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The Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review
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Problems with final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Sweden: Implications for new-build plans Dr. Johan Swahn, Director The Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review (MKG) e-mail: johan.swahn@mkg.se, mobile: +46 70 467 37 31 The Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review (MKG) Box 7005, SE-402 31 Gรถteborg, SWEDEN, Tel: +46 31 711 00 92, Fax: +46 31 711 46 20 www.mkg.se
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Introduction/Summary (1) •
The Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review, MKG*, was created in 2004 by the largest Swedish environmental NGO, the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, SSNC** to work specifically with nuclear waste issues. * MKG = Miljöorganisationernas kärnavfallsgranskning in Swedish ** Naturskyddsföreningen in Swedish
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MKG receives funding from the Swedish Nuclear Waste Fund to participate in the review process of the license application for a proposed Swedish repository for spent nuclear fuel near the Forsmark nuclear power plant. The Swedish nuclear industry’s waste company, SKB, has filed an application for a license for the repository on March 16th 2011. There are a number of serious problems with the Swedish repository plans, especially regarding the long-term environmental safety. These will be addressed in the licensing review where MKG and the SSNC will be strongly argue in opposition to a permit.
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Introduction/Summary (2) • •
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The Swedish case shows that even with high ambitions the management and final disposal of nuclear waste from nuclear power is highly problematic and involve high costs. Costs for decommissioning of nuclear reactors are also high. All new-build plans for nuclear power, especially in countries without previous nuclear experience, inevitably underestimate and ignore the problems and costs of nuclear waste and decommissioning. The reason for this is that if these issues were considered with the seriousness necessary, decisions for nuclear new-build would be very difficult, considering the environmentally better alternatives available. To bring forth these problems to decision-makers is therefore vital.
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Long-term environmental concerns for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel • • •
Radiation risks for hundreds of thousands of years Nuclear weapons proliferation risks for over one hundred thousand years Chemical risks for all future time
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Management of nuclear waste in Sweden • • • • • •
By law, the Swedish nuclear industry is responsible for managing and finding a sustainable method for final disposal of the nuclear waste. An economic system with a state-controlled Nuclear Waste Fund has been set up to guarantee that the polluter-pays-principle is upheld. The Swedish nuclear industry has given the task of solving the nuclear waste problem to an industry-owned nuclear waste company – SKB. In Sweden the spent nuclear fuel is to be directly disposed of on a geologic repository. Reprocessing was early seen as non-economic, environmentally dangerous and a risk for nuclear proliferation. SKB has been working for over 30 years on developing a method (the KBS method) for a repository and finding a site for the disposal of Swedish spent nuclear fuel. Finland also wants to uses the KBS method, but rely entirely on the Swedish safety analysis to be approved.
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Management of Nuclear Waste in Sweden LOW-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE Source:SKB
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Management of Nuclear Waste in Sweden Source:SKB
SFR – Final repository for low-level nuclear waste at the Forsmark nuclear power plant
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Management of Nuclear Waste in Sweden SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL Source:SKB
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Management of Nuclear Waste in Sweden Source:SKB
CLAB – Intermediate storage of spent nuclear fuel at the Oskarshamn nuclear power plant
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Management of Nuclear Waste in Sweden THE NEXT STEP? A FINAL REPOSITORY FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
Source:SKB
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The KBS Method • • •
The KBS method was developed in the 1970s. The basis is geologic repository at about 500 m depth in granite bed-rock. The long-term safety is to be guaranteed by artificial barriers – copper canisters surrounded by a bentonite clay buffer.
