Arche Vol. I, No. 2 (Spring 2016)

Arche | Ἀρχή

Journal of Philosophy and Political Theory Spring 2016 | Volume I, Issue No. 2

Arche | Ἀρχή

Journal of Philosophy and Political Theory Spring 2016 | Volume I, Issue No. 2

A Journal Published by the Philosophy and Political Theory Students of Patrick Henry College

STAFF & CONTRIBUTORS editor-in-chief

Samuel Cordle senior editor publication manager

Sarah Dunford senior editor

Sarah Crandall senior editor

Lanson Hoopai

The Arche Journal of Philosophy and Political Theory is an undergraduate journal publishing academic essays on topics of philosophy proper and political theory.

Arche (Ἀρχή) is an ancient Greek word meaning “beginning” or “origin.”

Carrying the idea of a source or ground of being from which other things flow, it captures the purpose of this journal: to present careful writing dealing with first principles and the deepest questions of reality and human life.

Essays in the journal represent the opinions of the authors and are not necessarily the views of Patrick Henry College or the editors.

ISSN 2471-2655 Patrick Henry College 10 Patrick Henry Circle Purcellville, VA 20132 (540) 338-1776 archejournal@gmail.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Authors of the respective essays in this publication retain copyright privileges.

Copyright © 2016 • Printed in the United States of America.

TA B LE O F C O N T EN T S Letter from the Editor

1

The Knowledge of God:

3

Van Til, Plantinga, and the Sensus Divinitatis

By Philip Bunn

The Necessity of Assumption:

14

Epistemology and the Crisis of the Word:

29

Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Screen:

44

Book Reviews

63

An Investigation into the Possible Solutions to the Problem of the Criterion

By Jordan Hughes

An Exploration of Deconstruction and How It Undermines Epistemology

By Katie Coyne

Regarding the Impact of Technological Forms on the Soul of Man

By Lanson Hoopai

The Closing of the Liberal Mind: How Groupthink and Intolerance Define the Left

By Kim R. Holmes Reviewed by Sarah Crandall

One Child: Do We Have a Right to More?

By Sarah Conly Reviewed by Lanson Hoopai

LET TER FROM THE EDITOR

LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

Sometimes eternity breaks into this world in ways that are simply inescapable. We do not always reach God by a sequence of deductive reason but instead encounter the reality of his presence in the supra-rational experience of the world around us through the faculties special to the human soul. Beauty really is there in the brokenness of our world, and eternity in mundanity. The whole world bursts with the presence of God, if we would but open our eyes. One can begin to marvel at simply being in this world, at the awe of natural sublimity, and at the presence of another person. In a very real way the beauty of every human person can be just as overwhelming to us as the beauty of the most majestic natural vista.

However, to perceive these lessons—to become aware of eternity in the now—man must give up his lust for control, his thirst for ceaseless understanding and explanation as preconditions for belief or acceptance, his restlessness because reality is too much for him to grasp, making him try to explain it away or deny it. Too often, in the ever-fitting words of Wordsworth, “[w]e murder to dissect.”1 Wonder, sparked by beauty, enabled by a cultivated imagination, overflows in a love for the world that results in a joyful and flourishing life.

To make the assumptions that there is something out there to be known and that there are consistent traits of the human person that give dignity to man is not to circumvent reason. In The Abolition of Man, C. S. Lewis suggests a view of reason that is far more expansive than the modern, calculative view of reason.

Explaining the necessity of assuming some things, Lewis puts it well: “You cannot go on ‘seeing through’ things for ever. The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through it. . . . It is no use trying to ‘see through’ first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent.

But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To ‘see through’ all things is the same as not to see.”2 Ultimately, accepting the world as gift means rejecting skepticism in our approach to truth but also in our approach to people. Philosophy starts with wonder: wonder at truth, at existence, at the marvel of humanity and human thought. Love likewise starts with wonder: wonder at another. If philosophy properly understood is a love for the world, a marveling at existence, then philosophy need not be sterile, though it so often is through the permeating influence of an obsessively analytical, rationalistic world. The way of philosophy, as thinkers like Socrates would have conceived of it, is one that does not want to let things pass by without appreciating them and reveling in them. This mindset 1. William Wordsworth, “The Tables Turned,” in The Complete Poetical Works of William Wordsworth, ed. by Henry Reed (Philadelphia, PA: James Kay, Jr. and Brother, 1837), 337.

2. C.S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, (New York: HarperOne, 2001), 81.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

1

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

would view the world and the human souls in it not as products to be consumed or subdued to the human mind or will but rather as gifts and objects of giving.

Some of these themes are addressed by the authors of the papers in this journal. They suggest that we assess the current state of both our culture and our philosophical thought and not simply accept things the way they are. The first two papers, “The Knowledge of God” and “The Necessity of Assumption,” address epistemological questions regarding the possibility of knowledge of certain fundamental, unempirical truths. Both suggest that there is a sense in which the model of knowledge only through the calculative reason or the senses may not be sufficient to account for the knowledge we really can and do have. The next paper, “Epistemology and the Crisis of the Word,” operates in a similar paradigm to address a question of meta-epistemology, dealing with the detrimental effects of deconstruction on language and on the human capacity for knowledge.

Finally, “Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Screen” suggests several negative societal consequences of our current technological era and applies a classical understanding of human nature as a correction to the community-diminishing tendency to view fellow human beings as products or simple parts of the technological construction of the world. These articles reward careful reading and challenge common assumptions about the means to knowledge, the rationality of assumption, and the impact of our technology on society.

Cogitate profunde, Samuel Cordle

2

•

Spring 2016

PHILIP BUNN

|

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD: VAN TIL, PLANTINGA, AND THE SENSUS DIVINITATIS Philip Bunn

A

serious study of Scripture will naturally lead one to the conclusion that one’s faith has a profound impact on one’s epistemology. The Christian Bible makes claims not only about God’s nature and the nature of the universe, but also makes claims about man’s epistemological capabilities and preconditions. If Christianity is true, it is a grave mistake to not take these divine statements about the mind’s capacity to know into account when performing an analysis in the field of epistemology. To this end, many Christian philosophers have sought to puzzle out the exact demands of Scripture on philosophy. This paper will analyze and compare two Christian philosophers, Alvin Plantinga and Cornelius Van Til, and their different views on what constitutes Christian epistemology, specifically relating to the knowledge of God. This paper will argue that both have similar foundations in Scripture and commitments to the Lordship of Christ in the area of epistemology, and that there are significant agreements between the two; however, their different understandings of the nature of the sensus divinitatis mean that there will always exist some tension between the two schools of thought.

Some background on the two thinkers in question is helpful to better understand their approaches to philosophy. Cornelius Van Til was a Dutch immigrant to America who pursued theological education, eventually earning a Ph.D. and going on to teach at Princeton. Van Til was a founding faculty member at Vol. I, No. 2

•

3

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Westminster Theological Seminary, teaching there full-time from 1929 to 1972, and continuing to lecture until 1979.1 Van Til was first and foremost concerned with apologetics, a defense of the Christian faith.2 This focus colors all of his work, both devotional and philosophical. Van Til fathered what would come to be known as “presuppositional apologetics,” a school of Reformed thought that contrasted with the classical apologetic methods that focus on using philosophical, Aquinas-influenced arguments for the existence of God. Van Til was well versed in contemporary philosophy and often spent significant portions of his writing commenting section-by-section on the works of philosophers like Immanuel Kant.3 Van Til’s influential students include John Frame, K. Scott Oliphint, and Greg Bahnsen.

Alvin Plantinga is a modern analytic philosopher who has held professorships at Calvin College and the University of Notre Dame. He received his Ph.D. from Yale and has gone on to author countless books and articles on the subject of Christian philosophy and epistemology. Plantinga and his colleague Nicholas Wolterstorff, are credited with pioneering what is known as “Reformed Epistemology,” relying on Plantinga’s theory of “warrant” which will be explored later.4 Plantinga is revered as one of the most rigorous and influential modern Christian philosophers.

S ummary Before analyzing the similarities and differences between the two schools, Van Tillian presuppositionalism and Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology, it is important to understand the basic principles of each. Van Til’s apologetic and philosophical approach relies on the professed certainty of the Christian religion.

As Van Tillian thinker Bahnsen argues in his work Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended, “A Christian apologetic grows out of, and is shaped according to, a total dedication to the wisdom of the Logos as expressed in His inscripturated Word—not self-sufficient human ‘wisdom.’”5 For Van Til and those who follow him, one’s prior commitments, or “presuppositions,” have ethical weight.

One’s presuppositions are either in submission to God and His revelation or they are opposed to the same. Because of the eternal consequences of these commit1. Cornelius Van Til, Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of Revelation, Scripture, and God, 2 ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2007), 5.

2. Ibid., 1.

3. Ibid., 5-6.

4. Anthony Bolos and Kyle Scott, “Reformed Epistemology,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed December 20, 2015, http://www.iep.utm.edu/ref-epis/.

5. Greg Bahnsen, Presuppositional Apologetics Stated and Defended (Powder Springs, GA: American Vision, 2010), 3-4.

4

•

Spring 2016

PHILIP BUNN

|

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

ments, for Van Til, a faithful apologetic does not merely suggest or argue for the probability or reasonableness of the Christian faith. Rather, “it is an appeal to the necessity of Christianity’s truth.”6 How does this issue of presuppositions relate to the knowledge of God? Van Til argued explicitly from Calvin’s notion of the sensus divinitatis, or the sense or knowledge of the divine that is present in all men. As Calvin explains in his Institutes of the Christian Religion, There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty. . . . Men of sound judgment will always be sure that a sense of divinity which can never be effaced is engraved upon men’s minds.

Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who though they struggle furiously are unable to extricate themselves from the fear of God, is abundant testimony that this conviction, namely, that there is some God, is naturally inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow.7

This argument from Calvin is footnoted both with historical examples of unbelievers who possessed a professed inherent knowledge of God and with the text of Romans 1, the primary text on which Calvin bases his claims. This innate knowledge of God forms a critical part of Van Tillian epistemology. If, as Romans 1 says, man has inherent knowledge of God, yet suppresses it, this means that natural man and his thinking is an enmity with God. This is what John Frame calls “knowledge in disobedience.”8 While knowledge of God typically leads to obedience and worship, the suppressed knowledge of the unbeliever leads to rebellion.9 Because of this type of knowledge that the unbeliever possesses, says Van Til, the Christian philosopher cannot assume equal footing with the unbelieving philosopher, and must rather approach philosophy from an explicitly Christian and unashamedly presuppositional angle, regardless of whether or not the unbelieving epistemologist will find this persuasive. As Bahnsen explains, because the disagreements between the unbeliever and the believer are ones of the natures of reality, reason, and truth, the Christian cannot argue as if there is a commonality 6. Bahnsen, 15.

7. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion Vol. 1 (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), 43, 45-46.

8. John M. Frame, Systematic Theology: an Introduction to Christian Belief (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2013), 710-711.

9. See Frame, 705-715, for an explanation of the differences between knowledge in obedience and knowledge in disobedience.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

5

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

on these issues.

Plantinga wrestles with the problems of foundationalism in epistemology.

Essentially, the difficulty lies in justifying inferences. In order to be truly justified in believing something inferential, one must be able to justify that inference.

For Plantinga and others, this means that, unless there is an infinite regress of inference, there must be some points of knowledge that are arrived at non-inferentially. They “arise within us” on the basis of properly functioning faculties or a priori knowledge.10 Properly basic, non-inferential beliefs are then those that are evident to the senses, incorrigible, or self-evident.11 A belief in God can be self-evident, and therefore properly basic, because of the sensus divinitatis.

Like Van Til, Plantinga relies heavily on the idea of the sensus divinitatis, a concept both thinkers adopt explicitly from Calvin. In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga describes his understanding of the sensus divinitatis as . . . A kind of faculty or a cognitive mechanism, what Calvin calls a sensus divinitatis or sense of divinity, which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God. These circumstances, we might say, trigger the disposition to form the beliefs in question; they form the occasion on which those beliefs arise. Under these circumstances, we develop or form theistic beliefs—or, rather, these beliefs are formed in us; in the typical case we don’t consciously choose to have those beliefs. Instead, we find ourselves with them, just as we find ourselves with perceptual and memory beliefs.12

Though Plantinga readily accepts the notion that man has an innate aptitude for the knowledge of God, he is not, like Van Til, able to say that all men innately know God necessarily from birth on. Plantinga continues, The capacity for [the knowledge of God] is indeed innate, like the capacity for arithmetical knowledge. Still, it doesn’t follow that we know elementary arithmetic from our mother’s womb; it takes a little maturity. My guess is Calvin thinks the same with respect to this knowledge of God; what one has from one’s mother’s womb is not this knowledge of God, but a capacity for it.13

Plantinga’s argument, then, is not that every person currently believes in or has knowledge of God. Rather, all men possess an innate ability to sense God, and by exercise of their senses and observation of the created world, which 10. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000),

175.

6

11. Bolos and Scott.

12. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 172-173.

13. Ibid., 173.

•

Spring 2016

PHILIP BUNN

|

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Plantinga takes to be created by the Christian God, they find the knowledge of God occurring non-inferentially in their minds. Thus, because basic beliefs are non-inferential or self-evident, belief in—and indeed knowledge of God—is a properly basic belief.

A nalysis It would be disingenuous to begin a comparison of Plantinga and Van Til without admitting that there is significant commonality between the two. Van Til is famous for his approach known as pushing the antithesis, where the apologist identifies and exposits the absolute antithesis between Christianity and all other systems of thought. Van Til argued, along with many of his students, that it is fallacious to assume neutrality and attempt to argue the unbeliever to God from that position. Put in simpler terms, a position of neutrality is one that denies the sovereignty of God. One cannot argue from a position that denies the sovereignty of God to a position that accepts the sovereignty of God. If a position has already ruled out the Christian God, His existence, and His sovereignty, then that position cannot reasonably be expected to reason to the existence and sovereignty of the God it has denied. Because of this, Van Til reasons there is a single system of thought that is subject to God and His sovereignty, which is Trinitarian Christianity, and there are systems of thought that are not subject to God, which is all non-trinitarian Christianity. There is no neutrality.

Plantinga does not reject this notion. In fact, Plantinga explicitly accepts Van Til’s rejection of neutrality, though he does not credit Van Til for the concept. In his article “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Plantinga says I deeply believe that the pattern displayed in philosophy is also to be found in nearly every area of serious intellectual endeavor. In each of these areas the fundamental and often unexpressed presuppositions that govern and direct the discipline are not religiously neutral; they are often antithetic to a Christian perspective. In these areas, then, as in philosophy, it is up to Christians who practice the relevant discipline to develop the right Christian alternatives. . . . What I want to urge is that the Christian philosophical community ought not think of itself as engaged in this common effort to determine the probability or philosophical plausibility of belief in God. The Christian philosopher quite properly starts from the existence of God, and presupposes it in philosophical work, whether or not he can show it to be probable or plausible with respect to premises accepted by all philosophers, or most philosophers at the great contemporary centers of philosophy.14

14. Alvin Plantinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 1, no. 3 (October 1984): 261-262, (first part of quote is found in Plantinga’s preface available at http://www.faithandphilosophy.com/article_advice.php, (accessed December 20, 2015).

Vol. I, No. 2

•

7

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Here, Plantinga admits that Christians cannot assume neutrality but rather presuppose God in their argumentation and philosophical reasoning, and encourages other Christian philosophers to do the same. This sounds remarkably similar to Van Til’s presuppositional apologetic.

Van Til offers a helpful summary of his apologetic foundations in his work Christian Apologetics where he writes [The Christian God] cannot be proved to exist by any other method than the indirect one of presupposition. No proof for this God and for the truth of his revelation in Scripture can be offered by an appeal to anything in human experience that has not itself received its light from the God whose experience and whose revelation it is supposed to prove.15

Van Til’s argument consists of entirely scriptural presuppositions. If, as Scripture claims, the entire world was created by God, then there is no part of creation that can prove God without presupposing Him as its author. If man’s reasoning is analogical to God’s order and character, then man cannot reason to God without presupposing Him as the foundation for reasoning, even unconsciously. In this way, the Christian cannot escape presupposing God, and likewise even the non-believer cannot escape it.

