FOSTERING A FOURTH DEMOCRATIC WAVE

171 Kiai, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association,” para. 36.

172 For example, see: Anthony H. Cordesman, “Russia and the ‘Color Revolution,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), May 28, 2014.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-color-revolution; Stella Chen. “China’s top police chief warns law enforcement to stay alert to risk of ‘colour revolution’ ahead of major Communist Party gathering,” South China Morning Post, September 18, 2022.

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3192868/chinas-top-police-chief-warns-law-enforcement-stay-alert-risk

173 Wilson, “International Legal Basis of Support,” 160. In a subsequent work, Wilson lists rights from the ICCPR that “a movement can invoke and exercise while waging their nonviolent struggle,” including:

Collective rights

Article 1 (self-determination)

Expressive and associational rights

Article 18 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religions)

Article 19 (freedom of opinion and expression)

Article 21 (freedom of peaceful assembly)

Article 22 (freedom of association)

Article 25 (right to political participation)

Bodily integrity rights

Article 6 (right to life)Article 7 (freedom from torture; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment)

Article 9 (liberty and security; freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention)

Article 10 (dignity)

See Elizabeth A. Wilson, People Power Movements and International Human Rights: Creating a Legal Framework, (Washington, DC: ICNC Press, 2017), 66.

174 “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, Seminar on Effective Measures and Best Practices to Ensure the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Peaceful Protests,” UN General Assembly Document A/HRC/25/32/, para. 11; the seminar took place on December 2, 2013.

175 Wilson, “International Legal Basis of Support,” 159-60.

176 ICCPR, Art. 21.

177 “General Comment No. 37 (2020) on the Right of Peaceful Assembly (Article 21),” Human Rights Committee, CCPR/C/GC/37, September 17, 2020, paras. 15-20; and Kiai, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association,” paras. 49, 78.

178 This paragraph draws from or uses language (with permission) from Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 28. Also see Peter Ackerman and Michael Glennon, “The Right Side of the Law,” American Interest (September 1, 2007).

179 This paragraph draws from or uses language (with permission) from Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 28.

180 This paragraph draws from or uses language (with permission) from Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 28.

181 ICCPR, Article 1(1).

182 ICCPR, Article 25.

183 Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 29.

184 Michael Ignatieff, “The Return of Sovereignty,” review of Sovereign Equality and Moral Disagreement,by Brad R. Roth, New Republic, January 25, 2012, https://newrepublic.com/article/100040/sovereign-equality-moral-disagreement-government-roth.

185 For a discussion of how the AU implicitly factors movements into government recognition decisions, see Florian Kriener and Elizabeth A. Wilson, “The Rise of Nonviolent Protest Movements and the African Union’s Legal Framework,” ESIL Reflections (2021); and for a discussion of criteria by which a movement may be recognized under international law, see Elizabeth A. Wilson, “‘People Power’ and the Problem of Sovereignty in International Law,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 26 (2016): 551-594.

186 Wilson, “‘People Power’ and the Problem of Sovereignty in International Law,” 593-594.

187 Based on World Bank data, 2021.

188 For example, see Jain et. al., “From the G7 to a D-10”; and Jain, Kroenig, and Parello-Plesner, “An Alliance of Democracies.”.

189 See Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Ivo Daalder, “Memo on an Economic Article 5 to Counter Authoritarian Coercion,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Alliance of Democracies, June 2022; and Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig, with Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, “A Democratic Trade Partnership: Ally Shoring to Counter Coercion and Secure Supply Chains,” Atlantic Council, 2022.

190 For example, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project has developed its Case for Democracy policy brief series showing the benefits of democracy in areas such as peace, economic growth, education, responding to climate change, public health, service provision, transparency, and social protection for traditionally excluded groups; see these papers, https://www.v-dem.net/our-work/policy-collaborations/case-for-democracy/.

191 Jon Temin, “Civil Society Should Be at the Center of Foreign Policy,” Lawfare (blog), Lawfare Institute in collaboration with the Brookings Institution, March 1, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/civil-society-should-be-center-foreign-policy.

192 Chenoweth, “Backfire in Action,” 30.

193 Jackson, Pinckney, and Rivers, External Support for Nonviolent Action, 12; also see Sharon Nepstad, “Creating Transnational Solidarity: The Use of Narrative in the U.S.-Central America Peace Movement,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly (2006), 21-36; and Christine Mason, “Women, Violence, and Nonviolent Resistance in East Timor,” Journal of Peace Research (2005), 737-49.

