SafeBR Safety Assessment and Analysis

Assessment and Analysis Regarding Public Safety Services and Service Consolidation in Baton Rouge

I. Introduction

A. Overview and Scope of the Assessment

SafeBR engaged 21CP Solutions (“21CP”) to conduct a high-level assessment of law enforcement services and operations currently performed by the Baton Rouge Police Department (“BRPD” or the “Police Department”) and the East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office (“EBRSO” or the “Sheriff’s Office”) (collectively, the “agencies”) SafeBR is a coalition “of private, public, and non-profit leaders”1 focused on “bring[ing] the community together around the conversation about” enhancing community safety and reducing crime.2 21CP is a diverse, national collective of professionals that help cities and communities effectively tackle the challenges of delivering safe, effective, just, and constitutional public safety services in the 21st century.

SafeBR specifically asked 21CP to conduct this analysis in part to consider the viability of potentially changing the system of public safety in Baton Rouge to one where the EBRSO is the primary provider of policing services throughout both the Parish and the City – thereby functionally consolidating policing services in Baton Rouge in one agency, the Sheriff’s Office.

Currently, the Sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer of the Parish. 21CP understands from SafeBR that the potential course of action contemplated would be for BRPD to be phased out, with EBRSO taking over the Department’s prior duties and creating a single policing agency for Baton Rouge. In this report, 21CP calls this potential policy proposal of eliminating BRPD and placing the Department’s current responsibilities with EBRSO going forward a consolidation of public safety services (or, more simply, consolidation), a streamlining of policing services, the elimination of BRPD, the investment of more responsibilities in EBRSO, and other descriptions. Regardless of nomenclature, however, 21CP is referring to the same fundamental proposal to have EBRSO, and EBRSO alone, conduct policing services in Baton Rouge in the future in the way BRPD has to date.3

As 21CP heard from several Baton Rouge stakeholders, the logic of consolidation is that Baton Rouge may benefit from better, more effective, and less expensive policing if the current BRPD were eliminated and the Department’s duties and responsibilities were invested in or transferred to EBRSO. Although it would not involve a structural consolidation or a formal merger, the functional consolidation would be potentially aided, in a significant way, by EBRSO inheriting personnel, equipment, technology, facilities, and other resources from BRPD – with the City and Parish likely paying the Sheriff’s Office to take on the new role of providing policing services within the city limits of Baton Rouge.

With this understanding that the streamlining or consolidation of policing services may be proposed, 21CP’s evaluation focused specifically, for both agencies, on:

• Current functions and assets;

• Operational structures;

• Staffing and deployment;

• Demand for public safety services and crime rates;

1 “SafeBR Announces Law Enforcement Excellence Study,” Press Release (Jan. 9, 2024).

2 SafeBR, Resources, “Our Goals,” https://www.safebr.org/about (last visited June 11, 2024).

3 Additionally, this report uses the terms “policing” or “police services” and “public safety services” interchangeably The use of “public safety services” is not intended to suggest that the evaluated proposal would invest EBRSO with responsibility for fire or emergency medical services.

• Budgets;

• Employment considerations;

• Equipment, technology, and facilities;

• Policies and procedures;

• Training;

• Organizational culture; and

• Community engagement.

This report provides substantial detail about each of these areas in order to engage with a central, critical inquiry: What do EBRSO and BRPD do now, and could EBRSO potentially absorb, adapt to, or grow its current capacities in the future to accommodate or incorporate what BRPD is currently doing? The report also describes the Sheriff Office’s and Department’s current activities and operations to ensure that a wide audience of potential readers are considering the possibility of feasibility within the same underlying understanding of what public safety service currently requires and entails in Baton Rouge Ultimately, 21CP endeavors in this report to show, rather than merely to tell or conclude for policymakers and community members, how EBRSO and BRPD function in the critical areas that will bear on the potential ease or difficulty of consolidation.

Critically, 21CP also considered the contributions of both agencies to ensuring and advancing public safety in Baton Rouge – and how changes in agency responsibilities might impact public safety services, organizational efficacy, accountability, internal culture, and more.

In this way, 21CP’s work is not a comprehensive assessment of all BRPD or EBRSO policies, practices, procedures, staffing, or operations. It is not an evaluation of either agency’s performance across time or an investigation of any particular incident involving either organization or its personnel. Instead, it is a consideration of how the agencies currently provide public safety services for the City and Parish of Baton Rouge and of the potential advantages, disadvantages, opportunities, and drawbacks for effectuating changes in how public safety services may be provided going forward.

Additionally, 21CP emphasizes at the outset that others in Baton Rouge are better positioned to address potentially complicated legal, budgetary, and other administrative issues that functional consolidation would implicate 21CP did not conduct its own exhaustive financial analysis; instead, this report generally focuses on broad, overall costs and savings associated with potentially consolidating operations. Similarly, 21CP did not conduct its own analysis of the legal issues implicated or raised by consolidation, instead focusing on understanding the broad classes of issues that consolidation may implicate (e.g., retirement system participation for BRPD personnel who may want to work at the EBRSO). Ultimately, this report focuses on analyzing the benefits, disadvantages, and challenges that may be associated with EBRSO absorbing the functions and responsibilities of BRPD going forward.

B. Approach

To evaluate BRPD and EBRSO and consider the feasibility of public safety consolidation in Baton Rouge, 21CP first examined an array of written materials and information relating to agency performance and operations. 21CP evaluated this documentation considering a range of nationally accepted policing practices, emerging approaches, and law enforcement standards. Throughout this report, we detail or reference the specific materials and the best, emerging, or promising national practices used to consider those materials.

Second, 21CP endeavored to evaluate the overall aggregate performance of both agencies in practice. This primarily took the form of assessing various agency performance data to understand long-term performance patterns, dynamics, and trends It should be noted that the independent data verification was beyond the scope of 21CP’s engagement.

Third, in March, April, and May 2024, 21CP conducted interviews, focus groups, and other conversations with a diverse array of approximately 20 stakeholders from Baton Rouge, including seven government or other parish stakeholders, ten BRPD sworn personnel, and three EBRSO sworn and professional staff. The Sheriff provided written responses to some interview questions that 21CP shared with EBRSO representatives. BRPD personnel interviewed included key leaders in charge of administrative and operational functions such as recruitment, training, patrol, criminal investigations, dispatch, technology, and special operations. The EBRSO personnel interviewed included leaders in charge of training, equipment, and technology, as well as other individuals familiar with the overall operations and administration of the EBRSO. Because the scope of 21CP’s work focused primarily on internal operations and discrete areas of performance, 21CP’s stakeholder engagement focused mainly on BRPD and EBRSO personnel and major external partners assisting in playing critical roles relating to the delivery of core public safety services. The engagements occurred via videoconference.

Some stakeholders were interviewed alone, or with a small number of other personnel with similar assignments, about their work, experiences, and views At least one and, typically, multiple 21CP team members participated in the conversation. Across all interviews, focus groups, and discussions, all participants were assured that their participation was voluntary and confidential – and that, although 21CP might characterize or quote various aspects of their comments, their names and identities would not be disclosed. Meetings were not recorded.

No individuals were strictly mandated to speak with us – making participation voluntary and self-selecting. Because participants were not randomly selected, the views of participants in our stakeholder engagement may or may not reflect all of an agency’s sworn or civilian personnel. Likewise, although 21CP engaged with an array of critical leaders and stakeholders, our approach and timeline did not allow for engagement with a statistically significant number of agency stakeholders. As a result, some important views likely did not surface in our engagement simply because of the number and nature of the individuals with whom we spoke.

In describing recurring themes and areas of feedback, this report cites, characterizes, and sometimes quotes stakeholder participants from interviews and interactions. To ensure candid discussions and preserve the confidentiality of participants who sometimes shared sensitive information or experiences, 21CP did not record the identities of who said what during focus groups and interviews. General information about rank, assignment, and/or affiliation was recorded for context, along with the specific content of what participants said Therefore, this report refers to specific stakeholders in generic ways (e.g., “a senior BRPD leader” or “a Baton Rouge stakeholder”).

This report aims to provide actionable guidance and pragmatic recommendations for Baton Rouge stakeholders. However, Baton Rouge is certainly not alone in encountering some of the challenges and opportunities that public safety and policing face today. 21CP has conducted reviews for other agencies and communities that have addressed some of the same issues and topics. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the common challenges that communities and police departments face, some of the analyses that 21CP has conducted and the recommendations that it has provided are similar. Consequently, some portions of this report advance recommendations or discuss the logic and rationale for those recommendations using the same language,

examples, discussions, and/or citations as we did in reports prepared for other communities or contexts. Nevertheless, even where this report discusses similar issues or makes similar recommendations to those that may apply to different departments and communities, the specific realities and needs of BRPD, EBRSO, and the Baton Rouge community are the focus and foundation of this report’s analysis and assessment.

21CP endeavored to approach its engagement with humility. Although we believe that the assessment and analysis summarized in this report are grounded in nationally accepted policing practices, emerging and promising public safety approaches, and an understanding of dynamics within Baton Rouge, 21CP is not a part of BRPD, EBRSO, or the Baton Rouge community It is possible, if not probable, that these and other limits to our approach have led us to overlook details, miss nuance, omit reference to important history and dynamics, or bypass some areas of importance.

Ultimately, this report does not have all the answers. None of our reports do because we do not have all the answers For that matter, it is unlikely that any one agency stakeholder or Baton Rouge community member alone has all the answers regarding community safety and policing. This report aims to consider how the City and Parish can ensure and enhance the delivery of effective, lawful, safe, fair, and just public safety services to the people of Baton Rouge

C. Report Overview

This section summarizes our conclusions, which are more fully detailed and repeated later in the report. 21CP concludes that the idea of consolidating public safety services in Baton Rouge is feasible. Indeed, there may be a number of benefits. Some overall financial efficiencies may be realized, and the Sheriff’s ability to more easily hold officers accountable who perform counter to expectations might enhance public trust in important ways

A single public safety entity in Baton Rouge would have the opportunity to benefit from the best approaches and practices from both existing agencies. At least in some areas – such as with respect to core policies around use of force – EBRSO’s existing approaches are more comprehensive and may prove beneficial to Baton Rouge residents if extended uniformly across the City and Parish of Baton Rouge. At the same time, BRPD’s approaches along some critical dimensions – from its integration of community policing into its core philosophy to its recruitment and training programs – are firmly aligned with best practices and promising approaches

At the same time, the process of eliminating a police department and scaling up the responsibilities addressed by another is a complex and complicated task. Baton Rouge will not stop needing police services while organizational changes are being made. Any implementation will require the resolution of difficult issues, navigation through complex project management challenges, and the adoption of new or adapted approaches by the Sheriff’s Office to accommodate new functions, personnel, relationships, and community needs.

The most viable pathway forward for consolidation is one in which substantial, additional planning among Baton Rouge stakeholders generates a clear agenda for practically addressing and implementing the many things that, while neither a reason to consolidate or not to consolidate, are potentially challenging to resolve or coordinate As the Sheriff noted directly to 21CP, “I think if so desired by the community, [consolidation] would require lots of changes in the laws.” For instance, the City and Parish would need to determine how to compensate EBRSO for addressing a much higher volume of calls for service and taking on a much larger set of

responsibilities. Significant practical issues related to everything from equipment and facilities to employee benefits will need to be addressed for consolidation to have a chance of making a positive, long-term impact on public safety in Baton Rouge Time and again, thoughtful Baton Rouge stakeholders inventoried to 21CP an array of issues, considerations, and steps implicated by consolidation that are, ultimately, not benefits or disadvantages but, instead, are complexities that would need to be capably navigated to ensure that consolidation does ultimately produce enhancements to community safety.

In short, if the consolidation process is managed in a way that thoughtfully addresses the many complex practical considerations implicated and EBRSO adopts the tangible enhancements and changes necessary for it to respond to a much higher volume of activity, then consolidation could well achieve cost savings, help to increase the quality of public safety services in Baton Rouge, and enhance accountability and public trust.

The remainder of this report inventories some of the major considerations that relate to the potential consolidation of public safety services in Baton Rouge Specifically:

• Section I includes an overview of considerations regarding consolidating public safety services.

• Section II provides an overview of public safety services in Baton Rouge.

• Section III details current public safety operations provided by BRPD and EBRSO and assesses the feasibility of consolidation.

• Section IV summarizes practical and logistic considerations relevant for any jurisdiction contemplating consolidation of public safety service

II. An Overview of Considerations Regarding Public Safety Service Consolidation

The City and Parish of Baton Rouge are not the first jurisdiction where stakeholders have considered whether streamlining law enforcement agencies might produce better and more efficient public safety services. Indeed, with more than 18,000 federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, law enforcement in the United States is highly fragmented. This stems directly from a federated system of national government that sees law enforcement organized at the state rather than national level, and within each state, at the county, city, town, or municipality level.4 This section provides historical context, examples, and lessons learned from previous consolidation efforts and trends that may inform the proposed changes in Baton Rouge Some of our examples reference small to medium agencies, which may not be directly relevant or comparable to the specific situation in Baton Rouge. Still, the information is provided in the interest of providing a comprehensive examination of consolidation as a concept.

Other countries take different approaches – with some having consolidated their law enforcement agencies significantly. For example, England and Wales decreased from 243 forces at the turn of the 20th century to 43 by the late 1960s. Even in the United States, other public service fields –such as education, health, welfare, and emergency services – have been the subject of significant consolidation or streamlining in the United States. Nevertheless, there has yet to be a coordinated movement toward regionalizing policing in the United States.5

At the same time, there have been several moments over the past century during which consolidation has garnered support. For example, the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement’s (i.e., the “Wickersham Commission”) 1931 report sought to improve the economic and administrative efficiency of policing. The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice’s 1967 Task Force Report: The Police found that fragmented policing in the United States created challenges in providing effective service, coordination, or information sharing – ultimately making it more difficult to prevent and control crime. Consequently, the Commission recommended regional consolidation and resource pooling between departments.6 Similarly, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals’ 1973 National Strategy to Reduce Crime highlighted the inefficiencies of fragmented police services and called for the “total consolidation of small police departments,” focusing on those with ten or fewer officers.7

More recently, there have been at least two eras where calls for streamlining policing services became more prominent. First, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, an increased urgency regarding cross-agency information sharing emerged with the new focus on counterterrorism at the national and local levels. Several years later, the “Great Recession” of 2008 and 2009 impacted the budgets of law enforcement agencies across the country. In response, many reported undergoing austerity measures such as consolidating units within the department, consolidating services with other departments, closing, or consolidating stations, and/or contracting out services, among other measures.8

A. Forms of Consolidation

4 Albert Reiss, “Police Organization in the Twentieth Century,” 15 Crime and Justice 51 (1992).

5 O.W. Wilson & Roy Clinton McClarent, Police Administration (4th ed) (1977); Albert Reiss, “Police Organization in the Twentieth Century,” 15 Crime and Justice 51 (1992).

6 The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice 68 (1967); Daniel Skoler, Progress in Policing: Essays in Change 103 (1980).

7 Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. A National Strategy to Reduce Crime (1973), available at https://clecpc.org/wpcontent/uploads/1973-National-Strategy-to-Reduce-Crime.pdf

8 Police Executive Research Forum, Policing and the Economic Downturn: Striving for Efficiency is the New Normal (2013).

The streamlining of public safety and policing services may take many forms. One widely discussed is “public safety consolidation,” which involves formally moving some or all first response agencies – including police, fire, and emergency medical technicians – into a single organization. As this report explores the path forward for two law enforcement or policing agencies, that specific type of merger, although among the most common, is not discussed here.9

Contract policing is the practice of a municipality or county sheriff’s department providing some or all police services to a city or to a smaller police department via formal agreement.10 Law enforcement contracts may cover full- or part-time enforcement for a specific area or sector.11 For example, California's Los Angeles County Sheriff (“LASD”) began providing contract services to the City of Lakewood in 1954.12 As of 2022, LASD was contracted to provide all police services to 42 of the 88 incorporated cities within the County of Los Angeles and laboratory and academy training to many of the smaller law enforcement agencies within the County.13

Functional consolidation involves two or more agencies combining specific units – such as communications, dispatch, or records – and sharing resources, functions, and personnel, such as administrative staff. Agencies may also share training expenses and facilities or engage in cooperative personnel recruitment efforts.14 For example, in 2009, 36 law enforcement agencies from Will and Grundy counties in Illinois, as well as the FBI and Illinois State Police, joined forces to create a Major Crimes Task Force that provides services for a wider geographic area.15

Overlapping jurisdictions are areas where agencies may cross-deputize personnel to pool resources and improve coverage by creating mutual enforcement zones (e.g., city police may enforce arrests in the county, and sheriff’s deputies may make arrests in the city).16 This sometimes takes the form of a mutual aid agreement in which two or more entities agree to provide mutual support during emergencies or serve as backup when the other agency’s officers are unavailable.17 Local agencies may receive specialized support from state or regional units or task forces, particularly in narcotics enforcement, personnel selection, training, vice investigation, and other specialized services.18

Full consolidation involves coalescing two formerly separate departments into a single law enforcement agency. This may be done locally (e.g., two small communities or metro areas), regionally (e.g., agencies in a geographic

9 To the extent that Baton Rouge policymakers wanted to contemplate not just policing but overall public safety response consolidation, there may be some additional efficiencies and advantages to such an approach. Because 21CP did not evaluate fire and emergency medical response in Baton Rouge for this report, we focus predominantly on the consolidation of policing/law enforcement functions.

10 Albert Reiss, “Police Organization in the Twentieth Century,” 15 Crime and Justice 51 (1992).

11 Laberge Group. Town of Chester and Village of Chester Police Department Consolidation Feasibility Study (2011), https://dos.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/chesterfinalreport.pdf

12 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach, (2003).

13 Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, “About Us,” https://web.archive.org/web/20220329082526/https://www.lasd.org/about_us.html (last visited May 18, 2024).

14 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach, (2003); O.W. Wilson & Roy Clinton McClarent, Police Administration (4th ed.) (1977); Laberge Group. Town of Chester and Village of Chester Police Department Consolidation Feasibility Study (2011). https://dos.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/chesterfinalreport.pdf

15 Will County State’s Attorney Office, “Will/Grundy Major Crimes Task Force Announces Ready Status” (2009), https://willcountysao.com/2019/01/will-grundy-major-crimes-task-force-announces-ready-status/

16 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

17 Laberge Group. Town of Chester and Village of Chester Police Department Consolidation Feasibility Study. (2011). https://dos.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/chesterfinalreport.pdf

18 O.W. Wilson & Roy Clinton McClarent, Police Administration (4th ed.) (1977).

area consolidating), or at the metropolitan level (e.g., two overlapping agencies joining forces).19 For example, in 1973, the Las Vegas, Nevada Police Department joined forces with the Clark County Sheriff’s Department, forming the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”). Other consolidations have occurred in major cities – such as the merger of 13 Canadian departments, forming the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force in 1957, and the combination of the Charlotte, North Carolina Police Department with the Mecklenburg County Sheriff’s Department in 1993, creating the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department.20

In some instances of city-county consolidation, the entire government has been consolidated rather than just public safety services. For instance, Jacksonville and Duval County, Florida, consolidated governments in 1968, and in Colorado, the city of Broomfield and portions of four counties consolidated to form a new Broomfield County in 2001.21 Louisville, Kentucky merged with surrounding Jefferson County on January 1, 2003, and in doing so, merged their two distinct police forces.22

21CP understands that the form of consolidation potentially contemplated in Baton Rouge would be something similar to a full consolidation but effectuated via one entity, BRPD, discontinuing its services and being eliminated in favor of another agency, EBRSO, assuming the BRPD’s prior duties and responsibilities. The reason is that the Louisiana Constitution already gives the Sheriff the responsibility of being the chief law enforcement officer of the Parish – meaning that consolidation would have to occur within the Sheriff’s Office rather than with the Police Department

B. Benefits of Consolidation

A government, department, or other authority might consider consolidating law enforcement agencies or services for any number of reasons. Generally, the motivation has been to improve agency efficiency and/or effectiveness by pooling personnel, capital, and other resources.23 Expected benefits may include cost savings, reductions in crime, increased professionalism, and improved recruitment prospects. The following sections explore these potential benefits in greater detail. Some of the reasons and benefits discussed below may not directly apply to Baton Rouge but are provided to give a comprehensive review of the advantages of consolidation.

1. More Specialized Services

Public safety costs represent significant portions of most annual budgets for local governments. For some, a merger or other form of consolidation can create opportunities to provide residents with previously unavailable services 24 For example, specialized services and teams – such as crime analysis, K9, and helicopter or marine units – as well as resources to target specific issues – such as homelessness, traffic enforcement, and

19 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).; Laberge Group. Town of Chester and Village of Chester Police Department Consolidation Feasibility Study. (2011). https://dos.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/chesterfinalreport.pdf

20 International Association of Chiefs of Police. Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach, (2003).

21 Jeremy M. Wilson & Clifford Grammich, “Police Consolidation, Regionalization, and Shared Services: Options Considerations and Lessons from Research and Practice,” Be on the Lookout 1 (2012), https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/ric/Publications/cops-w0641-pub.pdf

22 Divya Karthikeyan, “Merger-era Decisions Set the Stage for Louisville Police’s Later Missteps,” Louisville Public Media (Oct. 16, 2023), https://www.lpm.org/news/2023-10-16/merger-era-decisions-set-the-stage-for-louisville-polices-later-missteps

23 Mark Ernst, California Police Officer Standards and Training Committee, “What Impact Will Consolidation of Police Services by Small and Medium Size Police Agencies Have on Community Policing by the Year 2003?” (1994), available at https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/151687NCJRS.pdf

24 Wilson, Jeremy M., Alexander Weiss, & Clifford Grammich, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Pathways to Consolidation: Taking Stock of Transitions to Alternative Models of Police Service (2015).

enforcement or investigation of drug or gang activity – can be beyond the reach for many local police departments.25 Further, some of these resources are needed so infrequently that they can be difficult to justify in an annual budget. However, a larger, consolidated agency or multi-agency task force may be able to justify and finance these assets by providing the less frequently used resource to a larger area or number of agencies, thereby creating efficiencies of scale.

Consolidated services within a larger umbrella will also be better able to respond to large-scale emergencies with its higher headcount and capacity for higher-quality service through more efficient and coordinated deployments, better training, and improved supervision.26

2. Possible Crime Reduction

While there is an expectation that increasing law enforcement resources and efficiency should directly impact crime-related outcomes, research on police consolidation is limited, and much of the available information is inconclusive.27

Contemporary policing research generally supports the notion that the number of police officers and their presence and visibility in the field can reduce crime.28 This body of research finds that police may affect crime through “deterrence, arrests, and building community trust,” although the exact mechanism for how police reduce crime is still debated.29 However, as these studies are not specific to departments undergoing an organizational transformation, it is unclear if the same benefits could be expected during or in the near aftermath of a consolidation.

After the City of Compton, California began contracting with the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 2000 following the closure of the Compton Police Department, clearance for six Part I crimes (other than homicide) experienced statistically significant improvements, and burglary rates experienced a significant, sustained decline.30 The authors of a study evaluating the Compton experience concluded that contracting with a well-resourced agency with prior experience in police consolidation may allow an agency to maintain, if not improve, the quality of its services.31

3. Streamlining Expenditures

By pooling resources through consolidation, an agency may be able to reduce overall capital and operational expenses by maintaining fewer facilities, a shared debt service, and reduced facility overhead costs (e.g., maintenance, energy, equipment, and supplies).32 This streamlining of costs may be a more significant,

25 Ken Plunkett, “With Decreased Resources, How Will the Police Continue to Provide Quality Services?,” Police1 (Aug. 29, 2021), https://www.police1.com/chiefs-sheriffs/articles/with-decreased-resources-how-will-the-police-continue-to-provide-quality-servicesP4RlHqKZSNXms829/

26 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

27 Jonathan Mendel, et al, “Does Police Size Matter? A Review of the Evidence Regarding Restructuring Police Organisations,” 18 Police Practice and Research 3 (2017).

28 Aaron Chalfin, et al, “Police Force Size and Civilian Race,” NBER Working Paper No. 28202 (2020).

29 National Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/CEA%2BCriminal%2BJustice%2BReport.pdf

30 N. Corsaro, N., and J.M. Wilson, “The Effects of Police Contracting on Crime: An examination of Compton, California,” 14 Journal of Experimental Criminology 59 (2018).

31 Id

32 Laberge Group. Town of Chester and Village of Chester Police Department Consolidation Feasibility Study (2011). https://dos.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/chesterfinalreport.pdf

sustained benefit if there is a need for a significant procurement, such as a major investment in capital or equipment, regionalization of jails, or the decision to create a regional facility such as a Public Safety Answering Point (“PSAP”).33 At the same time, however, the initial costs of consolidation – related to reorganization, planning, standardizing equipment and uniforms, and a potential need for a new building – might blunt, at least initially, some of these longer-term cost savings.34

A larger department may also benefit from operational economies of scale by being able to place larger orders for equipment, vehicles, and technology and reducing costs per capita for each employee.35 Further, to the extent that streamlined services expand overall headcount and/or increase efficiency, agencies may experience a reduced need for overtime.36

Consolidation can also result in the streamlining of administrative and record-keeping processes that were previously duplicative. For example, in jurisdictions where a police agency and a sheriff’s department use separate data systems, paperwork, fingerprinting, and other procedures may be performed twice in a single arrest and booking process.37 Streamlined services can ensure against the duplication of administrative efforts and leave officers and other safety personnel with more time for other functions.

4. Improved Recruitment Prospects

Law enforcement in the United States is currently facing critical staffing challenges. Compared to 2019, “[o]fficer resignations were up 47%” in 2022, “and retirements [were] up 19%.”38 At the same time, many departments are encountering increasing difficulties recruiting new officers.39 A 2023 survey by the International Association of Chiefs of Police reported that more than three-quarters (78%) of American police departments “reported having difficulty in recruiting qualified candidates,” while nearly two-thirds (65%) said they had “too few candidates applying to be law enforcement officers” to meet their needs.40 With police agencies increasingly competing for the same qualified talent, centralizing regional recruitment efforts into a single agency or entity may be especially beneficial. Small agencies are often limited in recruitment to their immediate vicinity, and, as such, the prospective applicant pool is often limited. Conversely, in addition to a larger prospective pool based on geography, a large regional agency may have a larger recruitment budget, more competitive pay, and a more robust package of personnel benefits and other inducements to offer candidates.41 Likewise, a larger agency may be able to provide greater opportunities for professional development, specialized training, and promotions and advancement.42

33 Daila Shimek, Feasibility Study of Consolidating Public Safety Answering Points in Perry County, Ohio (2013).

34 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

35 O.W. Wilson & Roy Clinton McClarent, Police Administration (4th ed) (1977); Harry Pachon & Nicholas Lovrich, “The Consolidation of Urban Public Services,” 37 Public Administration Review 38 (1977); Laberge Group. Town of Chester and Village of Chester Police Department Consolidation Feasibility Study (2011). https://dos.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/chesterfinalreport.pdf

36 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

37 O.W. Wilson & Roy Clinton McClarent, Police Administration (4th ed.) (1977).

38 Associated Press, “The U.S. is Experiencing a Police Hiring Crisis,” NBCNews.com (Sept. 6, 2023), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/usexperiencing-police-hiring-crisis-rcna103600

39 See, e.g., Stefanie Dazio, et al, “Law Enforcement Struggles to Recruit Since Killing of Floyd,” Associated Press (June 11, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/government-and-politics-george-floyd-racial-injustice-only-on-ap-coronavirus-pandemicd434cc8023875ddb996abb7df0a7bc44; Police Executive Research Forum, Responding to the Staffing Crisis: Innovations in Recruitment and Retention (Aug. 2023), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/RecruitmentRetention.pdf

40 International Association of Chiefs of Police, The State of Recruitment: A Crisis for Law Enforcement 3, https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/239416_IACP_RecruitmentBR_HR_0.pdf (last accessed Oct. 25, 2023).

41 O.W. Wilson & Roy Clinton McClarent, Police Administration (4th ed) (1977).

42 Laberge Group. Town of Chester and Village of Chester Police Department Consolidation Feasibility Study (2011). https://dos.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/chesterfinalreport.pdf

From a budgeting perspective, sharing or consolidating hiring and recruiting can also yield savings in at least two ways. First, recruitment expenses may be significantly reduced by sharing administrative personnel, engaging in joint outreach to prospective candidates regionally, and sharing a candidate pool or by engaging in the entire process from a single consolidated department. Second, by regionalizing this process, agencies would no longer compete against neighboring jurisdictions; instead, a uniform salary schedule and benefits could be established.43

5. Reform Capabilities

Advocates for police reform have noted that disbanding and rebuilding departments may be necessary to overcome the entrenched culture of organizations.44 Several legal scholars have argued that fragmented local departments are largely insulated from democratic oversight; however, instead of consolidation through a merger or contract, they propose disbanding local sheriff and police departments and replacing them with a new, local law enforcement agency with democratic accountability measures in place.45 Others have posited that large departments allow higher levels of professionalism to occur relative to small agencies – making the formation of one agency out of smaller agencies a potentially positive vehicle for systemic change 46

C. Consolidation Risks

Although streamlining or consolidating public safety services may have generalized benefits, there may also be several risks Deeply held agency cultures and traditions may create environments that make collaboration or adaptation to new norms difficult. One or more agency executives must typically relinquish some or all of their authority, which can present a significant challenge. Other challenges are related to quality of service, start-up costs, and internal accountability. The following sections explore each of these general disadvantages or risks to consolidation in greater detail.

1. Culture and Authority

Each police organization has its own traditions, style, formal and informal policies and procedures, and culture. Among these, a level of collective trust and understanding among officers is particularly important for a new or expanded agency to be successful.47 For this reason, consolidations or partnerships will likely be most successful among organizations with pre-existing relationships and a history of inter-agency collaboration.48 Indeed, research demonstrates that insufficient attention to organizational culture can be a critical factor when consolidations fail.49

43 Ken Plunkett. “With Decreased Resources, How Will the Police Continue to Provide Quality Services?,” Police1 (Aug. 29, 2021), https://www.police1.com/chiefs-sheriffs/articles/with-decreased-resources-how-will-the-police-continue-to-provide-quality-servicesP4RlHqKZSNXms829/

44 Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su, & Guyora Binder, “Disbanding Police Agencies,” 121 Columbia Law Review 1327 (2021).

45 Id

46 Harry Pachon & Nicholas Lovrich, “The Consolidation of Urban Public Services,”37 Public Administration Review 38 (1977).

47 Wilson, Jeremy M., Alexander Weiss, & Clifford Grammich, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Pathways to Consolidation: Taking Stock of Transitions to Alternative Models of Police Service (2015).

48 Id.

49 J. Stinchcomb & F. Ordaz, “The Integration of Two ‘Brotherhoods’ into One Organizational Culture: A Psycho-social Perspective on Merging Police and Fire Services,” 7 Public Organization Review 143 (2007).

Cultural dynamics may be further complicated when there is initial resistance to the change by one or both agencies – or within the community that the agencies serve 50 This risk is not unique to policing. For instance, social scientists have found that most corporate mergers fail – often because of conflicting or ultimately incompatible organizational cultures.51 Indeed, performance and outcomes may actually decrease following the merger of two organizations, and employees may blame decreased performance on members of the other firm.52

In policing, conflict may emerge if two agencies seeking to work together approach the job with different philosophies. For example, agencies that are oriented toward community policing and problem-solving may struggle to fully enmesh with an organization that focuses on more standalone special programs or initiatives when it comes to community engagement.53

Another risk relates to how the consolidation impacts the lists or rankings that determine promotions, advancement, or special assignments for officers and supervisors.54 First, while the candidate list for senior or specialized roles may grow if a new agency is larger in total headcount, the number of these positions may not increase proportionately as the organizational structure is streamlined, potentially increasing competition. Second, agencies are likely to have offered different training or professional development opportunities before the consolidation, and personnel from one agency may have stronger credentials or more experience. Third, as supervisors of similar rank in the two organizations may not have previously earned the same amount, promotional incentives may also be affected. For instance, following the merger of Bibb and Macon Counties in Georgia, issues of pay parity and pensions in the newly consolidated sheriff’s department created additional complexities and delays 55

Different agency cultures and organizational structures must also be aligned in terms of how they approach union or collective bargaining representation. Benefits for employees, including leave (sick, personal, maternity, bereavement), paid holidays, overtime, call-in pay, vacation, uniform allowance, health care contribution, and insurance benefits, among others, would need to be negotiated.56 While certainly possible, for some agencies, this can be a challenge – and may contribute to additional conflict to be overcome at the outset of the consolidation.

