggering potential of the Chinese online public sphere is the capability of translating online protest into actual on-the-street mobilization. A representative case of this translation is the incident of the PX chemical plant in Xiamen; thanks to sensitization campaigns and newsletters based on forums and on the blog website Bullog, private citizens were able to mobilize thousands of city inhabitants to protest against the opening of a chemical plant in the vicinity of the city59. Interpersonal networks gave ample resonance to the event, and the effectiveness of the online public opinion and its mobilization was proven by the fact that demonstrators achieved the political goal they were campaigning for. In fact, the issue of the plant came to the attention of local politicians, and eventually the construction plan was blocked in light of the strong opposition among the populace60.

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Blakely & Matsuura (2001) Wong & Welch (2004) 56 Zheng & Wu (2005) 57 Yang (2003) 58 Giese (2006) 59 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2007/06/01/china-liveblogging-from-ground-zero/ 60 For a general overview of the episode, see http://www.infzm.com/content/trs/raw/32877 55

Aside from the specific cases, umpteen other campaigns with political purposes have started from online mobilization –for instance, the protest about the Maglev train in Shanghai, or protests against unemployment at the beginning of 200961. Although located outside the scope of political institutions, virtual public opinion has been able to give rise to concrete political protest, and this can be seen as one of the most important “surrogate” democratic effects it fulfills62. In fact, the increasing ties between online and offline experiences –the growing attention that traditional media pay to the new online public sphere, the increasingly frequent cases of mobilization on the Internet leading to physical encounters– as well as the concrete effects that online public opinion has on the social and political fabric has lead Karsten Giese to define Chinese forums and blogs as “virreal places” –an integration between being “virtual” and “real” that suggestively depicts the democratic impact brought about by the online public sphere63.

It is natural to regard public protest as an element of instability, and therefore online-based protest as a threat to the political system; and yet, despite this instinctive association, there is reason to believe that it rather contributes to the maintenance of a socio-political equilibrium. Wu and Zheng have shown how positive cases of collective action on the Internet have succeeded because they have made use of a “cooperative strategy” as opposed to a “conflictual strategy”; in other words, protesting citizens have not taken a stance of frontal opposition against the regime, but rather took collective action in order to oppose a specific policy or obtain a precise objective. In this sense, they have been willing to come to peaceful and constructive discussion with the political actor in order to achieve their goals. Politicians have increasingly become aware of the positive effect of public protest, which acts as a release valve for social tensions accumulating in China’s delicate transition period. In this sense, the protesting voices raised have been accepted and, when possible, included into the process of policy construction, in order to reduce the risk for the system and increase the degree of satisfaction of the public towards the State and its policies64.

In this chapter, I have shown how the Internet contributes to the creation of a western-style public sphere in China, which responds under most respects to the classical definition of Habermas’ public 61

For information about web-based middle class protests in China, see http://chinadigitaltimes.net/tag/maglevprotests/ 62 Yang (2003) 63 Giese (2006) 64 Zheng & Wu (2005)

sphere. Interpersonal networks and communication platforms based on the web, thanks to their impact on setting the political agenda, favoring contacts between citizens and rulers, and mobilizing protest with political purposes, fulfill a “surrogate” democracy function, which is instrumental in maintaining a socio-political equilibrium within the system; an equilibrium with quasi-democratic characteristics.

Of course, much can be said about the capability of the online public sphere of breeding a mature democratic civil society, or about the necessity that a true public sphere should assume a more institutionalized configuration, and therefore act as a “non-surrogate” democracy factor. Chris Berry has noted how scholarly attention towards the Chinese public sphere has constantly availed itself of a binary model, in which “freedom” was understood as the absence of state “power”, and the dichotomized idea that a country either has a public sphere or does not have it. He instead suggests that in the case of China power and public sphere could well coexist, and that the idea of public sphere should be rather substituted by public space, a concept that comprehends “areas of public debate as produced and regulated by power and appearing in a variety of forms65”. On the other hand, the Chinese Internet expert Hu Yong has noted how, after enduring emasculation of the principle of democratic participation by Chinese rulers, civil consciousness has deteriorated; in this sense, the new online public sphere is only to be considered as an “unfinished public sphere”66. It is certainly hard to disagree with Hu’s viewpoint, but it is also hard to disagree with the fact that a stronger and bolder civil consciousness has emerged, and that the Internet has had a fundamental role in this evolution. As suggested by Yang, the development of civil society and the diffusion of the Internet in China are two processes that have been influencing and favoring each other since their first emergence67; it is thus reasonable to think that they will continue advancing simultaneously in the near future, and that the “unfinished public sphere” will soon assume a more finished and less “surrogate” configuration.

65

Berry (2009), in Zhu & Berry (eds.) http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20081221_1.htm 67 Yang (2003, 2) 66

Web 2.0 and the Chinese media system: an analysis of the Sanlu incident This chapter focuses on the effect that the web 2.0 has on the Chinese media system and on information diffusion, i.e. the channels and the extent of circulation of public news among the population. It is not hard to understand the impact that the Internet has on Chinese information: since the beginning of 2008, China has become the world’s largest Internet population68, and among the almost 250 million netizens, an increasing majority regularly uses the net to look for news69. As a consequence of the hunger for news and of the great economic appeal of this growing market, all the principal national and local newspapers and magazines have opened a web-based issue; beside them, a multitude of commercial websites has started providing news bulletins, competing with traditional media agencies for the attention of Chinese netizens70.

In addition, the several interpersonal platforms that shape the web 2.0 have given further impulse to the diffusion of information. Hundreds of websites provide bbs and blogs, where the 85% of netizens who take part in online discussion can chat and debate recent news71. A sharply increasing number of Internet users keeps or visits blogs to sound out information or opinions about current events; some popular blogs can attract hundreds of thousands of visits every day, and thanks to the authoritativeness they have acquired within the online world and to the large following they enjoy, they have obviously become an influential channel for information diffusion72.

Notwithstanding, the impact of the Internet on Chinese information is not limited to these impressive figures. It is the purpose of this chapter to show how information on the Internet, and especially information based on interpersonal platforms like blogs or forums, can fulfill a surrogate democracy function, which ultimately contributes to maintaining an equilibrium within the system. In order to prove this hypothesis, I will make use of specific examples of web information dynamics, and I will particularly focus on the Sanlu incident, which erupted in September 2008.

The arrival of the Internet has shaken the balance of the Chinese information system like no other 68

CNNIC (2009) The CNNIC Internet reports show that the percentage of web users using the Internet for news browsing has increased steadily since 2003; see CNNIC Report (2003, 2005, 2007). In 2009 78.5% of the netizens regularly use the Internet as a source of news: CNNIC (2009) 70 Xu (2005) 71 CNNIC (2009) 72 CNNIC Report (2007) 69

revolution could have. In fact, the once foremost bastion of political restriction –the control of information by the authorities– has suddenly started to be eroded, and a substantial number of western scholars have suggested that this might have democratic implications for the political system.