1975-1983
Source: MKG
• After a long history of siting failures, the nuclear company SKB has
since the turn of the century been carrying out site investigations at two sites, both right adjacent to a nuclear power plant. • In June 2009 Forsmark was chosen for a repository, with an encapsulation plant to be built at Oskarshamn. Source: MKG/Mikael Kårelind, Ummagumma
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Siting of a Swedish Spent Fuel Repository
SFR
CLAB
Forsmark nuclear power plant
Oskarshamn nuclear power plant
The planned Forsmark repository for spent nuclear fuel
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A Lengthy Licensing Review • The nuclear industry’s waste company SKB submitted an application for licensing of a KBS repository for spent nuclear fuel in Forsmark on March 16th 2011. • The license application was submitted to regulator (Swedish Nuclear Safety Authority) according to the Nuclear Act and to the Environmental Court according to the Environmental Act. • The application means that the regulator will have legal grounds to act fully on the issues of concern that it has previously just been able to comment. • Until 2013 the regulator and the court will decide what supplementary information is necessary before the final review can start. Because of the problems with the repository much work may be necessary before a final review can start. • After the final review is ready the regulator and the court will give recommendations to the Government. It is the Government that finally decides if a permit is to be given or not. Such a decision is far away.
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The KBS Method: Long-term Environmental Concerns (I) • A final repository for spent nuclear fuel cannot be allowed to release harmful radioactivity
for a period of over 100,000 years. • A geologic repository in Swedish bedrock at a depth of 500 m has corrosive groundwater flowing through the repository. • A repository using the KBS method therefore has to rely on man-made barriers (clay and copper) to isolate the nuclear waste from the environment. • The chemical and biological environment will in the long term threaten the artificial barriers of copper and clay in ways that are difficult to foresee. • There has been much discussion in Sweden and internationally the last few years concerning the fundamental SKB understanding that copper is essentially inert/immune to corrosion in the repository environment. The controversy remains unresolved but copper corrosion research results points to major problems.
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The KBS Method: Long-term Environmental Concerns (II) • In Sweden it is expected that there will be one or more ice ages
during the next 100 000 years. • Glaciation will lead to extreme variations in the chemical and biological environment that will affect the man-made barriers. • Glaciation during ice ages will also physically affect a repository (lateral movement, major earthquakes, permafrost). • The uncertainties of long-term physical, chemical and biochemical impact on a KBS repository means that there are still a number of unanswered questions in the safety analysis. And not to forget ...
• Spent nuclear fuel contains plutonium that poses a long-term
nuclear weapons proliferation risk for over 100 000 years. This means there will be monitoring and surveillance demands for an extended future.
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Important Issues in the Licensing Process (I) • Basic legal issues. Has the consultation process has been
proper? Does the environmental impact statement meet legal standards? • Will the complex model for the long-term safety analysis hold up to scrutiny (hundreds of thousands of years)? – Are ice age scenarios covered in an appropriate way (permafrost, earthquakes)? – Are scenarios for release of radioactivity and impact on the biosphere covered in an appropriate way? – Can SKB show that the clay will not erode too fast during glaciation?
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Important Issues in the Licensing Process (II) • Can the “input data” to the model be verified or at least made
plausible (first 1 000 years) ? – There is extremely weak experimental support for the fundamental idea that copper does not corrode in the repository environment. – Will the clay swell and behave as predicted? – SKB has major problems with the results of research on copper and clay. Will the copper corrode very fast during the hot first thousands of years as some researchers claim? • Issues related to intrusion scenarios, retrievability and need for long-term monitoring/information transfer to the future. – Risks for unintentional or intentional intrusion have to be balanced with positive aspects of retrievability. – Nuclear weapon proliferation risks with plutonium with the need for long-term monitoring.
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Implications for New-Build • • • •
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It is possible (likely?) that major problems will appear in the review process for a Swedish repository for spent nuclear fuel. The licensing of the KBS method in Sweden is definitely not a certainty. The Swedish case shows that even with a system with high ambitions the possibility to “solve” the nuclear waste problem is highly uncertain. Costs for taking care of low-level waste, for interim storage of spent fuel and for the decommissioning of nuclear reactors are very high. All new-build plans for nuclear power, especially in countries with-out previous nuclear experience, inevitably underestimate and ignore the problems and costs of nuclear waste and decommissioning. The reason for this is that if these issues were considered with the seriousness necessary, decisions for nuclear new-build would be very difficult, considering the environmentally better alternatives available. To bring forth these problems to decision-makers is therefore vital.
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For More Information ... English:
www.mkg.se
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Johan Swahn, johan.swahn@mkg.se, +46 70 467 37 31
The Swedish NGO Office for Nuclear Waste Review