Thoughts on the Military Dimension of US-China Relations Karl Eikenberry Overview: A comprehensive U.S. security strategy towards China must consider the two countries’ future growth rates and comparative power, China’s national interests and security goals, PLA strengths and weaknesses, U.S. military strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, and the role of Sino-American military relations. These five topics are briefly addressed below with the aim of stimulating discussion among the Task Force participants. Growth Rates and Comparative Power: Since World War II, the U.S. has been the world’s economic colossus, providing the fiscal, industrial, and scientific-technological foundation necessary to field a peerless military. For some seven decades, American defense planners have taken this foundation for granted. If China’s economic growth continues to outpace that of the United States, as it has for the past 35 years, this assumption would be invalidated. For example, if over the next twenty years China experiences a sustained annual growth rate of 5 percent while the United States maintains a 2 percent growth rate, by 2036 China’s GDP (using current estimates of PPP as the baseline) would stand at more than $35 trillion, compared with an estimated U.S. GDP of about $24 trillion. China’s own modern history demonstrates how economic power enables military power. PRC military spending, less than $10 billion in 1990, grew to more than $129.4 billion by last year, second only to that of the United States and accounting for 9.8 percent of total global military expenditures. The uncertain growth trajectories of China and the U.S. greatly complicate American defense planning. First, China will not (if ever) attain military parity with the U.S. until well into the second half of the twenty-first century (even with 5% vs. 2% growth rates). Planners consider 5-15 year time horizons and are unlikely to alter strategies based upon highly contingent 40-50 year forecasts. Even while the balance of national power may be shifting in China’s favor, the change is gradual and does not generate deep strategic reappraisals (unless stimulated by a crisis). Second, even if the PRC does eventually surpass the United States in national power, will its political system evolve in such a way that China will contribute to the liberal concept of a global democratic peace? Certainly, since the 1990s, many U.S. advocates of “responsible stakeholder” policy variants have assumed such a salutary outcome, but the domestic and foreign policies of President Xi Jinping have raised doubts. Third, although PLA capabilities may lag behind those of the U.S. armed forces for decades to come, what matters is the relative utility and sustainability of those capabilities in specific scenarios. America’s military has demonstrated that with 100,000 troops, it can fight lightly-armed Taliban insurgents to a draw on distant Afghan battlefields. But it could not defeat Taliban, nor was the enterprise sustainable given the high strategic opportunity
costs. Crisis scenarios that might involve U.S. and Chinese military forces (excluding the Korean Peninsula) are primarily in the Western Pacific maritime domain – the East China and South China Seas, and Taiwan. As PLA modernization continues, the tyranny of distance erodes U.S. military efforts to credibly and effectively respond to such scenarios. Fourth, the maritime scenarios described above are seemingly bounded geographically, but could easily escalate horizontally and vertically, making more difficult the task of determining the inventory of forces required to respond to a particular crisis. China’s National Interests and Security Goals: The leaders of the Communist Party define PRC national interests and establish security goals to defend these interests. These goals are: • • •
Preservation of core institutions, the most important of which is the Communist Party Defense of sovereignty and territorial integrity Safeguarding the physical security and improvement of the well-being of the people
The three goals are interrelated because the legitimacy of the Party depends on the ability to demonstrate to the Chinese people that it is uniquely capable of delivering social stability, improving standards of living (and increasingly, quality of life), and restoring the nation to its rightful place in the sun. The current level of ambition in pursuing these goals is reflected in the Party’s “two 100’s” policy objectives: • •
Become a “moderately well off society” able to prevail in a regional conflict by 2021 (the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party); and Assume the status of a fully developed nation by 2049 (the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC)
The leaders of the Communist Party, confronted with a daunting array of internal political, economic, and social problems (aging population, income inequality, severe environmental degradation, corruption, lagging economic structural reform, etc.), are strategically risk averse, hoping to avoid global or regional instability that might threaten their exclusive ownership of the domestic commanding heights. Nevertheless, with ever increasing means, PRC strategic goals become more expansive, and it is likely that the PLA will contest American military hegemony in the Western Pacific in the coming decades. China’s assertive actions in the East and South China Seas are tactics supportive of a long-term strategy aiming to diminish U.S. influence along the PRC’s only maritime frontier. A final point on China’s national security strategy relates to its “One Belt, One Road” development strategy and framework. PRC leaders are investing considerable financial and diplomatic capital into what is much more than the bumper sticker it was just several years ago. China is increasingly active in Central and parts of South Asia, vast areas in which the U.S. has only limited interests and equities. While Washington should be