The first moment in which the Internet manifested its full potential in challenging the existing information system was during the SARS crisis at the beginning of 2003. In a time when authorities and traditional media were still concealing information about the deadly disease, a spontaneous and unprecedented information campaign on bbs and forums emerged: and thus, together with the pressure of international health authorities, the online public opinion brought the SARS case out of the official silence. Through Internet communication platforms, private citizens revealed the existence of the crisis to the major public, mobilized prophylaxis activities, and eventually forced the government to loosen its control on information, and to take a more cooperative stance on issues like prevention measures, and assessment of behaviors of public officials73.

At least during the peak of the SARS crisis, the Internet managed to break the monopolistic control that the CCP traditionally kept on information in China, and in that moment it seemed that web-based communication would be able to liberate the information system, bringing it to a degree of freedom and democracy comparable to the west. Despite the fact that after the end of the crisis much of the governmental control was reestablished, the SARS case has been often idealized by many Chinese as a golden peak of democratic participation, and it is still regarded by many policy-makers as a good example of how China has become a more democratic and open country74.

In recent times, the Chinese government has substantially relaxed its policy towards media and information; and the advent of Internet communication has had an important role in this policy shift. It has been observed that from the end of the 1990s, the Chinese mass media have undergone a process of progressive marketization and commercialization, which has diminished the effectiveness of control imposed by the authorities on information, and also the importance of media as a tool for propagating ideology75. Along with economic development and cultural opening to the world, the

73

For an overview on the SARS crisis and information diffusion on the Internet, see He (2003), Abraham (2005) and Fenn (2009) 74 Zhang (2006) 75 Zhao (1998), Lam (2000), Wang (2009)

audience has become more mature and less permeable to ideological content; this has favored the emergence of new commercial media, and drove existing media to adjust their contents76.

The appearance of web-based media has accelerated this process of opening and marketization.

Thanks to the Internet, a multitude of news bulletins and information agencies has proliferated, and this has swiftly modified the structure of the media system. In fact, the unipolar system of the media previously present –under which only state-based information agencies were allowed to broadcast in the country– has been substituted with a tripolar system, in which state media, commercial media and regional-based media coexist, cooperate and compete. The greater variety of different media has modified the system of information management: whereas in the past information was passed from the central news agency to subordinated agencies according to a hierarchical system, now all the newlyemerged media agencies receive and manage news at the same time. This has evident advantages for the speed and the quality of information diffusion, as information becomes available to the public more quickly, and different analyses from different sources increase the possibility of obtaining objective interpretations of the ongoing events77.

In addition, the official policy towards the Internet has undergone progressive relaxation, and this has led some to argue that the approach of the government towards the Internet is nowadays much more liberal than the one towards any other media78. On one hand, the progressive commercialization of the Internet has rendered online information more open, and penetrable to content that does not comply with the ideological orthodoxy of the regime; this makes political control ineffective and schizophrenic, because it often collides with the economic interests behind the Internet79. On the other hand, the staggering expansion of the web, of its users and websites has made it harder and harder to apply physical control and guidance to any piece of information that is produced or appears online.

As Zhang points out, control and supervision of the Internet has undergone major transformation since its beginning. In the early period, authorities attempted to exercise direct and ideological control on online information; nowadays, instead, governmental control has become indirect and management

76

Weber & Jia (2007) Xu (2005) 78 Zhang (2006) 79 Harwit & Clark (2001) 77

of the web has been downgraded to a merely administrative practice80. Significantly, the main tool of control of the Internet and its content is now the “Public Pledge on Self-Discipline for China’s Internet Industry”, a document which websites and web providers voluntarily sign, committing themselves to control and report the content of their web platforms81. While physical control on the Internet still exists –exercised for instance through the so-called “Great Firewall of China”– it has been suggested that its extent is less pervasive and effective than generally thought in the west82.

In sum, in dealing with the Internet, the government seems to have put aside ideological concerns –which have traditionally been the driving forces of policy making towards information and mass communication in communist China– and it has rather prioritized economic and social development.

In this sense, the government has shown to be sensitive to the need of the people to expand their communication networks, and to make use of the Internet in order to attain a more modern and civilized lifestyle83. This does not necessarily mean that authorities have given up their control over society, but rather that socioeconomic development has increasingly become a precondition for political control; and, as we will see below, the potential political threat posed by online information is well balanced by its positive stability effect.

Despite these positive notes, the Chinese information system is still far from being completely free and open. As a matter of fact, the management of news is still under the control of a centralized information agency, Xinhua agency, which has great discretion in deciding when and what kind of information should be distributed to other media agencies and thereby revealed to the public84. As a result of such centralization, the government is still able to exercise a certain control on media and on the content of information they manage85. In sum, regardless of liberalization of the media, the official position on the news market still remains tied to the idea that journalists should serve the party and promote discipline among the population, and limit diffusion of information that opposes the orthodox

80

Zhang (2006)

81

“中国互联网行业自律公约”

Integral text available at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/PIc/590141.htm Tsui (2008) 83 Kluver (2005), Zhang (2006) 84 Zhao (2008) 85 Pan (2005), in Romano & Bromley (eds.)

82

ideology and the current establishment. Changes in this old-fashioned conception of the media have been slow and tortuous86.

Even when regarding new online media, traces of institutionalized control are well visible. The main law regulating information on the Internet since 2000, the “Provisional Regulations on Governance of Internet-based News Providers”, prohibits commercial media agencies online from gathering news directly87. This means that, although many commercial media agencies have progressively circumvented this regulation and obtained first-hand news on subjects like sport, economics, or foreign news, information on sensitive matters such as politics or internal affairs still remains solidly in the hands of centralized authorities, namely the online branch of Xinhua agency, xinhuanet.com88. Western studies suggest that the strategies implemented by the government to control and filter the Internet have been highly successful: in the first phase of direct control on the Internet, Chinese authorities have been able to prevent detrimental information from appearing online, to control the access of citizens to foreign websites, and to weaken online mobilization of dissident groups89.

Even the recent strategy shift to indirect control and self-regulation does not seem to have completely undermined the grip the government on the Internet. In fact, Weber and Jia conclude that voluntary self-regulation creates an effect of “peer pressure” among websites, which feel compelled to abide by the ethical and political standards set by the authorities, and actively contribute to control and filter online information. Besides, through web-based information, the government has been able to guide online public opinion, by promoting positive values that do not challenge the existing sociopolitical order –the sentiment of uniqueness of the Chinese nation, nationalism, and the idea of collective endeavor for the economic growth. By that means, Chinese authorities have managed to maintain a “cultural control” on the Internet, which to a certain extent is just as effective as the previously exercised physical control90.

86

Lam (2000) “互联网站从事登载新闻业务管理暂行规定” Integral text available at http://www.xinnet.com/Download/news.htm 88 Xu (2005) 89 Chase & Mulvenon (2002), Katathil & Boas (2003), Shie (2004) 90 Weber & Jia (2007) 87

Despite the control imposed on Chinese media –or I should say because of it– information diffusion through web 2.0 platforms has acquired a vital importance. In fact, forums, chat and blogs have increasingly remedied the shortcomings of the institutional media system, opening up the market of information and pushing traditional media towards a more transparent and objective attitude. The pursuit of more free and open information has evident democratic implications; for this reason, it is not hard to conclude that the Internet currently fulfills a democracy function within the system.

Because it develops outside the scope of institutionalized media, compensating the flaws of official information, it is to be defined as a “surrogate” democracy function. To better understand the way interpersonal Internet platforms can fulfill this surrogate democracy function, I shall here present the case of the Sanlu milk powder incident, and the dynamics of information diffusion that have developed around that event.