2. Leadership

Few governmental officials or police administrators will question the desirability of pooling resources to establish a consolidated or regional crime laboratory or training facility. On the other hand[,] there is much more apprehension about pooling patrol service and criminal investigation, which form the backbone of local policing. However, perhaps the greatest obstacle to consolidation is the unwillingness of small-city executives both in the local government and in the police department to relinquish authority.57

50 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

51 Roberto A. Weber & Colin F. Camerer, “Cultural Conflict and Merger Failure: An Experimental Approach,” 49 Management Science 400 (2003).

52 Id

53 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

54 Id

55 Liz Fabian. “Pay Scale, Promotions Lag in Bibb Sheriff’s Consolidation,” The Telegraph (July 24, 2014), https://www.macon.com/news/local/crime/article30135300.html

56 Daila Shimek. "Feasibility Study of Consolidating Public Safety Answering Points in Perry County, Ohio" Maxine Goodman Levin School of Urban Affairs Publications. (2013).

57 O.W. Wilson & Roy Clinton McClarent, Police Administration (4th ed) (1977).

The success of a consolidation process could be at risk if a new administrative structure is not effectively implemented. Uninterrupted supervision and leadership of employees by a mutually accepted individual is critical. In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, a new chief executive was brought in from an external agency with the perspective that independent leadership would help to ease the transition during the consolidation process. Additionally, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg merger benefitted from broad community support. Initial resistance by law enforcement officers in both agencies eased over time, and the newly merged department jointly adopted a community-oriented policing philosophy as the basis for growth as a new agency.58

Following the 2003 merger that created the Louisville Metropolitan Police Department, an outside police chief was brought in to diffuse tensions between the two agencies, who were described as “crimefighters versus traffic ”59 The role of the outside chief was particularly challenging, as he had to concurrently establish trust with officers on the force and in the community while also working through the policy and administrative needs of creating a new department.60

Developing and maintaining a productive relationship between the jurisdiction, community members, and law enforcement leadership is critical. If a relationship between entities deteriorates following the consolidation, the local jurisdiction may find itself in a difficult situation with limited options. For example, when the Maricopa County, Arizona Sheriff conducted an extended raid in the town of Guadalupe in 2008, its residents and leaders protested. The sheriff responded by unilaterally canceling the town’s contract, leaving them without law enforcement. They had few options, and the contract was ultimately reinstituted under the Sheriff’s terms.61

3. Accountability

Another concern of consolidation is that it may reduce personalized service to the communities served, leaving a transformed agency responsible for a larger geographic area and more residents 62 Local control and representativeness of the police department could be at risk, and the consolidated agency could be seen as less accountable to the city residents.63

Consolidation case studies show mixed results for accountability-related outcomes. In Camden, New Jersey, the city police force was disbanded, and a newly formed county agency was implemented to serve the city, county, and several neighboring jurisdictions through a contract model. The Camden County takeover is generally seen as a success story with regard to resetting agency culture and its relationship with the community.64 Accountability measures were implemented following the transition, which included using the Internal Affairs (“IA”) division to monitor abuses of benefits such as sick leave, and leveraging technology for personnel management, including the use of a computerized Directive Management System (“DMS”) to deliver

58 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

59 Divya Karthikeyan, “Merger-Era Decisions Set the Stage for Louisville Police’s Later Missteps,” Louisville Public Media. (Oct. 16, 2023), https://www.lpm.org/news/2023-10-16/merger-era-decisions-set-the-stage-for-louisville-polices-later-missteps

60 Id

61 Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su, & Guyora Binder, “Disbanding Police Agencies,” 121 Columbia Law Review 1327 (2021).

62 Laberge Group. Town of Chester and Village of Chester Police Department Consolidation Feasibility Study (2011). https://dos.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2019/10/chesterfinalreport.pdf

63 Harry Pachon & Nicholas Lovrich, “The Consolidation of Urban Public Services,” 37 Public Administration Review 38 (1977); Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su, & Guyora Binder, “Disbanding Police Agencies,” 121 Columbia Law Review 1327 (2021).

64 Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su, & Guyora Binder, “Disbanding Police Agencies,” 121 Columbia Law Review 1327 (2021); see also Brenda Breslauer, et al, “Camden, N.J. Disbanded its Police Force. Here’s What Happened Next,” NBC News (June 22, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/newjersey-city-disbanded-its-police-force-here-s-what-n1231677

training, an Automatic Vehicle Locator (“AVL”) system, and early intervention system to track officers’ activities.65

Conversely, in Maricopa County, Arizona, there have been several conflicts between the sheriff and the cities that either contract with the sheriff’s department or have concurrent jurisdiction. Residents in the affected cities, such as Phoenix and Mesa, could exert little control over the actions taken by the sheriff in their jurisdiction that they did not agree with.66

65 Police Executive Research Forum, Policing and the Economic Downturn: Striving for Efficiency is the New Normal (2013).

66 Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su, & Guyora Binder, “Disbanding Police Agencies,” 121 Columbia Law Review 1327 (2021).

III. Overview of Public Safety Services in Baton Rouge

East Baton Rouge (“EBR”) Parish (“EBR Parish” or the “Parish”) was created in 1810 before Louisiana was named a U.S. state in 1812, while the City of Baton Rouge (the “City”) was incorporated shortly after that in 1817.67 The city and parish consolidated into a single government structure in 1947 by a vote of the people; in 1982, further local government consolidation occurred when the parish citizenry voted to merge the City and Parish councils into the Metropolitan Council.68 The executive branch of the consolidated government is the Mayor-President, who is currently Sharon Weston Broome; she serves as both the City Mayor and the Parish President.69

As of 2023, EBR Parish is home to approximately 448,467 people and encompasses approximately 455 square miles.70 The City of Baton Rouge, within EBR Parish, has a population of 219,573 and encompasses approximately 86.3 square miles.71 As shown in Table 1, the race and ethnicity of the residents of the parish and city are similar. However, the city has a slightly larger percentage of Black or African American residents.72

Table 1 Race/Ethnicity of EBR Parish and City of Baton Rouge, 202273

Race/Origin

Indian and Alaska Native, alone

alone

Hawaiian & Other Pacific Islander, alone

Figure 1 is a map of EBR Parish, incorporated areas (including the City of Baton Rouge), and the jurisdictional areas of the six parish, municipal, and state law enforcement agencies that provide public safety services to EBR Parish: Baton Rouge Police Department (BRPD), East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office (EBRSO), Baker Police Department, Central Police Department, Zachary Police Department, and the Louisiana State Police. The focus of our analysis is the BRPD and EBRSO.

67 City of Baton Rouge, Government, About Baton Rouge, “A Brief History,” https://www.brla.gov/841/A-Brief-History (last visited June 7, 2024).

68 City of Baton Rouge, Government, About Baton Rouge, “Our Government,” https://www.brla.gov/1062/Our-Government (last visited June 7, 2024).

69 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, “Mayor-President,” https://www.brla.gov/588/Mayor-President (last visited June 7, 2024).

70 U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana; Baton Rouge City, Louisiana, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/eastbatonrougeparishlouisiana,batonrougecitylouisiana/PST045223 (last visited June 7, 2024).

71 U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, Baton Rouge, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/batonrougecitylouisiana/PST045222 (last visited June 7, 2024).

72 The demographic characteristics of just the unincorporated areas of EBR Parish are not reported by the U.S. Census, so the percentages provided for the parish include the city of Baton Rouge and the parish’s unincorporated areas.

73 U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana; Baton Rouge City, Louisiana, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/eastbatonrougeparishlouisiana,batonrougecitylouisiana/PST045223 (last visited June 7, 2024) Percentages based on American Community Survey, 2022, 5-year estimates.

1. Map of East Baton Rouge Parish and Law Enforcement Agency Jurisdiction

74 East Baton Rouge Parish GIS Portal, https://ebrgis.maps.arcgis.com/home/webmap/viewer.html?webmap=5b769396ef684f0cbfc853724883d410 (last accessed June 12, 2024).

Figure

A. Overview of BRPD

BRPD was established in 1865.75 It has jurisdiction anywhere within the City limits.76 BRPD became accredited through the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) in 1996 and has successfully renewed its accreditation status every four years since.77 The Department is currently engaged in its ninth accreditation review. The process focuses on standards that reflect accepted practices related to life, health, and safety procedures for the agency and are foundational for contemporary law enforcement.78

The stated mission of the BRPD is “to serve with the Baton Rouge community to prevent crime, and to promote the safety and well being of all” and its vision is that the BRPD “be one with the community, single-minded in purpose, principle, and resolve in the advancement of public safety.”79 Per BRPD General Order 100, the primary responsibilities of the department are:

• The preservation of public peace and order,

• The prevention of crime,

• The apprehension of criminals,

• The protection of the rights of persons and property, and

• The enforcement of the laws of the state and the ordinances of the council.80

The current Chief of Police is Thomas Morse, appointed by Mayor-President Broome in December 2023 and sworn in as Chief in January 2024, succeeding former Chief Murphy Paul.81 Chief Morse oversees approximately 566 sworn personnel, 67 professional staff, and 80 civilians,82 although the full authorized strength is 696 sworn, 102 professional, and 91 civilian, respectively.83

B. Overview of EBRSO

The EBRSO is Louisiana's oldest law enforcement agency, established in 1805.84 Although the EBRSO Sheriff is the Chief Law Enforcement Officer85 of EBR Parish and has Parish-wide jurisdiction, the EBRSO primarily polices the unincorporated areas of EBR Parish.86 EBRSO is not CALEA-accredited. The stated mission of the EBRSO is to “provide quality law enforcement, detention, court security, and homeland security services to the

75 “Morse is Baton Rouge’s 34th Chief of Police Since Agency Was Created Shortly After Civil War,” WBRZ.com (Dec. 21, 2023), https://www.wbrz.com/news/morse-is-baton-rouge-s-34th-chief-of-police-since-agency-was-created-shortly-after-civil-war/

76 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 100 (last rev. July 9, 2023).

77 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, Transparency, “Accreditation,” https://www.brla.gov/3016/28273/Accreditation (June 7, 2024).

78 See generally Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, https://calea.org/lawenforcement#:~:text=Law%20Enforcement%20Accreditation&text=The%20program%20provides%20the%20framework,prepared%20to%20ma nage%20critical%20events (last visited June 7, 2024).

79 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 106

80 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 100

81 City of Baton Rouge, News, “Mayor Broome Announces Next Chief for the Baton Rouge Police Department” (Dec. 21, 2023), https://www.brla.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=1235; City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, About Us, Staff Divisions, Chief of Police, https://www.brla.gov/1393/Chief-of-Police (last visited June 7, 2024).

82 Although professional or non-sworn staff is often also referred to as “civilian,” 21CP learned in its interviews that BRPD has civil service classified positions for non-sworn personnel but also maintains other civilian positions that are not classified under civil service. These civilian positions are filled according to Baton Rouge City/Parish Human Resources guidelines.

83 BRPD Complement Jan. 1, 2024, Police Personnel Report.

84 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Past Sheriffs of Baton Rouge,” https://www.ebrso.org/SHERIFF/Past-Sheriffs (last visited June 7, 2024).

85 Louisiana State Constitution, Article V, §27, available at https://legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?d=206465

86 21CP interviews with EBRSO, BRPD, and other parish stakeholders.

residents and visitors of East Baton Rouge.”87 Its vision is to “be a leader in public safety, community service, and crime control. We strive to integrate community policing philosophies of developing partnerships with our community and maintaining a high quality of life through collaborative problem solving in everything we do” and “that East Baton Rouge remains one of the safest and most enjoyable places to live and visit in the State of Louisiana and the Nation.”88

The current Sheriff is Sid Gautreaux, III; he was first elected in 2007 to fill an unexpired term of the previous Sheriff and has been re-elected to four additional terms, most recently in 2023.89 Sheriff Gautreaux oversees an agency of approximately 787 sworn personnel, although the full authorized strength is 889. Unlike the BRPD, all EBRSO employees are sworn deputies. However, not all sworn personnel are POST-certified law enforcement officers.

87 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Who We Are,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE (last visited June 7, 2024); EBRSO Policy Manual, Mission Statement

88 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Who We Are,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE (last visited June 7, 2024); EBRSO Policy Manual, Vision

89 “EBR Sheriff Gautreaux Easily Turns Back Challenger to Win Another Term as Sheriff,” WBRZ.com (Oct. 14, 2023), https://www.wbrz.com/news/ebrsheriff-gautreaux-easily-turns-back-challenger-to-win-another-term-as-sheriff

IV. Analysis & Assessment of Current Operations and the Feasibility of Consolidation

SafeBR’s engagement with 21CP to conduct a feasibility analysis was motivated by many of the perceived benefits of consolidation described in Section I, including:

• Elevating law enforcement pay;

• Filling recruitment gaps;

• Increasing efficiency;

• Reducing crime;

• Creating a new standard of accountability among law enforcement; and

• Establishing a new paradigm of public safety in Baton Rouge.

This part of the report details 21CP’s evaluation of the current operations of the BRPD and EBRSO through the lens of how they may impact the feasibility and potential success of the consolidation of public safety services in Baton Rouge. It seeks to evaluate some of the underlying assumptions and logic behind the idea of consolidation – namely, that the discontinuation of BRPD in favor of EBRSO being the primary entity providing safety services in Baton Rouge would result in uninterrupted and superior public safety service while amounting to a practical, if not formal, merger of the two entities. It explores whether EBRSO might provide the same or better service as BRPD while realizing greater efficiencies of service and economies of scale that would save taxpayers money. It also considers how the different ways that the agencies have historically managed performance – from formal policies governing police interactions to mechanisms for transparency and accountability – might impact long-term community confidence, trust, and satisfaction in a potentially consolidated public safety ecosystem within Baton Rouge.

The remainder of this Part addresses what could be beneficial about consolidation – and what may be drawbacks.

A. Baton Rouge Public Safety Demand & Deployment

Consolidating policing services with EBRSO would mean that EBRSO would handle the responsibilities and community issues that BRPD currently handles. The viability of consolidation depends, then, on whether EBRSO can suitably scale and adapt its operations to expanded and different public safety dynamics specific to the city of Baton Rouge – ensuring the same or better response times for calls for service, patrol activities, crime deterrence and prevention activities, and other critical functions that help respond to and prevent crime.

This section considers Baton Rouge’s current public safety service demand – the calls for service and related policing activities that occur within the City and Parish of Baton Rouge. It considers how BRPD and EBRSO are structured specifically to address the portions of Baton Rouge’s public safety demand that each agency currently handles. It concludes, unsurprisingly, that consolidation of safety services would transition a notable volume of police interactions, encounters, and calls for service from BRPD to EBRSO – significantly changing the fundamental charge and operations of the Sheriff’s Office to focus more intensively on urban crime response and deterrence.

1. BRPD

The BRPD Patrol Operations Bureau is organized into five geographic districts with precincts within each district (shown in Figure 2). District 1 appears in purple, 2 in blue, 3 in red, 4 in green, and 5 in orange. District

a. Organization of Patrol

Figure 2. Current BRPD Patrol Districts and Precincts

5, the geographically smallest, is primarily responsible for downtown Baton Rouge and is staffed by fewer officers who generally patrol on bicycles.90 After the completion of an efficiency study, redistricting to balance the workload across districts occurred in 2021.91 In general, BRPD Patrol officers are assigned to specific zones so they can foster relationships with community members in those areas.92

Although the EBRSO has jurisdiction throughout the entire Parish, dispatch transfers calls for service within the city to BRPD unless the caller specifically requests the Sheriff’s Office. Sheriff Gautreaux has stated that he will not deny service to anyone in the parish. As a result, a percentage of EBRSO calls for service are inside the city of Baton Rouge.93 As Baton Rouge is BRPD’s only jurisdiction, they respond to criminal incidents, motor vehicle accidents and other calls for service.

b. Public Safety Demand (Calls for Service and Crime Rates)

As shown in Table 2, the BRPD received 129,797 calls for service (CFS) in 2023 and averaged 123,860 from 2019 to 2023.

Table 3 displays the number of calls in 2023 by BRPD patrol district. Due to redistricting, a by-year comparison is not appropriate. Although the number of calls in 2023 is fairly evenly distributed among Districts 1 to 4, the Patrol Bureau’s Annual Report noted that Districts 1 and 4 responded to a comparatively larger proportion of violent calls, requiring more officers per call.96

90 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel; City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, About Us, Staff Divisions, Patrol Operations, https://www.brla.gov/1654/Patrol-Operations (last visited June 7, 2024).

91 Management Partners, Police Department Organizational and Operational Assessment (Feb. 7, 2020).

92 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

93 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

94 BRPD Real Time Crime Center, 2023 BRPD CAD Statistical Analysis

95 BRPD notes that these are all “file-related” calls. Including non-file related calls increases the total number of calls to BRPD to an average of 207,283 calls annually between 2019 and 2023 with a low of 199,283 in 2022 and a high of 216,399 in 2022

96 BRPD Uniform Patrol Bureau, 2023 Annual Report

97 Id

Table 2 BRPD Calls for Service by Year94

Table 3 BRPD 2023 Calls for Service by Patrol District97

Table 4 displays the average BRPD response time to emergency calls for service by year. The emergency response time for calls in 2023 was four minutes and 34 seconds. The average emergency response time from 2019 to 2023 was four minutes and 44 seconds. Based on 21CP’s experience with other jurisdictions across the country, the reported BRPD response time is very good. While there are no national statistics on police response times, recent analyses of major urban areas show emergency response times between five and ten minutes.98 BRPD reported that the average emergency response time for 2024 (year to date) is three minutes and 23 seconds.

Table 4. BRPD Emergency Response Time to Calls for Service by Year

In addition to calls for service, 21CP sought to understand the nature and incidence of crime, particularly violent crime, that BRPD addresses. Unfortunately, the end-of-year summaries for calls for service provided by BRPD only include homicides. UCR and NIBRS data did not align with the department-provided data, leaving 21CP to rely solely on the number of homicides provided by BRPD – which, it must be noted, complicates the ability to compare EBRSO and BRPD on this dimension. BRPD reported that this issue was due to the report management system (RMS) that the department previously used, which was a project spearheaded by EBRSO.99

Table 5 displays the five-year counts of homicides investigated by BRPD. As shown, homicides have declined in the period of 2021 through 2023. Other reports also note decreased non-fatal shooting incidents from 2021 to 2023.100 Nevertheless, the City’s homicide rate is consistently higher than in many cities of comparable size.101 As of May 31, 2024, there had been 45 homicides, compared to 35 for the same period in 2023.102 BRPD personnel that 21CP interviewed acknowledged this recent uptick in violence, particularly violence related to retaliation among gangs or groups.103 As one interviewee put it, “Today’s suspects become tomorrow’s victims.”104

98 Matt Halpin, “Police Response Times in US Cities,” ASecureLife (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.asecurelife.com/average-police-response-time/

99 Written communication with BRPD Personnel.

100 Baton Rouge Police Department, “2023 Report to the Community.” https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16841/BRPD22-01-AnnualReport_Digital_FINAL; East Baton Rouge Gun Violence Collaborative, PSP 2023 Q4 Quarterly Report (2023). https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/19288/PSP-Q4-2023-Final

101 Bruhl, Allison, “Louisiana Has High Murder Rate Compared to Rest of US, Data Shows,” BRProud (Mar. 7, 2024), https://www.brproud.com/news/louisiana-news/louisiana-has-high-murder-rate-compared-to-rest-of-us-data-shows/

102 BRPD Crime Trends Analysis, available at https://ebrgis.maps.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/eb93a3afad534c4498e02e78d3d74d98 (last accessed June 7, 2024); Jimenez, Gabby. “Baton Rouge Is On Pace to Match its Deadliest Year for Homicides. Here are the Numbers,” The Advocate (Apr. 8, 2024), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/baton-rouge-homicide-rate-on-track-to-match-deadliestyear/article_5677beee-f134-11ee-9043-53c9ebcb6509.html

103 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel.

104 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

105 BRPD Real Time Crime Center, 2023 BRPD CAD Statistical Analysis (2024), https://ebrgis.maps.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/eb93a3afad534c4498e02e78d3d74d98; Open Data BR, Crime Type Comparison Chart, https://data.brla.gov/Public-Safety/Crime-Type-Comparison-Chart/3w6m-huxf (last accessed June 7, 2024).

106 The BRPD provides homicide statistics as total and actual, reducing the former to the latter by subtracting justifiable, negligent, and domestic homicides. 21CP reports the total number of homicides.

Table 5 BRPD Reported Crimes by Year105

c. Crime Reduction Strategies

BRPD personnel interviewed told 21CP that BRPD’s crime reduction strategies are guided by a multi-year strategic plan, which states that the priority is to “reduce violent crime in chronic areas plagued by gun violence and empower residents to take part in keeping their neighborhood safe. Departmental components will be synced and continually adjusted to work together in a cooperative effort to implement proactive, innovative, and intelligence-led operational strategies.”107 Interviewees reinforced these themes by stating that they are (1) focused on proactive policing, (2) concentrating efforts in violent hot spots and on the small percentage of repeat offenders, (3) guiding their work based on data and intelligence, and (4) reallocating resources to increase visible patrol presence on the streets as well as internally reorganizing all intelligence components under the same departmental umbrella.108 The staffing shortage that BRPD faces has the Department operating burglary, detectives, and auto theft at less than ideal capacity, though homicide is fully staffed.109 The perception among several personnel was that the Department’s focus on maximizing efficiency allows it to keep pace with both the response to calls for service for criminal activity and proactive efforts despite the decreased personnel.110

In addition to proactive patrol, BRPD’s Special Investigations Unit is focused on “dismantling criminal activities perpetrated by groups and gangs.”111 It appears that BRPD also emphasizes community engagement in these efforts. As one interviewee noted, “We encourage officers to make as many contacts with the public as possible - does not mean police action has to be taken.”112 BRPD’s efforts to be visible and accessible to community members as part of violence reduction strategies is further described in this report in Section K.

BRPD’s 2023 Annual Report to the Community and the Multi-Year Strategic Plan outline in more detail these strategies and others that support the department’s crime reduction strategies, including:113

• A Patrol Strategies Initiative focused on high-visibility presence in violent, hot-spot, micro areas identified through a data-driven approach.

• Focused deterrence strategies that prioritize outreach and intervention with carefully selected highrisk, repeat offenders as well as efforts to reduce conflicts and violence through partnerships with community street teams, faith-based groups, and local non-profit organizations.

• Leveraging technology to engage in smarter policing, through the use of cameras and license plate readers that link to the Real-Time Crime Center and the creation of the Public Safety Common Operational Platform Public Safety Common Operational Platform (PSCOP) that maps criminal activity and calls for service and creates dashboards to allow the Department to make data-driven decisions in prioritizing its resources.

107 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel; BRPD, Multi-Year Strategic Plan 53 (rev. 2022).

108 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel; see also Velazquez, Trinity. “Baton Rouge Sees Rising Numbers in Homicides, Violent Crime, Police Data Says,” BRProud (Apr. 12, 2024), https://www.brproud.com/news/local-news/baton-rouge/baton-rouge-sees-rising-numbers-in-homicides-violent-crimepolice-data-says/

109 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

110 Id

111 Velazquez, Trinity. “Baton Rouge Sees Rising Numbers in Homicides, Violent Crime, Police Data Says,” BRProud (Apr. 12, 2024), https://www.brproud.com/news/local-news/baton-rouge/baton-rouge-sees-rising-numbers-in-homicides-violent-crime-police-data-says/

112 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

113 Baton Rouge Police Department, 2023 Annual Report to the Community, https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16841/BRPD22-01-AnnualReport_Digital_FINAL; BRPD, Multi-Year Strategic Plan (last rev. 2022).

• Partnerships with federal, state, and local public safety partners such as:

o Crime Gun Intelligence Center (CGIC) focused on quickly identifying shooters, disrupting crime, and preventing shootings in the future.

o EBR Public Safety Partnership focused on Parish-wide collaborative efforts to reduce gun violence with the support of federal funding and technical assistance to assist in strategic planning process114

a. Organization of Patrol

As shown in Figure 3, the EBRSO has six substations: Central, Gardere, Kleinpeter, Pride-Chaneyville, Scotlandville, and Zachary.116 EBRSO’s Uniform Patrol deputies respond to calls for service received through the Communications Division (also known as Dispatch) and patrol the commercial and residential areas of the unincorporated areas of the parish to deter and detect any criminal activities 117 Outside of patrol, Special Criminal Operations divisions work throughout the parish (e.g., the newly established Gang Intelligence and Enforcement Unit, joint operations, narcotics investigations, Special Community Anti-Crime Team).

114 City of Baton Rouge, State of the City Report, 2024, https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/18585/State-Of-City 2024-?bidId=

115 Id.

116 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Uniform Patrol,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Uniform-Patrol (last visited June 7, 2024).

117 Id.

2. EBRSO

Figure 3. Current EBRSO Patrol Substations115

b. Public Safety Demand (Calls for Service and Crime Rates)

As shown in Table 6, the EBRSO reported that it received 69,439 calls for service (CFS) in 2023 and averaged 67,989 from 2019 to 2023.118

Table 6. EBRSO Calls for Service by Year119

Table 7 displays the number of calls in 2023 by EBRSO patrol substation. As shown, Gardere and Kleinpeter substations, which service more urban areas of the Parish, respond to the largest volume of calls, while PrideChaneyville and Zachary, which provide service to more rural areas of the Parish, have the fewest calls for service.

Table 7. EBRSO 2023 Calls for Service by Patrol Substations

*Non-file calls and Self-Initiated Checks – 94,856120

Table 8 displays the average EBRSO emergency response time to calls for service by year. The overall response time for emergency calls in 2023 was five minutes and one second. The average emergency response time from 2020 to 2023 was five minutes and seven seconds.

Table 8. EBRSO Emergency Response Time to Calls for Service by Year

In addition to calls for service, 21CP sought to understand the nature of crime, particularly violent crime, that EBRSO currently addresses. Unfortunately, the CrimeStats link on the EBRSO webpage has been rerouted to be included with City-Parish data,121 leaving 21CP to rely on crime incident data reported in the agency’s annual reports. As a result, Table 9 displays the five-year counts of homicides, robberies, residential/business burglaries,

118 EBRSO notes that these are all “file-related” calls. Including non-file related calls increases the total number of calls to 94,856.

119 EBRSO Annual Reports, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023. Unlike the BRPD CFS data, the EBRSO annual reports did not specify the number of CFS for violent crimes.

120 Per an interview with EBRSO personnel, non-file numbers are calls in which a file is not necessary such as a barking dog or other minor interaction that does not require further documentation. Self-Initiated Checks are proactive business checks by deputies, often ramped up during the holidays, to ensure area businesses are secure.

121 See https://web.ebrso.org/stats/cad/

vehicle burglaries, and auto thefts. The number of homicides reported by the EBRSO is significantly lower, with a five-year average of 17.2 for EBRSO, compared to 103 for BRPD Notably, however, the area policed by EBRSO does not have the same population density as BRPD.

Table 9. EBRSO Reported Crimes by Year122

c. Crime Reduction Strategies

When asked about what is driving crime and violence in the parish, the Sheriff contended that a small percentage of people commit at least 80% of the violent crime (homicides, armed robberies) and are involved in selling drugs. The Sheriff described the Office’s crime reduction strategy as a multi-pronged approach of strict enforcement, community outreach/education, and prevention/rehabilitation:

Most important is Community Outreach/Education. Any efforts on the part of law enforcement will be short lived without the help of the community. Stringent Enforcement that targets the individuals and groups that wreak havoc on our community through drugs and violence. And finally, we attempt to rehabilitate those that are in Parish Prison to provide them with any tools and education possible to make reoffending less likely.123

Recently, Sheriff Gautreaux announced the creation of a “multi-division, full-time” Gang Intelligence and Enforcement Unit (GIE).124 It includes multiple divisions within the EBRSO (e.g., Narcotics, Gang Intelligence, Special Community Anti-Crime Team) and other Parish entities to proactively address and investigate “drug dealers, gang members, and others involved in violent crime in East Baton Rouge.”125

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

As this report has previously observed, EBRSO and BRPD overlap in jurisdiction – with BRPD generally handling calls for service and crime occurring within the Baton Rouge city limits and EBRSO addressing what occurs in all other areas of the Parish. At the same time, in the wake of BRPD eliminating its Street Crimes Unit,126 the Sheriff’s Office has taken on a more active role with respect to narcotics and gangs in Baton Rouge, with personnel telling 21CP that EBRSO’s activities in these areas include those taken within the city limits of Baton Rouge EBRSO indicates that it has dedicated many of its efforts – particularly those related to crime reduction

122 East Baton Rouge Police Department Annual Reports, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023.

123 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

124 Gabby Jimenez, “Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office Forms New Unit to Combat Gang Violence,” The Advocate (Apr. 11, 2024), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/east-baton-rouge-sheriffs-office-forms-new-unit-to-combat-gangviolence/article_74f73b1a-f80a-11ee-a0a1-b312c2a95a63.html

125 Id

126 Jeremy Krail, “BRPD Dismantles Unit Linked to ‘Brave Cave’ Probe, Launches Criminal Investigation Into Officers’ Actions,” WBRZ.com (Aug. 31, 2023), https://www.wbrz.com/news/brpd-dismantles-unit-linked-to-brave-cave-probe-launches-criminal-investigation-into-officers-actions

and narcotics enforcement – to areas inside the city limits for more than 16 years.127 It notes that these efforts and the agency’s clearance rates help demonstrate EBRSO’s ability to service the demands of policing urban communities.

Operationally, the consolidation of policing services into one agency across both the City and Parish of Baton Rouge would require an analysis to incorporate the EBRSO’s six substations and BRPD’s five districts into one patrol plan that balanced the workload. This would likely require significant reductions in command-level patrol personnel. A specific technical analysis would have to be conducted to determine the number of patrol areas required However, based on 21CP’s experience, there is unlikely to be a need for more than six or seven substations and commanders. The streamlining of supervisory and leadership positions within an expanded, restructured EBRSO could produce some important, long-term cost savings (discussed further in Section D).

At the same time, considerable increases in patrol officers would be necessary for the EBRSO to have the capacity to police and patrol within the city limits as the primary law enforcement agency. As shown in Table 10, the EBRSO call-for-service workload is currently just over half of the BRPD. At the least, the consolidation of services will require that EBRSO handle a substantially elevated volume of calls for service. A consolidated public safety agency will be responsible for providing service to 387,131 residents of East Baton Rouge128 –responding to approximately 124,000 more calls for service and investigating an additional roughly 100 homicides per year. Adjusting for the population served, BRPD’s average homicide rate is 4.7 per 10,000 residents and EBRSO is 1.03 per 10,000 residents.

Table 10. Summary Comparison of Key Public Safety Demand Indicators, BRPD vs. EBRSO

As discussed in other sections, the likelihood of BRPD members joining EBRSO would impact the EBRSO’s ability to quickly scale up to deliver the necessary services equally or better and without interruption. If consolidation occurred, it could allow for more patrol officers throughout the parish, which could reduce crime and violence In other consolidation examples, the new agency sought to maintain at least the same number of patrol personnel on duty in each department.130

Both agencies’ leadership and the Parish-City stakeholders who 21CP interviewed say that most crime and violence is highly concentrated among a small percentage of persons and places. As a result, there is some

127 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

128 This excludes the residents of East Baton Rouge Parish that reside in the cities of Baker, Central, and Zachary as they have their own police departments.

129 This reflects the population that is not within the jurisdiction of another law enforcement agency. Therefore it excludes the populations of the city of Baton Rouge, Baker, Central, and Zachary.

130 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

similarity in the agencies' approaches with respect to addressing these dynamics. Both agencies have participated in the East Baton Rouge Gun Violence Collaborative (“EBRGVC”), a multi-agency collaboration borne out of the strategic planning process associated with the federally funded National Public Safety Partnership program. Both BRPD and EBRSO engage on a bi-weekly basis to share information and collaborate with partners from the Mayor’s Office, all federal, state and local law enforcement agencies in EBR, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the EBR District Attorney’s office and the Mayor’s Safe, Hopeful, Healthy BR Initiative toward the following four goals: 131

(1) Conduct outreach to young people involved in violence to provide them with opportunities for a different path in life;

(2) Prioritize gun crimes and high-risk offenders when prosecuting criminal cases, both in district and federal court. (coordinate and enhance LE partnerships to investigate, prosecute, and reduce gun violence);

(3) Address blight and infrastructure that contributes to gun violence in neighborhoods; and

(4) Identify and focus law enforcement resources on violent individuals and locations. Utilize data, technology, intelligence sharing, and proactive policing.

Several interviewees from both agencies and the larger community noted that communication and collaboration between the two law enforcement entities have been problematic in the past but have improved more recently.

132 EBRSO reported that a recent BRPD change to its Records Management System has purportedly complicated information-sharing, but BRPD maintains that the RMS change was a direct result of difficulties associated with the RMS that EBRSO spearheaded for all agencies in the Communications District and BRPD was forced to accept at the time.133 Regardless, the similarity in fundamental underpinnings with respect to each agency’s crime and violence reduction strategies would seem to be beneficial if the streamlining of policing services under the EBRSO were to occur.

