Existence as a Predicate in Kant and Mulla Sadra Reza Akbarian, Tarbiat Modarres University, Iran Abstract The question of "existence as a predicate" enjoys an outstanding significance from the historical and comparative point of view. Kant, the eminent German philosopher, claimed that existence could not be a real predicate for its own subject, since existence is not a concept that could add anything to an object. According to Kant, existence in its logical sense is, merely, copula (rabit), rather than either of the terms. The copula of the proposition, on the other hand, does not indicate something that owns a real referent. Its exclusive role is, rather, to establish a nexus between the predicate and the subject. Mulla Sadra, the great Muslim Philosopher, has acknowledged the concept of being (wujud) as an independent and predicative concept. His remarks concerning the contents of the simple proposition, i.e. "A is existent" are similar to that of Kant in some respects and different from them, in others. In so far as the content of the proposition signifies the subsistence and the realization of the subject, rather than the subsistence of something for the subject, their respective remarks are quite similar; however in so far as Mulla Sadra, on the basis of his philosophical stance, i.e. "the principality of being" demonstrates that what is principle in external reality is "existence" rather than "quiddity", he is quite different from the philosophical viewpoint of Kant. Quiddity, in his opinion, is mentally posited (itibari) i.e. either abstracted from the limits of being, or it is the manifestation of the limits of being within the mind. A comparative study of Mulla Sadra’s and Kant’s views concerning existence as a predicate, or any other issue in general, without taking into account their whole systems as well as the basic principles of Mulla Sadra’s ontology, will be impossible. The being that is applied by Mulla Sadra, like other Muslim philosophers -as a predicate in the existential proposition- is totally different from that of Kant. Mulla Sadra, just as his predecessors, examined the concept of being-God- and reality from an aspect wholly different from that of Kant. Accordingly, Kant and Muslim philosophers, despite their similar methods of applying the concepts in their philosophical arguments, believe in two exactly distinctive worlds. Therefore, to compare them, it is not possible to consider certain concepts such as "being" or "necessity", and ask about the soundness of either one. However, the chief aim of this paper is to carry out a comparative study of the philosophical systems of the two philosophers. The present paper is a comparative study of Kant’s denial of existence as a real predicate, on one hand, and Mulla Sadra’s acknowledgement and demonstration of such predicates, on the other. Hopefully, this study will pave the ground for an inquiry into one of the most important philosophical problems, and the way for a study of the "reality of being" in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy will be prepared through the demonstration of such philosophical propositions.
The study of Kant’s doctrines on existence as "predicate" and comparing it with that of Mulla Sadra -who believes in the reality of philosophical concepts- who presents an account other than that of Kant, in order to prove the reality of philosophical propositions are of paramount importance. Kant, the famous German philosopher, claims that existence cannot be a real predicate for its subject; for the existence is not (such) a concept which can add something to a thing. According to Kant, and in logical terminology, existence is, in fact, only a copula of the proposition and neither of its sides. The copula of a proposition does not tell us a thing, which may have a real referent. The only task of it is to connect the predicate to the subject. The highly respected philosopher of the Islamic world, Mulla Sadra, accepts existence as an independent and predicable concept. His words on the simple proposition "A exists" are similar to that of Kant’s, in a way, and different in another way. The content of this proposition is the affirmation and realization of the subject, and not the affirmation of something for the subject; in this way, he is unanimous with Kant; but since -relying on the primacy of existence- he proves that what has reality in the external world is existence, and not quiddity, here he differs from Kant.