In the early morning of September 11, 2008, Xinhua agency for the first time released information about cases of kidney stones occurring in babies in the province of Gansu, in western China91. The tone of the report was very cautious, and the causes of and responsibility for the event were not defined; it vaguely stated that “it seemed that all the babies had made use of milk powder of the same brand”92. The name of the brand of milk powder, though, was not revealed. Media agencies all over the country echoed such vagueness when reporting the fact, and published the news in secondary sections of their newspapers; the morning news bulletin of CCTV –China Central Television– reported the news with a mere statement by the anchorman93. The pithiness of the accounts suggested that the investigation of the incident was still at a preliminary stage, and not much information was available for journalists to offer the public; especially the name of the brand of poisoned milk powder seemed to be still unknown.

In fact, the situation was rather different: babies poisoned with the tainted milk had already started filling hospitals all over the country since the beginning of June, and procedures of inspection had already been directed towards a specific milk powder producer, Sanlu Group. Although the facts and responsibilities were clear, the authorities had decided to delay the revelation of information for 91

The analysis of the milk-powder incident is based on first-hand materials I was able to collect through daily monitoring of the web right at the moment of the outburst of the scandal, and reflects general trends I could observe through the material collected. Specific forums and blogs are cited in footnotes.

92 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/11/content_9924992.htm 93 http://vod.cctv.com/01/0000/index.shtml?today=2008/9/11

more than three months, and even once disclosed to the public, news about the event was kept as vague as possible94. The reason for this prudence is not hard to spot: it was, in fact, right in the midst of the fervor for the Beijing Summer Olympics, a time in which huge media attention was directed at China, and in which the government had been widely praised by politicians and observers all around the world for the impeccable management of the sport event, for improvements made in environmental and living conditions in the country, and even for the greater openness shown towards the world. At such an idyllic moment, a dirty scandal about poisoned food, environmental pollution and young victims would certainly disrupt the festive and celebrative atmosphere, and would even jeopardize the international repute of China, building up the number of scandals –such as the Tibet riots or the Hu Jia affair– that had preceded the Olympic Games and that were used by foreign media for what in China was seen as a deliberate campaign of smearing the country95.

Comprehensibly, no politician would risk an international incident –and personal blaming– at such a delicate moment; besides, it is an untold rule within the Chinese bureaucratic machine that local authorities should limit the diffusion of detrimental information in periods of high sensitivity for the central government and top-level politicians96. For these reasons, the scandal of poisoned babies had been kept quiet during the peak days of the Olympics, and even once the news was first released, politicians were still hoping that the event would not acquire excessive clamor. Unfortunately, things developed in a rather different way.

At 3 a.m. Chinese time of September 11, xinhua.net released the first cautious report about the case, and was soon followed by other traditional media, which published short accounts in secondary sections of their websites. And yet, just few minutes later, Chinese blogs were already flooded with information about the milk powder incident: at this early stage most bloggers merely copied the brief official articles on their personal webpage, in order to let this underreported piece of news attain a larger audience. Later on, local media started adding new information to the approximate scenario depicted by the governmental agency, describing the cases of kidney stones occurring in local hospitals. This news was already available to local newspapers, as they had already been monitoring the cases of poisoning in the months preceding the explosion of the scandal, but was not disclosed 94

Brady (2009) Ibid.

96 Wong & Zheng (2004) 95

because of prohibition by local governments97. This emerging amount of information was appetizing food for information-hungry bloggers: by 8.30 of the same morning, some blogs were already giving a more accurate account of the kidney stone incident at a national level, which had been obtained by putting together the fragments of information coming from different sources. Scrolling down the main page of any Chinese blog provider, and reading the titles of the newest posts, it appeared clear to the reader that the situation was much more serious than the one depicted by Xinhua agency.

Soon after, the attention of bloggers moved to disclosing the name of the brand of poisoned milk, which at the time was still unmentioned by traditional media. Some local news agencies, such as Oriental Morning Post98 and ifeng.com, had mentioned the brand name Sanlu in their reports and, even though they had placed the article about the event in a secondary section of their website, the piece of information fell inevitably in the hands of netizens, who started spreading the name of Sanlu around the web. In an inflammatory article widely circulating on the net, “shangyu301” inveighed against the cold-hearted “so and so” (as used in official reports about the “so and so” milk brand, not revealing the name of the incriminated brand), blaming official newspapers for endangering the health of other infants by not revealing which milk powder was dangerous, and praising Oriental Morning Post for having the courage to oppose such criminal reticence99. In another popular post, “abyss of the palm forest” attacked the shortcomings of the Chinese legal system, which prevented media agencies from revealing information to the public in fear of repercussions by local governments and big corporations, and ended the article with the name Sanlu in huge capital letters100. Already by 9.30, the name Sanlu appeared everywhere in blogs and personal websites; the silence was overcome.

In the course of a few hours, bloggers had reset the information agenda in a way that went against the interests and the expectation of authorities and official media. In fact, whereas traditional media suffered from pressure of political and economic actors, thus underreporting the milk scandal, netizens made use of their personal pages and networks in order to amplify and complement the coverage of information they deemed as sensitive and important. The extent of “leaks” about the milk poisoning was so vast that traditional media could not overlook the new agenda set by blogs. The 97

Brady (2009) www.dfdaily.com 99 http://blog.sina.com.cn/shangyu301 100 http://yangshufa.blog.sohu.com 98

more bloggers paid attention to the event, the more media agencies were pressured to feed the “information hunger” of netizens, and to release further details about the incident: by midday, the main pages of commercial websites like alibaba.com.cn and sina.com presented comprehensive accounts of the facts available at the time, including the name of the implicated brand and number of kidney stone cases. Users utilized these pieces of news on their blogs, trying to put together a coherent assemblage of diverse information101. At 19.16, outpaced by any commercial website and hundreds of blogs, even Xinhua revealed the name of Sanlu Group in its report of the event102.

Along with the increasing amount of details being revealed by official media, bloggers were able to include more precise information in their posts: as a result of this, by the evening of September 11, some blogs presented extremely exhaustive reports of the incident. In his blog, for instance, “William Aben” looked back at a previous incident, which occurred in the United States in March 2007, in which poisoned pet food imported from China had caused the death of thousands of dogs; “William Aben” noted the striking similarities between that incident and the current one, and wondered how such events could happen in just a year’s time103. The parallel with the pet food scandal was also drawn by “small fish of the southern sea”, who posted a considerably comprehensive amount of information about melamine –the chemical agent the milk powder was tainted with– and about the effects that it could have on the human body104. At a time when the official media had barely revealed the existence of the problem, this sheer amount of information had an extremely important informative function, and many Internet users could not but turn to personal blogs for accurate news about the incident. As an example, “Graduating Wanderer” left a message on “William Aben”’s webpage, thanking him for the precious elucidations given; as “Graduating Wanderer” himself conceded, William’s blog had been his main source of information about the Sanlu scandal105.

