FROM THE
GULF NILE Water Security in an Arid Region
TO THE
Peter Engelke and Howard Passell
FROM THE
GULF NILE Water Security in an Arid Region
TO THE
Peter Engelke and Howard Passell
This document was produced by the Middle East Peace and Security Initiative. Established in 2012 as a core practice area of the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, the Middle East Peace and Security Initiative brings together thought leaders and experts from the policy, business, and civil society communities to design innovative strategies to tackle present and future challenges in the region. ISBN: 978-1-61977-435-3 Cover photo: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. March 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction 1 Gulf-to-Nile Freshwater Overview
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Water Hotspots
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Case study: Egypt, the Nile, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
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Recommendations 15 Conclusion 17 About the Authors
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FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE
INTRODUCTION Fresh water is fundamental to human health, social development, peace, and economic growth everywhere in the world. Yet in a great many places, and for a great many people, clean freshwater is scarce. Current trends on both the supply and demand sides strongly suggest that clean freshwater availability will become more challenging in more places in the future. As a result, water will become even more important than it currently is in contributing to the degradation of social, political, and economic systems in troubled countries around the world.1 Nowhere are these dynamics more evident or more important than in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where population growth and water scarcity threaten acute impacts in the years to come. An unreliable water supply can act as an important catalyst for instability, especially when present alongside other sources of discontent and unrest (such as ethnic, religious, political, or economic stressors).
“The ‘Gulf-to-Nile’ region is . . . one where waterrelated challenges are especially salient.” The “Gulf-to-Nile” region, a portion of the Middle East and North Africa, is not only an area of enormous geopolitical consequence but one where waterrelated challenges are especially salient. This region is bounded by Turkey to the north, the Gulf in the east, Ethiopia and Yemen to the south, and Egypt in the west (see figure 1). How this region and the world respond to chronic (and worsening) water stress may be a harbinger, for good or ill, of how similar water stresses in other key world regions will impact societies. Speaking broadly, the Gulf-to-Nile region’s aridity, combined with its rapid population and economic growth plus its welter of interstate and intrastate conflicts, mean that the region experiences just about every type of water security challenge possible. But the region also offers some promising opportunities. For instance:
Hydro-diplomacy: Given the Gulf-to-Nile region’s history, few would be surprised to find that water disputes have contributed to violent conflict between neighboring states. Yet, there is very little evidence to substantiate this claim. Interstate violence over water in the region has been the exception rather than the rule, as has been true elsewhere in the world. There is only one case in recent history—the 1967 Six Day War, when Israel fought Egypt, Jordan, and Syria—where water disputes might have helped ignite an interstate war, and even then water disputes were only one part of a much larger geopolitical explanation for the outbreak of hostilities.2 Regardless, active cooperation among states is not a given and must be built over time. For every instance of successful hydro-diplomacy, there is at least one example of hydro-diplomatic neglect. The result is less effective water management overall. Water and fragility: A more troubling portrait arises in the context of water as a driver of societal fragility. The “threat multiplier” concept, well-established in environmental security literature, links environmental stressors to insecurity within societies. Chronic water scarcity or increased water variability (more frequent flooding or drought, or seasonal changes in river flows) can begin to fray societal cohesion, especially where capable governance is missing. In extreme cases, these conditions can lead to forced migrations or other sources of instability. They can contribute to intrastate conflict through riots, tribal or ethnic clashes, and violence. Left unchecked, such conflict can then lead to the breakdown of social and political systems. As this essay discusses, water stress might have been a contributing factor to current conflicts in the region, including conflicts in Yemen and Syria/Iraq.3
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3
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R. Damania, M. Bazilion, S. Dahan, S. Hallegatte, I. Klytchnikova, S. Moore, L. Nitake, D Rodriguez, J. Russ, W. Young, High and Dry; Climate Change, Water, and the Economy, World Bank Group, 2016.
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For a brief overview of water and conflict in the Middle East, including the Six Day War, see Hannu Juusola, “Water Conflicts in the Middle East,” ISN ETH Zurich October 18, 2012, http:// www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/ Detail/?id=153761&contextid774=153761&contextid775=153757. For a longer treatment of water in this conflict, see Moshe Shemesh, “Prelude to the Six-Day War: The Arab-Israeli Struggle over Water Resources,” Israel Studies 9, 3 (Fall 2004), 1-45. Shemesh concludes that water, especially Arab concerns over Israeli water planning, played a significant role in escalating tensions in the years prior to the conflict. The “threat multiplier” concept was first articulated in a 2007 CNA Corporation report: The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (Washington, DC: CNA Corporation, 2007). On the general question of water and intrastate conflict, including Syria, see Marcus DuBois King, “Water Security,” in Mely Caballero-Anthony (Ed.), An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies: A Transnational Approach (London: Sage, 2016), 163-164.
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FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE
Figure 1. Water in the Middle East, from the Gulf to the Nile
Turkey
Cyprus
Syria
Lebanon Palestine Jordan Israel
Iraq
Iran
Kuwait Egypt Saudi Arabia
Bahrain Qatar UAE Oman
Sudan
Yemen
Eritrea
Djibouti
South Sudan
Ethiopia
Somalia
Water as a weapon of war: While water insecurity has not been a direct cause of interstate warfare, water can be used as a weapon once war starts. Water has been used as a weapon of war in the past, including in recent history (shortly after the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein drained the Mesopotamian marshes in southern Iraq, in order to deny his domestic enemies, the cover that the marshes provided). Water is currently “weaponized” in the Iraq/Syria conflict.
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While most independent observers concede that different groups in this multi-faceted conflict have used water as a weapon, all agree that the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has been not only the most aggressive but the most strategic as well in using water as an instrument of warfare. Water as innovation and opportunity: But water as a stressor and as a weapon is only part of the region’s story. A more positive storyline exists as well, and it is one that should be told. Several states in the region, including Israel and some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, have become known for their attempts to overcome aridity challenges through innovation, technical development, and good management. Several now enjoy reputations as innovators through the development and deployment of desalination technologies and “smart” water systems. These countries believe, rightly, that there is a large and growing global marketplace for such technologies, and that innovation is a key to becoming both water secure at home and prosperous abroad. This report is a collaborative effort between the Atlantic Council and Sandia National Laboratories to draw greater and more focused attention to this region and this rising problem. It includes a synopsis of recent empirical work on Egypt, the Nile, and the Copyright © Free Vector Maps.com Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, conducted jointly by Sandia and the Atlantic Council. More exhaustive findings are contained in a Sandia Labs report on Egypt and the Nile, released in the spring of 2016.4
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H. Passell, M. Aamir, M. Bernard, W. Beyeler, K. Fellner, N. Hayden, R. Jeffers, E. Keller, L. Malczynski, M. Mitchell, E. Silver, V. Tidwell, D. Villa, E. Vugrin, P. Engelke, M. Burrows, B. Keith, Integrated Human Futures Modeling in Egypt, Sandia Report SAND 2016-0388, 2016, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, http://prod.sandia.gov/sand_ doc/2016/160388.pdf.
