A Series of Somewhat Formalized Arguments on Religious BeliefWhich may or may not be so incredibly dry as to be dull By Reynolds Johnson
0. On Humility: P0.1 – In order to be intellectually honest, one must abandon identified false belief(s). P0.2 – A considered argument that purports to show false belief(s) fails only if it is invalid, or unsound. Conclusion 0 – In order to be intellectually honest one must abandon false beliefs identified by an argument, or show that argument to be invalid or unsound.
There is no way to definitively show existential beliefs to be false. After all, any number of seemingly impossible things could be true. It might be possible that gremlins exist, or that cats have invisible angel wings, or that there are Loch Ness monsters, or bigfeet, or honest politicians, or any such nonsense. But what can be shown to be a false is the belief that there is good reason to think that these things are true. With that in mind, this argument on humility has both nothing and everything to do with the arguments below.
1. Taxonomy of Justification for Faith: P1.1 - Arguments for religion will either deal with the truth of that religion (T), or not (N). P1.2 - If arguments of type T are successful they give reason for belief. P1.3 - If arguments of type N are successful they give reason for adherence. P1.4 - Reasons of type N will either be pragmatic (N1), or not (N2). P1.5 - Reasons of type T will either be based on evidence (T1) or not (T2). Conclusion 1 – All arguments for religion will be one of 4 types: T2, N2, T1, N1.
This argument is based solely off of tautological premises. In addition, two premises not directly related to the conclusion are included in this section for ease of reference. It should also be noted that in practice, Arguments of type T are not used in isolation. Almost always there is a tacit argument of type N attached to the end which runs something like, “if true, then adherence.” Because all such type N arguments are shown to be unsound if the type T argument doesn't hold, this further distinction is unnecessary. Finally, bear in mind that “reason for belief” is epistemological in nature. When I found my parents stashing presents under a Christmas tree, and then they explained themselves, I had, at the sad age of 22, no more reason to believe in Santa Claus. However, as the seasons most heartwarming movies explain to me time and again, I still have reason to “believe” in Santa Claus. This usage is roughly equivalent to feigning belief and/or to hoping, and unless I am sadly unique in my inability to continue believing something to be true after it has been shown to be false, these two usages cannot be interchangeable.
2. T2 Arguments “Blind Faith”: P2.1 – Arguments asserting the truth of x without evidence give no reason to believe x. P2.2 – Reasons for religion of type T2 assert the truth of a religion without evidence. P2.3=1.2 – If arguments of type T are successful they give reason for belief in the religion. Conclusion 2 – Arguments of type T2 are always unsuccessful.
Obviously this whole argument rests on the supposition that asserting truth without evidence is no good. If you disagree with this, then I must confess a certain confusion as to why you're still reading this paper, but as long as you're here allow me to explain that everything that you use to come to the conclusion that your religion is true is, in fact, evidence. From the burning in your bosom to burning bushes, and from walking on water to wine and wafers, if you have divorced yourself from evidence then no one, not even the god(s) you claim to worship, could convince you that you were wrong.
3. N2 Arguments “Empty Faith”: P3.1 – All reasons to adhere to a set of beliefs will be either pragmatic or epistemological or both. P3.2 – Arguments of type N2 are neither pragmatic nor epistemological. P3.3=1.3 – If arguments of type N are successful they give reason for adherence. Conclusion 3 – Arguments of type N2 are always unsuccessful.
I very nearly didn't include these types of arguments. After all, who would ever use an argument with no reason to reach the conclusion at all? Unfortunately these arguments are all too common. Usually they deal with the consistency of a set of beliefs, which has nothing to do with the truth of that set, and nothing to do with any convincing motivation to hold that set if not true either. Obviously there are some problems here. Having a more consistent set of beliefs is very impressive to be sure, but there is an infinite number of sets of consistent beliefs and no reason to feel that they are true. If I hold the following, P1 – Pirates always travel by boat. P2 – Pirates sneak into my room each night and steal all my clothes, P3 – After stealing clothes Pirates head to Montreal by train. And someone comes along and points out that the set of beliefs would be far more consistent if I replaced “train” with “Spanish galleon”, they are certainly right, but it gives no real reason to think that each night there is a pinstriped man-thong on a Spanish galleon bound for Montreal.
As such, arguments showing that a religion is more consistent with, say, a certain set of scriptures, should be viewed likewise, absent any argument to believe that this set of scriptures is true.
4. T1 Arguments “Scientific Faith”: P4a.1 – Given two explanations, the one with fewest assumptions to explain the evidence is most likely true. P4a.2 – For any evidence there can be an explanation with fewer needed assumptions than invisible god(s). Conclusion 4a – For any evidence, the explanation not requiring invisible god(s) is most likely true.