The dynamic of the event is remarkable: in less than a day’s time, Internet interpersonal networks utterly transformed the agenda of newsmakers, forcing traditional media to give more space to an event they were trying to keep suppressed. Bloggers remedied the partiality and incompleteness of 101

See, for instance, the collages made by “zhang120jing” (http://zhang120jing.blog.china.alibaba.com/), or “old snow in June” (http://blog.sina.com.cn/zgc) 102 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/11/content_9926009.htm 103 http://william-aben.spaces.live.com/default.aspx 104 http://blog.sina.com.cn/szhocking 105 http://william-aben.spaces.live.com/default.aspx

official news, giving more relevance to information they regarded as important to share with others, and allowing news to have a considerably higher resonance. The great quantity of relevant posts on blogs made news about the milk-powder scandal reach the main page of blog-providing websites and, as a consequence, it exponentially enlarged the network of readers106.

Notwithstanding, it has to be noted how, in this first phase of the events, bloggers did not produce any first-hand news: they rather gathered information from different original sources, pasting the fragments together on their personal pages. This cut-and-paste activity, though, should be undervalued: while traditional media were subjected to limitations and pressures from external actors, bloggers could freely select interesting information, highlighting reports that seemed reliable, and disregarding or even refuting biased and imprecise reports. By looking at official media, readers could not obtain a clear overview of the event; on the contrary, blogs presented facts in an organic and seemingly complete way.

In order to observe how interpersonal platforms can be used to produce information, instead of merely gathering second-hand news, we have to wait just 24 hours, and analyze the happenings of September 12. The day after the outbreak of the scandal, a document entitled “Suggestions for resolution of public relations in Sanlu Group”, started circulating on dozens of blogs and forums all around the country: this was an alleged internal communication of Sanlu, sent at the beginning of August to top-level managers of the company. In the document, managers were called upon to take advantage of the positive atmosphere and the media distraction created by the Olympic Games in order to block news leaks about the kidney stone cases –which at the time had already started occurring around the country– appeasing the victims with economic compensation not to make them reveal the cause of the poisoning to the authorities and the media; at the same time, the letter mentioned an agreement to be signed with the Chinese search engine baidu.com, in which Baidu committed itself to not display negative news in the search result of the query “sanlu milk powder”107.

Shortly after its first appearance, copies of the document popped up in hundreds of forums and blogs around the country, and within hours, the “Suggestions” had become the hottest topic of discussion of 106

For a complete chronological account of the first days of the Sanlu incident, see http://www.haokanbu.com/story/112552/ 107 In Chinese,“三鹿集团公关解决方案建议” available, with some comments of the readers, at http://blog.sina.com.cn/wintor2008

the online community. Along with the diffusion of the latest news, more information appeared: netizens reported cases of kidney stones connected with the use of Sanlu milk powder that had already occurred at the beginning of the summer108; many websites even posted the scan of the supposedly original document in question109.

The realization of Sanlu’s behavior generated a wave of rage and indignation. Netizens posted infuriated comments on blogs and forums, showing without hesitation their complete disapproval of the behavior of Sanlu group, of Internet search engines, and even of the government. On a forum page on tianya.cn, a netizen eloquently named “those responsible in Sanlu should be shot dead” advocated the most severe punishment for those who allowed such a terrible disaster to happen110; on the interpersonal network douban.com, “little rice” grumbled that baidu.com had just become a new CCTV, being paid by local governments and big corporations to filter negative information, and just displaying empty label news on their main page111. On the popular blog ROSE GARDEN, a n anonymous reader bitterly noted how Sanlu had been recently given the status of “Golden Brand of China”, and had been even awarded by the government with a gold medal for food safety; in this sense, the government was also responsible for the tragedy112.

Facing the strong reaction of online public opinion, the government was forced to radically change its approach in dealing with the incident. Already on September 13, the State Council promulgated the “Six Resolutions about the Sanlu case”, which included two decisions that were clearly directed at appeasing the public opinion: on one hand, the government provided free medical treatment to the victims of the poisoning; on the other, it promised thorough and severe punishment for all organs, politicians and managers implicated in the scandal113. Although these steps were formal and symbolic, they can anyway be seen as a sign that the Internet can attract the attention of politicians and effectively set the political agenda.

The Internet was the sole means of diffusion of the “Suggestions for resolution of public relations in Sanlu Group”, as traditional media carefully avoided mentioning such a controversial document in 108

http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_46e9d5da0100b088.html Among many, http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_50a223810100b02i.html 110 http://laiba.tianya.cn/laiba/CommMsgs?cmm=27320&tid=2622475168723029228 111 http://www.douban.com/note/18081084/ 112 http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_46e9d5da0100b088.html 113 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/13/content_9974780.htm 109

their reports of the incident; in a sense, this shows the importance of interpersonal networks in producing alternative news. Despite this, up to today it is still unclear whether the “Suggestions” were an authentic document, or rather a fake made by netizens to acquire visibility, or even by competitors in order to further discredit Sanlu Group and its activities. As a matter of fact, on September 13, baidu.com published an official statement in which it refuted the existence of any agreement with Sanlu, and that any attempt made by Sanlu to suborn baidu.com would be refused by the company114; some days later, Baidu even accused a competitor of having deliberately diffused false rumors in order to blacken the name of the search engine115. And yet, whether authentic or not, this episode proves how the Internet is able to produce and diffuse original information outside the scope of the state-controlled information system. Importantly, original Internet information can have concrete repercussions on the social pattern and on the political agenda, as political and economic actors have to acknowledge the reaction of online public opinion to this information, and sometimes even adjust their policies to the public demands coming from netizens.

The third and last way in which interpersonal networks shaped the Chinese information system during the crisis is by promoting debates and discussions about the Sanlu incident. In this regard, blogs and forums fulfilled an especially important function, firstly because they often hosted topics and opinions that were overlooked or even censored in official media; and secondly, because these discussions were not just incoherent and emotional manifestations of public outrage –like the comments summarily made after the first discovery of the scandal– but rather aimed at resolving structural shortcomings of the industrial, legal and political apparatus of China. Many of these attempts did not find a following and remained unrealized resolutions in the mind of upstanding netizens. Some others, instead, had a much more pronounced impact on policy-making of the government after the Sanlu scandal.

Once the initial wave of anger had dissipated, netizens engaged in more mature reflections about the milk powder incident, and of the causes that could have provoked it. In fact, for months after the eruption of the incident, the Sanlu scandal and related topics remained the most debated argument on Chinese language forum platforms: from September 2008 to March 2009, popular forum providers like tianya.com, sina.com.cn, ifeng.com and qq.com, hosted thousands of bbs with millions of hits 114 115

http://news.xinhuanet.com/internet/2008-09/15/content_10003918.htm http://it.people.com.cn/GB/42891/42894/8058009.html

altogether116. The debates regarded topics such as the abolition of the system of exemption from quality control for top-brands (as Sanlu milk powder was)117; the shortcomings of the system of quality control118; food security and its legal framework119. Many forums even involved interventions of specialists who answered technical questions about how products could have been poisoned, how consumers could protect themselves from tainted food, and who was to be held responsible for the disaster120.

Most of the netizens participating in the online discourse were common people, but debates were also joined by experts in relevant fields of the argument, such as lawyers, university professors and local politicians, who wanted to share their knowledge with the online community. In addition, relevant discussions about production fallacies, food safety and state-granted quality control exemption were picked up by traditional media, allowing an even bigger audience to be sensitized and to take part in the public debate. Critical standpoints on sensitive matters, which would have probably been excluded from the official discourse, could find visibility thanks to the online debate, and structural reforms in the country swiftly gained priority in the political agenda of top politicians121.