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GULF-TO-NILE FRESHWATER OVERVIEW Aridity is the defining environmental characteristic of the Gulf-to-Nile region, although there are some important exceptions. Table 1 illustrates the aridity’s extent. Of seventeen countries listed in the table, only four have enough freshwater on a per capita basis to exceed a “water stress” standard of 1,000 cubic meters per person per year (this standard, commonly accepted in the literature, attempts to define a threshold below which societies are considered at risk from water scarcity).5 Not coincidentally, the countries with the most freshwater (the first column in table 1) are riparian states with major rivers running through them—Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Sudan. To put the numbers from table 1 into some perspective, in 2014 the United States had 3,069 billion cubic meters (BCM) of total renewable freshwater available from all sources, which translated to 9,538 cubic meters per person.6 Admittedly, the United States is a vast country with its own arid regions, so these numbers are not reflective of every part of the country. But, averaged nationwide, the United States has some fourteen times more freshwater than Turkey, the most water-rich country in table 1; each American citizen has access to roughly 3.5 times more water relative to each Turkish citizen. Comparing the United States with Yemen, a country that is arid, poor, and conflict-ridden, the proportions are astonishing: the United States has 1,461 times more total freshwater and 113 times more water per capita compared with Yemen. A 2013 study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) underscored the extent of the aridity challenge facing countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Although the countries in that study do not overlap exactly with the countries analyzed in this essay, it nonetheless provides a useful recent overview of how scarce fresh water is in this part of 5
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The Falkenmark indicator is the most common measure of water stress, with 1,000 cubic meters per capita, per year defined as the cut-off for a water-stressed society. There are other indicators. See Chris White, “Understanding water scarcity: Definitions and measurements,” Globalwaterforum.org, May 7, 2012, http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/05/07/ understanding-water-scarcity-definitions-and-measurements/ and Amber Brown and Marty D. Matlock, A Review of Water Scarcity Indices and Methodologies. White Paper 106 (Tempe, AZ: The Sustainability Consortium, April 2011). FAO, Aquastat, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/ query/index.html?lang=en.
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the world.7 On the supply side, most countries are arid or semi-arid, defined as receiving less than 250 mm (9.8 inches) of rain per year. On the demand side, high population growth in many parts of the region has meant that the per-capita share of water has been declining for the past fifty years, in some cases dramatically.8 In a part of the world characterized by so little rainfall, it is not surprising that there is little surface water. However, there are several important river systems, the most critical of which are the Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers. (The Jordan River is also an important and historic freshwater source, but its volume is tiny in comparison to these other rivers.)9 These rivers underscore the boom-or-bust distribution of surface water across the Gulf-to-Nile region. Of the countries listed in table 1 that are above the 1,000 cubic meters threshold, all have the Nile, Tigris, and/or Euphrates rivers running through them. (Egypt’s low per capita figure, relative to the other Nile riparian states listed in the table, is a result of higher population and lower rainfall.) As in other countries around the world, Gulf-to-Nile states have augmented their surface water supplies by tapping into groundwater reserves. While these reserves can be extensive in the region, groundwater extraction rates often are well above recharge rates. On the Arabian Peninsula, extraction rates are exceedingly high, often over half of all water withdrawals. Rising demand is the culprit behind this increased reliance on groundwater, even in those riparian states that are relatively rich in surface water endowments. While some aquifers do recharge, especially those beneath or near river basins and in rainy areas, aquifers in the region generally recharge very slowly (or, in some cases, not at all) and are thus tapped well beyond replenishment rate.10 7
The UNDP study was of the “Arab Region,” hence did not include Turkey and Israel, nor Nile River riparian countries except for Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan. Conversely, the UNDP study included countries not addressed in this essay: Libya, Algeria, Djibouti, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, Comoros, and Mauritania. United Nations Development Programme, Water Governance in the Arab Region (New York, United Nations Development Programme, 2013). 8 UNDP, Water Governance in the Arab Region, 11-12. 9 Average annual discharge in million cubic meters: Nile, 109,500; Euphrates, 32,000; Tigris, 52,000; Jordan, 1,340. Ibid., Table 1.1, 13. 10 UNDP, Water Governance in the Arab Region, , 16-19.
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Table 1. Overlap between Select Transboundary River Systems and US Geostrategic Interests
Country
Renewable water resources (billion m3/yr)*
Water resources per capita (m3/inhabitant/year)**
Population growth rate (percent/year)
Bahrain
0.12
86.3
0.9
Egypt
58.3
699.1
2.2
Ethiopia
122
1264
2.5
Iraq
89.86
2584
3.0
Israel
1.78
227.6
1.9
Jordan
0.94
124.9
2.3
Kuwait
0.02
5.7
4.3
Lebanon
4.5
906.8
1.2
Palestinian Territories
0.84
188.7
N/A
Qatar
0.06
25.6
3.3
Saudi Arabia
2.4
81.7
2.2
South Sudan
49.5
4217
3.9
Sudan
37.8
975.1
2.1
Syria
16.8
764.1
1.7
Turkey
211.6
2790
1.2
United Arab Emirates
0.15
15.6
0.5
Yemen
2.1
84.1
2.5
Sources: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Aquastat, World Bank. * FAO Aquastat’s “Total renewable water resources (TRWR),” meaning total renewable surface and groundwater, from all available internal and external sources. FAO estimates this figure for some countries. ** FAO Aquastat’s “Total renewable water resources per capita,” meaning TRWR divided by number of inhabitants of the country. *** World Bank open data, “Population growth (annual %).” This database does not provide statistics for the Palestinian Territories.
Nor is this sobering portrait the end of the story. Rising demand and increasingly constrained supply are projected to continue well into the future. As population growth rates are high in the region (see table 1), and as climate change will increasingly pressure surface water sources, countries that are currently facing “water stress” levels will face even more challenges in the decades to come. To illustrate, a 2012 study by a team of Dutch scientists estimated that demand for freshwater in the MENA region will
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rise by 50 percent by 2050, the result of increased population and economic growth. At the same time, the authors projected that supply will decrease by 12 percent under an average climate change scenario, mainly a reduction in surface water levels.11
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P. Droogers, Immerzeel, W. W., Terink, W., Hoogeveen, J., Bierkens, M. F. P., van Beek, L. P. H., Debele, B., “Water resources trends in Middle East and North Africa,” Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 16 (2012), 8.
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FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE
WATER HOTSPOTS This section briefly reviews some of the water hotspots within the Gulf-to-Nile region.
GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL STATES The six Gulf Cooperation Council states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) are part of the Arabian Peninsula, one of the driest places on Earth. Extremely low rainfall— less than 100 mm (3.9 inches) annually—plus high heat and evaporation rates mean that GCC countries have almost no surface sources of freshwater. Historically, these states depended on shallow groundwater aquifers that were sufficiently large (and at accessible depths) to meet basic needs, albeit for societies that were at much smaller levels of both population and wealth. Starting in the 1950s, however, this equation began to change dramatically with the increasing importance of the oil-driven economy. To keep up with booming economic and population growth, GCC states began turning to deep groundwater aquifers and desalination to provide freshwater supply. Both of those techniques required modern machinery, which in turn required huge energy inputs.12 Currently, several GCC states rely on groundwater sources for the bulk of their fresh water needs, but this practice is unsustainable because the region’s deep aquifers, while enormous, cannot recharge at rates anywhere near fast enough to replace withdrawals.13 This is one reason why GCC states have turned to desalination. In 2010, the combined desalination capacity of the six GCC states was almost 40 percent of the entire world’s production.14 Desalinated water is thus increasingly important; it now meets about a quarter of Oman’s fresh water needs, half of Saudi Arabia’s, and an astonishing 87 percent of Qatar’s.15
12 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), Desalination in the GCC: The History, the Present & the Future (The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf [GCC], General Secretariat, 2014), 10-12. 13 Omar Saif, Toufic Mezher, and Hassan A. Arafat estimate that GCC states are “all using hundreds to thousands times more water than sustainable recharge would allow.” See Omar Saif, Toufic Mezher, and Hassan A. Arafat, “Water security in the GCC countries: challenges and opportunities,” Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 4 (2014), 329. 14 Hassan Fath, Ashraf Sadik, and Toufic Mezher, “Present and future trend in the production and energy consumption of desalinated water in GCC countries,” International Journal of Thermal and Environmental Engineering 5, 2 (2013), Figure 2, 156. 15 Rabia Ferroukhi et al., Renewable Energy Market Analysis: The GCC Region, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2016, 79.