According to him, quiddity is a mentally- posited thing, which is either abstracted from the limits of existence or it is the manifestation of the limits of existence within the mind. A comparative study between Mulla Sadra’s point of view about predicative existence -and in general, every issue- and that of Kant would be impossible without taking their intellectual and philosophical systems into account and also disregarding Mulla Sadra’s ontological doctrines. The "existence", regarded by Mulla Sadra and the other Muslim philosophers as a predicate in the "existential proposition", is totally different from what is intended by Kant. Kant deals, in effect, with the relatively empirical concepts of "existence", "reality" and "necessity". It is not surprising that, with these conceptual restraints, it is impossible to prove the necessity of the existence for God; and Kant, whilst seeking to reject the ontological argument, refers to the point that existence is not a real predicate. Like his predecessors, Mulla Sadra has dealt with the concepts of "existence", "God" and "reality" in a totally different way to that of Kant. That is, despite interesting similarities in their methods of incorporation of concepts in arguments, Kant and Muslim philosophers, as regards their philosophical theologies, belong to two entirely different worlds. Thus, to make a comparison between them, one cannot take a particular concept such as "existence" or "necessity" and enquire as to which of them is right. What is needed is a comparative study between the intellectual systems and an accurate examination of both. In this paper, we are to study Kant’s expressions on the denial of predicative existence and those of Muslim philosophers, in a comparative way, so that we can examine one of the most important philosophical issues, and subsequently, make grounds for a study of the "reality of existence", which is the most important issue in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, through affirmation of the "existential proposition" and other philosophical propositions. Predicative existence according to Farabi’s theology and comparing him with Kant Those who are familiar with the main texts of Islamic philosophy know that this issue has been debated since olden times by Muslim philosophers. The first founder of Islamic philosophy, Hakim Abu Nasr Farabi, has paid attention to this issue and has discussed it in some of his treatises such as "Risalah fi Masa’il e Mutafarraqqah" (Treatise on various issues). Farabi thinks that if one looks at objects and examines the natural arrangements, from the point of view of a naturalist, he will not regard existence as a real predicate in the propositions. However, if he does not restrict himself within the framework of nature and looks at the object from an "ontological" viewpoint, he has to admit that existence is a real predicate, and every proposition whose predicate is the existence is among the most authentic propositions. Farabi’s words are as follows: And the proposition that whether "man exists" is predicative or not, is an issue debated on by the earlier and later ones. Some of them have maintained that it is a predicative one and some of them have said it is not. We think that both of them are right, in a way. For, such propositions, if looked at from the point of view of a naturalist, who scrutinizes the things, are not predicative ones, for the existence of the thing is not other than the thing itself, and the predicate should be a concept whose addition and negation from the thing is judged. In this way the proposition has not a predicate. If it is looked at from the point of view of a logician, however, it is consisted of two words, which are its two terms, and this proposition can be affirmed or denied. In this way, thus, the proposition has a predicate. And both opinions are, in a way, right.1
The arguments, which Farabi adduces to on behalf of the deniers of predicative existence, are totally similar to those, which are interjected in Kant’s introduction in his "Critique of Pure Reason". In this regard he says:
" Being" is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment.2
According to Kant, existence is not predicative at all. For if this was the case, it would be required to add something to the concept, when posited. The problem, here, is that we have not posited the same thing which represents our imagination, i.e. that which is posited is not equivalent with that which is in the imagination, but it has something added to it. Then Kant gives an example: there is no discrepancy between the $100 which exists and the $100 which does not exist; that is conceptually there is no discrepancy between a possible $100, i.e. the $100 which does not exist3 at all, and the $100 which I possess. Conceptually there is no discrepancy; for if the $100 which I have is a real $100 which corresponds with its concept, it cannot be different from the concept of $100 in any case. The discrepancy between the imaginary $100 and the real $100 is that the imaginary $100 has no real referent, while the real $100 does have a real referent. So far, there is no discrepancy between Farabi and Kant. Farabi, also, accepts that in the proposition "the man exists", the predicate of existence does not add something to the concept of man and, thus, it is not regarded as a real predicate for it: whether the man exists or not, nothing will be changed within the concept of "man"; i.e. for the imagination, there is no difference between the man who exists, in the mind, and the man who exists in the external world. The discrepancy between the subjective man and the objective man is not in their concepts; the discrepancy, in fact, lies between the concept and the referent. (In fact the predicative existence leads the study from concept to referent and its referred one). What makes Farabi’s thought distinct from that of Kant’s is that the former studies the predicativity of existence, in a proposition, from two angles: one, that of natural sciences and, the other, is a metaphysical viewpoint. In Kant, however, we do not find such a distinction. According to Farabi, Man at one time, seeks to know an object and understand its natural causes, from a naturalist’s point of view, and at another time, he wants to know them from a metaphysician’s viewpoint and