Separately, some of the long-term cost savings that Baton Rouge might realize from consolidation could be invested in strategies and programs designed to prevent and deter crime, with new EBRSO personnel engaged to focus substantially on coordinating the types of long-term efforts that can produce more enduring reductions in crime.

131 Baton Rouge Strategic Plan (Nov. 2022), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16194/Public-Safety-Partnership-Strategic-Plan-2022

132 21CP interviews with EBRSO, BRPD, and other government and parish stakeholders.

133 Written communication with EBRSO personnel; written communication with BRPD personnel

B. Organizational Structure

This section addresses the current structure of BRPD and EBRSO – considering whether anything about how the organizations are currently structured to provide services to the people of Baton Rouge might tend to promote or impede the consolidation of services. Overall, the section finds that nothing about the organizational structures of the entities would prevent eliminating BRPD and giving EBRSO responsibility over policing in the City of Baton Rouge – though it is likely that EBRSO, to address the increased calls for service and patrol duties discussed in the previous section, would need to expand and further customize its Criminal Operations function to account for a wider array of duties within the city limits of Baton Rouge.

Fundamentally, the organizational structure is the means through which a law enforcement agency accomplishes its mission, goals, and objectives. There are, of course, several ways in which the work of an organization can be structured, and decisions about how the structure is developed must reflect the agency’s scope of services, enforcement priorities, and philosophy. Practically, the organizational structure requires an understanding of the distinctions between line, staff, and support functions. The number of levels, and the degree of centralization, must also be addressed.

Generally, the work of a law enforcement organization is structured in three ways: function, program, or geographical

• Functional: The work is divided based on the type of work being done (e.g., patrol, investigation, administration).

• Program: The work is divided based on the type of program (e.g., traffic, narcotics, homicide, sex crimes).

• Geographical: The work is divided based on geography (e.g., District 1, West Division). 134

Most law enforcement agencies are hybrids in which all three types are incorporated in the agency structure to varying degrees. In this sense, most police organizations are organized functionally. The function of patrol is organized both geographically and by time.

Designing a suitable organizational structure also requires an understanding of the distinctions between line, staff, and support functions:135

• Line functions work directly to achieve the department’s objectives (e.g., patrol, investigations, traffic);

• Staff functions assist management in directing the organization and in accounting for the organization’s activities (e.g., budget, planning, legal); and

• Support functions provide support to the entire organization and cut across all functions (human resources, information technology, training).

134 D. Stephens, “Organization and Management.” Local Government: Police Management (1991).

135 Id

A good organizational structure reinforces the principle of unity of command136 – an individual employee reports to and receives direction from one supervisor. This principle enhances accountability and responsibility for the work effort

To consider the extent to which organizational structures may facilitate or complicate consolidation, the following sections summarize how BRPD is currently organized to conduct policing activities in the city of Baton Rouge and EBRSO’s current organizational structure.

1. BRPD

BRPD is currently organized into four bureaus, each overseen by a Deputy Chief, with the Internal Affairs and Public Information Offices reporting directly to the Chief.137 The four bureaus include Administration (also Chief of Staff), Patrol Operations, Criminal Investigations, and Operational Services/Special Operations. This reflects some recent structural changes within the organization.

Specifically, in 2019, the BRPD engaged a consulting firm – Management Partners – to review the department operations with a view toward recommendations that save money that could be used to improve officer pay. In February 2020, Management Partners presented their findings to the department in a 59-page report. The report included 54 recommendations to save an estimated $9-10 million annually. With respect to departmental organization, the Management Partners report included 11 recommendations for changing the organizational structure from three to four functional areas and locating divisions within the functional areas.138

The BRPD adopted those recommendations in 2021 and made additional changes to their structure that were adopted in May 2023. Further modifications have been made since the appointment of the new chief. These changes included moving units into the Operational Services/Special Operations division, including narcotics, CGIC, and task forces (previously under Criminal Investigations) and Homeland Security and the Real Time Crime Center (both previously under Administration), and moving Training Services from Operational Services to Administration 139

The Deputy Chief of the Administration Bureau acts as the Chief of Staff and oversees accounting/personnel, court support, intelligence, training services (including recruiting), the department’s legal advisor, mayor’s security, operational management, professional standards (i.e., CALEA, extra duty details), officer wellness, and the health and safety office

The Deputy Chief of Patrol Operations oversees the largest bureau in the department, responsible for patrolling and responding to calls for service, traffic enforcement, and preliminary criminal investigations within the city.140 Patrol Operations also oversees the mounted patrol unit, K-9 division, and traffic division.141 Patrol operations are discussed more fully in Section III, A.

136 Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management (1967).

137 BRPD Organizational Chart (rev. Mar. 25, 2024).

138 Management Partners, Police Department Organizational and Operational Assessment (Feb. 7, 2020).

139 BRPD Organizational Chart Organizational Chart (rev. May 25, 2023); BRPD Organizational Chart Organizational Chart (rev. Mar. 25, 2024).

140 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel; City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, About Us, Staff Divisions, Patrol Operations, https://www.brla.gov/1654/Patrol-Operations (last visited June 7, 2024).

141 BRPD Organizational Chart Organizational Chart (rev. Mar. 25, 2024).

The Deputy Chief of the Criminal Investigations Bureau is responsible for follow-up investigations of major crimes; the bureau is organized into investigative support, property crimes, and persons crimes with multiple sub-units within each 142 For example, investigative support includes, among others, crime scene investigation, Crime Stoppers, and victims’ assistance. Property crimes includes auto theft and impound, financial crimes, and burglary. Persons crimes includes divisions for homicide, major assaults, armed robbery, and special victims.

The Operational Services/Special Operations Deputy Chief oversees the most diverse BRPD bureau. It provides several support functions for uniform patrol and criminal investigations but also includes several specialized enforcement and investigation units 143 Support functions include alarm enforcement, communications, community resources, crime statistics and research division, fleet management, fingerprint division, mobile data/video, traffic and criminal records division, and supply division Special operations is staffed by approximately 120 personnel and includes the dive team, explosives material unit, violent crime apprehension team, special response team/SWAT, and multiple task forces 144 Other jurisdictions, particularly smaller parishes and surrounding rural areas, often call the BRPD for SWAT team and dive team assistance.145 The BRPD also has its own Special Investigations Unit to focus on group violence intervention.146 Special duties include providing security and assistance for special events, parades, sporting events, and other situations as needed. The bureau was also tasked with handling hostage situations, search warrants, dignitary protection, and other high-risk events.147

The Department provides services one would expect to find in the most up-to-date urban police agencies, including a real-time crime center, victim assistance, a wellness unit, special victims’ unit, and crime and intelligence analysis.148 To this end, one BRPD interviewee noted, “Our approach has always heavily relied on data. We go where the data takes us and have long since left the approach of relying on ‘cop sense ’”

21CP’s review found that BRPD’s current organizational structure is generally consistent with sound principles. It includes functional, program, and geographical structures that are typical of most police agencies. It appropriately aligns line, staff, and support functions with a few exceptions

2. EBRSO

EBRSO has three organizational components that fall under Sheriff Gautreaux’s oversight and leadership. The Chief Criminal Deputy (a Colonel) oversees Criminal Operations, while the Civil Office and Parish Prison are led by Lieutenant Colonels, who go by the titles of Chief Civil Deputy and Warden/Chief of Corrections, respectively.149 The major responsibilities and sub-units of each organizational component are summarized in Table 11. Notably, only the EBRSO’s Criminal Operations Division is comparable to the functions and

142 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel; BRPD Organizational Chart Organizational Chart (rev. Mar. 25, 2024).

143 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, About Us, Staff Divisions, Operational Services/Special Operations, https://www.brla.gov/271/Operational-ServicesSpecial-Operations (last visited June 7, 2024).

144 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel; BRPD Organizational Chart Organizational Chart (rev. Mar. 25, 2024).

145 21CP interview with BRPD personnel.

146 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel; Gabby Jimenez, “Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office Forms New Unit to Combat Gang Violence,” The Advocate (Apr. 11, 2024), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/east-baton-rouge-sheriffs-office-forms-new-unit-to-combat-gangviolence/article_74f73b1a-f80a-11ee-a0a1-b312c2a95a63.html

147 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, About Us, Staff Divisions, Operational Services/Special Operations, https://www.brla.gov/271/Operational-ServicesSpecial-Operations (last visited June 7, 2024).

148 BRPD Organizational Chart Organizational Chart (rev. Mar. 25, 2024).

149 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Who We Are,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE (last visited June 7, 2024).

responsibilities of the BRPD. Therefore, the focus of this section’s remaining analysis of the EBRSO organizational structure is primarily Criminal Operations.

Table 11. Major Organizational Components of EBRSO

Organizational Component Leadership

Responsibilities Sub-units

Criminal Operations Colonel, Chief Criminal Deputy Law enforcement within EBR Parish, including answering and responding to calls for service, patrol, investigations, and training

• Uniform Patrol

• Special Operations / Crimes Against Persons

• Property Crimes

• Training Division

• Community Policing & Engagement

• Support Services

• Gang Intelligence & Enforcement

Civil Office Lieutenant Colonel, Chief Civil Deputy Financial administration of the EBRSO, collection of parish property taxes, and collection of courtordered fines

• Comptroller

• Tax Director

• Inmate Accounts Supervisor

• Foreclosures Supervisor

• Judicial Process Supervisor

• Property and Risk Purchasing Manager

Parish Prison Lieutenant Colonel, Warden / Chief of Corrections Staffing and administration of the EBR Parish Prison

• Chief of Intake & Release

• Chief of Security

• Chief of Court Security

• Chief of Investigation

• DOC Re-entry Program

The EBRSO is a functional structure at the highest level: Criminal, Civil, and Corrections. The sub-units are then organized according to geography, program, line, staff, and support functions. The overall structure is typical of many police agencies.

The Sheriff has six direct reports: the Chief of Criminal Operations, Media Relations, Internal Affairs, and Legal are appropriately among them However, the heads of Human Relations and Information Technology also report to the Sheriff – which, in many other departments, would be part of an administrative or support function. EBRSO indicates that the Sheriff is currently preparing to restructure some administrative functions.

The Colonel in charge of the Criminal area has 14 direct reports, including the leadership of the other two divisions, Digital Evidence, Narcotics, and Grants/Research & Development.150 As summarized in Table 12, six Majors serve as the Chiefs of Uniform Patrol, Support Services, Property Crimes, Special Operations/Crimes Against Persons, Training, and Community Engagement within Criminal Operations:151

• Uniform Patrol. The major in charge of this department area has 12 direct reports, including six substation Captains. Uniform Patrol also oversees the Communications (Dispatch) function, the Criminal Information Unit (which provides information to patrol deputies while in the field), K9, Reserve Deputy program, traffic enforcement, and the honor guard.

• Support Services. The major in charge of Support Services has seven direct reports. It includes a Computer Operations section, as well as Fleet and Building Maintenance.

• Property Crimes. The property crimes major has eight direct reports and a collection of functions, including Chaplains, Peer Support, Extra Duty, Records, and Crime Analysis. A Computer Forensics section includes a Secret Service Task Force (also one in Financial Crimes). The Larceny area includes Homeland Security and is separate from the Homeland Security function in Special Operations.

• Special Operations and Crimes Against Persons. This major oversees all violent crimes against persons and all Special Operations, which often support such violent crimes. These include Maritime, Aviation, SWAT and other special operations divisions.

• Training. The Major that oversees training has seven direct reports, including a program specialist and the individuals in charge of the EBRSO range, CARTA (the Capital Area Regional Training Academy, in-service training, corrections training, the field training program, and recruiting

• Community Engagement. The community policing and engagement function is also commanded by a Major and has four direct reports. It has a warrant unit and a Coroner’s Office subunit as well.

EBRSO maintains multiple specialized units, although the K-9 unit is organizationally located under uniform patrol. This is likely because six of the ten canines are designated as patrol canines, while two are dual-purpose and two are nationally certified narcotics canines.152

Table 12. Responsibilities of the Six Major Components of EBRSO Criminal Operations

Organizational

Component of Criminal Operations

Responsibilities

Uniform Patrol • Six captains oversee patrol substations

150 Id.; EBRSO Organizational Chart (Feb. 2024).

151 EBRSO Organizational Chart (Feb. 2024).

152 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “K9 Unit,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/K9 (last visited June 7, 2024).

Support Services

Property Crimes

Special Operations and Crimes Against Persons

Training

Community Engagement

• Six captains oversee communications, reserve duty & field training, K-9, night supervisors (2), and traffic

• Two captains oversee construction and building services and fleet operations

• Individuals of an unknown rank153 are responsible for Radio and Lights Installation, Computer Operations, Building Information/Security, and Uniform Supply.

• Five captains oversee armed robbery/burglary, criminal records/ crime analysis, larceny, financial crimes, and computer forensics

• Individuals of an unknown rank are responsible for the chaplain’s office, crime victims’ assistance, and the peer support team

• Nine captains oversee SWAT, Maritime, Air support, intelligence, crime scene, evidence, homeland security/emergency preparedness, homicide/VCU, and general investigations

• Three captains oversee the range, CARTA, in-service training

• Individuals of an unknown rank are responsible for corrections training, recruiting, and the field training program

• Four captains oversee the Community Policing Unit, the School Drug Taskforce, DARE, and Warrants

Another major specialized unit of the EBRSO is the Marine Search & Rescue Division (“MSAR”), which includes Marine Patrol, search and rescue, the dive team, and Sonar Operations. Deputies are assigned to MSAR in fulltime, part-time, and reserve capacities, but all receive the same specialty training 154 Because the EBR Parish is located on the Mississippi River, the EBRSO “must have full capabilities in security of a commercial port, search and rescue, dive-recovery, and recreational boating law enforcement.”155 EBRSO indicates that these divisions are often called out to assist other jurisdictions throughout the state due to their abilities and training.156

EBRSO is also the lead agency for Joint Task Force 7, a counterterrorism task force formed by sheriffs in the area responsible for port security. The EBRSO reports that its Dive Team has completed a wide variety of missions, including person-in-water rescue/recovery, evidence recovery, searching through sunken vessels, ship hull scans, vehicle recovery, and numerous other related operations. The Dive Team has also published reports and training to assist other agencies in the operations and performance of their own dive teams.

Another EBRSO specialized unit is the SWAT team, a “designated law enforcement team, whose members are selected, trained, equipped, and assigned to resolve high-risk incidents involving a threat to public safety which would otherwise exceed the capabilities of traditional law enforcement first responders and/or investigative units” (e.g., hostage situations, high-risk warrant services, personal protection details, etc.).157 The EBRSO SWAT team is part-time, so its members have other full-time duties but are on-call for SWAT incidents as needed and are fully trained in these specialized enforcement operations.158

153 Some units on the EBRSO org chart do not specify the rank of the responsible individual.

154 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Maritime,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Maritime (last visited June 7, 2024).

155 Id

156 Written Communication with EBRSO personnel.

157 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “SWAT,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/SWAT (last visited June 7, 2024).

158 Id

EBRSO also has an Air Support Unit, which conducts routine patrols within East Baton Rouge Parish while assisting calls for service that may benefit from aerial support. The Air Support Unit also assists specialized divisions in physical surveillance, intelligence gathering, and apprehending suspects. Further, the Unit obtains aerial photographs to be used for project planning, evidence, court preparation, and training.

The recently announced Gang Intelligence and Enforcement Unit (“GIE”) is described by the Sheriff as “a multidivision, full-time unit dedicated to proactively investigating drug dealers, gang members and others involved in violent crime in East Baton Rouge.” It “is made up of three divisions: Narcotics, Gang Intelligence and the Special Community Anti-Crime Team (SCAT), ”159 which report to a Captain that reports directly to the Colonel of Criminal Operations This Captain is responsible for the three separate subunits within the GIE.

The EBRSO told 21CP that its organizational structure is unique to the agency, with support and operational functions often combined due to the agency’s, and the community’s, unique needs.160 The Sheriff’s Office acknowledged that they are currently considering reorganizing some units under more appropriate command staff. Currently, there are instances where an organization-wide support function reports to an operational command. The Sheriff’s Office mentioned that it is considering the creation of an administrative unit that would combine human resources, recruiting, records, and other related administrative functions.161

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

Ultimately, any effective and efficient consolidation of functions will require thoughtful analysis, planning, and some administrative creativity to structure a single entity to provide all of the City and Parish of Baton Rouge’s public safety services. In particular, it is unlikely that keeping the status quo within one agency, and simply absorbing additional personnel, would be sufficient to ensure the type of effective, efficient operations – and operational structure – required for a streamlined agency to provide expanded services.

Consolidating law enforcement services within a single agency would require significant reductions in command-level personnel – which might practically, as other sections of this report discuss, limit a streamlined agency’s ability to retain high-quality supervisors from a discontinued agency. At the same time, however, this reduction in overall command-level personnel may contribute to overall cost savings, across the Parish, on policing and public safety. This is further discussed in Section D.

Both organizations’ investigative and special operations functions are similar, and consolidation may realize savings through reductions in the required numbers of command-level personnel within those functions Likewise, functions such as information, records, and human resources may also benefit from some overall efficiencies with respect to command/supervisory personnel.

Cost savings associated with consolidation will only be maximized by thoroughly re-organizing the Sheriff’s Office and integrating like functions into a coherent structure. Personnel assigned to the functions and units should be based on workload demands, qualifications, and experience. This will likely require assigning some

159 Gabby Jimenez, “Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office Forms New Unit to Combat Gang Violence,” The Advocate (Apr. 11, 2024), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/east-baton-rouge-sheriffs-office-forms-new-unit-to-combat-gangviolence/article_74f73b1a-f80a-11ee-a0a1-b312c2a95a63.html.

160 Written communication with EBRSO personnel.

161 Id

existing personnel to different functions. Before consolidation, current members of both agencies should know the potential impact on them, available options, and the decision-making process.

Ultimately, nothing about EBRSO’s current structure precludes the consolidation of safety services. For Baton Rouge and EBRSO to fully realize the potential benefits of consolidation, the Office would likely need to restructure Criminal Operations to accommodate the expanded volume and nature of service that it would provide in the City of Baton Rouge, as other sections of this report discuss in greater detail below.

C. Staffing, Hiring, and Recruitment

The preceding section described how BRPD and EBRSO are currently structured from an organizational perspective, concluding that, especially if EBRSO adjusted or scaled its structure to accommodate expanded responsibilities and public safety demand, nothing about the structures necessarily would impede or complicate the consolidation of safety services. This section considers whether anything about each agency’s current dynamics concerning the people and personnel operating within those organizational structures may impact the viability of consolidation.

Section A of this report considers public safety demand in Baton Rouge and finds, logically, that the Sheriff’s Office taking over primary policing functions within the city limits of Baton Rouge would substantially expand EBRSO’s responsibilities, call volume, and patrol responsibilities. By extension, this would require a notable complement of patrol officers. This section starts by considering what staffing EBRSO has in place, and what staffing BRPD currently requires to meet the City of Baton Rouge’s public safety demands.

Additionally, as Section I of this report briefly described, recruitment and retention have been among the biggest challenges facing law enforcement agencies nationwide, as most agencies have routinely been operating with significant personnel vacancies.162 Anticipating that a consolidated EBRSO with expanded responsibilities would require additional personnel, this section considers the current hiring and recruitment practices of the BRPD and EBRSO.

1. BRPD

BRPD has six ranks between officer and chief: Police Officer, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, Deputy Chief, and Chief.163 This is typical of most police agencies, though larger ones often have two or three additional levels. BRPD General Order 101 details each rank's duties and responsibilities.164

As of January 1, 2024, BRPD is authorized a total of 889 personnel165 – 696 sworn officers, 102 professional staff, and 91 civilians, but the current strength of the department is approximately 566 sworn personnel, 67 professional staff, and 80 civilians.166 Demographic data for sworn personnel as of November 1, 2023, indicate approximately 43.8% of officers were Black and 53.2% were White, while 88.8% were men and 11.2% were women.167 Of the professional staff, 70.1% were Black and 25.3% were White, while 13.4% were men and 85.1% were women. 168

Based on the information provided for the beginning of 2024, the BRPD had 124 sworn vacancies (18%), 35 nonsworn vacancies (34%), and 12 civilian vacancies (26%).169 Even though there are 124 vacant officer positions

162 International Association of Chiefs of Police, The State of Recruitment: A Crisis for Law Enforcement, https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/239416_IACP_RecruitmentBR_HR_0.pdf (last accessed June 7, 2024); Police Executive Research Forum, Responding to the Staffing Crisis: Innovations in Recruitment and Retention (Aug. 2023), https://www.policeforum.org/assets/RecruitmentRetention.pdf

163 Per the 2024 Quadrennial Review of Job Descriptions completed by BRPD’s Professional Standards Division, the Major position was removed when the executive level was restructured with additional deputy chiefs The last major retired at the end of 2023.

164 BRPD General Order 101

165 Consolidated Government of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge Louisiana, Annual Operating Budget (2023), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16712/2023-City-Parish-Annual-Operating-Budget-PDF

166 BRPD Complement January 1, 2024, Police Personnel Report.

167 Total Police Department Personnel Characteristics provided by BRPD (Nov. 1, 2023).

168 Statistics for the civilian employees were not provided in the Total Police Department Personnel Characteristics provided by BRPD (Nov. 1, 2023).

169 BRPD Complement January 1, 2024, Police Personnel Report.

(24%), there are no vacancies in the sergeant, lieutenant, and captain positions.170 As a result, 21CP observes that the department is even more top-heavy than normal. BRPD is authorized 192 supervisory and management positions, which is 28% of the total authorized sworn positions, but 34% of the actual sworn personnel available

In 2023, the Uniform Patrol Bureau represented approximately two-thirds of the overall sworn staffing for BRPD.171 Several interviewees and the Uniform Patrol Bureau 2023 Annual Report noted that the sworn personnel vacancies led to some personnel shuffling to try to be as efficient as possible and ensure that patrol was fully staffed. As one interviewee said “Uniformed patrol is the backbone of this department. We cannot create deficiencies in patrol."172 BRPD personnel we interviewed noted that they have instead created deficiencies in administration and other areas that do not provide direct public safety services.

To address staffing vacancies, BRPD has focused considerable efforts on recruiting. Nearly all BRPD personnel with whom 21CP spoke specifically praised the energy, work ethic, and demeanor of the new leadership of the BRPD Recruiting Division and had confidence in its ability to meet the department’s goals, even in a challenging recruiting climate. The BRPD Recruiting Division has a data-driven approach to entice applicants to the BRPD and is focused on identifying what is working well and what can be improved. The Division is guided by its 2024 Strategic Recruitment Plan, which was provided to 21CP for review and appears both sound and comprehensive.173

BRPD uses applicant tracking software called Airtable to monitor applicants’ progress through the selection process.174 The Division logs all communications with potential applicants, including any questions and concerns identified. They routinely use text and social media communications to meet younger people where they are. Based on internal analysis, BRPD personnel informed 21CP that over 60% of applicants came from referrals, so the unit has increased employee engagement in the recruiting process and morale-boosting events. Furthermore, the Recruiting Division actively engages in community outreach, hosting public events (e.g., open houses, meet the fleet), and attending community events. The director meets regularly with religious leaders and colleges, attends career fairs, and spreads the recruiting message at local sporting events and other city special events.175 BRPD personnel reported looking for applicants of great character with a passion to serve.176

The Department works to communicate frequently with applicants and to shorten the length of the hiring process to avoid losing good candidates.177 Although the average length of time varies by person (i.e., how fast they submit documents, complete doctor’s physical, etc.), BRPD personnel reported that the process can be as short as 90 days or take up to six months. Notably, the Department’s Early Hire Program allows BRPD to hire individuals 8-9 weeks before their academy start date, which also helps with retention.178 This allows the new hires to be exposed to different parts of the department they may work in before going to the academy.

The BRPD Recruiting Division maintains its own website, which provides recruits with resources to set them up for success, including a list of employment requirements, prep classes, study guides, the ability to connect

170 Id

171 BRPD Uniform Patrol Bureau 2023 Annual Report.

172 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

173 Baton Rouge Police Department, Strategic Recruitment Plan

174 Written communication with BRPD Personnel; the software tracks applicants for all positions processed through the Recruiting Division, not just police officers.

175 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel.

176 Id

177 Kevin P. Morison, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Hiring for the 21st Century Law Enforcement Officer: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies for Success (2017).

178 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel

with a recent recruit, and frequently asked questions.179 The Recruiting Division also has social media accounts that are separate from the main department accounts to assist in delivering more recruitment-targeted messaging.180 The Department has maintained contracts with outside digital marketing firms in the past, which recently ended, but they are pursuing this further going forward. BRPD personnel also reported using student workers and local university contacts to assist in digital marketing efforts.181

One example of BRPD’s successful recruitment efforts is with the BRPD professional staff positions in communications. This unit’s vacancy rate was 37% at the beginning of 2024. The new Director of Recruiting held an open house at the communications center to expose potential applicants to the work environment and has had tremendous success recruiting for these vacancies. By the end of 2024, all vacant communications positions will be filled.182

BRPD personnel also reported success in recruiting lateral officers from other agencies to come to BRPD.183 The Department typically runs lateral training academies twice a year. The Recruiting Division felt that the appeals of the BRPD for these applicants were increased overtime availability, variety of ancillary duties, opportunity for lateral movement, civil service protection, and retirement benefits. They also reported that the turnover rate was better than in previous years; further, most people who left the department before retiring reported in their exit surveys that they were not leaving for other law enforcement jobs in the state. 184

Notably, the BRPD recently sent a letter of intent to participate in Class 2 of the grassroots 30x30 campaign and pledge for law enforcement agencies to improve the representation and experiences of women in policing.185 The BRPD is also establishing a Women in Law Enforcement Board to help attract and retain female officers.186

Finally, it is notable that BRPD’s Recruiting Division has enjoyed success despite having a relatively small fulltime staff, with only the Sergeant/Director, one full-time sworn recruiter, and two administrative specialists. This core team is supported by approximately 30 to 40 part-time or ancillary duty recruiters who are trained and enthusiastic to spread the word when needed. Similarly, applicants’ background investigations are also completed by sworn officers or detectives as an ancillary duty after completing a 10-hour training class for that purpose.

Generally aligned with best practices, BRPD’s selection process “includes only those rating criteria or minimum qualifications that are job related, and are administered, scored, evaluated, and interpreted in a uniform manner.”187 BRPD’s process is intensive and involves a significant amount of work done before the candidate is interviewed.188 Nevertheless, BRPD leaders did not believe the robust background investigation process was a deterrent for applicants.189 The steps in the process include:

179 Baton Rouge Police Recruiting, https://geauxbrpd.com/resources/ (last visited June 7, 2024).

180 21CP written communication with BRPD Personnel.

181 Id

182 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel; see also Gabriella Mercurio, “New Recruits Starting BRPD Training Academy,” WAFB (May 7, 2024), https://www.wafb.com/2024/05/06/new-recruits-starting-brpd-training-academy/

183 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel.

184 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel.

185 BRPD 30x30 Letter of Intent to Dr. Tanya Meisenholder (Apr 8, 2024).

186 21CP interview with BRPD personnel.

187 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/96-4 Recruitment and Selection Process

188 Baton Rouge Police Recruiting, “Apply Police Officer,” https://geauxbrpd.com/apply/; 21CP interview with government official

189 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

1. Police Civil Service entrance exam and application (through the Louisiana Office of State Examiner)190;

2. Police Officer intake form and application;

3. Physical assessment, including physical fitness (test includes 1 ½ mile run, one minute of sit-ups, and one minute of push-ups) and physical ability tests (measures applicant’s ability to perform jobrelated exercises);

4. Fingerprinting and photos;

5. Personal history questionnaire and authorization for the release of background information, three letters of recommendation, a credit report, their social security card, and a passport photo;

6. Background investigation, includes truth verification test, background check (including in-home interview, interviews with previous employers and peers, social media review), board interview by panel of BRPD personnel, psychological assessment, physical and drug/alcohol screening; and

7. Final selection and a conditional offer of employment.

Notably, the BRPD engaged the services of Standard & Associates in 1994 to establish a physical ability test in addition to the physical fitness test. The physical ability test “is comprised of events related directly to the work of police officers in the City of Baton Rouge.”191

2. EBRSO

The EBRSO has nine ranks between deputy and Sheriff: Deputy, Corporal, Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, Major, Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel, and Sheriff.192 Unlike the BRPD, all EBRSO employees are sworn, though some are POST-certified and corrections deputies are generally not; corrections deputies complete other specialized training.193 EBRSO has 271 supervisory and management positions (Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain, and Major), which is 34.7% of the currently filled sworn positions.194

EBRSO provided its May 2024 position report to 21CP indicating that, while the authorized strength of EBRSO is 890 sworn personnel, the current, actual strength is 779 Just over 50% of these employees are Black or African American, and 46.8% are White, while 61.8% are men and 38.2% are women.195 The largest representation of women deputies is within the Civil Office (56.1%), followed by the Parish Prison (43.4%), and Criminal Operations and Administration (32.0%), including 28.4% within Uniform Patrol. This above average representation of women among sworn personnel is notable.

The EBRSO has 111 current vacancies (12.4%).196 The highest percentage of vacancies is within the Prison (20.3%), followed by 10.3% in Criminal Operations, and 2% in the Civil Division. Over half of the current EBRSO personnel are assigned to the Criminal Operations Division, while 220 sworn personnel staff the Parish Prison and 97 employees work in the Civil Office. Approximately half of the personnel assigned to Criminal Operations work in uniform patrol, all of whom are POST-certified (Peace Officer Standards and Training).197 The remainder of personnel working in Criminal Operations are detectives (n=60), special operations and crime (n=77), support (n=31), and community policing and service (n=31).

190 Office of State Examiner, Fire & Police Civil Service, https://ose.louisiana.gov/ (last visited June 7, 2024).

191 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/96-4 Recruitment and Selection Process

192 21CP interview with EBRSO Personnel.

193 Id

194 Written document summarizing the number of employees by position titles provided by EBRSO.

195 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

196 EBRSO Position Report, May 2024.

197 21CP interview with EBRSO Personnel.

In addition to full-time sworn personnel, the EBRSO also relies on approximately 91 reserve deputy volunteers as part of the Sheriff’s Office Reserve Division, approximately half of whom are active duty and the other half are retired.198 Reserve deputies are POST-certified; they are initially trained through a special part-time Reserve Academy and then complete all ongoing training required of full-time deputies.199 They serve the EBRSO as nonsalaried, fully commissioned law enforcement officers in various roles; active reserve deputies volunteer for at least 20 hours per month while retired reserve deputies work extra duty details only 200 Reserve deputies regularly devote more than 15,000 volunteer hours to the EBRSO, saving the agency about $500,000 annually.201

EBRSO says that it established a recruiting unit under the Training Major last year.202 EBRSO Policy 1000 provides that:203

The Recruiting Division should employ a comprehensive recruitment and selection strategy to recruit and select employees from a qualified and diverse pool of candidates. The strategy should include:

a) Identification of racially and culturally diverse target markets (La. R.S. 40:2401.2).

b) Use of marketing strategies to target diverse applicant pools.

c) Expanded use of technology and maintenance of a strong internet presence. This may include an interactive office website and the use of office-managed social networking sites if resources permit.

d) Expanded outreach through partnerships with media, community groups, citizen academies, local colleges, universities, and the military.

Furthermore, the policy states, “The Office should strive to facilitate and expedite the screening and testing process and should periodically inform candidates of their status in the recruiting process.”

EBRSO indicates that Recruiting is now staffed by a full-time recruiter, a recruiter’s assistant/administrator, a recruiting background investigator (RBI) and one clerical secretary. EBRSO tells 21CP that the unit is currently being expanded.204 The Office also reported that they develop a yearly recruiting plan based on needs and open positions.205 21CP reviewed an EBRSO recruiting video available on YouTube206 and on the agency’s Recruiting Facebook account. The video highlights the diversity of work opportunities available within the EBRSO, particularly specialized assignments. Additionally, shorter videos focusing on patrol and corrections regular duties are available on recruiting social media and will be featured on a nearly-completed recruiting website.207

198 Letter from Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux, III, available at https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/DOCS/Reserve%20Program%20Letter.pdf (last accessed June 7, 2024); 21CP interview with EBRSO Personnel; written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

199 Letter from Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux, III, available at https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/DOCS/Reserve%20Program%20Letter.pdf (last accessed June 7, 2024)

200 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Reserve Deputy Program,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Reserves (last visited June 7, 2024); 21CP interview with EBRSO Personnel; Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

201 Letter from Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux, III, available at https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/DOCS/Reserve%20Program%20Letter.pdf (last accessed June 7, 2024); EBRSO Annual Report, 2022; EBRSO Annual Report, 2023.

