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the Ambassador of Israel to Hungary The Situation of Christianity in the Middle East—
ISRAEL’S EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY— INTERVIEW WITH HE YACOV HADAS-HANDELSMAN, THE AMBASSADOR OF ISRAEL TO HUNGARY
Zsolt Csepregi, 20 January 2021, Budapest
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Your Excellency, let us start with a broad question. How do you see Israel’s position as both an Eastern Mediterranean and a Middle Eastern state? How can these two aspects complement each other? And where do they collide if they collide at all?
Well, first of all, Israel is not the only country that could be described as having one leg here and one leg there. The Eastern Mediterranean has gained additional importance in recent years, and some of its importance stems from its connection to the Middle East. What do I mean by this? We have been witnessing the ongoing civil war in Syria, where, in order to prevent Assad’s regime from being destroyed by ISIS and all the other rebels, the Russians returned to the region. In some sense, they have returned with greater military capacity than they used to have there during the Cold War, and, now, they are in control of this area.
Then, you have the gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean: a financial bonanza and an energy resource which is also a solution to the problem of climate change—or, at least, a partial one because, while being a fossil material, gas is still less contaminating than oil or, of course, coal. This is also why the area has gained more importance than it used to have before.
In my interpretation, Israel’s position has in recent years improved. It has happened so because we have been the first to extract the gas deposits. Apart from Egypt, of course, as they have been dealing with offshore gas for years but mainly in the western side of the region near the Alexandria area. Israel is economically better off today because we have started to develop our fields, and we have been swift to utilise them, so the Israeli economy can now switch rapidly from all kinds of energy sources to either renewable energy or, at least, energy extracted from natural gas.
Israel’s position has also changed significantly in light of the so-called Arab Spring, which was, of course, not an “Arab Spring.” I have to mention that it was very depressing to watch on television recently that people in Tunisia or Libya are missing Ben Ali or Qaddafi.
In this complex region, Israel is like a huge lighthouse in the middle of a stormy ocean where you can find shelter. One just has to look at the process of Israel’s normalising or, in some cases, renormalising its relations with the states of the Gulf and North Africa. It has not just come out of a void. It is the result of the changes in a world where the Arab countries understand that, on the one hand, the US is not that interested in being the world’s police anymore, and, on the other hand, the “bad guys” are still on the march. By
“bad guys,” I mean mainly Iran in this region. And you have, of course, unexpected developments like the coronavirus pandemic, which leaves many countries and communities helpless, as they do not know what to do.
Meanwhile, there is no progress in the Palestinian–Israeli track. However, people feel now a bigger need to deal with daily life. Primarily, you need to look for something to bring home, food to feed your family. Therefore, many people in the region say, “Look at the Israelis there, in the midst of us. They have a western country.” I am not even mentioning that we are a democracy but that we are a western country. They say, “Israel is a start-up nation.” The Arab states have actually been cooperating with Israel under the table for many years. I can tell you this by first-hand experience: I was part of this because I was the director of the Middle East and Peace Process Division at the ministry, in Jerusalem, for almost six years.
Having served as the head of the Israeli office in Qatar, I think that it is about time we bring our relations with the Arab countries out into the open. We are not a “mistress” anymore, we are ready to come out of the closet and say, “Yes, we are in love.” The matchmaker was Donald Trump with his ideas and with the “deal of the century.” Some Arab leaders asked, “What are we waiting for? Why can we not cooperate with Israel? Why can we not talk to Israel? Why can we not work with Israel? It is for our mutual benefit. The Israelis get what they want, and we get what we want.” From their point of view, they will tell the Israelis and the World that the Palestinian issue is still there. Yes, it is there. However, the major change now is that, for the first time, the Palestinians were practically denied their virtual veto right, as they could claim for many years: “If you want to cooperate with Israel, you have to get the seal of approval from us because the Israelis are only interested in normalisation and they do not want to deal with the territorial problems and give us a state. If you give something to Israel, they will not give us a state.”
