Conclusion

Nothing discussed here will likely fully resolve the dual nature of US-Iraq relations. Rather, the argument is that optimizing US-Iraq relations requires aligning to some degree the interests of multiple actors, all of whom are in competition. Moreover, this analysis avoids specific recommendations regarding Iraq’s well-known concerns regarding militia integration, malign influences, corruption, constitutional reform, and so on. While advocating for such aspirational goals has utility, it makes no sense to base a relationship on things one cannot have. Until the underlying and competing interests described above are better aligned, there is little the Iraqi government can do to deliver on any of these issues.

Therefore, what is recommended is an opportunistic approach that seeks to create alternatives to corrosive influences. Creating these alternatives would certainly benefit from greater emphasis on economic cooperation, as more economic opportunities would lower the stakes overall, creating conditions for cooperation on other critical issues. However, economic opportunity also depends on political and security improvements. Whether those improvements come depends on the character of the new government currently under formation. While the Sadrist victory may yield a prime minister who may be less friendly to US interests, there are other Iraqi stakeholders who may be more open to them.

Taking advantage of that openness does not entail undermining any new Iraqi government. Rather, it involves credible and capable inducements and, where necessary, threats that either raise the stakes to impose costs on an actor or lower them to create more room for cooperation. In changing the stakes, one frequently changes the value others ascribe to the status quo. To discourage subsequent challenges, one should seek ways to raise the value of the status quo, at least up to the point where one is worse off. Where that is not possible, one should prepare for confrontation. Decreasing the chances, or at least the severity of any confrontation requires carefully calibrating demands to encourage cooperation. Big demands, even when accompanied by high costs for failure to concede, generally result in failure. Thus, an approach that looks for cooperation on a broad change of smaller, less costly concerns will have a higher chance of success than one that seeks to directly confront Iraq’s corrosive influences.