Once more, the government proved not to be insensitive to demands coming from the online public opinion: on September 18, the State Council ordered the suspension of the system of exemption from quality control for Chinese top brands, and instead implemented a stricter series of quality control measures to be applied to any product of any Chinese company122. At the same time, it promised a serious restructuring of the national system of food safety and quality supervision: this effort culminated in the announcement of a new law on food safety on February 28, 2009. The new law has reorganized every aspect of food production and processing, raising quality standards, and

116

Figures based on personal researches on the search engines of forum providers. In the period of time considered, ifeng.com alone hosted 698 forum discussions, with a total of more than 700.000 visitors (!h!t!t!p!:!/!/!b!b!s!.!i!f!e!n!g!.!c!o!m!/!s!e!a!r!c!h!.!p!h!p!?!c!=!5!&!q!=三隿 ) 117 http://qbar.book.qq.com/culture/7638.htm 118 http://bbs.ifeng.com/viewthread.php?tid=3368441&highlight= 119 http://s.bbs.sina.com.cn/pview-9-649304.html 120 For instance, see http://bbs.ifeng.com/viewthread.php?tid=3367991&highlight= and http://laiba.tianya.cn/laiba/CommMsgs?cmm=49295&tid=2623749786167154139&ref=regulartopics 121 For an overview of the debate around law and food safety, see Hong (2008) http://www.law-lib.com/LW/lw_view.asp?no=9786; for quality control exemption see Chen (2008) http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleId=44436 122 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-09/18/content_10076522.htm

tightening regulations and controls on processing, transportation, import and export of edible products; the apparatus of control and supervision has been rationalized and reinforced, and the system of exemption from quality control has been definitely abolished. Furthermore, the new law sanctioned the responsibility and accountability of local governments and supervision bodies in case of ineffective controls, and recognized the role of “watchdogs” of media and civic organizations, in monitoring and reporting fallacies in the control machine, or irregular behavior of governmental organs and producing companies123.

In the course of the case study of the Sanlu incident, I have shown the impact of Internet interpersonal networks on the Chinese information system. Blogs and forums play a role in 1) promoting and diffusing information, thus enlarging the audience pool and influencing the agenda of public opinion; 2) creating alternative sources of information that would not find space in traditional media; 3) hosting public debates that aim at solving structural shortcomings in the country.

The Internet fulfills a democratic function within the Chinese information system, because it increases plurality in the sources and means of distribution of information, and it contributes to enhancing quality and objectivity of news, thanks to its supervision and censure towards traditional media. Borrowing Xu Wu’s analysis of the Chinese media system that I mentioned above, it is possible to argue that the web 2.0 has transformed the tripolar system of Chinese media –where central, commercial and local media coexist and compete– into a quadripolar one –where online interpersonal networks constitute the fourth pole of the information system124. Just like conventional media, the Internet is able to sensitize the population, set the agenda of public opinion, and influence the political actors with its demands and opinions; as noted by Gillmor, the presence of a grass-root information system is a sign of greater freedom and democracy in a political system125. In addition, with its informative function, the Internet has created new platforms for citizens to obtain knowledge about the state apparatus and its functioning, making them more politically aware, and able to express

123

“中华人民共和国食品安全法” Integral text available at http://www.chinacdc.net.cn/n272442/n272530/n272907/n272922/29613.html 124 Xu (2005) 125 Gillmor (2004)

judgments and demands about state policies, and this generates a democratic effect outside the scope of official institutions126.

Some western scholars have deemed the presence of more free and diverse sources of information as a threat for a regime like the Chinese, which bases its power on the control of media.

Early studies about the information revolution in China predicted that the Communist Party would not be able to maintain its grip on the liberalized online information, and that this would undermine the very foundation of the power of the CCP, eventually leading to the fall of the regime127. And yet, historical evidence –the fact that after 20 years of online information the CCP is still firmly in power– and a closer look at online information show that the Internet, despite fulfilling a surrogate democratic function, actually contributes to the maintenance of the existing political balance.

As a first thing, if we analyze closely the discourse developed on Internet interpersonal platforms, we can see that it rarely aims at the radical overturning of the political system, and it often involves elements and members of the political system. Looking back at the Sanlu case, the greater part of debates and opinions fell within the acceptance of the political order: outraged and disapproving comments filled the web, of course, but the disapproval was mostly directed at the mistakes and responsibility of single economic or political actors, or at the shortcomings of specific governmental policies, and not at the political status quo per se. Netizens who participated in the online debate did so because they wanted to condemn what they thought was broken or rotten in the political machine, and promote their opinions and suggestions on how to fix it. In a sense, by advancing political demands to the political actor, netizens were communicating with the government; and this, needless to say, implies that they fully recognize the position and role of their interlocutor.

The fact that many of these demands were effectively tackled by the government enhanced its image in the eyes of citizens, and ultimately contributes to political stability. In fact, on one hand citizens realize that the existing channels of political representation and communication are effective and sufficient, and are less likely to pursue political campaigns in different, perhaps violent or antisystemic, manners; on the other hand, the government is able to gather consensus around itself and its actions, and this lessens the risk of dissatisfaction and unrest among the populace. In this regard, during my analysis of the Sanlu case I have observed that the wave of indignation of netizens calmed 126 127

Weber & Jia (2007) Mueller & Tan (1997), Gompert (1998)

down progressively as soon as the government started taking serious and convincing measures to remedy the structural problems that the crisis had unveiled. A testimony of this is the generally positive reaction of netizens to the recently approved law on food safety128.

To conclude, it is interesting to note that, in an important study on China after Jiang Zemin, Ding Xiaoli listed the policy of sealing up information as the biggest threat to China’s future stability.

According to him, the commonly operated mismanagement and concealment of information in China has severe political implications, because it starts with single politicians who hide the truth in order to reduce their personal risk and cover their errors, but it can turn into a political issue, because the population blames the political system rather than individual officials for failing to tackle the problems. For this reason, in order to maintain a socio-political equilibrium without radically changing the political system, it is necessary to create a more transparent and multilateral information system129. As I have explained, the Internet is a constituting element of the more transparent and multilateral information apparatus of post-Jiang China; in this sense, it contributes to the maintenance of a democratic equilibrium, as it provides a release valve for demands of justice of people, and avoids that problems are hidden to the irreversible point in which they become a political problem.

Perhaps, the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration has held on through the years of its reign also thanks to the Internet, and the stabilizing effect that information based on it has within the system.

128

See, for instance, debates on http://bbs.cnr.cn/redirect.php?fid=286&tid=377642&goto=nextoldset or http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1513301.shtml 129 Ding (2002), in Wong & Zheng (eds.)

Chinese interest groups and their action on interpersonal networks This chapter focuses on mobilization of interest groups with political agendas on the Chinese Internet. As I have mentioned in the previous chapters, interpersonal platforms provide a stage for netizens to rally together when sharing common views and common purposes, and to advance opinions and demands conflicting with the official stance of the Chinese government; in certain cases, assembly on the Internet can even transcend the virtual dimension and evolve into concrete mobilization of interest groups with political aims. The presence and activity of interest groups within the Chinese political system is undoubtedly an element of freedom and democracy; and yet, because these develop on virtual platforms without formal and institutional recognition, the democratic effect online interest groups have in China can only be regarded as “surrogate”.