find knowledge of its existential causes. Farabi regards both viewpoints as necessary with respect to the recognition of reality. According to the first viewpoint, the naturalist considers objects as a subject for his philosophical study only in terms of their natural reality. Then, like for Kant, according to Farabi, existence is not regarded as a real predicate for a proposition; for when we say "the man exists" we add nothing to it, and if having said this sentence we have added something to its imagination, then we are not speaking of what we had imagined of it, but, rather, we are speaking of a new thing. In the second viewpoint, the philosopher does not confine himself to nature; he looks at nature from an extended and fundamental point of view. The question of existence is a fundamental one; the philosopher always seeks to philosophically contemplate on existence, and pave the way to reach its solution. In this view, existence is present as a real predicate within the existential propositions, making them meaningful and providing causes for their being true. Discrepancy between Kant and Farabi has its roots in a more important issue. What distinguishes Kant in his opposition to the Christian, Jew, and Muslim philosophical theology is that he regards "existence" as a mere empirical thing. In Kant’s philosophy, we are confronted with two important empirical rules, which- if not taken into- will lead to inexcusable errors in comparative studies between Kantian and Muslim philosophers. The first: the assignment of existence to the object should be justified, based on empirical evidences; and secondly; the concepts are different, according to their empirical differences. When Kant says that existence is not a real predicate and
argues that it does not add to the concept of a thing, his focus is only on the empirical discrepancies i.e. discrepancies of the sort of sense qualities or quantities which are related with the object- or its sense results. Kant’s expressions- in the above-mentioned argument that the real $100 has nothing in addition to the possible $100- suggest our above-mentioned claim. In addition, Kant stipulates that all Man’s perceptions of "existence" are based on sense experience; hence, it will be more suitable if we assume that Kant is speaking of a special sort of existence- which could be called "empirical existence". His method in crediting, determining, and distinguishing is, in effect, an empirical one. Farabi, and subsequently, other Muslim philosophers cannot accept such an opinion. According to Farabi, the distinction between "quiddity" and "existence" is an intellectual- philosophical one. He takes existence as standing ‘personality’ and classifies the existents into "necessary" and "possible". According to him, the "necessary" is pure existence and the "possible" is dependent on the "necessary". If Farabi had discussed "empirical existence", Kant would certainly have been right. According to Farabi, Man is aware of his existence, but not through sense experience. He can speak of existence but not through essential sensory concepts. Farabi, Ibn-Sina, and Mulla Sadra do not seek to prove the "empirical existence" of God. In fact, to prove the existence of God through argumentation- and even the claim that the existence of God can be proved through such argumentation-are similar to accepting that the existence of God is nonempirical and free of empirical content, and thus separate. In addition, to prove the reality of existence- whether through the philosophical method of Farabi and Ibn-Sina which leads to the sameness of existence and ‘personality’, or in Mulla Sadra’s philosophical way which is expressed as "the primacy of existence"- is the best argument, suggesting that the cognition of existence and its accidents is out of the realm of sensation and experience. The non- analyticality of existential propositions Kant believes that every existential proposition- a proposition whose predicate is existence- is compositional, not analytical. Hence, since these propositions are compositional ones, their truth or falsehood are related with the external world and do not originate from (their) definitions. According to Kant, existence is not a part of the concept of something; rather, when we say that something exists, we only posit the subject with all its predicates. Hence, if we negate the existence of something, it does not mean to negate a predicate from a certain subject; rather, we are negating, in our mind, the subject with all its predicates, thoroughly, and thus no contradiction will arise. In his Critique on Pure Reason, Kant writes: "If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates and no question of contradiction can then arise".4 For example if one says: "God does not exist", he does not negate existence in order to retain its predicates such as absolute power, absolute knowledge, absolute wisdom; rather he negates all the predicates and with them, the subject.5 Thus claiming that "God exists", even if it may be false, does not require any contradictions. The contradiction will occur if we regard a part of a proposition as being affirmed and the other part as rejected. According to Kant, propositions such as "God is absolute perfection", "God is Omnipotent" and "God is Omniscient" are essential necessary propositions. That is, if we admit the existence of God, these kind of predicates and attributes will be needed, but if one rejects the subject, then none of these predicates and attributes will be required, and all of them will be negated through the negation of the subject, and thus there will be no contradiction.6
Mulla Sadra, also, does not regard the existential propositions as analytic ones. He believes that the predicate of "existence" has not been considered in the definition of the subject. Just as "existence" which can be predicated; of the subject, "non-existence" may also be predicated; and the one who predicates the non-existence of a quiddity, does not contradict himself. Muslim philosophers are unanimous in that the concept of "existence" is not an analytic part of quiddity and synonymous with it. There cannot be found a [Muslim] philosopher who rejects this point. In this regard, Mulla Sadra says: And otherwise "man" and "existence" would be synonymous, and there would be no use for the proposition "the man exists", and the contents of the propositions "the man exists" and "man is man" would be identical, and one of them could not be considered, neglecting the other…7