Van Til’s reasoning leads the Christian to the conclusion that those who do not actually confess belief in or submission to God actually, actively know Him and presuppose Him, as evidenced by their actions. In Christian Apologetics, Van Til argues that the triune Christian God is necessary to understand the order observed in scientific research, which means that God is a necessary precondition for science. Because of this, Van Til argues, “even non-Christians presuppose [the existence of God] while they verbally reject it. They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account for their own accomplishments.”16 Essentially, Van Til argues that the unbeliever cannot even meaningfully dispute the existence of God with his reasoning because the very existence of ordered rules of thinking called logic and reasoning is due to and presupposes the existence of God. This argument ties into what Van Tillian John Frame calls knowledge in unbelief, referenced previously. This knowledge is the sort the unbeliever possesses. It does not require that the unbeliever verbally assent to the existence of God, or that he consciously think to himself, “God exists.” Rather, by virtue of being made in the image of God, the unbeliever does know of God and His pow15. Cornelius Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 2nd ed., ed. William Edgar (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2003), 141.

16. Ibid., 134.

8

•

Spring 2016

PHILIP BUNN

|

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

er and glory, per Romans 1, but his response to that knowledge is not obedience.

Rather, the response consists of rebellion, rejection, suppression, and unbelief.

This seems to square well with the biblical account of the knowledge of man. Scripture suggests that in one sense, man knows of God and things about God. In another sense, man does not. Insofar as “knowing God” means knowing God closely, fellowshipping with him, and pursuing Christ, the unbeliever does not know God.17 Insofar as knowing God means non-inferentially knowing of God’s existence because of the sensus divinitatis, man possesses this knowledge and suppresses it. This subconscious knowledge forms the basis of a presuppositional apologetic; one argues for the truth of the Christian worldview by pointing out things the unbeliever already knows but to which the unbeliever does not actively assent.

How then does Plantinga’s assessment of the unbeliever’s knowledge of God line up against that of Van Til and Scripture? In addition to his claims in Warranted Christian Belief, in “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” Plantinga expounds a bit more on his interpretation of Calvin’s sensus divinitatis. He says, “Calvin’s claim, then, is that God has so created us that we have by nature a strong tendency or inclination or disposition towards belief in him. Although this disposition to believe in God has been in part smothered or suppressed by sin, it is nevertheless universally present.”18 Plantinga’s reading of Calvin differs strongly from Van Til’s on this point. Plantinga does not argue that all unbelievers currently, actively possess knowledge of God by which the Christian can grab them and from which the Christian can argue as a point of contact. Rather, Plantinga interprets Calvin, and indirectly interprets Scripture, to mean that the unbeliever’s epistemic state with regards to God is one of potentiality. For Plantinga, the sensus divinitatis does not require that the unbeliever have a suppressed, warranted true belief in God. Rather, it only requires that the unbeliever have a natural propensity to belief in God. This disposition, damaged by sin, is the reason men tend towards belief in God, but may not always possess it.

The sensus divinitatis is, then, a faculty that can be properly exercised and acted upon by the material world much like our senses. Plantinga thus argues that just as we see that the argument for modus ponens is valid non-inferentially and self-evidently by the proper function and operation of our intellect, “a belief about God spontaneously arises in those circumstances . . . that trigger the operation of the sensus divinitatis.”19 The belief in God that arises in this manner is therefore a “starting point for thought . . . not accepted on the evidential basis of 17. Frame, 710.

18. Platinga, “Advice to Christian Philosophers,” 261.

19. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 176.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

9

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

other beliefs.”20 Van Til and Plantinga then disagree on the potentiality or actuality of the knowledge of God. Van Til is certain that Romans 1 teaches that all unbelievers actually know of God’s existence but actively suppress that knowledge in favor of their sin. This requires a unique epistemic category, perhaps a form of self-deception.21 If it is true that we are both not aware of many of the things we actually believe and that we do not truly believe many of the things we think we believe, it is possible that our belief in God, prior to conversion, is contained in the category of beliefs that we are unaware of or simply choose to disregard. If Van Til is right, the unbeliever must have a justified, true belief in God, but not assent to that belief. The unbeliever must be deceiving himself or herself into thinking that they do not believe in God when he or she does believe in Him, and is in fact acting in rebellion against Him. Plantinga and others would perhaps question if it is possible to have a belief and deny it simultaneously. Plantinga’s language with regards to the sensus divinitatis suggests that he is not comfortable with the idea that every human that exists currently has knowledge of, and therefore some form of belief in, God. Rather, Plantinga seems to view the sensus divinitatis as a means by which the common, nearly ubiquitous formation of a belief in a God or god is formed in natural man, non-inferentially and apart from theistic proofs. This sensus divinitatis does not necessarily lead one to the triune God, but to a concept of the divine.

Plantinga’s motivations for his arguments are laudable. He is seeking to justify the beliefs of those Christians who have never developed a systematic apologetic, have never considered Aquinas’s cosmological arguments, and in fact have never attempted to formulate a reason that they believe in God. Plantinga, like most Christians, would like to believe that the faith of a new Christian, an uneducated convert, or one’s own grandmother is a perfectly legitimate faith, and can in fact be called rational.

Van Til would agree on this point; however, he would approach it from a different angle. Rather than arguing that theistic beliefs tend to arise in most people, therefore theistic beliefs can and do arise non-inferentially, Van Til would argue that theistic beliefs are present in all people whether they assent to them or not. Further, belief in God is rational because anything else is irrational.

Asking a grandmother or an uneducated convert to “prove” the existence of God presupposes the existence of reason, order, and independent things that can be proved. There are epistemological and metaphysical assumptions wrapped up in 20. Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 176.

21. For more on this concept, see Gregg A. Ten Elshof, I Told Me So: Self-Deception and the Christian Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2009).

10

•

Spring 2016

PHILIP BUNN

|

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

demands for proof, assumptions that presuppose and require the existence of God. Van Til suggests that demands for proof display the suppressed knowledge of natural man. From a materialistic, empiricist standpoint, men have no reason to expect or demand order, reason, and proof. Rather, due to Hume’s problem of induction, natural man should instead be faced with uncertainty about the nature of the future and the reliability of his own sense perception. However, contrary to this clear lack of ultimate justification for inferential reasoning, natural man demands proof and relies on order to function in his day-to-day life.

Ultimately, Van Til’s interpretation of Calvin’s Institutes seems more tenable. Again, Calvin claims, “Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who though they struggle furiously are unable to extricate themselves from the fear of God, is abundant testimony that this conviction, namely, that there is some God, is naturally inborn in all.”22 Calvin does not seem to suggest a mere potentiality to the knowledge of God, nor a propensity to knowledge, but an actual knowledge of God “engraved” on the minds of men inextricably. Calvin does not seem interested in defending the rationality of belief in God, but rather appeals to the common knowledge of God as proof that no proof is needed for God’s existence.

Van Til’s understanding of the sensus divinitatis also seems more compatible with the statements of Romans 1. The Apostle Paul writes, For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made.

So they are without excuse. 23

That the nature of God, or specific parts of His nature, has been “clearly perceived” by men so that they are “without excuse” suggests that men actively have knowledge of God, not that they have a mere potentiality, propensity, or tendency.

C onclusion Van Til and Plantinga both rebut the strict evidentialist who requires that all belief in a deity be justified materially and evidentially. Both thinkers argue persuasively that belief in God is simply basic, something that men do not have 22. Calvin, 46.

23. Romans 1:18-20, ESV.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

11

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

to justify explicitly before men to be epistemologically justified in their belief.

Plantinga argues that this is because belief in God is properly basic and need not, and indeed cannot, be justified on the basis of evidence. Van Til argues that man not only knows that God exists, but also can clearly see that it is impossible for God not to exist.

Plantinga cannot be faulted for his systematic approach to Christian philosophy. He has not committed the errors that Van Til criticizes in his works, which include forsaking Scripture and attempting to argue from neutral ground.

Rather, Plantinga unapologetically presupposes God while simultaneously attempting to show the unbelieving philosophical world that such beliefs are not irrational. For this, Plantinga ought to be commended. However, as shown, his interpretation of the Romans 1 statements on the knowledge of God and Calvin’s sensus divinitatis do not appear tenable. Van Til and his students offer a similar foundation for a Christian epistemology that better fits with Calvin’s interpretation of Romans 1, and provides a certain point of contact between the believer and the unbeliever: the sure, shared knowledge of God’s existence.

12

•

Spring 2016

PHILIP BUNN

|

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Bibliogr aphy Bahnsen, Greg. Presuppositional Apologetics Stated and Defended. Powder Springs: American Vision, 2010.

Calvin, John. Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion. 1559 ed. 2 vols. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006.

Frame, John M. Systematic Theology: an Introduction to Christian Belief. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2013.

Plantinga, Alvin. Warranted Christian Belief. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. . “Advice to Christian Philosophers.” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 1, no. 3 (October 1984): 253-71.

Til, Cornelius Van. Christian Apologetics, 2nd ed., ed. William Edgar. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2003. . Introduction to Systematic Theology: Prolegomena and the Doctrines of Revelation, Scripture, and God. 2nd ed. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2007.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

13

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION Jordan Hughes

A

lthough originating centuries ago, the problem of the criterion has returned to prominence in large part due to the efforts of Roderick Chisholm (1916-1999).

The problem of the criterion, as Chisholm presents it, is an inquiry into the very foundation of knowledge. He poses the following two questions: (A) “What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?”

(B) “How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?”1 The importance of these questions is that they go together. It seems true that to answer one we must also answer the other. To clarify this, Chisholm gives the following analogy: Let us suppose that you have a pile of apples and you want to sort out the good ones from the bad ones. You want to put the good ones in a pile by themselves and throw the bad ones away. This is a useful thing to do, obviously, because the bad apples tend to infect the good ones and then the good ones become bad, too . . . But how are we to do the sorting? If we are to sort out the good ones from the bad ones, then, 1. Roderick M. Chisholm, “The Problem of the Criterion,” The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 65.

14

•

Spring 2016

JORDAN H UGH ES

|

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION

of course, we must have a way of recognizing the good ones. Or at least we must have a way of recognizing the bad ones. And—again, of course—you and I do have a way of recognizing good apples and also of recognizing bad ones. The good ones have their own special feel, look, and taste, and so do the bad ones.

But when we turn from apples to beliefs, the matter is quite different. In the case of the apples, we have a method—a criterion—for distinguishing the good ones from the bad ones. But in the case of the beliefs, we do not have a method or a criterion for distinguishing the good ones from the bad ones. Or, at least, we don’t have one yet. 2

In other words, to know whether or not a certain apple is a good apple, the apple sorter must know what separates good apples from bad apples. He must know the criteria. However, if he has no idea which apples are good or bad apart from the criteria, he will never know whether or not the criteria will successfully sort the apples. To know that you have the right criteria, then, you must know which apples are good and which are bad. This puts the apple picker, or by analogy, the knowledge seeker, on an endless wheel where (A) requires an answer to (B), and (B) requires an answer to (A). To have knowledge, you must somehow get off this wheel. Chisholm proposes three possible responses to this problem: particularism, methodism, and skepticism. In addition to these responses, this paper will examine other possible solutions that have been proposed in response to Chisholm’s argument, such as coherentism and various forms of reflexive equilibrium. After thoroughly examining the arguments, it will become clear that, while there are more than three possible responses to the problem of the criterion, none are satisfactory.

C larification of the P roblem The most helpful way to look into the possible answers to this problem is to formulate the skeptic’s argument that is based on the above questions (A) and (B), and then evaluate how each option responds to the skeptical argument.

Chisholm provides us with the skeptical argument: (1) You cannot answer question A (“what do we know?”) until you have answered question B (“ how can we decide whether we know?”).

(2) You cannot answer question B until you have answered question A. (3) Therefore, you cannot answer either question.

(3a) You cannot know what, if anything, you know.

(3b) There is no possible way for you to decide in any particular case.3 2. Chisholm, “The Problem of the Criterion,” 63-64.

3. Ibid., 66.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

15

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Before advancing to the responses to this argument, though, we must first add clarity that Chisholm does not provide.4 We will follow Andrew D. Cling’s suggestions in “Posing the Problem of the Criterion” to do so.5 First, we can easily replace “what do we know?” with “what is true?” in question (A) and “how can we decide whether we know?” with “how can we tell which statements are true?” in question (B). This adds clarity by simplifying Chisholm’s argument to its most basic form while not fundamentally changing the question. The answer to these two questions, for the purposes of the argument as Chisholm explains it, will be the same.6 Thus the argument is now as follows: (1) You cannot answer question A (“what is true?”) until you have answered question B (“ how can we decide which statements are true?”).

(2) You cannot answer question B until you have answered question A. (3) Therefore, you cannot answer either question.

(3a) You cannot know whether any statement is true or not.

(3b) There is no possible way for you to decide in any particular case.7 However, without clarifying further, it seems that these premises are false.

It is possible to answer the question “what is true?” without answering “how can we decide which statements are true?” To return to the example of separating out apples, I can answer question (A) without answering question (B) simply by randomly selecting apples and calling them “good.” This is clearly not what Chisholm, or any writer commenting on the problem of the criterion, intends.

Therefore, it is necessary to say that “you cannot have a good answer . . .” rather than simply that “you cannot have an answer . . .”8 This makes it clear that what is desired is some satisfying answer to the problem, not simply any answer. By adding the qualifier good, randomly selecting apples (beliefs) as true is no longer an option. The argument can now be put thusly: 4. While Chisholm’s argument is very powerful, as seen by how much response it has received, it will prove very helpful to add clarity to his argument. If my understanding of Chisholm’s argument is correct, he would not object to the edits that I will provide. I am not attempting to change or improve upon his argument, only to crystalize it.

5. Andrew Cling, “Posing the Problem of the Criterion,” Philosophical Studies 75, no. 3 (1994): 266-269.

6. Andrew D. Cling argues for the validity of this clarification by pointing out that, “The questions which lead to Chisholm’s higher-order version of the problem of the criterion are special cases of ‘which statements are true?’ and ‘how can we tell which statements are true?’. . .” See Cling, p.266-267 for more.

7. Chisholm, “The Problem of the Criterion,” 66.

8. We will accept Cling’s vague definition of “good” here as simply having “positive epistemic value” (p. 267) for the vagueness is inconsequential.

16

•

Spring 2016

JORDAN H UGH ES

|

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION

(1) You cannot have a good answer to question A (“what is true?”) until you have a good answer to question B (“ how can we decide which statements are true?”).

(2) You cannot have a good answer to question B until you have a good answer to question A. (3) Therefore, you cannot have a good answer to either question.

(3a) You cannot know whether any statement is true or not.

(3b) There is no possible good way for you to decide in any particular case.9 This form of the argument is still not without problems, though: The conclusions (3a) and (3b) do not follow from the premises. All that can follow from these premises is that beliefs and criteria depend upon one another; good beliefs require good criteria and vice versa. Again, this is not what Chisholm means.

We can align the argument more closely with Chisholm’s intention if we add the assertion that good beliefs require good criteria that are independent of the good beliefs. By the same token, good criteria require beliefs whose goodness does not rely on the criteria. In addition to this, by the word “until,” Chisholm does not refer to a chronological order; he intends an epistemic priority. This can be clarified by changing “until” to “only if.” Thus the final, clarified form of the argument with which we will proceed is this: (1) You can have a good answer to question A (“what is true?”) only if you have an independently good answer to question B (“ how can we decide which statements are true?”).

(2) You can have a good answer to question B only if you have an independently good answer to question A. (3) Therefore, you cannot have a good answer to either question.

(3a) You cannot know whether any statement is true or not.

(3b) There is no possible good way for you to decide in any particular case.10 C hisholm ’s Three R esponses to the P roblem With this clear, precise, and valid argument in front of us, we can now proceed to investigating the possible responses. As mentioned above, Chisholm argues that there are only three possibilities: particularism, methodism, and skepticism. Chisholm chooses to take the first option, particularism, as his own view. This view asserts that the problem is solved by denying premise (1) of the 9. This form of the argument is found at Cling, 268.

10. Cling, 269.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

17

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

argument.11 The particularist assumes an answer to “what is true?” without having any criteria for his assumed propositions. There is room for much diversity amongst particularists based on how many propositions they fit into this category of assumed truths; some may accept very few while others accept many.