194 Backfire occurs when repression imposes significant costs on the regime. Domestically, this can take the form of heightened movement support and mobilization, and/or defections from a regime’s pillars of support. Internationally, backfire can happen through sanctions or withdrawal of foreign government support.

195 In this cited study, international backfire was defined as “economic sanctions by world or regional powers, or arms embargoes being put in place as a result of repressive violence against unarmed protests,” but did not consider withdrawal of foreign support. See Jonathan Sutton, Charles R. Butcher, and Isak Svensson, “Explaining Political Jiu-jitsu: Institution-building and the Outcomes of Regime Violence against Unarmed Protests,” Journal of Peace Research (2014), 564, 568.

196 Chenoweth, “Backfire in Action,” 31.

197 Chenoweth and Stephan, The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns, 2.

198 Chenoweth and Stephan, The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns, 46.

199 Julia Grauvogel, Amanda A. Licht, and Christian von Soest, “Sanctions and Signals: How International Sanction Threats Trigger Domestic Protest in Targeted Regimes,” International Studies Quarterly (2017): 86.

200 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 27.

201 Dursun Peksen, and A. Cooper Drury, “Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy,” International Interactions (2010).

202 To address the scapegoating opportunity that broad sanctions offer to authoritarian elites, democracies may wish to couple these sanctions with “information campaigns explaining the rationale, mechanisms and objectives of their penalties.” Agathe Demarais, “Why Sanctions Don’t Work Against Dictatorships,” Journal of Democracy, November 2022, https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/why-sanctions-dont-work-against-dictatorships/.

203 Chenoweth and Stephan, The Role of External Support in Nonviolent Campaigns, 76.

204 Named after lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who was investigating corruption in Russia and died mysteriously while in jail, Magnitsky laws have been passed in a variety of countries and allow states to freeze assets and ban the travel of sanctioned individuals and entities.

205 Multilateral Magnitsky Sanctions at Five Years, Report of Human Rights First, Open Society Foundations, Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights, and Redress, November 2022, 5.

206 Multilateral Magnitsky Sanctions at Five Years, 5.

207 Multilateral Magnitsky Sanctions at Five Years, 5.

208 Eugenia Andreyuk and Anonymous, International Mechanisms for Accountability for Human Rights Violations in Belarus, German Marshall Fund, January 2022

209 Ibid.

210 US Department of Defense Directive 5205.82; also see a comprehensive set of essays on SSR and DIB in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: Center for Complex Operations, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2017).

211 Blair, Military Engagement Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions, Vol. I, 11-12.

212 Blair, Military Engagement Influencing Armed Forces Worldwide to Support Democratic Transitions, Vol. I, 12.

213 The International Republican Institute (IRI) has written extensively on this topic. For example, see “Coercion, Capture, and Censorship: Case Studies on the CCP’s Quest for Global Influence,” IRI, 2022; “Global Thought Work—Case Studies on PRC Influence in Africa’s Information Space,” IRI, 2022; and “A World Safe for the Party: China’s Authoritarian Influence and the Democratic Response,” IRI, 2021.

214 “Coercion, Capture, and Censorship”; “Global Thought Work”; and “A World Safe for the Party.”

215 For possible criteria to determine the nonviolent character of a movement, see page 47.

216 For a legal discussion, see Danny Auron, “The Derecognition Approach: Government, Illegality, Recognition, and Non-Violent Regime Change,” George Washington International Law Review (2013): 443-499.

217 As Danny Auron writes: “Ultimately, if states have been unwilling to predicate recognition of new governments on noncompliance with internal legal norms in extra-territorial situations, why should continued governmental recognition not be predicated on similar requirements of avoiding international wrongs?” See Auron, “The Derecognition Approach,” 495.

218 This subsection draws from or uses language (with permission) from Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 22-23.

219 This subsection draws from or uses language (with permission) from Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 23-25.

220 This subsection draws from or uses language (with permission) from Ackerman and Merriman, Preventing Mass Atrocities, 25-26.

221 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 217.

222 Stephan, Lakhani, and Naviwala, Aid to Civil Society, 11.

CHAIRMAN EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN EMERITUS PRESIDENT AND CEO

EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS

CHAIRMAN EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN EMERITUS PRESIDENT AND CEO

EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS

VICE CHAIRS TREASURER DIRECTORS

VICE CHAIRS

TREASURER DIRECTORS

HONORARY DIRECTORS

HONORARY DIRECTORS

*Executive Committee Members

List as of March 6, 2023

*Executive Committee Members

List as of March 6, 2023