In this sense, the aim of this chapter is twofold: on one side, I will describe the importance and activity of interest groups on the Internet, and the “surrogate democracy function” they consequently fulfill; on the other hand, I will try to show how interest groups –especially those with aims that conflict with the views, policies and values of the regime– ultimately act within the framework of acceptance and recognition of the current political situation. These interest groups, representative of a very small portion of the Chinese population –the urban, young and well-educated emerging middle class– act for the attainment of self-serving objectives or, at most, for the resolution of specific shortcomings of the political system they deem as detrimental or disadvantageous to themselves and their own interests, and not quite for overthrowing the regime. For this reason, online interest groups with political agendas ultimately contribute to the maintenance of a socio-political equilibrium.

Since its first appearance in China, the Internet has served as a means for broadcasting and diffusing political heterodoxy130. One of the first blatant demonstrations of political action associated with the web was the march of Falun Gong in Beijing in April 1999, when members used the Internet and its interpersonal networks as the main means of communication and mobilization131. It was in the aftermath of that event that western scholars and media started arguing about the possible democratic effect of the Internet in China. As a matter of fact, at the time public sphere and online mobilization were at a preliminary stage, and the event was perceived by the government as a political threat 130 131

Mueller & Tan (1997); Gompert (1998) For further information about the 1999 demonstration and Falun Gong, see Ter Haar (2002)

coming from an elite group, and for this reason repressed with force. Along with the diffusion of the Internet and the emergence of a growing online citizenry, though, phenomena of political expression on the web have become increasingly common and extensive, and authorities have kept an increasingly lenient stance towards them132.

During the SARS crisis of 2003, the Chinese web was flooded for the first time with a profusion of political satire and jokes directed against the government and single politicians; moreover, netizens made extensive use of the Internet to advance demands to the political actor and express opinions about the government and its actions133. Later on, Internet users campaigned against specific policies of local or central governments: against the demolition of old neighborhoods in cities in the midst of China’s contemporary urban renovation frenzy; against the magnetic levitation train in Shanghai; or against the PX chemical plant in Xiamen134. The net has been the stage for citizens to target harsh criticism at the Beijing Olympics, at the way it had been managed by the government, and most of all at the campaign of mass indoctrination and distraction that some thought to be cloaked behind the atmosphere of enthusiasm and brotherhood of the period135. Even long-term policies, like the plan for the privatization of rural land released by the government at the end of 2008, have been subject to attention by the web, and netizens have joined the political discourse with their positions and their criticism136. Some Chinese web 2.0 platforms keep an overtly critical stance against the government, the Communist Party and the regime in general, hosting blogs of political dissidents and forums about sensitive political topics. The most famous and frequently visited of these is Bullog –recently renamed Bullogger– a blog provider founded by the political activist Luo Yonghao, which keeps a very liberal and edgy stance on political issues. Finally, political antagonism and campaigning for political aims online have become so widespread that new English-language bridge sites have started monitoring the sizzling political underworld of the Chinese Internet, gaining recognition among western media and western sinologists –among others, Danwei, China Media Project, EastSouthWestNorth or ChinaSmack. These bridge sites, although serving different purposes and adopting different stances 132

Zheng & Wu (2005) Fenn (2009) 134 http://chinadigitaltimes.net/tag/maglev-protests/ 135 Brady (2009) 136 http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/02/14/virtual-land-the-opinions-of-chinese-bloggers-on-privatization-ofrural-land/ 133

towards the web, are anyway representative of the big amount of political information on Chinese interpersonal networks, and of the growing interest of the west.

In many of these phenomena that I have listed, we can identify dynamics of political lobbying very similar to the ones occurring in the west –i.e. the organized attempt of the public to influence political actors. In fact, behind the confused wrangle that is commonly identified with Internet debate, some orderly and rational discussion takes place. Single citizens or groups present themselves on the Internet with undisguised political objectives, trying to gather consensus among the online public opinion around their point, and refuting the opposite argument. This is, for instance, the case in the debate around the reform of rural land: soon after the release of the “Resolutions concerning the many important problems in the development of reform in the countryside” in October 2008, netizens opposing the privatization plan started a large-scale online campaign of sensitization around the issue on forums and blogs, which aimed at attaining consensus and raising awareness in the public opinion about the risks of the envisaged reform137. The anti-reform group has availed itself of prominent voices, such as that of the journalist Wen Tiejun and of the village chief and countryside expert Li Changping, who have published several attacks against the reform on their blogs and in traditional media, and have thus become the “faces” of this political and ideological campaign138.

Whereas it is too early to measure the effects of this specific political campaign on the behavior of the political actor, it is still possible to assert that online lobbying has recorded some successes in influencing governmental policies. One among many, the campaign against the construction of the PX chemical plant in Xiamen, which was prompted by the online public opinion, gathered so much momentum that authorities were in the end forced to stop the plan and yield to the will of interest groups139.

In sum, online interpersonal platforms have been beneficial to the creation and action of interest groups with political purposes. Thanks to the Internet, netizens can organize themselves in a grouping

137

“中共中央关于推进农村改革发展若干重大问题的决定” integral text available at http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/8194300.html; for an overview of the online debate, http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/02/14/virtual-land-the-opinions-of-chinese-bloggers-on-privatizationof-rural-land/ 138 For Wen Tiejun’s blog, see http://wtj.caogen.com/; Li Changping currently writes at http://lichangping.qzone.qq.com/ 139 http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/zmzg/200705280624.asp

and coordinate their actions in a way that was not possible before; besides, the communication instruments offered by the web enable interest groups to better publicize their positions and their objectives, so that they can reach wider recognition within the public opinion, and possibly even among political actors140. And this is particularly true for the specific case of China: in fact, in the past all political movements and protests were born from a certain degree of state initiation, because of the penetration of the political machine in society, and also because the state relied on political campaigns and mass mobilization to pursue political purposes or promote social and economic changes141.

Conversely, as I have amply indicated in the previous chapters, the advent of the Internet has contributed to the decrease of state influence and of ideological mobilization on society, thus favoring a more spontaneous assembly of private citizens. When the legitimacy and the endurance of the regime is not at stake, interest groups and individuals have been able to initiate collective actions with political purposes outside the scope of the state and its representation channels; by helping the public formulate interests and demands to the state, the Internet has allowed the government to better discern that the majority of these demands pose no threat to the political status quo, and that giving in to these requests even produces a benefit for the current regime142.

The presence and effectiveness of interest groups proves the existence of the germs of an active civil society, which is able to organize itself to achieve social objectives free from the influence of the state, and therefore has democratic implications within the Chinese system. Although mainly acting through the “surrogate” platforms offered by the Internet and its communication networks, these interest groups are still able to attain recognition in the public opinion, to advance political demands or campaign for political purposes, and sometimes even to influence the political actor with the pressure they exert on the virtual public sphere and on the concrete social pattern. In this sense, it is possible to assert that interest groups on the Internet fulfill a surrogate democracy function in China.

