www.afap.org.au
Edition 2 || 2016
afap your
A Journal for Virgin Group Pilots
FATIGUE MANAGEMENT: ENHANCING PRESCRIPTIVE RULES WITH A RISK-BASED APPROACH
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WELCOME TO
YOUR AFAP Welcome to another edition of Your AFAP. As you would expect, your AFAP industrial staff and pilot representatives have been particularly busy lately. We have been primarily addressing four ongoing issues: 1. 2. 3. 4.
The eJet Decommissioning Tigerair Integration Wide Body EBA Narrow Body EBA
EJET DECOMMISSIONING The eJet decommissioning is a complex issue that will place significant resource constraints on the Company. The next 18 months will see 35x 737 courses, going through to March of 2018, with about a quarter of all pilots in the Company either moving positions or being trained. Additionally, the NZ based VAI operation has lost a significant amount of pilots to Air New Zealand. Any decision about the ATR fleet appears to have been put on hold until after the eJet is decommissioned and, as a result, there is also a large amount of training to be done on the ATR. This will be a great challenge for all, especially in the next 6 months. We are working with the Company on a policy/plan document for the eJet that should hopefully be finalised by the time this goes to print. The Company is assembling a working team with representation from the AFAP to oversee the process and we are hopeful that Cpt. Rowly Hipwell will be part of this. It is imperative that the training plan and transition run to schedule. If it does not, the flow on effect could delay training associated with the introduction of the 737 MAX. More on the eJet on page 8. TIGERAIR INTEGRATION Integration with Tigerair is something that Virgin’s AFAP members have been consistently calling for since Virgin Australia purchased a 60% share in Tigerair back in early 2014. On August 11, we reached agreement with Virgin management, Tigerair management and VIPA on a Deed that, subject to a successful vote of Tigerair pilots, will see integration of Tigerair onto the Virgin Australia Group Pilot’s List. This has not happened overnight. It is the culmination of over two years work, and something that Virgin has strongly resisted until recently. It is still not certain, as Tigerair pilots are yet to vote on the Deed, but we have spent a lot of time and effort working with Tigerair’s AFAP pilot reps Cpt. Michael McCaull, Cpt. Michael MacNamara and Cpt. Matthew Sheppard to arrive at a proposal that Tigerair pilots will hopefully see as fair and reasonable. Tigerair’s pilot reps made it clear from the outset that Tigerair pilots would not agree to any proposal where Tigerair’s pilots were disadvantaged. They were adamant that all pilots presently employed at Tigerair must maintain priority for Tigerair positions and this was integral to the concept we arrived at. For more on the Tigerair Integration Deed see page 4.
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pilots have been patient and understanding. However, with the long hours being worked and no relief in sight, until the first batch of eJet pilots complete their 737 training, and VAI Tigerair pilots return in around 6-8 months, that goodwill is rapidly wearing thin. The Company needs to either dedicate the appropriate resources to Narrow Body negotiations or roll over our present Agreement. For a bit more on EBA negotiations see pages 8 and 12. VPF ELECTIONS Your VPF is the pilot conduit between Virgin Australia Management and the AFAP industrial staff. Your VPF committee provides direction and feedback to AFAP industrial staff so that the AFAP can respond promptly to issues that affect Virgin’s AFAP members. Your VPF committee also determines which of your colleagues represents AFAP members in EBA negotiations, FRMS governance meetings, AIC meetings etc. The AFAP has Council elections every 2 years and the next elections are coming up in the latter part of 2016. Nominations have now closed for the 15 VPF Council positions. In addition to many of the current committee nominating, the AEC received nominations from new pilots who have not been part of the VPF previously. Therefore, we will have a healthy, contested election. Some colleagues from our current VPF Council (i.e. Capt. Steve Lunn, Capt. Scott Edwards and Capt. Rowly Hipwell), have decided not to re-nominate. I just want to take this opportunity to thank all of them for their contributions. They have volunteered much of their spare time over the period of their involvement. "Lunny" in particular has been representing Virgin's AFAP members on the VPF committee since it was formed in 2008. Over the past 2 years he and his fellow welfare rep, Brett Loeliger have put much work into improving Welfare procedures and programs for AFAP members. The HIMS and MAP programs are prime examples. As a past AFAP Trustee, Scott has also been actively involved with the AFAP over a long period of time so I'm sure he'll enjoy some extra time with his family. Rowly has been a strong advocate for eJet issues and was the go to point of contact for many of our members during the closure of the Perth eJet base and again with the present eJet decommissioning. Capt Wal Gowans has also not re-nominated, but in Wal's case, it wasn't a deliberate act, he simply forgot to submit his form to the AEC in time. Wal will still be providing input and advice to the EBA negotiations, but given the amount he's contributed in the past in negotiating the last two EBA's I'm sure he'll enjoy the break. Thanks Wal!
EBA NEGOTIATIONS
There are many ways to get involved with your AFAP and you don’t have to be part of the VPF to contribute. Thanks to those that do because with the amount of restructuring taking place there will be a lot of work to do over the next few years whilst we do our best to balance assisting the Company whilst defending the rights and expectations of AFAP members. If you are not happy about decisions being made then please get in touch, or get involved.
As everyone is aware, EBA negotiations are going slowly. The Company has a lot of “balls in the air” at the moment and not surprisingly they want to prioritise Wide Body negotiations so that they can get the A330 heading up to China. The Narrow Body
Regards, Rod Aldridge VPF Chair
Your AFAP// 2016 // www.afap.org.au
PILOTS FACE GROUNDING OVER MEDICAL DELAYS MITCHELL BINGEMANN AVIATION EDITOR, THE AUSTRALIAN Almost 1000 pilots are facing delays of two months or more to receive the medical certificates they need to fly because of a mammoth backlog within the aviation regulator’s new online medical portal. About 170 pilots are also within 14 days of having their medical certificates expire — which will *effectively ground them and put them out of work — as the backlog continues to grow and slow down the processing system. The logjam was created with the introduction of Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s online medical records system, which has been in operation since March 21. The new system was meant to streamline the application process and create a repository of pilot medical records for future use but teething problems with the system has instead created a slowdown that is now affecting hundreds of pilots. The new system is processing about 1700 medical certificates a month, down from the 2000 a month that the old system was capable of issuing. The delays mean there is now a backlog of about 900 pilots who are being told to expect waits of two months to receive their certificates. In about 400 cases, some are being told the wait is even longer.
come to grips with the new system. The average processing time for Class 2 medical certificates (for student pilots, private pilots and balloon operators) is taking 27 days and Class 3 medical certificates (for air traffic controllers and flight service officers) about 21 days. One pilot who contacted The Australian — but asked to remain anonymous — has had to wait six months to get clearance for a Class 1 Medical certificate and has lost work as a result of the delays. “It’s been a total ‘fubar’. I’ve missed out on some jobs because this is hanging over my head,” the pilot said. An investigation by The Australian prompted the Australian Federation of Air Pilots — the largest industrial and professional association for commercial *pilots in Australia with over 3500 commercial pilots — to survey its members about issues with the new system. The response rate on the survey set a record for the AFAP which has collated 19 pages of complaints about the system. In total, some 69 per cent of the 312 respondents to the survey have reported problems and major delays with the new online system.
Many of those surveyed pilots reported around a seven- to eight- week wait to receive Under the old system, the average processing their medical certificates, while the most time for Class 1 medical certificates — which severe cases had seen waits of up to four are issued to holders of Air Transport Pilot months. Licences, Commercial Pilot Licences, Multicrew Pilot Licences and Flight Engineer The most common complaints about the Licences — was 17 days. system are that it is slow or not working, recurring glitches resulting in incomplete But that time has now blown out to an applications and payment problems. average of 20 days as pilots and doctors
“My company has been on my back about the expiry and renewal and told me that if my medical expires they will stop paying me until it is renewed,” one pilot said. “All the while, CASA is still sending me emails reminding me that my medical expires within 60 days, and what the renewal process is. I have done everything required to renew it, well ahead of the expiry date.” CASA has acknowledged the problem and is shifting additional staff into its aviation medicine branch to cope with the strains on the system. Changes are also being made to workflow practices to improve turnaround times. “Some medical certificates are taking more time to process. CASA apologises to pilots who have been waiting longer than normal for their medical to be *finalised and thanks everyone for their patience,” a CASA spokesman said. “Anyone who considers they are facing hardship due to a delay in medical processing should contact CASA as soon as possible, and assistance will be provided.” The aviation regulator is also prioritising medical certificate *applications where the current certificate is due to expire within 14 days. “There are more than 400 medical certificate applications that have been lodged for eight weeks or longer. In the majority of these applications CASA requires further information from the applicant and/ or specialist medical reports,” the CASA spokesman said. This article has been republished with permission from The Australian.
