COVID-19
Pre-departure border controls may minimise post-arrival COVID risk The political focus on perceived security gaps in Managed Isolation Facilities, writes chief editor Nicholas Dynon, distracts from the critical task of implementing more proactive border management measures. In a 19 August media release, Minister of Housing, Hon Dr Megan Wood, announced that the security of the Managed Isolation and Quarantine System and maritime border would be bolstered by an additional 500 NZDF personnel. “We are reducing our reliance on private security guards by scaling up Defence Force personnel, especially in the highest risk facilities,” explained the Minister. “They will staff the higher risk security areas such as entry and exit points and public areas.” On 26 August, the Director General of Health authorised members of the Armed Forces at MIQFs with enforcement officer powers under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act 2020 to be able to give legally enforceable directions, and to request a person to provide identifying information. Under section 18 of the Act the Director-General may authorise “a suitably qualified and trained person who is employed or engaged by the Crown or a Crown entity” to carry out any functions and powers of an enforcement officer under the Act. Some legal experts have since questioned the legality of authorising military personnel under section 18 given that servicemen and women are not employed by the Crown or by a Crown entity, which is generally taken to refer to Executive Government,
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but rather by the Governor General on behalf of the sovereign in accordance with section 5 of the Defence Act 1990. Beyond such legal arguments, some commentators have had more to say. Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie, in a blog post titled “The NZDF Aren’t Handbag Checkers”, wrote “given that we know the ‘War on Covid-19’ is a long game, it would be madness to lock down our Defence Force into a cycle of running hotels, manning roadside barriers, ‘handbag checking’ and ‘drain-sniffing’.” There are no doubt strong arguments to be made on either side of that debate. But, ultimately, no one is doubting the ability of NZDF personnel deployed at MIQFs to acquit themselves admirably in their unexpected role. What’s concerning about the Housing Minister’s announcement is its implication that private security is to blame for gaps in the COVID border control regime. As part of her announcement, Dr Woods stated that the government would “be moving to a model of direct employment of security guards with the appropriate training and paying the living wage.” Unsurprisingly, the private security industry’s peak body, the New Zealand Security Association (NZSA), hit back. “The announcement raises a number of concerns with regards
to how the plans will be enacted and the resulting impact on security providers and their staff,” stated NZSA CEO Gary Morrison in a 20 August update to his members. “It also fails to recognise that many of the staff working on these sites are already being paid the living wage and are engaged in industry [NZQA Certificate] Level 3 training.” Morrison also acknowledged the controversies surrounding the highly criticised role of private security providers in securing Melbourne’s isolation facilities, but pointed out that the making of any trans-Tasman parallels is misleading. To be sure, there have been disappointing lapses by private security personnel at the MIFs, but these have been overstated by a media that has allegedly been offering bounties for images of dozing isolation facility security guards. “When things go wrong, the tendency is to blame operational mistakes,” Keith Woodford, Honorary Professor of Agri-Food Systems at Lincoln University wrote recently in relation to the issue. “The reality is that such mistakes always occur in large scale operations. The New Zealand border operation, with between 400 and 500 people entering on most days, is very large scale. Yes, mistakes will happen.” Meanwhile, with hundreds of travellers entering New Zealand daily
October/November 2020