202 21CP interview with EBRSO Personnel.

203 EBRSO Policy 1000

204 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

205 Id

206 “Recruitment Overview - East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Office,” YouTube, https://youtu.be/pzbpXsqQXfo

207 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

Further, EBRSO personnel indicated they are working on various new recruiting videos and marketing campaigns and are in the process of purchasing applicant tracking software 208

The Sheriff’s Office offers online and in-person applications. Website FAQs provide an overview of benefits and the steps in the selection process 209 Available information does not, however, provide information about the average length of the selection process, though this was reported to be approximately eight weeks long.210 In addition to their website's main Career Opportunities section, EBRSO maintains recruitment-specific LinkedIn and Facebook pages.

One of the EBRSO interviewees relayed that they recently conducted an internal survey of current employees to inform their recruitment efforts. Approximately 500 of 900 employees took the survey (55%). Initial results indicate that 75% of EBRSO employees applied to the office because of a friend or family. EBRSO said they are currently exploring incentive possibilities for current employees to refer new applicants.211 Job fairs and advertising were rarely cited as the reason employees applied.212 Current employees were motivated to apply for retirement and insurance benefits. Employees reported staying with EBRSO due to the benefits and enjoyment of those they work with. EBRSO says that it plans to continue to invest in ways to boost recruiting efforts, which includes continuing outreach (e.g., job fairs, community events).213 EBRSO personnel reported looking for applicants committed to public service.214

When prospective new deputies apply, they note their preference for Corrections, Communications (Dispatch), Reserves, or uniform patrol on their application. Because the functions require separate training, deputies who wish to transfer from corrections to uniform patrol must complete CARTA training before they can do so. Furthermore, individuals who successfully complete the selection process work in communications until their training schedule begins.215

The EBRSO Recruitment and Selection policy notes the process “should employ a comprehensive screening, background investigation, and selection process that assesses cognitive and physical abilities.”216 Because the EBRSO is an at-will employer, the steps in the selection process to become a deputy are slightly different than BRPD’s process, particularly because a civil service written exam is not required. The steps include: 217

1. Employment application including previous employment, references, education, and military record (if applicable)218;

2. Physical fitness assessment219;

208 Id

209 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “EBRSO Employment: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s),” https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/DOCS/HumanResources/Forms/EBRSOEmploymentFAQS2019.pdf (last visited June 7, 2024).

210 Written communication with EBRSO personnel.

211 Id.

212 Interview with EBRSO personnel.

213 Written communication with EBRSO personnel.

214 Id

215 Id

216 EBRSO Policy 1000 at 2.

217 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “EBRSO Employment: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s),” https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/DOCS/HumanResources/Forms/EBRSOEmploymentFAQS2019.pdf (last visited June 7, 2024); EBRSO Policy 1000

218 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “EBRSO Employment Application” (rev. Sept. 2019), https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/EBRSO%20APPLICATION%209-2019_2.pdf

219 The passing scores vary by the deputy position being applied for. Patrol and reserve deputies have more stringent requirements than communications and corrections deputies.

3. Background investigation that includes criminal history check, employment history review, driving record check, reference checks, information from public internet sites, credit report;

4. Oral interview;

5. Polygraph examination220;

6. Psychological risk assessment;

7. Credit check; and

8. Medical examination, including a drug screen.

One EBRSO interviewee noted that only about 30% of the applicants are hired because of the difficulty of the process. 221

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

The rank structures of the agencies are different at the executive level The BRPD has a Chief and four Deputy Chiefs, while the EBRSO has the Sheriff, Chief Criminal Deputy, Chief Civil Deputy, and Prison Warden titles. However, the only organizational element of the EBRSO that is directly comparable to the BRPD is the Criminal Operations area, which includes EBRSO’s law enforcement operational elements and the training function. The EBRSO has six majors in Criminal Operations, while the BRPD recently dissolved its major rank. If law enforcement services are consolidated in a single agency, the duties and responsibilities of these positions would have to be analyzed to determine differences, overlap, and the appropriate number of people to do these jobs. For example, there may be some overlap in the specialized units like SWAT, training, records, etc., but the EBRSO may need to increase the staffing levels of the other specialized units depending on their workload. Estimating the number of personnel required to staff a single agency responsible for all public safety services in Baton Rouge is beyond the scope of 21CP’s work Therefore, a priority should be commissioning a workload and staffing analysis that will help determine the number of people and where they are needed.

Another consideration is whether EBRSO’s current administrative staff could accommodate increased personnel. One EBRSO staff member told 21CP that there are 67 administrative (including leadership, management, and clerical) and 31 support personnel in the Criminal Operations Function. This serves 367 deputies in Criminal Operations. By comparison, BRPD has 56 sworn and 26 civilian staff in their Administrative Bureau (though this includes leadership, management, and administration of the police department) to cover 566 sworn and 147 non-sworn personnel. This totals 713 personnel, which is almost 50% more than the EBRSO’s current Criminal Operations. The takeaway here is that further analysis is needed to determine the roles of each administrative position in relation to the needs of each agency. The consolidation of policing services within EBRSO would require that the Sheriff’s Office have more patrol officers but also more of the types of support services personnel required to ensure that this higher number of officers can carry out their duties.

Overall, uniform patrol for the EBRSO totals 206, while BRPD’s patrol personnel level is 358. Although some of these personnel may not be needed after consolidation, it is unlikely that a significant cut in personnel could

220 An EBRSO representative indicated that the office is evaluating whether to move away from a polygraph examination in favor of a voice stress analysis test.

221 Interview with EBRSO Personnel.

maintain the existing service level in Baton Rouge, given that EBRSO currently does not address the majority of the calls for service, patrol functions, and other policing services required in the city limits of Baton Rouge.

BRPD, in recent years, has used good management practices like (1) using outside assistance and following many of the efficiency study recommendations, (2) tracking staffing levels, workload, and activity statistics (e.g., individual bureau annual reports), (3) developing a strategic plan and implementing, updating, and documenting progress, and (4) gaining and maintaining professional accreditation.

EBRSO’s vacancy rate (12%) is lower than BRPD’s (18%). A vacancy rate is a combination of attrition and hiring and increases when hiring cannot keep pace with attrition. BRPD and EBRSO face similar recruitment challenges, but they also have some distinct differences that may contribute to their ability to recruit and retain members. EBRSO has a built-in recruitment pipeline because deputies who provide jail services can, with additional training, become street deputies. A law enforcement agency’s community engagement, perception, and level of scrutiny and accountability influence both recruitment and retention efforts.222 21CP heard in interviews that the Baton Rouge Parish population tends to perceive the EBRSO less negatively than BRPD because they do not get the same level of negative media attention.

At the same time, 21CP was favorably impressed by both BRPD’s recruitment processes and initiatives and with the demonstrated success that the Department has enjoyed in attracting new candidates in a difficult hiring climate for law enforcement agencies. 21CP would also need more detailed information from EBRSO to make a more comprehensive and definitive comparison. Nevertheless, to the extent that the best practices of the BRPD recruiting division are melded with the EBRSO’s current efforts through the consolidation effort, the EBRSO would benefit from an enhanced ability to expand the workforce.

It should be noted that a consolidated policing service created by eliminating BRPD and expanding EBRSO may offer benefits that some potential candidates will find attractive. A larger agency allows greater opportunities for promotions and a variety of assignments. The Sheriff’s Office also has an internal recruiting mechanism allowing deputies with training to move from jail operations to patrol. However, as this report discusses elsewhere, the current national police recruiting problems may continue to be challenging in filling vacant positions in the new department.

222 Police Executive Research Forum, Responding to the Staffing Crisis: Innovations in Recruitment and Retention, Washington, D.C., PERF, August 2023.

D. Budget & Resources

The primary funding sources for local police come from the operating budget of the relevant governing entity, reimbursed expenses, taxes, fees, fines, forfeitures, private donations, and grants. Sixty-five out of the nation's 300 largest cities spend 40 percent or more of their general budgets on policing, but the average percentage allocated to policing across the country’s biggest cities is 13%.223 Nationally, a typical local government budget dedicates 9.2% of its budget to the policing function, second only to education.224 Sheriff’s Offices are typically funded by a county or parish and commonly supported by county-specific taxes, fees, charges, reimbursement for services, grants, forfeiture funds, and donations. A primary difference in the funding of police and Sheriff’s Offices is that a Sheriff’s Office usually can collect fees for a broader range of services and generate revenue through service contracts with municipalities.

The general incentive for any local police department is to spend all their allocated budget because any balance is returned to the general fund, and next year’s budget is based on the current year’s expenditure. Usually, a police department’s budget is built on the prior year’s expenditure and, as such, reflects incremental increases associated with inflation, increased wages and benefits costs, and added functions. Personnel costs account for the majority of a police department’s budget. All these factors limit budget growth and how a budget is used. With a vast majority of budgeted resources in many police departments going to personnel costs and another portion to re-occurring costs, there is limited opportunity to improve technology, vehicles, and specialized equipment or implement new programs and initiatives. The prolonged procurement process often complicates limited discretionary funding. This is especially true for new contracts or significant equipment purchases.

This section considers the current resources allocated for BRPD and EBRSO and the areas that are earmarked for specific financial resources At the outset, we note that 21CP assumes that, if BRPD were wound down and EBRSO assumed primary responsibility for all law enforcement activity in both the City and Parish of Baton Rouge, General Fund resources from the City and Parish would need to be paid to EBRSO for the elevated service and response that it would need to provide to meet the public safety demand outlined in Section C, above. However, 21CP’s core expertise is in public safety and public safety services, not budgeting – and we leave it to Baton Rouge’s many capable stakeholders with specific expertise in the City and Parish’s budgeting dynamics to address the specific mechanics of how EBRSO would ensure sufficient resources to provide the whole of the Parish with uninterrupted public safety service were BRPD to be eliminated.

1. BRPD

BRPD’s 2023 Fiscal Year Budget was $103,242,710 with $96,265,340 coming from the General Fund, which is the “government’s primary operating fund of the consolidated City and Parish” and the remainder coming from self-generated and dedicated revenues like property taxes.225 This is an 11 percent increase in total budget (difference of $11,206,230) since 2021. The BRPD budget is roughly 28% of the City-Parish Annual Operating

223 Katharina Buchholz, “How Much Do U.S. Cities Spend on Policing?,” (Feb. 6, 2023), https://www.statista.com/chart/10593/how-much-do-us-citiesspend-on-policing/

224 USA Facts, “Police Departments in the United States Explained” (Apr. 28, 2021), https://usafacts.org/articles/police-departments-explained/

225 Interview with government official; Consolidated Government of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge Louisiana, Annual Operating Budget 46 (2023), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16712/2023-City-Parish-Annual-Operating-Budget-PDF

Budget.226 The 2024 budget allocates $107,003,520 to BRPD, which is also 28% of the overall City-Parish General Fund ($381,269,450).227

The number of allocated personnel stayed virtually the same between 2021 and 2023, with an increase of only two employees. However, budget costs increased partially due to a 7% cost of living increase granted in September 2022 to municipal police personnel. A total of 13% pay raise over the last two years is helping close the compensation gap for municipal police. Annual funding associated with this increase and related benefits, as well as funding for the 3% merit raise for eligible employees who have not reached the top of their pay grade was included in the 2023 budget.228

Table 13 displays the budget allocations by BRPD organizational unit. The greatest portion of the costs associated with the police department is for the Uniform Patrol Bureau (49.7% of the total budget), representing approximately half of the BRPD employees. This reflects a 22.9% increase in uniform patrol costs between 2021 and 2023. The next largest portion of the budget was for the Criminal Investigations Bureau at 21.2%. The Administration Bureau and Operational Services Bureau both comprised approximately 10.5% of the BRPD budget in 2023. The costs associated with the Administration Bureau were $10,866,630 in 2023, which is a reduction from the 2021 budget but a slight increase from the 2022 budget, while the costs associated with the Operational Services Bureau have steadily increased from 2021 to 2023.

Table 13. Budget Allocations by BRPD Organizational Unit229

A supplemental budget request was submitted for fiscal year 2023 for a total of $15,332,356, with most of the increase attributable to the procurement of 133 vehicles and associated safety equipment. The other major

226 Interview with government official; Consolidated Government of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge Louisiana, Annual Operating Budget (2023), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16712/2023-City-Parish-Annual-Operating-Budget-PDF

227 Consolidated Government of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge Louisiana, Annual Operating Budget (2024), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/18820/2024-Annual-Operating-Budget-and-Capital-Budget-PDF

228 Interview with government official; Consolidated Government of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge Louisiana, Annual Operating Budget (2023), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16712/2023-City-Parish-Annual-Operating-Budget-PDF

229 Id

230 As described in the City-Parish Annual Operating Budget, the Dedicated Funds Division is “to allow for the use of funds generated from state confiscated narcotics monies.” Consolidated Government of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge Louisiana, Annual Operating Budget 141 (2023), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16712/2023-City-Parish-Annual-Operating-Budget-PDF

request was for building repair and maintenance, including resurfacing a parking lot and relocating the Training Academy. The supplemental request also included funding for civilian pay raises. 21CP was unable to confirm whether any of this supplemental request was funded

2. EBRSO

The EBRSO’s primary revenue source is property taxes (ad valorem taxes), and the EBRSO’s Civil Office is responsible for tax collection.231 Other revenue sources include 1) intergovernmental revenues, 2) fees, charges, and commissions for services, 3) interest income, 4) donations, 5) lease proceeds, and 6) miscellaneous.232 EBRSO 2023 revenues totaled $119,062,310, with 66% coming from taxes, 21% from fees, charges, and commissions for services, and approximately 9% from intergovernmental revenues. The Fund Balance was $39,448,173 in 2023. According to the Louisiana Independent Auditors’ Report, “this level of fund balance provides a reasonably adequate level of operating reserves.”233

Comparing 2021 financials to 2023, revenues increased by $2.1 million, with taxes rising by 5% and fees, charges, and commissions for service increased by 35%, but it appears that 2020 and 2021 collections were lower than usual.234 The FY 2023 Audit states this increase resulted from increased revenues collected from the City-Parish for feeding and housing prisoners and additional civil and criminal fee income.235 The same audit of the Sheriff’s Department finances also noted there was a 30.9 million deficit primarily associated with post-employment benefit liability.236

Several interviewees identified how EBRSO manages their “millage” in an advantageous manner and helps cover the cost-of-living increases.237 Specifically, EBRSO rolls forward their millage, while the City rolls it backward. Millage rollbacks mean that if property assessments go up, the amount the local government taxes residents get rolled back, so a property owner is paying less in taxes. However, the government can legally roll forward the millage, which means the rate stays the same – and the amount paid goes up.

Table 14 displays the EBRSO expenditures for the past three years. The EBRSO’s 2023 Fiscal Year budget/expenditures was $107,180,144, with 65% for personnel services and benefits.238 This represents a steady decrease from 2021 (74%) and 2022 (68%). EBRSO also reported managing $4,466,609 in grant funds, an increase from 2021 and 2022.

Table 14. Annual EBRSO Expenditures by Year, 2021-2023239

231 Interview with EBRSO Personnel; interview with Government Official.

232 EBRSO Annual Reports, 2022 and 2023.

233 EisnerAmper, East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Financial Report 4 (June 30, 2023), https://app2.lla.state.la.us/publicreports.nsf/0/d7e5debea7b21c9686258aa000506d47/$file/000038d0.pdf?openelement&.7773098

234 EBRSO Annual Reports, 2021 and 2023.

235 EisnerAmper, East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Financial Report (June 30, 2023), https://app2.lla.state.la.us/publicreports.nsf/0/d7e5debea7b21c9686258aa000506d47/$file/000038d0.pdf?openelement&.7773098

236 Id

237 Interviews with Government Officials.

238 EBRSO Annual Report 2023.

239 EBRSO Annual Reports, 2021, 2022, and 2023.

EBRSO personnel provided a more specific breakdown of the 2023 budget by departmental classifications.240 This information is provided in Table 15. As shown, the costs for the Parish Prison were the highest at $25,688,365, followed by office-wide expenses ($23,799,683) and Uniform Patrol ($16,904,305.32), which is the most significant organizational component in terms of personnel. Combining uniform patrol, detectives, and special operations, $31,003,766 was spent to provide direct law enforcement services to the Parish, accounting for 28.9% of the EBRSO’s expenditures in 2023. However, there are associated administrative and support costs that cannot be separated by individual departments.241

Table 15. Budget Allocations by EBRSO Departmental Classification242

insurance claims, life insurance premiums, auto & general liability deductibles, fuel)

The Parish, by law, must provide the Sheriff’s Office with office space (though 21CP understands that it funds some of their own facilities), costs associated with jurors, the salary of deputies attending a court session, and the cost of prison facilities.243 According to the 2024 Parish Budget, these costs totaled $9,962,510, representing 240

a 35% increase over the prior year. The increase is associated with the number of inmates housed in other parishes.244

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

SafeBR reported to 21CP that the City-Parish spends approximately $210 million annually for policing services across the BRPD and EBRSO budgets for a population of approximately 450,000 people. This is approximately $467 per person. The CATO Institute reports that the average per capita spending on police in both the United States and Louisiana is $352.245 This suggests that there may be opportunities for Baton Rouge to realize greater resource efficiencies while preserving, and ideally enhancing, public safety overall.

Other jurisdictions that have consolidated policing services have enjoyed mixed experiences regarding cost savings. For example, a consolidation in Indianapolis was expected to save $4.3 million in personnel costs, but costs actually increased post-merger due to increases associated with overtime, Social Security spending, and pay raises.246 On the other hand, Louisville saw an immediate increase in spending following consolidation, which continued for a few years – but this was eventually followed by incremental savings that grew to approximately 30% by eight years after consolidation.247

EBRSO absorbing BRPD’s current functions would likely result in some cost savings. For instance, EBRSO and BRPD both currently maintain SWAT units, a maritime response capability, and support services like training and records all of which could be consolidated within EBRSO’s current functions.

However, the savings would not be the entire budget for BRPD – because many personnel and functions would still be necessary at an elevated level to maintain sufficient police services in Baton Rouge. As one interviewee noted, “If we were to wave a wand magically, we’d still have the same number of calls for service, crimes, workload on patrol men and women, same supervisory needs.”248 For example, although EBRSO could absorb some portions of the Administration function, the Sheriff would likely have to increase staff to manage the increased administrative workload associated with handling substantially more calls for service, arrests, and other core enforcement activity.

As noted in Section C, estimating the number of personnel required to staff the EBRSO if they were responsible for all policing services in Baton Rouge would require a comprehensive staffing study that is beyond the scope of 21CP’s work. However, 21CP was able to estimate potential cost savings per position based on an analysis of publicly available budget and salary information and by relying on several key assumptions.

Descriptive statistics were calculated for 2023 salaries for personnel of all ranks employed by BRPD for the full calendar year (see Table 16). As the goal is to estimate annual totals, salary information was not included for individuals who either began or concluded employment with BRPD during 2023. Additionally, individuals who

244 Consolidated Government of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge Louisiana, Annual Operating Budget 141 (2023), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16712/2023-City-Parish-Annual-Operating-Budget-PDF

245 Chris Edwards, CATO Institute “Spending on Police by State” (June 5, 2020) https://www.cato.org/blog/spending-police-state

246 Matt Adams, “Study of 2007 IMPD merger shows no money was saved,” Fox59.com, (2014), https://fox59.com/news/only-on-fox59-study-of2007-impd-merger-shows-no-money-saved/

247 Charles D. Taylor, Dagney Faulk, & Pamela Schaal, “Where are the cost savings in city-county consolidation?,” Journal of Urban Affairs (2016); Dagney Faulk, Pamela Schaal, & Charles D. Taylor. "How does local government amalgamation affect spending? Evidence from Louisville, Kentucky." Public Finance and Management 13.2 (2013): 80-98.

248 Interview with City-Parish stakeholder.

did not collect a salary, and only received workers compensation or severance pay, in 2023 are not included in these statistics.

Gross pay data is a sum for all of 2023 that encompasses each employee’s base salary, overtime, shift differential pay, pay adjustments, education pay, special assignment, suit allowance for detectives, worker’s compensation, employee reimbursement, employee refund, commander pay, field training pay, and aviation pay.

Table 16. City-Parish Employee Annual Salaries for 2023249

Base Pay Average (range) Gross Pay Average (range)

Police Officer

– $61,874

Police Sergeant Mean $67,624 $90,217

$69,889 $86,138

$59,709 – $69,889 $66,007 – $171,756

Police Lieutenant Mean $71,164 $102,823 Median $75,831 $95,105 Range $26,249 – $104,885 $72,915 – $174,341

Police Captain

$81,746 $100,724

$76,969 – $81,824 $87,202 – $142,163

Police Major250 Actual $83,432 $106,524

Deputy Chief Mean $108,675

$136,120 Median $108,675 $134,636 Range $108,675 $133,206 – $140,519

Chief Actual $165,178 $169,145

To estimate the cost of benefits per individual sworn employee, 2023 public salary was referenced against the 2023 operating budget.251 In 2023 there were 380 sworn, non-contract employees in BRPD’s Uniform Patrol Bureau. The 2023 budget for the Uniform Patrol Bureau included the following benefits:

• Police Retirement Fund (MPERS)

• CPERS Police Trust Retirement System

• Postemployment benefits

• Group Insurance – Health

$7,924,861

$5,526,418

$3,423,812

$3,564,497

249 City-Parish Employee Annual Salaries. Baton Rouge Open Data https://data.brla.gov/Government/City-Parish-Employee-Annual-Salaries/g9vhzeiw (last visited June 18, 2024)

250 BRPD salary records indicate that only one major was employed between 2018 – 2023 and did not complete the year. The salary information presented for the Major is from 2022, via Baton Rouge Open Data.

251 Baton Rouge Parish Government. (2023). Budget for the Police Department. Retrieved from https://budget.brla.gov/#!/year/2023/operating/0/segment2/POLICE+DEPARTMENT/0/fund?vis=barChart (last visited June 18, 2024)

These four line items in the Bureau’s budget total $20,439,588 annually. When divided equally across the Bureau’s 380 sworn personnel, these four benefits cost the Department approximately $53,800 per person annually. It is likely that the costs are not equally distributed across assignment and tenure. Consequently, it must be emphasized that these figures are rough approximations for the additional cost paid per sworn personnel, in addition to base and supplemental pay.252

The approximate cost savings for reducing one BRPD patrol officer would be $108,000 annually. For patrol sergeants, savings would be approximately $140,000; for patrol lieutenants, approximately $149,000 annually; for patrol captains, approximately $155,000 annually; and for deputy chiefs, approximately $188,000 annually.

Again, the full array of positions that could be streamlined within EBRSO would depend substantially on an evidence-based staffing analysis that is beyond the scope of 21CP’s initial evaluation of consolidation summarized in this report. Indeed, these kinds of comprehensive public safety staffing analyses are highly technical and often result in reports equal in length to the present report. However, 21CP observes in multiple instances in this report that BRPD is already, before consolidation, somewhat top-heavy –making it likely that at least some number of upper management might be streamlined during consolidation, which would result in ongoing cost savings.

Additionally, 21CP notes that the specific details relating to how and what the City of Baton Rouge would need to pay the Sheriff’s Office for it to provide public safety services are beyond the scope of its work and expertise. However, it must be emphasized that the financial implications of consolidation go beyond annual, ongoing budget considerations. For one thing, it is unknown how consolidation would affect the millage for the BRPD or the costs associated with moving retirement systems. Additionally, there are likely to be considerable upfront and one-time costs to consolidation, including but not limited to the standardization or procurement of equipment, facilities, training, information technology, and the like. Further, to ensure that a consolidated EBRSO had the personnel necessary to respond to calls for service and engage in proactive policing and crime deterrence within the city limits, it is possible that resources would need to be earmarked for hiring incentives to ensure that either current BRPD personnel, or other new hires, joined EBRSO as opposed to other departments with strong financial hiring incentives.

We discuss some of these employment-related financial considerations in Section E, below, and other of these considerations relating to consolidation implementation in Section IV, below. For now, it must simply be noted that the budget implications of consolidation relate both to the ongoing costs of providing public safety services and the costs of scaling up EBRSO to be the primary law enforcement entity within both the City and Parish of Baton Rouge.

252 To account for the several outlier data points in the salary information (e.g., an annual salary of $1,375), the approximated cost of benefits was added to the median gross salary for all ranks to estimate a total annual cost. Estimates are rounded to the nearest thousand, to reflect that these figures are rough estimates, and should not be interpreted as precise actuarial accounts.

E. Employment-Related Considerations

One assumption that surfaced in conversations with several stakeholders regarding the prospect of consolidating public safety services in Baton Rouge is that personnel from an eliminated agency would simply migrate to the remaining agency – allowing for the practical and functional, if not formal, merging of personnel More directly, consolidation would permit uninterrupted safety services in Baton Rouge because BRPD personnel would be hired by EBRSO.

This section considers whether this assumption appears to be warranted from the standpoint of employmentrelated considerations – including pay, benefits, and working conditions. Other sections of this report consider separately whether, even if employment considerations were sufficiently satisfactory, if cultural considerations might either promote or prevent BRPD personnel from making a move to EBRSO if the streamlining of services were to occur.

1. BRPD

a. Civil Service and the Police Union

BRPD is a civil service organization; every rank is protected.253 This means that every officer who has been confirmed in the civil service system has a property right to their job.254 As we heard directly from some BRPD personnel, the perceived advantages of civil service-based employment include job security and an equitable promotion structure that takes any politics or favoritism out of the decision-making; multiple interviewees noted that, unlike the at-will employment of the EBRSO, BRPD employees do not fear losing rank if a new chief or mayor comes in.255 The perceived disadvantages are that the Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board has significant power over firing officers, making it difficult for department leadership to hold them accountable.256

The collective bargaining agreement between the union of police personnel and the mayor’s office addresses issues like pay raises, paid time off, wellness leave, and extra pay for specialized divisions.257 It is not involved in the processes for assignments or promotions. As discussed in Section J, the police union is perceived to be a powerful entity within the BRPD, particularly before and during the tenure of former Chief Murphy Paul.

b. Pay and Promotion

BRPD sworn employees have a 19-step pay plan with a starting salary of $19.67 per hour and a 3% increase yearly up to pay step 19 with satisfactory performance.258 However, new officers are currently being hired at base pay step 5 ($40,906 annual pay), with a 3% merit increase six months from the date of hire ($42,134) and an additional 3% merit increase one year from the date of hire ($43,398).259 In addition, officers are eligible for additional annual pay based on their education ($1,125 annually for those with 80+ college credit hours, $3,000 annually for a Bachelor's degree, and $3,750 for a Masters degree).260 Finally, one year from the date of hire, officers are eligible to

253 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

254 Interview with Parish Stakeholder.

255 Interviews with BRPD Personnel.

256 Id

257 Id

258 Interview with Government Official.

259 Baton Rouge Police Recruiting, https://geauxbrpd.com/police-officer/ (last visited June 7, 2024).

260 Id

begin receiving $7,200 annually in state supplemental pay.261 Thus, officers can earn between $50,598 and $53,148 annually after completing their first year of service with BRPD. Promotions are governed by the state civil service system and are primarily seniority-based. Recently, the law was changed to let the chief pick who to promote from the top five candidates 262 Typically, BRPD employees reach the sergeant rank around pay step 16.

c. Benefits

The BRPD provides a comprehensive benefits package for its employees263 that includes:

• Health, dental, and vision insurance;

• Free life insurance;

• Retirement plan (through the Municipal Police Employees Retirement System (“MPERS”));

• 12 paid holidays per year (up to $5000 + annually);

• Paid monthly vacation and sick leave accrual;

• Military Leave;

• G.I. is accessible while in the academy;

• Uniforms, a take-home police vehicle (including fuel), and equipment are provided;

• Education incentive;

• State supplemental pay;

• Ability to earn comp time;

• Opportunities to receive additional Extra-Duty Details ($30 to $50 per hour); and

• Shift Differential Pay.

In addition to these benefits, BRPD says that it is actively working to expand its employee wellness offerings. One BRPD leader mentioned working with the San Antonio Police Department to model several of their successful programs.264 Currently, a city-wide wellness contract provides access to an online wellness portal.265 Services include health coaching and various programs for healthier living, including diabetes management, pregnancy wellness, and tobacco cessation. Regular health screenings are provided at BRPD facilities. BRPD interviewees described these resources as well-utilized by the department’s employees.266 A free employee assistance program also exists to provide BRPD employees and their families with confidential counseling for family concerns, substance abuse, grief, and emotional problems.

267

The BRPD operates a Critical Incident Peer Support Team with established standard operating procedures that were provided to 21CP. The critical incident officer support is robust and gives good guidance on what should happen when officers are in crisis following critical incidents. As described in the SOP, the program is designed to supplement additional existing BRPD resources, including Peer Support, Chaplains, the Family Assistance Program, etc.268

261 Id

262 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

263 Baton Rouge Police Recruiting, https://geauxbrpd.com/police-officer/ (last visited June 7, 2024).

264 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

265 Healthy Lives, https://healthylives.org/ (last visited June 7, 2024).

266 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

267 Brochure for Hidalgo Health Associates.

268 Baton Rouge Critical Incident Peer Support Team Standard Operation Procedures.

2. EBRSO

a. At-Will Employment

Unlike the BRPD, the EBRSO is an at-will employer and is not governed by civil service. The EBRSO does not have a union.269 Thus, all EBRSO employees work at the discretion of the Sheriff. EBRSO representatives that we interviewed and other parish stakeholders perceived the at-will employment as an advantage regarding accountability, as deputies can be fired for misconduct without any civil service issues.270 Many of these interviewees noted that this can work the other way as well, where officers can be retained, which should not be. The Sheriff, in written communication, indicated that he saw no disadvantages to at-will employment “as long as leadership has everyone’s best interest at heart.”

b. Pay and Promotion

The EBRSO recently revamped its pay scale into a 15-step scale, with a 4% raise accompanying each pay step if the employee passes their performance evaluation every 2 years.271 An EBRSO deputy's starting salary is currently $45,393 (if they have no prior law enforcement experience), reflecting an increased starting salary from the end of 2023 of $43,231.272 They also offer education pay ($3,500 per year for a Master’s Degree, $2,500 per year for a Bachelor’s Degree, and $1,000 per year for an Associate’s Degree or 80+ credit hours) and supplemental state pay for POST-certified employees, which is $7,200 annually after one year of service 273 Thus, POST-certified deputies can earn between $54,409 and $57,909 after completing one year of service with the EBRSO.

Promotions within the EBRSO appear to be more flexible and discretionary than BRPD. Promotions are based on work performance and merit rather than seniority 274 They go before a promotion board that collectively makes recommendations and the Sheriff and Colonel have final approval for all promotions.275 An individual does not necessarily have to be one rank below a position to be considered for promotion to that position.276 While this has potential advantages, it may also make the promotion process somewhat more subjective. At the same time, as EBRSO notes, this also provides some flexibility to help ensure that the best or most appropriate personnel receive the corresponding assignments.

c. Benefits

EBRSO reported to 21CP that it provides a comprehensive benefits package for its deputies that includes277:

• 100% paid health insurance, vision, and life insurance that includes mental health allowances and the option to add family members;

269 Interview with EBRSO Personnel; written documentation from EBRSO Personnel.

270 Interview with EBRSO Personnel; interview with Parish stakeholders.

271 Id

272 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel

273 Id

274 Interview with EBRSO Personnel; written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

275 Interview with EBRSO Personnel

276 Id

277East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Career Opportunities,” https://www.ebrso.org/Careers (last rev. June 7, 2024; Interview with EBRSO Personnel; East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “EBRSO Employment: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ’s),” https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/DOCS/HumanResources/Forms/EBRSOEmploymentFAQS2019.pdf (last rev. June 7, 2024).

• Additional Life, Dental, Disability, Accident, Cancer, and Critical Care Insurance coverage are available for employee purchase;

• Louisiana Sheriff’s Pension and Relief Retirement Plan (vested after 12 years, within 3.5% increases until 30 years);

• Free Employee Assistance Program;

• Free Employee Wellness Center;

• Free Telemedicine Program;

• Multiple paid holidays;

• Paid sick and vacation leave accrued each year;

• Military Leave;

• Uniforms, a take-home vehicle (including fuel), and equipment;

• Opportunities to receive additional Extra-Duty Details ($30 or more per hour); and

• POST State Supplemental pay ($7,200 annually).

The EBRSO’s Peer Support Team and two staff chaplains, deployed to check on employees in need, are organizationally located under the Property Crimes Bureau.