Either way, Chisholm admits that this position begs the question.12 In fact, it is unilaterally agreed upon by those discussing the problem of the criterion that particularism begs the question.13 By denying the skeptic’s first premise without any reasoning, the particularist begs the question against the skeptic (and, as will be discussed, the methodist). Furthermore, the particularist position actually requires that the first premise must beg the question. McCain and Rowley explain: If she [the particularist] goes outside that set of particular propositions to provide reasons for them, she abandons that particularist response and either picks a new set of particular propositions to assume (a new particularist response) or picks something other than simply a new set of only particular propositions to assume and ceases to be a particularist.14

A response that always begs the question against its opponents by assuming its own foundation surely cannot be satisfactory. However, it will soon be clear that Chisholm’s other two possibilities are no better.

Whereas particularism denied (1), methodism denies (2), that “you can have a good answer to question B only if you have an independently good answer to question A.” Like particularism, it does this through assumption. Methodism, with no attempt to ascertain reasons for doing so, assumes criteria for knowledge; it assumes to know how to decide on the truth of a proposition without any other true particulars to verify the epistemic goodness of the criteria. This, of course, falls into the same trap as particularism by begging the question against both the skeptic and the particularist. The particularist and the skeptic claim that you 11. Chisholm does not think that particularism solves the issue. He argues that there is no answer that can answer the skeptic’s argument without begging the question. All solutions are on an equal playing field when compared to the argument. Therefore, Chisholm’s decision to take the particularist approach is purely a pragmatic one. He believes particularism is the most helpful in living in accordance with what we intuitively know to be true. See Roderick Chisholm, “Reply to Amico on the Problem of the Criterion,” Philosophical Papers 17, no. 3 (1988): 231-232.

12. By begging the question, I mean assuming the truth of the very thing you are trying to prove, or making an assumption that others disagree with that leads to your conclusion. Cling states that an argument begs the question when it “illicitly presupposes the truth or falsehood of some specific proposition whose truth or falsehood is in question” (p. 277).

13. Chisholm, Cling, Amico, DePaul, McCain, and Rowley (all of the philosophers cited in detail by this paper) agree that particularism begs the question.

14. Kevin McCain and William Rowley, “Pick your Poison: Beg the Question or Embrace Circularity,” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2014): 129.

18

•

Spring 2016

JORDAN H UGH ES

|

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION

can have no good criterion without an independently good answer to (A); the methodist denies this with no reasoning whatsoever and therefore argues for a conclusion by assuming an answer to a debated question. Neither particularism nor methodism provide any real solution to the problem of the criterion.

It may seem, after considering the weakness of particularism and methodism, that the skeptic has won. After all, Chisholm only provides three possible solutions, and the first two do not solve the problem. Indeed, it seems likely that skepticism is the only choice of the three that does not beg the question. While Chisholm holds that all three responses beg the question, including skepticism, Cling is adamant that skepticism does not beg the question against either the particularist or the methodist (or any other possible solution, if we find that there are other options). He writes, However unappealing the skeptic’s conclusions may be, the skeptic need not beg these crucial questions, for skeptics need not affirm (1) and (2) uncritically. These premises are supported, as we have seen, by plausible, independent considerations about the necessary conditions for having good criteria of truth and good beliefs.

Such considerations may be mistaken but they scarcely appeal only to skeptics. This is shown by the deep disagreements among anti-skeptics themselves about which premises of the master argument should be rejected.15

Cling argues, then, that skepticism does not beg the question because its “reasonable” assumptions are agreed to by some anti-skeptics. To break this down in terms of the problem of the criterion, his point is that some anti-skeptics (the methodists) agree to (1), and others (the particularists) agree to (2). Therefore, because the skeptic’s assumptions are agreed to by some anti-skeptics, they are reasonable and therefore do not beg the question. However, even by Cling’s own definition of question begging, skepticism fails. He defines question begging as follows: “Consequently, to say that an argument is unacceptable because it begs the question is to say that it illicitly presupposes the truth or falsehood of some specific proposition whose truth or falsehood is in question.”16 By this standard, skepticism begs the question anytime it argues against either a particularist or a methodist. In either case, one of the skeptic’s premises will be debated. Therefore, if the skeptic asserts the truth of his side, he is begging the question.

Furthermore, the skeptical argument actually undermines itself. Conclusion (3a) states that it is impossible to know whether or not any statement is true.

However, premises (1) and (2) are both truth claims. The skeptic cannot use 15. In this quotation, Cling uses (1) and (2) to represent the same premises of the same argument that has been developed in this paper. Cling, 278.

16. Cling, 277.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

19

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

truth claims to prove that no statement can ever claim to be true. To this, Cling replies thusly: The master argument . . . is a proposed reductio ad absurdum of anti-skepticism.

It poses an important challenge because it purports to show that our best understanding of what is necessary for the attainment of epistemic goodness implies that epistemic goodness is unattainable. Unlimited skeptics will not care that the master argument undermines its own premises: that is an important component of unlimited skepticism. The master argument is designed to show that rationality is self-destructive.17

Even if the anti-skeptic is to allow the skeptic this much, that he is only inserting himself briefly into the anti-skeptic world to show the absurdity of it and then retreating back to his own epistemic world, this still provides no reason for the anti-skeptic to agree with the skeptic. According to Cling’s perspective, the skeptic’s role can be thought of as simply trying to provide a stumbling block to the anti-skeptic through the problem of the criterion. It will be helpful here if we rephrase the argument as a hypothetical: “If (1) and (2) are true, then (3), (3a), and (3b) are true.”

The problem for the skeptic is that he cannot actually affirm (1) and (2) because he denies that we can affirm the truth of any statement. Therefore, he lofts this conditional into the anti-skeptical camp so that anyone affirming (1) and (2) will be forced to affirm (3), (3a), and (3b). However, of the two perspectives we’ve discussed so far, neither affirms both (1) and (2). Therefore, particularism, methodism, and skepticism are all on equal footing. To affirm their own position, all three must beg the question. The skeptic can provide no reason to prefer the skeptic’s position over the others; accordingly, accepting the skeptical response because of the problems with particularism and methodism is question begging.18 Thus we have seen that neither particularism, nor methodism, nor skepticism provide a satisfying solution to the problem of the criterion. This is not altogether surprising considering the fact that Chisholm claimed from the beginning that no solution was possible. Contrary to Chisholm’s claim, however, there seems to be more possible responses than just these three.

A dditional R esponses to the P roblem Before we investigate the validity of other solutions to the problem of the criterion, it will be helpful to once again restate the skeptic’s formal argument; 17. Cling, 280.

18. McCain and Rowley, 132.

20

•

Spring 2016

JORDAN H UGH ES

|

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION

this time, we will also add two new premises, (1a) which follows from (1) and (2a) which follows from (2), (1) You can have a good answer to question A (“what is true?”) only if you have an independently good answer to question B (“ how can we decide which statements are true?”).

(1a) We can have no independently good beliefs.

(2) You can have a good answer to question B only if you have an independently good answer to question A. (2a) We can have no independently good criterion of truth.

(3) Therefore, you cannot have a good answer to either question.

(3a) You cannot know whether any statement is true or not.

(3b) There is no possible good way for you to decide in any particular case.19 (1a) and (2a) do not change the structure or validity of the argument. It is still true that if (1) and (2) are true, then (3), (3a), and (3b) logically follow. All that has been added is a further implication of both (1) and (2) in the form of (1a) and (2a) respectively. This will clarify how the next response interacts with the argument.

One possible response to the problem of the criterion that Chisholm does not mention is what Cling labels “coherentism.” He describes the view in this way: To be a coherentist is to reject the epistemic priority of beliefs and criteria of truth.

Instead, coherentists recommend balancing beliefs against criteria and criteria against beliefs until they all form a consistent, mutually supporting system. 20

This view could be interpreted in two ways. The first is to see coherentism simply as a form of methodism. It assumes a certain criteria for knowledge and then from there deduces particular sets of truth. Under this model, its criteria for knowledge are that a particular proposition is true if it has been balanced well with other beliefs (both particulars and methods). If any coherentist holds this view, he fails to provide a solution because he begs the question exactly as all methodist responses do.21 The other interpretation of coherentism, which is the more generous reading of the theory (and perhaps the only correct one), is that it is entirely different

19. Cling, 270.

20. Ibid., 274.

21. It seems evident that those calling themselves coherentists do not accept this interpretation. They claim to be in an entirely different category than the methodists. This still does not remove the question begging.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

21

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

than methodism. Whereas methodism rejects premise (2), coherentism rejects both (1) and (2). It claims that it is impossible to have good particular knowledge independently of a good criteria, and that it is impossible to have good criteria independently of good particular knowledge. Particular knowledge and general criteria cannot be separated because they reinforce one another; they work together to make each other stronger or better. Therefore, the coherentist response denies (1) and (2) but affirms (1a) and (2a). While this response does appear different than the others, it does not avoid question begging. By affirming (1a) and (2a), the coherentist assumes that there can be no independent answer to (A) or (B).22 Accordingly, he begs the question against the particularist and the methodist who both assume that there is an independent answer to either (A) or (B).

The last two views this paper will examine both fall under the concept of reflective equilibrium.23 McCain and Rowley explain this theory well: Roughly, reflective equilibrium involves starting with a set of data (beliefs, intuitions, etc.) and making revisions to that set—giving up some of the data, adding new data to the set, giving more/less weight to some of the data, and so on—so as to create the most agreement among the members of the resulting set. Reaching this equilibrium state of maximized coherence of one’s data is thought to make accepting whatever data remains, whether this includes any of one’s initial data or not, reasonable. 24

This view could very easily be understood as no different from the coherentist view discussed above and would therefore fall prey to the same question begging.

To avoid this, the theory must assert that —while the knower starts with beliefs about (A) and (B) and must balance the two in order to reach the best epistemic result— it does not make the same assumption that coherentism does. That is, this response claims to not take any stance at all on whether or not it is possible to have a good answer to either (A) or (B) independently of the other. Instead, it just starts with beliefs about both and seeks to refine them.25 The first version of reflective equilibrium is put forward by Michael R. DePaul.26 He argues that we begin with both “our initial particular and our ini-

22. McCain and Rowley, 130.

23. This is very closely related to coherentism. In fact, DePaul, a supporter of a version of reflective equilibrium, calls his idea a form of coherentism. See Michael R. DePaul, “The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 1 (March 1988): 81-85.

24. McCain and Rowley, 133.

25. Ibid., 134.

26. DePaul’s argument is entirely in terms of moral knowledge, but he begins by asserting that his theory applies to moral theory as well as epistemology as a whole. So while he speaks in moral terms, he is discussing the same issue that we have at hand.

22

•

Spring 2016

JORDAN H UGH ES

|

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION

tial general beliefs” and these are used together in “theory construction.”27 But DePaul is committed to question begging already. By having an initial belief, he claims to have some form of grip on the truth of both particulars and methods without one being good independently of the other. This begs the question against the skeptic who claims that both the particulars and the method require the independent good of the other. The only way around this would be for DePaul to assert that there is no independent answer for (A) or for (B), but this puts him right back in the coherentist camp and therefore would cause him to beg the question against the particularist and the methodist.28 Either way, by claiming that he starts with beliefs (truth claims), DePaul cannot avoid begging the question.

The last response we will examine is an attempt to side step the problem that DePaul faces. This view, put forward by Earl Conee and Paul Moser, and referred to as the seeming intuition response (SIR) by McCain and Rowley, agrees with DePaul’s basic structure, but replaces his initial “beliefs” with initial “intuitions.”29 In so doing, this response seeks to ascertain good answers to both (A) and (B) without assuming the truth of anything initially. It does not presume the initial intuitions to be true; rather, this solution states that these intuitions seem to be true. From this point, the individual makes modifications to his intuitions about both (A) and (B). McCain explains that, by “make modifications,” SIR means, “give up some intuitions, form different intuitions, rank some intuitions as more/less important than others, and so on.”30 The theory claims that once you have reached a point of equilibrium, you are able to answer (A) and (B).

The first obstacle this response must avoid is the accusation that it is just a form of methodism. After all, it is a response to the problem of the criterion that suggests a way to improve upon your current beliefs or thoughts to make them more in line with truth. McCain and Rowley argue that SIR avoids this criticism because of one major difference: Methodism relies upon the assumed truth of the method and SIR does not. In other words, the methodist states, “This is my method and it is true. Therefore, I can base all other truth claims on it.” According to SIR, on the other hand, we need not even be aware that we are following the SIR model. McCain and Rowley explain that this situation is analogous to rule following: 27. DePaul, 83.

28. McCain and Rowley, 134.

29. This view goes by many different names. Conee refers to it as “Applied Evidentialism.”

Moser calls it a form of “Explanatory Particularism.” I will use the name that McCain and Rowley use, as it seems to be the most descriptive: the “Seeming Intuition Response.”

30. Kevin McCain, “The Problem of the Criterion,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/criterio/ (accessed December 15, 2015).

Vol. I, No. 2

•

23

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

S might behave in accordance with the rule not to walk on the grass without intending to obey the rule and without even being aware that there is such a rule. S’s ignorance does not make it incorrect to say that S is actually in accordance with a rule. Likewise, one might employ the method of reflective equilibrium without being aware of the method at all. SIR does not require that one accept or even be aware of the method being used. 31

Because of the fact that, according to SIR, SIR can help move someone to good answers to both (A) and (B) without the individual assuming the goodness of SIR, SIR does not beg the question in the way that a methodist does.

However, by attempting to avoid begging the question, SIR has opened itself up to a new problem that we have not seen to this point in our investigation of responses. While SIR does not necessarily require the knower to be aware of SIR, in the present context, it is being presented as a solution to the problem of the criterion. Anyone who presents SIR as a solution to the problem necessarily asserts that it is an epistemically good response.32 At this point, though, he who makes such a claim is caught in circular reasoning. When asked why SIR is a good response to the problem of the criterion, the proponent of SIR must answer by relying on what “intuitively seems true” to him. In other words, SIR is a good response because SIR has produced it. SIR works very hard to avoid begging the question against the other responses we have discussed; however, it must assume itself in order to propose itself as a solution to the problem before us. McCain and Rowley explain, The gist of the worry is that SIR will allow it to be reasonable for someone to come to believe that reflective equilibrium is a good method for determining true propositions by using reflective equilibrium to support that belief. This kind of circular reasoning has been termed “rule-circularity” . . . [and] occurs when a rule or method is employed to establish that that very rule or method is acceptable. 33

The only way for this form of reflective equilibrium to avoid such circular reasoning is to return to straight-forward question begging. Thus, this response does not provide a solution that is any more satisfying than those already discussed.

Furthermore—and perhaps this is why Chisholm does not even consider such responses in his original work—reflective equilibrium has not truly disagreed with the skeptic. He who takes the reflective equilibrium stance bases 31. McCain and Rowley, 136.

32. If they do not present SIR as a good solution, then there is no reason to prefer it over any other response.

33. McCain and Rowley, 138.

24

•

Spring 2016

JORDAN H UGH ES

|

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION

all of his beliefs upon a foundation of intuitions which he admits may be false.

This seems to render any certainty or absolute truth claims impossible. To assert that his conclusions are true, he must assert that his intuitions are inherently good. But he specifically and purposefully does not assert that his intuitions are inherently good, for if he does, he begs the question. Therefore, the reflective equilibrium proponent has relegated himself to probability, likelihood, or reasonableness. He must agree with the skeptic’s conclusion that it is impossible to know whether any statement is true or not. He must attach the caveat “I might be wrong” to every statement he makes. He must accept the skeptic’s claim that there is a possibility of pervasive error.34 It is clear, then, that the additional answers suggested in response to Chisholm’s work provide no better solution than Chisholm’s original three. This paper has investigated all of the major responses given to the problem of the criterion, and none of them offer a satisfactory answer.

Dealing with the Unanswer able P roblem We have now come full circle back to Chisholm who began this conversation by referring to this issue as the “insoluble problem of the criterion.”35 McCain and Rowley conclude their work by asserting that until a better answer is found, “When responding to the POC [Problem of the Criterion] we have an unpalatable pick of poisons.”36 Faced with such a bleak conclusion, Robert P. Amico offers an interesting perspective. He states: The problem of the criterion, as understood here, is no more a problem than the question: How does one make a circle square? Once one understands that the conditions set by the skeptic for solving the problem are in principle impossible to meet, it is no longer a wonder that it cannot be solved. But I would say that the problem has dissolved, because there is no longer any rational doubt as to how to answer the question. 37

While I agree with Amico’s overall analysis, we must not ignore the lessons 34. More recently, both Cling and DePaul, two of the major supporters for these coherentist or reflective equilibrium approaches, have abandoned these views in favor of a skeptical stance, acknowledging that all possible responses to the problem of the criterion beg the question. See McCain, “The Problem of the Criterion,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm. edu/criterio/.