Also, in Khwajah Nasir-al-Din Tusi’s Kalam we read: If the concept of the existence was identical with the concept of man, then the opposite concept [i.e. nonexistence] should not be predicated of it, and we could not say, " man is non-existence.8
As it is seen, these expressions are similar to those of Kant’s, and both of them believe that the existential propositions are non-analytical and thus compositional. From the propositions’ being compositional Kant, however, does not come to the conclusion that in these propositions, the predicate is real; though stipulating that "the predicative existence takes the discussion from the realm of the concept to the realm of reference; that is, makes the proposition compositional, 9 he does not regard existence as a real predicate for any quiddity or concept. Criterion for the reality of the predicate, according to Kant Kant has determined a criterion to discriminate distinction between the real and non-real predicates, which according to him, is a logical predicate. According to him, in order to construct a predicative proposition everything can be used as predicate; even the thing, itself, can be regarded as the predicate to construct a logical proposition, such as "man is man"; in the real predicates, however, this is not the case; for a predicate can be a real predicate for its subject only when it adds something to the subject and enlarges it in a way. But a determining predicate is a predicate, which is added to the concept of the subject and enlarges it.10
Thus, the real predicate is only the predicate, which is not considered in the nature of the subject, but is, perfectly, an added predicate. Therefore, there is an objectivity and reality for the predicate, other than the realization of the subject. For example, when it is said, "a certain body is white", bodyness has a reality other than that of whiteness; the former is a substance and the latter is an accident. In the proposition "A exists", however, the predicate and the subject are not two separate concepts. They are, in fact, two concepts with a common external individuation and determination. According to Kant, this is not specific possible things. In all things, God or otherwise, when the of an object is interjected, the relation between the subject and the predicate should not be regarded as an analytical or additive relationship. Kant believes the "existence" is not a predicate by way of adherence, and it is not a special thing, which is able to add to something else and enlarge it; this is, however, among the primary principles of Islamic philosophy. Under the headings "the simplicity of existence" and "addition of existence on to quiddity" Mulla Sadra has discussed these issues in detail.11 According to him, existence is the simple reality; by simplicity of reality, it is meant that no additive is admitted in it. The thing, in which no additive is admitted, has no limit, and since there is no limit, there is no quiddity wither-
which is the limit or of things. He does not deem existence as a kind of quiddity: he believes that existence is not a quiddity among quiddities, but is essentially, a substance, rather than an accident. Although he does not regard the predicate of existence, as an additive one, Mulla Sadra is not in agreement with Kant. He considers existence neither as an analytic part of the subject nor as a predicate by way of adherence; he has accepted, however, ‘predicative existence’ and takes it as one of the most important doctrines in his philosophy. In general, according to Mulla Sadra the predicate is not restricted to the predicate by way of adherence. For him, the predicate is classified under the "predicate by way of adherence"(bil zamimah) and "predicate by way of intimacy"(bil samimah).12 In the "predicate by way of adherence", when it is said, "a certain body is white" bodyness has a reality other than that of whiteness. In the "predicate by way of intimacy", by which the abstract predicate is meant, however, when it is said, for example, "man is possible", one can suggest that the possibility is neither among the man’s essential attributes- leading- the proposition to an analytic one- nor has it a reality other than that of the man- so that it can be regarded as a predicate by way of adherence; but it is a predicate, which is abstracted from Man’s interior and predicated of it. That is, since the existence and non-existence are equally related with Man’s essence and the possibility has no meaning other than this equality i.e. with regards to the negation of the necessity of existence and non-existence, then it, itself, is an origin for abstracting the predicate. Therefore the possible predicate is an abstract predicate and the intended proposition is an abstract and analytical proposition. According to Mulla Sadra, the objective attributes- whether abstract or additive- exist both in and out of the mind, their modes of existence, however, vary. As a result, three kinds of attributes and, thus, three kinds of concept can be identified: (i) the additive attributes, which are included in the primary intelligibles, though Mulla Sadra does not use these terms; (ii) the abstract attributes which include philosophical concepts such as necessity and possibility, and (iii) consists of the logical concepts or the secondary intelligibles, in their particular application. If we are to identify the class of the predicates, according to the primacy of existence of the existential propositions- they could not be regarded as amongst the class of the extracted predicates, as well. For example when it is said "the man exists", we cannot say that the predicate is extracted from the subject, since according to the primacy of existence, we should say that the subject is a mentally-posited thing and it is the predicate which is the original and the origin of the abstraction. Thus, it should be said that in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, where the quiddity is the subject of the proposition and the existence is its predicate, we come to a fourth kind of predicate which is neither an isagogical predicate of existence, nor predicate by way of