I think the European Union is the only one that does not understand this ongoing new process, because, for it, the old paradigm regarding the peace process is still there. The tension between Israel and the Union did not start under Netanyahu because of this or that policy. It started when we were in the midst of the Annapolis Process, in 2008. I was there, so I know it. During this process, the European Union wanted to upgrade Israel’s position not only as a token of appreciation, but also because achieving closer relations with Israel would suit the European Union. However, the European Union has other, politically motivated intentions in mind, and it checks you, tests you, and treats you according to your merits. If you are good by their standards, they let you cooperate, but, if you are not good enough, they say “So what should we cooperate on? We will not take you into our scientific and research programme Horizon 2020.” In 2008, the European Union wanted to upgrade Israel’s position to something unique, but the Palestinians and the Egyptians stopped the process. They convinced the EU that, if they upgraded the relations with Israel, it would discourage the Israelis from completing the peace process. Now, the peace process remains locked in stalemate, and this is not our fault. Ehud Olmert was like Ehud Barak, he
offered everything to achieve peace with the Palestinians, and they rejected even this offer. People saw this, and they were almost ready to ask: “OK, but why? Why do we have to put up with it? Enough is enough.” So this is a new era, you see a new era of cooperation. And we have a win-win situation here.
As I have said, Israel is a lighthouse in this stormy water of the Middle East, and this fact is even becoming much more relevant today. Israel’s position, therefore, improved, but, naturally, we should not sit idle and say, “We do not have to do anything now.” Another reason for the importance of this region today is Turkey and Turkish policy. It does not matter whether you like or dislike these policies. Turkey is a major factor that you have to take into consideration now in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East.
Only a last thought about this question. You know, in Arabic, and especially in Egypt, there is an expression. Former Egyptian foreign minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit, who is the secretary general of the Arab League today, always refers to the Middle East as the Arab Middle East. Why is that? Because, in the Middle East, all countries are Arab except for three: Iran, which is Muslim but Shiite, not Arab, Turkey, which is Sunni, but not Arab, and Israel, which is none of the above. We are like a fish bone stuck in your throat. However, the Arabs know that we do not have any aspirations to dominate the Middle East. In the propaganda, people might say otherwise, but they know it is not true. You cannot say the same about Iran and Turkey. Iran is not an Eastern Mediterranean country, but Turkey is. It is not for nothing that relations between Turkey and Egypt have been so strained since the Arab Spring. The relations were strained even under Mohamed Morsi but for a different reason, because Erdoğan tried to lecture him. He went there for a visit, and he told him, “Listen, there is no contradiction between Islam and modernisation. Just take the Turkish example.” And the Egyptians told him, “You can go home, we do not need your advice. Who are you?” And here you can see that it all comes down to the issue that Arabs think Muslims who are not Arabs are inferior.
The Eastern Mediterranean has gained a lot of importance in recent years. Each of its countries has important factors and trends, like Libya and its instability, then Egypt with its hardships, but Egypt, of course, also controls a very significant international gateway, the Suez Canal. Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus all are very important. And as I said, currently it is not less important what is under than what is over the water. The undersea natural gas deposits are the wealth of the region, and, by the way, they are also the wealth of Europe. Why is that? Because it is an alternative supply channel, which means that you, even Hungary, will be in a better position to bargain for a lower price per unit of natural gas, which means that, at the end of the day, you will pay less for your heating bill.
You mentioned the European Union, and you also mentioned old-new friends in the Arab world. However, Israel also has new friends in the Eastern Mediterranean part of the European Union: Greece and Cyprus. How do you see the partnership between these states and Israel? Does it only focus on the economy? We have recently seen that Israel and Greece also signed military agreements. What potential do you see in this cooperation?
First of all, let me correct some things to be accurate. The thing you have referred to is not a military agreement, it is a contract. It is a major contract for modernising the Greek training aircraft and the connected capabilities, worth USD 1.8 billion. It is not a military pact between Israel and Greece. Regardless, we have everything for a comprehensive partnership, including economic cooperation. Israel and Cyprus have gas resources. Cyprus is connected to Greece, which serves as a major hub and a terminal for gas transit. Through Greece, as it is located on mainland Europe, the road to Budapest, for example, is open, so Hungary also has an interest in this connectivity. The cooperation, however, is not limited only to this economic partnership. It is gradually extending to all domains, which is natural, as we are neighbours with Greece and Cyprus.