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

The differences between civil service and at-will employment can be stark. It is not obvious, based on those with who 21CP spoke, that a material number of BRPD officers would actually pursue employment with the EBRSO if consolidation occurred rather than go to some other municipal police agency, especially in an era of competitive signing bonuses. For one thing, many who seek a career in law enforcement, especially in cities, do so while ideologically believing in unions and are attracted to the civil service model. Indeed, we heard from several BRPD personnel that many officers believe that civil service protections provide them with more institutional support and a fairer employment environment. If the assumption is that most or all BRPD officers would seek employment from the EBRSO if BRPD were eliminated, it is not clear to 21CP that officers would not, under these circumstances, seek employment with another police agency with civil service protections and, potentially, strong hiring incentives.

Others are attracted to the corrections, suburban, and rural models and are more likely to join sheriff’s departments. Lastly, at least some personnel join at-will sheriff departments because city police departments may have more robust or complicated hiring standards governed by civil service. Although the EBRSO hiring process was described as “very vigorous,” compared to the BRPD selection process, it would appear somewhat less robust. For instance, the EBRSO process, unlike that of BRPD, does not include a written exam.

An EBRSO deputy’s starting salary is $45,393 if they have no prior law enforcement experience. However, after six months of “satisfactory service,” an EBRSO Deputy’s salary is increased to $47,209, and up to $49,099 after two years of service. As noted previously, with state supplemental pay this total is $54,409 after one year of service and $56,299 after two years of service with additional stipends for post high school education. BRPD starts at $40,906, but by the end of the first year, the BRPD police officer’s salary, including state supplemental pay, is at least $50,598. The two agencies operate on different pay step scales, merit increases, and processes and frequencies for determining whether individuals advance to the next pay step. Therefore, it is difficult to know, in practice, what the pay differential is between the BRPD and EBRSO. Furthermore, if consolidation were to occur and an individual from BRPD joined the EBRSO, the Office may practically need to find a

mechanism for ensuring that former BRPD personnel would not take a significant pay cut by joining EBRSO. One recommendation from another jurisdiction that consolidated two agencies was that salaries and benefits should be raised to the higher of the two agency’s level, with costs being split between the city and county (or in this case, Parish).278

Promotional processes also differ dramatically between the two agencies, and it is not immediately obvious whether personnel going from the BRPD to the EBRSO would automatically be able to maintain ranks and specialized assignments. At the least, policymakers and EBRSO personnel will need to make clear decisions about the rank, assignment, and promotional implications of personnel who may elect to seek employment at EBRSO if the BRPD is dissolved.

On their face, the two departments seem to have similar benefits packages (e.g., insurance, EAP, PTO, vacation, and incentive pay). One area that several stakeholders told 21CP is a major difference is that the two agencies operate on two different retirement systems. Currently, if someone from the BRPD moves to the EBRSO, reciprocal agreements are in place. As 21CP understands the current dynamics, employees can leave their credits in one system or buy them out and move to the new system.279 This would give BRPD employees who seek employment with EBRSO the option to stay with an existing retirement system or to transition to a new one. Transferring retirement credits becomes more expensive as time goes on, however, and multiple stakeholders impressed upon 21CP that the logistics and costs associated with transitioning from the BRPD retirement system to the EBRSO system could be significant – making planning, communication with personnel about options, and the creation of incentives for transitioning retirement benefits all potentially significant components of an effective implementation process.

Section J of this report addresses some of the organizational and cultural considerations that may also impact the ability for EBRSO to attract current BRPD personnel if the Department were decommissioned. There, we discuss the likelihood that the Office would need to offer incentives to ensure that Department personnel transitioned to EBRSO rather than seek employment from another law enforcement entity elsewhere. It must be observed here, however, that at least some of the cost savings (discussed in Section D) that a consolidated law enforcement approach in Baton Rouge could yield might be used to ensure that pay for new EBRSO personnel is competitive – making the Office attractive to new officers and helping to retain current, wellperforming deputies.

278 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach, (2003)

279 Interview with Government Official.

F. Equipment and Technology

An expanded scope of responsibility that requires more personnel would also require that EBRSO provide those additional personnel with the equipment and technology necessary to perform their duties. To ensure that officers have the cars, computers, body cameras, and other technology necessary to engage in 21st-century policing, EBRSO will logically either have to buy more or find more.

EBRSO could expand its equipment and technology infrastructure by simply procuring more – more physical items and training or licenses for personnel on how to use existing data systems. However, any of this implicates initial implementation resources, including just training personnel on the mechanics of using a different records management system than what they previously used. Another obvious possibility is that EBRSO could inherit BRPD’s existing equipment and technology infrastructure However, this would only be practical and feasible if the technology systems are already the same or, otherwise, can be made to interface or integrate effectively.

The comprehensive evaluation and audit of a law enforcement agency’s technology, information systems, and equipment audits are typically detailed affairs resulting in weighty, standalone reports. For various reasons, that level of detail, for two agencies, is beyond the scope of 21CP’s work here Instead, this section summarizes the equipment and technology currently used by BRPD and EBRSO. It considers how each agency’s current technology and equipment ecosystem might impact the cost, complexity, and efficiency of consolidation

21CP finds that some existing core technology is common to BRPD and EBRSO and may well be able to be redeployed from BRPD to EBRSO – which has the potential to reduce costs and increase efficiencies. At the same time, any consolidation process would require a methodical, detailed, and technical inventory of agency resources and infrastructure to determine, at the level of a detailed technology project plan, what systems and equipment might be able to be transitioned and how that transition could occur to ensure efficient and effective integration.

1. BRPD

a. Vehicles

BRPD’s current vehicle fleet consists of 859 units, which includes patrol cars, motorcycles, take-home cars, vans, special operations vehicles (boats, SWAT, etc.), and mobile command centers. Each officer is responsible for their own vehicle, and each division is responsible for its specialty vehicles.280 BRPD interviewees perceived that officers having take-home vehicles led to them being better maintained. According to BRPD personnel, the size of the current fleet is insufficient to ensure that there are spare units for each division. According to BRPD Policy Number 502, the department also has a Solo Motorcycle Division, intended to “provide quick and immediate response to traffic situations, special events, and escorts;” as of 2023, the BRPD currently maintains 31 motorcycles in the fleet.281

280 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

281 Baton Rouge Police Department. Intra-Divisional Procedure No.502/95-1: Solo Motorcycles, (last rev. 2014), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16068/Intra-Divisional-Procedure-502-95-1-Solo-Motorcycles; Consolidated Government of the City of Baton Rouge and Parish of East Baton Rouge Louisiana, Annual Operating Budget 142 (2023), https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/16712/2023-City-Parish-Annual-Operating-Budget-PDF

BRPD’s Fleet Management division is “[r]esponsible for the research, testing, acquisition, outfitting, and maintenance of the police vehicle fleet.”282 Fleet Management falls under the Operational Services Bureau and includes three officers and clerical specialists specific to the unit.

b. Cameras

BRPD has equipped its vehicles with in-car cameras since approximately 2005, and currently utilizes 358 Axon Fleet 3 cameras and 75 Fleet 2 cameras.283 Mobile video data is staffed by three sworn officers and two civilian personnel.

To capture body-worn camera (“BWC”) footage, BRPD has approximately 698 Axon Body 3 cameras, which equates to one for each budgeted officer. BRPD implemented body-worn cameras around 2014, and in the time since, BRPD leadership has reported that wearing BWCs has been accepted as a way of doing business without controversy.284 The BWC program is partially funded by the City-Parish government and a Bureau of Justice Assistance (“BJA”) grant.285

BRPD has specialists redact sensitive information from BWC footage and averages a ten-day turnaround to fulfill requests.286 Redactions may be required when fulfilling Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests or assisting the District Attorney’s Office. The department has a standard policy for presenting videos to the public as quickly as possible during critical incidents, but those are infrequent.287

c. Computer Software and Hardware

BRPD’s technology is managed by several groups. Baton Rouge Information Services (“IS”) is a City-Parish agency that supports BRPD’s network and servers.288 IS supports two BRPD data centers, while BRPD’s Mobile data division manages the department’s mobile devices and functional applications.

The Mobile Data division’s wide range of responsibilities encompasses the operations, maintenance, and training related to all of BRPD’s mobile technology and data. This division handles all department mobile hardware and software needs, including mobile devices and computers, granting virtual private network (“VPN”) access, and managing all user accounts. 289

BRPD provides each officer with a Panasonic Toughbook Mobile Data Computer (“MDC”) during the first week of Academy training. Mobile Data images each Toughbook, which is installed in officer vehicles with laptop stands and a Cradlepoint for Wi-Fi access.290

BRPD had been documenting incident information in 365Labs Records Management System (“RMS”) software since January 2021. However, in May of 2024, BRPD transitioned off 365Labs RMS and moved to Axon Records.

282 BRPD, Multi-Year Strategic Plan (rev. 2022).

283 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

284 Id

285 Baton Rouge Police Body Camera Program, https://www.brpdbodycam.com/ (last visited May 30, 2024)

286 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

287 Id.

288 Interview with BRPD Personnel; City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Information Services, https://www.brla.gov/311/Information-Services (last visited June 7, 2024).

289 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

290 Id

Mobile Data oversaw the Axon Records implementation, training, and is responsible for its ongoing management.291

In addition to Axon Records, Mobile Data also manages access to a variety of other software applications, which includes, but is not limited to:

• CentralSquare Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”);

• Evidence.com digital evidence management;

• CloudGavel e-warrants;

• National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”);

• ATF eTrace;

• National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (“NIBIN”); and

• eCrash crash reporting

Axon Records also pushes information out to IS for digestion in the internal Public Safety Common Operational Platform (“PSCOP”) system, which maps public safety-related data, in addition to the City’s’ public-facing Open Data portal (data.brla.gov).292

d. Real Time Crime Center

BRPD’s Real Time Crime Center (“RTCC”) was initially conceptualized with the goal of being a mini-Fusion Center that would serve as a clearinghouse for all intelligence and investigative support roles, and to function as a force multiplier for uniform patrol. The RTCC was originally going to be a joint operation with EBRSO, Baker Police Department, and/or Zachary Police Department,293 but BRPD reported that EBRSO and other agencies declined to accept the offered spaces at the facility.294 EBRSO reported they were not offered adequate space.295 EBRSO indicated that it built its own Investigative Support Unit (ISU), which functions as a standard real-time crime center (described more fully below).296

Sworn and civilian personnel staff the RTCC, including:

• 16 criminal information specialists that provide 24/7 coverage running warrants, license plates, and drivers’ licenses, and querying NCIC;

• Six crime intelligence analysts that compile data about crime and hotspots for weekly Compstat meetings;

• Five sworn officers who monitor CAD for high-priority calls for service and provide real-time support to officers in the field by using BWC live feeds; and

• Two crime statisticians.

The sworn support is available Mondays through Fridays from 6:00 am until 1:00 am, but the department notes that it would be beneficial to have that service around the clock. 297

291 Id

292 Id

293 Id

294 Written communication with BRPD personnel.

295 Written communication with EBRSO personnel.

296 Id

297 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

RTCC also administers and controls access for programs such as:

• Clear;

• ShotSpotter;

• LexisNexis;

• Flock License Plate Readers (“LPRs”);

• Video Management Software (“VMS”); and

• Motorola CommandCentral Aware

In addition to their own systems, BRPD subscribes to centralized networks of cameras, efficiently increasing their visibility throughout the city. Project NOLA, for example, is a nonprofit organization that networks HD crime cameras, which they provide to “residents, business owners, developers, associations and municipalities” and “are most often placed on private property facing a street or park.”298 Through a subscription-based model, BRPD has access to footage from any Project NOLA camera, of which BRPD estimates there are at least 60 in their jurisdiction. BRPD also manages and has access to access license plate reader data from Flock Safety and Vigilant LPR systems

While the BRPD RTCC is not formally linked with EBRSO, BRPD personnel report having at least two conversations per week with the EBRSO to ensure they all have access to each other’s information (except, according to EBRSO, through BRPD’s new RMS) 299 That said, BRPD believes that they do not serve identical functions.300

2. EBRSO

a. Vehicles

EBRSO’s fleet includes almost 700 vehicles, of which 250 patrol units and 300 unmarked units are take-home vehicles. Deputies who live in East Baton Rouge may pay a nominal fee ($65 monthly) to have a take-home car for off-duty use; those who live outside the Parish, up to 25 miles away, may also take their vehicle home and pay slightly more ($130 monthly).301

EBRSO Fleet Operations services its own vehicles when possible, except in the event of accident damage.302 The patrol units are purchased by the agency and replaced every 4 years around 100,000 miles, except in the rare event of excessive mileage. Over the last four years, EBRSO has transitioned from purchasing unmarked vehicles to signing 4-to-5-year leases. 303

In addition to marked and unmarked patrol vehicles, the fleet includes spare units, command trailers, 18 boats, air support (i.e., helicopters), and SWAT vehicles. 304

298 Project N.O.L.A. National Crime Camera Program, “About Us,” https://www.projectnola.org/about.html (last visited (June 7, 2024)

299 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

300 Interview with BRPD Personnel.

301 Interview with EBRSO Personnel.

302 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, Annual Report 2023, https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/DOCS/Annual%20Reports/2023%20Annual%20Report.pdf?ver=cpwYdFCIFxi_gWGlSzAA7w%3d%3d

303 Interview with EBRSO Personnel.

304 Id

b. Cameras

EBRSO has 175 Axon body cameras, or one for each uniformed deputy, that integrate with in-car cameras.305 EBRSO signed a five-year, $2.5 million contract with Axon in 2022 to provide body-worn cameras and attachments, in addition to the software, licensing, and storage each year.306 The BWC footage stored in Evidence.com integrates with EBRSO’s CAD and RMS. EBRSO has a BWC-specific division that handles video requests from the public or courts, which they receive almost daily. 307 EBRSO told 21CP that, while other area agencies can take weeks or months to release video of critical incidents, it attempts to communicate as quickly, transparently and effectively as possible. To this end, the Office notes that it has released body-warn camera footage of deputy-involved shootings within hours.308

According to EBRSO personnel, “patrol deputies have embraced camera systems.” Deputies are expected to activate cameras during any engagement with the public, and body and in-car cameras are automatically triggered to record when a taser or firearm is drawn. 309

c. Computer Software and Hardware

EBRSO’s Computer Operations Division is “responsible for installing, operating, and maintaining the computer and telephone networks,” including the agency’s “network of approximately 600 desktop and mobile computers.”310 EBRSO reports replacing 125 computers per year. As in BRPD, EBRSO deputies are assigned Panasonic Toughbooks. The department reports that they have a total of 200 to 215 Toughbook units. 311

EBRSO reports that all of their current software is on annual subscriptions, which includes:

• CentralSquare CAD;

• 365 Labs RMS; and

• Evidence.com.

The following description is available on EBRSO’s Communications Division page of the agency website:

Currently the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office is cooperating with the parishes that form the State of Louisiana's Region II, as well as the State of Louisiana, in the use of a 700/800MHz digital radio system that incorporate new tower sites established by parish and city agencies, and existing state-run tower sites to form a statewide radio system. In addition to providing for the day-to-day operations of the Sheriff's Office, this new system provides a gateway for inter-operable communications between participating agencies, during special events or emergency incidents that require multi-agency and/or multi-parish response. The East Baton Rouge

305 James Finn, “Why East Baton Rouge, La., Sheriffs Finally Got Body Cams,” The Advocate (July 18, 2022), available at https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/why-east-baton-rouge-la-sheriffs-finally-got-body-cams

306 Id.

307 Interview with EBRSO Personnel.

308 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

309 Id

310 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Computer Operations,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Computer-Operations (last accessed June 7, 2024).

311 Interview with EBRSO Personnel.

Parish Sheriff's Office is dedicated in being one of the first agencies in Region II to use this system for day-today operations and to also take full advantage of the system's inter-operable capabilities.312

d. Real-Time Crime Center

EBRSO shared with 21CP that it opened its Property Crimes Complex/Investigative Support Unit (“ISU”) in 2022. The approximately 7,500 square-foot facility houses ISU and the Office’s divisions for armed robbery and burglary, auto theft, organized retail theft, and extra duty. ISU assists deputies with in-progress calls for service and developing leads for cases under investigation. ISU uses technology, such as automated license plate recognition (ALPRs), crime cameras, and other computer programs to assist investigators with identifying suspects, suspect vehicles, or locating video footage of a crime. ISU is also tasked with assisting deputies responding to an in-progress call by using technology to direct responding deputies to a suspect or give any details about the scene they can gather using technology. ISU is made up of detectives, with the Larceny division focusing on auto theft and organized retail theft investigations. EBRSO says that having the facility located in the center of Baton Rouge, near one of the largest business hubs of the community, will help to facilitate better collaboration with business partners and quicker response times. The ISU monitoring room, equipped with large-scale viewing screens, allows deputies to monitor events as they occur and relay that information to those on scene. Deputies monitor crime cameras, traffic cameras, shot spotters, LPR alerts, active call screens and other event-specific intelligence. EBRSO says that it has plans to enhance equipment and expand coverage to aid further in crime prevention and solving efforts.

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

Some existing overlap between BRPD and EBRSO equipment and technology systems makes it at least possible that EBRSO could inherit and deploy existing BRPD resources. Table 17 summarizes that BRPD and EBRSO currently both use Panasonic Toughbook mobile computers; Axon for body-worn and in-car cameras and the storage of captured video; Central Square for computer-aided dispatch; and ESRI ArcGIS for mapping.

Table 17. Summary Comparison of Core Equipment & Technology Systems, BRPD and EBRSO

Hardware

MDTs

BWC

In-Car Cameras

Panasonic Toughbook

Axon Body 3

Axon Fleet 2 and Fleet 3

LPR Flock, Vigilant

Software

CAD

Central Square

RMS Axon Records

Evidence Evidence.com (Axon)

Mapping

ESRI ArcGIS

Panasonic Toughbook

Axon (unspecified)

Axon (unspecified)

Flock, Vigilant

Central Square

365 Labs

Evidence.com (Axon)

ESRI ArcGIS

312 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Communications Division,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Communications (last visited June 7, 2024).

Part of the reason that BRPD and EBRSO use the same CAD and mapping platforms is that all BRPD and EBRSO dispatch and communications personnel are currently co-located in the East Baton Rouge Parish Communications District, which serves as the Parish’s primary Public Safety Answering Point (“PSAP”). Although the agencies are both physically in the PSAP, they are in different areas, and the 911 call handlers transfer law enforcement calls directly to BRPD EBRSO, EMS, or Baton Rouge Fire.313 Each department contributes to the PSAP’s funding and provides equipment such as keyboards, mice, and headsets.314

The Communications District provides each agency with an instance of CentralSquare CAD, with BRPD and EBRSO in the same folder, allowing them to see the location of each other’s units. By physically already being in the same space and using the same CAD software, this area initially appears conducive to consolidation, with the potential to increase efficiency. That said, as each department currently has its own communications function, consolidation would require analysis of the appropriate levels of staffing and equipment to eliminate redundancies without affecting the quality of the communications function.

A primary area of divergence in current systems is with respect to each agency’s record management system. BRPD recently changed to Axon Records from 365Labs RMS, which is currently used by the EBR Parish Communications District, EBRSO, Zachary Police Department, Baker Police Department, and Central Police Department – and which 21CP understands to integrate with the District Attorney’s Office, Clerk of Courts Office, and EBR Parish Prison. It appears that these differences contribute to some inefficiencies. For example, due to the lack of an interface between the RMS systems, the BRPD Records Division now pushes information to EBRSO using PDFs, and then the information must be re-entered into EBRSO’s own RMS, creating numerous opportunities for information to be missed, entered incorrectly, or backlogged for entry. BRPD, however, reported that an offer to integrate the two systems at no cost was provided to EBRSO and their RMS vendor and was declined.315

Should the decision to consolidate be advanced, a comprehensive audit of both departments’ equipment across all categories, including weapons, vehicles, and radios, would be necessary to fully catalog the collective equipment, identify redundancies and gaps for a streamlined inventory, and develop a detailed plan that would understand what current BRPD resources could and could not be meaningfully redeployed or repurposed within EBRSO.

With respect to vehicles, it is again possible that EBRSO could adapt BRPD vehicles for its use. It could re-badge the exterior and ensure uniform-related technology installations. However, it is not clear that BRPD currently maintains a sufficient number of vehicles to facilitate both expanded EBRSO responsibilities and the maintenance of the Sheriff Office’s current vehicle take-home policy.

313 Interview with BRPD personnel; East Baton Rouge Parish Communications District, “EBRP Communications District Board of Commissioners Meetings,” https://ebr911.org/ (last rev. June 7, 2024).

314 Interview with BRPD personnel.

315 Written communication with BRPD personnel.

G. Facilities

Determining and providing the facilities needed to support the expanded size and scope of a consolidated, expanded Sheriff’s Office is another major area that requires careful consideration. Given the geographic location, size, and nature of the Office’s current facilities, it is almost certain that consolidation would require EBRSO to expand its facilities.

Among those who have proposed eliminating BRPD and putting EBRSO in charge of all policing services in the city of Baton Rouge, 21CP heard an expectation that the Sheriff could inherit and use BRPD facilities to help ensure that it has the type of geographically dispersed physical infrastructure that any police agency needs to provide services inside the city limits of Baton Rouge. Consequently, EBRSO would have to evaluate its own facilities as well as BRPD’s and decide which would most effectively carry out the functions of the new agency – or whether new facilities need to be procured in the immediate or long term. This section explores the current portfolio of facilities used by BRPD and EBRSO and identifies next steps for making cost- and strategy-informed decisions regarding facilities for a consolidated department.

1. BRPD

BRPD reports a portfolio of 15 facilities, of which they own 12, rent two, and are provided one for free. Table 18 summarizes these facilities. The BRPD Headquarters is located in a remodeled Women’s Hospital, which underwent over $4.6 million in renovations in 2014 to convert it into a police facility.316 The 24-acre Airline Highway hospital campus was purchased by the city for $10 million, with the goal of converting it into a public safety complex.317 However, according to a government official interviewed by 21CP, the campus is underutilized. While the goal was to have a dedicated public safety campus, currently it houses just BRPD and a voter registration office, despite plans to move Emergency Medical Services and other public safety services there as well.318

BRPD’s Real Time Crime Center (“RTCC”) is housed within the Police Department, and although currently staffed exclusively by BRPD personnel, has enough space to accommodate other organizations who have yet to accept offers to co-locate personnel.319

Table 18 Summary of

Facility Name and Address Function Status

1 BRPD Headquarters and 3rd District Uniform Patrol 9000 Airline Highway Headquarters, Training Academy, Administrative Staff, Criminal Investigation Bureau, General Detectives, Traffic Division, Records, and 3rd District Uniform Patrol Owned

2 1 st District Uniform Patrol 4545 Plank Road 1st District Uniform Patrol, Booking Area, and Sex Offender Registration Owned

316 Ben Wallace, “Work Continues to Turn Former Hospital into Police Department,” The Advocate, (Sept. 26, 2014). https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/work-continues-to-turn-former-hospital-into-police-department/article_9ef467817c67-5108-b301-351074e546a5.html

317 Interview with Government Official; WAFB Staff. “BRPD begins move into new headquarters.” WAFB 9 https://www.wafb.com/story/24229202/brpd-begins-move-into-new-headquarters/

318 Interview with Government Official.

319 Interview with BRPD personnel.

320 List of BRPD facilities provided to 21CP by the Department; BRPD, Multi-Year Strategic Plan (rev. 2022).

Facilities Currently Used by BRPD320

BRPD reports that they plan to make several repairs and improvements to their facilities in 2024. According to a document provided to 21CP by BRPD, 2024 facility maintenance activities include, though may not be limited to:

• Remodel the 6th Floor of HQ Building to accommodate Training Service needs for New Academy’s, In-service Training, and Recruiting;

• Replace sliding glass doors (1st floor back doors) to automatic swing doors;

• Replace glass siding doors (2nd floor garage) to automatic swing doors;

• Replace the AC Chillers in the boiler room at the HQ building;

• Add stairway lighting in the garage stairway;

• Repair the transfer switch for the generator at the Pistol Range;

• Install additional electrical outlets in the Mobile Data office;

• Complete remodeling/renovations of the 1st District precinct;

• Door repair of the prisoner transport office at 1st District;

• Installation of security gates up and around the HQ garage; and

• Install new LED lighting in the parking lot of 1st District Precinct.

The upgrades to BRPD’s First and Second Districts are funded from a $2 million allocation through the American Rescue Plan Act (“ARPA”). BRPD also received grant funding for public safety generators at BRPD Headquarters to “ensure continuance of operations during times of outages and emergencies.”321

BRPD is also in the process of building a new training facility on the sixth floor of the Public Safety Complex to provide proper space for police academy training and ongoing public safety training.

2. EBRSO

Based on publicly available information and conversations with government officials, it appears that, at minimum, EBRSO operates a Headquarters facility, six regional substations, a tax collection office, and a traffic section facility, in addition to maintaining the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison.322 Table 19 summarizes these facilities. According to a government official, representatives from city law say that the Parish must provide the Sheriff with office space, including headquarters, maintenance, electricity, and operational costs. While the Parish provides these facilities, it is unclear whether the Parish owns or rents them. The Parish also provides EBRSO with space on the second floor of Parish City Hall to carry out tax collection duties.323

EBRSO Headquarters is a 20,000 square-foot facility near the Baton Rouge Metro Airport. The building previously housed the flight standards office before it was remodeled to become EBRSO Headquarters in 2013.324

2 Gardere Substation 3777 L’Auberge Crossing

Criminal Records & Analysis, Human Resources, Warrants, Internal Affairs, Computer Operations, General Detectives, Financial Crimes Leased by Parish

40 Deputies including Patrol, Traffic, Clerical and Communications personnel Donated by L’Auberge

3 Central Substation 13016 Gurney Road Patrol Deputies and supporting staff Owned by EBRSO

Kleinpeter Substation 14431 Airline

33 Deputies, 1 Substation Commander, and 1 clerical position Kleinpeter Family Owns 5 Scotlandville Substation 1270 Rosenwald Road 16 Deputies, 1 Commander, 1 Secretary, and 14 Reserve Deputies Provided by Parish

321 Baton Rouge City-Parish, 2024 Annual Operating Budget and Capital Budget 22. https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/18820/2024Annual-Operating-Budget-and-Capital-Budget-PDF

322 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department, “Uniform Patrol,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Uniform-Patrol (last visited June 7, 2024).

323 Interview with Government Official.

324 “EBRSO officially opens new headquarters,” WAFB (July 1, 2013), https://www.wafb.com/story/22733149/ebrso-officially-opens-newheadquarters/

325 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department, “Uniform Patrol,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Uniform-Patrol (last visited June 7, 2024); East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Department, “Parish Prison,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Parish-Prison (last visited June 7, 2024). The ISU described in Section F is not included in this table because the EBRSO has not yet responded to 21CP’s request for its location

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

The East Baton Rouge Parish Public Safety Complex, which was once envisioned as a shared site for both EBRSO and BRPD, and currently houses BRPD Headquarters, serves as a reminder that efforts to realize efficiencies among the Office and Department – including by streamlining the two agencies’ facilities – is not a new idea in the Parish. It is feasible that the footprint of the two agencies could be consolidated, and an expanded headquarters operation could possibly already be supported using the Public Safety Complex facilities.

Additionally, as described in an earlier section, all BRPD and EBRSO dispatch and communications personnel are already co-located in the East Baton Rouge Parish Communications District, albeit in different areas of the facility, with 911 call handlers transferring law enforcement calls directly to BRPD EBRSO, EMS, or Baton Rouge Fire.326

With the limited information available, it is not currently possible to compare BRPD and EBRSO’s complete rosters of facilities to identify redundancies in a comprehensive way. Figure 4 shows BRPD’s districts and the EBRSO substations. Rather than retaining all five BRPD districts and six EBRSO substations, it may be possible to reduce the total number of field offices post-consolidation. That said, careful attention must be paid to the impact of removing any local district or substation offices regarding how it might impact police functions, response times, and accessibility for personnel and the public. The closing of any public safety station or substation is often met with strong community opposition – with community members believing that police response will be less immediate and relationships with police more attenuated – and must be appropriately managed.

Once a comprehensive inventory is available, facilities that house specialized units should also be reviewed for possible redundancies, including marine/dive units, K-9, SWAT, and investigative units. Further, as BRPD uses its own Training Academy, and EBRSO uses the Capital Area Regional Training Academy (“CARTA”), a decision would be needed regarding whether to retain the BRPD academy, continue using a shared entity, or a hybrid approach.

326 Interview with BRPD personnel; https://ebr911.org/ (Last accessed May 29, 2024)

Several factors would influence whether it is preferable to reconfigure current spaces to meet the needs of a consolidated department or seek out new facilities. The following information would be required to conduct the kind of detailed cost analysis that must inform these decisions:

• An inventory of all facilities currently leased, including the amount paid in rent and maintenance, utility fees, length of the lease, and breakage terms;

• An inventory of all facilities currently owned, annual costs including property taxes and maintenance, utilities fees, and debt service, if applicable; and

• An inventory of the condition and security of all facilities.

Aside from condition and capacity, the consolidation of policing services in EBRSO may also require executive decisions and potentially legislative actions regarding responsibilities for various costs related to the ownership transfer of facilities and equipment, defining maintenance responsibilities, and establishing insurance coverage. These issues require clear agreements between the merging entities to ensure seamless operation and financial clarity in the newly consolidated law enforcement body. In the proposed scenario in which BRPD is eliminated, some of these challenges may be bypassed if the City-Parish is already the owner of BRPD facilities, as it is responsible for providing facilities to EBRSO, and ownership would, from a practical perspective, be unchanged.

Figure 4. Map of EBRSO Headquarters and Substations & BRPD Headquarters and Districts

H. Policies & Procedures in Specific Performance Areas

The implication for expected and/or required police responses during particular types of critical encounters with civilians is another important area for consideration. Specifically, if public safety services were transitioned away from BRPD and to the EBRSO, the residents of the City of Baton Rouge would be receiving police services that might operate according to different “rules of the road” in terms of codified policies, procedures, and performance expectations than they have been to date.

This section explores the key differences and similarities among the formal expectations that the BRPD and EBRSO have in place along five foundational performance areas: (1) use of force; (2) stops, searches, seizures, and arrests; (3) vehicle and foot pursuits; (4) impartial, bias-free and/or discriminatory policing; and (5) interactions with individuals experiencing mental or behavioral health issues (i.e., crisis intervention).

At the outset, it should be observed that EBRSO’s policies are authored by Lexipol, a company that, among other services, “provides fully developed . . . public safety policy services . . . for law enforcement . . . based on nationwide standards and best practices while also incorporating state and federal laws and regulations where appropriate.”327 This means that the Sheriff’s Office predominantly uses pre-written policies that may be modified, at least partially, to suit the agency and its services In contrast, BRPD authors, manages, and maintains its own policies that meet the best practices of CALEA accreditation standards

As the following sections summarize, 21CP’s evaluation found that, although EBRSO’s core use of force policy is more comprehensive and better aligned with best practices than BRPD’s current policy, across many other foundational areas relating to police interactions, both agencies have room for improvement.

1. Use of Force

As former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger reportedly observed, “[t]he officer working the beat makes more decisions and exercises broader discretion affecting the daily lives of people every day and to a greater extent than a judge will exercise in a week.”328 This decision-making rises to a level of particular significance, gravity, and community attention when it relates to the application of physical force. Consequently, a police agency’s overall approach and specific policies and protocols setting forth performance expectations and guidelines regarding force are a foundational way of ensuring that officers, as governmental actors, do not impinge on the Fourth Amendment’s right to be free of “unreasonable searches and seizures”–which encompasses the application of physical force.

BRPD maintains separate policies addressing the use of deadly force (General Order 131) and less-lethal force (General Order 135), with other policies addressing specific force instruments (firearms (General Order 132), Tasers (General Order 135.1), and less-lethal impact projectiles (General Order 135.2). EBRSO maintains a unified policy (Policy 300) addressing the use of force. Although the Office did not provide any policies relating to the use of force beyond Policy 300, 21CP’s knowledge of and experience with Lexipol-drafted policies leads the project team to believe that EBRSO maintains additional policies that address specific types of force instruments and/or less-lethal instruments. However, this could not be independently confirmed.

327 Lexipol Solutions, “Policies & Updates,” https://www.lexipol.com/solutions/policies-and-updates/ (last accessed May 10, 2024) Although Lexipol policies are in place in agencies across the country, the use of such policies does not, by itself, make it more or less feasible for officers from other agencies to transition to a Lexipol agency, especially given that Lexipol agencies themselves typically customize the policies to their own specifications

– leading some Lexipol agency policies to look somewhat different in critical areas of operations and performance

328 Karen M. Hess, Police Operations: Theory and Practice 523 (5th ed. 2006).

A comprehensive evaluation of each agency’s force policies is well beyond the scope of this report and 21CP’s report. However, in reviewing the policies, 21CP identified several ways in which EBRSO’s core use of force policy, while able to be improved along some critical dimensions in its own right, is better aligned with nationally accepted policing practices and provides more specific, comprehensive guidance to officers on performance expectations.