adherence and nor an extracted one. In such propositions, the predicate suggests original existence and the existential relations and also the imperfections and non-existential things, and it is not an indicator of a particular quiddity. The contents of the existential propositions according to Kant and Mulla Sadra Mulla Sadra’s expressions on the contents of existential propositions are, in a way, similar to those of Kant; and in some ways, it is different from them. Mulla Sadra maintains a difference between the simple proposition "the man exists" and the other propositions. In this proposition, according to him, what is important is the affirmation and the realization of the subject and not the affirmation of a thing for the subject; that is, in this proposition, the predicate i.e. the existence and the subject (i.e. the object) are externally realized through the same existence. In the other propositions, such as "the object is white", however, the whiteness has an accidental existence and the object has a substantial existence.13
In opposition to Bahmanyar- who does not make a distinction between "existence" and "quiddity" on the one hand, and "accidents" and their "subjects" on the other hand- Mulla Sadra explicitly says: Verily the relation between existence and quiddity is not same as relation between accidents and their subjects. Existence and quiddity are externally, as well as mentally, the same; therefore, there is no receptacle and no received one involved. Unless we consider, in our mind, two concepts for the existent: the existence and the quiddity, in this way, they are more similar to the matter and form, rather than the subject and the accident. The mechanism of this qualification is as follows: reason considers quiddity and abstracts it from all existences and even from this consideration, since this consideration itself is a mode of existence, then it describes it by means of the existence through which this quiddity exists.14
It is not only Mulla Sadra who expresses these issues. Ibn-Sina also admits this same thing. After proving his own opinion, Mulla Sadra recourses to an expression of Ibn-Sina and says: Among the things which confirms that the simple existential proposition "Zayd exists" is intended only to suggest Zayd’s existence and not existence of something for Zayd (as it is stipulated by some researchers), is IbnSina’s expressions in some of his books: "the existence which can be maintained for the object is same its existness, and not, say, whiteness in the white object, since the whiteness does not suffice to an object’s being white." That is, for the truth of the predication of any predicate (other than the existence) of the object, we have to have an essential concept for the predicate, and it should have an existence in the subject, even its essential existence may be same as its existence for the object. Therefore, here, three things are involved: The existence of the subject, the concept of the predicate, and a copulative existence between the two. In our expression "the object exists", however, the object and the existence suffice, and there is no need to the third thing.15
As we have already said, Kant agrees with the opinion of Muslim philosophers that "existence is same as the realization of the thing". According to him "existence is not a concept which can add something to the thing". This led him to say that the proposition "A exists", since its predicate is existence, is not a real proposition which makes us aware of a certain reality; but it is only in the form of a proposition and not its reality; and, in addition, it is a form which cannot be matched with a certain reality… The nature and possibility of the existential propositions According to Muslim philosophers, the nature of "existential propositions" is other than the objective reality of these propositions, in the external world. In the external world, the objective reality of these propositions is, in fact, the affirmation of the object. This reality, when it is reflected in the mind, however, is reflected as the simple existential proposition, which consists, at least, of two concepts: nominal and independent. One of them which is usually expressed in terms of a subject is an essential concept and can be regarded as a conceptual frame in which the external thing is suggested. And the other, which is expressed in the terms of a predicate, is the concept of the "existent" which is among the philosophical secondary intelligibles, and suggests the realization of the referent of the thing. In this way, two different concepts are derived from the same objective reality; each of them has its own characteristics. Like every other proposition, the existential propositions also consist of two parts: subject and predicate. The subject and the predicate are imagined only to suggest that which is beyond them. By the imagination of a particular thing or a universal concept, their corresponding realization is not meant. The representativeness of the imagination will turn to actuality only when it is turned to a proposition, including the statement and representing the belief in its contents. For example, the concept of "man" does not suggest the realization of the man; only when it is combined with the concept of existence and when their identitical relation turns them into a posited knowledge, will it actually indicate the external world; that is, the proposition "the man exists" can be regarded as a proposition, suggesting the external world. Even simple knowledge by presence (such as intuition the thinking), which is in no way combined, once they are reflected in the mind, at least two