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Desalination trends in the GCC are expected to go nowhere but up, the result of ongoing demandside growth for fresh water resources. One 2013 study estimated that GCC countries will increase their production of desalinated water by 180 percent between 2006 and 2025 (table 2). Because desalination is extremely energy intensive, that increase will require, in turn, a 150 percent growth in energy consumption by GCC desalination plants, absent technical breakthroughs.16 The consequences are significant. Desalination already consumes an enormous amount of energy in the GCC, thus it contributes to this region’s high carbon footprint. The consultancy firm Strategy& estimates that desalination consumes 10-25 percent of power generation in the six GCC countries.17 Saudi Arabia alone consumes around 300,000 barrels of oil daily just to run its desalination plants.18 Moreover, desalination has considerable local environmental impacts. Because a sizeable fraction of the world’s desalination capacity is located on the shores of the Gulf, the ecology of the Gulf is being transformed. Chemical and brine releases (which increase pollution levels and salinity), and water intake processes are having serious effects on the Gulf’s ecosystems and its marine life.19 Some of these challenges can be ameliorated through a focus on the water-energy nexus, specifically on using renewable energy to power desalination plants. As the Arabian Peninsula is blessed with sunshine, solar energy is a feasible (i.e., cost-competitive) option for powering desalination plants, and indeed several GCC states, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have ambitious plans for large-scale renewable-powered desalination plants.20 But even a wholesale shift to renewable energy would address only one of the water security challenges facing the GCC. Doing so would leave other challenges unmet, including the fact that the Gulf’s ecology would continue to erode even under an all-renewables scenario. 16 Derived from Fath, Sadik, and Mezher 2013, 163. 17 Strategy&, Achieving a Sustainable Water Sector in the GCC: Managing Supply and Demand, Building Institutions, Strategy&, 2014, 7. 18 Ferroukhi et al. 2016, 83. 19 Saif et al., “Water security in the GCC countries: challenges and opportunities,” 331, 334-335. 20 Ferroukhi et al., 2016, 43-87. (Page 85 has reference to Saudi Arabia/UAE plans.)
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Table 2. Desalination Forecast in the GCC
Country
2006 desalination production (Million cubic meters / day)
2025 desalination forecast (Million cubic meters / day)
2006 energy requirement for desalination (GWh)
2025 GWh energy requirement forecast for desalination (GWh)
Saudi Arabia
9.1
23
48,391
119,111
United Arab Emirates
6.7
17.5
64,762
145,412
Kuwait
1.3
6
10,143
50,604
Qatar
1.2
3.2
14,516
32,625
Oman
0.8
3.1
5,471
12,150
Bahrain
0.8
2.8
8,772
22,225
Total GCC
19.9
55.6
152,055
382,127
Volume Increase 2006-2025
35.7 Mm3/day
230,072 GWh
Percent Increase 2006-2025
179 percent
151 percent
Source: Adapted from Fath, Sadik, and Mezher, 2013, 163.
Experts point to the need not only to increase future supply, but also to decrease future water demand. Strategies for reducing demand include reducing high subsidies for energy and water, which now result in consumers paying far below the true cost of water production, emphasizing water conservation through public awareness campaigns, and relying more on water recycling.21 Over the past few years, Saudi Arabia, the most populous GCC state, has taken steps in this direction. For decades, Saudi Arabia’s water policies focused on expanding water supply through groundwater extraction, desalination of seawater from the Gulf and Red Sea, and construction of water infrastructure (irrigation systems, etc.). All of this was enabled by the kingdom’s incredible oil abundance and its resulting cheap energy. However, this equation has recently shifted. Saudi officials, sensitive to both falling oil prices (which have dramatically reduced state revenues from oil exports) and increasing water constraints, have begun taking action to reduce water demand and shift supply to recycled water. Of these, by far the most controversial has been a reduction in Saudi Arabia’s generous water subsidy, a decision motivated in part to stimulate efficiency gains and in part to save billions in public revenue. Although based on sound economic and environmental principles (one 21 Strategy&, Achieving a Sustainable Water Sector in the GCC: Managing Supply and Demand, Building Institutions, 7-12; Saif et al., “Water security in the GCC countries: challenges and opportunities,” 344.
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estimate concluded that customers in Saudi Arabia pay around three cents per cubic meter for water that costs the government around $10.00 per cubic meter to provide), the political backlash in Saudi Arabia has been severe, driven by outraged customers used to paying very low fees for this critical resource.22
ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBORS The most pleasantly surprising storyline in the Gulf-to-Nile region involves Israel and its neighbors. Although this troubled part of the world has been beset by occasional discord over water, the trend has been toward successful hydro-diplomacy, technical progress, and innovation. Israel’s status as a regional water hub is a critical part of this success. Water security has been a feature of Israeli identity since the country’s founding in 1948.23 Through decades of dedicated effort, Israel has transformed from a country facing chronic water stresses to one that is water secure, the result of a combination of factors. Since 1959, Israel has codified 22 Stella Thomas, “Water security requires the removal of subsidies,” The Source, February 29, 2016, http://www. thesourcemagazine.org/water-security-requires-theremoval-of-subsidies/; Glen Carey and Zaid Sabah, “Saudi King fires water minister after complaints over tariffs,” Bloomberg, April 24, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ articles/2016-04-24/saudi-king-fires-water-minister-aftercomplaints-over-tariffs. 23 The observations in this paragraph are taken from Seth Siegel, Let There Be Water: Israel’s Solution for a Water-Starved World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015), esp. chapters 1-2, 4-7.
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FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE
into law the principle that all water in Israel is public property to be managed by the state. This approach has worked because the state has, as a matter of empirical fact, proven to be a competent manager of the nation’s water. Among other things, the Israeli state planned, built, and runs the National Water Carrier, which transfers water from the (relatively) waterrich northeast to the arid south, enabling economic development and human settlement in the southern parts of the country. Over the same period, Israeli scientists, engineers, and entrepreneurs also focused on disruptive water technology development, ranging from drip irrigation to wastewater reuse to plant breeding to desalination technologies. After successful experimentation, Israelis have scaled these watersaving or -generating technologies to the point where they could contribute meaningfully to the country’s water security. For example, Israel now desalinates some 500 million gallons (1.9 million cubic meters) of water every day, adding that quantity to the nation’s freshwater mix. The result not only has been a dramatic increase in the amount of water available for Israeli use (and available for export to Israel’s neighbors), it also has helped delink Israel’s water supply from natural variation, in particular drought cycles. Israel has become a global leader in the development of water technologies. A long-standing emphasis on technical accomplishment in the water space has cultivated a deep bench of water expertise within Israel. Some of these experts have taken advantage of Israel’s innovative culture to begin building a watertech, start-up subculture. Aided by government policy designed to turn Israel into a knowledge economy powerhouse, Israeli entrepreneurs have been working on everything from biotech-based wastewater treatment technologies to water-smart household appliances to sensor-based water management systems. While such technologies will contribute to Israel’s water security, they are increasingly viewed as important commercial exports.24
24 Amanda Little, “Israel’s Water Ninja,” Bloomberg, January 8, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2015-01-08/ takadu-helps-israel-be-a-most-efficient-water-manager; William Booth, “Middle East: Israel knows water technology, and it wants to cash in,” Washington Post, October 25, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/ israel-knows-water-technology-and-it-wants-to-cashin/2013/10/25/7bb1dd36-3cc5-11e3-b0e7-716179a2c2c7_story. html. International business rankings often place Israel at the top of the MENA region, in part due to the strength of its entrepreneurial start-up culture. See Peter Engelke, Brainstorming the Gulf: Innovation and the Knowledge Economy in the GCC, Atlantic Council, March 2015, Table 2, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/ brainstorming-the-gulf-innovation-innovation-and-theknowledge-economy-in-the-gcc.