Similarly, we also cooperate very closely with the Egyptians when it comes to security. We see things eye to eye because the Egyptians and President Sisi understand exactly what the threatening potential of terrorism is in the Sinai Peninsula and the rest of the country. Let us not forget that Egypt, at a certain stage, declared Hamas to be a terrorist organisation. They did it because they were more than convinced that Hamas had been cooperating with Daesh, with ISIS, and other extreme groups in the Sinai Peninsula. The nature of the relations between Egypt and Iran also shows that they are perfectly aware of the reality. I know that, in the end, it comes down to politics, which means that sometimes you turn a blind eye, and sometimes you do not. You have to make a compromise. A compromise does not mean that I change my mind on you. At the end of the day, there are many shared interests between Israel and Egypt. Talking about Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece, they also have their own triangle focussing on the economy, trade, and Turkey. Finally, everyone is alarmed by the Russians, as the Americans are not happy with their current geopolitical actions. We have lots of operations in Syria, so we must coordinate them together all the time in order not to have an accident. We had one once, and even that one was too painful, although it was not us who caused this tragedy. A Russian military transport aircraft was shot down by a Syrian missile, as Israeli jets were operating somewhere there. The Syrians missed the target. Many Russian soldiers were killed; it was a catastrophe.
Apart from Greece and Cyprus, we see that Italy, France, and many other countries are also active in the region. Do you think that the European Union can have a new role in the Eastern Mediterranean? How can Central Europe contribute to a more cooperative Mediterranean neighbourhood?
First of all, of course, Europe has an interest in this, an economic interest—and also a political one—because nobody wants instability. Stability is important for everyone and especially for Europe these days. Second, Europe has two member states in this area, which are Greece and Cyprus. Cyprus is occupied by Turkey; 3040% of its territory is controlled by Turkey, a state not belonging to the European Union. Then, there are further EU member states in the outer circle but still in the region: Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania. Therefore, the EU has an interest in the region; it has an interest because Europe needs to secure its energy sources, and the supply routes and some of the pipelines come through Turkey to Europe, while new energy resources will come to Europe from the deep sea.
Now, if you ask me about the role of the V4, let me tell you that, first of all, what we witness today in the European Union is a crystallisation of small alliances and small blocks. It is natural that this happens because each block has common interests. Hungary’s interests are much closer to the interests of Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and maybe even Austria. In the end, there is no common European foreign policy stance, there are only compromises. Such an example was the Palestinians’ application to become a member of UNESCO. We, the Israelis, lobbied against it in the EU, and, regardless of the position of some of the member states due to French pressure, the EU abstained during the vote instead of voting “no.” At the end of the day, the most important matters on the EU’s agenda are the daily, relevant topics, first and foremost economic questions, and not necessarily foreign policy issues. The European Union is the single biggest trade market in the world, an economic giant, which is the greatest asset it has. Condemning Israel for some of our government’s decisions like a bid for additional 800 housing units in East Jerusalem or some similar matters is not the real issue for the EU.
The European Union has an interest in the region, and, as I said, this interest is mainly economic, but there is also a political aspect to be considered, because some member states of the European Union are located in the Eastern Mediterranean. I will just mention that one can only imagine where Greece and Cyprus would be today without the European Union. If it had not been important for the Germans, both countries would have gone bankrupt five years ago, but
the necessary funds were pumped into Greece under the leadership of Merkel. The Greeks benefitted from their EU membership, but, again, Merkel did not do it only because she loves the Greeks. She did it out of interest because, if Greece had fallen over the cliff, it would have dragged Germany and others with it. Therefore, Merkel was ready to give the Greeks more money so it could recover and settle the account later. This is a kind of mutual responsibility and group work. That is why they have invested a lot in Greece. And they do not want to lose their investment.
So this is the long answer to the question what the role of Europe is in the region. It has a significant role, but the problem is that, as in many other cases, it focusses its activities on the wrong aspects. Do not try to educate everyone, because it will not work. Try to cooperate with everyone, and then you can get, in my humble opinion, the same result but in a different manner.