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TIGERAIR UPDATE PATRICK LARKINS, DEANNA CAIN AND SIMON MILLER AFAP INDUSTRIAL TEAM Over the last few months TPF representatives have been in discussion with the VPF, Virgin and Tigerair regarding the alleged breach of job security provisions in the Virgin Short Haul EBA, which stems from the transfer of the B737 DPS flying to Tigerair. These discussions have focused on providing pilots from both operations with reciprocal access to opportunities at Tigerair and within the Virgin Group through integration of Tigerair pilots onto the Virgin Australia Group Pilots List. To this end, the Company put forward a deed giving effect to a “Y” system ‘integration model with existing Tiger pilots being added to the bottom of the Virgin Group List with a GDOJ of 8 April 2106 and retaining priority for opportunities at Tigerair (i.e. the same as the integration of VARA and VANZ). A number of face to face meetings occurred to discuss the terms of the deed and various
iterations were drafted following feedback from the AFAP. Below is a summary of the major components of the deed, which has now been signed off by the AFAP, VIPA, Virgin and Tigerair. Importantly, the terms of the Tigerair integration must be voted and approved by a majority of Tigerair pilots as part of a variation to the EBA before it can take effect. It is important to highlight that the AFAP’s acceptance of the deed effectively settles any claim against Virgin for breaching the Short Haul EBA. Part of the settlement also includes the unions agreeing to relax some of the existing job security provisions in a new EBA, in order to avoid any potential future disputes around expansion of Tigerair. Before deciding to sign the Deed the AFAP considered the option of litigation in response to the alleged breach.
After careful consideration, the AFAP determined the better long term approach is for Virgin pilots is to have access to positions at Tigerair so that any future expansion creates opportunities for all Virgin Group pilots. Additionally, the Deed provides Tigerair pilots access to positions in the Virgin Group into the future, while retaining their priority for internal positions, creating a reciprocal benefit for Tigerair pilots. This is in direct contrast to arrangements at Jetstar, where Qantas pilots have access to commands at Jetstar ahead of Jetstar pilots. The AFAP Virgin and Tiger pilot representatives worked collaboratively to ensure this was not repeated in this instance. From the AFAP perspective, any growth of Tigerair should not be at the expense of Virgin, as Tigerair is a low cost carrier with different product offerings not competing in the same market as Virgin.
SUMMARY OF DEED WHY IS THERE A DEED? The Job Security provision at Clause 52 of the Virgin Australia Short Haul Pilots’ Agreement 2013 (“VAA EBA”) states that: Virgin Australia will not outsource its Pilot labour and/ or Australian based flying to any other company or entity within Australia or overseas and will maximise the circumstances in which Australian based flying is performed by Australian based Pilots covered by this Agreement. The AFAP Virgin Pilot Federation alleged that the transfer of the Bali flying from Virgin to Tigerair represented a breach of the above clause. While Virgin did not accept that it had breached the job security clause, it sought to remove the threat of legal action not only in relation to the current transfer of the Bali flying from Virgin to Tigerair, but also any future expansion of Tigerair. Accordingly, the unions as a part of the Deed, and in exchange for Tigerair Integration, have signed a release that any current or future expansion of Tigerair on current or future Group routes will not breach the VAA EBA. This provides Tigerair certainty that it can expand and grow without the continued threat of legal action by Virgin pilots. However the release is conditional on Tigerair continuing to operate in different market segments with different product offerings (i.e. low cost carrier versus full service carrier) and not in direct competition to VAA. In exchange the Company has offered Virgin pilots access
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to positions at Tigerair through integration, with Virgin pilots going to the bottom of Tigers list and Tiger pilots going to the bottom of the Virgin Group Pilots List. TERMS OF THE DEED - COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATION OF DEED Before any of the terms of the Deed come into effect, eligible Tigerair Pilots must first vote to approve the integration proposal by way of a variation to the Tigerair EBA under the Fair Work Act as it represents a change to the seniority provisions in their current Agreement. This requires that a majority of eligible Tigerair pilots vote to approve the variation. VAA pilots will not be required to vote on the Integration proposal as under clause 1.6 of Appendix 4 of the Virgin Short Haul EBA, the VAA AIC can agree to the inclusion of the Tigerair pilots on the Pilots’ List, similar to what occurred with VARA pilots joining the Group Pilots’ List. As Tigerair pilots will go to the bottom of the Virgin Group Pilots’ List, there is no detrimental impact for existing Virgin pilots. As above it is a term of the deed that the AFAP and VIPA agree that any current or future expansion of Tigerair on current or future Group routes will not breach clause 52 Job Security of the VAA EBA. This does not completely do away with the job security provisions in the current EBA as this condition is be to be read in conjunction with the following agreement between the parties which forms a term of the deed: 1.
Virgin Australia and Tigerair operate in different
2. 3.
4.
market segments, with different product offerings; the intention of this deed is to maximise the job opportunities for all Virgin Australia Group pilots; the proposed growth of Tigerair is not intended to be at the expense of the current or future Australianbased flying performed by pilots covered by the VAA EBA. The release and indemnity in this clause 5(a) of this deed is conditional upon a. Tigerair operating a low cost carrier under Tigerair livery; b. Virgin Australia continuing to operate as a full service carrier under Virgin Australia livery using pilots consistent with the relevant enterprise agreement.
TIGERAIR PILOTS’ LIST The Deed sets out that the Tigerair seniority list will be published as follows: a.
The Tigerair Pilots’ List in place under the Tigerair EBA as at 8 April 2016 will be the initial seniority list (“initial Tigerair Pilots’ List”). The pilots on this initial Tigerair Pilots’ List will not be re-ordered;
b.
All the Group pilots on the Virgin Australia Group Pilots’ List as at 8 April 2016 will be added to the bottom of the initial Tigerair Pilots’ List;
c.
The list will then be updated to include all pilots who join the Group after 8 April 2016.
As a result existing Tigerair pilots will retain their current seniority for the purpose of any positions that arise in Tigerair. Virgin Group pilots will be able to access positions at Tigerair where there are no suitable Tigerair candidates on the Tigerair list available to fill a position. The significance of Virgin Group pilots being added to the bottom of the initial Tigerair Pilots’ List is that instead of recruiting a pilot externally, Tigerair must now offer positions to Virgin Group pilots. VIRGIN AUSTRALIA GROUP PILOTS’ LIST Virgin Group pilots will retain their current positon on the Group Pilots’ List.
