RIBA Case Study

ANDREW

IRVIN

RIBA CASE STUDY

ZHEJIANG NATRURAL HISTORY MUSEUM

Contents

1. Summary 1.01 1.02

Key Information Introduction

2.01 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.06

David Chipperfield Architects My Role and the DCA Team Client and Main Stake Holders The Appointment Fees and Resourcing

3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04

Stage`0+1, Strategic Definition, Preparation and Brief Stage 2, Conceptual Design Stage 3, Design Development Stage 4, Technical Design

4.01 4.02 4.03 4.04 4.05

The Procurement Process Form of Contract Working with an LDI Tendering Procedures Mobilisation

5.01 5.02 5.04 5.05

Planning, Development Heritage and land disputes Sustainability and LEED accreditation Building Regulations

6.01 6.02 6.03 6.04 6.05

Role of the Architect Contract Administration Delays and Variations Post-Mobilisation Health and Safety Handover and completion

7.01 7.02 7.03

Conclusions Recommendations for Future Practice Bibliography

2. Project Environment

3. The Design Process

4. Procurement

5. Legislative Framework

6. Construction

7. Conclusion

Central Garden Section

1. Summary

1.01 Key Information Overview Project Title Location Gross Area Internal Area Site Contract Value Construction Period

Zhejiang Natural History Museum (ZNHM) Anji, Zhejiang, China 55,000 sqm 700,000 sqm 520m rmb (£52m) October 2015 – October 2018

Client

The Anji County Government, (Overseeing delivery of building, 50% share of construction cost.)

The Zhejiang Department of Culture (The end user, 50% share of construction cost.)

Design Team Project Manager Architect and Lead Consultant Architect of Record Landscape Architect Structural Engineer M+E Engineer Façade Specialist Exhibition Designer Lighting Consultant Principle Contractor Interior Contractor Quantity Surveyor Health and Safety Officer Museum Director Infrastructure Consultant Environmental Consultant

Wang Jia (Anji County official) David Chipperfield Architects Zhejiang South East Design Institute (ZSEDI) Zhejiang South East Design Institute (ZSEDI) Zhejiang South East Design Institute (ZSEDI) Zhejiang South East Design Institute (ZSEDI) QuickMix Encore Exhibition Design Henry Chang, SunLux Zhejiang Provincial Erjian Construction Group Ltd. (Erjian) Fushenjian Construction Group Ltd. Zhejiang Provincial Erjian Construction Group Ltd (Erjian) Zhang Qi, Anji County Yan Hongming Dong Yi, Anji County Li Yao, BEE

Contractual Framework Architectural Appointment Procurement Route

The International Architectural and Engineering Contract ‘FIDIC.’ Construction Management

1.02 Introduction This case study examines the construction of a 55,000m2 Natural History Museum currently under construction in Anji Provence, Zhejiang China. It is set within a new cultural development area and will be the flagship attraction to the areas regeneration as a tourist destination. It will be one of the largest Natural History Museums in the world when it opens in December 2018. This case study will provide a comparison on each element of the project with best RIBA Practices that would be undertaken in the UK. The main building sits to the north of the site, surrounded by existing trees and overlooking a valley of rice fields. The museum’s volume is divided into a series of 8 halls that step down along with the sites natural gradient and are orientated around a large stepped central garden. A clay render, sourced from the unique red earth onsite, is used on most of the exterior and public interior, allowing the buildings to harmonise with the natural surroundings despite their size. The programme includes 6 large exhibition halls, a temporary exhibition hall, education facilities, cinema, lecture theatre, offices, shops, restaurants and underground parking.

In January 2014, David Chipperfield Architects were invited to a limited competition for a new Natural History Museum in Zhejiang. Success from that initial competition led to a commission for a comprehensive design scheme. Work began on the design after the signing of the ‘letter of intent’ in October 2014 in consultation with the clients; Anji County and Zhejiang Department of Culture. The other main stakeholder; the Museum Director and his curatorial team along with the other key members of the design team; the Local Design Institute ‘ZSEDI’ and the principle contractor ‘Erjian Construction’ were also involved from the initial consultations.

As a public-funded project in China, the procurement route has multiple stakeholders and design team members working together in a system of collaborative contract management. The Client, LDI and Contractor are all either Government Agencies or Public Private Partnerships resulting in a healthy collaborative nature, with many individuals that have worked together on previous projects.

The contract used for the appointment is an FIDIC, (Fédération Internationale Des IngénieursConseils) with specific tailored appendices for the project. I will compare this to the JTC Management Building Contract (MC) in its successes and weaknesses and how the Chinese system varies to the UK system.

My involvement on this project began in October 2014 when the project was still in Concept Design.

I was a member of the team seeing the project through to the delivery of the technical documentation in November 2015. It remained my primary project through that time. In the months since, I have been attending meetings and site visits during this phase of post-mobilisation. This has also involved shadowing colleagues during the completion of the interior technical design package and the resolving of on-site complications.

The overall aim of this case study is to review the salient points from which project that I have been closely involved in and contrast the project environment, legislative framework, contract choice, tendering, post-mobilisation and procurement route with best practices in the UK. In evaluating this project I will therefore be providing a comparative analysis of the successes and failures of both Chinese and British building practices. From this, I will draw conclusions on what can be learned going forward from each of their varying approaches.

2. Project Environment

ZNHM Project Folders

2.01 David Chipperfield Architects David Chipperfield Architects is a practice founded in London in1984 by David Chipperfield. The office has developed over the years gaining a good reputation due to its emphasis on rational and restrained architecture and quality detailing. The practice has offices in London, Berlin, Milan and Shanghai. Its work includes commercial, cultural and residential projects as well as masterplanning; interior, product and furniture design.

Each office has developed a unique identity with varied specialisations and they are all registered as separate companies. London, for example, is a limited company structured with 5 Directors, compared to the other large office Berlin, which is a partnership with 5 Partners currently. The London office has a focus on larger commercial projects and oversees projects, whereas following from the work DCA Berlin was involved in on Museum Island they bring in a substantial amount of renovation work or interventions into listed buildings. The Milan office was established after winning the flagship store design for ‘Valentino’ and, as such, their work focuses of commercial high end interiors.

The Shanghai office has run as a Limited Liability Partnership (David Chipperfield Architects Shanghai LLP) between the partners David Chipperfield, Mark Randal and Libin Chen since 2014 when they officially registered the company in Shanghai. Each partner, of course, takes on a different role; as the Senior Partner David has ultimate authority on all design and business decisions but considering his commitment to other offices, he only contributes on critical issues. The two other partners, Mark and Libin, divide their responsibilities with Mark focusing on the initial design stages and Libin concentrating on technical supervision and client relationships. There are two other senior staff in the office, both whom have been with DCA Shanghai for close to 10 years; Liping Xu and Chu Xiao. Liping is solely focused on Business and Management and is not an architect. Chu Xiao is an architectural conservation specialist with vast knowledge on Chinese building techniques and construction generally. He is, without doubt, the office ‘guru’ during technical design and construction. He is highly valued in the office and is involved in several projects simultaneously, including supervising and providing counsel on this one.

In the 10 years prior to registering as a LLP, DCA’s presence in China was only a site office, which legally restricted them in terms of hiring staff. During that time, all projects in China were directed from Berlin. From 2014 onward, the Shanghai office worked independently, developing designs and entering competitions without assistance from Berlin There is around 100 staff in each of the London and Berlin offices. Milan has around 35 staff and the Shanghai office 24. When I joined the office in October 2014, I was employee number 10 so the office has already more than doubled in size since becoming an official DCA office, with scope for further growth. The office breakdown is 3 partners, 1 Senior Architect, 7 members of the permanent architectural team, 3 support staff and 10 new graduates and interns.

This growth in the office has altered the environment for the better, adding a larger wealth of experience and cultural backgrounds from across the world. The office is now 16% foreign nationals, which is a good mix. Most international firms in Shanghai are closer to 50% which really lowers the understanding of the local environment.

The recent change in staff has seen an uplift in the Shanghai office’s morale, though has equally presented a number of challenges, particularly in terms of quality control. This has arisen due to the number of projects in the office that primarily consist of new members of staff with little prior experience of the DCA standard procedures. My role in the office has developed in order to help respond to this issue. However, this comes as an addition to my existing work load. As well as the office CAD administrator, my role involves overseeing all images and presentation documents leaving the office, I am now often the staff member overseeing office introductions. This can also

DCA Office

include tutorials and introductions to the DCA resources and guidelines. This reduces my opportunity to invest time in a single project as my responsibilities are now spread over the entire office.

There is limited scope for progression within the company internationally. DCA is famed for the high number of staff it has retained for decades in both London and Berlin, thus restricting the natural advancement of newer staff members. This is not the same, however, for the two younger offices of Milan and Shanghai. They are both rapidly growing and as a result, have a level of fluidity in the movement between other DCA offices. Integration between offices is also highly encouraged, with Shanghai staff occasionally working from Berlin and London. Progression is almost always done internally across all offices. This makes progression out with Shanghai less of a possibility given that staff movement is much lower in other locations.

Similar to all the other DCA offices, our projects often focus on stages 0-4 with the work that is completed post-design development, transitioning to a ‘Local Design Institute’ with ourselves often involved in a consultancy role. This is generally due to many of our projects being overseas; however, in China, provincial legislation and standard practice make it virtually impossible to complete a project without partnering with an LDI. A Limited Liability Partnership typically would comprise of ‘Members’ rather than ‘Partners’, the latter traditionally referring to only a partnership. The reason behind DCA Shanghai opting for a LLP was to enjoy the business opportunity afforded by a limited company whilst retaining the culture of shared responsibility in a partnership. As such, we refer to Mark and Libin as partners in the company.

LLP’s within the UK are subjected to careful oversight following the UK Limited Liability Partnership Act of 2000 and this is also much the same in China. If anything, it is more stringent under the Chinese 2007 Partnership Enterprise Law which limits LLP to knowledge-based professions and technical service industries. Both the UK and China LLP structures shield other partners from liabilities arising from misconduct or gross negligence of an individual partner. It also separates the identity of the company from that of its partners.

Operating a company in China that is a WFOE (Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise) comes under strict regulation and makes removing profit from China without incurring high taxation impossible.

Operating a ‘joint venture’ or a partnership with Chinese nationals is seen as a way of alleviating this and making international companies such as DCA more appealable to the Chinese Market1.