concepts can be derived: one, the essential concept of the "thought" and the other, the philosophical concept of "the existence", which, via their combination we are led to the proposition "thought exists" and sometimes, through adding some other concepts, it turns to "I think" or "I have a power of thinking". Unlike Muslim philosophers, Kant regards existence, logically, merely as a copula between the subject and the predicate, in the proposition. Thus, he believes that if we ascribe the existence to a subject- whatever it may be- and say that "something exists", we have only ascribed its objective reality to its imaginary concept. This relation between the objective reality and imaginary concept is the same thing, which is derived from the term "is". For example, in the proposition "God is Omniscient" the term "is" is neither in the side of the subject, nor is it on the side of the predicate. The only use of the term "is" is the ascription of the predicate of "being omniscient" to the subject of "God", and makes "being omniscient" which is among the attributes of God realized for him. If we regard the subject- God- with all its attributes, including "being omniscient" as being realized, and say that "God exists" or "there is a God for the universe", we have regarded, in fact, a reality which is attributed with all the attributes of perfection, as a referent for our own mental concept, i.e. "God"; and here by "existence" it is meant that this objective referent is related (corresponds) with this mental concept. The equality maintained between the concept and referent by Kant, from which he concluded that the term "is" in this equality is, in fact, a relation between two sides- while being in none of them- is the same as the equality maintained by Ibn-Sina’s disciple, Bahmanyar, i.e. between the abstract concept of existence and the subject of the proposition, leading him to a conclusion completely different from that of Kant. According to Bahmanyar, the truth of the proposition "A exists" is conditioned to the realization of, at least, one referent for "A".16 The proposition "the man exists" is true, since there are some referents for man. The proposition "Socrates exists" is true if and only if there is a referent for Socrates; that is, if, and only if, Socrates" correlates with something. The discrepancy between Bahmanyar’ s viewpoint and that of Kant should be looked for, in the ontological interpretation of the real referent of the concept of existence. Both Kant and Bahmanyar maintain a real referent for the existent; according to his own existential doctrine, inherited from Farabi and Ibn-Sina, however, Bahmanyar proves that what is externally real is either necessary or possible; while Kant restricts himself to a particular kind of reality which can be called "empirical reality". What Bahmanyar says on existence, is noted by Khwajah Nasir-al-Din Tusi, the mediated disciple of Bahmanyar, at the beginning of his fourth Namat of Ibn-Sina’s Isharat.17 Evidently, Mulla Sadra’s critique on Bahmanyar’s argument holds for Khwajah Nasir’s demonstration to prove the accidentiality of the concept of the existence, as well.18 Though accepting the gradation of the concept of existence, that is accepting that the concept of the existence applies gradationally on the referents, Mulla Sadra does not accept that the graded concepts supervene on their referents. Relying on the primacy of existence, Mulla Sadra proves that what is externally real is the objective reality of existence i.e. the concept taken by Kant as the original side of the equality cannot be other than the real existence of the concept which is same as the predicative existence. Therefore, Mulla Sadra claims that, when we take the concept, according to Kant’s equality, as the referent and construct a proposition in which the "referent" is regarded as the subject, the "imaginary concept" as the predicate and "is" as the copula, the "real referent" and the "essential individual" of the thing are nothing but the objective reality of existence. He says: Whenever it is said that a concept, e.g. man, has reality, or is existent, by this it is meant that in the external world, there is something on which this concept can be predicated, and it is said to be man. It is the case for the horse, heaven, water, fire and other concepts, which have external individuals as well; and those concepts can be
predicated on these individuals. And by the fact that these concepts are realized or have reality, it is meant that these concepts are, essentially, and not accidentally, true for something… This is also the case for the concept of reality and the concept of existence; these concepts are, certainly, the concepts, which can be predicated on something, so that one may say: this is the reality and this is the existence; that is, these two concepts should be essentially true for something…therefore the existence requires a referent in the external world on which this title can be essentially and commonly predicated, and what is a referent for a concept in the external world is the individual of that concept, and this concept is realized in it. Then it is affirmed that there is, regardless of the reason and the mind, an individual, who has the objective and external form, for the concept of the existence…19
According to Mulla Sadra’s understanding of existence, one cannot, like Kant, claim that the existent has no primary and essential referent, in the external world; the "primacy of existence" suggests that what is externally real is the existence and not quiddity; and quiddity, according to two different interpretations of the primacy of existence is either abstracted from the limits of the existence or it is the manifestation of the limits of existence, in the mind. This expression is not restricted to Mulla Sadra; in Ibn-Sina’s philosophy also we can maintain an acquired meaning for the "existential proposition" and take the existent as implying "existence"; it should be taken into account that Mulla Sadra considers the "essence of existence" as the reference of the "existent" and thus believes in the mentally-positedness of quiddity. Ibn-Sina, however, classifies the existent under the "necessary" and "possible". The existence of the "possible" depends on other than itself, and the "necessary" grants existence to the possible. On the subject of the necessary, it is said that, "the Truth has not quiddity". Thus, both Ibn-Sina and Mulla Sadra accept that quiddity, devoid of existence, cannot be called the real referent of the "existent"; in both cases, whether the referent means the existent quiddity or the essence of existence, the real existence is taken in the referent. It is exactly because of such an approach that Muslim philosophers, unlike Kant and the like who deny the "predicative existence", regard the concept of "existence" as an independent and predicable concept. The discrepancy between Kant and Muslim philosophers cannot be regarded as restricted to a logical-conceptual issue, and thus