35. Chisholm, “Reply to Amico on the Problem of the Criterion,” 232.

36. McCain and Rowley, 140.

37. Robert P. Amico, “Reply to Chisholm on the Problem of the Criterion,” Philosophical Papers 17, no. 3 (1988): 236.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

25

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

learned from our inability to solve the problem of the criterion. We do not attempt to make a circle square because it is obviously impossible, but our recognition of the task’s impossibility is crucial. The problem of the criterion, absent any good response, has taught us that it is impossible to have knowledge without making any foundational assumptions. It is good to recognize that the problem cannot be solved; it is not good to walk away from it without learning the lessons that it teaches. No human being can make truth claims (including the truth claims that there is no truth or that we cannot know truth) without first making assumptions.

Having reached this unsatisfying conclusion, it is interesting to note that the Christian worldview fits very well with this problem. In fact, if one presupposes the Christian worldview, he would expect to find this very problem.38 The Bible asserts that God has created men and women with an innate structure of belief and knowledge; we are born with both particular knowledge and criteria for knowledge. This is seen through a quick examination of Romans chapters one and two. Romans 1:18 says that we “suppress the truth.”39 This implies that there is innate knowledge that we are able to suppress. The following verse states that God has revealed certain knowledge to men (Rom. 1:19). Next, God has given us a method of perception that is reliable enough even to believe truths about God through the physical objects that He has created (Rom. 1:20). Verse 21 states that even those who deny God “knew God.” This assumes some sort of innate knowledge of God. Additionally, Romans 2:15 asserts that God’s moral law is written on our hearts from the very beginning, and that we have a conscience that helps us determine truth. Thus, even in this brief passage, it is clear that, according to the Christian worldview, we are born with innate particular knowledge (moral truths, God, etc.) as well as innate criteria for knowledge (perception, conscience, etc.).

The implications of this worldview on the problem of the criterion is born out through a helpful analogy. Consider a robot that has been designed to perform certain functions. For example, he has been programmed to dance when a button on his head is pressed. It can be said that the robot is functioning improperly if he does not dance when the button is pressed. According to the Christian worldview, God has designed human beings in such a way that when certain buttons are pressed, we believe certain truth claims. If we do not, we are functioning improperly. If the Christian worldview is correct, then, it is not 38. I am not here arguing that belief in the Christian faith is reasonable or necessary (although I hold those views). Rather, I am simply pointing out the fact that the significance of this unsolvable problem is diminished if the Christian worldview is presupposed. For the Christian, it is not surprising that this problem cannot be solved; in fact, it makes sense that this problem exists.

39. ESV (English Standard Version). All quoted verses will come from this translation.

26

•

Spring 2016

JORDAN H UGH ES

|

THE NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION

surprising that we must beg the question in order to have knowledge. In fact, it follows that it is necessary to beg the question in order to have knowledge. If we have been programmed to make certain assumptions, it would actually be more reasonable to make the assumptions than to deny them until they can be proven or verified. Even if the robot were capable of rational thought, he would not be able to explain his reasoning for dancing when the button is pushed unless someone gave him an instruction manual that explains how he has been programmed.

Christians take the Bible to be such an instruction manual.

After seeing that there are no good solutions to the problem of the criterion, perhaps we ought to take a step back and attempt to determine which worldview fits best with the fact that we are forced to make assumptions. I have asserted that the Christian worldview fits well with this problem. This is not to say that the problem of the criterion proves or even directly supports the Christian understanding of the world. However, it is fascinating that a worldview that has been consistently held to by many people throughout the history of the world fits perfectly with a modern problem that no one can solve.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

27

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Bibliogr aphy Amico, Robert P. “Roderick Chisholm and the Problem of the Criterion.” Philosophical Papers 17, no. 3 (1988): 217-229. . “Reply to Chisholm on the Problem of the Criterion.” Philosophical Papers 17, no. 3 (1988): 235-236.

Chisholm, Roderick M. “Reply to Amico on the Problem of the Criterion.” Philosophical Papers 17, no. 3 (1988): 231-234. . “The Problem of the Criterion.” The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

Cling, Andrew. “Posing the Problem of the Criterion.” Philosophical Studies 75, no. 3 (1994): 261-292.

DePaul, Michael R. “The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 1 (March 1988): 67-86. . “Sosa, Certainty, and the Problem of the Criterion.” Philosophical Papers 40, no. 3 (2011): 287-304.

McCain, Kevin. “The Problem of the Criterion.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/criterio/ (accessed December 15, 2015).

McCain, Kevin, and William Rowley. “Pick your Poison: Beg the Question or Embrace Circularity.” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (2014): 125-140.

28

•

Spring 2016

K AT I E C O Y N E

|

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD: AN EXPLORATION OF DECONSTRUCTION AND HOW IT UNDERMINES EPISTEMOLOGY Katie Coyne

I

n a brilliantly insidious way, deconstruction undermines epistemology by dismantling not the philosophy itself, but the assumptions upon which it is founded.

In a short documentary on Why Beauty Matters, British philosopher Roger Scruton says modern art has become a cult of ugliness and utility. Art, he says, “[n]o longer . . . raise[s] us to a higher moral or spiritual plane. It is just one human gesture among others; no more meaningful than a laugh or a shout.”1 In this critique of modern art, Scruton’s observations indicate a pervasive pathology in today’s culture: violence. Art, once a techne by which man could draw near to beauty, now serves the libido dominandi—possessed, dominated, and used to portray man’s will.2 This sickness has spread like cancer, attempting to corrupt and dominate all in its wake. Where God’s love once caused him to humble himself to the point of death on the cross, now man’s lust would seek to overthrow his saving power, isolate his being to words, and use those words to declare his final death. This is the postmodern culture. It is characterized by “incredulity toward metanarratives,”3 and its prophets, beginning with Nietzsche, pronounce death: “God is dead” and “we have killed him”—and with him, metaphysics, and with 1. Roger Scruton, Why Beauty Matters (BBC Scotland, 2009).

2. Plato, Gorgias 447c.

3. Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984), xxiv.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

29

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

metaphysics, philosophy.4 Man’s use of words to kill God represents the violence which the postmodern man has done to words. This is characteristic of the deconstructionist movement.5 For deconstruction, however, there can be no foundational speech-act, no saying immune from un-saying. This is the crux. Developing, radicalizing a Nietzschean intuition, deconstruction knows that there is in each and every assumption of a correspondence (however subject to sceptical and epistemological query) between word and world . . .6

Where once words were the first creative act, now they are used to condemn the Creator. Where once words offered a connection between God and man, man and man, and man and the world, now Derrida can declare, “The text is all and nothing is outside the text.” 7 Statements like this are tantamount to the death tolls of epistemology.

Epistemology has its roots not only from the Greek word episteme but from the Neo-Kantian–German term Erkenntnistheorie, “theory of knowledge.”

Heidegger observes that Erkenntnis presupposes “a tacit . . . awareness of the world.”8 What Heidegger is drawing attention to here is that a theory of knowledge presupposes that there is something about which to have knowledge. Rorty draws the emergence of epistemology back to the central concern of modern philosophy—systematic philosophy. He defines its task as determining a foundation of knowledge and accurately representing reality.9 Alvin Goldman asserts that “the quest for truth, reason, and objectivity” are the “hallmarks of traditional epistemology.”10 Each of these descriptions suggests something about the nature 4. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 120.

5. Derrida’s writings “deconstruct the philosophy of presence, which includes the metaphysics of presence and logocentric philosophy. To deconstruct a philosophy of presence involves demonstrating that its theory is constructed (and its text is composed) out of terms and distinctions which, though taken by the theory as given or fundamental, are themselves constructs open to interrogation, and which are demonstrably unstable and lack ultimate grounds. Such ultimate grounds have traditionally been sought in the metaphysics of presence.” John C. Coker, “Derrida,” in Robert L. Arlington, A Companion to the Philosophers (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 204.

6. George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 119.

7. Quoted in Alvin Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 17.

8. M. J. Inwood, Ibid., 37. (Malden, MA: John Wiley and Sons, 1999), 111.

9. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 3.

10. Goldman, viii.

30

•

Spring 2016

K AT I E C O Y N E

|

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD

of the epistemic philosophy: it suggests that knowledge pertains to knowledge of or knowledge that something is.

As indicated by the difference between the ancient Greek episteme-logos and the 19th century German Erkenntnistheorie, the term epistemology has aggregate meanings. This is because the study of knowledge has undergone significant modifications over the centuries. Notable is the the loss in translation of the logos. This term “is never used in the merely grammatical sense, as simply the name of a thing or act . . . , but means a word as the thing referred to: the material.”11 The replacement of logos with the word theory—“to look at”—is indicative of the historical shift in an approach to man’s discussion of knowledge. While Erkenntnis still maintains a metaphysical-ontological awareness, ontology has lost its primacy, replaced by method.

Born out of the Cartesian model, modern epistemology holds knowledge to be “justified true belief.” That is to say, a claim of knowledge requires certainty and—as Rodrick M. Chisholm put it—a criterion. In “The Problem of the Criterion,” Chisholm lays out two possible starting points for knowledge: (A) “What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?”

(B) “How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?”12 Those philosophers who begin with (A) Chisholm calls “particularists,” while those who begin with (B) are “methodists.” This distinction of particularist and methodist allows for a means by which to distinguish between modern and ancient epistemology. Chisholm’s particularist gives primacy to metaphysics-ontology and from there begins epistemic philosophy. By contrast, methodists like Descartes, Locke, and Hume give primacy to epistemic method and from there establish a metaphysic.

Lloyd P. Gerson offers a further distinction, suggesting that ancient epistemology can be thought of as naturalism—“an account of cognition in general rooted in an understanding of the natural world to which humans belong and also from which they somehow stand apart as observers and thinkers.”13 He later asserts, “Broadly speaking, from the beginning of ancient Greek philosophy up to Descartes, epistemology was viewed as both naturalistic in its shape and con11. Marvin R. Vincent, Word Studies in the New Testament, Vol. 2 (New York: Scribners, 1887), 26.

12. Roderick M. Chisholm, “The Problem of the Criterion,” The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 65.

13. Lloyd P. Gerson, Ancient Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

31

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

tent and as irreducible to the enterprise that we would call empirical science.”14 By contrast, the modern or contemporary approach to epistemology—“the view that epistemology is largely a matter of logic and semantics and not a legitimate branch of modern science”—he terms the “non-natural or ‘criteriological’ approach.”15 The etymological evolution in the translation of epistemology, Chisolm’s Problem of the Criterion, and Gerson’s distinction between natural and criteriological epistemology all indicate that modern epistemology has allocated metaphysics to a secondary position. However, the continued presence of metaphysics is notable. In epistemology, whether ancient or modern, there is an assumption of metaphysics. The metaphysical assumption comprises two components, the known and the knower. There is also another assumption common to both modern and ancient epistemologists, namely, that knowledge consists in the connection between the knower and the known. Call this the epistemic assumption.

This leads to the epistemic question: how can certainty of this connection between known and knower be established? Ancient philosophers began with the ontological assumption in order to infer the epistemic assumption, but modern epistemology inverses this process, focusing first on the epistemic assumption in order to justify the ontological assumption. Although both assumptions continue to be present in the epistemic enterprise, the entrance of the pathogen which will spell death to epistemology may arguably be traced back to this inversion.

Whereas beginning with the ontological assumption leaves no room for doubt of ontology, beginning with the epistemic assumption led historically to the Cartesian quest for certainty: “I shall first of all set forth in these Meditations the very considerations by which I persuade myself that I have reached a certain and evident knowledge.”16 Descartes, influenced by skeptics like Montaigne, sets aside faith in being in order to prove with certainty the ontological assumption.

In this school, epistemology is prior to ontology. Man must reason to creation rather than from creation. Whereas reason once allowed man to know about being—see Aristotle, Aquinas, Bacon, Pascal, etc.—now man had to reason to being.

For although it is quite enough for us faithful ones to accept by means of faith the fact that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it certainly does not seem possible ever to persuade infidels of any religion, indeed, we may almost say, of any moral virtue, unless, to begin with, we prove these two facts 14. Gerson, 1.

15. Ibid.

16. Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003), 61.

32

•

Spring 2016

K AT I E C O Y N E

|

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD

by means of the natural reason.17

Descartes purposely extricates the language of theology from the starting point of his epistemology, advocating that persuading the “infidels” of the existence of the unseen—God and the human soul—should be the task of philosophy and not of theology. Correctly enough, he perceives that it is not the faithful who needed certainty of God’s existence, but rather the skeptics who require certainty. Despite what would seem an evangelistic intention, in removing faith from the discussion of knowledge, he relegates knowledge from the transcendental (as in the Platonic-Augustinian tradition) to the merely physical and opens the door for modern skepticism.

Prior to the emergence of Cartesian “super-skepticism,” so called by Richard Popkin in The History Of Scepticism From Erasmus To Descartes, skeptics often claimed to be Christian.18 One of the main avenues through which skeptical views of antiquity entered late Renaissance thought was a central quarrel of the Reformation, the dispute over the proper standard of religious knowledge, or what was called “the rule of faith.”

This argument raised one of the classical problems of the Greek Pyrrhonists, the problem of the criterion of truth. With the rediscovery in the sixteenth century of . . . Sextus Empiricus, the arguments and views of the Greek skeptics became part of the philosophical core of religious struggles then taking place. The problem . . . first raised in theological disputes was then later raised with regard to natural knowledge.19

Prior to Descartes, skeptics’ efforts aimed mostly at questioning religious claims to knowledge of the transcendental. After Descartes, “the skeptical arguments had to be altered to fit the new opponent and skepticism in the last half of the 17th century changed from being anti-scholastic and anti-Platonic, to being anti-Cartesian.”20 Descartes, reacting to skepticism, tries to start from a place of super-skepticism, a questioning not only of faith in the transcendental and God but even the reality of the natural world. Although Descartes starts from this point in order to disprove skepticism, by limiting knowledge to natural reason he accomplishes three outcomes. He re-appropriates the epistemic assumption, giving it priority over the ontological assumption and simultaneously fathering modern epistemology—based on certainty and justification—and modern skep17. Descartes, 48.

18. Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), xvii.

19. Ibid., 1.

20. Ibid., xvii.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

33

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

ticism—which questions not only the ontological assumption but also the epistemic assumption. Thus with Descartes it becomes clear how the inversion of the starting assumptions of epistemology leads to modern skepticism and how modern skepticism emerges out of the modern emphasis on natural reason over faith. The inversion of Cartesian epistemology sets the stage for something far worse than skepticism, as Catherine Pickstock suggests: It is as a metaphysician, after all, that Derrida upholds knowledge as writing, domination, and capital, for his exaltation of absence and postponement turns out to be but the inevitably nihilistic conclusion of a rationalism indifferent to the specificities of human place, time, and desire. The perfectly present is that which will never arrive, as he himself dialectically affirms. Thus he perfects, and does not refute, the Cartesian abstraction from embodiment. Not only, on the above reading, does it seem that the Derridean and entire postmodern assumption of a seamless line of development of a culpable “metaphysics” from Plato to Descartes is false; it also appears that Derrida remains within a post-Cartesian set of assumptions whose ancestry lies in sophistry and not Platonic dialectics. 21

Deconstruction begins its task like Albert Camus’s rebel, with simultaneous affirmation and negation.22 Unlike skepticism, deconstruction is not a denial of epistemology, modern or ancient. Rather it begins by affirming the Cartesian inversion of epistemology, and then it affirms the epistemic assumption—that knowledge consists in the connection between the knower and the known. In this way it affirms Plato’s analogy of the sun; it affirms that man exists separately from the world and that in order for man to have knowledge of the world he needs a means by which to acquire it. Deconstruction is conscious that the sun acts as man’s connection to the world, illuminating what is already present in order that he is not isolated to a world of darkness. It recognizes these three components—the correspondence between the world, man, and the sun—as the premises of epistemology; then, placidly, it gives man the sponge by which to wipe away the horizon and blot out the sun.23 Deconstruction’s affirmation of correspondence occurs through its identification of “words” as the means by which man has knowledge of the outside world. Words, it recognizes, are what Eric Voegelin terms “language symbols.”24 Voegelin’s conception of symbols is perhaps best articulated in his explanation of 21. Catherine Pickstock, After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 47-8.