Your answer leads us to my last question. It might be a bit of science fiction; still, the European Union always insists on creating regional frameworks and regional cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. There were very positive signs coming from the Israeli–Lebanese indirect negotiations. How do you see, can the Eastern Mediterranean benefit from overcoming the conflicts it used to face and from having some kind of regional cooperation beyond what you have already mentioned? Certain triangles have already emerged in the region.
First, regarding the Lebanese–Israeli rapprochement, I must tell you it is stuck again. It is like dancing what I would call a “reverse tango”: tango is two steps forward, one step back. In this case, it is always one step forward, two steps back, or, at least, sideways, and not towards a solution. However, the main reason why the Lebanese agreed was the economy, as Lebanon is bankrupt. It is not for nothing that you also have all these demonstrations against Hezbollah. The Lebanese are fed up
IN THIS COMPLEX REGION, ISRAEL IS LIKE A HUGE LIGHTHOUSE IN THE MIDDLE OF A STORMY OCEAN.
with their situation. Hezbollah has exhausted the country, and it has taken the whole country hostage. However, the last straw that broke the camel’s back was what happened in the port of Beirut several months ago, that catastrophe. It was a disaster bound to happen. Hezbollah, which controls the port, has its own interests. They kept dangerous materials there, and they exploded. So this is for one thing. For another, Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, got mixed up in this confusion during the Syrian Civil War. His Iranian masters ordered him to help Assad and the Syrian army, or what was left of it, through Hezbollah, along with Iranian soldiers, mainly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Afghan and Iraqi militias. We made sure that they could not move. Nobody knows exactly how many but at least hundreds of Hezbollah members were killed and thousands were injured. They suffered heavy losses. And people in the 21st century start asking questions even in dictatorships. They say, “I am ready to accept that my son will sacrifice his life to fight the Zionist infidels, but I am not ready to accept that my son will sacrifice his life, fighting for Assad against whoever he is fighting.” This is why Nasrallah finds the current situation very difficult.
Now, Nasrallah can say that he has 100,000 missiles and he is working on developing their accuracy, but the equipment needed for this work, for some reason or another, is bombed from the sky all the time. We are now almost fifteen years after the Second Lebanon War. I
can still remember that day when the war broke out, I was in charge of the Middle East, and I ran the situation room during this war in the ministry from 12 July 2006. Now, in half a year, on 12 July 2021, it will be the fifteenth anniversary of the day when the war broke out. Where has Nasrallah lived since then? He now lives in the gutters somewhere. He does not live like us. He remembers, he knows very well what happened fifteen years ago and what can happen again. And he is in dire straits because his Iranian masters are pushing him in one direction, while he is in Lebanon, and he understands that there is a limit. He is like a lemon: the Iranians keep on squeezing him, but, in the end, they squeeze every last drop from him, and nothing more comes after that drop. And he is getting there now. So the Lebanese agreed at the end of 2020 to indirect negotiations with Israel mediated by the UN and the US in an attempt to settle the line of the maritime borders. There are three or four internationally recognised methods to measure boundaries, and surface boundaries and maritime boundaries are not always the same. Why does this matter? Because there are a number of legitimate solutions, but the involved parties, Israel and Lebanon, have to agree on something. However, we have already been extracting natural gas there, and they have not. We do not extract directly from the disputed area, but the Lebanese do not recognise political boundaries; they recognise geological boundaries. So when we pump gas out of the sea, the gas sometimes comes from their part to our part. This is what bothers them, and it bothers them rightfully. The Lebanese are ready to negotiate because they need money. They badly need money. And this condition promotes a kind of regional partnership.
