LIM ITS ON F ISS I L E MAT E R I AL P RO DUCTI O N
2. Plutonium 2.1 Description Iran’s primary option to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons is the Arak heavy-water research reactor, which, if completed and operated as planned, could produce enough weapons grade plutonium in its spent fuel for one or two nuclear weapons annually.5 Under the JCPOA, Iran will work with an international consortium (including all of the P5+1) to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor to a new design agreed to by the P5+1. The new design will reduce the reactor’s power level from 40 megawatts-thermal (MWt) to 20 MWt, and replace the natural uranium fuel with low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel enriched to 3.67% U-235 (see Figure 5). The initial fuel load for the redesigned reactor will be manufactured outside of Iran, and the international consortium will provide technical assistance to help Iran build facilities to test and fabricate fuel thereafter. Iran will cease production of the original natural uranium fuel for Arak and destroy the original calandria or core for the Arak reactor by filling the openings with concrete. In addition to redesigning Arak, the comprehensive agreement calls for Iran to ship all of the spent fuel from Arak out of the
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The Russian-built Bushehr light-water power reactor produces large amounts of plutonium—about 200 kg annually—but Iran has agreed to return all Russian-origin spent fuel to Russia for the lifetime of the reactor. In addition, IAEA safeguards at Bushehr would detect with high confidence diversion of spent fuel or irradiation of clandestine targets to produce plutonium.
The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Definitive Guide