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“Israel’s actions, since its founding in 1948, have turned the country into a regional water powerhouse.” Israel’s actions, since its founding in 1948, have turned the country into a regional water powerhouse. The same cannot be said for two of its neighbors, Jordan and the Palestinian territories, both of which face more challenging water conditions than Israel. While relations among these three parties have a long and often tortured history, water scarcity has not led to overt conflict between them. On the contrary, while transboundary water has been a contested issue, more often it has proven to be a source of cooperation. As one might expect, cooperation has been greater between Jordan and Israel than between the Palestinian territories and Israel. Tacit hydro-diplomacy between Jordan and Israel began even before the two countries signed the 1994 Peace Treaty. After the treaty, these states established a formal, standing process (the Joint Water Committee) to institutionalize their bilateral hydro-diplomacy. Under the treaty, both sides agreed to find ways to augment Jordan’s water supplies, a situation that resulted in more technical cooperation between them (and the actual transfer of water to Jordan from Israel). Israel’s evolution into a desalination powerhouse, which has eased the supply side, has helped defuse tensions over water between these countries, facilitating water-sharing agreements.25 Yet despite progress, Jordan’s situation remains tenuous. Jordan is poorer than Israel, its natural water supply is more constrained, and it now has to provide water for perhaps a million Syrian refugees who have taken up residence in the country just over the past few years.26 One hopeful solution is the so-called “Red Sea-Dead Sea” project. Under the “Red-Dead” plan, 25 A review of this history is provided in Ram Aviram, David Katz, and Deborah Shmueli, “Desalination as a game-changer in transboundary hydro-politics,” Water Policy 16 (2014), 609-624. See also Naama Teschner, Yaakov Garb, and Jouni Paavola, “The role of technology in policy dynamics: the case of desalination in Israel,” Environmental Policy and Governance 23 (2013), 91-103; Eran Feitelson and Gad Rosenthal, “Desalination, space and power: the ramifications of Israel’s changing water geography,” Geoforum 43 (2012), 272-284. 26 Michael Tiboris, “Jordan’s water woes are a wellspring of Mideast strife,” National Interest, December 11, 2015, http:// nationalinterest.org/feature/jordans-water-woes-arewellspring-mideast-strife-14579?page=2.
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Figure 2. Map of Tigris and Euphrates rivers, including watersheds
Turkey
Iran
Syria
Euphrates Iraq
Tigris
Jordan
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia Source: Wikimedia.
seawater will be drawn from Jordan’s Red Sea coast and desalinated, with the fresh water shipped a short distance for use in southern Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority; and the brine shipped to the salty Dead Sea as a means of refilling that shrinking lake. Hydroelectricity generation will benefit these countries, as the water flows from the higher coastal location to the Dead Sea (which is below sea level). Under this plan, Israel will send fresh water from its resources in the north to Jordan, near Jordan’s population centers, specifically Amman. Although 8
Jordan and Israel are the Red-Dead plan’s two major players, negotiations have included the Palestinian Authority. The plan is thus an example of how hydrodiplomacy and transboundary water engineering can lead to cooperation and mutual interdependence.27
27 Siegel, 2015, 186-189. In the same chapter, Siegel discusses more ambitious ideas involving how water might lead to much deeper regional cooperation among all three parties (Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians); especially 190-195.
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FROM THE GULF TO THE NILE TURKEY, IRAQ, SYRIA As is true of the Nile and Jordan rivers, both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have enormous historic importance. As in Egypt, the fertile land that these two riverbeds created, along with the rivers’ water, gave rise to ancient civilizations. Today, these rivers continue to provide much of the water for the countries they traverse, especially Turkey, Iraq, and Syria (see figure 2). As in other parts of the Gulf-to-Nile region, when it comes to water, the stressors along the Euphrates and Tigris are more on the demand side than on the supply side. The combined effects of population growth, intensive use of the river for agricultural, industrial, municipal and other purposes (leading to heavy pollution), and intensive dam-building have led to a dramatic reduction in the flow of the Euphrates (through water withdrawals and consumption) and a significant worsening of its water quality.28
“[T]he stressors along the Euphrates and Tigris are more on the demand side than on the supply side.” The root problem facing both rivers lies in the fact that the region has a limited history of interstate cooperation on transboundary river systems. Tri-partite talks over water management have occurred periodically in past decades, and Turkey has unilaterally agreed to send 500 cubic meters per second downstream to the Turkey-Syria border. However, there is no parallel to the long-standing hydro-diplomacy that has existed for decades between Israel and Jordan over the Jordan River. There has been no consistent platform for water-sharing talks among all three states and little willingness to build the diplomatic infrastructure leading to long-term interstate governance. Each of the three countries historically has used the rivers first for their own purposes, with effects on other users a distant second on their list of priorities. For example, over thirty dams have been built on the Euphrates during just the past half century. The inevitable results are widespread pollution and a significant reduction in the river’s flow (estimated at a 40-45 percent reduction in flow since 1970).29 28 United Nations Environment Programme, Vulnerability Assessment of Freshwater Resources to Climate Change: Implications for Shared Water Resources in the West Asia Region (United Nations Environment Programme, 2012), 71. 29 M. Nouar Shamout with Glada Lahn, The Euphrates in Crisis: Channels of Cooperation for a Threatened River. Research Paper (London: Chatham House, April 2015), 2-4.
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In addition, in the past few years, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria have placed both the Tigris and Euphrates under even greater stress. Recent scholarship has documented the extent to which water has been weaponized in these conflicts. Combatants (especially the Islamic State) have attempted to leverage their control of water sources to fund their activities; flooded (or threatened to flood) downstream communities as a form of control, eviction, or intimidation; and diverted river water to impede their enemies’ movements. As an example, in August 2014 the Islamic State seized the Mosul Dam, upstream of the city of Mosul, Iraq. Perhaps motivated by fear that the Islamic State might breach the dam and flood the entire city, US-supported Iraqi and Kurdish troops swiftly retook the dam after heavy fighting.30 As the conflicts in Syria and Iraq are not over, their full effects on the rivers are not yet known. A long stretch of the Euphrates remains smack in the middle of the conflict between ISIS and other state and non-state combatants. The resulting breakdown of state control over stretches of the Euphrates River, especially in Syria, and the breakdown of normal diplomatic relations between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, makes the governance challenge particularly acute.
YEMEN Yemen is one of the most water-insecure countries in the world. The average Yemeni has access to only 86 cubic meters of water annually. On the supply side, Yemen receives only 167 mm (6.6 inches) of rainfall per year (by comparison, Israel, also an arid country, receives about 2.5 times as much).31 Historically, Yemenis have managed to thrive despite these conditions through appropriate farming choices and inventive methods of capturing rainwater. But over the past half century, increasing demand has upended Yemen’s delicate water balance. There are two main culprits. The first is population growth: Yemen’s population has grown from about five million in 1960 to over 26 million today, and its current high growth rate (about 2.5 percent per year) guarantees strong population increases well into the future.32 The second is khat, a thirsty plant whose leaves are used as a narcotic and to which many Yemenis are 30 For a comprehensive read on the conflict and water, see Marcus DuBois King, “The Weaponization of Water in Syria and Iraq,” Washington Quarterly 38, 4 (Winter 2016), especially 155-158. 31 World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://data. worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.PRCP.MM. Israel receives 435 millimeters (17 inches) annually. 32 World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports. aspx?source=2&country=YEM&series=&period=.