All current Tigerair pilots employed will be added to the Virgin Australia Group Pilots’ List with a group date of joining of 8 April 2016 consistent with their existing order on the Tigerair Pilots’ List. OPERATION OF THE VIRGIN AUSTRALIA GROUP PILOTS’ LIST To facilitate the career progression of Tigerair pilots to other positions within the Group, Tigerair will be required to release up to 10% of Tigerair pilots in any rolling 12 month period. However Tigerair at its discretion may release more than 10% of Tigerair pilots in any 12 month period. There is no reciprocal restriction on the amount of pilots Virgin must release to positions in Tigerair in any 12 month period and the expectation is that following the Integration date (July 1 2018 – see below) Virgin will release as many suitable candidates as required to fill vacancies at Tiger. PROCESS FOR MOVING TO TIGERAIR POSITIONS The Deed requires that Virgin Australia Group pilots before being awarded a position (including a command) at Tigerair must have satisfied the promotional criteria and process defined by Tigerair. Similarly, a Tigerair pilot moving to a Virgin Australia Group position must have satisfied the promotional criteria and process defined in the relevant operation. This clause ensures that Tigerair pilots and Virgin pilots are treated the same in moving between operations within Tigerair and the Virgin Group. COMMENCEMENT OF INTEGRATION ARRANGEMENTS Due to current decommissioning of the E190 and ATR fleet reduction which is resulting in an extensive training program on the B737 Virgin management have maintained that there is no ability for Virgin Group pilots to be released to fill any consequential positions at Tigerair in the next 2 years. Separately Tigerair’s resources are also going to be stretched as they restructure to an all B737 operation. It will present a challenge to transition all of Tigerair’s existing pilots to the B737 whilst still sourcing pilots for the phase out of the A320. As such, while the deed commences operation as soon
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as the condition precedents have been satisfied (i.e. VAA AIC approval, successful variation to the Tigerair EBA and successful Transfer of Business application to FWC) the ‘Integration Date’ is defined as 1 July 2018 or another date agreed between the parties. The deed further sets out that Virgin will not be required to release Virgin pilots to fill Tigerair positions before 1 July 2018 (Integration date), however pilots may be released earlier at the Company’s discretion. After 1 July 2018, existing Tigerair pilots will continue to receive priority for positions within Tigerair in accordance with Tigerair EBA. However, from this point, Tigerair vacancies that are not filled by existing Tigerair pilots will be advertised to the Virgin Australia Group and Virgin pilots will have access to these positions in accordance with their position on the List and must be released. It is clear in the deed that Tigerair shall not engage pilots from outside of the Virgin Australia Group until the pool of suitable internal candidates has been exhausted. INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS The Deed sets out that until the integration commences on 1 July 2018, any consequential vacancies at Tigerair may be offered to temporary contract pilots, who will have a contract termination date no later than 1 January 2019. This is required so that Tigerair has flexibility to crew the B737 and A320 operations until such time as Virgin pilots can be released to fill positions. Further, the Deed requires that Tigerair shall not engage contract pilots to fill any line Captain positions at Tigerair, except in the following circumstances: •
•
to avoid having more than 20% of Captains on an aircraft type who are initial Tigerair command upgrades with less than six (6) months’ experience on that aircraft type; or where there is insufficient successful bids by existing Tigerair pilots.
The Deed also states that Tigerair shall not engage any Contract Pilot beyond 1 January 2019 unless the pool of suitable Virgin Group and Tigerair pilots has been exhausted. In such circumstances where a Contract Pilot is offered permanent employment at Tigerair it can only be as a First Officer and their Group date of joining on the Virgin Australia Group Pilots’ List, shall be the date they commence permanent employment (i.e. 1 July 2018) This ensures that contract pilots cannot stay on in permanent line Captain roles. Further the deed mandates that there will be no compulsory redundancies of Group pilots whilst the Contract Pilots remain engaged by Tigerair, provided the affected Group pilots participate in the opportunities made available by the Group to transfer to positions occupied by the Contract Pilots.
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To be clear, under the terms of the deed Tigerair is not permitted to engage any permanent external pilots unless there are no Tiger or Virgin pilots seeking opportunities at Tiger. The use of contract pilots to fill the void until Virgin pilots can be released, while not ideal, will ensure future opportunities for Virgin pilots at Tigerair are not lost indefinitely and the circumstances are far more preferable than Tigerair engaging permanent pilots. PERIODS AND BONDS – TIGERAIR PILOT MOVING TO B737 The AFAP negotiated strongly for a reduced bond period for current Tigerair pilots moving onto the B737 given they are now being forced into a move due to fleet replacement. Initially, the Company were seeking a $45,000 bond over 36 months for Tigerair pilots moving onto the Tigerair B737 operation. Tigerair considered this feedback and agreed to revise the position for existing Tiger pilots who transfer onto the B737 who will now be bonded for $36,000 for a period of two years following the date of entry into the cyclic proficiency program. FREEZE PERIODS AND BONDS – VIRGIN PILOT MOVING TO TIGERAIR A Virgin pilot who transfers employment from a Group company to Tigerair will be frozen in Tigerair for three (3) years. This is irrespective of any aircraft type freeze, to ensure a return of service within the Tigerair operation. In addition if the pilot is not endorsed on the type then Tigerair will pay the cost of the endorsement training and the pilot will be bonded for $45,000 for the period of three (3) years following the date of entry into the cyclic proficiency program. This is consistent with the bond and freeze arrangements being sought by the Company in the Narrow Body negotiations. FREEZE PERIODS AND BONDS – TIGERAIR PILOT MOVING TO VIRGIN A Tigerair pilot who transfers employment from Tigerair to a Virgin Group company will be frozen on the aircraft type in accordance with the relevant EBA. Currently, the freeze in the Virgin Short Haul and Long Haul EBAs is 30 months from entry into the cyclic proficiency program but this may increase to 36 months as an outcome of the current EBA negotiation processes in both Narrow Body and Wide Body operations. In addition, a Tiger pilot (if they require an endorsement) will be bonded in accordance with the relevant EBA. Currently, this is $30,000 over 30 months in both operations, but this could to increase to $45,000 in the new EBAs in each operation subject to a negotiated outcome.
WOMEN’S NETWORK ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING This year’s Women’s Network AGM was held at our Brisbane office on Thursday 16 June. It was a great opportunity for our women members to reflect on the past year and discuss the Network’s goals and plans for the year ahead.
AFAP Legal Counsel Joseph Wheeler gave a presentation on ‘Reflections on aviation law with a focus on women’s issues and achievements’.
WOMEN’S NETWORK WESTERN AUSTRALIA MEETING// WHEN: THURSDAY 25 AUGUST 2016 14.00 - 16.00 WHERE: LEFT BANK 15 RIVERSDALE RD, EAST FREMANTLE WA 6158
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VAA UPDATE PATRICK LARKINS, DEANNA CAIN AND SIMON MILLER AFAP INDUSTRIAL TEAM E190 DECOMMISSIONING
VAA NARROW BODY EBA UPDATE
As part of the Company’s fleet simplification initiative, in June Virgin announced its intention to decommission the E190 fleet by mid-2018. Since this announcement VPF representatives have been involved in an ongoing consultation process with the Company in an effort to understand the implications and minimise any adverse impact for E190 pilots.
The narrow body EBA negotiations have progressed slowly throughout 2016. So far the majority of negotiations has been spent presenting and understanding the respective claims on the table.
It is expected that the flying currently undertaken by the E190 will be absorbed through increased and optimised B737 flying, creating additional positions on the B737. The Company has introduced an intensive and extensive training plan to transition all E190 pilots onto the B737 over the next 18 to 24 months. It has also guaranteed that no pilot will be made redundant between now and July 2018. While this seems like a positive outcome, there is currently significant frustration and uncertainty for E190 pilots around how the E190 decommissioning will be managed and where pilots will end up (base and rank) at the end of the process. As rank and base protection is not assured there is a lot riding on what the B737 operation will look like in 2018. Unfortunately, the Company has advised that it is not able to accurately forecast this far ahead. It is also unknown what, if any, wide body vacancies will become available during this period, making the bidding process for E190 pilots somewhat a guessing game. Many E190 pilots are now left to contemplate whether they should bid off now to protect their base and or rank, or wait until the end of the decommissioning in the hope that there will be a position in their preferred base or that a wide body opportunity may eventuate in the meantime. While the AFAP appreciates the complexity of the B737 training plan and unreliability of projecting the schedule and resources too far in advance, we have informed the Company of the need to provide as much information to E190 pilots as possible to assist with their bidding, managing realistic expectations and enabling pilots to plan their future accordingly. Other significant issues being discussed as part of the E190 consultations include allocation of E190 pilots to B737 training courses, bonds and freezes for E190 pilots moving to the B737, relocation assistance for E190 pilots relocating to other bases, and involuntary and forced demotions. We are encouraging the Company to provide clear and definitive guidance to pilots on these issues in the E190 Policy document that will be released to pilots.