Table 20 summarizes where the agencies’ use of force policies stand along some core policy dimensions. Critically, EBRSO’s force policy does a substantially better job in requiring that all force be objectively reasonable – the cornerstone legal foundation for force long articulated by the United States Supreme Court329 – and specifically identifying factors that enter into a determination of whether force is objectively reasonable under the circumstances. By including these features and a comprehensive statement of values that affirms the sanctity of human life, the EBRSO policy is somewhat more comprehensive and specific. More generally, as described previously, the EBRSO, by having a single force policy that addresses performance expectations across all force, provides more straightforward, streamlined guidance than BRPD, which somewhat confusingly divides force guidance into multiple policies.

Table 20. Partial Comparison of Key Policy Provisions, EBRSO and BRPD

BRPD

Contains comprehensive statement of purpose that affirms the sanctity of human life

Requires that force be used only when necessary

Requires de-escalation whenever safe and feasible under the circumstances

Yes. (Policy 300.1.)

Yes. (Policy 300.3.)

Partially. (Policy 300.3.1 instructs deputies that they “should use” de-escalation strategies “[w]hen circumstances reasonably permit.”)

No.

Yes. (GO No. 131 at 1; GO No. 135 at 1.)

Partially. (Required in GO No. 135, “Less-Lethal Force.” Not mentioned in GO No. 131, “Use of Deadly Force.”)

Requires verbal warning before force whenever safe and feasible under the circumstances

Requires that force be used only when proportional to the nature of the threat posed by a subject under the circumstances

329 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 387 (1989).

Partially. (Policy 300.4 addresses verbal warnings before using deadly force under some circumstances.)

Partially. (The concept of proportionality is described, without using the term expressly, in Policy 300.3.)

Yes (GO No. 131 at 2; GO No. 135.1 at 2; GO No. 135.2 at 2; GO No. 280 at 3.)

Partially. (GO No. 135 at 2–3 details a continuum of “level[s] of control used by the employee” that must “be based on the level of subject resistance encountered” but does not

Requires that force be used only when objectively reasonable, providing sufficient detail on the factors that inform the reasonableness determination

Requires that officers report the point of a firearm at a subject as a use of force

Yes. (Policy 300.3.3.)

Specifically prohibits:

• Use of chokeholds/neck restraints

• Use of force against subject(s) who only verbally confront officers.

Yes. (Policy 300.5.)

Yes. (Policy 300.3.6.)

• Use of retaliatory force. No.

• Use of force against subjects who are handcuffed or otherwise restrained.

• Use of head strikes with hard objects unless deadly force is authorized.

Imposes an affirmative duty on officers to intervene when other officers are using inappropriate force

Outlines expectations regarding officers rendering and/or request medical assistance after force is used

mention proportionality specifically.)

No. (GO No. 131 provides that “[t]he decision to use force must be based on reasonableness and necessity,” but the concept of objective reasonableness, and the factors that may enter the reasonableness analysis, are not listed.)

No. (GO No. 131 at 2 requires that officers submit a written report about the pointing of a weapon but specifically indicates that it is not to be reported as a use of force via the ‘Response to Resistance’ form.)

Yes. (GO No. 131 at 3.)

Yes. (Policy 300.2.1.)

Yes. (Policy 300.6.)

Yes. (GO No. 135 at 1.)

Yes. (GO No. 135 at 4.)

Addresses use of force training requirements

Provides for non-disciplinary afteraction review of force incidents for lessons learned and training, equipment, and policy implications.

Yes. (Policy 300.8.)

Yes. (Policy 300.9.)

Yes. (GO No. 131, at policy statement; GO No. 135.1 at 1; IDP No. 505/95-7, at 1.)

Yes. (GO No. 135 at 4; GO No. 135.1 at 4.)

The policies of both agencies could be enhanced along multiple dimensions, including by:

• More expressly and specifically requiring de-escalation in all instances where safe and feasible under the circumstances across all force-related policies330

• More explicitly requiring that all officer force be proportional to the nature of a subject’s threat and/or resistance;

• Specifically prohibiting the use of force in instances where it is unlikely to be reasonable, necessary, or proportional, unless deadly force is authorized (e.g., applying force to handcuffed or restrained subjects, striking a subject’s head with a hard object, etc.);

• Providing and applying a general critical decision-making model to force decision-making.

However, with respect to providing specific guidance to officers and the community about expectations regarding the use of force, the EBRSO’s core written policy is, in some important ways, clearer and more robust than the policies that BRPD maintains.

2. Stops, Searches, Seizures, and Arrests

As with the use of physical force, a police officer’s temporary detention of an individual is a “seizure” that must comply with the Fourth Amendment. Although the Constitution, by its express language and plain meaning, contemplates that a lawful seizure requires a judge to issue a warrant before effectuating a seizure,331 courts have established several exceptions

One such exception, about which police must regularly exercise discretion in applying, relates to investigatory or “Terry” stops – temporary detentions of an individual based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual “is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.”332 In some circumstances, otherwise, voluntary encounters between police and individuals can become involuntary Terry stops. These involuntary detentions may or may not involve searches. Some stops may lead to or result in an arrest.

Laws and obligations surrounding stops, searches, seizures, and arrests are notoriously complicated.333 The differences among various types of encounters with individuals, the boundaries and restrictions on various

330 For example, as noted in Table 20, de-escalation is specifically required in GO No. 135 but not mentioned in GO No. 131.

331 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

332 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see generally Terry v. Ohio 392. U.S. 1 (1968).

333 See generally Stephen Budiansky, “Rescuing Search and Seizure,” The Atlantic (Oct. 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/10/rescuing-search-and-seizure/378402/ (observing that Fourth Amendment-related legal “rules are hard for a layperson to make much sense of,” with the application of various exceptions to the Constitution’s warrant requirement especially “bewildering”).

types of searches, and the requisite levels of legal justifications that officers must have before conducting particular stops, searches, and arrests are complex and nuanced.

At the same time, community confidence and trust are often impacted substantially by a police department’s performance regarding stops and searches. Stopping, detaining, and/or searching individuals too frequently when individuals have been engaged in no wrongdoing can have ongoing, negative effects – especially when concerns arise that certain types of individuals may unfairly and disproportionately be more likely to be stopped than others. At the same time, officers making inappropriate decisions about whom to stop and what to do during a stop can result in wasted officer capacity and a compromised ability to sustain criminal convictions due to court suppression of unlawfully obtained evidence Thus, a law enforcement agency’s policies and protocols relating to stops, searches, seizures, and arrests can uniquely affect its public safety outcomes.

EBRSO provided one policy, Policy 311 (“Search and Seizure”) to 21CP addressing stops, searches, seizures, and arrests Although it reiterates that “the federal and state constitutions provide every individual with the right to be from unreasonable searches and seizures,”334 the two-page policy focuses entirely on searches rather than legal parameters surrounding when an officer may and may not involuntarily detain an individual in the first instance

21CP assumes that, like other departments that use Lexipol for policy guidance, EBRSO maintains a separate policy that addresses involuntary and/or temporary detentions.335 However, 21CP was provided only with the agency’s policy related to search and seizures. EBRSO told 21CP that more detailed guidance regarding core types of searches, including probable cause searches, frisks during investigative stops, plain view searches, and strip and body cavity searches is contained within the agency’s Standard Operating Procedure but that the SOP is not for public release due to officer safety concerns.336 A consolidated agency would benefit from making public and transparent its protocols for upholding core Fourth Amendment rights against undue governmental intrusion in the way that numerous agencies, including those that employ Lexipol policies, already do without substantial public or officer safety impacts.

Separately, Policy 401, “Bias-Based Policing,” indicates that “[d]eputies contacting a person shall be prepared to articulate sufficient reason for the contact” and that deputies must, in some instances, document the contact (“e.g., arrest report, field interview (FI) card”).337 However, the policy also provides that “nothing . . . shall require any deputy to document a contact that would not otherwise require reporting”338 – leaving open the possibility that, counter to best practices,339 at least some types of involuntary contacts or interactions may not be subject to uniform documentation and reporting requirements.

334 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 311 at Section 311.1.

335 See, e.g., Urbana Police Department, Policy 417, Contacts and Temporary Detentions, https://www.urbanaillinois.us/sites/default/files/attachments/Urbana_PD_Policy_Manual_Redacted_Release_010923.pdf; Santa Clara Police Department, Policy 419, Contacts and Temporary Detentions, https://www.santaclaraca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/83480/638465439560370000; Austin Police Department, General Order 318, Detentions, Field Interviews & Field Photographs, https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/files/Police/General_Orders.pdf

336 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

337 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 401 at Section 401.4.1.

338 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 401 at Section 401.4.1.

339 See, e.g., Cleveland Division of Police, General Order, Investigatory Stops (Apr. 25, 2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5651f9b5e4b08f0af890bd13/t/5d81088a7a152a6219030763/1568737418788/Ex+B+Investigatory+Stop s.pdf; New Orleans Police Department, Operations Manual, Chapter 41.12, Field Interview Cards (last rev. Dec. 20, 2020), https://nola.gov/getattachment/NOPD/Policies/Chapter-41-12-Field-Interview-Card-EFFECTIVE-12-20-20.pdf/?lang=en-US; accord Marie Pryor, et al, Center for Policing Equity & the Policing Project at NYU School of Law, Collecting, Analyzing, and Responding to Stop Data: A Guidebook for Law Enforcement Agencies, Government, and Communities (2020), https://policingequity.org/images/pdfs-doc/COPS-

Meanwhile, BRPD maintains a few policies relating to stops and searches General Order 270 governs “Field Interviews,” or “contacts with individuals who are involved in conduct that an officer reasonably believes to be suspicious or with individuals who have been reported to an officer as having been involved in suspicious activity.”340 To explain the legal justification that an officer must have to conduct an involuntary stop or detention, the policy expressly quotes Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 215.1, which itself codifies the United States Supreme Court standard in Terry v. Ohio341 that officers may detain a subject when they have reasonable suspicion that a subject has committed, is committing, or “is about to commit” a crime.342 In this complicated area of the law, the best practice is to provide officers with more guidance on what factors may and may not be weighed in making the reasonableness inquiry. 343

Subsequently, the one-and-a-half-page General Order 270 provides that “[w]hen an officer determines that such reasonable suspicion exists he may,” among other actions, “[d]etain the suspect until such time that his response or other pertinent facts can be verified,” “[u]se reasonable force to enforce such detention,” and “[f]risk the outer clothing of the suspect for weapons.”344 Even as a subsequent paragraph indicates that “[a]n officer will not . . . [h]old the suspect for any longer than is necessary to investigate the suspicious activity observed or reported” or “[u]se unnecessary force,” this cursory treatment of what an officer may and may not do during an involuntary detention of a subject is insufficient. Likewise, the policy does not sufficiently clarify that an officer may only frisk an individual if they have reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that the detained individual is presently in possession of a weapon.345 Similarly, the policy’s failure to link the Department’s overall policies and philosophy on force to the use of force in an investigatory stop detention may lead to the inappropriate belief that force is de facto justified during an investigatory stop encounter.

Another BRPD policy, General Order 281, “Search of Persons,” addresses some of the deficiencies in General Order 270 with respect to frisks during involuntary detentions. This separate policy indicates that “a frisk may be conducted”346 during a stop encounter and lists a variety of appropriate “[f]actors an officer will consider when making the decision to frisk a suspect” during such an involuntary detention.347 In contrast to at least the policy materials that EBRSO made available to 21CP, BRPD General Order also contains detailed guidance to sensitive and/or invasive types of searches, including strip searches and body cavity searches.348 However, EBRSO maintains this is in a Standard Operating Procedure not available to the public.

BRPD maintains another policy, General Order 319, on “Warrantless Searches,” which addresses a variety of other types of searches beyond those conducted during investigative stops – including consent, plain view,

Guidebook_Final_Release_Version_2-compressed.pdf; The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, New Era for Public Safety: A Guide to Fair Safe and Effective Community Policing 104–05 (2019), https://civilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/Policing_Full_Report.pdf

340 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 270, Field Interviews at 1.

341 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

342 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 270, Field Interviews at 1.

343 See, e.g., Baltimore Police Department, Policy 1112: Field Interviews, Investigative Stops, Weapons Pat-Downs & Searches (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.baltimorepolice.org/1112-draft-field-interviews-investigative-stops-weapons-pat-downs-and-searches; New Orleans Police Department, Operations Manual, Chapter 1.2.4.1, Stops (last rev. Oct. 6, 2019), https://nola.gov/getattachment/NOPD/Policies/Chapter-1-2-4-1-StopsEFFECTIVE-10-6-19.pdf/?lang=en-US; Seattle Police Department, Policy Manual, Section 6.220, Voluntary Contacts, Terry Stops & Detentions (last rev. Jan. 1, 2020), https://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-6 arrests-search-and-seizure/6220 voluntary-contacts-terry-stops-anddetentions.

344 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 270, Field Interviews at Section I(B).

345 See Baltimore Police Department, Policy 1112: Field Interviews, Investigative Stops, Weapons Pat-Downs & Searches (Oct. 12, 2020), https://www.baltimorepolice.org/1112-draft-field-interviews-investigative-stops-weapons-pat-downs-and-searches

346 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 281 at Section I(A).

347 Id. at Section I(B).

348 Id. at Sections III, IV.

abandoned property, crime scene, exigent circumstances, vehicle, and post-arrest searches.349 This type of systematic inventory of types of searches and specific legal considerations that apply to them is appropriate –even as best practice would point toward a number of policy enhancements to provide most clearly to officers the full array of considerations that each type of search may implicate. At the same time, however, the maintenance of separate policies on warrantless searches from “searches of persons” runs the risk of confusion, making officer application in the field and supervisor oversight of performance difficult.

Without independently analyzing encounters involving involuntary detentions and searches in the field, 21CP cannot reach conclusions about whether the practices, in the field, of the Office or the Department are or are not consistent with law and nationally accepted policing practices – or about which agency may do a better job in ensuring safe, effective, and lawful performance during stops and searches. However, at least based on a policy review, and while they each have distinct strengths and weaknesses, both EBRSO’s and BRPD’s currently policies on stops and searches have room for improvement. The process of consolidation could result in better, more detailed, and more comprehensive guidance to deputies on effective and constitutional policing within the context of involuntary encounters.

3. Vehicle & Foot Pursuits

“Pursuits are an inherently dangerous aspect of police work.”350 “Engaging in a vehicle pursuit involves risk to innocent bystanders, the officers in the pursuing vehicle, and the suspect and any other occupants of the car being pursued.”351 The Police Executive Research Forum, summarizing academic studies, notes that “crashes occur in at least 30 percent of vehicle pursuits,” with injuries and fatalities occurring in as many as 17 percent of pursuits.352 “Foot pursuits are” also “inherently dangerous”353 – “emotionally charged . . . events that occur frequently in police work.”354 One FBI study estimated that nearly one-fifth (19%) of “critical-injury assault cases . . . involved foot pursuits.”355

Accordingly, law enforcement “[a]gencies must establish a balance between protecting the safety of the public and officers during pursuits . . .and law enforcement’s duty to enforce the law and apprehend suspects.”356 More specifically, the risks of engaging in pursuits must be “weigh[ed] . . . against the risks of not pursuing the suspect. For example, a suspect who has committed a series of violent crimes presents an ongoing threat” that may exceed the inherent risks associated with pursuit.357 On the other hand, a series of studies on vehicle pursuits found that “[a]s many as 91 percent of pursuits occur when drivers are suspected of non-violent crimes, with traffic violations being the most common” basis for pursuit.358

349 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 319 at Sections I–VII.

350 Jason Hoschouer, “Top 5 Dangers That Every Officer Faces During a Pursuit,” Police1.com (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.police1.com/policeproducts/pursuit-management-technology/articles/top-5-dangers-that-every-officer-faces-during-a-pursuit-wuozNiKoZ7oNlwmO/

351 Police Executive Research Forum, Vehicular Pursuits: A Guide for Law Enforcement Executives on Managing the Associated Risks 25 (2023)

352 Id.

353 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Considerations Document, Foot Pursuits at 1 (last rev. July 2019), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/Foot%20Pursuits%20Considerations%20-%202019.pdf

354 Ron Martinelli, “Foot Pursuits: To Chase or Not to Chase,” Police (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.policemag.com/patrol/article/15348096/foot-pursuitsto-chase-or-not-to-chase.

355 Brian McAllister, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Law Enforcement Bulletin, “Officer Survival Spotlight: Foot Pursuits: Keeping Officers Safe,” (Jul. 8, 2015), https://leb.fbi.gov/spotlights/officer-survival-spotlight-foot-pursuits-keeping-officers-safe (summarizing prior research findings).

356 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Considerations Document, Foot Pursuits at 1 (last rev. July 2019), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2019-07/Foot%20Pursuits%20Considerations%20-%202019.pdf

357 Police Executive Research Forum, Vehicular Pursuits: A Guide for Law Enforcement Executives on Managing the Associated Risks 26 (2023)

358 Anna Skinner, “Hundreds are Killed Each Year in Police Pursuits, Many of Them Bystanders,” Newsweek (July 16, 2022), https://www.newsweek.com/hundreds-are-killed-each-year-police-pursuits-many-them-bystanders-1734216; accord Eric Daigle, “Point of Law: Drafting Vehicle Pursuit Directives,” Police (Aug. 31, 2022), https://www.policemag.com/point-of-law/article/15308264/point-of-law-drafting-vehiclepursuit-directives (citing Department of Justice study).

The EBRSO/Lexipol policy regarding vehicle pursuits is extensive and is consistent with national guidance and best practices in many ways In particular, it appropriately outlines several factors that personnel must weigh when determining whether to initiate359 or terminate360 a pursuit.361 The policy appropriately outlines clear roles and responsibilities for supervisors,362 though 21CP would generally recommend that agencies require that supervisors approve vehicle pursuits either before, or as soon as feasible after officer, initiation.363 The current EBRSO’s prohibition on the PIT maneuver364 – a somewhat controversial and increasingly ineffective technique for intentionally striking a vehicle to terminate a pursuit365 – is notable and commendable.

BRPD maintains a similar policy regarding vehicle pursuits, General Order 136 In some areas, the Department’s policy is more specific and prescriptive than EBRSO’s policy. Whereas the Sheriff’s Office lists “[t]he seriousness of the known or reasonably suspected crime” as the first of twelve factors that deputies and supervisors must consider in deciding whether to initiate pursuit – appropriately providing that “[m]inor offenses, such [as] traffic violations, nonviolent misdemeanor[s], and simple thefts do not warrant the dangers of police pursuits” – BRPD policy outlines “classes of violations,” from “least serious to . . . most serious,” and observes both that “[a]s the seriousness of the offense increases, so will the inducement to pursue increase” and that “it may be the wisest course of action to terminate the pursuit for the less serious classes.”366 At the same time, when it comes to guidance on when to terminate pursuits, BRPD policy lists eight circumstances under which “[p]ursuits will be immediately terminated,”367 while the Sheriff’s Office provides a list of “factors [that] should be considered in deciding whether to terminate a pursuit.”368

However, the BRPD policy in other areas is less detailed and aligned with best practices First, although the Department’s guidance lists ten factors that officers must consider “when deciding to initiate a pursuit,”369 the EBRSO’s discussion of similar factors are more comprehensive and detailed Similarly, although the Department’s policy addresses parameters surrounding “roadblocks,”370and states that “there will be no ramming or boxing-in of the pursued vehicle unless the use of deadly force would be justified,” 371 the Sheriff’s

359 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 306 at Section 306.3.1; see generally Police Executive Research Forum, Vehicular Pursuits: A Guide for Law Enforcement Executives on Managing the Associated Risks 35–38 (2023) (summarizing best practices with respect to factors that should inform the vehicle pursuit initiation decision-making process).

360 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 306 at Section 306.3.4.

361 21CP would advise EBRSO to consider adding specific policy language affirming that personnel will not be disciplined for electing not to initiate or continue a pursuit See, e.g., Albuquerque Police Department, Procedural Orders, Standard Operating Procedure 2-45-6 (last rev. June 14, 2023), https://documents.cabq.gov/police/standard-operating-procedures/2-45-pursuit-by-motor-vehicle.pdf (“Sworn personnel who terminate a pursuit for safety considerations shall not be subject to discipline for making this decision.”); Austin Police Department, General Order 214, “Vehicle Pursuits” (rev. Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.austintexas.gov/sites/default/files/images/Police/APD_Policy_Manual.pdf (“In recognizing the potential risk to public safety created by vehicular pursuits, no officer or supervisor shall be criticized or disciplined for deciding not to engage in a vehicular pursuit because of the risk involved.”).

362 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 306 at Section 306.6.

363 See, e.g., Seattle Police Department, Policy Manual, Section 13.031, “Vehicle Eluding and Pursuits,” at 3 (last rev. Feb. 19, 2021), https://public.powerdms.com/Sea4550/tree/documents/2042751 (“Supervisors will approve and monitor all pursuits.”(formatting changed to sentence case)); New Orleans Police Department, Policy Chapter 41.5, Vehicle Pursuits at 4 (last rev. Dec. 6, 2015), https://nola.gov/getattachment/NOPD/NOPD-Consent-Decree/Chapter-41-5-Vehicle-Pursuits.pdf/ (“Officers must receive supervisory approval prior to initiating the pursuit.”).

364 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 306 at Section 306.10.3(b) (“The PIT maneuver is not an acceptable option for the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff Office deputies and will not be used.”).

365 See Jing Zhou, et al, Vehicle Dynamics in Response to the Maneuver of Precision Immobilization Technique 6 (ASME Dynamic Systems and Control Conference 2008), available at https://jianbolu.tripod.com/paper/DSCC2008-2183.pdf (last accessed May 14, 2024); Pete Tortorell, et al, “Effects of Electronic Stability Control (ESC) on the Precision Immobilization Technique (PIT),” Police Chief, https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/effects-escpit/ (last visited May 14, 2024).

366 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 136 at Section II(A).

367 Id. at Section XIII(C).

368 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 306 at Section 306.2.

369 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 136 at Section I(B).

370 Id. at Section XIV.

371 Id at Section IX.

Office provides more specific and useful guidance to personnel on permitted and prohibited pursuit intervention techniques.372 BRPD’s policy is silent on the use of the PIT maneuver.

Overall, with respect to foot pursuits, the Sheriff’s Office policy provides greater details in some areas, but the BRPD policy provides clearer expectations in others Presuming that both agencies meaningfully adhere to their policies in practice, it does not appear, at least on paper, that the EBRSO’s expanded operations in the City of Baton Rouge would necessarily mean an uptick in vehicle pursuits or more regular engagement in high-risk vehicle pursuits.

The Sheriff’s Office also maintains a separate policy on foot pursuits Policy 307 provides appropriate guidance that aligns with the expressly stated philosophy that “[t]he safety of office members and the public should be the primary consideration when determining whether a foot pursuit should be initiated or continued,” with “immediate apprehension of a suspect . . . rarely more important than the safety of the public and office members.”373 Like the vehicle pursuit policy, the foot pursuit policy identifies a number of critical considerations that deputies should consider when electing whether to engage in or continue a foot pursuit.374

In contrast, BRPD did not provide any policy guidance on foot pursuits – a deficiency that overlooks an area of critical concern for officer and public safety. The review of officer performance in foot pursuits was beyond the scope of 21CP’s engagement, making it difficult for 21CP to determine definitively whether the Department’s lack of a foot pursuit policy is correlated with officers engaging in higher-risk or unsafe pursuits However, if EBRSO’s duties expanded and the Office rigorously adhered to Policy 307, it is possible that public and police officer safety would be enhanced as a result.

4. Impartial, Bias-Free, and Discriminatory Policing

The concern that some individuals and communities may be subject to police activity and enforcement not because of actions or behaviors but because of race, ethnicity, gender, or other immutable or protected characteristics remains significant – with the ensuring distrust compromising the ability of community and police to work together to co-produce public safety.

Disparities in impact and treatment may stem from explicit bias, but not all disparities necessarily arise from intentional or conscious bias. (Indeed, human beings may have an “implicit bias” to judge all actions as “intentional by default”375). Numerous studies establish that, even among individuals with an express commitment to treating people equally,376 “attitudes or stereotypes . . . [may] affect our understanding, actions, and decisions . . . involuntarily and without an individual’s awareness or intentional control.”377 Indeed,

372 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 306 at Section 306.10.

373 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 307 at Section 307.2.

374 Id. at Section 307.4.

375 Evelyn Rosset, “It’s No Accident: Our Bias for Intentional Explanations,” 108 Cognition 771 (2008).

376 Justin D. Levinson, “Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision-making, and Misremembering,” 57 Duke Law Journal 345, 360 (2007) (“[I]mplicit racial attitudes . . . frequently diverge from explicit racial attitudes.”); accord Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda H. Krieger, “Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations,” 94 California Law Review 945 (2006) (defining implicit biases as “biases based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes” that “can produce behavior that diverges from a person’s avowed or endorsed beliefs or principles”).

377 Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity, “State of the Science: Implicit Bias Review 2014” at 16, http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/2014-implicit-bias.pdf

everyone – from lawyers and judges to physicians and teachers 378 – appears to have implicit, or subconscious, biases to some extent because, in the same way that the brain is hard-wired to identify patterns and associate certain characteristics with certain phenomena:

Over time, the brain learns to sort people into certain groups (e.g., male or female, young or old) based on combinations of characteristics as well. The problem is when the brain automatically associates certain characteristics with specific groups that are not accurate for all individuals in the group . . . . 379

Thus, disparities may stem from implicit or subconscious bias – modes of thinking that may not be readily apparent or obvious to individuals as they operate within the world.

It may also be the case that some explanation for disparity with respect to law enforcement activity is related to disparities across the criminal justice system and broader social life Systemic racism and enduring bias in education, housing, employment, the courts, public health, and other foundational areas of American life may be reflected in data regarding, for instance, who police departments interact with and arrest.

Regardless of the web of reasons for disparities, police departments occupy a singular place in helping to consider and implement solutions that might address and affect unfair treatment and outcomes. Indeed, whether conscious or unconscious, or intentional or unintentional, when it comes to policing, both the perception and reality that the burdens of law enforcement are distributed unequally based on race undermines the sense of fairness, justice, and legitimacy that are bedrock democratic principles.380 A critical part of addressing disparities in law enforcement is ensuring that a department has policies in place that can help it identify potential disparities and work with the community to determine if it might adopt different, effective approaches that would help to reduce disparity.

The Sheriff’s Office’s primary policy on bias-free policing is Policy 401, “Bias-Based Policing.” There, EBRSO “strictly prohibit[s]” bias-based policing, which is defined as “[a]n inappropriate reliance on actual or perceived characteristics such as race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, economic status, age, cultural group, disability, or affiliation with any non-criminal group (protected characteristics) as the basis for providing differing law enforcement service or enforcement.”381 The policy provides that “[m]embers should, when reasonable to do so, intervene to prevent any bias-based actions by another member.”382 EBRSO indicates that it also provides annual mandatory Procedural Justice/Implicit Bias training for all employees.383

378 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, “The Law of Implicit Bias,” 94 California Law Review 969, 975 n.31 (“The legal literature on implicit bias is by now enormous”); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, “Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers,” 53 DePaul Law Review 1539, 1553 (2004) (implicit bias among defense attorneys); Alexander R. Green, et al, “Implicit Bias Among Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis for Black and White Patients,” 22 Journal of General Internal Medicine 1231, 1237 (2007) (“[P]hysicians, like others, may harbor unconscious preferences and stereotypes that influence clinical decisions.”).

379 National Center for State Courts, “Helping Courts Address Implicit Bias: Resources for Education” (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.ashx

380 See National Institute of Justice, “Race, Trust and Police Legitimacy” (Jan. 9, 2013), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/race-trust-and-policelegitimacy

381 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 401 at Section 401.1.1.

382 Id. at Section 401.1.3.

383 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

BRPD maintains a policy on “Bias Based Profiling,” General Order 108. The express “purpose of this policy is to unequivocally state that bias-based policing in law enforcement is totally unacceptable.”384 “Bias based profiling” is defined as “[t]he detention, interdiction, or other disparate treatment of individuals based solely on a common trait of a group,” which “includes race, ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation, economic status, age, cultural group or any other identifiable group.”385 The remainder of the policy primarily, and briefly, addresses the legal justifications required for arrests, traffic stops, and investigative detentions;386 mentions considerations relating to bias and “proactive patrol”387; and provides some policy provisions relating to complaints about bias.388

Ultimately, neither agency currently maintains a best-in-class policy approach in this area. Better policies for promoting impartial policing would, among other things:

• Expressly reflect a commitment to procedural justice;389

• Commit the agency to conducting regular analysis of data on officer and aggregate departmental performance to determine if any activities, programs, or enforcement approaches are having disproportionate impact on specific groups, communities, or types of individuals – and, if so, to exploring effective alternatives that might reduce disparities;390 and

• Outline mechanisms for community participation and involvement in training on the history of Baton Rouge’s communities, cross-cultural competency, and decision-making strategies that can help counteract the effects of cultural assumptions.391

Consequently, at least based on codified policies, there is not a meaningful difference between the agencies in the practices and protocols in place that address bias-free policing issues. Dynamics relating to performance in the field and cultural considerations related to these issues are discussed elsewhere in this report.

5. Crisis Intervention & Interactions with Individuals in Mental & Behavioral Health Crisis

The Centers for Disease Control estimates that more than 50 percent of Americans will be diagnosed with a mental health disorder at some point in their life; one in five will experience a mental illness in any given year; and approximately one in 25 Americans are currently living with a chronic, serious mental illness, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depression.392

Consequently, police officers are frequently asked to respond to and address situations involving individuals experiencing mental health, substance abuse, and other behavioral health challenges. Studies indicate that “at

384 Baton Rouge Police Department, General Order 108 at 1.

385 Id.

386 Id. at Section I(B).

387 Id. at Section II.

388 Id. at Section IV.

389 The Justice Collaboratory, Yale Law School, Procedural Justice, https://law.yale.edu/justice-collaboratory/procedural-justice (last visited May 14, 2024); U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Organizational Change through Decision Making and Policy: Procedural Justice Course for Managers and Supervisors (Apr. 2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/042015/a_new_procedural_justice_course.asp

390 See, e.g., Seattle Police Department Policy Manual Section 5.140, Bias-Free Policing at ¶ 9 (last rev. Aug. 1, 2019), https://public.powerdms.com/Sea4550/tree/documents/2042894

391 See, e.g., Michael J. Palmiotto, et al, “Training in Community Policing: A Suggested Curriculum,” 23 Policing 8, 13 (2000) (noting that law enforcement agencies have a role to play in ensuring that “officers . . . possess a sense of social history” and “of society and community”).

392 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mental Health, Learn About Mental Health https://www.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/learn/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).

least 20% of police calls for service involve a mental health or substance abuse crisis.” 393 Indeed, nationally, “one in four people with mental disorders have histories of police arrest.”394

BRPD maintains a Crisis Intervention Team (“CIT” Team), a group of BRPD officers who “have received specialized training in recognizing and handling persons with apparent mental illness.”395 Per the Department’s written procedures, the maintenance and response of CIT personnel are intended to reduce risks to the person suffering a mental illness crisis, the public[,] as well as involved Police personnel when they come in contact with these individuals.”396 Although 21CP would suggest various enhancements and improvements to the Department’s written guidance, the policy, and approach are consistent with standard mechanisms for ensuring that specialized personnel address situations that implicate mental and behavioral health crises.

Meanwhile, EBRSO provided 21CP with its Policy 408 on “Crisis Intervention Incidents.”397 Primarily a general policy that provides all EBRSO personnel with guidance on interacting with individuals experiencing mental or behavioral health crisis, it inventories a number of important considerations for in-the-field interactions.398 It also outlines general mechanisms for the Office to interact with and coordinate with “mental health professionals to develop and education and response protocol.”399 The Sheriff’s Office says that it has a CIT program and designates and trains specific officers to serve as crisis intervention responders. EBRSO also indicated that it utilizes PEER Support as well as trained negotiators in response to individuals experiencing mental and behavioral health crises.400 21CP was not able to independently verify the existence, or gauge the nature and scope of the current operations of, the CIT and PEER Support programs.

If the Sheriff’s Office assumed primary responsibility for responding to calls for service within the City of Baton Rouge, it and its personnel would almost certainly be addressing a correspondingly larger overall number of calls implicating mental and behavioral health considerations. To maintain the level of service that BRPD is currently seeking to provide through its CIT program, EBRSO would need to ensure that it appropriately scaled up its personnel and established a staffing scheme that allowed for personnel with specific training and expertise in crisis intervention to address relevant calls for service and interactions.