Concerning regional cooperation, we are in favour of it because we think that, first of all, we can help others. It is not that we want to patronise anyone. We treat everybody as an equal party, and we are ready to help, especially in agriculture and water management. We are a very developed country, and we can help and cooperate, and not only on this. We are there, we know the climate, we know the people, we know the culture. So can regional cooperation work? The paradox is that cooperation can work between Israel and Arab countries much more than between Arab countries themselves, and that is for two reasons. First of all, Israel does not have the barriers between its country and any other Arab countries that other Arab countries have between them. Look at the rivalries between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. When I was the head of our trade office in Qatar between 2001 and 2003, there was no Saudi ambassador there, just like currently there is none. So when at the beginning of 2021 the Americans managed to square the circle and to facilitate a kind of reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar it seemed that the Saudis were going to send an ambassador to Qatar, and Qatar was going to send an ambassador to Saudi Arabia. And hearing this, I said I was having déjà vu. You see, when I was there, Al Jazeera and everybody was talking about that the Israeli were there, while the Saudi were not. You know the Qataris are traitors according to some other Arab countries. In a way, Saudi Arabia and Israel have much more in common than Saudi Arabia and Qatar. It is not that they do not have common issues to cooperate on, but they have a significant barrier between them.
Let me tell you another personal example. In the autumn of 1993, I was the counsellor at our embassy in London. It was after the
Oslo Accords, the big euphoria, when, on 13 September 1993, late Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli minister of foreign affairs Shimon Peres were standing with the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation Yasser Arafat and signed the agreement. Everybody was talking about a new Middle East, the vision of Peres, and cooperation. Then, there was a one-day seminar organised in London by the European Commission about the prospects of peace in the Middle East. And the person who was at the time the director of the directorate general, which dealt with external relations and with the European neighbourhood, poured cold water on our enthusiasm. We were passionate about the new prospects, but he dampened our enthusiasm. He looked at me and said: “There will not be any cooperation.” And what was the reason for that? It was not politics or prejudice, nothing like that. The reason for it was the fact that, at the time, only 7% of the Arab trade was conducted in the region. I talk about 1993. I am sure that the figures have changed, but, unfortunately, I do not think that they have changed drastically. The majority of Arab trade happens with external markets. They trade with Europe. At that time, only 7% of the total trade was among themselves. He also said at the time that the only thing the Arab countries could offer was energy. And energy works in a way that the Saudis will not sell oil to Algeria, and vice versa, because they have their own resources for their own consumption. They give some donations to poor brothers like Jordan or Mauritania, but the rest goes to Europe, the United States, China, or whoever is ready to pay more. They do not have anything else to sell.
So I do not know whether one could expect effective cooperation among Arab countries. There is Egyptian–Greek cooperation, but what about an Egyptian–Libyan or Egyptian–Sudanese one? Other parties which could be involved in greater cooperation with the Arab countries could be either Israel or Europe. But do not try to teach the Arab countries what is best for them. Even if you know better, and sometimes we do know better, they have their dignity. They have their pride, and, even if they make their own mistakes sometimes, let them make their own mistakes because those are their mistakes and they will learn from them. However, they have a different culture, and sometimes it is going backwards. It does not matter whether we agree with it, or not. It does not matter whether it matches your democratic standards, but you have to understand the cultural differences. Actually, you, in Hungary should understand it better than others because sometimes you also face this situation at your meetings with your fellow members in the European Union. There are lots of differences you have to respect, and it is a long process to learn how to respect them. It takes a long time because everyone has their own tradition, their own culture, and you have to understand this.
Now, to answer your question, I think that, today, in the era of globalisation, our future and our welfare depend on cooperation. You cannot do things on your own. The boundaries have shrunk, and the world has become a global village, so there is no doubt that the future lies in regional cooperation. It can help to save raw material, money, reduce expenses—and we have not even touched the issue of climate change and the Sustainable Development Goals, which are gaining more and more weight because of overpopulation or other reasons. This pandemic we face now is a great example: with today’s technological advances you can fly to the Moon, but then one virus or a minor change in the worldwide precipitation regime can cause everything to come to a standstill. There are people who tell you that it is another proof of God, while others tell you it is nature. At any rate, it shows how small we are and to what extent our plans and visions could be disrupted by something unexpected. Therefore, I believe that, today, more than ever, the future lies in regional cooperation. You cannot stand on your own, and this also refers back to your first question, because this is one of the reasons, if not the main reason, that motivates these countries, especially in the Gulf, to come out of the closet and openly cooperate with Israel. They need us, and we also need them geo-strategically and economically.