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The Company has put forward a number of significant work rules changes aimed at achieving closer alignment with CAO48.1 where it is more operationally beneficial. These include fewer restrictions around consecutive early morning duties and expanded FDP limitations. The AFAP has been working closely with our Safety and Technical team to address and respond to these claims. Our main focus has been ensuring any deviation from the current rule set is consistent with ICAO/IFAPA fatigue management principles. We will continue to be open minded in our approach and are not opposed to offering the Company greater flexibility and productivity if it means the Company can roster more efficiently. The Company cancelled the scheduled EBA meetings in June and July due to a lack of available resources to complete the modelling and costings around various claims that were needed to progress the negotiations. While this has enabled your AFAP representatives to focus on E190 consultations, we will strongly resist any further delays to this process. As the narrow body EBA expired in May this year and over a year has now elapsed since the last annual pay increase (July 2015), the AFAP sought a formal commitment from the Company around back pay. Disappointingly, at this stage the Company’s back pay commitment is tied to the Agreement being voted up on the first vote – a familiar bargaining tactic employed by Virgin management which we do not support. It is expected that negotiations will resume in August.
TIME TO RETHINK DRONE LAWS JOSEPH WHEELER, AFAP LEGAL COUNSEL You may recall the news headlines earlies this year which reported that a British Airways jet was potentially struck by a drone as it landed at one of the world’s busiest airports - Heathrow. Recent studies show that most close encounters between drones and passenger aircraft (at least in the US) occurred around other busy airports - New York and Newark. Before a calamity occurs we need to address the dearth of research in this space, because that is what will ultimately support the laws we need to identify, punish, and exclude misusers of drones. Due to the many identified risks, the FAA requires registration of operators, and intends to require security and background checks, plus restrict the age of operators to 17 and above. In fact countries like Ghana and India are similarly enlightened as to the risks. A visit to any Australian toy store will demonstrate that, while our drone (“RPAS”) laws are evolving, we don’t quite treat the risks in the same way. Right now identification of an RPAS owner is almost impossible for legal purposes, and no requirement for mandatory insurance coverage will be in place for the under 2kg commercial operations that will be permitted come September 2016. Of course we can’t completely eliminate risks like terrorism or unlawful interference. But without suitable laws, we also can’t pursue offenders. We also need to rethink whether we can allow farmers and other property owners to use up to 25kg drones on their land without training and certification. This too would result from the legislative amendment to Part 101 of the CASR, come September. The US’s attempts at bringing rules into force for flight of small RPAS over people is instructive to observe as a comparison to Australia’s relatively relaxed regulatory approach. The FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking
Committee recommended on 1 April 2016 that only “small” RPAS (ie, 250g or less) should be permitted to operate with minimal regulator scrutiny. This is because the ARC concluded there is a 1% chance of serious injury for RPAS weighing 250g or under if operated over people. Heavier RPAS warrant more stringent operational restrictions and proof of risk mitigation measures (such as keeping a minimum distance from people, proving the operator’s qualifications, and proof of engaging with local authorities before operating above people).
locations to conclude that multicopter RPAS of 4-5 kg in weight can cause irreversible damage to primary structures of aircraft, and catastrophic failures of other components. Medium sized hobby RPAS (1-3kg) can potentially cause critical damage. Simulations where 3 foot diameter RPAS were ingested into a 9 foot diameter jet engine showed failures of up to 3 engine blades and loose debris moving around the engine chamber at speeds of up to 700 miles per hour. That is a recipe for disaster.
So, at least there is some empirical research on small drone impacts on people. The same cannot be said for impacts of hobby sized RPAS on passenger aircraft. I would submit that if that was properly pursued then RPAS registration, specific traffic management for RPAS, technological separation measures like sense-and-avoid and geo-fencing, would soon become mandatory. Organisations like BALPA and the AFAP support calls to further investigate both the science of collision of such vehicles on passenger aircraft, and the technology used for separation.
The news is just as bad for helicopters. An article in the most recent IFALPA InterPilot magazine, released in July 2016, quotes a 2015 study from Texas which found that “a head on rotorcraft drone strike may cause catastrophic failure of the rotorcraft’s windshield, resulting in significant damage to the aircraft and most likely injury to the pilot. The damage and injury … show to be non-survivable based on the kinetic energy of the impact”. A graphic example is made when the kinetic energy of the impact of a 1.28 kg drone hitting an aircraft cruising at 133 kt is compared to five 9mm bullets fired at the aircraft. This force is enough to have catastrophic consequences.
The most recent incident analysis suggests why: there were 921 incidents of drones flying within or near the flight paths of manned aircraft in the US near enough to meet the FAA’s definition of “near mid-air collision” between 2013 and 2015. The majority of these occurred within 5 miles of an airport and above 400 feet (the zone where drones in both Australia and the US must not fly). Twenty eight of these incidents required the pilot to manoeuvre to avoid collision. Anecdotally, the trend in Australia of such proximity events is growing too. Simulation studies by engineers at Virginia Tech have used the history of bird strike
If the British Airways warning isn’t close call enough, then surely such engineering studies merit further consideration in light of informing laws allowing us to identify everyone who puts an RPAS into our airspace for fun or for business, as well as mandatory insurance for commercial operators (using any size drone). Joseph Wheeler is Aviation Legal Counsel to the Australian Federation of Air Pilots and a Member of the IFALPA Legal Committee. This article is based on an article originally published in The Australian on 22 April 2016.
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FATIGUE MANAGEMENT: ENHANCING PRESCRIPTIVE RULES WITH A RISK-BASED APPROACH TO MITIGATING PILOT FATIGUE The purpose of this article is to provide a basic introduction of the prescriptive approach to flight and duty time regulations and then apply a Safety Management Systems (SMS) driven approach to Fatigue Management (FM). This will then build the foundation on how you can introduce Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS), as desired or needed, to enhance FTL and effectively mitigate fatigue and enhance alertness.
CAPTAIN DON WYKOFF EX-IFALPA PRESIDENT In early 2015, IFALPA, ICAO and IATA released an updated version of the co-branded Fatigue Risk Management Systems Implementation Guide for Operators. This new version includes more than just guidance on Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS). It includes appropriate methods to mitigate pilot fatigue via prescriptive approaches and develop a path to better mitigate fatigue with a data driven, risk-based approach. This new version is titled Fatigue Management Guide for Airline Operators. This manual is available on IFALPA’s, ICAO’s and IATA’s web pages, and you are encouraged to download it and distribute as needed. The purpose of this article is to provide a basic introduction of the prescriptive approach to flight and duty time regulations and then apply a Safety Management Systems (SMS) driven approach to Fatigue Management (FM). This will then build the foundation on how you can introduce Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMS), as desired or needed, to enhance FTL and effectively mitigate fatigue and enhance alertness. To properly paint this picture, it is important to recognize that the management of safety risks is evolving into a data driven, risk-based approach rather that a prescriptive, carrot and stick approach. Since pilot fatigue is one of many safety 10
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DEFINITIONS FTL (Flight Time Limitations) - often used to define the prescriptive approach, also encompasses basic flight and duty regulations. FM (Fatigue Management) - In the newest of regulations is a mandatory method to look at fatigue risks more holistically– in essence, ensures that fatigue hazards are managed using the SMS processes that are in place for managing other types of hazards. FRMS (Fatigue Risk Management System) - A data-driven means of continuously monitoring and managing fatigue-related safety risks, based upon scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience that aims to ensure relevant personnel are performing at adequate levels of alertness.
Figure 1.
risks associated with the profession, to be truly effective and, in some regards, innovative, one has to accept that the “traditional” prescriptive approach does not provide a complete solution in the quest to minimize pilot fatigue. Before moving beyond a basic prescriptive approach, it is crucial to have an ICAO compliant prescriptive approach based on scientific principles established in one’s respective country. These scientific principles are: •
Getting enough sleep (both quantity and quality) on a regular basis as it is essential for restoring the brain and body.