RIBA Employment Policy could be reviewed by DCA Shanghai to adapt to a formal system of best practice. I think some of the points are already achieved successfully such as commitment 3; ‘promoting the business, social and environmental benefits of good employment and diversity in architectural practice’. DCA Shanghai already achieves this with a wide diaspora of gender, age and cultural backgrounds throughout all levels of experience. Perhaps, like most offices today, there is a lack of senior female members of staff, but it is an industry-wide problem and I don’t see this as a permanent situation.

One aspect that DCA is not proactive in achieving from the ‘Employment Policy,’ is regular CPD training and supporting further training of its staff. This is normal practice in China as CPD’s and trainers for software, that present in English, are hard to find. This, combined with the Chinese culture of staff continually moving office, makes it an expensive investment by DCA without clear benefits, despite being standard practice in the UK.

1

https://ins-globalconsulting.com/china-market-entry-guide/

Beijing

Nanjing

Anji Hangzhou

Shanghai

I also think, that to encourage feedback from staff with the introduction of an annual review forum, could benefit DCA. It would allow staff to voice queries and concerns in an open and constructive way. This would allow the practice to adapt and learn as it develops. Individual, annual staff reviews could also be an alternative solution.

My Role and the DCA Team I joined the team as the project sprung to life after a 6 month period of stasis following us winning the competition. Initially, it was Norah Wuttke and I working under the guidance of Partner Mark Randel. Libin Chen, as the partner focused on client relationships, had been managing the project up until the ‘letter of intent’ was signed. After that point, as we transitioned into concept design, Mark assumed control of the project and we began reviewing the design options to accommodate the changes to the brief. Mark was, however, based in Berlin 3 out of 4 weeks every month so, despite his commitment to the project, he couldn’t really ever afford to have a hands on approach to the design process. This did, however, allow Mark to sit down weekly with David Chipperfield, be it in Berlin or London, allowing him to add comment to our work. We scheduled regular reviews by Skype to keep him abreast of our progress and to get Mark and David’s Feedback. By this point, given that she had been on the project from the beginning of the competition Norah was focusing on coordination and communication, allowing me to be a fresh pair of eyes to focus on reviewing the design. As the Conceptual Design Stage progressed the team slowly grew to include Miguel Angel and the interns Jinghui and Yuchen.

After the move into Design Development, Norah left the office to take another job. Miguel assumed the role of project manager following Norah’s departure and joining me to further the design was Hans and Huiwen. As I had prepared all the 3D Modelling and rendering in the concept stage, I again took on this responsibility towards the end of the design development as we were required to submit as part of the deliverables of the package, a set of 10 renderings. I was, of course, also working on drafting drawings in all stages of the design in 2D but, it was my responsibility for much of the project to provide three dimensional oversight on the impact of changes to the plans, sections and elevations.

Following the delivery of our Design Development package, my role became part time, along with several other staff, as other projects became a priority in the office. The remaining staff was working mainly from the ZSEDI office overseeing the production of the Technical Design Stage.

There was a significant shift again after the project moved on to site. The only full time staff on the project at this point were Huiwen and Jinghui. The partners, Miguel and I were only providing support during construction. We were kept in the email chains, involved in any large meetings, occasionally onsite and were party to all major decisions. However, given the nature of the procurement of the project, the DCA role was significantly minimised after the beginning of construction.

A lack of continuity between the different design stages did occur due to staff changes and without a single partner overseeing the project, this also created the occasional conflict of contradictory opinions. I think this was also felt by the client and as with most professional relationships in China, trust and confidence matter much more than any contractual obligations, so these conflicts really began to damage the architect / client relationship.

The Heart of this problem, I believe, could be addressed by a review of the project based communications at DCA. The client, on occasion, was left unconvinced by our expertise in part due

层， 程度

的

点缀 馆建

ype

ns ga

s a

e he hen

Building essentials

Building form Process 单一大体量建筑 single building mass

分散布置的小体量建筑 pavillions scattered in the park

1 3 Main Moves

三大关键设计要素 - 3 key design aspects

2: Following the topography

Buildings set into the Landscape

2

小体量建筑聚落 pavillions’ Cluster

3

to our technical and design reporting not being perceived as objective or concise.2 We were overwhelmed with information on occasion and picked our battles poorly to emphasise our design intentions leaving the client thinking we were putting our own interests ahead of the stakeholders. I think that with one partner or a senior architect on this project from concept to completion, the time needed to build the clients trust would have been more achievable.

This problem was further compounded by the lack of formal contractual correspondence with the client. As we were contractually only involved on a consultancy basis most communication was verbal or over instant messenger. This is standard practice in China but I believe we should have also implemented a more formal series of responses to the client in addition to the other forms of communication.

These issues, and others with the internal running of the DCA team, could also be alleviated by adopting a more formal process of quality control. RIBA’s standard guidelines for practice for an office of this size are the use the full RIBA Quality Management Toolkit to review all projects3. This, combined with using QA procedural assessments such as BS EN ISO 9001, would demonstrate to clients, particularly public ones, that DCA takes the provision of quality design services seriously.

22 3

Nigel Ostime, RIBA Handbook of Practice Management 9th Addition (London: RIBA Press, 2013), p 235.

Nigel Ostime, RIBA Handbook of Practice Management 9th Addition (London: RIBA Press, 2013), p 225.

Lobby

Restaurant Cafe & Shop

Lake

Garden Aquarium

s Re ea & rch

Garden Happy Farm

t po De

Office

Boarding House Amphietheatre Garden

Masterplan

Pond

Garden

2.02 Client and Main Stake Holders The Client for this Project is Anji County. Located just outside of the city of Huzhou in the North East of the province of Zhejiang, Anji is famous all over China for its rare white tea and Bamboo. Anji is China’s largest producer of bamboo poles and has the largest bamboo nursery in the world. The county is also focused on tourism and, in particular, eco-tourism.

Moving the current Natural History Museum in the Province’s capital Hangzhou, to Anji, would form a major draw for tourists, especially considering the site is in close proximity to its other two main tourist attractions; the Zhongnan Bacao Gardens on the adjacent site and the newly opened Hello Kitty Land 15 minutes away.

The list of Primary Direct Stakeholders on this project is…

-

Anji County (Mayor’s Office) Zhejiang Department of Culture CPC Sectary of Zhejiang (Xia Baolong) The Director of the Zhejiang Natural History Museum (Yan Hongming)

The other direct Stakeholders on this project are…

-

The Museum’s Curatorial team The Huzhou Economic and Technological Development Zone (HETD) Anji County Agricultural Comprehensive Development Office (ACAD) Anji County Fund for Ecological Development (AED)

There are also serval indirect stake holders in the project such as the local neighbouring residents and businesses, the previous owners of the land before the compulsory purchase by Anji County, the families whom have burial plots currently on the site, the design team, other local attractions and tourist spots and local service providers such as catering.

Anji County secured 50% of the projects funding from their budgets to further improve tourism in the area and affirm its reputation as a centre for culture. This brings in two minor stakeholders with ACACD and ACED who are overseen by the Anji Mayor, Chen Yonghua. The other main stake holder overseen by Anji County is the HETD who are currently building a new highway adjacent to the site4. They worked with Anji County in coordinating the wider masterplan for the area and administering an eco-business development zone nearby.

The Anji Mayor appointed Wang Jia, an Anji Official and engineer with ample construction experience, to manage the project on his behalf and the interests of all Anji Stakeholders and oversee the construction. The Mayors team are very experienced and have built 3 other museums in the last 10 years, along with several other large public projects.

The other 50% of the budget comes from the Zhejiang Department of Culture, who administer the central government funding for cultural projects and manage state museums and parks and, as such, will also be the end user. The project was budgeted as part of China’s 12th 5 year plan for 2011-2016 and the money allocated to Zhejiang accordingly.5 The 5 year plan system in China represents a single political cycle with many bureaucrats moving job at the end of the plans implementation. In the summer of 2014 there was significant pressure from the Governor of Zhejiang, Li Qieng, to move ahead with the project and hopefully have the building nearing 4 5

http://www.huzhou.gov.cn/art/2013/6/25/art_2921_213678.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five-year_plans_of_China

Landscape Plan

completion prior to him leaving his position in June 2016 to ensure the money was not allocated elsewhere.

Despite Anji County commissioning the project, as a result of half the funding coming from the Zhejiang Department of Culture and the governor’s direct involvement, the division between direct stake holders and clients began to blur on several occasions. In particular, separating the valid concerns of the end-user with the Museum Director and the more immediate concerns of the client, Anji County was a challenge I don’t think we best handled.

The result was a cabal of differing opinions and, without the Project Managers authority to quell the lack of unity, resulted in several needless programme changes deep into the design process. From accounts from DCA London on similar public funded projects, such as the Turner Contemporary, a complicated relationship with the varying concerns of the stakeholders is not uncommon.

Public funded clients in China and the UK are both usually very experienced and substantially risk adverse. Both countries also encourage diverse funding methods and public consultation to include indirect stakeholders in the design process. The UK government launched the ‘Cultural White Paper’ in March 2016 that outlined their objectives for future policy. In section 4.2 it encourages cultural organisations to develop more mixed funding, recognising the need to encourage private and corporate support for new cultural institutions.6 This is a clear indication of the government embracing a wide array of stakeholders on institutional projects such as this one.

A major difference in this scenario from that of the UK, is the pervasive nature of the public sector through its presence in the private. The LDI, the construction company, all the funding and project management were all either completed by government institutions, quangos or PPP companies.

This is not unique to the project. After seeing the boom of private sector wealth from construction around 10 years ago, it became Chinese policy for each Province, City and County to set up development and enterprise funds. Their objective was to retain a share of profits and compete on commercial projects with private clients. This lead to a drastic change to client and stakeholder relationships at DCA and ZNHM could be seen a blueprint for this going forward.

6

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/culture-white-paper

Entrance Entrance

HangingGarden Garden Hanging

Reception Desk Reception Desk

Information Desk

MainCirculation Circulation Corridor Main

Main Circulation Corridor

2.03 The Appointment 2.03 The Appointment

Most approaches DCA Shanghai gets for new work are from recommendations by previous clients or from our international reputation. Anji County approached us to take part in the initial competition following DCA’s success the Liangzhu Museum which is also within the With Most approaches DCA with Shanghai gets for Culture new work are from recommendations by province. previous clients the more public funded Anji projects or approached PPP in China thepart lastin10 invited or shift from towards our international reputation.