22. Albert Camus, The Rebel (New York: Vintage International, 1991), 13.

23. Nietzsche, 120.

24. Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 28.

34

•

Spring 2016

K AT I E C O Y N E

|

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD

Aristotle’s formation of the Ethics and Politics.

When [Aristotle] constructed his concepts . . . he did not invent these terms and endow them with arbitrary meaning; he took rather the symbols which he found in his social environment, surveyed with care the variety of meanings which they had in common parlance, and ordered and clarified these meanings by the criteria of his theory. 25

What Voegelin draws out here is that words have meanings because they are representations of something which is pre-existing. George Steiner adds to this discussion of the meanings of words in his consideration of hermeneutics. Steiner aptly points out that the term “hermeneutics” draws its etymological origin from the Greek God Hermes: “patron of reading and, by virtue of his role as messenger between the gods and the living, between the living and the dead, patron also of the resistance of meaning to mortality.”26 Hermeneutics, says Steiner, is “defined as signifying the systematic methods and practices of explication, of the interpretative exposition of texts.”27 In other words, hermeneutics deals with interpretation between the symbol that is a word and the meaning which the word symbolizes. Steiner then elucidates what is meant by interpretation, giving three understandings of the word.

The three principal senses of “interpretation” give us vital guidance. An interpreter is a decipherer and communicator of meanings. He is a translator between languages, between cultures and between performative conventions. He is, in essence, an executant, one who “acts out” the material before him so as to give it intelligible life.

Hence the third major sense of “interpretation.” An actor interprets Agamemnon or Ophelia. A dancer interprets Balanchine’s choreography. A violinist a Bach partita.

In each of these instances, interpretation is understanding in action; it is the immediacy of translation. 28

Voegelin’s idea of words as representations shows that “language symbols” are endowed with meaning because of their connection to something exterior to the text; words derive their meaning from metaphysics. Similarly, Steiner’s explanation of hermeneutics articulates that the interpreter of the meanings of symbols is actually an interpreter of the material before him. Here it begins to be evident why words are the means by which man has knowledge of the outside world.

25. Voegelin, 28.

26. Steiner, 7.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 7-8.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

35

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

In Real Presences, Steiner calls deconstruction “the crisis of the word.”29 He traces the historical progression of deconstruction, asserting that “[w]e can . . . identify some of the actual moments and pronouncements, some of the attitudes and texts . . . at which, in which, the crisis became a fact of awareness.”30 It is here where culture first exhibits symptoms of the previously unnoticed malady threatening the life of epistemology, in “Mallarmé’s disjunction of language from external reference and in Rimbaud’s deconstruction of the first person singular.”31 Steiner observes that the work of these two French poets, and all that these proceedings entail, “splinter the foundations of the Hebraic-Hellenic-Cartesian edifice in which the ratio and psychology of the Western communicative tradition had lodged.”32 Using the example of a rose, Steiner summarizes Stéphane Mallarmé’s position: To ascribe to words a correspondence to “things out there,” to see and use them as somehow representational of “reality” in the world, is not only a vulgar illusion. It makes of language a lie. To use the word rose as if it was, in any way, like what we conceive to be some botanical phenomenon, to ask of any word that it stand in lieu of, as a surrogate for, “the perfectly inaccessible ‘truths’ of substance, is to abuse and demean it. It is to encrust language with falsehood” (“impure” is Mallarmé’s preferred epithet). 33

Situated in Mallarmé’s text is the first rebellion of the word against the logos. Here also is the simultaneous affirmation and negation which comes with rebellion. In using words to negate what has previously been understood as the proper function of words, Mallarmé accepts that words are a conduit by which the knower has connection to the known. He accepts that the meaning of a word is derived from an assumption of ontology. Steiner calls this the “Logos-order” and suggests that it entails “a central supposition of ‘real presence.’”34 Mallarmé uses the logos-order to negate the “supposition of real presences,” advocating an extraction of logos from the word on the grounds that an understanding of the word as logos limits the power of the word and confines it to a connection with the “inaccessible truths’ of substance.” Steiner asserts that, in contrast to the logos-order, deconstruction’s treatment of a word entails “a central supposition of ‘real absence.’”35 That is to say, the power of a word exists not in its connection to 29. Steiner, 94.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid., 95.

33. Ibid., 95-6.

34. Ibid., 96.

35. Ibid.

36

•

Spring 2016

K AT I E C O Y N E

|

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD

the world, but in its separation and freedom from the world.

Enfranchised from the servitude of representation, purged of the lies, imprecisions and utilitarian dross which this servitude has brought with it, the “word-world” can, via poetry and the poetics of thought in philosophy, resume its magic, its formal and categorical infinity. Pace Adam, lion neither roars nor defecates. Freed from any representational obligations on behalf of these functions, the word lion can now enter the reticulative unboundedness of its lexical-grammatical universe. There it can “become”—which does not, of course, mean that it “is,” that it “stands for”— either the head of a chrysanthemum, as in Marianne Moore’s famous simile, or a lineament of the Zodiac. In such metamorphic becoming and refusal of empirical correspondence, lion will interact with, will quicken into fresh life other words from which the flower or the star cluster are as wholly absent as is the tawny malodorous quadruped. Neither the poem nor the metaphysical system is made of “ideas,” of verbalized external data. They are made of words. 36

In this way man’s rebellion against God plays out in the word’s negation of the logos; “The truth of the word is the absence of the world.”37 The supposition of “real-absence” displays an anti-theological tenor, as the Judeo-Christian God is historically understood not as absence but as unchanging presence. Rimbaud displays the anti-theological aspect of deconstruction more clearly in his deconstruction of “I is another” into “I is an/other.”38 Steiner observers that Rimbaud “deconstructs the first person singular of all verbs; he subverts the classical domesticity of the ‘I.’ The provocation is deliberately, necessarily, anti-theological.”39 As Steiner goes on to explain, Any consequent deconstruction of the individuation of the human speaker or persona is, in the context of Western consciousness, a denial of the theological possibility and of the Logos concept which is pivotal to that possibility. “Je est un autre” is an uncompromising negation of the supreme tautology, of the grammatical act of grammatical self-definition in God’s “I am who I am.” Rimbaud’s decomposition introduces into the broken vessel of the ego not only the “other,” the counter-persona of Gnostic and Manichean dualism, but a limitless plurality.40

Albert Camus suggests that a rebellion is necessarily a recognition of that 36. Steiner, 97-98.

37. Ibid., 96.

38. Ibid., 99.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

37

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

against which the rebel rebels.41 In this way, by separating the logos from words, deconstruction recognizes the presence of God. Deconstruction does not want to simply ignore or question the logos-order—as does skepticism—but it recognizes and identifies the presence in order that it may first isolate that presence and then kill it. Thus deconstruction separates the “language-symbol” from the representation of being and then, using the power which it gives empty, meaningless words, isolates and restricts this existence of being, of God’s presence, of metaphysics to the text.

Deconstruction is, therefore, not an alternative or parodistic epistemology of aesthetics and reception. It is, or ought to be, an uncompromising negation of meaning and of form as these are made the (fictitious) objects of both interpretative recognition and of consensual or “objective” valuations. That which necessarily underwrites such recognitions and valuations is nothing more nor less than the myth, now glaringly untenable, of divine guarantee. In a time of epilogue and after-Word, a critique such as deconstruction must be formulated. It is Derrida’s strength to have seen so plainly that the issue is neither linguistic-aesthetic nor philosophical in any traditional, debatable sense—where such tradition and debate incorporate, perpetuate the very ghosts which are to be exorcized. The issue is, quite simply, that of the meaning of meaning as it is re-insured by the postulate of the existence of God.42

Derrida’s observation that God and objective reality continue to exist only as myth is the same which caused Nietzsche to declare that “God is dead.” “Contrary to the opinion of certain of his Christian critics,” says Camus, “Nietzsche did not form a project to kill God. He found him dead in the soul of his contemporaries.”43 Both Derrida and Camus draw attention to the way that God has been subsumed by the text. On this conception, being no longer exists apart from the text; now being can only exist in the text. It is from this position that Derrida can say, “The text is all and nothing is outside the text.”44 Steiner summarizes this view: God has become likened unto “[v]acant metaphors, eroded figures of speech, [which] inhabit our vocabulary and grammar. They are caught, tenaciously, in the scaffolding and recesses of our common parlance. There they rattle about like old rags or ghosts in the attic.”45 By this way of thinking God’s existence has become no more than memory held in empty, meaningless words.

17.

38

41. Camus, 16.

42. Steiner, 120.

43. Camus, 68.

44. Quoted in Alvin Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 45. Ibid., 3.

•

Spring 2016

K AT I E C O Y N E

|

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD

Rather than the word participating in God, the logos, God is now isolated to the word. This second inversion of deconstruction does violence not only to God, but to the word.

The now-antiquated understanding of words as symbols and representations of that which is outside of the knower seems to indicate that words have a proper function. Before deconstruction this function seemed to be a participation in and not a denial or negation of the power of God. In this way the word is likened unto Jesus; it takes a servant’s role, being the means by which God communicates with and shows love to his people. John opens his gospel by saying: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men.46

This passage seems to indicate two points, that the “Word” derives its power from being the same as the logos—God—and that all that exists is not isolated to texts, only empty words, but rather derives its metaphysical origin from the logos. The Word incarnate is Jesus. Like the word, he was a product of man’s co–creation with God, but the logos also indwelt him. His proper role was to serve men and restore to men a connection with God which had been lost. In like manner, this is the role proper to words. To separate Word-incarnate from the logos does violence to God himself and separates him from part of his nature. This act of violence plays out at the passion in the cry of Jesus on the cross: “My God, my God why have you forsaken me?”47 Deconstruction crucifies the word again, doing violence to words just as violence was done to Christ, the Word. In Christological terms, the role of the word before deconstruction was that of a humble servant to God and a gift to man as imago Dei. In classical terms, the role of the word was that of a messenger of meaning. In both cases the word derives its power and meaning from a supposition of ontology. Claiming that words have already had violence done to them in the limiting of their power, deconstruction seeks to free the word of the Christian and classical constraints of metaphysics and imbue it with unlimited power and meaning. Therefore, the pathology of deconstruction which leads directly to the death of epistemology is a violence done to words.

This is the brilliance behind deconstruction: capitalizing on man’s lust for power and disguising itself as a friend to words, it offers words a power which properly belongs to God the Father and not to words themselves. Deconstruction 46. John 1:1-4, ESV. 47. Matthew 27:46.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

39

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

makes the instrument God uses to create into the destroyer of his creation and into the replacement of God as creator. In this way deconstruction affirms the power of words while negating or stripping the word of its power to connect the knower to the known, thus isolating the knower from reality. Rather than representing being, the emptied word subsumes being into itself, until the text is all that remains to be known. From this place the word, which is meant to serve God, instead can be used to pronounce his death, and it is here that deconstruction finally succeeds in complete domination and demolition of the logos.

If the logos is truly dead, then the word is also dead. The word and the logos cannot exist without each other. Even in separating the word-symbol from the logos, the word-symbol still derives its power and life from the logos. If the word, which has taken into itself all being, is dead, then there is nothing left to be known, and both the ontological assumption and the epistemic assumption which comprise epistemology have been negated, and deconstruction has victory.

Or does it?

In his book, I See Satan Fall Like Lighting, Rene Girard argues that the violence done to Jesus on the cross emerges out of what he calls a “mimetic contagion”—a sickness which overtakes a crowd and results in what he terms the “single victim mechanism.”48 Unwilling to give the devil a metaphysical form, Girard likens the violent contagion unto the devil himself.49 In Girard’s conception the pervasive sickness in the world—the violence which spreads through culture—is a manifestation of Satan. The devil realizes that if he lets his sowing of “disorder, violence, and misfortune among his subjects” destroy God’s creation, then his own dominion will be completely destroyed as well.50 Satan, who “respect[s] nothing but power,” will not allow this to happen. He cannot destroy being without destroying himself. The pervasive violence against the word seen in deconstruction is the same mimetic violence which Girard identifies as a manifestation of Satan. It is for this reason that deconstruction cannot and does not succeed. In deconstruction’s victory over God it ensures its own destruction.

Like cancer, deconstruction kills the host upon which it depends for its own survival. Deconstruction can only use words to claim its success, but it undermines itself in its first act of violence against the word. If indeed words are stripped of the logos as deconstruction claims, then everything which deconstruction says is emptied of meaning and power. It is with these empty, powerless words that deconstruction declares the death of God. When the cancer has finally conquered, it kills itself. The task of deconstruction is the execution of God, but the Word 48. Rene Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightning (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001), 20,

35.

40

49. Ibid., 152.

50. Ibid., 37.

•

Spring 2016

K AT I E C O Y N E

|

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD

had already died and now lives. On the cross, Jesus defeated death and restored the connection between the knower and the known, between metaphysics and epistemology. In the end, the death tolls of epistemology turn out instead to be the trumpet of victory for Jesus and the word.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

41

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Bibliogr aphy Camus, Albert. The Rebel. New York: Vintage International, 1991.

Chisholm, Roderick M. “The Problem of the Criterion.” The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

Coker, John C. “Derrida.” In Robert L. Arlington, A Companion to the Philosophers. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.

Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method and Meditations. Trans. Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2003.

Gerson, Lloyd P. Ancient Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Girard, Rene. I See Satan Fall Like Lightning. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001.

Goldman, Alvin. Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999.

Inwood, M. J. A Heidegger Dictionary. Malden, MA: John Wiley and Sons, 1999.

Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1984.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Pickstock, Catherine. After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.

Plato, Gorgias. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1987.

Popkin, Richard. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. New York: Humanities Press, 1964.

Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979.

42

•

Spring 2016

K AT I E C O Y N E

|

EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CRISIS OF THE WORD

Scruton, Roger. Why Beauty Matters. BBC Scotland, 2009.

Steiner, George. Real Presences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.

Vincent, Marvin R. Word Studies in the New Testament, Vol. 2. New York: Scribners, 1887.

Voegelin, Eric. The New Science of Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

43

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

PAY NO ATTENTION TO THE MAN BEHIND THE SCREEN: REGARDING THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL FORMS ON THE SOUL OF MAN Lanson Hoopai

I

n 1964, French writer Jacques Ellul observed the following: “Without exception in modern society, technique belonged to a civilization and was merely a single element among a host of nontechnical activities. Today, technique has taken over the whole of civilization.”1 Ellul’s observation rings true 50 years later, for one can scarcely ignore the pervasive influence of technology in modern American society. Technology, as commonly understood, can be divided into two primary categories: hardware and software.2 Hardware describes those pieces of technology that occupy space, that is, that are physical. This category includes technology such as phones, laptop computers, and televisions. Small businesses, corporations, public entities, and other institutions that value “relevance” must utilize technological hardware, if they wish to survive and thrive in a commercial culture. This platitude, viewed within the context of 21st century American culture, does not seem to require philosophical proof; nor does its counterpart, that proficient use of technological software also greatly affects one’s relevance in the marketplace of ideas and services. Software, simply, contains the non-physical aspects of technology. Churches, policy think-tanks, and intellectuals have 1. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), 128.

2. For the purposes of my argument, a third possible group, firmware, can be grouped together with hardware, for they both play little role in the main thrust of my thesis. Ellul offers a more comprehensive definition of technology per se, in his “Note to Reader” in The Technological Society: It is “the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field of human activity. Ellul, xxv.

44

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

found it necessary to create websites, establish Facebook pages, and release mobile applications in order to defend their share in the internet-based marketplace of ideas. Of course, this may not strike a reader as something necessarily bad; after all, engaging in an online community allows one to plug into previously inaccessible people-groups and to network with individuals and opportunities unavailable to those less technologically-adept. Technology makes things more convenient, perfectly fitting a society interested in the newest iPhone, the fastest Intel processor, or the latest realist post-apocalyptic simulator. However, I would pose this question: What cost must one pay for these conveniences?

I do not refer merely, or even at all, to the monetary cost. It seems to me that the language of “plugging in,” “networking,” and “online community” points towards an interesting phenomenon: That is, the language of technology has been co-opted into the language of human interaction, in a way that appears natural.