•
Reducing the amount or the quality of sleep, even for a single night, decreases the ability to function and increases sleepiness the next day. The circadian body clock affects the timing and quality of sleep and produces daily highs and lows in performance on various tasks.
•
•
Workload can contribute to an individual’s level of fatigue. Low workload may unmask physiological sleepiness while high workload may exceed the capacity of a fatigued individual
Referring to Figure 1, the basic prescriptive approach is somewhat restrictive in what can be accomplished and has no additional obligations for the operator except complying with a set value in the regulation. Once an ICAO compliant prescriptive scheme is in place, Safety Management Systems (SMS) processes can be applied to manage fatigue hazards in the same manner as other hazards in the organization. In the most recent rulemaking efforts in North America and Europe, this process is specifically defined and is mandatory for all airline operators operating under US FAR or EASA rules (e.g. InFO 10013, FRMP and ORO.FTL.110, Fatigue Management). While moving to a broader FM approach is still accomplished under a prescriptive ruleset; using the SMS process has the potential to take the first steps in “type of operation” flexibility. Although less restrictive from a regulatory perspective, this approach will be more comprehensive from a fatigue risk perspective as the operator will have to identify hazards, limit the operation due to those identified hazards and continuously monitor the operation to ensure the mitigations in place are working correctly. In this environment, the operator will also need to establish transitional procedures and ensure flight crews are properly trained.
“[...] it is strongly
that aim to ensure relevant personnel are performing at adequate levels of alertness. While FRMS is the most customizable, flexible approach, it is also the most resource intensive requiring a robust set of processes for risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion, all properly documented with appropriate policy. In short, while FRMS is optional and not likely for everyone, there are several elements of FRMS that apply perfectly well with fatigue management. One of those elements is the Fatigue Safety Action Group (FSAG). Although not required under the ICAO SARPs for FRMS, FSAG is highly recommended in the co-branded Fatigue Management Guide for Airline Operators and should be established and used even before a FRMS is contemplated. Since fatigue management must be based on shared responsibility and requires an effective safety reporting culture, it is strongly recommended that the FSAG includes representatives of all stakeholder groups (management, scheduling staff, and crew member representatives) with input from other individuals as needed to ensure that it has appropriate access to scientific, statistical, and medical expertise. Inclusion of all stakeholders is an important strategy for promoting engagement in the FRMS. The size and composition of the FSAG will vary for different operators, but should be appropriate to the size and complexity of the operations covered by the FRMS, and to the level of fatigue risk in those operations. In small operators, a single individual may represent more than one stakeholder group, for example the chief pilot may also be the primary scheduler. Larger airlines will have specialized departments that interact with the FSAG. The regulator needs to be confident that the operator has considered its operational and organizational profile in deciding the composition of the FSAG which principle functions are to: • • •
•
oversee the development of the FRMS; assist in FRMS implementation; oversee the ongoing operation of the FM processes; contribute as appropriate to the FRMS safety assurance processes; maintain the FRMS documentation; and be responsible for ongoing FRMS training and promotion.
recommended that the FSAG includes representatives of all stakeholder groups.”
It is the third point above where a FSAG can be effective in the FM process. Once again referencing to Figure 1, hazard identification is a key part of FM. An effective FSAG, comprised and executed as defined in the Fatigue Management Guide for Airline Operators, can be a powerful tool in not only identifying hazards but also developing mitigations to strengthen the operation by specifically mitigating and minimizing pilot fatigue. For example, the ICAO SARPs (Annex 6 Part 1, Appendix 7) requires three types of hazard identification: Notice that these are hazards in general, not just something that happens if a FRMS is employed. In fact, it is suggested that this method of hazard identification is custom fit for a FSAG to be accomplishing well before a FRMS is even thought about and specifically in the more comprehensive FM approach. The hazards and risks of fatigue has been on the pilot’s radar for many years. The movement from a prescriptive approach to a data driven, risk-based approach looks more promising. It will only be effective, however, if all stakeholders recognize its strengths, weaknesses and need for all stakeholder groups to be equal partners. This starts with a culture that not only recognizes the need for a just reporting culture, but strongly encourages it. This is not about finding creative ways to do more with less, but rather how to be smarter and more effective in our daily operations by finding, identifying and mitigating fatigue hazards. It is truly a team sport! This article has been reprinted with the kind permission of IFALPA.
The final “tier” in Figure 1 is FRMS. As defined above, FRMS is a data-driven means of continuously monitoring and managing fatigue-related safety risks, based upon scientific principles, knowledge and operational experience www.afap.org.au// 2016// Your AFAP 11
VAI UPDATE PATRICK LARKINS, DEANNA CAIN AND SIMON MILLER AFAP INDUSTRIAL TEAM VIRGIN WIDE BODY EBA UPDATE Wide Body negotiations have been painstakingly slow over the past two years, but have recently gained impetus from the announcement that the Virgin Group will introduce flying to Hong Kong and Beijing next year. The Company will be utilising the A330 to conduct this flying, although the B777 may also be used on the Beijing route.
Pleasingly, the Company has indicated it supports this approach and the parties are looking at provisions providing for three and four crew depending on the length of an international FDP. This work rule would not be route specific, meaning the parties would not need to renegotiate crew complement each time a new international route is introduced.
The parties have focused discussions on addressing the augmented crew provisions required as part of the A330 Work Rules to facilitate this flying.
The parties have also worked towards finalising the outstanding claims and issues for both wide body fleets. The primary remaining matter is the introduction of a new credit system (modelled on the current B777 credit system), which would provide a minimum daily credit, as well as credits for positioning and standby duties.
The AFAP’s preferred position is that the flying be performed with four crew to Beijing and three crew to Hong Kong. Due to the combination of a block time to Beijing of 12 hours (FDP rostered will need to be 15 hours), the significant operational challenges in Asia, the fact that the only rest available is “Class 2” (business class seat with curtain) and that flying out of China is likely to be back of the clock, the AFAP can only see this being performed safely by four crew. Similarly, for Hong Kong, the block time is approximately 8 hours (FDP 10 hours), and again with flying likely to be back of the clock into Australia, three crew would need to be minimum.
The focus of discussions will now be resolving the major items outstanding and the AFAP are optimistic a final document can be released soon. However, whether this is voted up by the pilot group will be contingent on the Company improving its previous remuneration offer and providing pilots with evidence that their lifestyle will not be impacted detrimentally by a new credit system.
VARA UPDATE PATRICK LARKINS, DEANNA CAIN AND SIMON MILLER AFAP INDUSTRIAL TEAM ATR FLEET PLAN Virgin announced its plan to reduce the current ATR-72 fleet of 14 aircraft by between 4 to 6 aircraft in June. However, the Company has been unable to confirm the timing. The announcement and associated uncertainty regarding timing has naturally caused considerable concern amongst the ATR pilot group. Virgin have advised that the timeframe for ATR fleet reduction is largely dependent on the finalisation of the extensive B737 training program being undertaken over the next 2 years, which will then enable VAA resource planning to accurately plan future pilot requirements on the ATR. The time and complexity involved in developing the B737 training plan has increased with the announcement of the decommissioning of the E-Jet and the transfer of the Company’s Bali flying to Tiger. It is expected there will be substantial pilot movements and significant resourcing challenges for the Company over the next 18 months or so as it transitions pilots off the E190. Whilst we appreciate the challenges involved, the AFAP has expressed its concern to the Company about the lack of detail surrounding the ATR fleet plan, and
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the Company’s inability to provide clear and timely communications to the pilot group on the future plans of the ATR. The AFAP is very aware that the capacity for ATR pilots to plan their futures is dependent on the provision of regular and detailed briefings by the Company. To this end, the AFAP has sought ongoing consultation with the Company concerning its ATR fleet plan and the outcome of its ongoing review of underperforming routes. We are also committed to raising pilot concerns through the WRC process. In response, the Company has indicated a willingness to consult and share information when it comes to hand, but has not yet confirmed any further developments or decisions on its ATR fleet reduction plans. However, it has advised that, at present, there are no prospective buyers for any ATR airframes and that the ATR fleet will continue therefore as is for the foreseeable future. We will continue to pursue more definitive information and ongoing consultation regarding its ATR fleet plans, and will keep ATR pilots abreast of all further developments.