County us over to take theyears, initial an competition competition like the one for is usually the Museum standard which approach DCA receives.

We only following DCA’s success withZNHM the Liangzhu Culture is also within the province.

With occasionally now receive a private commission without an initial competition. the shift towards more public funded projects or PPP in China over the last 10 years, an invited competition like the one for ZNHM is usually the standard approach DCA receives. We only The office onlynow engages exclusively consultancy contracts with competition. clients and always bids alongside occasionally receive a private in commission without an initial a LDI on a project, with them taking on the role of architect of record and covering all professional indemnity ononly the engages project. From my experience, I cancontracts say that this is almost The office exclusively in consultancy with arrangement clients and always bidsuniversal alongside with small international offices in Shanghai such as us.

Larger offices such as Foster and Partners a LDI on a project, with them taking on the role of architect of record and covering all professional orindemnity SOM, often haveproject. shares From in, or my outright own, a I Chinese whichisthey exclusively on the experience, can say Design that thisInstitute arrangement almost universal partner with. international This arrangement architect as consultant andas LDI as constructor is with small officesofinappointed Shanghaidesign such as us. Larger offices such Foster and Partners the norm of shares foreign in, companies China. Design It creates an array of they problems and or expected SOM, often have or outrightworking own, ainChinese Institute which exclusively benefits I will arrangement detail later inofthis document.

In the case ofasZNHM, ZSEDI prior is partnerwhich with. This appointed design architect consultant andwas LDI appointed as constructor tothe the expected competition and was due to work with whoever won.

We had never had a prior relationship norm of foreign companies working in China. It creates an array of problems and with the office. benefits which I will detail later in this document. In the case of ZNHM, ZSEDI was appointed prior to the competition and was due to work with whoever won. We had never had a prior relationship DCA withwill theusually office. seek one of three contracts for appointment. FIDIC, Chinese Standard Architectural Contract or by using their own bespoke contract drafted by German Lawyers and tailored to the specific needs of DCA. FIDIC is thecontracts most widely used form ofFIDIC, appointment by international DCA will usually seek one of three for appointment.

Chineseused Standard Architectural developers and contractors and it is the most prominent one used in the office, usually with project Contract or by using their own bespoke contract drafted by German Lawyers and tailored to the specific appendices attached.

Theis‘Chinese Architectural Contract’ apportions national specific needs of DCA. FIDIC the mostStandard widely used form of appointment used bythe international fee scale andand is used less given unique projects one we take often are not able be developers contractors andthe it ismore the most prominent usedon in and the office, usually with to project accommodated by it. The bespoke be seen as a substitute for the JCT Minor specific appendices attached.

Thecontract ‘Chinesecould Standard Architectural Contract’ apportions the Works national contract andand hasisbeen a few timesprojects in the office. fee scale usedused less successfully given the more unique we take on and often are not able to be accommodated by it. The bespoke contract could be seen as a substitute for the JCT Minor Works The FIDICand Contract, withused project specific appendices, contract has been successfully a few times inwas the used office.on this project. We received the initial ‘letter of intent’ which included the scope of work, work delivery dates, negotiated fees, the th method of feeContract, calculation fee schedule on August 15 Work the project had been The FIDIC withand project specific appendices, was 2014. used on thisonproject.

We received the progressing to this withincluded a series studies and alternative conceptual options already initial ‘letterprior of intent’ which theofscope of work, work delivery dates, negotiated fees, the th th completed the ‘letter and of intent’.

The formal was completed method ofprior fee tocalculation fee schedule on contract August 15 2014.

Work on on November the project18had2014 been following Anji’sprior internal reviewofof studies the full design team’s appointment. process is progressing to governmental this with a series and alternative conceptual This options already th similar to the prior PPQ to documentation requiredThe on formal a publiccontract project was in thecompleted UK. completed the ‘letter of intent’. on November 18 2014 following Anji’s internal governmental review of the full design team’s appointment. This process is The appointment internally

by Anji of Wang Jia project manager contract administrator, ZSEDI similar to the PPQ documentation required on aaspublic project in the/ UK. as a LDI and Erjian Construction as contractor were was also completed at this time with all th of November 2014.

The appointment the other consultant roles contracts formalisedinternally by the 18 The appointment

by Anji of Wang Jia as project manager / of contract administrator, ZSEDI within teamConstruction was done as by contractor the clientwere on DCA’s recommendation during as a the LDI design and Erjian was also completed at this time design with all th development. contracts formalised by the 18 of November 2014. The appointment of the other consultant roles within the design team was done by the client on DCA’s recommendation during design development.

It was a calculated risk on the part of DCA to proceed with the project like this. Both the ARB Code and the RIBA Code of Professional Conduct require the architect to record the terms of any appointment before undertaking and have the necessary competence and the resources.

A It was a calculated risk on the any part work, of DCA toto proceed with the project like this. Both ARB Code written agreement is therefore essential,Conduct and it isrequire in the interests of both and the RIBA Code of Professional the architect to client recordand thearchitect terms ofthat any they fully understand agreement. agreement should dene competence the services and to beresources. provided, A appointment before the undertaking anyThe work, and to have the also necessary state the obligations of each party, identify the associated terms and conditions, set out the fee written agreement is therefore essential, and it is in the interests of both client and architect that basis for the method of payment and clarify the grounds on which a contract can be terminated. they fully understand the agreement. The agreement should also define the services to be provided, state the obligations of each party, identify the associated terms and conditions, set out the fee basis for the method of payment and clarify the grounds on which a contract can be terminated.

It is by no means best practice to proceed without a formally signed appointment, as was done by DCA Although no major work was undertaken prior to ‘letter of intent’, it presents significant risk to the practice increases the risktoofproceed disputes in the afuture as there a potential lack clarity It is by no and means best practice without formally signedis appointment, as of was donetoby what has been agreed.

DCA Although no major work was undertaken prior to ‘letter of intent’, it presents significant risk to the practice and increases the risk of disputes in the future as there is a potential lack of clarity to Delaying project would, however, have had a knock on effect with the programme and time what hasthe been agreed. scale, and affected the agreed delivery date for the conceptual design package. As the clients concern for the the project schedule outweighed many other on, wewith decided not to compromise Delaying would, however, have hadconcerns a knockearly on effect the programme and time the clientand relationship so agreed early in delivery the project to work design prior topackage. the finalisation the scale, affected the datebyforrefusing the conceptual As theofclients contract. concern for the schedule outweighed many other concerns early on, we decided not to compromise the client relationship so early in the project by refusing to work prior to the finalisation of the contract.

Building Form Building Form

Site analysis

Site analysis

View of the wall separating the Site with Zhongnan Baicao garden

12

Vegetation on site Vegetation on site

View towards the Experience Park Site

13

16 16

2.04 Fees and Resourcing We received a marginal amount of compensation for the initial competition, which far from covered our outlay on expenses for the 3 months work. We believed we were in with a good chance of winning and thus it felt like a calculated risk.

Once awarded the commission for the project, the architectural fees were initially negotiated based on a percentage of an estimated total construction value of 520m RMB (£60.3m). This may have been short-sighted on the behalf of DCA with construction costs and total square metres significantly changing over the design process. The fee was structured over 5 payments, coinciding with DCA’s submission of key deliverables, namely; Concept Design, Developed Design 80%, Developed Design 100%, Construction Documentation (Technical Design) and the final fee will be due following the projects hand over to the user. An itemised set of deliverables for each stage was agreed upon and included in the contract’s appendices along with the dates.

The project’s allocation of resources was then budgeted according to the contract deliverables and the total square metres of the project. The difference between the fee and the budget formed the estimated project profit.

In the Budget, staff costs were purposely over estimated given the ambitious nature of the initial schedule that was drawn up by the client. We suspected we would require further staff eventually to meet the deadlines, or if the dates would be pushed back. The extra cost to the budget incurred by either scenario would therefore be accommodated. This proved wise as we experienced delays and programme changes during design development and didn’t go over budget.

A significant portion of the budget was left for media and model making. We decided early on to eliminate the media costs for rendering by completing all images in-house thus we could budget for a short presentational movie at some point.

As the project has progressed it has remained within budget. However, with the further extension of the construction time, this may well change during the construction phase.

The initial fee calculations were done based on construction cost and total GFA calculations. These numbers were revised during the design development phase of the project. There were also additional amendments to the list of the deliverables, with the client insisting on a promotional video and further large display models. Delivery dates specified in the contract were also changed by the client and with the delivery date of the project being shifted back by a year, our obligation to on-site supervision was greatly increased.

DCA would have been within their rights to challenge the form of appointment, perhaps even renegotiating the fee. In practice an additional fee was negotiated for the changes to the deliverables and all other changes were accepted by DCA.

Panomramic view from elevation to east

Zhejiang Museum of Natural History Competition

Zhejiang Museum of Natural History Competition

Zhejiang Museum of Natural History Competition

ƒ

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12

3. The Design Process

1st Topography Model

3.01 Stage 0 and 1 - Design Development We December of 2013, DCA was approached by the client, along with the Dutch architects ‘MVRDV’ and the Chinese office ‘Atelier Deshaus’, to enter a limited competition and submit design proposals for the Hangzhou Natural History Museum. With a fee agreed and a contract in place, work began on the initial competition on the 5th of January 2014. An intensive work schedule was set up between the small team of two architects and an intern in Shanghai. They were overseen by the three partners in a series of workshops in both Shanghai and with David Chipperfield in Berlin.

A design concept was further developed and prepared for the competition design presentation on the 15th of March. David Chipperfield came to Shanghai to finalise the design and present the work to the client in Anji. We learned that we had been awarded the project a few weeks later. The jury was convinced by our commitment to sustainable design, our design approach of harmonising the building with its environment and our record of building similar projects in China and around the world.

Over the following 6 months there was a period of inaction on the part of DCA as the Client consulted its direct stakeholders and redefined the strategic brief. Libin was in contact with the client during this time but, despite this, was not assisting as the project progresses through ‘RIBA Plan of Work Stage 0-1’. The client set a completed a feasibility study, initial budget, complied a revised programme, undertook serval site surveys and confirmed a procurement route suitable for the project. They also appointed Wang Jia as Project Manager who, along with his team, critically reviewed our design and highlighted elements of our competition proposal that they didn’t believe best suited the eventual use of the building. In particular, they wanted a separation of the exhibition and laboratory areas; an element integral to the initial design.