And yet, despite the “surrogate” democracy action of political mobilization, it is my opinion that such interest groups, even those that keep a critical stance towards the government or that campaign for specific political objectives that collide with governmental policies, do not jeopardize the Chinese

140

Mossberger (2008) Zhou (1993) 142 Zheng & Wu (2005) 141

political regime with their actions, but rather contribute to the maintenance of a socio-political equilibrium. In the following pages I will attempt to prove this point.

Firstly, by advancing political requests to the political actor, interest groups recognize the authority of the regime, and ultimately decide to act within the framework of the current political system. Zheng & Wu have noted how collective actions in China have tended to adopt a cooperative attitude towards authorities, and to campaign for a specific objective without trespassing the boundaries of political authority143. This tendency can be observed in the case of the 2007 protests against the PX chemical plant in Xiamen: in the course of this campaign, citizens made extensive use of new media –Internet interpersonal networks but also SMS on cellular phones– in order to gather consensus among the populace against the construction plan of the local government, and even managed to rally in a public protest on the streets of Xiamen on June 1144.

Despite this, the PX campaign did not challenge the political power: it was rather opposing a debated project that had not received the approval of the SEPA –the State Environmental Protection Administration– and that was violating a directive of the State Council stating that projects with environmental impact had to undergo public consultation before their realization145. Moreover, the protesters had a very clear understanding of the rights the legal system was granting them, thus knew exactly what they could fight for under the existing legislation. In a sense, protesters were demonstrating for the system, not against it. The PX campaign involved large sections of the active urban public opinion, as white collars, academics and even local politicians took part in the protest; most were campaigning for a more environmentally-conscious management of their city, but many were also driven by the fear that the chemical plant would diminish the value of their property, or were worried about the health threat that the polluting structure would pose. Besides, even the on-thestreet manifestation of June 2007 was carefully contrived so that it would not step on the feet of authorities: in fact, organizers did not openly define their rally as a political manifestation –because that would have infringed on the prohibition of public assembly still in force in the PRC– but rather as

143 144 145

Ibid. http://www.danwei.org/state_media/xiamen_px_sms_china_newsweek.php

“国务院关于落实科学发展观加强环境保护的决定”

original text at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-12/13/content_125680.htm

a “collective stroll”146. This formally “saved the face” of the local government in front of the dissent mounting among the populace, and allowed protesters to take to the street without being accused of provoking social unrest.

The dynamic of these events well shows how Chinese interest groups composed of different social classes have campaigned for a common political objective, yet without challenging the authorities and the political order. As Tang Hao, a Chinese scholar and environmental activist, commented, interest groups have been successful because they did not frontally attack the government or the system in its entirety; they rather “established a new type of activism, which focused on a single issue in order to change governmental habits and the law”147. And, we must remember, interpersonal platforms on the Internet have had a fundamental role in aggregating and mobilizing these interest groups.

As I have described, the Chinese web offers a space for interest groups to encounter and organize their protest, as well as to appeal to the political actor for the achievement of specific demands. By amplifying the visibility and impact of these interest groups, the Internet puts pressures on authorities to yield to their specific requests, thereby appeasing voices of dissent and increasing consensus in the population148. Thanks to the Internet, the government has been more able to “depoliticize” the issues at stake, i.e. to impede that these groups translate their dissatisfaction with a peculiar situation or policy to the political system in general, therefore safeguarding the endurance of the regime149. All this has facilitated what Russell Hardin called the politics of cooperation: the state can keep its citizens under control through cooperation without going to Orwellian extremes, because it can develop “conventions” to keep citizens from transgressing the boundaries and punish those who attempt to transgress those boundaries150. By helping construct and develop these conventions, the Internet contributes to a social balance in China.

Secondly, the Chinese Internet is mostly representative of a social class –the well-educated urban middle class– that is unlikely to advocate revolutionary political change, and for this reason it is improbable that political activism and dissent online could have anti-systemic effects on the Chinese 146

http://zonaeuropa.com/20070601_1.htm Tang (2008) 148 Zheng & Wu (2005) 149 Ding (2002), in Wong & Zheng (eds.)

150 Hardin (1990), in Cook & Levi (eds.)

147

political pattern. According to the CNNIC Report on Internet Usage in China, the profile of the typical Chinese Internet user is unequivocal: young, male, living in a big city, holding a job as a white-collar or a teacher with a relatively high income, or a student. Although gender and income divides have decreased over time, it is still possible to draw a clear barrier between those who are likely to access the Internet, and those who are unwilling or unable to make use of the new medium151.

Such a cleavage has important implications on political activism online. Young, highly educated male netizens are those who have very high possibilities of achieving careers and social success within the existing regime, and thereby are more bound to come to terms with the system rather than attempting to modify the rules of the game152. In this sense, actions on the Chinese Internet rarely degenerate into radical dissent, because the majority of the online population is reluctant to disrupt the possibility of attaining social status and economic success in the current political system.

In addition, Giese correctly points out that the Chinese Internet is mostly inhabited by the middle and upper-middle classes, social groups that are not on the losing side of China’s economic transformation and its political system, and therefore are not dissatisfied with the status quo. In their political activism online, these groups tend to defend and achieve their interests, instead of referring to larger systemic problems that affect a majority of the population that is still excluded from the Internet discourse153. A recent survey conducted by Wang shows that the middle class is the social group with the highest degree of political participation and interest on the Internet, and yet this interest is more connected with economic reforms, finance and job security, than with sensitive issues and structural reforms. Although functioning as an important mediator between the state and citizens, the Internet has weakened the political interest of middle class citizens, shying them away from politics and encouraging them towards popular and consumer culture154.

These findings are supported by official data: whereas usage of the web among white and blue collars has increased constantly in time, percentages referring to unemployed and laid-off workers have not changed significantly in recent years155; although Internet usage in the countryside is

151

CNNIC (2009) Harwit & Clark (2001) 153 Giese (2006) 154 Wang (2009) 155 CNNIC Report (2003, 2005, 2007) 152

increasing, it is still substantially below urban usage156. This shows that the sub-proletariat and groups with the highest potential for political antagonism do not have access to Internet mobilization, reducing the risks of political unrest and systemic change.

Western scholars have claimed that, starting from Jiang Zemin’s time in office, the CCP has increasingly adopted the strategy of enlarging the base of representation and of including different social and economic groups into the political arena in order to maintain power and its legitimacy. In this sense, campaigns such as Jiang’s “Three Represents” have attempted to establish an appeasement and an equilibrium between the emerging urban middle class and the political class157. A similar phenomenon seems to take place on the Internet, as the government increasingly yields to the requests and the tendencies that stem from the new Internet population, in order to maintain legitimacy and control over the political pattern.

Interest groups representing the urban middle class use the Internet to campaign for their specific interests as opposed to the interests of the state, or aim at solving established problems of the Chinese political apparatus, such as environmental degradation, corruption or political mismanagement. Even though they represent but a part of the population, their political action has still democratic impact on the system, because it promotes the general principle that the public can and should take part in policy-making, setting an important precedent of democratic participation for the next interest groups or social classes to come. On the other hand, though, with their online activism these groups do not challenge the existing political order: if they are protesting for personal interest, they choose the state as their interlocutor and ultimately recognize the authority of the political actor and the framework of the current regime. Moreover, if they address structural problems of the political machine, they even more contribute to its endurance, because they help eliminate shortcomings that could bring political instability or even a collapse of the system, and increase the degree of satisfaction of the population towards the political status quo. In this sense, it is truly possible to say that the Chinese Internet and its interest groups fulfill a surrogate democratic action that supports a political equilibrium.