one cannot conclude that "existence" adds nothing to "quiddity", and hence, it (the existence) has no nominal meaning and cannot be taken as the subject or the predicate of the proposition. The reason that Kant has not considered "existence" as a real predicate, and the simple existential propositions as propositions, is arises from confusion between the concept and referent; that is, the logical statements which hold true in the domain of concepts are generalized to the domain of objective realities. As we have said, if Kant intends to say that the predicate indicates only the realization of the subject in the simple proposition, this is an accepted opinion; on the other hand if he means that the simple existential propositions are not proposition at all, this is of course an unreasonable expression. The root of this false imagination is that he thinks every proposition must be a referent of the "realization of something for a thing", and since the existential propositions imply the "realization of the thing", then they are not propositions. Our predecessors also were confronted with this problem and each have found a solution for it. Finally, Mulla Sadra, according to the "primacy of existence", has divided the propositions and said that it is not a necessary condition that the proposition suggests always "the realization of something for a thing", but it should be noted that propositions are of two kinds: the divisible proposition and indivisible proposition; the former suggests "the realization of something for the thing" and thus it is covered in the principle of presupposition, and the content of the latter is "the realization of the thing", and it is not included in the principle of presupposition.20 The principle of presupposition holds when it makes "something" realized for "some other thing". In the indivisible propositions, in which the predicate of the proposition is the existent, "nothing" is
realized for the "other thing". These kinds of propositions realize only the thing in the external world. The principle of presupposition holds in two places: in the mind and in the external world. When Mulla Sadra says, "existence is the realization of the thing" he means that in the external world, existence is not something added to quiddity so that it may be included in the principle of presupposition. This is why it is said that "predicative existence" does not describe a quality of the subject, and it is not as predicate by way of adherence, but it is only an indicator of the realization, objectivity and externality of the subject. Kant’s point of view is similar to the doctrine of Mulla Sadra that regards the "realization of the thing" as the content of the simple "whether-ness". These two opinions can be regarded in a loose way as being close. The point that Mulla Sadra like other Muslim philosophers has taken into account, and of which Kant is unaware, is that Mulla Sadra believes that the existence in the external world is not an added thing to the quiddity; in the mind, (that is, in an intellectual analysis), however, it is supervened onto the quiddity: By the addition of existence on the quiddity, we do not mean an addition in the external world, because the researcher philosophers as well as those who believe in addition of the existence on the quiddity did not maintain that this addition appears in the external world. They maintained that this addition occurs in the mind, through contemplation and with pain… externally, the existence and the quiddity are the same, in the mind, however, the existent and the quiddity are different.21
The mechanism of the occurrence of the existence on the quiddity and the qualification of the quiddity with the existence Just like other Muslim philosophers, Mulla Sadra believes that in the existential proposition there is no consistency between the qualification of the quiddity with the existence and the Occurrence of the existence on the quiddity: qualification is an external issue, and Occurrence is a mental issue. If there is not a quiddity, which is realized in the mind, that is if the quiddity is not imagined in an intellectual analysis, the existence is not possible to supervene onto it. As far, we have not describe the mechanism of the qualification of the quiddity with the existence in the mind, taking the Occurrence of the existence on the quiddity into account; this mind itself is a mode of the modes of existence in the world of the fact-itself… and this is because of the cause that every attributed and every supervened on which something is supervened, should have a level of the existence.22
This statement of Mulla Sadra is not restricted to the existential proposition. In all philosophical propositions, whose predicates are the secondary philosophical intelligibles, the container of the qualification is other than that of Occurrence. That is, the Occurrence of the philosophical secondary intelligible, on the subject, is conditioned to the realization of the subject, in the mind; and the predicate supervenes on the subject in the mind-even if the subject is attributed with the predicate in the external world, and it is in the external world where the subject is attributed with the predicate. For example, in propositions such as "the man is possible" or "the man is caused", the qualification of the man to the "possibility" or "causedness" will not be an external qualification unless "the man" exists externally; and the "possibility" or "causedness" will not supervene on the man unless he is realized in the mind. This does not require the realization of the realizing things, i.e. the "possibility" or the "causedness" in the external world. For the possibility of the qualification, only the realized thing, i.e. man must exist, and not the realizing thing, which is the attribute, is needed. In Asfar, Mulla Sadra says:
Qualification of the thing with an attribute does not suggest that, that attribute has an independent existence; but it implies that the attributed thing exists.23
