undesirable actors, though perceptions of North Korean state actors vary widely and do not universally skew negative.185 In fact, as Park and Walsh have written, North Korea’s response to international pressure – “monetizing the risk caused by sanctions” in the form of higher fees – has in turn “attracted more capable partners” from the underground.186 Considering North Korean financially motivated actors’ emulation of cybercriminals and lack of private-sector support, it makes sense that Pyongyang has sought to collaborate with foreign non-state groups. Some experts As more states pursue have dubbed this phenomenon illicit revenue generation the “globalization of cyber”; through cyber means, the Kremez describes it as “uniting overlap between criminal the ununitable,” where aligned
and state groups will grow.
methods and interests drive the integration of criminality and statecraft.187 As more states pursue illicit revenue generation through cyber means, the overlap between criminal and state groups will grow.188
Further Research A detriment of working solely with information in the public domain is that a number of important questions remain unanswered. Many pertain to the government-level relationship between Russia and North Korea. How does Moscow perceive North Korean malign cyber activity? Do Russian authorities know about or encourage the collaboration between CIS cybercriminals and Pyongyang? Cybercrime aside, to what extent do Russian and North Korean state actors spy on each other in cyberspace? It would be valuable, moreover, to understand in greater depth the relationship dynamics between North Korean financially motivated actors and Russian-speaking cybercriminals. Are they sustained partners, or just repeat counterparties? Do their ties stem 185
Desombre et al., Countering Cyber Proliferation: Zeroing in on Access-as-a-Service, 7, 14.
186 Park and Walsh, Stopping North Korea, Inc.: Sanctions Effectiveness and Unintended Consequences, 58. 187
Kremez, The Deadly Planeswalker: How the TrickBot Group United High-Tech Crimeware & APT.
188 For more on the North Korean “model,” see How North Korea Revolutionized the Internet as a Tool for Rogue Regimes. A related trend is the rise in states’ reliance on what Tim Maurer has called “cyber proxies”: “intermediaries that conduct or directly contribute to an offensive cyber action that is enabled knowingly, whether actively or passively.” Delegating tasks to cybercriminals and private firms helps states gain new capabilities and avoid responsibility for offensive operations, among other benefits. Tim Maurer, “Cyber Proxies and Their Implications for Liberal Democracies,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1485332.
40
Cybercriminal Statecraft
