Space is the place for Australia’s defence

By Dr Malcolm Davis, Senior Analyst Australian Strategic Policy Institute

The importance of the space domain is fast soaring to a new zenith as the Australian Defence Force con front the growing challenge of assuring space access for the ADF and sustaining space control in an ever more contested operational environment.

The establishment of a Defence Space Command as of January 2022, led by Air Vice Marshal Catherine Roberts, marks a huge step forward in Australia’s thinking about space as an operational environment. It marks an end to the traditional approach of past decades which saw a disparate and scattered management of individual space projects, and a perception of space capability almost as an afterthought, which was at best, simply an enabling capability provided by foreign and commercial partners.

There’s now broad acceptance within government of the importance of developing sovereign space capability, including both a range of communications and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance satellites, and Australian companies are moving quickly to establish a sovereign space launch capability. This transformation in thinking on space has occurred only recently, with an emerging commercial space sector that has appeared from about 2015, and which is now rapidly growing in cooperation with the Australian Space Agency that was established in 2018.

In Defence, the traditional dependency on foreign provided space capability is receding as new sovereign capability emerges, whilst a review of Defence’s approach to the space domain is now underway, including the preparation of a new Defence Space Strategy document, which is due to be signed off by government this year.

In sum, Australian thinking about space has become far more sophisticated and ambitious in the last seven years. It marks a step change in how Australia’s approach to the use of space, not only for defence but also for broader commercial and civil purposes, is evolving. A number of factors can account for this shift in thinking.

Australia’s strategic outlook has deteriorated since the release of the 2016 Defence White paper, with the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and its accompanying Force Structure Plan recognizing that the risk of major power war is less remote than at the time of the 2016 White Paper. Appropriately, the 2020 update made clear that the traditional assumption of ten years strategic warning time for a major conventional attack against Australia is no longer an appropriate basis for defence planning.

Australia doesn’t have the luxury of a decade to plan for, and equip for major power war, particularly given increasing strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific between China

and the United States, and given the rapid modernisation of the PLA, which has seen a dramatic expansion of its space and counterspace capability. Time is short, especially if the predictions of a growing crisis over Taiwan culminating in a cross straits invasion by China occur within this decade.

With space being critical to the ADF’s ability to undertake joint and integrated warfare both for the defence of Australia, and also for expeditionary operations as part of a coalition, its vital that the ADF reduce risk generated by over-dependency on others for critical military capabilities. In a more stable strategic environment that dependency was an acceptable risk, but the growing likelihood of major power war in this decade means that greater investment in sovereign space capability reduces the risks of dependency.

This is not to imply that Australia must have fully autarkic space capability. It lacks the skills and technological base for building large satellites that will provide the basis for key projects such as the next generation satellite communications system (JP-9102) or future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites (DEF-799 Phase 2). Its almost certain that major overseas primes will lead these key projects in this decade and beyond.

However, the Australian government needs to be ready and responsive to make full use of Australian small and medium enterprises (SMEs) within the rapidly growing commercial space sector to develop sovereign space capabilities based around small satellite technology and launched by low-cost launch vehicles that are developed locally. Small satellite systems can augment large satellites such as those planned for JP-9102 and DEF-799, to provide added capability and boost resilience in the face of growing counterspace threats.

Also, government recognises that investing in sovereign space capability is no longer unaffordable. Concepts such as ‘Space 2.0’ and ‘newSpace’ that emphasize low-cost space access via cheaper, smaller technologies, in which the commercial sector leads, is at the heart of Australia’s approach to space capability, with the Australian Space Agency’s main goal being to grow the commercial space sector. Australia’s approach emphasises that there’s no need to recreate a ‘NASA down under’, and instead, embraces rapid innovation through low-cost commercial space technologies. These offer Defence a new way to utilise space and build sovereign space capabilities at affordable levels of investment. In short, Australia can afford to develop its own space capabilities to support the operational requirements of the ADF, and to allow Australia to ‘burden share in orbit’ with allies to a much greater degree than it has in the past.

The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan highlighted the importance of Australia pursuing both enhanced space domain awareness, as well as moving towards developing effective space control capabilities that could ensure space access for the ADF but also counter threats to allies in orbit.

There are real opportunities for space in Australia’s defence diplomacy. The signing of the AUKUS agreement on 16th September 2021 opens up new opportunities for collaboration on critical and emerging technologies, and cooperation in space technology is a natural fit for activities to be undertaken under AUKUS. Building closer cooperation with other partners in the Indo-Pacific region, through both the ‘five eyes’ and also via the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (‘the Quad’) also creates new opportunities for Defence to work with partners to manage emerging space security risks and challenges, especially those posed by Chinese and Russian counterspace systems.

The growing threat of counterspace technologies mean that Australia has to take space control seriously. The 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan highlighted the importance of Australia pursuing both enhanced space domain awareness, as well as moving towards developing effective space control capabilities that could ensure space access for the ADF but also counter threats to allies in orbit.

Russia’s test of a ‘kinetic kill ASAT’ on 15th November 2021, and the continued development of a suite of ‘hard kill’ and ‘soft kill’ counterspace technologies by both China and Russia have reinforced the reality that the days of assured space access for Australia are over. Instead, the ADF operating alongside its allies, will need to gain and maintain space control, which can’t be done if Australia is dependent on others in space.

The threat posed by counterspace systems is only going to worsen in coming years. Direct-ascent kinetic-kill ASATs, such as demonstrated by China, Russia and India, and which are operationally deployed by China, will be complemented co-orbital ASATs. It’s co-orbital ASATs that are perhaps more threatening because their use is likely to feature ‘soft kill’ technologies based around jamming, directed-energy weapons, or direct physical interference of a satellite. These can generate scalable effect (in the case of jamming) and can disable or deny rather than destroy. As such, they don’t generate a large debris field associated with kinetic kill ASATs, and therefore, are far more likely to be employed in a crisis, including to exploit grey zone effects. Ground-based interference, including cyber-attack on satellites and their associated ground-segment adds to the complexity facing the ADF in space. Space is an ‘operational domain’ but it seems almost certain that prior to, or at the outset of any war, it will become a ‘warfighting domain’ and the ADF alongside its key allies in the region need to be ready both to try to deter attacks in space, but also to defend against threats if they appear.

The ‘space control’ task for the ADF, as highlighted in the 2020 Force Structure Plan, alongside expanding ADF Space Domain Awareness (SDA) under project JP-9360 is going to be important in coming years. SDA is Defence’s Operation Dyurra which integrates space capabilities, services and effects into wider operations, and provides critical data to the US-led Operation Olympic Defender Space Surveillance network. Building this capability for space control must be a key priority for Defence Space Command in coming years and would complement Australia’s involvement in international diplomacy to define what constitutes responsible behavior in space. Australia is fully engaged in dialogue via a UN Open Ended Working Group, which was established late last year following the tabling of UN General Assembly Resolution 75-36 by the United Kingdom.

Ultimately, the space control task will require Defence to consider the importance of rapid augmentation and reconstitution of space capabilities in a crisis. Through enhanced SDA that will emerge under JP-9360, Australia and its allies can deny an adversary anonymity if they act in an irresponsible or threatening manner and can have better tactical warning of an emerging threat to take defensive measures. Yet, having the ability to launch Australian satellites on Australian launch vehicles from Australian launch sites in a manner that is responsive to rapidly changing tactical and operational requirements, should be a key goal for both Defence and the Australian Space Agency. It would mark the coming of age for Australia in space and mark a decisive break from past decades of dependency on others. It is this goal that should drive Defence Space Command in the coming decade as they consider how Australia’s defence force plays a role on the high frontier.