Following Neil Postman, I suggest that this, in turn, points towards a certain carelessness that both incorporates and extends beyond one’s use of language.3 After all, “a superior man considers it necessary that the names he uses may be spoken appropriately, and also what he speaks may be carried out appropriately.”4 Technology naturally was, and should still naturally be, a tool reserved exclusively for instrumental purposes. However, just as the language of technology has stepped out and merged into the vocabulary of humanity and interpersonal interaction, technology itself has gone along for the ride, becoming substantially conjoined with, rather than merely instrumental to, human life per se. In this paper, I suggest that this is a negative outcome. Specifically, I argue that three forms of technological software have contributed to the tarnishing of the soul of man: social media, community forums, and online gaming.5 I further suggest that two specific arguments advance my overall thesis: Technology both discourages virtue and encourages vice, and it also isolates the individual from his community.

Several preliminary observations are in order. First, my analogies and arguments will have American culture as their backdrop. By this, I do not mean to suggest that the condition I diagnose is territorially limited, or indexed to one specific culture. Rather, my thesis can be applied to any culture in which technology plays a significant social role; South Korea, Germany, Japan, and Hong Kong come to mind. Similarities could include the speed of technological advances, the pervading presence of certain corporations, or the popularity of social media. The essence of the soul of man is common to all geographical areas; 3. Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York: Vintage, 1993), 124-125.

4. Translated et al., Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean.

(New York: Dover Publications, 1971), 264.

5. I limit my immediate inquiry to these three forms, for they appear to represent a significant portion of modern technological usage.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

45

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

so also are those conditions that would hamper its flourishing. Any argument presented here should be abstracted by the reader, and applied to other cultures similarly situated to the United States. I am confident there will be very little dissonance.

Second, I wish to elucidate my view of the relationship between technology and the human soul, the substance of which is essential to a good bit of my argument. I will do this through a response to a primary objection to my thesis: It is clear, one could argue, that many things could tarnish a man’s soul in the ways that I identified. Alcoholism, for example, could easily both encourage vice through violence, diminish social etiquette, and lessen intellectual vigor, as well as isolate one from his community if taken to the extreme. Obsession with one’s career could create undue amounts of anger, and draw a man away from his family and friends. Even studying, it has been argued, could serve as an object of the appetites.6 Technology’s impact on the soul—specifically in the ways that I have offered—is terminally non-unique, and my argument is therefore too broad.

My burden in responding to this “uniqueness objection” is to distinguish the effect of technology from the effects of other sorts of activities, such as drinking or studying too much. In Technics and Civilization, Lewis Mumford speaks about a two-part historical progression of man’s view of space and time in relation to the material and immaterial world.7 Before the 14th Century, according to Mumford, space and time first served as “markers” to indicate the limitations of sensory experience. Anything beyond this clearly was not meant for human observation, and therefore belonged properly to the heavenly realm. On this view, therefore, there existed a clear split in the universe between earthly and heavenly. After the 14th Century, however, this line was blurred; space and time no longer served as markers between the material and immaterial, but between material and material. That is, the Scientific Revolution contributed to a rapidly developing view that an object’s placement in space and time was an essential part of that object, and not, as before, merely an indicator of its physicality. If an object was not located in space and time, it simply did not exist. The existence of space and time did not consist in demarcating the bright line between heaven and earth but only in distinguishing between earthly things. If any portion of space and time was unseen, its purpose was simply to be filled by man’s ever-increasing scientific knowledge. Therefore, “Eden and Heaven were outside the new space; and though they lingered on as the ostensible subjects of painting, the real subjects were Time and Space and Nature and Man.”8 6. Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: an Essay in Regulative Epistemology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 155.

7. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (London: University Of Chicago Press, 2010), 19-21.

8. Ibid., 21.

46

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

If Mumford is right in arguing that the Scientific Revolution has created a new concept of nature and man, then I would suggest that technology (and, perhaps, the indefinite modern period known as the “Technological Revolution”) has created a third historical stage that Mumford did not anticipate, and has concomitantly abolished any substance these post-scientific concepts contained, especially the concept of man. In this paper, I present what I view to be the distinction between technology’s effect on the soul of man, as opposed to other effects: In relating to social media, community forums, or online games, man no longer relates to himself or to others as himself. In these forms, he is encouraged, and sometimes forced, to adopt a persona that is not his own. Social media, like Facebook, effectively compels one to “put his best foot forward” and to conceal any weaknesses that one does not wish to reveal. Online forums and gaming are more barefaced in their methods: Users are forced to adopt a “profile” under a pseudonym. Thus, concealment of one’s identity is encouraged, and anonymity becomes a virtue; at least when one drinks or overworks, the moral actor cannot conceal his identity behind a mask of anonymity. To the contrary with regards to technology: “Man becomes a pure appearance, a kaleidoscope of external shapes” (emphasis added).9 On the World Wide Web, normative identity is an artifice; life on the internet is a constant masquerade, and a man of the internet is a man of the stage.

Once again, I ask: At what cost do we don our masks? To answer this question, I will seek to substantiate my first argument, that these forms of technology I have listed serve to encourage vice.10 José Ortega y Gasset, in The Revolt of the Masses, identifies a historical phenomenon that he calls Technicism. He defines this idea as the problematic characteristic of “doctors, engineers, etc., who are in the habit of exercising their profession in a state of mind identical in all essentials to that of the man who is content to use his motor-car or buy his tube of aspirin—without the slightest intimate solidarity with the future of science, of civilisation.”11 Man—specifically, in Ortega’s terms, the mass-man—uses technology, such as the automobile, but subconsciously believes it to be a naturally occurring phenomenon. He pays no heed to the efficient causes or the artificial 9. Ellul, 432.

10. I do not find it to be within the realm of this paper to comment on moral skepticism with regard to the existence of vice or virtue, a lengthy subject unto itself. Suffice it to say: “Woe to those who call evil good and good evil, who put darkness for light and light for darkness, who put bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter.” Isaiah 5:20 (ESV). I will additionally operate under the assumption that virtue is self-evidently nurturing to the soul, and vice self-evidently harmful, as Thomas quotes both Augustine and Aristotle in arguing: “No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good. . . . Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.” Aquinas, Summa Theologica II.1.55.3.

11. José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 87.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

47

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

nature of the technology, but believes it to be every bit as guaranteed as nature itself. Therefore, insofar as the advanced causes are not dwelt upon, according to Ortega, the Mass-Man is barbaric in his desires and outlook: A Naturmensch.12 Put more simply: Man is lazy, and thus uses technology with no desire to know its origins or causes. Though his argument deals primarily with the social unit of man as a whole, it seems to me that Ortega’s analysis also accords well with my thesis, applied on the individual level. I must extend his analysis further, though: Not only does the Naturmensch not know from what or where technology comes, he also pays no heed to where it is taking him. In other words, not only is man too lazy to pay attention to the causes of technology, he also does not observe, or even care, what the technology is doing to him.

Technology is an instrument of expediency. When a businessman or researcher seeks a piece of information, the desired answer is generally a few keystrokes and clicks away.13 This seems, prima facie et ceterus paribus, like a desirable outcome. Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and followers of these utilitarians would, it would seem, likewise find no issue with this outcome. “Of course it is a good thing; if I was given the option to do the exact thing I want to do, except faster, why would I not want to take the option?” However, I suggest that the virtue-minded reader ought to give pause to this apparently foregone conclusion.

(After all, when virtue ethicists seem to agree with utility ethicists, something must be amiss.) In order to avoid the indolent mindset of the Naturmensch, we must consider what impact this heightened efficiency provided by the rise of technology has had, first, on certain intellectual virtues: The two I primarily have in mind are the epistemic virtues of patience and charity.14 Intellectual patience seems, out of the two, the most evidently deficient with the widespread use of the internet. Students attempting to write papers for class no longer have to spend hours thumbing away at Plato’s Republic or Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment in order to understand what the book contains.

Now, resources such as “Sparknotes” and “Grade Saver” grant the student a distilled version of the book in question, compacting all the information necessary into a short, five-minute read. Additionally, given the fact that he can access this information anonymously, no one will be the wiser. This is, no doubt, efficient; but what is the impact on the student’s intellectual patience? What if the book in question is a relatively obscure one, such as Bertrand de Jouvenel’s On Power?

Will the student who has been relying on Sparknotes for knowledge suddenly 12. Ortega, 82.

13. It is surely interesting to note that the development of “Artificial Intelligence” via iPhone’s Siri, the Amazon Echo, and other quasi-sentient programs heighten efficiency even further, perhaps to the point of mitigating the active role of the user in the first place.

14. W. Jay Wood, Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1998), 45-76.

48

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

invest the time to autonomously understand Jouvenel’s concept of noblesse oblige?

I would wager not. Not only does the student divest himself of whatever beauty may be contained within the given work of literature (a loss which undoubtedly has further deleterious effects on the soul), his patience to learn has been gradually eroded by his reliance on minimalist online summaries. With the internet, the student is able to don the mask of diligence and studiousness; shatter the resource, and the mask shatters as well.

On the subject of virtues, intellectual charity also seems substantially compromised. Intellectual charity, according to Robert C. Roberts, is that characteristic that allows one to give another person the benefit of the doubt.15 It allows one to see the best in another’s argument, and always assume the strongest case possible, given the other person’s viewpoint. This is motivated both by an interest in pursuing the truth and by the humble acknowledgement that one could possibly be wrong. However, there seems to be startling lack of this virtue on social media, specifically Facebook. When there are conflicts of viewpoints between two people (they do not even have to know each other), whether the topic is regarding immigration, homeschooling, apologetics, or any seemingly morally significant question, the tendency for arguments to degenerate into straw man fallacies or ad hominem attacks is, it seems to me, disproportionately substantial compared to these same discussions between individuals in face-to-face conversation.

Odd as this may seem, I suspect that this phenomenon can be understood in terms of my masquerade thesis. Even when Facebook profiles purport to portray identity, the veil of the internet prevents one from fully, or even roughly, comprehending the personhood of the Other. One of the most effective ways—perhaps the only effective way—we can affirm the existence of “other minds” with certainty is to observe the behavior of other persons and relate those behaviors to our own.16 If this element of observation is removed (through, for example, communication over and behind the mask of the internet), our confidence in the existence of other minds is shaken, and our concomitant social obligations are as well. Social manners and etiquette, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed, sometimes come about as a result of “arbitrary conventions among certain men.”17 If those with whom one communicates, however, are not “men,” but masks, what obligations remain? There can be no certainty of the existence of other minds, 15. Roberts and Wood, 74.

16. I understand that this view is empiricist in nature, and renders my viewpoint vulnerable to idealist or non-empiricist objections regarding the acquisition of knowledge. I do not intend to offer a full account or defense of this view here, but will assume for the sake of the argument that it is true.

17. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 578.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

49

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

and there can therefore be no certainty in regards to the necessity of manners, especially intellectual charity. At best, one can unconsciously suspend belief in the existence of the one across the screen, but as William James noted, a suspension of belief is as good as denying the belief itself.18 The result is a remorseless form of internet harassment, toxic language, and vitriolic insults hurled at a mask, but terminated in a person. Ultimately, the result is a form of egoism, from the metaphysical solipsism birthed from the masquerade.

So much for intellectual patience and charity. What other vices can be observed to stem from technology’s newfound relation to the soul? I can think of at least three more, briefly. First, vicious curiosity is encouraged, for the anonymity provided by the internet provides a perceived lack of social accountability for one’s actions. Specifically, such headlines as “Find your friend’s criminal record online!” or “who has X celebrity divorced now?” promote as proper items of knowledge those items that have no real place in one’s epistemic structure.19 Rather, it only serves as the “gratification of the eye,” which is made easier when one’s eye is hidden behind a mask.20 Furthermore, I would also argue that social media allows one to feign virtue without being virtuous, that is, to adopt the form without the substance, to put on the mask of virtue. My reasoning is this: Aristotle posited that practical wisdom and virtuous behavior must be gained through experience; social media and community forums allow for the instantaneous appearance of virtuous thought, without the necessary moral experience to supplement the words with substance.21 One can easily post a verse from Scripture on Twitter, or an inspirational quote from Frost, Wilde, or Lord Tennyson on Facebook, while simultaneously lacking both the knowledge and actions necessary to substantiate the quote’s ideals. Moreover, only the petty person questions any possible discrepancy between the poster’s words on Facebook and character offline. The end result is the large-scale removal of accountability against hypocrisy, the likes of which is provided by a healthy society. 22 Lastly, the populist nature of Facebook, Reddit, and other similar sites renders users, it would appear, uniquely susceptible to groupthink.23 This form of self-deception, Gregg Ten Elshof argues, obtains when a group of people hold a certain position, and the individual thinks he holds to that same position by virtue of his cohort’s beliefs. In 18. William James, “The Will to Believe,” The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 1956).

19. Roberts and Wood, 155.

20. Augustine, Confessions, X.35.

21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1103a.15-18.

22. Other notable examples include joining important “causes” on Facebook, or tweeting “#PrayforParis.”

23. Gregg A. Ten Elshof, I Told Me So: Self-Deception and the Christian Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2009), 76.

50

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

instances such as these, it is imminently possible, according to Ten Elshof, that the person has merely succumbed to the epistemic bandwagon effect; populism, and its technological manifestations, therefore discourage intellectual honesty in the individual. Political beliefs on Facebook seem an apt example.

An important qualifier is appropriate here, before changing our modes of inquiry. Through my arguments, I do not mean to suggest that the technological forms necessarily bring about vicious behavior, but only that the forms encourage such behavior. Put differently, the relationship I have offered is not one of causation, but of correlation: One can conceive of an individual who frequents Facebook, Reddit, and online games, and yet perfectly exhibits the intellectual virtues of patience, charity, honesty, et cetera. There does not seem to be a necessary dissonance between the two kinds of characteristics, and this is therefore not an impossible scenario. However, upon the attempt to conceive of such an individual, I find myself compelled to recognize the thought’s possibility, but not to its probability. Indeed, my own experience (and, I would speculate, many others’ as well) strikes against this ideal. Regardless of logical necessity, there seems to exist a de facto element by which those souls consumed by the technological forms and those that exhibit the intellectual virtues generally do not converge. I am not willing or prepared to argue that, based on my experience, this ideal never obtains in reality. Rather, I make a more modest suggestion: the technological forms contribute in significant ways to the acting out of vicious characteristics.24 Concurrently, I would supplement with a similar qualifier my analysis of technology and community, and it is to that subject of community specifically that I now turn.

Abstracting away from the individual qua individual, I suggest that the masquerade of the internet also affects an individual’s relationship to his surrounding community, namely, that it encourages an isolation of the individual. In order to advance this argument, it seems necessary to present a workable definition of “community” for the purposes of dialogue.25 First, my concept of “community” will emphasize the individual’s relation to his society, as opposed to an Ortegan, “God’s-eye” perspective of the societal unit as a whole. Second, my conception of “community,” following Robert Nisbet, includes moral, social, political, and intellectual aspects.26 At its heart, these categories can be condensed into two fundamental features: First, community requires a strong no24. After all, the internet can serve as the entry or tipping point into and the mediator of vicious action.

25. I do not see exhaustive definition of “community” to be necessary nor practical for the purposes of this paper. Instead, I propose a definition that is as broad as reasonably possible, such that it can be widely agreed upon as accurate.

26. Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community: a Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute Books, 2010), 40-41.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

51

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

tion of individual personhood, whereby all individuals are accorded equal rights and equal social capital de facto. (Of course, for personhood to be recognized, there must first be a person; the best sort of community, then, must be physical and face-to-face. This positive view of physical society is exemplified in Christopher Lasch’s idea of “Third Places.”)27 Second, a healthy community should bind these individuals together in a “strong cultural heritage, with a sense of membership.”28 Indeed, this membership, in my view, is pre-political, such that laws merely serve to legally bind together individuals already bound by obligation; “I bind myself.”29 In sum, the best sort of community simultaneously recognizes the importance and autonomy of physical individuals, and is yet bound together by common pre-political obligations to each other, reinforced by legal regulations.30 Participation in a community is critical to a healthy soul of man; Aristotle postulated that man is, by nature, social.31 This proposition’s truth can be made clear when one considers man’s state of despair; the eradication of community and addition of technology seeks to provide comfort without faces. Yet, whom among us takes more comfort from the most profound answer on Google, than from the tritest words of a caring neighbor?32 Technology cannot soothe the heart of man, for a wall of masks can only terrify; “the natural role of the twentieth-century man is anxiety.”33 Without a face to the words of comfort, the grieving soul can only echo the words of King Richard III: “I am myself alone.”34 Man requires community; it is not metaphysically optional, nor is it the “subtler, quieter tyranny” that Frank Meyer makes it out to be.35 To quote Nisbet once more: “Mutilate the roots of society and tradition, and the result must inevitably be the isolation of a generation from its heritage, the isolation of individuals from their fellow man, and the creation of sprawling, faceless masses.”36 27. Christopher Lasch, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, New ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996), 119-121.

28. Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: Nabu Press, 2011), 245-246.

29. Roger Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002), 15.

30. I recognize that my idea of membership puts me at odds with the social contractarians, who would decry the idea of pre-political societal states. So be it; our conflict runs deeper than technology.

31. Aristotle, Politics, 1253a.1-10.

32. One cannot understate the importance of the virtues and benefits of face-to-face communication, among which are the ability to read emotion, vocal inflections that project empathy, and physical comfort.

33. Thomas Dormandy, The Worst of Evils: the Fight Against Pain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 253.

34. Nisbet, 9.

35. Ronald H. Nash, Freedom, Justice, and the State (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 104.

36. Nisbet, 21.

52

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

Roger Scruton, in speaking of Islam’s impact on culture, suggested that there has been a “confiscation of the political” in Islamic theology.37 In essence, those roles played by politics and negotiation in “The West” are reduced to religious roles in “The Rest.” To use this image analogously, I suggest that the pervasive presence of technology in society has enacted a similar confiscation: the technological “confiscation of the social.” I argue that there are two main ways in which technology has usurped the role of genuine, physical community in the soul of modern man. First, and perhaps most obvious, the forms of technology offer the ever-present diversions that Pascal talks about in his Pensees.38 Whether at the dinner table, public meetings, corporate environments, or the Metro Rail Transit System in Washington, DC, there is scarcely ever a lack of a smartphone or two out and open to Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, or some application for entertainment. John L. Locke observed, on a purely empirical level, that technological Americans are “no longer (the) volunteering, joining, getting-to-know each other, community-building citizens who once typified this nation to the rest of the world.”39 On the surface level, technology has a tendency to draw one away from his immediate surroundings, from his immediate community.

Of course, one may again object that this particular isolation effect is not unique to technology. After all, newspapers and magazines existed long before mobile electronic devices, and those also drew readers away from their surroundings. On my view, what distinguishes newspapers from modern technology is what happens after one has been initially drawn away. Newspapers, while immersive to an extent, force their readers back into the external world once they have been read through. This is the same, I would suggest, with any other text-based work.40 Not so with the internet, and especially with social media, community forums, and online gaming. Insofar as these forms of technology are populist in character (meaning, they derive their popularity from the userbase itself), these sources of diversion are only as limited as the collective human imagination.

Furthermore, and perhaps more dangerously, while newspapers make no claim to offer a substitute for authentic community, the internet seems to do so, and does so vigorously.

“Online communities” purport to offer all the characteristics of face-to-face communities; all those who make up the userbase of each platform are both free 37. Scruton, 91.

38. Blaise Pascal, Pensees, trans. by A. J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 42..

39. John L. Locke, The De-Voicing of Society: Why We Don’t Talk to Each Other Anymore (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 151.

40. Additionally, the very best books do not compel one to create a second artificial identity in order to suspend reality, but to temporarily look through the eyes of one already created, in order to grasp reality more fully. This is why, in my mind, book clubs are a unique and authentic sort of community.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

53

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

and equal in their capacity to communicate with each other, and the membership offered is entered into voluntarily, often for reasons outside of the rules set in place. Francis Fukuyama, in his work The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order, even identifies an element of trust that goes into certain technological forms, such as eBay’s purchase function.41 From this, one could argue that, while technology does draw one away from his immediate physical surroundings, the community offered by the internet is a viable substitute for the purposes of a flourishing soul.

I disagree, for two reasons. First, the system of “trust” upon which eBay and other sites function is essentially economic, insofar as one must accumulate social capital in order to achieve business goals and fill profit margins. If a seller does not meet a buyer’s expectations, or acts unethically or unscrupulously, the seller loses ratings, and therefore loses the “trust” of the community. Because of this, the seller will likely lose business, and therefore lower his profit margin. This is qualitatively different from the sort of trust upon which authentic, face-to-face communities are built. While eBay “trust” is essentially coercive, the trust that obtains in church and family communities are vulnerability-laden. This means that each member of the face-to-face community has confidence in the other members of the community, and yet seems to operate off of an implicit understanding that this trust could very well be broken someday. Yet, the risk is worth the trust, for the moral bonds of community require the benefit of the doubt; communities would never survive if every promise was subjected to intense scrutiny. There are, therefore, two different understandings of “trust” at work here: The first is intensely risk-averse, and the second is risk-enabling. Harm is severely punished in the first instance and is both reprimanded and forgiven in the second.

Second, though related to the first reason, it seems to me that an authentic “community” requires the ability to identify closely with the interests of the group at large. So closely, in fact, that if the interests of the group were compromised, the individual would also be hurt by virtue of his membership in the group. Therefore, if a family divorces, every member of the family is harmed, and if a church splits, the members are likewise distressed. This risk factor is not present when it comes to online communities. This can be explained, once again, in terms of my masquerade hypothesis: One identifies with an online community so long as the mask he chooses is worn. If the online community is compromised, the individual can immediately remove the mask and disassociate himself from his prior membership. Therefore, if a Facebook activist group is found to be fraudulent, any member can leave and block all associations with that group, 41. Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (New York: Free Press, 2000), 211.

54

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

and come out none the worse for the wear. If a game is found to be cheating its playerbase, a formerly loyal customer can immediately turn and sue the company to whom he owes hundreds of hours of entertainment. No harm is incurred if the basis of the community is found to be defunct, for no personal stake is required on the internet. This is a crucial factor of community, and a factor that fundamentally separates a physical one from those online.

Of course, no community is without its dissenters, just as no argument is without its objections. I consider three here: The first, I call the “Physicalist Objection.” With regard to both virtue and community, I have constantly asserted the importance and value of face-to-face interaction and assumed its moral goodness. One could question this assumption: “Why should physical communities be considered ontologically superior to non-physical communities? There seem to be no grounds upon which to accept this premise.” Though entire volumes could be (and have been) written on this subject, I offer one reason why physical communities ought to be considered superior to exclusively online communities: Decency is present in the former, and notably scarce in the latter. Lasch argues that public decency and manners are the “preeminent civic or political virtue,” in that the constant display of decency encourages the exercise of the other virtues, such as temperance, wit, and humility.42 Conversely, on Lasch’s view, decency discourages “pomposity,” “histrionics,” and intemperance, by constantly holding the vicious individual’s social standing and public image at stake.

Herein lies a crucial distinction: There exists no equivalent coercion method in the non-physical world of the internet, nor any compelling incentive to act decently or virtuously. On the contrary, many have argued that various web applications actually function as enablers towards vicious behavior.43 For example, in many multiplayer online games (MOs), communication with other players is critical to both success and enjoyment. This motivator, however, is compromised by the fact that individuals are willing and able to speak carelessly and thoughtlessly online, with words that would hardly be tolerated if spoken to someone’s face.44 This phenomenon of carelessness is reflected in the language used on Reddit, Facebook, Twitter, League of Legends and other sites that encourage communication. Though efforts can be undertaken to curb vicious behavior by, for example, banning user accounts, the anonymity of the internet provides ready workarounds; one can merely “swap masks” by creating alternative accounts.45 42. Lasch, 122.

43. Yannick LeJacq, “How League of Legends Enables Toxicity,” Kotaku, March 25, 2015, http://kotaku.com/how-league-of-legends-enables-toxicity-1693572469, accessed November 29, 2015.

44. As the Kotaku article points out, it is not uncommon to hear players tell their League of Legends “teammates” to kill themselves in reality.

45. “‘League of Legends’ Experiments With Near-Instant Ban System for Toxic Chat,”

Vol. I, No. 2

•

55

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Of course, one may argue that individuals can also adopt different personalities in physical community, thereby “putting on” a mask in a way similar to internet activity. My rejoinder would simply be this: It is much harder to both successfully adopt and maintain this mask in physical community than it is with an online profile, as it is much easier to hold a person accountable for vicious behavior and inauthentic character when face-to-face.

One could raise another, more potent objection, which I will call the “Benefits Objection:” I have thus far set the technological forms in opposition to the soul of man by way of community and virtue. However, it seems that this dichotomy neglects, so the objection goes, certain very tangible benefits that the forms may bring about. In one instance, a pre-existing community could use social media to communicate with members outside of physical proximity; a church would therefore use Facebook to speak with a missionary team in a third-world country. One would feign to call this negative. In another instance, an individual could use community forums to express thoughts and feelings that, due to social anxiety or panic attacks, he simply cannot in face-to-face communication. On the first thought experiment, the utility of the technological forms work towards the benefit of the community. On the second, the masquerade seems to play a healthy role. This incongruity is, I admit, what I see to be the biggest defeater to my argument. It is therefore my burden to respond as thoroughly as possible, and ask the question: Is my thesis commensurable with these perceived benefits?

I argue that it is. As a preliminary response, one must recall that my thesis identifies a relationship of correlation between vice and the technological forms, rather than one of necessary causation. Again, I would suggest that this relationship holds between the technological forms and and the ideal community, insofar as the concepts tend to, but do not necessarily, conflict. This allows me to admit incidental exceptions to the rule, of which the two foregoing examples might consist. Of course, dismissing objections as “incidental exceptions” is hardly intellectually satisfying, so I will attempt to respond to each example in turn.

In regards to the first thought experiment, regarding the effects of the technological forms on pre-existing communities, I do not deny that some concrete benefits could accrue to the community that utilizes them well. Even while critiquing technology’s role in culture, Mitroff and Bennis admit that “[t]aken in moderate, controlled doses, unreality can even be beneficial to prolonged social life—much as aspirin in moderate doses is helpful in warding off heart attacks.”46 At risk of mixing metaphors, I view technology’s role in a pre-existing commuForbes, May 25, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2015/05/25/league-of-legends-experiments-with-near-instant-ban-system-for-toxic-chat/, accessed November 29, 2015.

46. Ian I. Mitroff and Warren Bennis, The Unreality Industry: the Deliberate Manufacturing of Falsehood and What It Is Doing to Our Lives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 82.

56

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

nity as a prosthetic limb for a human adult; when it is necessary, it is helpful.

However, the basis of the prosthetic limb’s usefulness is found in the fact that the user is already human. This may seem painfully obvious, but I think it highlights an important point: The technological forms should only be seen as beneficial, if the community already exists prior to technology’s introduction. That is, if the community is pre-technological in essence, technology can play its proper, instrumental role. One must be careful, however, to not let technology take over all functions of the community; one would feign to call a man fully consisting of prosthetic parts “human.” Similarly, there seems to come a point at which a reduction to technological parts would destroy the identity of the previously existing entity.47 Furthermore, technology ought to be utilized only when necessary in community; superfluous prosthetic limbs do not good, if one’s arms and legs already function perfectly fine. Therefore, technology can have beneficial effects on a pre-existing society, but the community must remain vigilant to keep technology in its proper, instrumental place. If conflated with the essence of community, then one can only imagine what consequences would obtain.

The second thought experiment points to the potentially beneficial effects of the masquerade. Websites such as “Social Anxiety Support” utilize the anonymity provided by the internet, and allow users to express their frustrations and phobias in a manner that conceals their privacy.48 These websites, it is argued, though admittedly susceptible to the masquerade analysis, actually help individuals overcome their societal distresses by providing an expressive outlet. Even accepting the existence of the masquerade, it seems that anonymity does not, contrary to my suggestion, degrade community. Rather, it can enhance community by freeing individuals from those personality disorders that inhibit social integration.

Aristotle’s philosophy of community contributes greatly here. In Book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle conceives of three sorts of “friendships:” Those based on utility, those based on pleasure, and those based on virtue.49 Admittedly, these three motivations for friendship are not necessarily mutually exclusive: “good people are also pleasant to each other,” and “good people are also useful to each other.”50 Communities and friendships based on utility and pleasure are base, because they do not require mutual goodwill, do not require good men, change arbitrarily with time.51 Only those friendships based on vir47. I am reminded of the question of identity presented in the paradox of Theseus’ ship: Roderick M. Chisholm, Person and Object: a Metaphysical Study, (London: Routledge, 2002), 89.

48. Social Anxiety Support, http://www.socialanxietysupport.com/forum/, accessed November 29th, 2015.

49. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1156a-b.

50. Ibid., 1157a.1-3.

51. In Book VIII, Section 9 of the Ethics, the Philosopher describes community as the nat-

Vol. I, No. 2

•

57

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

tue can be appropriately predicated as the highest degree of friendship: “complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue.”52 It seems, then, that Aristotle identifies a gradient of community; that is, a gathering can be more or less of a good community, depending upon the basis for its formation. In fact, Aristotle argues, “Of [friendships based on pleasure and utility], the friendship for pleasure is more like [real] friendship.”53 Therefore, Aristotle sets up a scale that views utility-oriented friendships as the least akin to good community, and virtue-based friendships as the ideal.

Applying Aristotle’s philosophy to the objection at hand, I suggest two ideas in response. First, the object of this particular Benefits Objection necessarily precludes the highest form of relationship; i.e. the exclusively online relationship cannot comport with the virtue-based friendship. This is because Aristotle sees virtue-based friendships as requiring time and familiarity, since friends must have “shared their salt” before they can know each other.54 Anonymity, however, fundamentally prevents two parties from becoming familiar with each other; what party X knows about party Y is only what party Y has voluntarily disclosed. Upon this knowledge—if one can call it knowledge, for one can never be sure what is hidden behind the curtain of anonymity—the online parties seek to build a friendship. This falls far short of knowledge by acquaintance and experience, of the sort that Aristotle suggests is crucial to virtue-based friendships. On Aristotle’s view, this experiential knowledge comes about when each party agrees to trust the other, on the basis of perceived virtues and character. By contrast, the only knowledge that one can have online is what has, again, been voluntarily disclosed; it is not a thoroughly vetted trust, nor is it confirmable by experience. Short of agreeing to meet and establish a long-term relationship in reality, I see no way in which Aristotle’s virtue-based friendship can obtain between online individuals, given that the knowledge and trust presented are inherently questionable and not confirmable by experience.

However, even if the individuals in question sought to form long-term relationships by meeting in person, I still maintain that the relationship would not obtain in virtue. This is because the basis of the relationship, specifically in the context at hand, was utility. Though it is true that the friendship could potentially evolve into one consisting in virtue (community does not seem to be a binary ural extension of friendship based on justice, and thereby uses the terms “friendship” and community” interchangeably: “For in every community there seems to be some sort of justice, and some type of friendship also. At any rate, fellow voyagers and fellow soldiers are called friends, and so are members of other communities. And the extent of their community is the extent of their friendship, since it is also the extent of the justice found there.” Aristotle, Ethics, 1159b.26-31.

52. Ibid., 1156b.7-8.

53. Ibid., 1158a.18.

54. Ibid., 1156b.28.

58

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

concept, but one that can change forms), the initial impetus for the friendship, and thus the primary foundation, lay in the usefulness of the parties involved.

The Philosopher does not seem to hold a high opinion of these relationships: “Those who love each other for the utility love the other not in his own right, but insofar as they gain some good for themselves from him. . . . And so these sorts of friendships are easily dissolved.”55 (Permanency, Aristotle seems to suggest, is a key element of authentic community) Insofar as it is based on utility, then, the online relationship is far removed from the ideal of virtue. Online friendships could just as easily obtain in pleasure; online dating is a paradigmatic example.

In either case, I find it difficult to conceive of an online community that could realistically be based in Aristotle’s notion of virtue.

Aristotle’s theory of friendship, specifically of the gradation of communities, also proves informative when dealing with the third objection: what I call the “Alternatives Objection.” On this view, there exist social units that do not technically qualify under my definition of community, and yet appear to have a strong resemblance of such. My burden, as I see it, is to defend my definition against these hypotheticals that could be proposed: I consider one, to demonstrate an archetypal response against other, doubtless numerous, counterexamples. Fan conventions, whether the subject matter be anime, literature, video games, or science fiction, bring together individuals with common interests and like passions.56 It seems that, though these conventions are masquerades in a very concrete way (some fans dress up in costumes), other aspects of conventions portray a community-like character. After all, they are physical, they operate from a sense of membership, and members are all recognized as free and equal until proven otherwise.