Existing community-based resources in Baton Rouge will continue to be a part of providing service to individuals experiencing behavioral health crisis, regardless of whether the primary law enforcement entity in the city is BRPD or EBRSO. For instance, the Bridge Center for Hope, founded by the Baton Rouge Area Foundation with a goal of “decriminalize[ing] mental illness,” exists to “create a safety net to catch people in crisis, keeping them out of emergency rooms” and the criminal justice system “and offering treatment.”401

The consolidation of policing services under the EBRSO should be viewed as an opportunity to review and update all agency procedures and policies and consider how the best practices of both agencies can be combined.402 Two decades after the 2003 merger between the Louisville Division of Police and the Jefferson

393 Ashley Abramson, “Building Mental Health Into Emergency Responses,” 52 Monitor on Psychology 30 (2021), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2021/07/emergency-responses

394 James D. Livingston, “Contact Between Police and People with Mental Disorders: A Review of Rates,” 67 Psychiatric Services 850, 850 (2016), https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ps.201500312

395 Baton Rouge Police Department, Intra-Divisional Procedure No. 502/08-1 at 1.

396 Id.

397 East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office, Policy 408.

398 Id. at Sections 408.5–408.6.

399 Id. at Sections 408.5–408.4.

400 Written communication with EBRSO Personnel.

401 The Bridge Center for Hope, About, “Mission,” https://brbridge.org/about/ (last visited June 11, 2024).

402 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

County Police Department to create the Louisville Metro Police Department, the Department of Justice investigation of LMPD found that policies were “unclear . . . deficient . . . [and] boilerplate,” and argued these policy limitations left gaps in accountability, supervision, training, and discipline 403 In crisis intervention and the other critical performance areas addressed in this section, EBRSO will likely need to use the occasion of consolidation to ensure that its policies are consistent with best practices and well-tailored to meet the specific demands and challenges of both the City and Parish of Baton Rouge.

403 Divya Karthikeyan, “Merger-era Decisions Set the Stage for Louisville Police’s Later Missteps,” Louisville Public Media (Oct. 16, 2023), https://www.lpm.org/news/2023-10-16/merger-era-decisions-set-the-stage-for-louisville-polices-later-missteps

I. Training

Academy training for new police recruits and ongoing in-service training for current officers are the primary vehicles through which police departments develop and maintain the skills necessary to provide safe, effective, and lawful policing It is a critical way that police organizations translate policies and performance expectations into practice.

Traditionally, police training took the form of static, classroom-based instruction focused on technical skills and legal principles.404 Training typically was siloed, redundant, and routinely limited to what was necessary to meet state requirements or retain qualifications for various force tools or specific skills (such as CPR) If police agencies introduced new instructional topics, the additions were often driven by headlines, lawsuits, or new technologies405 rather than strategic determinations about professional development. Training was typically provided by in-house instructors – often simply supervisors called to preside over classroom-based instruction – who would recycle existing knowledge and beliefs rather than introduce new ideas and concepts.

Especially over the past few decades, standards and best practices in police training have transformed significantly Modern police training is built on a foundation of adult learning theory, which, among other things, recognizes that training is most effective when adult students are motivated to learn, are treated as equal partners in the learning process, and can connect the instruction to their experiences.406

The remainder of this section considers the training functions of both BRPD and EBRSO and analyzes the impact of consolidation on ensuring that well-trained officers provide public safety services to the communities of Baton Rouge. That is, the following discussion explores whether the consolidation of services within EBRSO would make it more or less likely that police in Baton Rouge would be supported by a robust, modern training infrastructure.

1. BRPD

a. Training Infrastructure

The BRPD Training Services Division, housed within the Administration Bureau, is governed by several trainingrelated policies and procedures that 21CP reviewed, including:

• Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-1, Training Academy Mission, and Function

• Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-7, Professional Development Training

• Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-8, Lesson Plans

• Intra-Divisional Procedure No.502/01-1, Field Training Program

• General Order 123, Request for Training/Travel

The Director of Training manages the activities of the Training Academy and is responsible for designing, selecting, implementing, coordinating, and evaluating all BRPD training (including academy, in-service, and

404 See, e.g., David Bradford and Joan E. Pynes, “Police Academy Training: Why Hasn’t It Kept Up With Practice?,” 2 Police Quarterly 283 (1999) (describing historical deficiencies in police training).

405 See generally Michael Buerger, “Educating and Training the Future Police Officer,” 73 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 26 (2004) (summarizing static nature of law enforcement training).

406 Mark R. McCoy, “Teaching Style and the Application of Adult Learning Principles by Police Instructors,” 29 Policing 77 (2006); Michael L. Birzer, “The Theory of Andragogy Applied to Police Training,” 26 Policing 29 (2003).

leadership), selecting and evaluating training personnel, and maintaining all training records for the department’s employees.407 This includes reviewing lesson plans, selecting instructors, evaluating course content, and determining the method of instruction and testing (performance vs. knowledge) 408 All full-time BRPD instructors receive instructor development training, which includes content related to adult learning theory, lesson plan development, testable performance objectives, and instructional, testing, and evaluation techniques.409

BRPD interviewees demonstrated significant pride in the department’s overall training program and a sincere belief in performance improvement resulting from a commitment to continual learning throughout officers’ careers. They indicated that training standards have always been well above the minimum requirements, officers are exposed to dynamic training scenarios, and that there is considerable opportunity for officers to receive ongoing, advanced, and specialized professional development training.410 The training policies generally reinforce these sentiments.411

b. New Recruit Academy

BRPD operates its own training academy, which trains only incoming BRPD officers and is accredited by the state Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) Council. This includes a 22-week program that delivers at least 835 hours of training, which is over 335 more training hours than the state requires (496 hours).412 This includes training “based upon the current inventory of essential skills needed by officers who complete recruit training” and delivered under the Adult Learning Theory model.413 Multiple instructional techniques consistent with adult learning principles are listed in Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-8, Lesson Plans Trainees are provided a recruit handbook that outlines the rules and regulations governing conduct during the academy.414

c. Field Training

After academy training and passing the POST certification test, Department trainees are assigned to the 16week Field Training Officer (“FTO”) program designed “to prepare new officers to perform the essential duties of a police officer.”415 As the FTO training manual outlines, “The Field Training Program introduces a newly assigned officer to the personnel, procedures, policies, and purposes of the department as well as providing the initial formal and informal training specific to the day-to-day duties of its officers.”416

The FTO program falls under the command of the Training Academy Director but is managed by an FTO Coordinator.417 The BRPD has eleven master FTO instructors certified through Applied Police Training and Certification (“APTAC”) who teach a 30-hour course to all FTOs based on the San Jose model.418 BRPD’s FTO

407 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-1, Training Academy Mission, and Function

408 Id

409 Id

410 Interviews with multiple BRPD personnel; various provided 2023 In-Service Lesson Plans

411 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-1, Training Academy Mission, and Function; Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-7, Professional Development Training

412 Interview with BRPD personnel; Baton Rouge Police Recruiting, “Academy,” Basic Schedule Worksheets for the 89th, 90th, 91st, and 92nd BRPD Academy Sessions

413 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-1, Training Academy Mission and Function

414 BRPD Student Handbook, Basic Training Academy.

415 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-1, Training Academy Mission and Function; Baton Rouge Police Recruiting, “Police Officer,” https://geauxbrpd.com/police-officer/ (last visited June 7, 2024); Intra-Divisional Procedure 502-01-1, Field Training Program

416 BRPD Field Training Officer Program Training Manual 1

417 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure 502-01-1, Field Training Program

418 Written communication from BRPD training personnel.

training program is comprehensive and appears to be aligned with best practices; it outlines all facets of the FTO selection process and an FTO’s responsibility for training recruits in the field 419 It also documents exactly what is expected of trainees, how they will be evaluated, and the criteria for passing to the next phases or being remediated.420 Lateral officers may be granted early release from the FTO program after participating for at least six weeks.421 Upon successfully completing field training, officers are assigned to the Uniform Patrol Division.

d. In-Service and Specialized Training

As affirmed by multiple BRPD interviewees and as codified in BRPD policy, the Department “encourages every member of the department to further his/her career through training and education. Professional development is the process by which this department provides opportunities for individual growth and development for its employees at all levels.”422

Typical in-service training includes 20 hours of POST-mandated annual training and a minimum of 20 hours of internally selected training.423 POST in-service requirements include eight hours of firearms training, four hours of officer survival training, two hours of legal updates and instruction, and six hours of electives; the curriculum content and delivery method are determined by the discretion of each law enforcement agency leader.424

In the last five years of training material 21CP reviewed, BRPD provided annual in-service training courses on425:

• Advanced Situational Awareness

• Active shooters

• Basic life saving

• Bi-Annual Low light Firearms training

• Building searches

• Defensive tactics

• Domestic violence

• Driving

• DWI training

• Duty to intervene

• Electronic Warrant Writing

• Firearms (pistol, shotgun, and patrol rifle annual qualification; advanced handgun)

• Incident Command System Training

• Individuals with behavioral health concerns

• Legal Updates (e.g., vehicle stops and searches)

• Standardized Field Sobriety Training

• Tasers (annual recertification and department policy refresher)

• Use of Force policy refresher training

21CP’s review of in-service lesson plans for the past several years confirms this and notes that they include a mix of classroom instruction, policy and legal updates, dynamic role-play scenarios, range training, shoot/noshoot drills, and debriefing sessions, with emphasis throughout on de-escalation, officer safety, and compliance with the law and department policy 426

In-service training is typically completed by officers in their birthday month. In addition to the 40 hours of inservice training, the BRPD has implemented more squad-based training twice per year so that teams of officers

419 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure 502-01-1, Field Training Program; see generally BRPD Field Training Officer Program Training Manual.

420 Id

421 Id

422 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-7, Professional Development Training; Interviews with BRPD personnel.

423 21CP interviews with BRPD personnel.

424 Louisiana Commission of Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, POST, “POST In-Service Training Requirements,” https://lcle.la.gov/programs/post/post-inservice-training-requirements/ (last visited June 7, 2024).

425 21CP interviews with BRPD personnel; Written communication with BRPD personnel; BRPD in-service lesson plans, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024.

426 BRPD in-service lesson plans, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024

can learn together. While shift roll calls are periodically used for training, they are typically only 15 minutes long; thus, this venue is not appropriate for more in-depth in-service training and documentation of the same 427

Several BRPD interviewees noted that the department provides extensive specialized training, and officers can request relevant training outside of the department to improve their skills, knowledge, and abilities 428 Some of the specific training areas are identified in policy, including advanced accident investigations, motorcycle riders courses, criminal investigations, crime scene processing, and training related to specialized divisions (e.g., dive team, canine, explosives, mounted patrol). 429

Leadership training is available for first-line, middle, and executive levels. Recent grant monies were used to develop a four-day course for sergeants and personnel close to promotion.430 This training includes but is not limited to instruction in “conducting performance evaluations, counseling employees, discipline, and coaching.”431 The curriculum for lieutenants and captains is currently being revamped. In addition, some supervisors and managers attend externally provided leadership training, such as that provided by the FBI National Academy or the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety.432 Finally, some supervisors receive assignment-based specialized training.433

Chief Morse addressed training goals in his First 100 Days plan:

• Ensure every officer receives Procedural Justice, Fair and Impartial Biased-Free Policing, and Duty to Intervene classes.

• Continue important scenario-based training that focuses on tactics and de-escalation techniques for all officers.

• Mandate all supervisory officers to receive newly developed Leadership Seminar classes 434

2. EBRSO

a. Training Infrastructure

The EBRSO Training Division is governed by Policy 203, which “establishes general guidelines for how training is to be identified, conducted, and documented.”435 The Training Commander, a Major, is responsible for “developing, reviewing, updating, and maintaining the office training plan so that required training is completed,” annual review of the training plan and its anticipated costs, and the documentation and retention of all training records.436 The Major is supported by several captains who are responsible for the range, the academy, in-service training, field training, and corrections training.437

427 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedures No.502/95-7, Roll Call.

428 21CP interviews with BRPD personnel; General Order No. 123; 21CP review of BRPD training requests and authorizations.

429 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-7, Professional Development Training.

430 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel.

431 BRPD Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-7, Professional Development Training.

432 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

433 Intra-Divisional Procedure No.505/95-7, Professional Development Training.

434 Chief Thomas S. Morse, First 100 Days, https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/18647/Chief-Morses-First-100-Day-Plan (last accessed June 7, 2024).

435 EBRSO Policy 203 Training

436 Id

437 EBRSO Organizational Chart.

The EBRSO makes assessments, changes, and additions to the annual training plan based on identified needs.438 At a minimum, however, the training program must meet federal, state, and POST training requirements.439 EBRSO personnel expressed pride in the extensive and stringent training provided on an ongoing basis to the office’s employees to enhance the delivery and effectiveness of provided law enforcement services. 440 The policy includes a similar statement: “It is a priority of this office to provide continuing education and training for the professional growth and development of its members.”441

b. New Recruit Academy

The EBRSO operates the Capital Area Regional Training Academy (“CARTA”), which trains EBRSO deputies and law enforcement from around the state and typically includes two to three sixteen-week classes per year 442 The CARTA training program includes more than 600 training hours, exceeding the 496 POST-required hours, and consists of physical fitness, weapons training, defensive tactics, legal, and classroom instruction on a variety of topics.443 The website states that “CARTA strives to maintain state-of-the-art training for the Louisiana law enforcement community and continuously researches the most effective training methods to ensure that we deliver the highest quality training to our students.”444

c. Field Training

The EBRSO field training program is governed by Policy 416, which states its purpose is to:

Ensure standardized training and evaluation, facilitate the transition from the academic setting to the actual performance of general law enforcement duties; and introduce the policies, procedures, and operations of the EBRSO. 445

The field training program is approximately 16 to 22 weeks after CARTA graduation, during which time the trainees are assigned to substations around the parish and supervised by a rotation of FTO officers to prepare trainees for safe, productive, and professional performance of their law enforcement deputies.446 Lateral transfers to EBRSO who are already POST-certified typically complete an abbreviated FTO program but the Louisiana POST may require lateral hires to complete the full program. 447 After the successful completion of the FTO program, new deputies are assigned based on Uniform Patrol staffing needs.448

438 Written communication from EBRSO personnel.

439 EBRSO Policy 203 Training

440 Interviews with and written communication from EBRSO personnel.

441 EBRSO Policy 203 Training

442 21CP interview with EBRSO personnel; East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Capital Area Regional Training Academy,” https://www.ebrso.org/Capital-Area-Regional-Training-Academy (last visited June 7, 2024).

443 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Capital Area Regional Training Academy,” https://www.ebrso.org/Capital-Area-Regional-Training-Academy (last visited June 7, 2024); Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, “Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (POST),” https://lcle.la.gov/programs/post/ (last visited June 7, 2024)/

444 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Capital Area Regional Training Academy,” https://www.ebrso.org/Capital-Area-Regional-Training-Academy (last visited June 7, 2024).

445 EBRSO Policy 416 Field Training, 416.1 Purpose and Scope.

446 EBRSO Policy 416 Field Training, 416.3 Field Training; Interview with EBRSO personnel.

447 21CP interview with EBRSO personnel.

448 Id

d. In-Service and Specialized Training

In-service training includes 20 hours of POST-mandated annual training and 20 hours of internally selected training.449 As noted above, POST in-service requirements include eight hours of firearms training, four hours of officer survival training, two hours of legal updates and instruction, and six hours of electives; the curriculum content and delivery method are determined by the discretion of each law enforcement agency leader.450 As part of the annual training review plan, when determining the content of electives and additional training hours, EBRSO personnel review incident reports, accident reports, and issues raised by Internal Affairs or other divisions 451 EBRSO personnel reported that in-service training generally includes some online training available through POST, in-person classroom instruction, scenario-based training, and qualifications/certifications for firearms and Tasers, but 21CP was not provided any lesson plans to review 452 According to the training policy, the EBRSO also assigns some members to complete online Lexipol Daily Training Bulletins, including content on the EBRSO policy manual and other relevant topics.453

The EBRSO provides a two-day, post-promotional supervisory training course that includes an overview of supervision concepts, the role of law enforcement supervisors, positive discipline, communication skills, performance evaluation, conflict management, and the FTO program 454

The 2023 Annual Report lists the following academy, in-service, and specialized training courses that were completed last year:455

• Active Shooter

• Annual Firearms qualification

• CARTA (full-time POST & Reserve)

• CARTA Firearms

• Concealed Handgun

• Corrections Defensive Tactics

• CPR

• Defensive Tactics Courtroom

• Defensive Tactics

• Defensive Tactics Instructor

• Emergency Vehicle Operations (Driving)

• Equalizer Self Defense

• Female Survival Class

• Firearms Lowlight

• Hunter Sight In

• Patrol Rifle

• Procedural Justice

• Supervisor Class

• Taser Certification/Recertification

Other recent annual reports reflect regular delivery of the above training classes and several others on an intermittent basis: 456

• Axon Body Worn Camera (2022)

• Below 100 driving safety (2019, 2021)

• De-escalation (2020)

• Ethics (2020)

449 Id

• Implicit bias (2021)

• K-9 perimeter (2019)

• Legal update/Domestic violence (2019)

• Mental health (2019)

450 Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, “POST In-Service Training Requirements,” https://lcle.la.gov/programs/post/post-inservice-training-requirements/ (last visited June 7, 2024).

451 21CP interview with EBRSO personnel.

452 Id

453 EBRSO Policy 203 Training

454 21CP interview with EBRSO Personnel; written communication with EBRSO Personnel

455 EBRSO Annual Report 2023.

456 EBRSO Annual Reports, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022.

• Minority relations (2020)

• Narcan (2019)

• Preventing sexual harassment (2020, 2021)

• Record management system (RMS) (2020)

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

• Tourniquet bleeding/Medical (2019)

• Various instructor training classes (2020, 2021)

• Vehicle dynamics driving (2021)

• Warrior survival (2019)

As the preceding sections summarize, BRPD and EBRSO both maintain notable training functions, both for new police recruits and for current officers. However, there are some crucial differences between the agencies concerning training. First and foremost, BRPD’s new recruit academy provides more hours of instruction – over 835 hours of training to become an officer in BRPD compared to 600 hours for EBRSO. In crude terms, this means that one effect of consolidation would be for new officers policing in Baton Rouge for EBRSO to be operating with substantially less advanced training and instruction than they would have received with BRPD. Second, EBRSO provides training for its own agency and other policing agencies across the region. In 21CP’s experience, training academies with responsibilities for other departments can sometimes default to teaching more generalized policing principles rather than specific agency policy requirements in an effort to ensure that instruction is broadly applicable for all attendees. The practical effect may be a reduced focus on EBRSOspecific policies and protocols and considerations more specific to urban policing.

EBRSO told 21CP that, because it operates a “Regional Training Academy,” the Office must work to meet the needs and standards of agencies across the state. As a result, they cannot hold trainees any longer from other agencies.457 EBRSO maintains that its employees receive as much, if not more, training than BRPD and observes that the current Major over training at EBRSO is a former BRPD Chief of Police, which may help to ensure practical continuity between the training approaches of the two agencies.

Ultimately, 21CP did not observe EBRSO or BRPD training. It cannot, therefore, make any determinations about the quality of instruction or the nature of the training the agencies provide. However, given that consolidation would require some scaling up of personnel – either lateral transfers from BRPD, other departments, or an influx of new recruits – some level of EBRSO training would be required This means that the quality and receptiveness to new approaches to the EBRSO training function would be critical elements in the viability and effectiveness of consolidation.

457 Written communication from EBRSO Personnel.

J. Organizational Culture

Organizational culture refers to the formal and informal ways an entity functions – and how people relate as they endeavor to fulfill the organization’s missions, visions, and values. The following sections consider organizational culture for two reasons First, if BRPD was discontinued and EBRSO became the primary law enforcement entity in Baton Rouge, its organizational culture would be dominant in public safety in the City and Parish – with ramifications, as described below, for accountability, transparency, and public trust. Second, to the extent that the consolidation of police services would either depend upon or be substantially aided by the migration of a material number of personnel from BRPD to EBRSO, the compatibility of the cultures of BRPD and EBRSO is likely to be a significant driver of long-term success.

1. BRPD

By most accounts, BRPD has experienced some tumult over the past several years. The specifics of these challenges are well-documented and have been the source of much internal and community discussion. However, because they continue to inform the Department’s overall dynamics, we summarize them briefly here, paying attention to how they continue to impact BRPD culture.

Chief Murphy Paul, the head of BRPD from 2018 through 2023458, “took the BRPD job . . . with a stated goal of making the department more accountable to the public.”459 In the words of one BRPD member, “accountability was not a thing before Chief Paul and has taken a while.” Unlike most of BRPD’s prior chiefs, Chief Paul did not come from within the ranks of the Department. This meant that, as one interviewee noted, “Paul had a different view since he was not from the PD.” Others suggested that being an outsider gave Chief Paul a more impartial lens for considering internal investigations and discipline: “It can be hard [as a Chief from within BRPD] to discipline people you’ve known for twenty years.”

By many accounts, Chief Paul’s changes and new approaches were, regardless of their relative merits, not wellliked among some of the rank and file – with some actively resistant to the Chief and his leadership. One “officer came up with a setup to try to catch the Chief committing a crime” by initiating a traffic stop of the Chief.460 Chief Paul purportedly received death threats against him and his family, which led him to begin “wearing a bulletproof vest to public appearances.”461 A group of “former BRPD chiefs, influential members of several law enforcement unions, retired law enforcement from the region[, and] officers still on the job” comprised a “defiant group” that “came to be commonly known by all sides as ‘The Resistance.’”462 One interviewee conceded that Chief Paul was “hated” by some, which meant that many of the “changes” he championed “were not well-received internally.”

Various BRPD personnel tended to agree with available media accounts that a major source of this resistance to Chief Paul was his focus on improving the Department’s internal affairs function One media investigation

458 “Baton Rouge Mayor Selects Thomas Morse Jr. as New Police Chief After Months of Deliberation,” WBRZ.com (Dec. 21, 2023), https://www.wbrz.com/news/baton-rouge-mayor-selects-thomas-morse-jr-as-new-police-chief-after-months-of-deliberation

459 Clarissa Sosin and Daryl Kahn, “‘Baton Rouge, We are Sorry’: A New Police Chief Pushes for Change,” Louisiana Illuminator (Oct. 12, 2023), https://lailluminator.com/2023/10/12/baton-rouge-police/

460 “Disgruntled BRPD Officer Caught Trying to Embarrass Police Chief in Traffic Stop Setup,” WBRC.com (Sept. 1, 2022), https://www.wbrz.com/news/disgruntled-brpd-officer-caught-trying-to-embarrass-police-chief-in-traffic-stop-setup/

461 Clarissa Sosin and Daryl Kahn, “‘Baton Rouge, We are Sorry’: A New Police Chief Pushes for Change,” Louisiana Illuminator (Oct. 12, 2023), https://lailluminator.com/2023/10/12/baton-rouge-police/

462 Clarissa Sosin and Daryl Khan, “Police Chief’s Push for Discipline Incites ‘The Resistance,’” Verite News (Oct. 17, 2023), https://veritenews.org/2023/10/17/police-chiefs-push-for-discipline-incites-the-resistance/

found that “[o]f the 308 use-of-force complaints the [D]epartment investigated between 2009 and 2018, Internal Affairs declared 86% of them ‘exonerated’ or ‘not sustained’” – including 100% of all investigations in 2017.463 Of particular focus within the Department and the community was Chief Paul’s decision to fire one officer and suspend another in connection with the shooting death of Alton Sterling in July 2016464 – with some within the Department displeased with the discipline imposed and with the Chief’s policy to the community for the fatal shooting.465

As one stakeholder noted, “In previous administrations, the tail wagged the dog – the union said what was going on But that changed under [Chief] Paul.” Ultimately, the “Union fought tooth and nail about changes and discipline.” BRPD personnel generally agree that rather than the Union intentionally selecting instances where it would push back on officer discipline or changes to the officer misconduct investigation and discipline process, the Baton Rouge Union of Police more regularly rapidly adopted opposition to any actions by Chief Paul regarding discipline.

Many noted that, even as he sought to enhance the internal affairs function and mete out more significant discipline for sustained misconduct, Chief Paul ultimately encountered the same type of structural limits as any other BRPD chief. Specifically, Internal Affairs ultimately must operate in a manner consistent with the State of Louisiana’s “Police Officers’ Bill of Rights.” At the same time, per civil service rules, any officer subject to a disciplinary action has 15 days to appeal the decision. A Civil Service Board hears the appeal, and the Board can override the Chief of Police’s decision.

As stakeholders shared with 21CP, and as has been the subject of media reports, during Chief Paul’s tenure, “[i]t got to the point where even minor discipline would lead to marathon battles at the Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Board.”466 In part because the Chief of Police’s discipline determinations can be overruled and overturned by the Civil Service Board, it appears to many within the Department and the wider Baton Rouge community that many community members believe that it can be difficult to hold BRPD officers accountable for following the Department’s rules and the law. Ultimately, the Department and the Chief are beholden to an entity, and to people, outside the Department for significant management decisions – potentially requiring them, at times, to continue to employ officers who they believe may compromise their relationship with the community or ability to sufficiently promote public safety in Baton Rouge.

Even as Chief Paul focused on enhancing BRPD’s internal affairs function, including by implementing mechanisms for making it easier for civilians to file formal complaints about police conduct, “the [D]epartment had a . . . 50% decrease in Internal Affairs complaints” between April 2018 and April 2023.467 Although the reason for this decrease in complaints could relate to a number of different factors, this reduction in external complaints may be consistent with Chief Paul’s focus on officer misconduct creating a culture of greater accountability where officers are doing a better job adhering to the law and department policy now than in the past.

463 Clarissa Sosin and Daryl Kahn, “‘No Further Action Taken’: Who is Policing the Police?,” Verite News (Apr. 17, 2023), https://veritenews.org/2023/04/17/no-further-action-taken-who-is-policing-the-police/

464 Anthony Izaguirre and Michael Kunzelman, “New Videos Show Clearest Account of Alton Sterling’s Killing,” AP (Mar. 31, 2018), https://apnews.com/article/88426d408d5e48558a6d5047f2103243

465 Clarissa Sosin and Daryl Khan, “‘Baton Rouge, We Are Sorry.’ A New Police Chief Pushes for Change,” Verite News (Oct. 11, 2023), https://veritenews.org/2023/10/11/baton-rouge-we-are-sorry-a-new-police-chief-pushes-for-change/ 466 Clarissa Sosin and Daryl Khan, “Police Chief’s Push for Discipline Incites ‘The Resistance,’” Verite News (Oct. 17, 2023), https://veritenews.org/2023/10/17/police-chiefs-push-for-discipline-incites-the-resistance/ 467 Clarissa Sosin and Daryl Kahn, “‘No Further Action Taken’: Who is Policing the Police?,” Verite News (Apr. 17, 2023), https://veritenews.org/2023/04/17/no-further-action-taken-who-is-policing-the-police/

Many acknowledge that much of the Chief’s work in other areas was tainted by the emergence, late in Chief Paul’s tenure in 2023, of allegations that BRPD officers had conducted illegal detentions, searches (including strip and body cavity searches), seizures, and uses of force at a warehouse “officially known as the Narcotics Processing Facility” and commonly referred to as “the ‘Brave Cave.’”468

It became clear to 21CP during its interviews with BRPD personnel that many see Chief Morse as a new start. One interviewee described Chief Morse as being “highly liked” and seen in the Department “as a breath of fresh air.” As another BRPD explained, the “new Chief has done a good job since day one of talking face-to-face with every employee in his department to convey his thoughts, message, [and] expectations.” Even as the new chief has had his “hands full” addressing violent crime, many said that Chief Morse has worked intentionally to reset and re-establish relationships both internally and externally that may have frayed or withered previously. This has resulted in a “healing process within BRPD” vis-à-vis some of the more controversial incidents of the past several years.

Even as some suggested that the Department “still has some challenges to overcome” from a cultural standpoint, with “some officers still hav[ing] trust issues because the culture was so bad for so long,” 21CP also identified a sense that there has been “increased productivity [and] effectiveness” among officers One officer explained:

I do believe we’ve turned a corner and see [a] renewed spirit amongst all sections of uniformed patrol. Mid-level supervision isn’t dragging guys down, and is showing [officers under their command] what to do. The sky is not falling The biggest goal is to show officers that if they police the way they are supposed to police then [the Department] will support them.

Several other stakeholders agreed that BRPD officers are engaging in more “proactive policing” and that the Department’s current climate is helping to promote that.

From a longer-term perspective, BRPD stakeholders pointed to some built-in features and structures that continue to promote a positive organizational environment Specifically, the Department is a “good size – not too big like major cities but not small,” which allows for professional opportunities and a “lot of room for lateral movement.” Several personnel cited BRPD’s sustained efforts at community engagement, discussed elsewhere in this report, as starting to yield positive outcomes both in terms of the Department’s wider community relationships and with public safety outcomes. Other non-law enforcement stakeholders suggested to 21CP that they are “feel[ing] positive about [the] direction BRPD is moving.”

One element of BRPD’s culture that both its officers and the Baton Rouge community appear to take as a given is the Department’s transparency initiatives. “Transparency is essential to building public trust and legitimacy,” and providing the public that a department serves with information about its policies, performance expectations, and actual performance cultivates this democratic legitimacy.469 To this end, BRPD makes its policy handbook available online, posts regular analyses of uses of force and internal affairs investigations, and

468 Melissa Alonso, “Baton Rouge Police Tortured Detainees in ‘Brave Cave,’ Lawsuits Allege,”CNN.com (Sept. 28, 2023), https://edition.cnn.com/2023/09/21/us/baton-rouge-police-brave-cave/index.html

469 The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, New Era for Public Safety: A Guide to Fair Safe and Effective Community Policing 65 (2019); Barry Friedman and Maria Ponomarenko, “Democratic Policing,” 90 N.Y.U. Law Review 1827 (2015).

links to video of certain critical incidents.470 The Department also maintains protocols for the release of video following significant incidents.

The BRPD pledged its participation in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (“IACP”) Trust Building Campaign that launched in July 2022.471 The BRPD has a dedicated section of its website to update the public about the department’s progress and alignment with the campaign’s goals, which include “to enhance trust between police agencies and the communities they serve by ensuring positive community-police partnerships that promote safe, effective interactions; create strategies to prevent and reduce crime, and improve the wellbeing and quality of life for all.”472 As of May 31, 2024, the BRPD reports being 92% complete with the campaign’s goals to implement 25 nationally recognized policies and promising practices in six key areas that promote police-community trust and collaboration: 1) bias-free policing, 2) use of force, 3) leadership and culture, 4) recruitment, hiring and retention, 5) victim services, and 6) community relations 473

21CP also heard from BRPD members about various internal processes and mechanisms used to analyze the Department’s overall performance and determine, on an organizational level, where its performance may be improved or enhanced. Although there are undoubtedly areas for additional growth, it appears that the Department has established the foundations necessary to be an organization committed to continuous, critical self-analysis and improvement.

2. EBRSO

Because 21CP had limited interaction with EBRSO personnel, it is comparatively more difficult to describe the Office’s current culture and internal climate. Whereas 21CP could engage with some BRPD personnel about their general sense of how employees are thinking and feeling about their work and public safety challenges in Baton Rouge currently, 21CP’s much more limited access to the Sheriff’s Office precluded this type of engagement.

In a written response to questions from 21CP, the Sheriff Gautreaux described the culture of EBRSO as “[a] commitment to serving the public as best we can by treating people with respect and dignity, working hard and staying the course in the pursuit of justice and safety.” To the extent that this is a generalized statement of organizational values and commitments, there is no reason that they could not apply to law enforcement services provided not just to unincorporated areas and correctional settings but to the whole of the City of Baton Rouge.

With respect to accountability, EBRSO is, as prior sections have described, an at-will employer. Consequently, all personnel serve at the pleasure of the Sheriff. Practically, this means, as multiple stakeholders described to 21CP, that the Sheriff’s Office can take immediate employment actions when problematic incidents arise – and can demonstrate to the community that they are taking allegations of deficient performance seriously. At the same time, several interviewees observed to 21CP that all employees being hired and fired at the pleasure of the Sheriff runs a structural risk that individuals may be hired, retained, or promoted on the basis of relationship, unknown metrics, or other factors unrelated to qualifications or performance.

470 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, Transparency, https://www.brla.gov/2507/Transparency (last visited May 24, 2024).

471 International Association of Chiefs of Police, “IACP Trust Building Campaign,” https://www.theiacp.org/iacp-trust-building-campaign (last visited June 7, 2024); Dwight E. Henninger, “The IACP Trust Building Campaign,” Police Chief (July 2022)

472 International Association of Chiefs of Police, “IACP Trust Building Campaign,” https://www.theiacp.org/iacp-trust-building-campaign (last visited June 7, 2024).

473 Id

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

Perhaps inevitably, personnel from both EBRSO and BRPD have pride and allegiance to their own organizations. One BRPD interviewee noted that while they “have the utmost respect for the Sheriff’s Office and the Sheriff himself, . . . we do things better.” At the same time, as the Sheriff told 21CP, EBRSO has “been very successful and well[-]received by the public.”

