V E R IF ICAT I ON AND COM P L I A N C E
4. Inspections and Monitoring 4.1 Description International monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program under the JCPOA consists of three tiers: (1) Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA, which it currently implements; (2) the Additional Protocol (AP) to Iran’s CSA, which Iran will implement under the JCPOA; and (3) additional verification measures in the JCPOA, which are unique to the agreement. Initially, Iran will implement the AP on a provisional basis (as it did from 2003 to 2005). Iran will “seek” ratification by the Majles (Iran’s parliament) when the IAEA reaches the “broader conclusion” that all of Iran’s nuclear material is in peaceful uses, or after 8 years, whichever comes first. Iranian adherence to the CSA and the AP is permanent, so long as Iran remains party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The specific JCPOA verification measures remain in effect for 10 to 25 years. Overall, the JCPOA verification regime has two basic objectives. First, it is intended to verify that specified limits are being observed at declared nuclear facilities, such as Natanz, Fordow, Arak, and Esfahan, and that nuclear material at these facilities is not diverted to undeclared uses. Second, the verification regime is designed to complement national intelligence efforts to help deter or detect any Iranian effort to engage in clandestine or undeclared nuclear activities prohibited by the JCPOA.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
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