A ‘Letter of Intent’ between DCA was signed on August 15 after a brief negotiation over fees and the role DCA would play in the project. ZSEDI and the contractor were also appointed formally in midAugust. All issues associated with risk management, the contractual hierarchy, work deliverables and scheduling were resolved prior to the signing of the ‘Letter of Intent.’ We quickly moved into ‘stage,1’ guiding the client through our response to the new strategic brief and reviewing the suggested amendments to the competition design. The design team, led by DCA, fleshed out the brief and programme and then swiftly moved on to concept design.

Under the RIBA Plan of Work guidelines there are several points that would have been undertaken in the UK that I believe would have been beneficial to ZNHM. In particular I think that the link between RIBA Plan of Work stage 0 and the stated aims for stage 7 were poorly considered. I believe if the client and stakeholders had invested more time in thoroughly outlining their stated aims for the buildings eventual use, some of the problems in the later stages may never have arisen.

The Design Quality Indicator (DQI) process; which provides a platform to stakeholders to agree common goals whilst encouraging effective communication between the suppliers and eventual users of the building, would have been beneficial to the project. A design responsibility matrix drawn up prior to the start of the design process would have also been constructive. The Chinese equivalent to the Pre-Qualification Questions (PQQ) was filled out on this project, as with all public projects of this scale. They are similar in nature to the BSI’s Publicly Available Specification ‘PAS 91’ form but they were filled out by the client without any input from the other stakeholders, DCA or ZSEDI. PQQ’s in either China or the UK should be a collaborative processes to ensure the most appropriate appointments for a project.7

7

Nigel Ostime, RIBA Job Book 9th Edition (RIBA Publishing, London 2013) Pg33

3.02 Stage 2 - Concept Design I joined the project at this time as DCA began revising the initial competition design. The first main task was the completely new masterplan needed, as a result of the programme changes, meaning facilities were spread over the large site. We were in bi-weekly review meetings with the client and the rest of the design team; however this was really the only involvement any of the other parties undertook during the concept design stage. All design decisions were made internally by DCA at this time.

It should be noted, however, this did not result in the programme, brief or budget being fixed prior to the beginning of concept design. There were changes to all three right up until design development as varying stakeholders pushed to influence the design process. During Concept design, in particular, there were massive alterations to the contracted deliverables and schedule, with the initial design development programme being divided into 3 separate packages; The Main Building, The Office/Dormitory and the Depot. With the client keen to start onsite as soon as possible, we agreed to deliver the Developed Design Drawings for the Office/Dormitory and the Depot building, with us then ceding all responsibility to ZSEDI to deliver the Technical Drawing package in February 2015.

This divided the team, with DCA working simultaneously on the conceptual design for the main building, our primary focus, and also rushing out a drawing set for the other two packages. To meet the contracted delivery dates, we increased the number of staff working on the project towards the end of 2014.

This ramping up of staff coincided with a major internal review early in 2015. Mark took a prolonged stay in Shanghai and we had an intensive week long workshop. David Chipperfield was also there on the last few days to review our progress and offer some much needed oversight prior to our final submission. This was followed by an intensive few weeks of revising the design and preparing the presentation and the delivery of our conceptual design package.

Changing the deliverables of a project would, of course, under normal circumstances, result in a contract amendment signed off by all parties. The ARB Architects Code: Standards of Conduct and Practice 2010 version under clause 4.5 states ‘Any agreed variations to the written agreement should be recorded in writing’. The only agreement on this project clarifying this change to the deliverables and the schedule was an informal email exchange between DCA and the client. I don’t believe this would suffice.8 Changes to programme, GFA, budget, and schedule increase exponentially the eventual cost on the design process as it moves into the latter stages. This, naturally, incentivizes clients to stick to the ‘RIBA Plan of Work’ guidelines and avoid amending any of the above during the design process to minimise cost of change. Standard practice in China, however, is set up very differently as regular changes to the project are common. Architects and contractors cost in substantial variations as a result and mould their businesses to accommodate this.

8

Nigel Ostime, RIBA Job Book 9th Edition (RIBA Publishing, London 2013) Pg22

Reception Desk

sk Information Desk

Iron Ventilation Grill

upply Spouts with cast iron grilles

3.03 Stage 3 - Design Development We moved straight into Design Development following the submission on the 10th of March 2014, with us working closely with ZSEDI from this point onwards. The submission for design development was to be delivered jointly, with DCA completing the architectural drawing set and ZSEDI overseeing all engineering, planning, quantities, regulations etc. This meant full time collaboration during this design stage. The DCA team, therefore, always had one or two members working from the ZSEDI offices in Hangzhou at all times, to review drawings, make quick decisions and act as a link between the technical considerations of the design and the more design orientated work done in the DCA Shanghai offices.

There were bi-weekly meetings set up with the client and the full design team to monitor progress.

This proved particularly challenging during this stage as the Museum Director and the Zhejiang Cultural department attempted to assert more control over the design. We were pulled in several directions by different stakeholders wanting different things during this time. The overall floor area and projected budget changed several times and our relationship with the client was damaged by not appeasing all the stakeholders’ requests. Our working relationship with ZSEDI, however, proved to be working well despite this. As we began to research materials and local suppliers from the DCA office in Shanghai, we were aided serval times with introductions made by ZSEDI. On the client’s request, we did agree to lock the position of the column grid, the service engineering drawing and the overall footprint of the building. This allowed them to begin onsite before we issued a comprehensive drawing set. The groundwork and foundations were already well underway prior to us completing the design development stage, a practice not unheard of in China.

Following our submission and presentation of the DCA Design Development deliverables on the 10th of June 2015, ZSEDI revised our drawings, formatting them in terms of language and ‘Chinese Standard Architectural Annotation’ for the full submission of the Design Development Package two weeks later.

After the delivery of the Design Development the role of the DCA team was changed from the principal architect to the position of consultant, providing design assistance to ZSEDI and ‘Erjian Constrcution’ from then on. Although our appointment was always contractually as a consultant, with ZSEDI the architect of record and taking on all liabilities for the project, we were acting in the capacity of the principal architect up until this point.

Although it proved not a large issue on this project, the change should have been represented contractually, with two separate contracts in place both before and after the Technical Design Stage. The ambiguity in the hierarchy of responsibility in the initial stages of the project left DCA vulnerable to litigation if a dispute arose and unable to successfully challenge any copyright issues.

This also was a clear violation of several points in the RIBA Code of Conduct.

The typical scenario for a project of this nature in the UK would be, assuming it was procured under a ‘Design and Build,’ would see DCA ‘novated’ to the contractor. Alternately, if say ZSEDI represented the contractors design, DCA could undergo a ‘Consultant Switch’ with a separate contract being put in place to cover the consultancy roll for the contractor.

Orientation on the floor

Orientation on the floor

Raised Floor Signage

3.04 Stage 4 - Technical Design The deliverables for the technical design stage was divided into 10 different packages with the work divided between the design team as follows.

-

Main Building Façade (ZSEDI) Main Building Carcass (ZSEDI) Main Building Carpark + Plant (ZSEDI) Main Building Interior Public (DCA + ZSEDI) Main Building Interior Exhibition (EEC + ZSEDI) Office/Dormitory Exterior (ZSEDI) Office/Dormitory Interior (ZSEDI) Depot Exterior (ZSEDI) Depot Interior (ZSEDI) Landscaping (ZSEDI)

By June 2015 the drawing packages for the Office/Dormitory and Depot were already completed and the contractor was already onsite with both. The interior exhibition package was to be delayed until after practical completion and ‘Erjian Construction’ had handed over the building to the client.

After ZSEDI assumed the role of principle designer and given the scope of work at this stage we naturally ceded a lot of control over the design. We instead focused on a few key details which we saw as important to the design. In our consultancy role, we were still travelling to the ZSEDI offices for one or two days each week to provide support to the technical drawing set. We developed the interior design of the public space during this time As the building is designed to accommodate the natural incline of the site, through a series of tiered halls around a hanging garden, inclusive design was always at the forefront of our process. Our aim was always to allow everyone to circulate the building together, regardless of special needs and not to separate the users of the building. We wanted to achieve this as the building stepped down through the varying floor levels with a series of integrated steps and ramps. This design decision responds to Part M of the Building Regulations, the Equality Act 2010, which requires a building to be designed for inclusion so that the environment is one that can be used by everyone, regardless of age, ethnicity or disability with choice and dignity.

As we developed the design for the accessible ramp in the main corridor, we naturally referenced and adhered to UK building standards during the technical design stage as we believed many of the regulations should be universal. After we were happy with the design we consulted ZSEDI to check it passed all relevant inclusive design building codes in Anji.

It is common practice for DCA to begin by adhering to UK or German building code and inclusive design initiatives on international projects prior to consulting an LDI for any local variations. This ensures the design begins by considering all users and avoids retroactively amending designs.

With ZNHM , for example, the signage throughout the project contrasts between its information and background colour to make it easily legible and aid the visually impaired. The Approved Documents Part M was also consulted to get an ideal ratio for the incline and the most suitable handrails9

9

https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/approved-documents

拐角处细部 Corner Detail Material Detail Material Detail

抹灰墙 Render wall

细部石材 Stone detail

窗框铜面层 Bronze clad window frame

踢脚线 Skirting detail

石材边饰 Stone trim 水洗石 Washed concrete

墙体拐角强化处理细部 typical corner detail to reinforce exposed corners of walls

Material Sample Board

Material Sample Board

4. Procurement

DCA苏丹Naga博物馆夯土实验 - Rammed earth tests for Naga Museum Sudan by David Chipperfield Architects

DCA苏丹Naga博物馆夯土实验 - Rammed earth tests for Naga Museum Sudan by David Chipperfield Architects

Rammed Earth Sample

4.01 The Procurement Process Anji opted for a Management Procurement Strategy. As a public entity and considering the client’s funding routes and a complex arrangement involving a number of direct stakeholders, the application of a ‘typical’ procurement route was inevitably impossible.10 The ‘Collaborative Management’ procurement route proved to be the most advantageous as unlike the other versions of the management procurement systems; risk appropriation was not the driving concern of the client. Obviating the risk onto other parties wasn’t in the client’s interests as, the majority of the ‘project team’ such as the LDI and contractor were all essentially under the control or ownership of either the local Anji County or the regional government of Zhejiang Province. The risk was already shared and a good working relationship between all the main parties existed from previous collaborations. Unlike what is typically seen in other versions of Management procurement, the client opted for a Prime Contract with only one Contractor. Although the works were packaged, they focused on a single appointment of a contractor.

