NOTES
I n t r od u c t ion 1. There are other exceptions as well, including single-party regimes in China, North Korea, and Cuba and the less easily classified authoritarian regime in Iran. These regimes exhibit varying degrees of military involvement in government. But in none of them does the military institution intervene in politics or control the government. Instead, soldiers are subordinate to the civilian party leadership. 2. Larry Diamond, “Is Pakistan the (Reverse) Wave of the Future?,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (2000): 91–106. 3. Th roughout this book, I use the terms “army” and “military” interchangeably except when making distinctions between the army and the two other armed forces, the air force and the navy, is necessary. 4. Initial conditions, events, and policy choices can create enduring political power relations, institutions, and norms by setting in motion processes that increase the likelihood of their continuity, either by socializing important social and political actors to certain roles or by creating interests vested in their continued existence. Social scientists call this phenomenon “path dependence,” a historical process in which, according to Paul David, “one damn thing follows another.” See Paul David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic Review 75, no. 2 (May 1985): 332– 337. See also Stephen D. Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics,” Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (January 1984): 223– 246; Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (2000): 251–267; Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review
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