concerned with possible flashpoints in the Western Pacific, the more consequential geopolitical game might be played out on China’s Silk-Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road. PLA Strengths and Weaknesses: China has made impressive strides in modernizing its armed forces since the early-1990s. The PLA is a credible regional military force. The U.S. Pacific Command would be far more challenged today responding to PRC military provocations against Taiwan then in 19951996. Moreover, Party leaders have recently demonstrated the will to continue PLA structural reforms, including a downsizing of some 300,000 troops and the possible streamlining of its four headquarters and seven joint regional commands. Also, as noted above, the PLA has growing time-distance advantages over the U.S. military when responding to crises in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Last, the PRC nuclear deterrent is credible and steadily improving, and its space-based capabilities are rapidly expanding. The PLA, however, has numerous serious liabilities. These include lack of extended and sustainable force projection capabilities, corruption, inadequate leader initiative due to overly centralized command structures (a problem made worse – for now – by President Xi’s ongoing purge of the senior officer ranks), lack of combat experience (the PLA’s last major military campaign was against Vietnam in 1979), and the still unproven ability of the PRC research and development establishment to produce equipment and systems that rival those of the United States and its key allies. Add to this list China’s dearth of useful military allies and partners, the likelihood that aggressive behavior will stimulate bandwagoning among the PRC’s traditional regional rivals, and the possibility that political demands on the Party for increased environmental cleanup and social welfare spending may constrain future PLA budgets. U.S. Military Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region: Near-term security threats to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific Region that are posed by or related to China include: 1) Challenges to freedom of navigation (both sea and air) in the South and East China Seas; 2) Coercive diplomacy or military provocations against Taiwan; and 3) Adverse actions during a crisis or conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, incidents between PLA and U.S. military forces operating in proximity, or between PLA and the forces of U.S. allies (especially Japan and Philippines), could escalate into crises far beyond the scope of the initial encounters. Long-term threats are: 1) Chinese restrictive control of the sea lanes of communications from Southeast to Northeast Asia; 2) Weakening of U.S. military alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific Region leading to sharply reduced forward basing, access, and influence; 3) Increased PRC leverage in Central, South, and Southeast Asia, providing it the means to dominate the politics of key resource distribution; and 4) Achievement of parity in critical technological domains (nuclear, space, cyber, stealth, UAVs, undersea warfare, etc.).
Assuming that China continues to enjoy economic growth rates of about 5% and increasingly seeks to diminish U.S. military presence and impact along its maritime frontier, the U.S. can only maintain the status quo by: 1) Investing more productively in usable capabilities; 2) Strengthening defense ties with allies and partners, and convincing them to increase their military spending; 3) Expanding the zone of U.S. China defense planning from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean (i.e., the Indo-Pacific Region); and 4) Preventing long-term deep strategic cooperation between China and Russia. Alternative approaches to simply reinforcing the status quo, including accommodating PRC expectations for greater military influence in the Western Pacific and establishing an inclusive consultative regional security architecture, should also be discussed by the Task Force, though the risks are high and difficulties of implementation formidable. The Role of U.S.-China Military Relations: Since the mid-1990s, successive U.S. administrations have advocated positive SinoAmerican military relations. Disruptions have occurred intermittently, triggered by PRC coercive behavior towards Taiwan, PRC reactions to U.S. Taiwan arms sales, and accidents and incidents between the military forces of the two countries. Since U.S.-China military dialogue, unlike economic exchange, can be temporarily halted without catastrophic consequences, it is likely that contacts between the two nations’ armed forces will again be suspended during a future crisis when one or both two presidents (ex officio commanders in chief) wish to send an immediate signal of resolve and determination to domestic and international audiences. Even if one were to place a premium on robust bilateral military exchanges as a key component of the overall framework for managing Sino-American relations, the prospects for sustainment are not good. However, the pay-off from U.S.-China military exchanges, even if they could be insulated from external shocks, is commonly overstated. Senior U.S. military officers often engage in quixotic searches for a PLA officer with whom they hope to develop a personal relationship and can communicate in times of crisis. However, the structure of the PLA and U.S. armed forces are quite different; organizational counterparts rarely exist. Moreover, the PLA’s command system is far more collective than that of the U.S. armed forces. Last, the PLA only permits its foreign affairs specialists, academics, and intelligence collection officers to have regular contact with foreign militaries. Its operators are afforded only limited and constrained access. The notion that robust bilateral military engagement will persuade Chinese military officers of American peaceful intent and serve both sides well when managing a crisis is misplaced. Moreover, a bilateral military engagement plan that calls for frequent senior-level visits risks inappropriately boosting the status of an already unsupervised PLA high command within the Chinese national security community. There is an important role for military dialogue and exchanges in the overall U.S.-China relationship, but one should assume disruptions and prioritize accordingly. Areas of emphasis should include: 1) protocols and agreements to reduce the possibility of accidents and to effectively manage crises; 2) academic exchanges designed to deepen reciprocal knowledge of the two sides’ military doctrines; 3) civilian-led but military-
supported efforts to initiate substantive talks on nuclear deterrence and arms control, space access and denial, and cybersecurity; 4) opportunities to display preparedness and readiness; and 5) inclusion of PLA forces in appropriate multinational exercises to encourage cooperation while demonstrating U.S. military convening power.