As with ‘Construction Management’, the ‘Collaborative’ approach to procurement requires an experienced client and is best suited to large and complex projects such as this. The client opted against a more extensive contract (as would typically be used in the UK, such as the NEC3) and instead relied on the more basic ‘Chinese Standard Professional Contract,’ which only commits both parties to a fee structure, an itemised list of deliverables and a broad set of professional guidelines.

This meant that mutual trust, proactive problem solving and extensive collaboration were inherently necessary as a result of the contract’s minimal division of responsibility.

A project of this nature being undertaken in the UK would almost certainly see the client being much more risk adverse and more concerned with minimising construction. With this in mind, I would conclude that the most likely avenue for procurement would be ‘Design and Build’ (DB). The ‘Management Contracting’ system of procurement passes on the most risk to the Client and ‘Design and Build’ represents the other extreme, with minimal risk for the client.

Interestingly, the ‘Government Construction Strategy 2016-20’ highlighted in Strategy Priority 17, that trials with newer more collaborative procurement routes have proven successful and should be encouraged. 11-15 strategy had promoted public projects to adopt DB procurement routes, private finance initiative or prime-type contract procurement routes, as these are considered to be more collaborative. The procurement route undertaken on ZNHM is not that dissimilar in this case. They also suggest adoption of the NEC3 form of contract which they believe encourages collaboration more effectively than some other more traditional contracts which can be seen as adversarial.11 The Client, Anji is very experienced in project managing large construction process; this, however, would not be the case for most UK councils who would probably lack this kind of experience and prefer to involve a 3rd party to manage the project. This would make a DB contract the most likely solution if it was a UK project. As Anji’s initial main concern was on the time schedule, a DB contract is also best suited for this as design and construction can continue in parallel and the contractor is incentivised to finish on schedule to minimise his construction overheads and maximise their profit.

It would also be more than likely that this project, if done in the UK, would be funded using some form of PFI scheme, partnering with the private sector, as outlined in the ‘Government Construction Strategy.’ This would also see an increased pressure to minimise risk and provide guarantees on the eventual costs.

10 11

Anthony Speaight, Architects Leagal Handbook 9th Addition (London: Architectural Press, 2010), p 185. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-construction-strategy-2016-2020

Render Wall Samples

The NEC3 would be a suitable contract in this scenario. They are recommended by the UK government for public projects due to their collaborative nature and their suitability for maintaining cost control. The ‘Employers Requirements’ could be annotated to give little room for delaying the project, enforcing a strong emphasis on the importance of completing on time. Liquidated Damages or Delay Damages could be specified, perhaps stipulating the contractor incurs a weekly financial penalty for each week delayed12.

‘Design and Build’ would however limit the client’s option to change elements of the project once the tender documents were complete. This would require the client to cover the cost of any variations, something that would sit in opposition to Anji’s preference for continued involvement in the project.

12

Hugh Clamp, Which Contract? 9th Addition (London: Architectural Press, 2012), p 288.

Large Wall Sample

Some of the Client Directives and Contract

n about factors to re-considered in the design

4.02 Form of Contract The contract signed between DCA and the client was a FIDIC (Fédération Internationale Des Ingénieurs-Conseils) which is the preferred contract in use for DCA and other international offices working in China. Founded in 1913 in France, Switzerland and Belgium, FIDIC has grown in stature over recent years by providing tailored contracts aimed towards international contractors. This has allowed their engineering contracts to become the industry standard for international architectural consultancy appointments, such as ours on ZNHM, despite not being widely used in the UK. The version DCA signed was the 1999 FIDIC red book, ‘Conditions of Contract for Construction for Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer.’ The ethos of the FIDIC contract is retaining the desire for standardisation. All of the contract forms are integrated, such as the General Conditions together with guidance for the preparation of the Particular Conditions, and a Letter of Tender, Contract Agreement and Dispute Adjudication Agreements.

The contract did not include a bill of quantities between DCA / ZSEDI and the client. The bill of quantities was drafted by ZSEDI and was included in the construction contract signed between ‘Erjain Construction’ and the client. There was no Contractor Design Portion (CPD) Specified, instead the responsibility of any amendments to the design or any further design work needed was the responsibility of ZSEDI during construction. This ensured their continued involvement by their on-site team.

This type of informal partnership helped mitigate the possibility of duplicated works that may have arisen in the UK on a ‘Design and Build’ project. The CDP may be undertaken by a different design team if the contractor does not novate the original designers, this lack of continuity would mean a loss of knowledge and may see issues arise. An example might be a change in an appointed manufacturer that would lead to a revised set of details but may have a knock on effect on another element of the design that the new team was unaware of.

Alternatively, a strictly adhered ‘Design and Build’ contractual arrangement may not appoint a Contractor prior to tender at the end of Stage 4. Involving the Contractor at an earlier stage would aid in helping to factor in the complex site logistics prior to stage 5, as well as helping to design some of the prefabricated elements with a guaranteed manufacturer in mind rather than switching part way through.

Assuming this project was undertaken in the UK and the client was still inclined towards an arrangement of partnering with the contractor, this could be formally incorporated into a contract quite easily. The JCT Framework Agreement (Binding or Non-Binding) could be added to another contract. This kind of bilateral agreement would make both parties more inclined to endeavour to assist each other in the resolution of any issues and do so under the clear guidance of a contract. 13

13

Hugh Clamp, Which Contract? 9th Addition (London: Architectural Press, 2012), p 333.

Window Detail

4.03 Working with an LDI The relationship DCA had with ZSEDI on this project I would say was relatively typical between an international architecture firm and an LDI. We were definitely given more opportunity for direct involvement in their work and they were more responsive to recommendations than I have previously experienced. For ZSEDI, this was a very prestigious project and working with us was seen as an opportunity to secure future projects on landmark buildings such as this. They were keen to learn from us and ensure that the project was a success as it was in everyone’s best interest.

‘Local Design Institutes’ are the dominant force within the architectural community in China, with over 2000 currently registered. Traditionally, design institutes have provided services including project feasibility studies, master planning, building or infrastructure design, environmental evaluation, quantity surveying, soil investigation, and land surveying, with a core business in building and infrastructure design. Independent design houses will still work on small scale private commissions without assistance from an LDI but anything above the size of a family home will almost certainly involve one.

Over the last 20 years this role has grown to include architectural services, project management and construction supervision. This has led to LDI’s competing in design competitions and securing a large amount of work independently. Their growth has coincided with the minimisation of independent architectural practices that offer the traditional role of the architect. This looks set to continue as the recent moves towards integrating the ‘design and build’ procurement system means LDI’s are now acquiring construction companies.

There are LDI’s for a range of project scales and specialities. Each office needs to have a license issued by the Ministry of Construction and are graded A to C. Grade A is the highest category, which allows for the greatest scope for project development. Grade B design institutes can only design buildings up to 50 m high and with oor areas up to 20,000 m2, while Grade C is the lowest category.14 ZSEDI is a grade A LDI with around 100 staff. They combine all the relevant professional roles involved in the construction industry including; architects, structural engineers, civil engineers, contract administrators, a legal team and quantity surveying. With the whole design team in one company there are clear benefits, however the system is not without flaws.

With accreditation and architectural licensing notoriously hard to achieve in China, the position of a licenced and insured architect which also works conventionally in design is virtually non-existent.

Almost all licenced architects work in China for LDIs with the sole responsibility of checking drawings or overseeing a team of architects. This often distances the design work from the approved drawings that go on site and makes specialist knowledge the purview of the LDI. The bifurcated role of the architect removes the ideal of a holistic design team that continues from RIBA stage 0 to 7 and this can really weaken the quality of the resulting building.

The other main problem with LDI’s contracted using the standard Chinese pay scale, the design process is never incentivised, meaning aspects of the construction process that could prove beneficial to the client, such as value engineering, are rarely explored. They have no obligation to ensure a quality building but rather deliver work on schedule and amend work as requested. These lead on to them almost always agreeing with a client’s requests and often avoids professional responsibilities by not raising issues of concern.

14

Tianji Xu, Development Strategies for Chinese Institutes (Journal of Management in Engineering, 2004), p 64.

4.04 Tendering Procedures There was no formal tendering on this project. The appointments and tendering by Anji County is awarded on a pro-rata basis between approved, contractors and Design Institutes. This is fairly typical in China where the architect (LDI), contractor and sub-contractors will be either owned by the government or they will have a controlling share that has been financed through a governmental development fund.

Erjian Construction was appointed as they were one of three approved contractors working in Anji.

The Call Tender and Tendering Law of the People’s Republic of China (2000), and The Contracts Law of the People’s Republic of China (1999) clearly express a competitive tendering process but as this was done prior to any drawings being completed, this was really only a formality.15 Erjian Construction was chosen mainly because they were not committed to any other large projects at the time of construction.

Specialist sub-contractors and consultants, such as ‘SunLux’ or ‘QuickMix’, who were involved in the project despite being beyond the purview of the contractor, were invited to bid on the work through recommendations by DCA or ZSEDI. This process remained cordial throughout the project as we had support from the client when recommending specialists that would add the expert knowledge to the project.

A typical scenario for tendering in the UK would be significantly different than the process undergone with ZNHM. A public project of this size would have to be open and competitively tendered for the appointment of the contractor and specialist consultants. According to the Government Construction Strategy a list of approved contractors should be compiled and invited to bid. This process should also involve a Pre-Qualification Questionnaire, (PQQ); ideally the PAS91 should be used.16 The tender would be published by the OJEU to allow a fair and transparent selection process. This opens up the tendering by publishing the details online early in the project usually for up to 52 days.

OJEU is essentially a framework for appointing a construction team using the European Union’s guidelines for tendering.17 A typical scenario in the UK would see a set point of either the end of Stage 3 or 4 where the relevant documents would be prepared prior to the issuing of the Invitation to Tender (ITT). If this was ‘Design and Build’ procurement, ‘The Employer’s Requirements’, or their equivalent documents, would outline any Contractor Design Portions (CDP) or specific conditions and be included in the tender. A ‘Management’ system of procurement may have packaged up separate tenders and presented each package for bidding at different stages18.

