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Executive Summary
There is no longer any question that the United States has entered a new era of strategic or greatpower competition. The “end of history” moment enjoyed by the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union was the exception, not the rule. Though Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are peer or near-peer competitors, China poses the primary threat to the US-led, rules-based global system. Taiwan (the Republic of China (ROC)) is key to achieving the United States’ interests, the most significant of which are the containment of China and the prevention of China achieving regional hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan is strategically located in the middle of the first island chain. It is the primary supplier of semiconductors to the United States and its allies, and one of the most advanced economies in the world. It provides the world with a visible example that a vibrant, multiparty democracy can thrive in Chinese culture. Though Taiwan is not a formal ally due to its unique status and the United States’ “One China Policy,” China—as well as US allies and other unaligned nations—well understands that Taiwan is under the US security umbrella.
China’s desire to achieve “reunification” is clear, and its efforts to test Taiwanese and US resolve on the issue are increasingly bold.1 These efforts are the most likely flashpoint for a future Sino-US conflict, as failure to deter Chinese aggression toward Taiwan could quickly escalate into war. Moreover, a US refusal to support Taiwan, or significant US military setbacks in a confrontation over Taiwan, could signal to both allies and potential allies in the Indo-Pacific that the United States is a declining power and China an ascendant one. Considering the recent US abandonment of its allies in Afghanistan, a further loss of credibility over Taiwan could make US containment of China increasingly difficult.2
This paper proposes a US strategy for strengthening the relationship between Taiwan and the United States, its allies, and its partners, to blunt China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific region by deterring any attempt to achieve “reunification” by force. This paper focuses on preventing a Chinese takeover of Taiwan through a policy of deterrence and denial.
Many potential methodologies analyze US challenges and formulate a cohesive strategy from the familiar “ends, ways, means” to the strategicplanning system Royal Dutch Shell created in the early 1980s. For analysis, this paper primarily utilizes the work of William Ascher and William Overholt in their 1983 book Strategic Planning and Forecasting: Political Risk and Economic Opportunity.
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