P4b.1 – There is no reason for belief in something less likely to be true than a known alternative. P4b.2=4a.2 – For any evidence there is an explanation with fewer needed assumptions than invisible god(s). P4b.3=Conclusion 4a – For any evidence, the explanation not requiring invisible god(s) is most likely true. Conclusion 4b – For any evidence there is no reason to believe in an explanation requiring invisible god(s).
P4c.1=1.2 – If arguments of type T are successful they give reason for belief. P4c.2=Conclusion 4b – For any evidence there is no reason to believe in an explanation requiring invisible god(s). Conclusion 4c – Arguments of type T are unsuccessful for any religion that requires invisible god(s).
P4d.1 – For any religion, there is a supernatural element that could fairly replace “invisible god(s)”. P4d.2=Conclusion 4c – Arguments of type T are unsuccessful for any religion that requires invisible god(s). Conclusion 4(d) – Arguments of type T1 are unsuccessful for any religion.
This is where most of the discussion of religion takes place. However, the only argument needed to show that these reasons are not compelling is a specific application of Occam's Razor. Occam's Razor (P4a.1) states that given multiple explanations for something, that with fewest assumptions is most likely to be true. Most people know how to apply Occam's Razor perfectly well in their “normal” lives. If I happen to be missing a certain pinstriped article of clothing, it would be completely possible for it to have been stolen by a group of seafarers, but it's far more likely that it was lost in the wash, or dropped on the way there, or borrowed by a roommate. Why? Because all of these require fewer assumptions. The same applies in “normal” life to near parallels of religious claims. If I tell you that I saw a show where a performer was fatally impaled on something long and sharp, and then placed in a locked coffin only to rise from the dead later, your skeptical eye immediately recognizes how many assumptions that would take to be true, and concludes that it must have been some sort of trick. But take nearly the same story, give it thousands of years, and hundreds of interpretations and translations (all of which should make it less likely to be true, mind you) and somehow it's accepted as fact. It's worth noting again the intended epistemological nature of “reason for belief” in p4b.1. It's also worth noting that this gives no specific degree of likelihood of any proposition being true. Finally there may be some “religions” where premise 4d.1 would not hold. They are the exception and not the rule, and require a fairly loose definition of the word religion. Conveniently though, as the chance that this premise is true decreases across religions, the practical impetus to show the religion to be false decreases as well. For this reason, I shall not spend much time trying to apply this premise to religions where it doesn't already clearly apply, even though I may feel that it does still hold true.
5. N1 Arguments “Agnostic in Disguise”: P5.1=Conclusion 4 – Arguments of type T1 are unsuccessful for any religion. P5.2=Conclusion 2 – Arguments of type T2 are always unsuccessful. P5.3=Conclusion 3 – Arguments of type N2 are always unsuccessful. P5.4=Conclusion 1 – All arguments for religion will be one of 4 types: T2, N2, T1, N1. P5.5 – Arguments of type N1 are pragmatic and don't deal with truth. (P1.4) Conclusion 5 – The only arguments for religion that can be successful are pragmatic arguments.
The only compelling reasons for being religious are practical. There are many practical reasons to be religious. Maybe you don't want to hurt your friends and family. Maybe you feel that morality would disappear without religion. Maybe there's a cute guy at seminary. Now I, obviously, don't find any of the pragmatic reasons to be religious terribly convincing, but as long as you recognize that you aren't motivated by truth, reasonable people can disagree.
6. The Necessary Acceptance of Harm P6.1 – To be intellectually honest in adherence to something one must do (at least) two things: a. Find the known reasons for adherence more compelling than the known reasons against. b. Accept the known arguments against adherence as necessary consequences of adherence. P6.2 – Each Religion has a measure of harm that it does that counts as an argument against adherence. P6.3=Conclusion 5 – The only arguments for religion that can be successful are pragmatic arguments. Conclusion 6 – In order to adhere to a religion, in an intellectually honest manner, one must find that practical arguments for adherence outweigh the harm done.
The final piece to add to this cacophony is the fact that any harm done by your religion must be accepted as a necessary consequence of whatever it is that you gain from religion. Let's say that you're religiosity is motivated by that cute guy at seminary. If your religion condemns a certain race, you have to be willing to accept that you are prioritizing that cute boy over the support of an organization that perpetuates racial injustice. The comparison is not always so silly. Some people may decide that the good that they can do in trying to change a damaging religious organization from within outweighs the harm that is done by their support of the religion in the mean time. This is a perfectly reasonable argument. It does, however come down to lines in the sand and comparisons of harm done, and worth. So really, it depends on how cute that boy is.