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addicted. Khat production in Yemen has expanded over the past several decades to the point where the crop now consumes a significant share of the country’s groundwater. As khat production in Yemen is highly profitable and controlled by political and military elites, there are few incentives to switch to less thirsty crops such as coffee.33 Since the 1970s, Yemenis have resorted to groundwater extraction as a way to find new sources of supply to meet rising demand, but that is an unsustainable practice—groundwater extraction in Yemen is far greater than aquifer recharge, as is true in other parts of the Gulf-to-Nile region and especially on the Arabian Peninsula.34 Solutions for Yemen are difficult, if not impossible. Desalination is not a realistic option, given its high cost relative to natural sources of fresh water. As Sana’a, the nation’s capital and largest city, sits inland and well above sea level (2,250 meters or 7,382 feet), the cost of desalinating seawater plus pumping the desalinated water to the city almost certainly would be prohibitively expensive. Instead of technical solutions, 33 Adam Heffez, “How Yemen Chewed Itself Dry: Farming Qat, Wasting Water,” Foreign Affairs Special Collection: The Green Book, May 9, 2014, 101-102. 34 James Fergusson, “Yemen Is Tearing Itself Apart Over Water,” Newsweek, January 20, 2015, http://www.newsweek. com/2015/01/30/al-qaida-plans-its-next-move-yemen-300782.html.
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external observers point to the need for better water governance in Yemen, in particular to building state capacity to regulate water extraction (illegal drilling is a major problem), improving monitoring capabilities, investing in water conservation and efficiency, and delivering water to disaffected populations in Sana’a and elsewhere. And all agree that Yemen’s production of khat must be reduced if the country is to have any chance at sustainable water consumption.35 But improving water governance in Yemen is far easier said than done. Yemen is not just a poor country but one being ripped apart by sectarian and ethnic conflict. Water has become a destabilizer within Yemen, where water scarcity leads to displacement of rural people and clashes over scarce water. Yemen’s government has estimated that as many as four thousand people die each year through violence related to water scarcity. For many outside observers who worry that Sana’a will become the world’s first capital city to completely run out of water (sometime during the 2020s), the nightmare scenario is abandonment of the city altogether.36
35 Heffez 2014; Craig Giesecke, Yemen’s Water Crisis: Review of background and potential solutions, (Washington: USAID Knowledge Services Center, June 15, 2012), 5-6. 36 Heffez 2014; Fergusson 2015.
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CASE STUDY
EGYPT, THE NILE, AND THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM37 The Nile Basin is one of the world’s most important transboundary river basins.37 For thousands of years, Nile waters have brought life and prosperity to peoples living along its edges. Egyptian civilization has been the most closely bound to the Nile (in 440 BCE, the Greek historian Herodotus famously quipped that Egypt was “the gift of the river”).38 Until very recently, there has been little competition for the lower Nile’s water. In 1929, the Nile Waters Agreement, brokered with Britain, allocated 4 billion cubic meters of water (BCM) per year of the Nile’s flow to Sudan, 48 BCM per year to Egypt, and none to any of today’s other nine riparian states. In 1959, the Nile Waters Treaty further codified a similar distribution. But in the decades since, other riparian nations have begun to demand what they claim as their fair share of the water, which they hope to use for badly needed economic development and human welfare. The construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile, the main tributary to the Nile, represents one of the first challenges to Egyptian influence over the Nile waters. If finished, the dam will be massive, storing 63 BCM of water in its reservoir (roughly equal to a full year’s flow from the Blue Nile) and producing 6,000 megawatts of hydroelectric power for Ethiopia and (possibly) neighboring states. The scale of the dam and disagreement over its planning and execution has meant that, in recent years, the GERD has become a source of contestation between Egypt and Ethiopia. Within Egypt, the project has raised fears that Nile River water supply will be reduced, which in turn will negatively impact the country’s agricultural production, food availability, economic productivity, public health, and overall well-being. Much of this anxiety is focused on the multi-year period during which the GERD reservoir will be filled, which will reduce the flow of the Nile
37 Much of this section is revised material taken from Passell et al., Integrated Human Futures Modeling in Egypt. 38 In The History of Herodotus, Book II, Herodotus wrote: “For any one who sees Egypt, without having heard a word about it before, must perceive, if he has only common powers of observation, that the Egypt to which the Greeks go in their ships is an acquired country, the gift of the river.” See: http:// classics.mit.edu/Herodotus/history.2.ii.html.
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downstream to Egypt, and on the size of the dam and thus of its reservoir. In partnership with the Atlantic Council, researchers at Sandia National Laboratories set out to evaluate the hydrological impacts of the dam and various other dynamics that might occur if the dam is completed at the size referenced above. Sandia used five modeling platforms to simulate hydrology, agriculture, economy, human ecology, and human behavior. The effort was not aimed at making predictions, but rather to better understand how potential hydrological impacts might ripple through other sectors of society and the economy. The most important result was that the dam’s effect on Egypt’s long-term impact on lower Nile water level is likely to be small, when compared with the effect of projected population and economic growth on demand for water. According to the models, Egypt’s growth dynamics are the main reasons why it is likely to face long-term water scarcity, regardless of whether the GERD is built or not. Filling the GERD reservoir at slow rates (e.g., over eight to thirteen years) will mitigate shorter-term risks for agricultural and energy production in Egypt, but over the longer run, the GERD’s effects will be minor compared with demandside pressures on the Nile. Sandia’s modelers also explored the possible impacts if the Egyptian populace came to see the GERD as a contributing factor for water and food scarcities or economic difficulty. In this case, building the dam could trigger unwelcome developments, such as internal social unrest or grievances directed outward toward Ethiopia. Although not tested in the model, increased diplomatic tension between these two countries could threaten a constructive relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia that is vital to maintaining stability and security within the region. To conduct their analysis, Sandia scientists ran five models, summarized as follows:
HYDROLOGY Researchers evaluated the GERD’s impact on water storage in Egypt’s Lake Nasser (the reservoir above
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Figure 3. The Nile River Basin and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
of food production in Egypt to 2050 has no significant correlation with the GERD fill rate.39
WATER-AGRICULTURE-FOOD SYSTEM Sandia scientists were also interested in understanding resilience in Egypt’s water-agriculture-food system, which faces a range of significant challenges. These challenges include a growing population, high dependence on food imports, widespread subsistence farming, and potential constraints on long-term Nile River water supply, including from the GERD. High food imports make economic sense when global supplies are plentiful and prices are low, but Egypt’s dependence on imports makes it vulnerable to price shocks. Subsistence farming makes up a significant fraction of Egypt’s agricultural output, with about a quarter of Egypt’s wheat not only grown but also consumed in rural areas.
Source: “The Geopolitical Impact of the Nile,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, 2012. Photo is republished with permission of Stratfor. https://www.stratfor.com/video/geopolitical-impact-nile.
the Aswan High Dam) and changes to Egyptian agricultural production. Results showed that filling the GERD reservoir should have an important short-term impact on water supply (figure 4) and food production in Egypt, depending on the fill rate and precipitation patterns. Food production could be reduced by about 25 percent in a worst-case scenario between 2020 and 2023. But the model also showed that demand—from projected Egyptian population and economic growth— will have a much more significant long-term impact on Nile water supply. Lake Nasser could be drained to its dead storage level (meaning a water level below the dam’s outlets, thus accessible only by pumping) sometime between 2025 and 2030, even if the GERD is never finished. Building the GERD might accelerate that process by up to five years. Projected water shortage will have a significant impact on Egyptian food production over the long term, mostly from increasing demand and not from building the GERD. The fill rate for the GERD does not have important impact over the long term, but slower fill rates will help with short-term impacts. The overall loss
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Modeling showed that increased ground water extraction for farming could provide a short-term option for dealing with supply shortages. But drilling wells represents a non-sustainable policy, as Egypt’s aquifers do not recharge. A second option, improving agricultural water efficiency, is expensive in the short term but can pay big dividends over the long term assuming water supply becomes scarcer. To have any significant impact, the bulk of Egypt’s farms would have to adopt these water practices, representing an enormous scaling problem. Finally, increasing food imports will likely be more expensive than aquifer drilling but cheaper than developing more efficient agricultural practices. However, increasing food import dependency deepens exposure to global food markets, representing a form of risk when global food prices spike.