The invited Contractors would respond to the IIT based on the tender documentation. These formal documents would set the bench mark from which future design work would be undertaken by the successful Contractor. As such, it is of upmost importance to make sure that there is sufficient information from which the scheme can be costed from and that all required information is available.

Failure to do so could lead to variations and additional cost at later stages of the project. It is,

15

Tianji Xu, Development Strategies for Chinese Institutes (Journal of Management in Engineering, 2004), p 62.

16 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-construction-strategy-2016-2020 17 http://www.ojeu.eu/whatistheojeu.aspx 18 https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Invitation_to_tender_for_construction_contracts

therefore, important that the Client is happy with the scheme and that the drawings are formally signed off prior to tender.

The tender documentation would request that the bidding Contractors were to submit a fully compliant bid, reflecting the drawings and information that had been included in their Invitation to Tender (ITT), as well as their own proposal highlighting potential cost saving. A mid-tender meeting may be set up for the contractors to gain further information prior to their bid. The tender returns would then be received a few weeks later and reviewed by the client’s team.

Following the selection of a contractor, there would ideally be an opportunity to review their bid at a ‘Tender Settlement Meeting.’ At this meeting, prior to signing the contract, the estimate can be checked that it complies with the clients requirements. This is also an opportunity to gain further information on the company bidding, clarify costing on the bill of quantities, review any suggested changes to the schedule and evaluate any risks added to the estimation.

Generally, at this point, the Contract Coordinator would negotiate with the Contractor on behalf of the client, perhaps with input from members of the project team such as the architect or any cost consultants. This would be concluded with the contract engrossment process and ultimately the contracts execution19.

4.05 Mobilisation The mobilisation of a project (Stage 5 of the RIBA Plan of Work 2013) typically involves the final preparations prior to work beginning on site. This includes the appointment of the Contractor and finalising the construction contract. In the case of ZNHM each of these was in place from the beginning of the project thus the mobilisation process was far from typical.

Enabling works on the main building were already underway during Stage 3, Developed Design, and the Dormitory, Office and Depot buildings were packaged off and began on site even earlier than that. There was a large amount of trees and other vegetation that were cleared prior to work on the piling and excavation beginning. As previously discussed, the foundations began to be cast prior to the compilation of technical design of the main building and, as such, the contractor was taking on an added level of risk in order to keep to the strict construction deadlines.

Wang Jia in his capacity as Project Manager, was crucial in overseeing this mobilisation process. As we were concluding Developed Design he was already on site full time. His involvement in overseeing the submission of drawings and coordination with DCA and ZSEDI was minimal as he focused his time on the supply team rather than the design team. This, I believe, would be typical for the mobilisation process in the UK.

19

https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Typical_tender_process_for_construction_projects#Clarification

5. Legislative Framework

5.01 Planning With Anji County’s involvement as the client on this project, planning and development was met with very few issues or objections. The application was formally approved following the submission of the site masterplan and basic design information to Anji’s Planning Office after the concept design submission. This process was completed by ZSEDI using the work done by DCA with approval being finalised on 22nd of March 2015.

The compulsory purchasing, by Anji County, of the few holdings that were on the site prior to the commencement of the project was completed around the same time as planning application approval. There were no disputes arising from purchase or the relocation of family burial plots that were also on the site. Given the regular occurrence of land purchasing and the burial plot relocation across China there is a central government agency that oversees this process. The previous residents were actually employed on the project.

The UK 2012 ‘National Planning Policy Framework’ would sit in opposition to the planning process that was undertaken by Anji for ZNHM. The area was designated a development zone by the Anji County with the express aim of encouraging sustainable development which would be supported by the NPPF. However, the tenant of ‘enshrining the local plan for local people would not apply. There was virtually no consultation of local residents or indirect stakeholders by Anji County, nor was a forum set up allow feedback from the locals to involve them in shaping the planning framework for the project. The site is also not a brownfield site but rather a greenfield site in a protected scenic area. This would present significant problems in trying to gain planning approval in the UK20.

In accordance with the ‘Town and County Planning (Use Classes) Order (1987)’, the ZNHM would also see a change in ‘Use Class’ from C3 dwelling houses and buildings for agricultural purposes to D2 Assembly and Leisure. This would require planning permission, as it is not one of the ‘permitted development changes exempt from the order.21

20 21

Seven Brookhouse, Professional Studies in Architecture, A Primer (London: RIBA Press, 2013), p 100. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1987/764/schedule/made

Burial Site

Earth Samples

5.02 Heritage There were 5 ancient burial sites that were revealed in the survey of the land prior to the planning application. In China, the standard practice for burial is to find a site on the top of a hill, ideally flanked by larger hills, to form a family burial plot for many generations. This has created a number of problems in Modern China as the concept of congregated burial areas is a relatively recent phenomenon. With the last 100 years seeing massive social upheaval in the country along with the largest migration in human history, there are many graves that are not attended to or their occupants unknown. With graves spread throughout the countryside it proved a serious burden on development and therefore the Central Registry of Graves was given increased powers to resolve issues.

The Central Registry recommended excavating 5 of the 21 burial sites as an official archaeological dig. The others were to be moved to a designated hill within the site boundary. Both of these objectives were done prior to construction beginning on site.

An archaeological dig being commissioned by the authorities is also a possibility in the UK. From the Ancient Monuments act of 1882 onwards there have been precedents set for the national government or local authority to step into the matter if the site is of significant importance.

Section 12 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) clearly states that it is the responsibility of the designer to be aware of any archaeologic significance of the site and any limitations placed on the site by the local authority through planning guidance. Key to this is that the NPPF uses the phrase ‘heritage asset’ to determine an element of the site with valuable evidence of past human activity. Without clear specifics, it would be up to the Local Authority’s Archaeological Officer to determine the value of a sites ‘heritage assets’ and the impact of the building would have.22 By placing an emphasis on the determination of a ‘heritage asset’s’ value to the evidence of past human life, there is not a focus on historical chronology or a physical place in heritage. This makes me believe that the importance of the ZNHM burial plots was not in their geographical position, but the contents of the graves and what we can learn from them. I believe that the UK would see the same outcome with the excavation of the site.

22

https://www.gov.uk/guidance/national-planning-policy-framework

5.04 Sustainability and LEED accreditation Sustainability was a key motivating factor for Anji from the beginning of this project. The initial aim was for ZNHM to be the first LEED public building awarded platinum status in China, an aim we lost out on to AZIA Centre in Shanghai in 2015. This did not, however, deter the commitment to building a sustainable building. Li Yao, a LEED specialist from BEE began consulting the design team from the design development stage of the project and provided us with much valuable insight into ways we could achieve accreditation. Value engineering has now removed the possibility of us achieving platinum status; however we do seem to be on track for LEED accreditation. We focused on several design strategies for the building’s construction and occupation that would push us towards becoming LEED certified. They are listed below.

-

-

Extensive green roofs and restoration of natural habitat where possible after construction.

Solar panels placed on the top of the exhibition halls, aiming to be self-sufficient in power.

Electricity and water sub-meters used to improve energy efficiency by monitoring power and water consumption.

Landscape irrigation system installed to help with rainwater collection for irrigation in the central hanging garden. Other areas of landscaping were planned without the need for irrigation after the first 2 years.

All stone and clay render are locally sourced from the surrounding area, using 3 different quarries all within 20km of the site Air handling units were designed to be supplementary rather than the main source of air circulation. We focused on natural ventilation options, where possible, to improve air quality.

Reduced parking and free bus services Integrated demand response systems and minimise energy consumption

LEED certification in the UK would require documents demonstrating compliance to the Green Building Certification Institute (GBCI) be submitted, which provides third party verification of compliance.

With 45% of carbon emissions in the UK coming from buildings today in the UK, ensuring the minimal standards of fuel and power conservation are met as outlined in part L of the building standards is really not proactive enough. The designer should be taking on more responsibility for ensuring the sustainability of a project currently. The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) outlines clearly that planning applications for sustainable developments should be treated preferentially. Also, schemes such as the ‘CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme’ and the ‘Energy Related Products Regulations’ have been introduced recently, showing that sustainable design is not a trend but an essential part of the future of construction. 23

23

https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Energy_targets_for_buildings

5.05 Building Regulations ZSEDI had an expert in the Zhejiang building code present in the team and he was in constant communication with the local authorities in Anji about the project. We also had an intern, during the design development and technical design stages, focused on checking the building regulations.

When I or another member of the team requested, she would check through the regulations we were concerned about in Chinese and, if needed, create a translation of the main points. Chu Xiao, as the senior architect with the most experience of construction in the DCA office, was also involved in checking over our drawings to highlight any possible issues we may have on meeting the Building Regulations.

The main concerns that occupied our time through stages 3 and 4 in adhering to the local building regulations were, fire compartmentation, fire truck routes and accessibility generally. These were the areas which we had contention with our design meeting the standards.

In our meeting with the Zhejiang Fire Officer assigned to the project there was a lot of concern about the overall size of the footprint of the buildings and the lack of vehicular access to the central courtyard. Fire compartmentation, the amount of sprinklers, fire lights and alarms were all raised. As would typically be done in China, a rough fire strategy was negotiated initially during design development between DCA, ZSEDI and the Fire Officer. This was then amended in a second meeting prior to the submission of the Technical Design Documents. The same Officer will then issue a certification on the completion of the project. This process, as with most elements of building control, was rife with corruption in the past. Following the Sichuan earthquake in 2008 however, where the collapse of several new schools saw a very high loss of life, several Contractors and Inspectors were jailed and since then there has been a much stricter process of building control.

In the Government’s Building Regulations Approved Documents, Section B5 16.1 describes the UK requirements for vehicular fire access. As ZNHM is over 24,000m² it would require 100% of the buildings perimeter to be accessible by a fire truck, which is not the case on this project. It would be pretty safe to assume that this project would not be approved without some considerable alterations to the design.24

24

https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/approved-documents

5.06 Professional Indemnity and Insurance DCA Shanghai does not carry professional indemnity for the office. It will, occasionally, carry insurance for a specific project if we are undertaking if outside of China but standard practice in the office is that we make sure all liabilities are covered by the LDI on a project. As there is really no imaginable scenario where we would work in China without partnering with an LDI, this means there is minimal risk being undertaken by the office. However it does minimise our authority when providing expert advice, as without any risk on the part of DCA, our recommendations could be seen as inconsequential.