Hence, Mulla Sadra believes in two kinds of composition: composition by way of unification and composition by way of annexation. Like all the philosophical propositions, the existential propositions suggest the "realization of the thing" and this is a composition by way of unification, and it is not consistent with the composition by way of annexation and what is suggested by the principle of presupposition (the realization of something for a thing). The term "is" which is employed in composition by way of unification and suggests the judicial identitive relation, is other than the copula between the two sides in composition by way of annexation. Kant has confused the judicial identitive relation with the copulative relation, which is the existence of the copula, or at least, he has not made a distinction between them. The relation is, however, other than identity, in the same way that the proposition is other than the statement:24 the existence is, in fact, a copula between the subject and the predicate of the proposition. The judicial identitive relation is the relation, which suggests only the identity of the subject and the predicate. The identity declared through these judicial relations is the main cause and the true criterion of the predication in all-predicative propositions, whether the propositions are of the kind of indivisible predicative propositions or they are divisible ones. In the indivisible predicative propositions, this identity is a real one and in the divisible ones, it is mentally-posited. Hence, the discrepancy between the existence of the copula and the judicial relation can be described as follows: in divisible predication- which suggests the existence of the copula- the relation neither suggests the existence of the realizing thing nor does it imply the existence of the realized thing directly; and this is a relation which indicates only the belong-ness and dependence of the realizing thing to the realized one. In the divisible proposition- in which the contents of the existence are predicative-the thing which is real, is the same predication and identity which should be realized in all predicated things, commonly, and it indicates the existential identity of the reality of existence and predicate, in the external world. Thus if we assume a composition for the subject and the predicate of the proposition, this composition cannot be the same in all conditions, since the composition which is made between the quiddity and the existence, is a composition by way of unification, and out of the mind the existence has nothing other than the quiddity. The composition of the accidents with their subjects, however, cannot be regarded as a composition of unification; for even if this is established, due to the predication, a sort of "identity" between the subject and the predicate-it is still not a real relation between them. Concerning Mulla Sadra’s view on the relation between quiddity and existence and the mechanism of the qualification of the quiddity with existence it is different to Ibn-Sina’s. According to the doctrine of the primacy of existence, though not entirely rejecting the reality of the "qualification" outside mind and accepting that the "qualification" occurs in the external world for the existence, he says that the external qualification goes in an opposite direction; for instance, when it is said "the man is existent", unlike what it may seem, the existent is not the predicate of the proposition, but it is the subject. The correct form of the proposition, then, is as follows: "the existent is the man"; that is, the "absolute existent" or the "reality of the existence" is determined through particular human determination. Therefore, in the propositions in which the reality and the existence of things and their perfect being are reported, "the reality", "the existent" or "the existence" are, according to the primacy of existence, the real subjects of the propositions, and hence, predicating the concepts of the "existent" or "the existent" of them is, in fact, in opposite direction of predication; that is, instead of the quiddity’s being attributed with existence, it is the existence which is attributed with the quiddity. Therefore, even if in the domain of the concepts, and in an intellectual analysis, the existence is an accident which supervenes on the quiddity and onto the quiddity is a receptacle for
the accident, in the external world, the existence is not an accident; on the contrary, it is a real thing and the quiddities are nothing but the determinations, limitations or modes of the single reality of existence. Notes: 1-Farabi, Abu Nasr, the collection of philosophical treatises of Farabi, Risalah fi Masa’il al- Mutafarraqah, Heydarabad Dakan, 1345(A.H, lunar), p. 9. 2-Immanuel Kant, Critic of Pure Reason, Norman Kept Smith, tr., (London, Macmillan Press, 1973), p. 504, A598/B625. 3-Ibid. p.505, A599/B627. 4-Ibid. p.502, A595/B623. 5-Ibid. p.501, A594/p.622. 6-Smith, K., p. 502/1985. 7-Quoted in Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi, al-Masha’ir, Tehran, Tahoori Publication, 1363 A.H. al-Fatihah, alMash’ar al-Khamis, p.29. 8-Muhaqqiq Tusi, Tajrid al-I’teqad, al-Mas’alah al-Thalithah fi innal Wujud Za,id ‘alal Mahiyyat, p.7, (the third question on the existence supervened on the quiddities). 9-Kant, ibid. p.505, A599/B627. 10-Ibid. P. 504, A598/B626. 11-Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi, al-Shawahid al-Rububiyyah, Tehran, University publication center, 1360 A.H. alMashhad al-Awwal, al-Shahid al-Awwal, al- Ishraq al- thani wa sadis, p. 6&8; al- Masha’ir, as no. 7, al- Mash’ar alAwwal, p.7. 12-Al- Shawahid al-Rububiyyah, al-Mashhad al-Awwal, al-Ishraq al-Sadis, p.9. 13-Ibid. p.10. 14-Ibid. p.9. 15-Ibid. p.12. 16-Bahmanyar, al-Tahsil, edition introduction and research M. Mutahhari, Tehran University, pp.272, 286. 17-Ibn-Sina, al-Isharat wal Tanbihat, Book Publication Office, vol. 3, p.2. 18-Al- Shawahid al- Rububiyyah, al- Mashhad al-Awwal, al-Shahid al-Awwal, al-Ishraq al-‘Ashir, p.17. 19-Al-Masha’ir, al-Fatihah, al-Mash’ar al-Thalith, al-Shahid al-Awwal, pp. 10-11. 20-Sadr al-Din Muhammad Shirazi, al-Asfar al-Arba’a, vol. 1, pp.43-44; al- Masha’ir, p.27; also see Mulla Muhsin Fayd Kashani, Usul al-Ma’arif, p.6. 21-Al-Masha’ir, al-Mash’ar al-Khamis, pp. 29, 31. 22-Al-Masha’ir, al-Mash’ar al-Khamis, p. 30.
23-Al-Asfar al-Arba’a, vol. 1, p. 414.
24-A statement is a simple sentence, which suggests one’s belief in the identity of the subject and predicate. What is stated in a statement is judicial identitive relation. A statement, which is the act of the soul, will not be realized unless there is such a relation.