ECONOMY Sandia’s researchers explored how the Egyptian economy might respond to reduced Nile flow by modeling the effect of reduced flow on employment, government spending, and commodity prices. Results showed that reduced Nile River flow did not produce sharp declines in health or food availability, at least up to a certain point. Beyond that point, however, the model predicted a sharp decline in conditions with a large negative impact on the population. Modelers estimated that the threshold value was in the neighborhood of 30 percent Nile River flow reduction. 39 The modeling in this section is described comprehensively in D.L. Villa, V.C. Tidwell, H.D. Passell, and B.L. Roberts, Applying the World Water and Agriculture Model to Filling Scenarios for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Sandia Report SAND2016-11187, 2016.
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Figure 4. Modeled Lake Nasser storage, 2000-2050, under various future consumption and climate scenarios 180 LTA No GERD LTA 10%
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Climate Bounds No GERD Climate Bounds GERD 10% 140
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The solid yellow line represents the projected storage in Lake Nasser assuming long-term average (based on 1912-1997 records) temperature and precipitation data repeated annually from 2000 to 2050. The scenario also includes a composite of projected UN population growth rates and historical World Bank data and projections from 1960 to 2100. The precipitous decline from 2000 to 2026 occurs because of projected increases in withdrawals from the lake to meet the resulting increases in consumption. Those increases in consumption are due to projected increases in population in Egypt coupled with projected economic growth, which drives higher water consumption. By 2026, the lake reaches its dead pool—which is water below the level of the dam intakes and accessible only with pumping. The dashed yellow line shows how the filling of the GERD’s reservoir would hasten the decline of the lake level. In this scenario, 10 percent of the Blue Nile’s discharge is diverted annually into the reservoir. At this filling rate, the lake reaches its dead pool about five years earlier. The gray lines show the projected decline in lake levels given the same population and economic projections with modeled climate data replacing long-term average data. Climate data were obtained from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5). CMIP5 results come from a range of climate change scenarios and project an upper bound (the upper gray line) and a lower bound (the lower gray line) to the effect on Lake Nasser. These projections capture the inter-annual variability inherent in hydrological systems. In general, CMIP5 results project increased rainfall in the Blue Nile Basin, and so occasional spikes in rainfall increase the storage, but continued pressure from population growth and economic development consistently brings the lake level back to the dead pool. The blue lines show the projected decline in lake levels from CMIP5 given all the same assumptions but with the 10 percent annual diversion from the Blue Nile to the GERD reservoir. Again, what is noteworthy is that the difference is very small between the gray lines, without the GERD, and the blue lines, with the GERD. Interestingly, the modeling that includes CMIP5 climate data only projects a one- to two-year difference in the time it takes the lake to decline to its dead pool in comparison to the five-year difference using long-term averages. This, along with the spikes in storage in the following years, suggest that Lake Nasser storage will
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be very sensitive to climate variability, and that filling schedules for the GERD reservoir should vary with the climate if Lake Nasser storage levels—and Egyptian water sustainability—are going to be considered. Projections for future population growth, economic development, and climate variability all contain uncertainty. Figure 4 shows the results from one simulation created from one set of possible values for future population growth, economic development, and climate. Even with this uncertainty, models like these are valuable for better understanding the possible ranges of future dynamics. This summary is paraphrased from: H. Passell, M. Aamir, M. Bernard, W. Beyeler, K. Fellner, N. Hayden, R. Jeffers, E. Keller, L. Malczynski, M. Mitchell, E. Silver, V. Tidwell, D. Villa, E. Vugrin, P. Engelke, M. Burrows, B. Keith,. Integrated Human Futures Modeling in Egypt, Sandia Report SAND 2016-0388, 2016, http://prod.sandia.gov/sand_doc/2016/160388.pdf.
In Egypt, that threshold value could be different, but the important point is that a threshold may exist, and policy makers should not assume a linear relationship between river flow and impact on Egyptian society. This model’s chain of causality was: reduced river water availability to Egyptian agriculture reduces food production, which produces higher food prices and reduced household food consumption, which negatively impacts health. However, model results suggest that an increase in subsidies could offset the effects of reduced food production.
HUMAN ECOLOGY Sandia’s Human Resilience Index (HRI) tests the hypothesis that human ecological conditions can be directly linked to a country’s security, stability, and resilience, as well as its ability to rebound from shocks. Shocks, such as hurricanes, floods, droughts, refugee migrations, economic failures, or ethnic clashes can degrade societies. In a society with strong resilience, shocks can be absorbed and the society can return relatively quickly to normal. In a society with poor resilience, shocks may cause wide oscillations leading to extreme conditions including instability, violence, and conflict. Sandia’s HRI modeling shows that the human ecological condition in Egypt was among the lowest in the MENA region in the early 1960s but climbed steadily into the twenty-first century. Moreover, Egypt is one of the few countries in the region that shows a relatively stable HRI projection into the future. This projection is a result of dynamic relationships between population growth, population density, caloric intake, and freshwater availability that are projected into the future. Egypt’s steady increase in HRI value suggests increasing resilience in Egypt until 2008, although the political and social turmoil in that country since then indicates less resilience. It is possible that sudden price shocks for food and energy, coming after such 14
a long period of gradual improvement in conditions, contributed to the unrest that occurred in Egypt after 2008.
SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACT Sandia researchers modeled how Egyptians might react to lower Nile River water, and whom they might blame for it—the Ethiopian government, the Egyptian government, or any other actor. The modeling showed that building the GERD likely will have a socio-political impact within Egypt, specifically the potential for social unrest. It showed that the highest potential for unrest is likely to occur well after the GERD reservoir is filled, with Nile water levels remaining low. Under this modeling scenario, the population would realize that blaming conditions on the dam was misplaced, thus increasing their resentment toward the government. The government might be able to deflect discontent outward toward the GERD and, by extension, Ethiopia, but only for a period of time. Perhaps the best way to prevent unrest is to reduce the importance of the GERD on the popular imagination. According to the model, Egyptians would see and feel the impacts of a shorter GERD filling period more intensely. A longer filling period, in contrast, might enable governments in both countries to adjust expectations over a longer period. Robust diplomacy between Egypt and Ethiopia could be an effective means for accomplishing this outcome. In summary, Sandia’s modeling indicates that the GERD’s contribution to the real material challenges facing Egypt is likely to be much smaller than stresses arising from other factors. However, building the GERD will stress the country and might contribute to economic, social, and political turbulence within Egypt. The good news is that timely government actions in Egypt and between Egypt and Ethiopia can offset that impact.
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RECOMMENDATIONS A recent and widely cited World Bank report asserts that there are three broad technical responses that can mitigate water shocks under a changing climate.40 All three can play crucial roles in relieving water stress and preserving prosperity and peace anywhere, including within the Gulf-to-Nile region. They are (1) increasing the supply of water, (2) improving water efficiency, and (3) enhancing resilience.