For ZNHM there was a ‘Contract Works Insurance policy’ that divided the risk between the client and the Contractor. However we were never party to the details of this contract to confirm information such as the defects liability period. The liability for Building design on this project was carried in its entirety by ZSEDI. Under the ARB code, a registered architect in the UK is required to maintain 'adequate and appropriate' professional indemnity insurance (PIII). The level of coverage would of course vary in relation to the size and scope of the projects undertaken but the architect must hold a limit of indemnity of no less than £250,000.25 Given that this project is situated in a Greenfield site in a protected environmental area, it would be safe to imagine that if it were built in the UK that the EU Environmental Impairment Liability (EIL) directive may have been used. This was set up to encourage environmental responsibility from companies by accounting for the risk to habitat, water sources and land with a human-risk factor.

This insurance would cover the costs of any environmental damage or pollution for the Contractor and may have been required as a stipulation in the construction contract.26

25 26

http://arb.org.uk/architects-code https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/Environmental_Impairment_Liability_(EIL)

6. Construction

6.01 Role of the Architect Following Mobilisation and the move into construction of the main building, there was a structural shift in responsibility for the project. At this time, Wang Jia the Project Manager and his team had set up a permanent site office which includes 2 members of the ZSEDI on site team. The ZSEDI staff were representing the interests of their offices role as the principal designer at this point who were, in turn, consulting us. In reality, as the staff members on site were not senior enough to hold much authority, their role was really to assist Wang Jai and Erjain Construction with any changes to the Technical Design package. This meant the authority of ZDEDI as the architect of record was often undermined and DCA’s role as consultant was even further marginalised.

As discussed under the chapter 4.01, this was a ‘Collaborative Management’ procurement route in essence, even if it was not contractually constructed that way. This meant that with Wang Jai as the Construction Manager, also incorporated the role of Contract Administrator overseeing the clients’ interests. ZSEDI as the architect of record (Lead Designer) and Erjian Construction as the Contractor (Works Contractor) are in practice not separated.

In terms of the role of the architect during construction, without the role of ‘Contract Administrator’ with either of the architects ZSEDI or DCA, the architectural duties to provide for example, an Architects Instruction (AI), an authoritative roll in quality control or the ability to oversee health and safety were curtailed to only providing advice. DCA were really only providing council to Wang Jai in his role of Project Manager. As ZSEDI was also taking direction from him, this meant that all of the architects on this project didn’t have professional objectivity.

The Architect’s role on this project, if it were in the UK on a DB contract, as I have previously discussed, as this is the most likely procurement in such a scenario, would ,I believe, be entirely different to that of the project in China. The two main aspects an architect’s role post-mobilisation are: as the client’s agent and as an independent professional adjudicator. The role of the architect is less significant than, for example, a traditional procurement route with the employer’s agent, who in this case would be Wang Jia, is responsible for all site inspections, instructions, assesses claims for time extensions and coordinates construction progress meetings. Despite this, there is still a clearly defined role for the Principle Designer (PD) on a DB contract, such as the JTC DB 16. There are professional responsibilities for the PD which are outlined in the contract and the CDM regulations. As the role of CDM coordinator is now filled by the principle PD, ensuring that CDM regulations are obeyed on site would ultimately be the responsibility of DCA or ZSEDI. With less emphasis on the contract in China, the role of the architect as a trusted professional is in danger of being undermined. The client must trust the architect’s objective expert professional advice to be able to function as their agent. By creating a nature of collaboration with less defined responsibilities the client, as with this project on occasion, may not see an issue raised by the architect as a duty of care but rather an evasion of responsibility. This means that the client can see the architect as not working in his or hers interests but, instead, their own.

The RIBA Code of conduct, the ARB Architect’s code, CDM regulations and the conditions placed on an architect through there PIII insurance, along with their contractual responsibilities, will all ensure, in the UK, that the role of the architect remains trusted as an independent adjudicator.

6.02 Contract Administration Wang Jia, in his capacity as Project Manager (PM), took on the role of the Management Contractor on this project as there was a ‘Prime Contract’ with only one main contractor, ‘Erjian Construction,’ who had control of all the construction packages (as listed in section 3.04). In practice, however, much of this work was subcontracted to smaller teams which were managed through Erjian Construction in there capacity as the ‘Works Contractor’. This meant that both the Works Contractor and the Management Contractor were overseeing the packages jointly. The result of this was, that the Management Contractor (who should be overseeing the interests of the client) and the Works Contractor (who should be overseeing the concerns of the sub-contractors) often were in agreement where normally they would have opposing concerns.

All payments from the client came through the PM for ZNHM and although he was quite hands on and had much experience of managing projects of a similar scale, his role focused on the construction firstly rather than the design. This was mainly due to the early start to construction, meaning he was based on site from the beginning of 2015.

The Quality Management System (QMS) implemented on site for this project was not using international standards such as the ISO 9000 Series but rather using the Chinese Quality Standards, although they provided mainly a formality. The practical implementation of the site’s QMS was weekly meetings on site to review the progress, followed by a site survey involving a number of people across the Project Team. This was coordinated by the PM from early 2015.

Members of Erjain Construction, ZSEDI and Anji were always present for this, with other consultants like DCA and Governmental Inspectors appearing usually once every 6 weeks for a major site update.

The issued documentation on site was the Technical Design stage construction documents that were provided by ZSEDI. There have since been 4 updated issues of the drawings (See the Key Dates Diagram) each with input from DCA and ZSEDI but mainly completed on site by the two ZSEDI Staff located there.. Cost management, civil engineering and structural engineering support was also provided by ZSEDI through the process.

To compare the ZNHM process of contract administration with that of a similar scenario in the UK, I would assume that the most likely form of procurement, as discussed, would be design and build with an NEC3 ECC contract. There would be scope to incentivise the collaboration between the Project Manager (the employer’s agent) and that of the Contractor was seen on this project. The NEC3 ECC’s ‘Option C: Target contract with Activity Schedule’ creates a shared target costing plan and scheduling, in which both the client and the contractor would share benefits or penalties depending on whether these targets were met. The activity schedule is also similar to the current contractual scenario, where rather than a full bill of quantities there is a charter of works to be completed.

6.03 Delays and Variations Post-Mobilisation The pressure to adhere to a very strict timeline for construction was the main focus of the client up until the end of 2015, with the announcement of the new 5 year plan. As the main political focus in China, similar to that of a national election, everyone was expecting perhaps a change in policy that may affect the project. There was not much political movement that affected us, with the CPC Secretary of Zhejiang Xia Baolong remaining in his position. What did happen, was that the construction period, initially planned for two years, was pushed to three and the intense interest from senior politicians from the province about our project significantly waned. The effect was, that with a more relaxed schedule, the client saw an opportunity to re-examine the exterior cladding. The existing specification was previously decided on as a compromise and not one that either DCA or the clients were particularly enthusiastic about.

There have been only a few unforeseen circumstances that have directly involved DCA during the construction period and almost all of them have been in relation to three topics, landscaping, LEED certification and the main building façade. The first two are inevitably linked due to value engineering conducted at the end of 2015, which reduced the budget. The original aim of achieving platinum level LEED status was reduced only seeking LEED certification Following the extension of the construction period by a year there was also a further series of decisions made by the client to readdress the façade material. This had been an ongoing major issue of contention during pre-mobilisation, with our initial proposal of rammed earth, our second proposal of a layered sprayed concrete façade and our third of precast concrete panels were all firmly rejected by the client and the PM as they lacked comparable examples of these options achieved in China. To meet our LEED targets our favoured option at this point was to use a clay render using the ochre coloured earth of the site. Using approved companies, we completed a scale mock-up during the design development stage. Although an option was chosen by the client they voiced their unease at the possible, poor aging of the material.

After the projects delay, the client issued change order to complete temporary works for a second full scale façade mock up, using one of the unapproved render specialists that we initially suggested; Quick Mix. This option achieved the kind of tactile façade we had initially wanted. The client much preferred this option and decided to go ahead despite the risk and the increase on the budget. They issued a change order to confirm the substitution of the entire façade after accepting Quick Mixes fee proposal.

During the casting of the washed concrete floor in the main lobby, DCA noted the finish to be uneven and poorer quality compared to some of the other sections. This defect is a good example of how dispute resolution worked on site. The issue was observed during a site inspection done jointly by ZSEDI and DCA. It was then noted in a site report compiled by DCA and forwarded to the PM, ZSEDI and the Contractor. This led to the PM concurring with our assessment that the defect was a result of poor workmanship and issuing an order to the contractor to re-cast the floor to a higher standard.

The NEC3 ECC states that all works shall be carried out in accordance with the agreed Contract Data that included in the Works Information (WI) agreed at the time the contract is finalised. This would mean that ZNHM, if using this contract in the UK, would see all parties referencing the contract and WI much more than we saw on this project.27 The NEC3 ECC also establishes a Compensation Events (CE) - Clause 60, (Compensation Events are equivalent to a Relevant Event or a Relevant Matter under a standard JCT form of contract) 27

Hugh Clamp, Which Contract? 9th Addition (London: Architectural Press, 2012), p 195.

which combine all claims for extra time or money in one system. This means that a CE, regardless of whether they are the fault of the contractor, the client or another party, are an assessment of the allocation of compensation, changes to the completion date or any other required changes to the contract.

If a client request, through the PM, for a work variation such as the substitution of the façade, the PM would request a quotation from the contractor. Upon reviewing the request the PM would decide whether to accept it or not and then amend the relevant CE. In the case of a defect under the NEC3 ECC, this would involve the use of an Early Warning Notice (EWN), Clause 16. This creates a binding obligation for either party to warn, as soon as possible, of anything which may affect the cost, timing of completion or a key date, or the quality of the works.

Failure to do so can result in sanctions for the Contractor. If there was a deviation from the specifications and standards outline in the WI, the individual party who noticed this would be obligated to issue a EWN. 28 In terms of dispute resolution out with the contract, litigation is not typical in China, with a litigated resolution to any contractual disputes, such as arbitration, virtually unheard of. Chinese standard practice always looks to resolve any conflicts privately. A formal legal challenge by a consultant architect or a contractor would almost guarantee the company’s isolation from all future public projects in China with very low chances of winning in court against the state.