F50 DECOMMISSIONING Discussions with VARA have continued over recent months regarding the decommissioning of the F50 fleet, and the outcomes for the remaining unassigned F50 pilots. Having previously advised that there would be no redundancies as a result of the decommissioning, the Company recently confirmed that the number of unassigned F50 pilots had been reduced to approximately 10. Other F50 pilots have been provided with relocation support to assist them in taking up a role at VAA/VAI on the east coast or New Zealand, with some opting to take Leave Without Pay.
In light of VARA’s indication that the most likely outcome for remaining unassigned F50 pilots is an ATR or 777 position, the AFAP has been advising its F50 members to have an up-to-date bids system at the time of bid import dates, particularly as consequential ATR and 777 positions may be assigned as a result of other advertised positions. We trust that currently unassigned F50 pilots will shortly find other positions within the Virgin Group, and we will continue to provide these pilots with every possible assistance in their transition.
THE WOCL PROOF FENCE FIRST OFFICER STUART BEVERIDGE The human body runs on a circadian body clock, which times a variety of functions including sleep. Apart from the need for sleep that arises from physical activity and extended wakefulness (sleep homeostasis), this body clock determines when and how we sleep. This cycle features two prominent sleep periods: the Window Of Circadian Low (WOCL), occurring between around 2:00 and 6:00, and the Secondary WOCL (SWOCL), occurring between around 15:00 and 17:00 [1] (acknowledged in some cultures as a siesta or afternoon nap). It is during these periods that the body will more readily fall asleep, gain the most restorative sleep, and if not asleep, suffer some degree of performance degradation and cumulative fatigue [2].
around the world, has led us to insist on maintaining the CAP 371 status quo for WOCL protection at the very least. We will also make efforts to bolster it where required, such as increasing the buffers, restricting progressively earlier starts, avoiding duties that go into the SWOCL after periods of sleep restriction (when one is more likely to fall asleep during the day), and mandating adequate rest periods to prepare and recover from such duties.
As pilots, we work, we are awake, and we are woken during these periods. In their fatigue management guidance, ICAO, IATA and IFALPA recognise that disproportionately increased fatigue can be expected to occur when sleep during the primary WOCL is impinged, and that performance can be expected to be degraded when operating during these periods [1]. To manage this, fatigue-related work rules including our current ones (based on the UK CAA CAP 371) place restrictions on duties that impinge sleep in the WOCL (e.g. with early starts) as well as duties that completely negate sleep during this period by spanning it (e.g. “back-of-clock”, or “Late Night Operations”). Of course, nobody awakes and is immediately ready to sign on for work. There is an amount of sleep inertia to recover from, then one must get ready, and then travel to the airport. This means that simply restricting duty times relative to the accepted WOCL period is not adequate. We need a ‘buffer’ around these: “a WOCL-proof fence”. CAP 371 and our existing work rules provide a 1 hour buffer – duties signing on between 1:00 and 7:00 [3]. IFALPA notes however that this may still be inadequate [4]; indeed, our own reserve provisions acknowledge 2 hours to get to a duty! Notably, the CASA CAO 48.1 “Late Night Operations” definition is much less restrictive than this, simply being duties with 30 minutes within 23:00 – 5:30 [5]. This is inconsistent with ICAO’s own WOCL definition, and therefore strays from the latest internationally accepted fatigue science. The AFAP VPF EBA negotiating committee has chosen to adopt current recognised standards when protecting a pilot’s WOCL. This has necessarily moved our position in parts well away from CASA’s new set of fatigue regulations. Our own work and research referencing ICAO and IFALPA sources as well as other regulators
We asked AFAP Safety & Technical Consultant Marcus Diamond’s 11 year old son, Sebastian Diamond, to draw us what a WOCL might look like. References 1. ICAO, Fatigue Management Guide for Airline Operators. 2015: Montreal, Canada, 2. Gander, P.H., M.R. Rosekind, and K.B. Gregory, Flight crew fatigue VI: A synthesis. Aviation Space and Environmental Medicine, 1998. 69(9 SUPPL.): p. B49-B60, 3. CAA, CAP371 Avoidance of Fatigue in Aircrew. 2004, Civil Aviation Authority: West Sussex, UK, 4. IFALPA, Annex 6: Fatigue Management. 2013, International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations: Montreal, Canada, 5. CASA, CAAP 48-1: Fatigue management for flight crew members. 2016, Civil Aviation Authority: Canberra, Australia.
www.afap.org.au// 2016// Your AFAP 13
TWO IN THE COCKPIT MARCUS DIAMOND AFAP SAFETY & TECHNICAL CONSULTANT In June 2016, AusALPA sent a submission to CASA on the “Two in the Cockpit” (Flight Deck Security) Policy and Procedures, to provide feedback for the post Implementation Review of “Two in the Cockpit” Policy UNINTENDED ESCALATION OF RISK AusALPA supports any initiative that enhances safety and security, provided that a thorough risk assessment is conducted prior to the implementation of any new procedure. This must involve widely based expert consultation, including the very people responsible for ensuring the safety of the aircraft once in flight, to ensure that there are no unintended consequences. That process did not occur. Our members have provided feedback on both perceptual and actual consequential events of the introduction of the 2ITC rule. AusALPA, therefore, considers that a range of unintended 14
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consequences have been introduced that have disproportionately increased system risk well beyond that which existed before the Germanwings incident. Some of those escalated risks relate to: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
increased amount of time the cockpit is unlocked elevates the cockpit security threat; increased exposure to a potential workplace injury for the pilot and/or the ‘authorised person’ as a consequence of that person’s lack of familiarity with the cockpit environment; increased exposure to a continuing distraction from the presence of the minimally qualified ‘authorised person’; potential for unexpected behavioural outcomes in the event of non-normal or emergency events to which the ‘authorised person’ has never been exposed; increased exposure to incorrect or inadvertent system operation by the ‘authorised person’ particularly where that person does not properly comprehend their intended role;
6.
7.
behavioural changes by flight crew to minimise the need to leave the cockpit, resulting in nutritional and hydration issues as well as elevated risks of DVT and other sedentary complications; and increased and prolonged exposure to a person in the cockpit who, with the exception of other flight crew members, is not required to be medically or psychologically examined and is not normally a target group for enhanced security screening.
CORRECTLY ADDRESSING PILOT MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES The underlying issue behind the Germanwings incident, and the one focused on by the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile (BEA) Final Report on the Germanwings crash is one of adequate medical identification of pilots with mental health issues and ongoing management of such cases. This should be complemented by the establishment of peer groups and other measures, as further highlighted in the recommendations of the BEA. It is essential that mental health issues are treated in a non-punitive manner within a culture that supports treatment and recovery, such that pilots are comfortable seeking treatment and disclosing health issues. This requires a mature approach between the regulator, employers, medical personnel, pilot representatives and the pilots themselves. Another fundamental recommendation by the BEA relates to the financial and social security ramifications for pilots in the event of a possible loss of license and income. The risk of economic ruin is a large negative influence against disclosure of concerns by the individual or their family. The BEA report recommends operators instigate measures to mitigate socio-economic risks should a pilot lose a licence due to medical reasons. AusALPA fully endorses these recommendations. It should be noted that there is already a very mature network of support services made available to Australian pilots by their airlines and via peer-support groups through the associations that comprise AusALPA. It should also be noted the BEA accident report does not recommend 2ITC procedures. OTHER ISSUES The 2ITC policy was arguably appropriate as an immediate reaction to mitigating a possibly emerging but not yet fully understood risk to flight safety. However, it was a policy outcome at odds with typical ICAO and foreign regulators’ (including CASA’s) approach to rulemaking following incidents that demonstrate the need for regulatory intervention. More detailed inter-agency effort is needed to justify such an intervention and, if found necessary, to
determine the most appropriate means of implementation. EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY (EASA) REVIEW On 27 Mar 2015 EASA reviewed its position including conducting industrywide consultation (Reference A). The Agency will no longer mandate 2ITC but rather recommend operators implement a performance-based approach. This position by EASA is consistent with that of the European Cockpit Association detailed at Reference B. SUMMARY OF AUSALPA’S POSITION ON “TWO IN THE COCKPIT” POLICY 1.
