INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Has Defence gone off the Pacific deep end? The Advancing Pacific Partnerships 2019 defence assessment gives too much away to great power balancing, writes Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, and this isn’t necessarily in New Zealand’s interests. Since the Ardern government took office, we’ve been treated to a veritable deluge of publicly launched defence policy documents. Minister Ron Mark has had no need of a new White Paper – the next one is due no earlier than 2021. But last year he launched something arguably just as significant in a Strategic Defence Policy Statement which changed New Zealand’s tune on China and paved the way for the purchase of the P8 maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft. The government’s ambitious remit for the defence force has since been spelled out in a new Defence Capability Plan. There are now so many major projects (many exceeding $1billion) that one has to wonder about the breaking point for the pursestrings of future governments. And that’s not all for readers of defence policy pronouncements.
Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington
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Boeing P8 maritime surveillance and patrol aircraft
Last year saw the first edition of a new series of Assessments explain how defence was taking climate change seriously, including in the Pacific. Jointly released by James Shaw, this was one way for Mr Mark to thank the Greens for their agreement to some of the above, including expensive aircraft good at finding submarines. The second assessment has now been launched, this time dealing New Zealand’s defence priorities in the South Pacific. Its ostensible purpose takes us back to one of the most important lines in last year’s big Statement: that the South Pacific would now be treated with the same operational importance as the defence of New Zealand and its immediate surrounds. As well as connecting to the government’s Pacific Reset, there is also a flow on from the climate change assessment. This week’s new
paper highlights the Boe Declaration in which Pacific Island Forum (PIF) countries identified climate change as the region’s most serious and urgent problem. But the writers of the new Pacific assessment seem to be even more worried about growing “strategic competition” in the South Pacific. These two words can readily be translated to mean China’s growing influence. China is only mentioned once in the document - in a list of the PIF’s dialogue partners. But Beijing’s presence hovers in the background when we read that: “the pace, intensity, and scope of engagement by external actors, who may not always respect our values across their activities, are at the heart of a growing sense of geostrategic competition that is animating many nations’ renewed focus on the Pacific.” Line of Defence