INCREASE SUPPLY Numerous technologies exist for increasing water supply in the Gulf-to-Nile region.41 Desalination in Israel and in the GCC is already playing an important role in meeting fresh water demand. But desalination is not the only option. Wastewater recycling increases water supply (for example, recycling water that is used at sewage treatment plants). If combined with anaerobic digesters, recycled water can generate energy (methane) for electricity generation for use by the plant itself. The waste sludge in turn can be used as a fertilizer. However, capital costs are high, a constraint that is especially problematic in poor cities and countries where waste water treatment may be rudimentary.42 Large dams and reservoirs harness river flows and dampen the impact of seasonal droughts and floods. And, as with the GERD, big dams generate massive electrical power. However, these dams have their drawbacks: they require big financing, often displace people (who then must migrate elsewhere), and disrupt riparian ecosystems through changing water flow, quality, and temperature. Large reservoirs, especially at lower elevations and in hot, arid environments (as with Egypt’s Lake Nasser) lose water to evaporation. 40 R. Damania, M. Bazilion, S. Dahan, S. Hallegatte, I. Klytchnikova, S. Moore, L. Nitake, D Rodriguez, J. Russ, W. Young, High and Dry; Climate Change, Water, and the Economy. 41 Unless otherwise noted, water conservation technologies and approaches throughout the concluding section are drawn from the World Bank paper cited above plus the following sources: K. Brooks, P. Folliott, and J. Magner, Hydrology and the Management of Watersheds (Ames, Iowa: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); A. Vickers, Water Use and Conservation (Amherst, MA: WaterPlow Press, 2); M. Falkenmark, and J. Rockstrom, Balancing Water for Humans and Nature; The New Approach in Ecohydrology (London: Earthscan, 2004); S. Solomon, Water (New York: Harper Collins, 2010); United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, The United Nations World Water Development Report , 2015: Water for a Sustainable World. Paris, France. 42 G. Tchobanoglous, H. Stensel, R. Tsuchihashi, and F. Burton, Wastewater Engineering; Treatment and Resource Recovery, Fifth Edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2013) ; David Mara, Domestic Wastewater Treatment in Developing Countries (London: Earthscan, 2004).
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And, over time, they fill with sediment, becoming less useful for water storage. Unfortunately, increasing supply by these means is costly in terms of money, energy, and in some cases pollution. It is not an accident that the region’s wealthiest countries rely on desalination, which is not a panacea even under the best circumstances. Desalination is like an alchemy that turns energy into fresh water, and is a reasonable strategy for providing drinking water when energy is cheap. But without dramatic technological improvements, desalination’s high cost precludes its use in agriculture. Also, the concentrated brine produced by desalination destroys coastal ecologies if not disposed of carefully and at considerable expense.
“The cheapest way to conserve water . . . is not to use it in the first place.” IMPROVE EFFICIENCY Improving the efficiency of water use is often a costeffective way to relieve stress on water sources. The cheapest way to conserve water, as the saying goes, is not to use it in the first place. Most efficiency efforts require fiscal incentives and effective government oversight and management. Public water ministries and agencies can provide leadership if they create the incentives and provide the funding to line irrigation canals and ditches (to prevent leakage of water into the soil), cover open ditches to prevent evaporation, apply advanced technologies to improve irrigation efficiency (for example, drip irrigation techniques), shift some agriculture to controlled environments (greenhouses), and change crops toward less water-intensive types. In wealthier parts of the region, cities can implement householdscale and commercial-scale efforts. Water pricing schemes are important. Progressive water pricing keeps water costs low for small users and the poor, but raises prices for large users. Water markets, which are still poorly developed or absent within the region, allow buyers and sellers to trade water. Putting a price on water that reflects the true cost of production allows water utilities to recover their investment. It also reduces demand through efficiency gains.
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However, higher water pricing schemes are almost always controversial. The most basic reason is that water is seen as a human right.43 For this reason, even where most people can afford to pay the true cost of water provision, the removal of water subsidies can generate significant consumer backlash. Saudi Arabia provides an example of how one country in the region is attempting these two strategies of developing new sources and improving efficiencies. For decades, the kingdom’s aggressive expansion of deep groundwater extraction and construction of desalination plants served the country’s needs. But that era is coming rapidly to a close, stimulated in large part by the Saudi government’s realization that it can no longer afford the high financial costs. Over the past couple years, it has formulated ambitious plans to provide alternative sources of water (such as reuse of urban wastewater) and to reduce demand through shifting away from waterintensive crops and other policies. (Unbelievably, for decades Saudi Arabia has subsidized wheat production; wheat is a thirsty crop unsuited for desert conditions.) The government’s recent decision to reduce its generous water subsidies, hence to increase the price of water for consumers, has proven to be highly controversial despite its economic logic.44 Improved efficiency is also a governance issue. As is true throughout this region, there are few transboundary river basins with strong management regimes in place. Fewer than half of the world’s transboundary basins have effective treaties governing their use, and many that do exist are insufficient to the management challenges at hand. River basin agreements often exclude important riparian states, do not address the full range of water use and management challenges in the basin, lack robust implementation mechanisms, do little or nothing to address sub-national water stresses (an important source of conflict over water), or do not possess the capacity to deal with sudden and unforeseen changes in water flow (as in the case of extended drought).45
43 On water as a human right, see Ken Conca, “The United States and International Water Policy,” The Journal of Environment Development, June 2008, http://jed.sagepub.com/ content/17/3/215, 225-226. 44 Thomas, 2015; Saeed Haider, “Saudi Arabia aims at 100 percent wastewater reuse by 2025,” Al Arabiya English, February 19, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/ technology/2015/02/19/Saudi-Arabia-aims-at-100-percentwastewater-reuse-by-2025.html; Sara Jerome, “Saudi Arabia sets sights on 100% wastewater reuse,” Water Online, March 25, 2015, http://www.wateronline.com/doc/saudi-arabia-sets-siteson-wastewater-reuse-0001. 45 For a general discussion of transboundary water regimes, see Ken Conca, “Decoupling Water and Violent Conflict,” Issues in Science and Technology, Fall 2012, 39-48.
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All river basins in the Gulf-to-Nile region face this dilemma, with weak governance regimes the norm rather than the exception.
ENHANCE RESILIENCE While floods and droughts are natural phenomena that introduce variability into hydrological systems, global climate change is exacerbating that natural variability. Increasing the resilience of systems in the absence of climate change has been an important objective and will become increasingly important as climate change progresses. Resilience is the ability of a system to suffer shocks without significant loss of function, which can be defined in terms of three capacities: absorptive, adaptive, and restorative.46 Absorptive capacity refers to how easily a system can absorb impacts and deal with the consequences. In terms of water security, to improve a system’s absorptive capacity would mean increasing water storage, strengthening water delivery and treatment systems, introducing redundancy into the system (e.g., building backup water delivery systems in case of disaster), and segregating water systems so that if one part of the system collapses, other parts of the system can continue to function.47 Increasing storage refers to building dams and reservoirs, which can capture flood water and allow that water to be used during dry periods. Creating and protecting wetlands is even better in that it both reduces and disperses floods while at the same time delivering other benefits like water purification, fisheries protection, and wildlife conservation. However, all these strategies require institutional support and investment, and many interventions can be expensive. Adaptive capacity refers to whether, and how fast, a system can be reorganized after disruption occurs. In the water space, examples include rerouting water (for example, inter-basin transfers), post-disaster water conservation, and even rationing.48 Restorative capacity refers to the capacity of a system to repair itself. In the water space, an example is construction of advance warning and monitoring systems that allow water managers to brace for disasters and other disruptions.49 But such
46 B. Biringer, E. Vugrin, and D. Warren, Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2013). 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.
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interventions also require large financing, sound planning, and foresight. Arguably, the greatest form of resilience is through reducing demand. A system requiring lower amounts of a resource can be more resilient to variations in supply, at least up to a point. At extreme levels of resource efficiency, systems can become no more efficient without painful interventions, a situation known as “hardening of demand.”50 The waste in the system that can be painlessly cut out has been eliminated, and further decreases threaten to break it.
There are very few countries in the Gulf-to-Nile region in such a position. This is the good news, meaning there is significant demand-side room for improvement. While there are many ways to increase water-use efficiency through technical interventions (detailed above), the greatest long-term threat to resilience in the Gulf-to-Nile region is not the variability of the hydrological system, nor even the impacts of climate change, but is rather the impacts of increasing population and increasing resource consumption.
50 C. Howe and C. Goemans, “Manager to Manager – The Simple Analytics of Demand Hardening,” Journal of the American Water Works Association 99, 2007, (10): 24-25.
