State of Affairs: August 2020

non-proliferation. An assessment of possible human rights violations through ICT, on the other hand, cannot be assessed alone by the technical competence of companies. This requires clear guidance from the state. Companies do not have the intelligence and security policy information from regions subject to political change. However, without access to such information, economic operators should not be obliged to assess risks autonomously in the form of self-regulation.

In order to give new impetus to the faltering reform process, under the Croatian Council Presidency in February 2020, the EP and Council instructed the COM to present a compromise proposal on ICT export controls.

European Commission Proposal

„Cyber-surveillance items“ are limited to those ICT that expressly serve the covert surveillance of information and telecommunications data.

A use-related export control (catch-all), which provides for three further pertinent reasons for control in addition to that related to the regime: - Military end-use; - Terrorist end-users; - ICT, where there is evidence that their end-use could serve internal repression and/or violate international human rights or international humanitarian law. Europeanization of the catch-all / Decision-making: - If an EU Member State requires a use-related control for a good with essentially identical end-use in the sense of the above, the Member State concerned should inform the Commission and the other Member States of this, unless there are security policy considerations; - Member States should take a position on this within ten days. Extensions up to 30 working days are possible; - If all Member States agree to control essentially identical transactions, the Commission will publish the relevant information in the Official Journal of the European Union. This ensures the positive knowledge of economic operators in the context of export control law.