2.
3.
4.
The 2ITC policy was a useful, immediate action to re-establish public confidence immediately following the Germanwings incident, however no risk assessment was done prior to implementation; On review, the 2ITC policy has introduced a range of unintended consequences and risks to safety and security of the aircraft; The 2ITC policy does not adequately address the core pilot mental health issues that were the basis of the Germanwings incident. Furthermore, the policy does not deal with a mental health-affected pilot who remains in the locked cockpit with his pilot colleague and acts nefariously; AusALPA fully supports initiatives in the BEA report to identify and manage instances of pilots’ mental health issues, including (but not limited to) medical examinations, airline and professional association support services and other methods to mitigate socio-economic impact for affected pilots.
RECOMMENDATION A transparent and formal risk assessment must be led by CASA and attended by airline operators and professional pilot associations with the objective to crystalise what risks exist and what mitigation is actually necessary. The confusion and unintended consequences created by the original policy imposition must be removed by a cooperatively determined statement that provides the source for policy analysis and reassessment, industry wide consistency in procedural development, training and implementation. REFERENCES a. https://www.easa.europa.eu/system/ files/dfu/Summary%20of%20survey%20 results%20SIB%202015-04.pdf b. https://www.eurocockpit.be/sites/ default/files/eca_position_minimum_ occupancy_of_the_flight_deck_ pp_16_0216_f_0.pdf
www.afap.org.au// 2016// Your AFAP 15
MBF TRUSTEE STORY
CAPTAIN WAYNE JERICHO
CAPTAIN WAYNE JERICHO MBF TRUSTEE Have you ever been driving home from a day of flying and asked the question, “what if something happened to my medical and that was my last flight? What would I do?” I have had this happen twice during my career. The first occasion was during a medical renewal with a DAME, who required me to visit a specialist for further treatment, after which I was able to regain my Class I medical. On the second occasion, I had not been feeling well for a period of time. My GP sent me to visit another specialist. While waiting for the test results, I wondered whether I would be ever able to fly again, and if I had already completed my last flight! Armed with test results and a medication treatment plan, I was then able to visit a DAME who confirmed that I was grounded. He forwarded the medical test results to CASA who in turn, sent me a advice that I was unable to exercise the “privilege of my License” until cleared by the DAME. After six weeks of medication (which I still take on a daily basis) and further testing to prove that my medical condition was under control, the DAME was able to clear me to return to flying duties.
As per the rules of the AAPMBF, I did notify the fund (MBF) of the loss of my medical and joined a list of “Notifications”. This is required within 90 days under the Fund Rules. Those of us who are employed by Virgin Australia are fortunate as the Company tends to pool short-term sick leave to help pilots. Others are less fortunate. Once all of their sick and annual leave had been used up, they then have to make claim upon the MBF. We spend our flying time dealing with contingencies, and the loss of a “Medical” is one contingency we need to bear in mind. This is where membership of the MBF can ease the stress on a person’s life in the event of illness or injury, either short term or permanently, that’s leads to the loss of medical. As a Trustee of the MBF, where we meet monthly to review notifications (of loss of medicals), benefit payments and other membership issues, I see the various medical conditions which cause the loss of a Medical. Some are accidental and sometimes the result of recreational sports and the remainder are general health issues. Flying is one of the most enjoyable and rewarding things that I do. It is a sad day when the Trustees approve a capital benefit payment for the permanent loss of Medical, because I know that someone has had to give up flying. But at least the financial impact on their life will be eased as a result of MBF membership. Stay fit and well.
HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DRIIVING HOME FROM A DAY OF FLYING & WONDERED, “WHAT IF THAT WAS MY LAST FLIGHT?”
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Human Intervention Motivation Study - An occupational substance abuse treatment & confidential support programme run by Pilots for Pilots
HIMS UPDATE CAPTAIN BRETT LOELIGER HIMS AUSTRALIA WORKSHOP MELBOURNE, 12 MAY 2016
Guest Speakers: Dr Michael Drane . Principal Medical Officer CASA Present were HIMS Australia stakeholders with representatives from AFAP, AIPA, VIPA, Aircrew Officers Association of Australia (Cathay), Rex, Qld Government Air (Helicopters), CASA, RFDS, Virgin Flight Operations (Paul D’Elia and Rob Edney), DAME’s and medical personnel. Apologies from Captain Steve Lunn, Dr. Ian Cheng, Chris Melhopt (NZHAG, NZALPA, Air New Zealand) ,Dr David Powell (NZHAG, NZALPA, newly appointed Virgin Australia Medical Group Medical Officer)
Firstly, the administration policy of HIMS Australia Advisory Group (HAAG) was presented and formally approved resulting in a management group with representation from each of the key areas of the HAAG, being: medical/industrial/welfare/pilots. A draft copy of the Model HIMS Australia Guidelines/ Handbook was also circulated for perusal and comment as an evolving document and will be tailored for each aviation group. Captain David Booth later advised that it is envisaged Virgin HIMS would hopefully be launched by the end of 2016. Dr Drane explained the CASA assessment process regarding substance misuse highlighting the adherence to the regulation safety standards in conjunction with an individual risk assessment. He stated that currently, employer/peer support is encouraged (as part of a treatment program) if a pilot has been diagnosed with a substance misuse problem. He further added that a HIMS program would help engage, educate and enforce the problem of substance misuse in the industry emphasising that collaboration (vs confrontation), support (vs suppression) and facilitation (vs frustration) with an affected pilot is most likely to result in a timelier and favourable outcome. Captain Matt O’Keefe (RFDS) made an enlightening presentation on his study tour in April attending a USHIMS seminar and
visiting the Talbot Recovery Centre. He gave an overview of the USHIMS structure, roles, funding and sponsors. He also recapped on testing procedures utilised at Talbot and demonstrated the “Soberlink” device used to monitor pilots in recovery. Lastly, HAAG Chairman Captain Laurie Shaw, tabled draft HIMS Q & A ‘s to help educate and alleviate some misconceptions in regards to HIMS. They have recently been finalised by stakeholders and are available for viewing at the HIMS Australia website www.hims.org.au/faqs A recap on “What is HIMS?” is detailed below: It is: •
a pilot welfare initiative in collaboration with the employer, regulator and company medical that provides a pathway for pilots afflicted by the disease of chemical dependency to be identified, treated and returned to duty.
•
a complement to what is an existing system of regulations and DAMP that offers an additional overlay of treatment, support, welfare and monitoring to aid recovery and save jobs and lives.
•
not a drug and alcohol policy; nor is it a DAMP replacement. HIMS is an integral aspect in the rehabilitation process for DAMP.