It is clear from limited exchanges with EBRSO personnel and a variety of interviews with elected officials, BRPD personnel, and other Baton Rouge stakeholders that EBRSO maintains a distinct organizational culture from BRPD. As one interviewee said, EBRSO and BRPD are “[t]wo totally different departments. Both agencies work really well independently because of the different cultures they have . . . Both are very unique.” Another stakeholder agreed that there are “distinct differences between the agencies.”

Existing and historical differences in organizational culture relate directly to public accountability. Two types or conceptions of accountability are critical in policing. The first is back-end accountability. “When people talk about accountability in policing, they usually are referring to the back end Something bad has happened, it is not what should have happened, and so someone must be held accountable.”474 To this end, the difference between the civil service regime in place at BRPD and the at-will employment arrangement at EBRSO may be particularly significant. It is possible that, if EBRSO were the law enforcement agency for the City of Baton Rouge, poorly performing officers or officers engaged in misconduct would be disciplined more promptly – and that the community would find this type of accountability to be more responsive and appropriate However, in the absence of some of the parameters that the civil service system advances, the Office might also retain individuals who underperform – setting the occasion for increased concerns about accountability.

However, accountability also refers to front-end accountability – or, before or separate from anything bad happening, ensuring that police perform in a manner consistent that is consistent with community needs and values.475 Transparency, discussed previously, helps to ensure front-end accountability because community members can evaluate for themselves whether their policing agency is addressing their concerns and performing consistent with community interests. Additionally, having one, and only one, law enforcement entity responsible for policing in the City and Parish of Baton Rouge could make it easier for law enforcement to respond to the community’s collective law enforcement needs and concerns.

As this report has emphasized, nothing about participation in the civil service system necessarily guarantees good outcomes or ensures against bad ones. In any organization or system, it is possible for poorly performing officers to be retained and for good officers to be overlooked for leadership positions or significant assignments. What must be emphasized is the substantial difference in overall orientation and day-to-day culture between EBRSO and BRPD because the Department currently is a civil service environment. Indeed, as one BRPD interviewee observed, it is an open question as to whether – if BRPD closed and Department personnel were afforded the opportunity to apply for positions at EBRSO – the Department’s current personnel would want to jump into a non-civil-service-protected organization or might, instead, want to go to another law enforcement agency. This uncertainty may very well be aggravated by the current hiring bonuses and incentives in place in

474 Maria Ponomarenko and Barry Friedman, “Democratic Accountability and Policing,” in 4 Reforming Criminal Justice: Punishment, Incarceration, and Release 5, 5 (Erik Luna ed., 2017).

475 Id. at 8; see, e.g., Barry Friedman, Unwarranted: Policing Without Permission (2017); Tracey Meares, “Policing and Procedural Justice: Shaping Citizens’ Identities to Increase Democratic Participation,” 111 Northwestern University Law Review 1525 (2017); Imani J. Jackson and Frank LoMonte, “Policing Transparency,” Human Rights (Jan. 7, 2020).

numerous law enforcement agencies across the country that are experiencing staffing shortages and personnel needs.476 It is possible, if not likely, that some relevant portion of BRPD personnel would, if left without a job at BRPD, choose to go to another police department in Louisiana or another part of the United States with a union/civil service culture – one also offering signing bonuses and other significant benefits for new employees – rather than sign on with an agency with a non-union/civil service culture offering different or no hiring incentives.

21CP observes here that EBRSO may be able to mitigate a number of the concerns that potential personnel have about working for a non-civil-service organization by ensuring that policies, procedures, and protocols relating to internal investigations, discipline, and promotions are clear, transparent, and codified That is, even as a Sheriff may lawfully be able to employ personnel at their discretion, the Office can commit itself in advance to using specific practices designed to ensure fair and transparent employment and promotional decisions.

In short, 21CP finds that, although there is nothing to suggest that EBRSO’s culture would prohibit it from capably expanding its services to encompass activities that BRPD currently performs, basic cultural differences may be a significant practical impediment to attracting former BRPD officers. To attract existing BRPD personnel, it is likely that the Sheriff’s Office would need to provide incentives and make some internal changes that can convince at least some material number of BRPD officers that cultural changes would be minimally impactful.

476 Mitch Smith, “As Applications Fall, Police Departments Lure Recruits with Bonuses and Attention,” N.Y.. Times (Dec. 25, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/25/us/police-officer-recruits.html; “The U.S is Experiencing a Police Hiring Crisis,” AP (Sept. 6, 2023), available at https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/us-experiencing-police-hiring-crisis-rcna103600; Robert Klemko, “Police Agencies are Desperate to Hire But They Say Few Want the Job,” Washington Post (May 27, 2023), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/05/27/policevacancies-hiring-recruiting-reform/

K. Community Engagement & Perception

Another critical consideration for consolidation is whether BRPD and ERBSO are compatible with respect to underlying philosophies of policing, law enforcement, and crime deterrence. As discussed earlier, divergent approaches to policing may create friction between the two agencies at the organizational and personnel levels.

Upon initial inquiry, as summarized in Table 21, BRPD and EBRSO’s visions and missions align with an orientation toward community policing and being leaders in law enforcement and public safety. However, what “community policing” looks like in practice can differ substantially across agencies, as some apply the term narrowly to a single program or initiative (e.g., community liaison officers or a community policing unit), while others use community policing principles to inform the organizational framework, problem solving, and community partnerships.477

Table 21. Vision and Mission Statements of BRPD and EBRSO

Vision

BRPD478 Our vision for the Baton Rouge Police Department is to be one with the community, single-minded in purpose, principle, and resolve in advancing public safety. We will continue to be the leader in law enforcement in the Greater Baton Rouge Area.

EBRSO479 It is the vision of the East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office to use collaborative problem solving in everything we do. It is our vision that East Baton Rouge Parish remains one of the safest and most enjoyable places to live and visit in the State of Louisiana and the Nation.

1. BRPD

Mission

To serve with the Baton Rouge community to prevent crime and to promote the safety and well-being of all.

The office’s mission is to be a leader in public safety, community service and crime control. We strive to integrate community policing philosophies with community partnerships.

It is the mission of the East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office to provide quality law enforcement, detention, court security and homeland security services to the residents and visitors of East Baton Rouge Parish.

Based on 21CP’s review of BRPD policy, programs, community policing plan, and interviews, BRPD has worked to infuse community policing principles throughout the department. The materials BRPD provided to 21CP included a comprehensive “Community Policing Plan,” which makes clear that principles of community policing

477 Gill, C., et al, “Community-Oriented Policing to Reduce Crime, Disorder and Fear and Increase Satisfaction and Legitimacy Among Citizens: A Systematic Review,” 10 Journal of Experimental Criminology 399–428 (2014).

478 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, About Us, “BRPD Mission,” https://www.brla.gov/2485/BRPDMission#:~:text=Our%20Mission,and%20well%2Dbeing%20of%20all (last visited June 7, 2024).

479 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, Annual Report 2023, https://www.ebrso.org/Portals/0/DOCS/Annual%20Reports/2023%20Annual%20Report.pdf?ver=cpwYdFCIFxi_gWGlSzAA7w%3d%3d (last visited May 24, 2024).

and engagement inform the organization at all levels. For example, BRPD’s approach to community policing focuses on “hiring officers who can build relationships and work collaboratively with all communities ” 480

The Department-wide approach to implementing community policing is reinforced in many ways481:

• A clear policy statement. “The Baton Rouge Police Department will effectively engage the community in collaborative problem-solving. BRPD will partner with residents and stakeholders to identify and solve problems that contribute to crime, fear of crime, and quality of life problems in communities. The Department is committed to proactively solving problems as well as reacting to their harmful consequences.”482

• Expectations for Patrol Districts. Each patrol district is required to establish a Community Policing Plan that (1) addresses the unique community needs in their district, (2) is informed by community members through surveys and meetings, (3) is updated semi-annually, (4) establishes clear priorities and methods for documenting planned responses, and (5) is shared with the Community Service Division. BRPD districts are also required to engage in proactive problem-solving projects.

• Relationship building in the Community. In December 2021 BRPD launched a new strategy to conduct weekly community walks or “Community Canvases” in various districts to hear community concerns, check on residents living in areas recently impacted by gun violence, and share information about services.483 City and parish partners often participate alongside the BRPD.484 BRPD uses forms to document details of interactions and action items for follow-up.

• Training. BRPD requires at least eight hours of training annually on topics related to community policing, community engagement, relationship building, procedural justice and problem-solving techniques. Community members are frequently invited to academy and in-service training for “Community Conversations” with cadets and officers.

• Measurement. The BRPD uses Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) codes that designate community policing activities to track activities.

• Accountability. Supervisors regularly check BWC recordings to evaluate whether officers actively engage with the community and promote public trust in the BRPD.

Other components of the Community Policing and Engagement policy and practices that were particularly noteworthy include:

• A required annual review of the Community Policing manual;

• Language that states “Implementation of Community Policing Plans shall focus on prevention and not solely on enforcement whenever possible;”

480 Baton Rouge Police Department, Operations Manual: Community Policing and Engagement

481 Id

482 Id. at 1.

483 Anum Siddiqui, “Baton Rouge Police Effort to Build Relationships with the Community,” BRProud, (Jan. 28, 2022); 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel

484 21CP interviews with BRPD Personnel.

• The 2019 establishment of a 30-member Chief’s Advisory Council representing a cross-section of community groups and organizations that meets for the Chief to brief the Council on recent developments and to hear concerns, feedback, and recommendations485; and

• Local chapters of nationally known youth programs: Explorers (14-18 year-olds) and Cadets (18-21 year-olds)

In addition to the community policing efforts across the BRPD, the Department also has a Community Services Division, which works across the entire city486 and is responsible for:

• “Promoting organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problemsolving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.

• Working closely with community partners, faith-based groups, business owners, and citizens to improve the relationships between the police and community to create a better living environment for all.”487

Despite these efforts and initiatives, multiple BRPD personnel acknowledged the harm done to community trust and police legitimacy by events like the Alton Sterling shooting and the BRAVE Cave scandal and understood that different parts of the community understandably have different perspectives.488 Interviewees that we spoke with seemed to share a sentiment expressed by one person, “For the most part, the community likes us and wants us here. They realize there are a few bad apples and want things done the right way with bad apples being held accountable.”489 Another said, “People want to see more of the right type of police. They want to see more visibility. The majority of interactions are positive.” 490

BRPD personnel appeared to recognize that ongoing work was needed to rebuild community relationships. Police-community relations were prominent in the new BRPD Chief’s First 100 Days Plan.491 Two of the three primary objectives explicitly mention interaction, engagement, and communication with community stakeholders to understand their public safety needs and concerns better. He identified several tangible steps to achieve these objectives, including continuing many already ongoing practices (e.g., participation in community events, Chief’s Advisory Council, continued discussions with elected leaders) while also proposing to:

• Host interactive listening sessions with fellow Baton Rouge citizens;

• Launch “Chat with the Chief” on the BRPD website (which is now available for individuals to sign up for a 15-minute conversation on a topic of their choosing)492;

• Develop a pathway for a Youth Chief’s Advisory Council;

485 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, Transparency, IACP Trust Building Campaign, “Community Relations,” https://www.brla.gov/3002/Community-Relations (last visited June 7, 2024); 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

486 21CP interview with BRPD Personnel.

487 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, About Us, Staff Divisions, Operational Services/Special Operations, https://www.brla.gov/271/Operational-ServicesSpecial-Operations (last visited June 7, 2024).

488 Id

489 Id

490 Id

491 Chief Thomas S. Morse, First 100 Days, https://www.brla.gov/DocumentCenter/View/18647/Chief-Morses-First-100-Day-Plan (last visited June 7, 2024).

492 City of Baton Rouge, “Form Center,” https://www.brla.gov/FormCenter/Police-Department-19/Chat-with-the-Chief-220 (last visited June 7, 2024).

• Increase the Department’s social media profiles and online engagement with the community (building on the BRPD’s robust website and current activity on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube)493; and

• Create more opportunities for Officers and the Community to interact within each district.

2. EBRSO

EBRSO did not provide 21CP with a community policing plan. It did supply a Community Relations Policy. Based on a review of the policy, information available from the agency’s 2023 Annual Report, interviews with EBRSO personnel, and a written description provided by the Sheriff to 21CP, the EBRSO appears to apply a narrower interpretation of community policing than BRPD. The Sheriff’s Office maintains that it has a more extensive view of Community Policing that is applied throughout the agency through a Standard Operating Procedure, which is not available to 21CP or members of the community.

EBRSO describes its community policing efforts in the context of a “Community Policing Unit” that hosts community events, participates in speaking engagements, and patrols parades.494 Similarly, the Community Service section of the EBRSO website features the Sheriff’s Public Information Office and Community Services Unit Captain.495 The EBRSO maintains an active social media presence (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube) and encourages community interaction through an EBRSO app for mobile phones.496

The EBRSO’s Community Policing Unit was formed in 2008 and is currently staffed by seven full-time deputies, including a Captain, Lieutenant, and two Sergeants.497 Their mission is “to build an alliance with the community to identify and solve problems of crime and disorder, which will enhance the community’s quality of life” and “to provide the community with access to the Community Policing Deputies and report concerns and problems in the community.”498 The Community Relations policy charges the Community Relations coordinator with:

• Working with community groups to identify and solve problems;

• Organizing programs, activities, and youth initiatives that help build positive relationships between office members and the community;

• Surveying the community around the EBRSO-community relationship; and

• Working with Uniform Patrol leadership to “develop patrol deployment plans that allow deputies the time to participate in community engagement and problem-solving activities.”499

A Special Community Anti-Crime Team (SCAT), a unit of 12 highly trained and motivated deputies, is described as a “Street Crimes/Community Policing Division that provides proactive law enforcement patrols and investigations in East Baton Rouge Parish.”500 It is unusual for a specialized proactive enforcement unit to include community policing activities. The SCAT unit’s activities are described as follows:

493 City of Baton Rouge, Departments, Police Department, “About Us,” https://www.brla.gov/2484/About-Us (last visited June 7, 2024).

494 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, Annual Report 2023.

495 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Public Information Office,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Community-Service (last visited June 7, 2024).

496 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Connect With Us,” https://www.ebrso.org/GET-IN-TOUCH/Connect-With-Us (last visited June 7, 2024).

497 Written communication from EBRSO Personnel.

498 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “Community Service,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/Community-Service (last visited June 7, 2024).

499 EBRSO Policy 340 Community Relations.

500 East Baton Rouge Sheriff’s Office, “SCAT,” https://www.ebrso.org/WHO-WE-ARE/Divisions/SCAT (last visited June 7, 2024).

The Division is involved in patrolling high crime areas, community policing initiatives, traffic enforcement, and operations that may include covert as well as overt enforcement operations targeting suspected gang problems, prostitution, street level sources of illegal drugs and weapons. The division is responsible for attending community meetings, identifying major problems of crime and disorder in the community, collecting and analyzing information from a variety of public and private resources, coordinating with other agencies and public to tailor actions suitable to community problems, and evaluating the effectiveness of those actions to determine if the problems were alleviated or minimized.501

The Community Relations policy states that:

It is the policy of the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff’s Office to promote positive relationships between office members and the community by treating community members with dignity and respect and engaging them in public safety strategy development and relationship-building activities, and by making relevant policy and operations information available to the community in a transparent manner.502

The Sheriff stated that he has tasked deputies with “building positive relationships with the community whenever possible.”503 To further this goal, the Community Relations policy indicates:

Subject to available resources, members should receive training related to this policy, including training on topics such as:

a) Effective social interaction and communication skills.

b) Cultural, racial and ethnic diversity and relations.

c) Building community partnerships.

d) Community policing and problem-solving principles.

e) Enforcement actions and their effects on community relations.504

In terms of community perceptions of the EBRSO, many stakeholders perceived that negative stories do not seem to gain the same traction for EBRSO as for BRPD.505 Often, this was attributed to the EBRSO being able to say that a person had already been fired for misconduct instead of being placed on administrative leave. The EBRSO personnel we spoke with or received written communication from felt that the community favorably viewed the EBRSO. They attributed this to striving to nurture their relationships with the community.506 In addition, a private survey provided to EBRSO conducted in February 2024 showed that 62% of respondents felt that EBRSO was doing a good job as opposed to only 47% felt the same for BRPD.507

3. Discussion of Implications for Consolidation

Overall, BRPD has been engaging in systematic, structured, and robust community engagement – even when, at the same time, the BRPD has also suffered recent setbacks with respect to trust among some community

501 Id

502 EBRSO Policy 340 Community Relations, Section 340.2.

503 Written communication with EBRSO personnel.

504 EBRSO Policy 340 Community Relations at Section 340.10.

505 21CP interviews with government, other parish stakeholders, and BRPD and EBRSO Personnel.

506 21CP interviews with EBRSO Personnel.

507 SurveyUSA, Private survey for Cabildo Strategy Services (Feb. 24, 2024).

members. For a consolidation effort that depended on personnel from BRPD to move over to EBRSO to be successful, EBRSO and BRPD would need to ensure that they were operating from the same perspective regarding underlying philosophies Even more importantly, the Baton Rouge community would also need to be convinced of the benefits of this approach and reassured that community policing would be as strong, if not more robust, in the transformed organization.

Based on written and verbal conversations with representatives of the two organizations, this could be a critical factor to the success and viability of eliminating BRPD in favor of EBRSO. For example, when EBRSO leadership was asked about moving the agency or one of its divisions “in a new direction philosophically or operationally,” they asserted, “I do not see a need for us to change the way we conduct our operations, which have been very successful and well received by the public.” Several BRPD interviewees expressed reluctance to consolidate.

Garnering public support and buy-in is another significant consideration – and challenge. 21CP spoke with some Baton Rouge stakeholders and community members whose receptivity ranged from unqualified enthusiasm to lukewarm, with many sharing reservations about eliminating BRPD. Some suggested the Sheriff is not currently held to the same standard as BRPD simply because EBRSO does not currently handle the level and volume of community interactions and response within the City of Baton Rouge. 21CP also heard concerns about whether the practicalities associated with consolidation and whether it could be achieved in a way that ensured against any disruption in public safety services.

Several law enforcement agencies that previously completed a consolidation process made a concerted effort to engage with their community members and serve with a community-policing orientation.508 Conversely, in Louisville, one leader of the merger noted that “the department was so busy on outreach in telling the community what we’re doing that it came up short in actual involvement of the community.”509A COPS Office report based on a focus group more than 60 people with law enforcement consolidation experience representing state, local, university, and sheriff agencies concluded, in part, that agency leaders must be prepared to spend time listening to residents, answering their questions, and offering concrete examples of how a new, consolidated approach to policing will benefit them and their communities.510

508 “Camden P.D.’s transformation? It’s complicated.” June 11, 2020. https://whyy.org/episodes/camden-p-d-s-transformation-its-complicated/; International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003).

509 Jeremy M. Wilson & Clifford Grammich, “Police Consolidation, Regionalization, and Shared Services: Options Considerations and Lessons from Research and Practice,” Be on the Lookout 1 (2012), https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/ric/Publications/cops-w0641-pub.pdf

510 Jeremy M. Wilson, Alexander Weiss, & Clifford Grammich, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Pathways to Consolidation: Taking Stock of Transitions to Alternative Models of Police Service (2015).

V. Summary and Practical Considerations

SafeBR engaged 21CP to conduct an evaluation of Baton Rouge’s policing services and asked it to consider whether eliminating one of those services, BRPD, and transitioning responsibilities and service to another of those existing services, EBRSO, was feasible. To conduct its analysis, 21CP requested and reviewed various and numerous documents from the EBRSO and BRPD and conducted interviews with key personnel from both agencies and significant stakeholders. BRPD made more documents and people available to us, resulting in this report containing a somewhat more fulsome evaluation of BRPD in the areas critical to whether consolidation may be a good idea. EBRSO told 21CP that they would do their best to assist in these efforts but were not actively seeking 21CP’s opinion related to their operations and agency.

As the preceding sections of this report detail, 21CP concludes that the idea of consolidating public safety services in Baton Rouge is feasible. Indeed, there may be a number of benefits. Some overall financial efficiencies may be realized, and the Sheriff’s ability to more easily hold officers accountable who perform counter to expectations might enhance public trust in important ways.

A single public safety entity in Baton Rouge would have the opportunity to benefit from the best approaches and practices from both existing agencies. This is the approach that the Louisville Metro consolidation took; as described by one former leader, “the merger was a chance to reinvent ourselves. We took a best practices approach to everything. We did adopt some old county ways and some old city ways but only if these were the best ways.”511

However, as noted, creating a single public safety entity from two existing ones is challenging, and the simple adoption of policies and practices will not guarantee success.

At least in some areas – such as with respect to core policies around use of force – EBRSO’s existing approaches are more comprehensive and may prove beneficial to Baton Rouge residents if extended uniformly across the City and Parish of Baton Rouge. At the same time, BRPD’s approaches along some critical dimensions – from integrating community policing into its core philosophy to its training and recruitment programs – are firmly aligned with best practices and promising approaches If EBRSO adopted or adapted some of these successful and promising approaches when it took over primary policing authority throughout the Parish consolidation of services may enhance the quality of policing services in Baton Rouge overall.

The differences between an at-will agency and a civil service-based agency with an active union cannot be minimized. In other consolidation efforts that combined agencies with more than one union or bargaining unit, the grievances, lawsuits, and other employment-related contractual issues were some of the most difficult and time-consuming to address.512 Structuring the initial phase of consolidation – which almost certainly must involve bringing a significant number of sworn and civilian personnel from BRPD into the EBRSO to ensure uninterrupted public safety service – is critical to the success of any consolidation effort.

511 Jeremy M. Wilson & Clifford Grammich, “Police Consolidation, Regionalization, and Shared Services: Options Considerations and Lessons from Research and Practice,” Be on the Lookout 1 (2012), https://portal.cops.usdoj.gov/resourcecenter/ric/Publications/cops-w0641-pub.pdf

512 Id.; Steve Janoski, “Former Bergen County cops will merge with Sheriff’s Office, ending 5-year battle,” NorthJersey.com (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/bergen/2020/08/18/former-bergen-county-cops-merge-sheriffs-office-ending-legalfight/3394896001/

At the same time, the process of eliminating a police department and scaling up the responsibilities addressed by another is a complex and complicated task that would require a detailed analysis of laws, budget requirements, and workload, along with the associated planning. Police leaders involved in consolidating agencies in Charlotte-Mecklenburg and Jacksonville (FL) noted the importance of a phased, strategic transition or implementation plan.513

It will also demand full and open cooperation from both EBRSO and BRPD. Baton Rouge will not stop needing police services while organizational changes are being made. Any implementation will require the resolution of difficult issues, navigation through complex project management challenges, and the adoption of new or adapted approaches by the Sheriff’s Office to accommodate new functions, personnel, relationships, and community needs.

The most viable pathway forward for consolidation is one in which substantial, additional deliberation among Baton Rouge stakeholders generates a clear agenda for practically addressing and implementing the many things that, while neither a reason to consolidate or not to consolidate, are potentially challenging to resolve or coordinate. As the Sheriff noted directly to 21CP, “I think if so desired by the community, [consolidation] would require lots of changes in the laws.” For instance, the City and Parish would need to determine how to compensate EBRSO for addressing a much higher volume of calls for service and taking on a much larger set of responsibilities.

Significant practical issues related to everything from equipment and facilities to employee benefits will need to be addressed for consolidation to have a chance of making a positive, long-term impact on public safety in Baton Rouge in the long-term. Time and again, thoughtful Baton Rouge stakeholders inventoried to 21CP an array of issues, considerations, and steps implicated by consolidation that are, ultimately, not benefits or disadvantages but, instead, are complexities that would need to be capably navigated to ensure that consolidation does ultimately produce enhancements to community safety. This section discusses, in greater detail, what might simply be called “difficult practical considerations” – complexities that are neither positive or negative but are, instead, potentially complex and challenging practical and logistical concerns that Baton Rouge, like any jurisdiction contemplating the consolidation of police services from many agencies into fewer agencies, might face.

In short, if the consolidation process is managed in a way that thoughtfully addresses the many complex practical considerations implicated and EBRSO adopts the tangible enhancements and changes necessary for it to respond to a much higher volume of activity, then consolidation could well achieve cost savings, help to increase the quality of public safety services in Baton Rouge, and enhance accountability and public trust. Ultimately, “[c]onsolidation must be viewed in the totality of police services, officer and citizen satisfaction, and the capacity of the new agency to better serve the public and fight crime. Looking at this larger picture, jurisdictions may adopt consolidation even with level or increased costs to bring stronger policing to their constituents.”514

The remainder of this section is a summary inventory – based on research, expert briefs, and case studies – of the key, practical considerations and decision points that Baton Rouge will almost certainly need to consider, address, and resolve with respect to consolidation. This is not intended to be an exhaustive implementation guide or roadmap. Instead, this section identifies a series of key questions that elected officials, policymakers, Baton Rouge stakeholders, and community members will need to consider when determining whether to attempt to consolidate public safety services.

A. Leadership and Administration

Practically consolidating two entities requires the leadership of one or both organizations to relinquish authority at some point in the process, which can be one of the greatest obstacles to overcome.515 For the consolidation to succeed, a new managerial framework and administrative structure must be implemented and accepted by personnel. In addition to requiring strong leadership throughout the consolidation, the processes for making decisions, engaging stakeholders, and communications in general must be clear to all involved from the outset.516

A.1 Who will be the key decision-maker in the process of planning for, implementing, and executing the consolidation?

A.2 How will the decision-making process be structured to ensure key stakeholders’ interests are represented?

B. Personnel

The discussion above has highlighted the general assumption among many stakeholders that consolidation would involve BRPD personnel migrating significantly from the Department to the Sheriff’s Office. Even if this does materialize, the involved agencies must consider whether all sworn and non-sworn personnel will be retained, what positions will exist in the consolidated organization, and the selection process for competitive roles. Although it may not be possible for every employee of both agencies to maintain their position, seniority, or specialized assignment, every effort should made to communicate with employees of both agencies so they understand the impact the consolidation will have on them.517As stated above, cultural integration is critical to the success of transformation, and the engagement and retention of key personnel would be an essential component of the integration.518 Louisville used several committees of sworn and non-sworn personnel to assist the designated project manager in making recommendations about consolidation planning.519

B.1 Will all sworn personnel from BRPD and EBRSO be retained following consolidation? Will ranks and job assignments be protected? If some personnel or positions will not be retained, and all BRPD personnel have property rights to their jobs, does this extend

515 O.W. Wilson & Roy Clinton McClarent, Police Administration (4th ed) (1977); Albert Reiss, “Police Organization in the Twentieth Century,” 15 Crime and Justice 51 (1992).

516 Peter Frumkin, Making Public Sector Mergers Work: Lessons Learned, IBM Center for The Business of Government (2003), https://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/PublicSectorMergers.pdf

517 Wilson, Jeremy M., Alexander Weiss, & Clifford Grammich, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Pathways to Consolidation: Taking Stock of Transitions to Alternative Models of Police Service (2015).

518 Aon Hewitt, Aon Hewitt’s Model of Employee Engagement (Jan. 2015), https://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-consulting/aon-hewittmodel-of-employee-engagement.pdf

519 Joseph Sterling Grant, Louisville-Jefferson County Police Consolidation: Officers' Perception of Organizational Justice (May 2011), https://ir.library.louisville.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1523&context=etd

to compensation? If pay or significant working conditions do not match BRPD, what is the possibility of litigation by former BRPD employees against the Sheriff or Baton Rouge?

B.2 Will all non-sworn personnel from BRPD and EBRSO be retained following consolidation? Will seniority and job assignments be protected?

B.3 How will employee pay, benefits, retirement programs, and collective bargaining be affected for each department?

B.4 Will the consolidated department have more or fewer promotional opportunities? Are the promotional criteria similar in BRPD and EBRSO, or will developing new promotional standards and protocols be necessary?

C. Financial Implications

A common rationale for consolidation efforts is the desire to reduce costs. At the same time, organizational transformations often require upfront capital for the transition period.520 Table 22 summarizes the likely initial or “one-time costs” associated with consolidating policing services within the EBRSO. The experiences of other jurisdictions that have consolidated policing services may provide some guidance about the size and scope of some of these consolidation-related expenses. For instance, Indianapolis spent $909,000 on new uniforms and $127,000 on new badges.521 (This specific cost may be lessened in the EBRSO scenario, in which only some personnel need new uniforms and badges, rather than re-outfitting the entire agency.) The Louisville-Jefferson County merger estimated that upgrades to communication systems cost approximately $70 million, and achieving parity in employee salaries, benefits, and equipment allowances were estimated to cost approximately $10 million.

Table 22. Summary of Potential Initial or “One-Time” Costs Associated with Consolidation

Legal fees

Accounting/auditing costs

Adjustments to insurance policies

Costs

Training and Integration

Severance packages or reassignment costs for redundant positions

6. Potential costs related to hiring new personnel or adjusting existing staff roles.

7. Temporary staffing or overtime during transitional period to ensure continuity of services

8. Initial and ongoing training for sworn and civilian personnel to adapt to new organizational structures, policies, and procedures

9. Outreach related to informing personnel on revised policies and procedures

520 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Consolidating Police Services: An IACP Planning Approach (2003) 521 Linsey Davis, “Price tag for police merger grows,” WTHR13, (2006), https://www.wthr.com/article/news/price-tag-for-police-merger-grows/5313f14146b-df0b-4413-9e3d-bd847714d445

Infrastructure and Technology

Equipment and Uniforms

Community and Stakeholder

Engagement

Legal and Regulatory Compliance

Operational Adjustments

Facilities and Real Estate

10. Revising promotional exam and selection processes

11. Integrating or upgrading IT systems, including data migration from PD

12. Integrating or upgrading communication systems

13. Integrating or upgrading other technological or network infrastructure

14. Upgrading hardware and software to ensure compatibility; may include procuring additional devices and software licenses

15. Costs associated with relocating equipment

16. Rebranding or replacing vehicles, uniforms, and other equipment with old insignia

17. Replacing equipment that does not meet policy requirements

18. Community outreach and materials, public relations efforts, and engagement with stakeholders

19. Rebranding public facing materials such as signage and websites

20. Regulatory filings, permits, and other compliance tasks.

21. Consolidating patrol routes, precincts

22. Consolidating or reorganizing specialized operational units

23. Leasing, purchasing, or renovating buildings

24. Integrating or modifying existing facilities

Additionally, consolidation may have tax implications for City and/or Parish residents.522 Especially in the wake of the incorporation of the new City of St. George,523 the financial implications to be considered should thus be contemplated for both the short- and long-term for all stakeholder groups.

C.1 Where will the financial resources come from to implement the consolidation process (e.g., reorganization, planning, standardizing equipment, technology, and uniforms, new construction, renovation, etc.)? How will it be secured and who will manage it?

C.2 How will existing budgets from the two departments be merged or allocated?

C.3 Will the consolidation have any tax implications on residents of the City of Baton Rouge and/or East Baton Rouge Parish?

D. Equipment and Facilities

As stated above, it is likely that new equipment would need to be procured during the transitional period. Some equipment such as firearms or unmarked vehicles may be compatible, with one model being phased out over

522 Id

523 Lara Nicholson, “St. George Officials Sworn Into Office Monday: ‘This World Will Never Forget,’” The Advocate (June 11, 2024), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/st-george-officials-take-oaths-of-office-monday/article_68b65aea-26b6-11ef-a375170e03bf6dc2.html

time, whereas other equipment such as uniforms or radios may need to be addressed immediately. Decisions will also have to be made about record-keeping, data, and evidence systems.

D.1 What are the specific costs associated with communications, records, and data equipment integration or necessary upgrades?

D.2 What are the legal requirements for transferring and integrating weapons, vehicles, and radios?

D.3 How will maintenance, upgrades, and training be handled for weapons, vehicles, and radios?

D.4 Who will own the combined assets, and how will ownership transfers be legally documented?

D.5 What changes in insurance coverage will be necessary to cover the consolidated assets and operations?

E. Operational Impacts

Among the expected benefits of a larger, consolidated department is increased operational efficiency. To that end, the process of streamlining duplicated services, deployment schedules and zones, and training must be considered to balance increased efficiencies with a high quality of service.

E.1 Will consolidation create any redundancies in service?

E.2 What changes in command structure and staffing will be necessary to manage the consolidated geography and resources effectively?

E.3 How will ongoing training and certifications be managed for staff by both departments?

E.4 Who will take ownership of developing, implementing, and measuring an urban crime response plan?

Matthew Barge

Jennifer Cherkauskas

Michael Harrison

Nola Joyce

Megan McDonough

Darrel W. Stephens

Scott Thomson

Teresa Towey

Project Team