CONCLUSION Much of the Gulf-to-Nile region is already water insecure. Unfortunately, in the decades to come many if not most countries in the region will face even greater challenges with respect to their water supplies. On the supply side, climate change will introduce greater turbulence into the region’s hydrological cycles, with uncertain and possibly grave consequences. On the demand side, growth—economic and demographic— will continue to pressure already stressed water supplies. High population growth is a core driver of increasing demand around the world and across the Gulf-to-Nile region. Suggestions to slow population growth over time are contentious for many reasons but should be included in any rational discussion of resource policy.51 The same is true for economic growth, which normally proceeds in tandem with increased water use. Perhaps the biggest question facing the region is whether countries can realize economic gains, given increasing populations, without higher water consumption? Although this is an exceedingly difficult challenge, there are reasons 51 See, e.g., J. Guillebaud, Voluntary Family Planning to Minimise and Mitigate Climate Change, BMJ, May 20, 2016, 353: i2102, http://www.bmj.com/content/353/bmj.i2102, accessed 6/1/2016. See also numerous publications from the United Nations Population Fund, http://www.unfpa.org/publications.
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to be optimistic. Some countries in the region—Israel is one—manage to conserve water while enjoying a buoyant economy at the same time. Realizing water efficiency gains across the region will depend on whether other countries can afford the technical upgrades that water-efficient countries such as Israel use, whether those countries can create the political will to make the necessary policy decisions and invest in the water management structures that are needed to pull off what is essentially a governance problem. The most important and ultimately effective resiliency strategy is to find a way to decouple demand for water from economic and population growth. As water has no substitute, finding ways to reduce high consumption levels while maintaining human welfare and quality of life is a massive and difficult challenge, but essential if countries around the region are to realize good economic fortune and political stability.52 52 See, e.g., Fischer-Kowalski, M., M. Swilling, E. von Weizsacker, Y. Ren, Y. Moriguchi, W. Crane, F Kruasmann, N. Eisenmenger, S. Giljum, R. Hennicke, R. Lankao, and A. Siriban Manalang. 2011. Decoupling Natural Resource Use and Environmental Impacts from Economic Growth. A Report of the Working Group on Decoupling to the International Resource Panel. United Nations Environment Program. ISBN: 978-92-807-3167-5. http://www. unep.org/resourcepanel/decoupling/files/pdf/Decoupling_ Report_English.pdf. Accessed 6/1/2016.
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ABOUT THE AUTHORS Peter Engelke is a Senior Fellow within the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. His work involves assessing global trends, connecting them to current challenges, and designing strategic responses for policymakers and thought leaders around the world. His diverse portfolio includes topics ranging from grand strategy to regional futures to natural resources and urbanization. Previously, Dr. Engelke was a visiting fellow at the Stimson Center. Formerly, he was on the research faculty at the Georgia Tech Research Institute, where he co-authored his first book, Health and Community Design. His second book (The Great Acceleration, 2016), is a global environmental history since 1945. Dr. Engelke is a former Bosch Fellow with the Robert Bosch Foundation in Stuttgart, Germany. He holds a Ph.D. in History from Georgetown University and is on the adjunct faculty at Georgetown’s School of Continuing Studies. Dr. Engelke currently is residing in Geneva, Switzerland.
Howard Passell works in the Strategic Futures and Systems Analysis Group at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His work focuses on emerging national security issues associated with water, energy, food, ecosystems, climate, and population, with an emphasis on the relationships between resource scarcity and human security. Over the years his work has included resource monitoring, modeling, management, capacity building, and policy-related projects at various scales in the US, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. He teaches as an adjunct professor in the Water Resources Program at the University of New Mexico. His undergraduate studies were in classical literature and the liberal arts at St. John’s College in Santa Fe, NM. He earned his master’s and doctorate degrees in conservation biology and hydrogeoecology at the University of New Mexico.
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Atlantic Council Board of Directors CHAIRMAN *Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. CHAIRMAN EMERITUS, INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Brent Scowcroft PRESIDENT AND CEO *Frederick Kempe EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS *Adrienne Arsht *Stephen J. Hadley VICE CHAIRS *Robert J. Abernethy *Richard Edelman *C. Boyden Gray *George Lund *Virginia A. Mulberger *W. DeVier Pierson *John Studzinski TREASURER *Brian C. McK. Henderson SECRETARY *Walter B. Slocombe DIRECTORS Stéphane Abrial Odeh Aburdene *Peter Ackerman Timothy D. Adams Bertrand-Marc Allen John R. Allen *Michael Andersson Michael S. Ansari Richard L. Armitage David D. Aufhauser Elizabeth F. Bagley *Rafic A. Bizri Dennis C. Blair *Thomas L. Blair Philip M. Breedlove Reuben E. Brigety II Myron Brilliant *Esther Brimmer R. Nicholas Burns *Richard R. Burt
Michael Calvey John E. Chapoton Ahmed Charai Sandra Charles Melanie Chen George Chopivsky Wesley K. Clark David W. Craig *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. Nelson W. Cunningham Ivo H. Daalder Ankit N. Desai *Paula J. Dobriansky Christopher J. Dodd Conrado Dornier Thomas J. Egan, Jr. *Stuart E. Eizenstat Thomas R. Eldridge Julie Finley Lawrence P. Fisher, II *Alan H. Fleischmann *Ronald M. Freeman Laurie S. Fulton Courtney Geduldig *Robert S. Gelbard Thomas H. Glocer Sherri W. Goodman Mikael Hagström Ian Hague Amir A. Handjani John D. Harris, II Frank Haun Michael V. Hayden Annette Heuser Ed Holland *Karl V. Hopkins Robert D. Hormats Miroslav Hornak *Mary L. Howell Wolfgang F. Ischinger Reuben Jeffery, III Joia M. Johnson *James L. Jones, Jr. Lawrence S. Kanarek Stephen R. Kappes *Maria Pica Karp
*Zalmay M. Khalilzad Robert M. Kimmitt Henry A. Kissinger Franklin D. Kramer Richard L. Lawson *Jan M. Lodal *Jane Holl Lute William J. Lynn Izzat Majeed Wendy W. Makins Zaza Mamulaishvili Mian M. Mansha Gerardo Mato William E. Mayer T. Allan McArtor John M. McHugh Eric D.K. Melby Franklin C. Miller James N. Miller Judith A. Miller *Alexander V. Mirtchev Susan Molinari Michael J. Morell Georgette Mosbacher Thomas R. Nides Franco Nuschese Joseph S. Nye Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg Sean C. O’Keefe Ahmet M. Oren *Ana I. Palacio Carlos Pascual Alan Pellegrini David H. Petraeus Thomas R. Pickering Daniel B. Poneman Daniel M. Price Arnold L. Punaro Robert Rangel Thomas J. Ridge Charles O. Rossotti Robert O. Rowland Harry Sachinis Brent Scowcroft Rajiv Shah Stephen Shapiro
Kris Singh James G. Stavridis Richard J.A. Steele Paula Stern Robert J. Stevens Robert L. Stout, Jr. John S. Tanner *Ellen O. Tauscher Nathan D. Tibbits Frances M. Townsend Clyde C. Tuggle Paul Twomey Melanne Verveer Enzo Viscusi Charles F. Wald Michael F. Walsh Maciej Witucki Neal S. Wolin Mary C. Yates Dov S. Zakheim HONORARY DIRECTORS
David C. Acheson Madeleine K. Albright James A. Baker, III Harold Brown Frank C. Carlucci, III Robert M. Gates Michael G. Mullen Leon E. Panetta William J. Perry Colin L. Powell Condoleezza Rice Edward L. Rowny George P. Shultz John W. Warner William H. Webster *Executive Committee Members List as of March 21, 2016
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