Implications Policy Realm The revelation that North Korean actors have dealt with foreign cybercriminals should affect how policymakers think about the current sanctions regime. While the recent financial sanctions did not spark North Korea’s interest in cyber, they may well have contributed additional motivation for the regime to develop its burgeoning cybercrime apparatus. As John Park and Jim Walsh note, toughened sanctions may unintentionally jumpstart innovation on circumvention techniques or “incentivize Pyongyang to collaborate with other entities that participate in illicit trade.”169 Similarly, harsh sanctions may push states into the arms of other actors who “are themselves the targets of sanctions.”170 North Korea’s engagement with the Russian-speaking underground and alleged ties to Iranian actors seem to support this notion.171 In operational terms, financially motivated cyber activities represent a means of diversifying from traditional illicit trade, a potent complement rather than a replacement. Moreover, cybercriminal operations can be extremely difficult to detect, track, and thwart in real time, which limits risk compared to activities that require international travel. These innovations undermine the effectiveness of the North Korean sanctions regime as currently constructed. Factors specific to North Korea’s internet ecosystem and to the cyber realm embolden regime actors to pursue ambitious targets with little fear of reprisal. One is North Korea’s minimal internet connectivity. Only a very small contingent of elites and their families have access to the internet, and the somewhat less restricted domestic intranet, called kwangmyong, is not connected to external networks.172 Thus North Korea is far less vulnerable to retaliatory cyberattacks than most other countries, especially its highly digitalized adversaries. Furthermore, financially motivated cyber operations often target private enterprises, not government or military institutions, 169 Park and Walsh, Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences, 33. 170 Park and Walsh, Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences, 32.
36
171
See note 87 on alleged Iranian cooperation.
172
North Korea Cyber Activity, Insikt Group, Recorded Future (2017), 19, https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/ reports/north-korea-activity.pdf.
Cybercriminal Statecraft