28

https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/NEC3#Operation

6.04 Health and Safety The separation in Health and Safety Standards between building practice in China and the UK, for me, is one of the starkest differences between the two systems. In the UK a small minority of people on a building site would be general labourers with little to no experience, whereas in China, in my estimation, the numbers of untrained labourers is usually around 90%. This situation arises through the surplus of cheap labour and a booming construction industry where trained professional builders, carpenters, electricians and plumbers are in high demand. The result, however, is chaotic building sites, details and drawings misinterpreted, poor quality workmanship and, above all, a very large increase to onsite health and safety risks.

Following a drive for better quality control and enforcement of the building regulations by the Central Government in China, the last 10 years has seen a dramatic increase in the standards of building sites. Sadly, Health and Safety onsite is currently of much lower governmental concern. In terms of practical oversight on health and safety, the Contractor and PM would be responsible for this, but the reality is that much of this falls to the individual worker, with little or no contractual obligation for compensating workers injured on-site.

An example of this on ZNHM would be in the excavation of the foundations. As it was cheaper to complete this manually, rather than hiring a pile driver, sets of teams were dispatched over the site to manually dig the foundations. They would drop precast concrete cylinders into the holes as the work progressed, to avoid the holes from caving in. In teams of two, one person would be digging whilst the other would be lifting and lowering a bucket on a trestle set above the hole. Needless to say, this was highly dangerous and executed with virtually no safety precautions. When I asked about the level of danger, the Contractor told me that he “only hired Husband and Wife teams for the foundations as you really have to trust the person lifting and lowering the bucket�.

Considering health and safety on site in the UK does not begin at mobilisation but rather is a consideration through the entire duration of the project. The CDM Regulations, introduced in 1994 under an EU directive, make the concern of minimising the risk to those that will eventually build the project the responsibility of everyone involved. The role of the principal designer (PD) in particular would give either ZSEDI or DCA a greater scope to ensure that safety standards were maintained onsite, as their own liability in the role of PD would be at risk otherwise.

As an architect, you should follow the CDM 15 Designer duties, which apply to the design team as a whole. As a designer, you should ensure that your knowledge and experience is appropriate to the tasks you are undertaking. You should ensure the client is aware of their responsibility, collaborating effectively, aiming to eliminate or reduce foreseeable risks and prepare suitable precautions for the risks which are ultimately unavoidable.29

29

https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/CDM_2015_designer_duties

6.05 Handover and Completion The project is now complete and was opened to the public in time for Chinese New Year 2019. My involvement in the project naturally ended in October 2016 when I left the office. This is a summary of events as I understand they progressed following my departure.

Erjian Construction handed over the building to the interior contractor, ‘Fuchenjian’ on June 30 2017. This was the date set for practical completion. Prior to that date the building was inspected by the Clients Team along with DCA and ZSEDI to compile a snagging list of defaults and omissions.

There were objections to the quality of several aspects of the work by DCA but given the nature of the contract, ZSEDI by this time had more responsibility and authority over the construction. The client rejected many of DCA’s requests for the variants in the construction from the tendered drawings to be rectified. They instead sided with ZSEDI’s advice to the PM to issue the Certificate of Practical Completion and release the contractors retained fee. From the accounts I have heard, following the handover of the site to Fuchenjian to begin the interior design of the exhibitions and public areas, there was an overlap with the initial contractor remaining on site to complete the outstanding defects and ommistions.

The retention of a substantial team from the main contractor did apparently cause some onsite frictions but again this was beyond the scope of work of DCA at this point and they were left with little authority to effect change. This was resolved from all accounts after the completion of the ‘Defects and Omissions’. The PM did issue a Final Certificate and release the rest of the retained fee, allowing Fuchenjian to assume full responsibility for the building. I would assume contractually, the vagueness of responsibility and risk undertaken by the two contractors during this time was done with the approval of the client. All parties would have been sensitive to clients desire to complete the building on schedule and accepted the risks.

After June 30 2017, the design team expanded to include the ‘Encore Exhibition Design’ team, who designed the exhibition that was now being installed. DCA and ZSEDI were retained for the following year and a half in a consultancy basis. Untill the buildings soft opening in November 2018.

A formal Post Project Review would perhaps make a good addition to the ZNHM construction process. This would, however, be complex as the external architecture was finished a full year and a half before occupation by the client. The review process could be split into a ‘Project Review’ on completion of the project and perhaps a Post Occupancy Evaluation perhaps 18 months later, when the building has been opened to the public. The first review would be an opportunity to review the entire design and construction process, highlighting successes and failures. The second evaluation, conducted after the building opens to the public, would be a good opportunity to identify any successes and failures in relation to the buildings use rather than its procurement. .

7. Conclusion

7.01 Conclusion Overall, I believe this project was a success, despite some short comings. Given the scale, it was always inevitable that the small team that began this project at DCA would see it grow to include other architects, other design professionals and an extensive team of builders to realise the Zhejiang Natural History Museum. The relinquishing of control meant also sharing the buildings success and failures with the wider project team.

In learning from all aspects of this process, we can better equip ourselves as architects. We must learn how to successfully share a design and ensure it can be fully realised. In this conclusion, I will summarise the points of the design and construction of ZNHM from which I believe we can learn from.

Dividing the management of this project between Shanghai and Berlin was not always practical for DCA and, on several occasions, hampered our efficiency. Work that was duplicated or misinterpreted would perhaps not have occurred had we the entire DCA team in the same building.

This problem was exacerbated during Technical Design, with some of the team migrating to the ZSEDI offices.

Another issue with staffing was the lack of continuity in the architectural team. Without a single senior architect overseeing this project from beginning to end and several partners involved in the management, the client was left interacting with too many different people and a strong client relationship was never able to grow.

As the first project completed in the office using AutoCAD, I felt the transition was handled admirably. The team listened to my advice and, as a whole, stuck to the drawing standards and filing system I set up. I think there were inefficiencies with the project management by DCA; however, the production of work was undertaken with aplomb. Several junior staff members on this project surprised me by dedicating time to learn and improve their skills and going on to make key contributions to the design’s development.

When comparing the procurement route of ZNHM to that of a typical scenario in the UK, you can clearly see lessons that could be learnt for similar projects undertaken by DCA in the future. The collaborative procurement of this project, as discussed, was wholly dependent on mutual trust.

Without the rigours of an enforceable contract from which to underpin a professional relationship, as is typical in most building projects in China, the investment in personal relationships to build trust is paramount. I think DCA failed to honour that tacit understating of a respectful relationship with the client, who didn’t believe that we were working in their best interests. With the erosion of the client relationship, we saw our ability to shape the design diminish. It could, therefore, be inferred that there is a limit to the success of ‘Collaborative Management’ procurement, unless there is a continued effort to maintain relationships by all parties involved.

I think the contract choice also compounded the fraying of the client relationship on this project, as our appointment as consultant, never gave us the authority we needed to drive the design. Given that it is unlikely that a project of this nature in China would be undertaken without an LDI, I would suggest it might be wise investing in a closer working relationship with a particular LDI. Perhaps one based in Shanghai. If DCA was to bid jointly they could still retain the authority needed whilst providing the necessary additional services that they can’t provide currently, such as Chinese certified architects, engineering services, cost consultants, local planning law and building regulation expertise and professional indemnity insurance.

This project also brought into focus the dangers of not providing open tendering. With such an early appointment and without the due process of a competitive bidding process, the client was left more open to spiralling costs.

There are many aspects of Standard Building Practice in the UK that could be beneficial if introduced in China. Health and Safety onsite and a better regulated system of Quality Control could really improve the building process.

There were strong steps taken to towards making this a more sustainable building, taking LEED certification as an aim from the project’s initiation was, I think, positive. However, when it became inevitable that our preferred rammed earth option was not viable, I think some careful thought on a replacement that could have retained a similar low carbon footprint, should have been considered.

We moved to considering concrete and similarly less sustainable materials far too quickly.

An office such as DCA Shanghai, which has seen rapid growth over the last 5 years, can never settle into complacency. The nature of construction and design is always changing and to not embrace that change and learn from it would be a missed opportunity. The Zhejiang Natural History Museum is rich with lessons to be learned from, and I hope this case study sheds some light on them.

7.02 Recommendations for DCA -

Create a more professional project environment, regardless of the contractual limitations.

Formal letters that formalise decisions or architectural instructions, should always follow any verbal communication or decisions made over instant messenger.

-

Investment in more training and CPD’s seminars for the staff, to create a wider understanding of the practicalities of construction, digital software, materials and new construction technology.

-

Provide more opportunities for staff to remain on projects longer to allow them to invest in client relationships.

-

Suggest commitments from the client to fixing the programme, budget and schedule after concept design. Perhaps, by placing an additional fee in the contract for changes on these topics after a certain date.

-

Either contractually, or though the building of client relationships, DCA should ensure more control over the Construction Phase of a project.

-

DCA should also review their contractual procedures for site supervision, as on a project like ZNHM, where the construction time allocated in the contract was almost doubled, we were left with increased staff expenses as a result and no contractual recourse for increasing our fee.

-

A review of the risks of not carrying Professional Indemnity Insurance for the office.

-

Research the benefits of a more binding relationship with an LDI. Examine whether joint bids and working closely with just one office could improve the long term success of the office in China.

7.03 Bibliography Books and Journals Seven Brookhouse, Professional Studies in Architecture (London: RIBA Press, 2013) Hugh Clamp, Which Contract? 9th Addition (London: Architectural Press, 2012) Nigel Ostime, RIBA Handbook of Practice Management 9th Adt. (London: RIBA Press, 2013) Nigel Ostime, RIBA Job Book 9th Edition (RIBA Publishing, London 2013) Anthony Speaight, Architects Leagal Handbook 9th Adt. (London: Architectural Press, 2010) Tianji Xu, Development Strategies for Chinese Institutes (Journal of Management in Engineering, 2004)

Reports and Standards https://ins-globalconsulting.com/china-market-entry-guide http://arb.org.uk/architects-code https://www.gov.uk/guidance/national-planning-policy-framework https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/culture-white-paper https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/approved-documents https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-construction-strategy-2016-2020

Online Reference https://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five-year_plans_of_China http://www.huzhou.gov.cn/art/2013/6/25/art_2921_213678.html http://www.ojeu.eu/whatistheojeu.aspx http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1987/764/schedule/made