The HIMS philosophy is an understanding of the science of addiction, confidentiality for the individual, thorough assessment prior to diagnosis by a Fellow of the Australasian Chapter of Addiction Medicine (FAChAM), quality inpatient treatment, robust monitoring by a tripartite group representing peer pilots, medical sponsor and a management representative for a period deemed appropriate by existing protocols. This ensures a safe return to work for the individual within the most efficient and appropriate timeframe. HIMS is fully supported by the Australian pilot associations including AFAP, AIPA, the AAOA and VIPA. Pilot leaders in these organisations have done extensive research on the pros and cons of HIMS and determined that Australian pilots suffering from dependency will greatly benefit from a working HIMS program. Our next meeting is in November 2016 in Sydney.
www.afap.org.au// 2016// Your AFAP 17
FATIGUE RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHOP
SIMON MILLER INDUSTRIAL ADVISOR A new initiative from the AFAP’s Safety & Technical Team was the Fatigue Risk Management Workshop held on 1 and 2 June in Melbourne. Facilitated by Dr Adam Fletcher, the CEO and Principal of Integrated Safety Support, the workshop provided a comprehensive examination of approaches to pilot fatigue risk management and a forum to discuss them. Topics specifically discussed were:
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•
An exploration of the causes and consequences of fatigue
•
CASA’s approach to Fatigue Risk Management Systems (FRMSs)
•
Identifying the need for an FRMS, as well as planning for and establishing a business case for an FRMS
•
Assessing sleep, fatigue and performance and
•
International standards and applications of FRMS, in particular, the Air New Zealand experience.
company needs an FRMS, acknowledging in particular the importance of finding an effective balance between managing fatigue-related safety considerations and ensuring operational viability. A critical issue was to consider the desired safety outcomes in approaching fatiguerisk management, acknowledging that an FRMS may not necessarily represent an appropriate method for addressing a company’s risk profile in certain contexts. A particular highlight of Day 2 of the workshop was the forum led by guest speaker, Captain Bruce Aberhart, the Chairman of Air New Zealand’s FRMS Working Group. Drawing on the fatigue-risk management experience at Air New Zealand, Captain Aberhart emphasised the independence of the investigations conducted by the FRMS Working Group. These investigations advise management of the intention to undertake fatigue risk management studies, but do not inform management of the substance of what those studies will be.
Having investigated the causes and consequences of fatigue, the workshop explored the operation of an FRMS as a mechanism for receiving and analysing fatigue–related data as the basis for continuous monitoring and management of fatigue-related safety risks.
Consequently, according to Captain Aberhart, the Air New Zealand experience of fatigue-risk management involves combining management sponsorship with a significant amount of pilot autonomy, featuring Captain Aberhart as Chairman reporting to one of Air New Zealand’s senior safety managers.
On day 1 of the workshop participants were urged to consider whether a
Captain Aberhart also referred to the Air New Zealand experience of effectively
Your AFAP// 2016 // www.afap.org.au
quarantining fatigue risk-management from the industrial relations domain, and the willingness of the company to release safety reports. The Air New Zealand experience underlines that fatigue risk management demands collaborative partnership between pilots and management beyond the often-adversarial dynamics of industrial relations, a pursuit that generally represents an ongoing challenge in an Australian context. Importantly, the workshop reinforced the availability of examples, resources, and other supports to assist pilots and management in the pursuit of effective fatigue risk management. It also highlighted the importance of building a fatigue risk management team and internal capability, to not only share the load of fatigue risk management but to assist in shaping organisational focus and culture more squarely around addressing fatigue. Through its Safety & Technical team, the AFAP seeks to provide all possible assistance to its members regarding managing fatigue, and to contribute to effective fatigue-risk management at the organisational level. For information about future workshops and contributing to effective fatiguerisk management in your organisation, please contact AFAP’s Safety & Technical Consultant Marcus Diamond on (03) 9928 5737 or marcus@afap.org.au.
UPCOMING AFAP ACCIDENT & INCIDENT TRAINING DAYS // PERTH
7 SEPTEMBER 2016
KINGSCLIFF, NSW
6 OCTOBER 2016
The AFAP’s Accident & Incident (A&I) Training is open to all members who would like to understand: • • •
Their rights, responsibilities and obligations in the case of an accident or incident, The regulatory framework underpinning accident investigation in Australia, and; The practical steps necessary to follow in order to protect your interests in the event of an accident or incident.
To register for any of the 2015 A&I Training courses please email Operations Manager Joanne Janes (joanne@afap.org.au). The course is only available to AFAP members.
AN EXCERPT FROM AFAP’S HISTORY BOOK MARY SHEENAN & SONIA JENNINGS; MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING, 2010
SIDNEY BERNARD MCDONELL AFAP PRESIDENT 1945–46 Sid McDonell was born on 15 September 1901, and hailed from Cundletown (near Taree) in New South Wales. McDonell became involved in aviation from its pioneering days, being a member of the Sydney Aero Club from the early 1920s. He gained his commercial pilot’s licence in 1932 and by 1935 was flying for Western and Southern Provincial Airlines, which operated passenger services between Narromine and Sydney. In the 1940s he joined ANA and was one of the first pilots to operate their two-way night service between Sydney and Melbourne. Towards the end of his career McDonell was a senior regional captain and is believed to have flown ANA’s first Douglas DC-4 from America to Australia. From 1943 McDonell represented New South Wales pilots at meeings of the re-convened Australian Institute of Air Pilots and Navigators. McDonell, like many civil aviation pilots, was still enlisted in the RAAF Reserve at the time, and had seen service in the Pacific region. In April 1945 he was elected president of the Australian Pilots’ Association. In the same month as his election,
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it was resolved to move the head office from Melbourne to Sydney and also to register the association as an industrial organisation under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbritration Act. McDonell recognised the need for a high level of membership, stating that the institute ‘can achieve only moderate success until it represents all air line pilots’. He took an active role in encouraging recruitment and promotion of the association to pilots across Australia and membership numbers grew considerably during his presidency. Mc Donell also initiated affilitation with the Air Line Pilots Association International, which in 1945 consisted of pilots’ associations from America, Britain and Canada. This organisation, with Australia as a member, was the predecessor to the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations (IFALPA) formed in 1948. In March 1946 McDonell stood down from the presidency. By this time he was approaching fortyfive and therefore at the age when civil aviation pilots were expected to retire. McDonell went on to own and operate the hotel at Pilligia in outback New South Wales. Sidney McDonell died in 1988 at the age of eighty-seven.
www.afap.org.au// 2016// Your AFAP 19
2015 ELECTED VPF REPRESENTATIVES
Rod Aldridge Capt. B737 VPF Chairman AIC Representative (Secondary) Editor Your AFAP
Scott Edwards Capt. B737 Membership
Brett Loeliger Capt. B737 Welfare Relief Editor Your AFAP
Captain Marcus K. Diamond Safety & Technical Consultant BscMelb
George Kailis Capt. B737 VPF Vice Chairman Editor Your AFAP
Stuart Beveridge FO E190 VPF Secretary Safety and Technical FRMS Governance (Primary)
Wal Gowans Capt. B737
Darren Gray Capt. B777 LH AIC Representative (Primary)
Steven Lunn Capt. B737 PBS Advisor Welfare Relief Editor Your AFAP
Joseph C. Wheeler Aviation Legal Counsel MRAeS
Darren Smith Capt. B737 PBS Advisor
David Booth Capt. B737 AFAP President SH AIC Representative (Primary) FDAP Governance Committee AusALPA President
Rowly Hipwell Capt. E190 AIC Representative (Primary) Communications
Deanna Cain Senior Industrial Officer LLB (Hons)
Captain Peter Gardiner Technical Director
Vaughan Bradshaw FO B737 VPF Convention Delegate Communications
Wayne Jericho Capt. B737 AAPMBF Trustee
Patrick Larkins Senior Industrial Officer LLB (Hons)
Emma Young Business Development Manager BBA IBUS
Andrew Carson Capt. B777 LH AIC Representative (Secondary)
Joseph Kirchner Capt. E190 SH PWC Representative FRMS CAST Representative FRMS Governance (Secondary)
Simon Miller Industrial Advisor BA (Hons), LLB
Serena Seyort Marketing & Communications Assistant
Special thank you to all Virgin Group Pilots who wrote for this publication. Chief Editors: George Kailis, Rod Alridge, Brett Loeliger & Steve Lunn Deputy Chief Editors: Emma Young & Serena Seyfort Contributors: Rod Aldridge, Stuart Beveridge, David Booth, Deanna Cain, Marcus Diamond, Wal Gowans, George Kailis, Patrick Larkins, Simon Miller, Steve Lunn, Brett Loeliger, Serena Seyfort, Joseph Wheeler, Emma Young Designed by: Emma Young & Serena Seyfort
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Your AFAP// 2016 // www.afap.org.au
The views expressed in this journal in any article, letter or advertisement are not necessarily those of the Australian Federation of Air Pilots. The material in this publication may not be reproduced without the express written permission of the AFAP.