To conclude this chapter, I intend to remark how radical political opposition on the Internet, which is constantly emphasized by western media and western scholar who adhere to the theory of convergence, actually plays a marginal role within the total panorama of the Chinese web, and 156 157

CNNIC (2009) Wong & Zheng, eds. (2002), Giese (2006), Fewsmith (2008), in Li (eds.)

constitutes just a small fragment of the information and of the discourse established by netizens on online interpersonal platforms. As I have monitored the Chinese Internet constantly during my research for this article, I have noted that anti-systemic positions are largely outnumbered by comments that, although roughly critical and even fierce against the political power, fully recognize the authority of the political actor and, by promoting change and improvement in the political regime, ultimately act within the acceptance of the existing system. Besides, by monitoring interpersonal platforms that normally host the most antagonist positions within the Chinese web –mainly Bullogger and Twitter– I have observed that the circle of active political militants –those who write antisystemic posts on their blogs everyday, gathering considerable fame within the Chinese Internet– is actually very limited in size, and that a large part of their readership is composed by western netizens rather than Chinese politically-conscious web users. These findings are the fruit of personal impressions rather than quantitative research, and deeper insight into this matter should be made before coming to definite conclusions; nevertheless, if confirmed by future studies, this would confirm my thesis that political mobilization on the Chinese Internet does not have anti-systemic implications, but ultimately contributes to the maintenance of the current socio-political equilibrium.

Conclusion In the course of this essay, I have attempted to demonstrate how Internet interpersonal platforms fulfill a “surrogate democracy function� in China. This democratic effect originates from the impact the Internet has in shaping an online public sphere and an online public opinion, in enhancing and diversifying the media and information system, and in mobilizing interest groups. According to my model, positive democratic impact of the Internet on the Chinese socio-political system increases the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and contentment of the population towards the behavior of the political actor; for this reason, the Internet contributes to the maintenance of the political status quo.

Evidently, measuring the degree of democracy prompted by the Internet and the stability effect that it induces is an arduous and problematic process, and during my research on the Chinese web, I sometimes had to extrapolate general trends from specific cases or quantitatively limited samples. In this sense, my investigation should not be considered as thorough and conclusive, and I warmly welcome new studies to contribute to casting light to the puzzling issue of the Internet in China.

Notwithstanding, historical evidence and some further proof have come to corroborate my thesis: since the arrival of the Internet in China, the political system has undergone important transformations, which have enlarged the role of citizenry and public opinion in influencing the political actor, and increased the responsibility and the consideration of the government in front of the public will. On the other hand, the Chinese Communist Party has maintained almost uncontested authority in the country, and the current political regime has demonstrated to outlive the major economic and social transformations that have occurred since the reform, and to be able to endure in the years to come. In both these trends, the Internet seems to have had an important stimulating role.

Furthermore, the most recent Pew Global Attitude Survey in China has emphasized the generalized sentiment of satisfaction that the population has towards the system and the political actor. In 2008, a staggering 86% of the population was satisfied or highly satisfied with the direction of the country and the way things were going; this makes China the country with the highest degree of public satisfaction in the world –outpacing Australia, the second classified, by 25 percentage points.

Interestingly, the levels of satisfaction in the population have increased steeply since the beginning of the century, as in 2002 only 48% of Chinese people considered themselves content about the

country’s overall direction158. Since many of the societal and political transformations happened between 2002 and 2008 have had a direct or indirect connection with the development of the web, it seems reasonable to affirm that the Internet has somehow been a factor in the growth of public satisfaction in the country. This would give further proof that the Internet, with its positive democratic effects on the system, helps maintain a socio-political equilibrium in China.

It is surely legitimate to question the genuineness of this perceived satisfaction with the Chinese regime, or to claim the necessity that those democratic mechanisms that have only appeared in the surrogate context of the Internet could be upgraded to real, institutionalized western-style democracy.

And yet, students of China should always remember that it is impossible to comprehend the innumerable contradictions of the political system unless we accept the social and cultural peculiarities of China, and the enormous repercussions these peculiarities have on the relation between state and society. For this reason, in order to understand the contradictory effect that the Internet has on the political system, it is perhaps useful to restyle the quotation from Kathleen Hartford used in the introduction of this essay and claim that as Internet use and applications expand in China, we may well find that its greatest impact lies in intensifying China’s existing peculiarities.

158

Pew Survey (2008), p.14-15; available at www.pewglobal.org

List of cited websites •

Alibaba China http://china.alibaba.com

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Ant Internet Community http://www.myust.com

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Baidu Search Engine www.baidu.com

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Bullogger Internet Community http://www.bullogger.com

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Caogen Internet Portal http://www.caogen.com

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CCTV – China Central Television Website www.cctv.com

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China Development Gateway http://cn.chinagate.cn

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China Digital Times http://chinadigitaltimes.net

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China Internet Portal http://www.china.com.cn

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China Law Library http://www.law-lib.com

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China Media Project http://cmp.hku.hk

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China National Radio Webpage http://www.cnr.cn

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ChinaSmack http://www.chinasmack.com

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Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention Webpage http://www.chinacdc.net.cn

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Danwei http://www.danwei.org

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Douban http://www.douban.com

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EastSouthWestNorth Blog http://www.zonaeuropa.com

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Global Voices Online http://globalvoicesonline.org

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Haokanbu Internet Portal http://www.haokanbu.com

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Hudong Online Encyclopedia !htt!p!:!/!/!w!w!w!.!h!u!d!o!n!g!.!c!o!m

•

Ifeng Internet Portal http://www.ifeng.com

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Leiden University Sinological Institute Webpage http://www.hum.leidenuniv.nl/chinees

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Liaoning Province Government Website www.ln.gov.cn

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Markle Foundation Webpage http://www.markle.org

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Nanfang Daily Webpage http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn

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O’Reilly Radar – Tim O’Reilly’s Blog http://radar.oreilly.com

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Oriental Morning Post Website www.dfdaily.com

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People’s Daily Website http://www.people.com.cn

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Pew Global Attitudes Project www.pewglobal.org

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QQ Internet Community http://www.qq.com

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Sina Internet Portal http://www.sina.com.cn

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Sohu Internet Portal www.sohu.com

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Southern Weekly Webpage http://www.infzm.com

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Tianya Internet Community http://www.tianya.cn

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Twitter Social Network http://twitter.com

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Windows Live http://home.spaces.live.com

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Xinhua Agency Website www.xinhuanet.com

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Xinwang Internet Portal http://www.xinnet.com

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Bi, Jianhai (2001). “The Internet revolution in China”, International Journal 56, (Summer 2001), pp. 2337

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Blakely, Craig & Matsuura, Jeffrey (2001). “E-government: is the e-democracy inevitable?”, available at www.itas.fzk.de

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Brady, Anne-Marie (2009). “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction”, The China Quarterly, 197, March 2009, pp. 1–24

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