What is the substantial difference? I suggest, first of all, that insofar as these gatherings base themselves in the passions, relationships formed here will have pleasure as their basis. Upon this factor alone, Aristotle would not consider these conventions to constitute true communities.57 Secondly, I would suggest that the temporary nature of conventions undercuts arguments that seek to predicate community to conventions. Again, Aristotle had it that the provisional nature of utility and pleasure-based relationships worked against a claim to the 55. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1156a.10-12, 20.

56. Marie Alcober, “Modern Cities and the Quest for Community,” Avatar Secrets, December 11, 2013, http://avatarsecrets.com/cities-and-the-quest-for-community/#.VlnTz9-rSRt, accessed November 29, 2015.

57. Of course, it is conceivable that, depending upon the nature of the subject matter, the conventions could attain more or less to the ideal community; literature conventions, perhaps, may comport better to the ideal community than anime conventions. This is because good literature tends to points to reality and the nature of existence, while anime generally functions upon the denial of reality as a whole. The object of a gathering’s interest may influence its ontological standing qua community.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

59

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

ideal community. Given that conventions usually only last for a week, at most, I struggle to see how, under Aristotle’s definition, conventions could lay even a plausible claim to authentic, virtue-based community. It must settle for something lesser, even much lesser than the ideal. Of course, one could certainly question Aristotle’s definition. However, this would involve arguing against the Philosopher himself; I, for one, find myself neither able nor willing to partake in this burden.

I have argued that the technological forms of social media, community forums, and online gaming have negative impacts on the soul of man. Specifically, I have suggested that they encourage vice while discouraging virtue, and that they have the effect of isolating man from his community; I have also defended this thesis from potential objections. Given this pessimistic view of technology’s relationship to the soul, one may wonder if I would prescribe a wholesale repudiation of the technological forms. I would not; in order to demonstrate why, I will conclude by briefly stepping away from the philosophizing, and suggest what I think would be an appropriate response to the technological forms. First, I would offer that the very act of reading this paper is a “positive step in the right direction,” as it were. Not that this paper qua paper is particularly insightful or intriguing; rather, I hope that the content of my claims, if not accepted at face value, have stimulated contemplation as to the effect of technology on the soul of man. Further meditation on the subject, and perhaps conscious action concomitant with the meditation, would vindicate my work.

Second, I would recommend a conscious moderation of our use of technology. After all, “all things are lawful for me, but I will not be enslaved by anything.”58 If we are to be cautious of technology’s adverse effect on our souls, the minimum action that seems prudent would be to re-evaluate our reliance on our electronic devices. Perhaps, if our social interactions find us staring at a screen more often than we gaze at a human face, some discipline is in order. This may involve, among other things, turning off one’s cell phone when breaking bread with friends. Lastly, I would suggest that the value of personal accountability cannot be overstated. Man intrinsically requires community for the flourishing of the soul; man can also enlist the extrinsic assistance of community towards the suppression of vice. This principle will, no doubt, instantiate itself in reality through different ways for different persons. Careful examination of individual situations, then, seems wise for the sake of virtuous growth in the soul. After all, theoretical speculation ought to have the effect of helping individuals become more virtuous. That, in my view, is philosophy’s proper role. Maybe—just maybe—there also exists unexamined ontological room for champagne, a ballroom, and the masquerade in this endeavor.

58. 1 Cor. 6:12b, ESV.

60

•

Spring 2016

L A N S O N H O O PA I

|

PAY N O AT T E N T I O N T O T H E M A N B E HIND THE SCREEN

Bibliogr aphy Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benzinger Bros., 1947.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. In Michael L. Morgan, Classics of Moral and Political Theory. 5th ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 2011. . Politics. In Michael L. Morgan, Classics of Moral and Political Theory.

5th ed. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 2011.

Augustine. Confessions. Trans. by R.S. Pine-Coffin. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976.

Chisholm, Roderick M. Person and Object: a Metaphysical Study. London: Routledge, 2004.

Confucius. Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean.

Trans. by James Legge. New York: Dover Publications, 1971.

Dormandy, Thomas. The Worst of Evils: the Fight Against Pain. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. New York: Vintage Books, 1964.

Elshof, Gregg A. Ten. I Told Me So: Self-Deception and the Christian Life. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2009.

Fukuyama, Francis. The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order. New York: Free Press, 2000.

Gasset, José Ortega y. The Revolt of the Masses. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994.

James, William. “The Will to Believe.” The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Dover Publications, 1956.

Lasch, Christopher. The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

61

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

Locke, John L. The De-Voicing of Society: Why We Don’t Talk to Each Other Anymore. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

Mitroff, Ian I., and Warren Bennis. The Unreality Industry: the Deliberate Manufacturing of Falsehood and What It Is Doing to Our Lives. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Mumford, Lewis. Technics and Civilization. London: University Of Chicago Press, 2010.

Nash, Ronald H. Freedom, Justice, and the State. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980.

Nisbet, Robert. The Quest for Community: a Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom. Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute Books, 2010.

Pascal, Blaise. Pensees. Trans. by A. J. Krailsheimer. London: Penguin Books, 1995.

Postman, Neil. Technopoly: the Surrender of Culture to Technology. New York: Vintage, 1993.

Roberts, Robert C., and W. Jay Wood. Intellectual Virtues: an Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Scruton, Roger. The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat.

Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002.

Tillich, Paul. The Protestant Era. Chicago: Nabu Press, 2011.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Trans. by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

Wood, W. Jay. Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1998.

62

•

Spring 2016

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEWS

The Closing of the Liberal Mind: How Groupthink and Intolerance Define the Left. Kim R. Holmes. New York: Encounter Books, 2016. 312 pp.

Reviewed by Sarah Crandall In a world of trigger warnings, decreasing freedom of conscience, and increasing pressure to say and do the politically correct thing, Dr. Kim Holmes calls for a return to civil discourse, open dialogue, and liberal liberalism. In his book The Closing of the Liberal Mind, he points out the discrepancy between the nomenclature of modern liberals and their illiberal behavior, tracing the phenomenon’s historical development from classical liberalism to radical liberalism through the Enlightenment and postmodern eras. This book seeks to make sense of the philosophical foundations of the modern tolerance movement and the consequences, intended or otherwise, of that philosophy.

The Closing of the Liberal Mind provides a survey and history of American ideas, following two of his previous books, Rebound: Getting America Back to Great (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013) and Liberty’s Best Hope: American Leadership for the 21st Century (The Heritage Foundation, 2008). Cultural analysis represents a shift in specialization for Holmes, who previously served as The Heritage Foundation’s vice president for foreign policy studies before a four-year stint as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs under President George W. Bush. He then returned to The Heritage Foundation, resuming his vice presidency until 2012, when he transitioned to the study of domestic ideological and historical trends. In turning to history, he returned to his roots: his master’s and doctoral studies were in history at Georgetown University. He continues to distinguish himself in foreign policy studies, serving as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

The inspiration for this particular book, as Holmes mentions in the introduction, was Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind, which discussed the intolerance of the left as seen in the academe of the 1980s. While Holmes includes plenty of modern instances of intolerance in academia, his goal is to show the historical progression and answer the question, How did classic liberalism morph into progressive and repressive liberalism? Thus, Holmes discusses the tendency to demonize one’s opponents in political rhetoric and supports his arguments with examples from the judiciary, the executive branch, the media, and celebrity culture, as well as universities.

Beginning with the philosophical groundwork, Holmes characterizes Vol. I, No. 2

•

63

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

classic liberalism, which he sees as the pre-20th century healthier ancestor of progressive liberalism, as a philosophy of openness balancing individual rights with the needs of society. It was limited by deference toward the moral law.

Key thinkers in this tradition include John Stuart Mill, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and John Locke. The Enlightenment produced two lines of thought, which Holmes refers to as the moderate Enlightenment tradition of Locke, Montesquieu, and Voltaire, and the radical Enlightenment tradition of Rousseau, Spinoza, and Diderot. The radical Enlightenment turned men into gods through its view of nature as essentially one and all-good. Holmes’ discussion of this movement is reminiscent of Eric Voegelin’s criticism of immanentism, the idea that man can, by his own efforts and prescriptions, bring about heaven in the here and now. The moderate Enlightenment, on the other hand, preserved a much more modest view of man’s nature and abilities; absolute equality was an impossible dream, and social hierarchy the necessary reality. Men could have equal political rights, but social and economic equality was unworkable.

Modern progressive liberalism built on the radical Enlightenment’s foundations. It elevated the state and justified the limitation of freedom for the sake of the welfare and security of all, as Tocqueville predicted it would do. The rise of postmodern thought complicated and further radicalized the situation by divorcing the end goal of society from any set truth about human nature. The good of each is subjectively determined and insulated by its individuality from argument. Such is the heritage of the modern illiberal left, according to Holmes on page 57: “not only the egalitarianism of the radical Enlightenment movement but also the irrationalism, radical individualism, and rejection of modern life found in some parts of the Counter-Enlightenment.” Holmes is careful to note that both the far left and the far right ends of the philosophical spectrum fed modern illiberalism; the authoritarian aspect was originally associated with totalitarian fascist regimes.

Although Holmes’ book primarily criticizes the political left, he does not refrain from condemning those on the nominal right who show illiberal tendencies, such as Donald Trump—a refreshing perspective. In explaining the relationship between classic liberalism, progressive liberalism, and libertarianism (the latter two often ally, according to Holmes), he is slow to place blame for any philosophical outcome squarely on the shoulders of a single thinker. In the end, he acknowledges that even classical liberalism contained the seeds of modern liberalism in its view of the autonomous individual. Although it would have been nice for this admission to occur closer to the beginning of the book than the end, it assuaged some of the concerns of this reader that Holmes had not traced the roots of the problem to a sufficient depth.

Holmes does seem to have a blind spot, as do many conservatives, and that 64

•

Spring 2016

BOOK REVIEWS

blind spot is Locke. Holmes lauds Locke’s view of human rights and natural law without addressing Locke’s own philosophical inconsistencies with regard to the metaphysical foundation of those rights. Since Locke views man as a tabula rasa, to assign him the human rights inhering to a human nature is impossible. At several points in his book, Holmes notes the delicate balance between individual rights and the collective societal good, and the tendency for the collective good to overpower individual rights, so it is troubling that he continues to rest on such a philosophically shaky view of human rights. Early in his book, he pays homage to the role of religion in helping to shore up natural law, but a discussion of the role of religion or a deeper metaphysical ground for liberalism is absent from his conclusion.. His ultimate solution is to call for a classically liberal economy and open dialogue where the diversity of ideas prevents any one faction from ruling (the intellectual equivalent of Madison’s solution to factions in Federalist Paper 10). One wonders, however, whether that is too simplistic a solution to a problem fundamentally rooted in doubt about the existence of external, objective truth.

If, as Holmes argues, a relativistic denial of such truth enables today’s liberals to maintain the high ground through subjective accusations of microaggressions and the doublethink language of tolerance, then a return to pluralistic dialogue based in skepticism toward truth will only be a temporary bandage, a rewinding to the point when postmodern thought first entered the conversation. Instead, constructive, open dialogue must be founded on a mutual desire for and openness to truth, if it is to last.

One Child: Do We Have a Right to More? Sarah Conly.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 264 pp.

Reviewed by Lanson Hoopai

Religious tradition has generally viewed children and childbirth as a chief constituent towards the life well-lived: The Christian Psalms proclaim, “Behold, children are a heritage from the Lord,” and the Quran petitions Allah, “Grant me from You, a good offspring.” Indeed, as Dr. Sarah Conly acknowledges, religious concerns form some of the main objections to her work, One Child: Do We Have a Right to More? Her overall thesis: “We don’t have a right to more than one biological child.” Through this, her latest work, Dr. Conly seeks to argue that the moral obligations of humans in modern society is to carefully analyze the economic, social, and environmental aspects of life, and to tailor their procreative behavior accordingly.

Dr. Conly boasts a distinguished educational background, with a bachelor’s Vol. I, No. 2

•

65

ARCHE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL THEORY

degree from Princeton University, and a MA and PhD from Cornell University.

Her ongoing academic interests include studies in consequentialism, the history of philosophy, and the ethics of Aristotle, Mill, Kant, and Hume. Her academic career includes teaching positions at Colby College, Bates College, the University of Michigan, and most recently, Bowdoin College. Well-published, Dr. Conly has written for the New York Times, for the Journal of Medical Ethics, and has authored two works, of which One Child is the second.

Her first published work, Against Autonomy, Justifying Coercive Paternalism (Cambridge University Press, 2012), sets the context for some of the ideas that One Child presents. In the popular ethical debate of consequentialism against deontological ethics, Dr. Conly sides unequivocally with the consequentialist, looking to maximize the greatest good for the greatest amount of people. In doing so, she offers her readers a starkly anti-Kantian position in the first half of her book, by denying that autonomy is a right that cannot be transgressed. At best, it is a contingent right, or, a right that depends upon circumstances external to it.

In this case, Dr. Conly conceives of the right of autonomy as contingent upon the continuation of a healthy society. She adopts John Stuart Mill’s classic “harm principle” as foundational: The autonomy of an individual can be compromised, if it is done towards the end of preventing harm to others. In this case, the individual’s right to autonomous decision-making—that is, the decision to procreate beyond one child—is subject to certain overriding concerns; we’re still not allowed to yell “fire!” in a crowded theater.

This extends further: Dr. Conly addresses certain moral rights that some would intuit to be universal. That is, she addresses the perceived rights to reproduction, childbearing, and equal treatment, and seeks to demonstrate that her allowance for one child, as opposed to none, should satisfy the concerns expressed by these critics.

In a shift away from Aristotle’s classic idea of the “good life,” Dr. Conly seeks to ground her prescribed action in a conception of the “minimally decent life.” Aristotle thinks that the moral worth of an individual’s action turns upon the question of human flourishing: Virtue, Eudaimonia, and Telos all contribute to an individual-oriented metaphysic. If an action is good, it will contribute towards the happiness and well-being of the individual who undertakes the action.

Dr. Conly disagrees: If an action is good, on her view, the action will promote the good of the individual’s society, even if the individual’s personal well-being may be injured. Society’s interests must come first, even if this requires legal action against those who refuse to obey this imperative.

Of course, Dr. Conly sees advantages to her theory, that ought to be recognized. One could admire her dedication to the cause of society and its welfare: A prime motivating factor for Dr. Conly, as expressed and emphasized through 66

•

Spring 2016

BOOK REVIEWS

the latter half of her work, is the danger that global warming poses to the global community. She presents a slew of empirical data to ground her concern for what she sees as a global threat, and argues that, even if we do not see the immediate impact of our actions upon the environment, future generations will most certainly bear the consequences of our short-sightedness. “Future people do have a claim upon us,” and therefore these considerations ought to temper our procreative desires and proclivities. Even if the reader is unsympathetic to her politics and her ultimate conclusion, her impulse towards society’s preservation, at least, could merit praise.

Moreover, in the vein of Aristotle, she recognizes the problem that human intemperance and appetitive impulses causes. Indeed, on her view, the modern tendency to constantly consume the natural resources given to us plays no small role in the problem of global warming, as she conceives of it. However, though she recognizes that the human impulses are the driving force behind global warming, she argues that efforts at curbing consumption are doomed to failure. Her solution, therefore, is her single-child ideal: Instead of controlling the impulses of the people, control the people themselves.

Her viewpoint is not entirely unique to her: Dr. Christine Overall and author Naomi Klein have both advocated for the moral imperative of the single-child ideal, but, in a departure from Dr. Conly, dismissed any legal enforcement of the idea as abhorrent. Dr. Conly sees legal enforcement as the logical end to the moral requirement; therefore, it could be argued that her articulation of the doctrine is the most logically consistent.

Yet, the idea is vulnerable to critical attacks. Why does Dr. Conly dismiss the possibility of cutting consumption, and instead advocate for this policy that seems so drastic? Is it not the case that we find the Chinese one-child policy so immoral, not only for the techniques used, but for the idea in itself? And is it possible that approaching the procreative process as a “right” is the entirely wrong way to go about addressing the subject? If we are to follow Aristotle, perhaps it is a fulfillment of one’s telos, more than a mere exercise of arbitrary, autonomous free choice.

Even before the religious objections, it seems that Dr. Conly must answer these crucial questions before the moral individual can accept her ideas.

Vol. I, No. 2

•

67

Thanks Arche Journal of Philosophy and Political Theory would like to gratefully recognize the Collegiate Network for their contribution to the success of our publication.