5 minute read
Defence structure versus structure
Is there a problem with the organisational design of the NZDF Headquarters? If there is, writes Dr Simon Ewing-Jarvie, history suggests that the Defence Force is not well placed to resolve it.
Much can be established about any organisation from two documents – the pay scales and the internal phone directory. One tells you what is valued and the other reveals the approach to work. Together they are a road map to the culture. Job titles appearing in both documents cast more light on the norms and behaviours.
NZDF pay scales have been the subject of media coverage in relation to retention issues. However, nothing much has been said about the merits or otherwise of how NZDF organises itself and consequently spends the remuneration part of Vote: Defence Force.
It is a given that any organisation with the size and range of tasks of the NZDF will be bureaucratic, and several formal reviews of structure have occurred. However, given the declining overall size of the force, discussion regarding the current number and size of headquarters is due.
The current situation of hollow units creates a dilemma. Should a large HQ structure be maintained in anticipation of a complete – and possibly larger – future force? Or should the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) get the HQ to an appropriate size now knowing that it is easier to upscale than vice versa in the future?
The actual size of HQ NZDF is extremely difficult to ascertain due to the data supplied under OIA being consolidated numbers reporting to Tier 3 positions. The NZDF declined to provide a detailed organisational chart claiming that it would take substantial research and collation effort as one does not readily exist. This latter point is concerning given claims in the Briefing to the Incoming Minister this year that work was progressing well on the recommendations from the 2020 Op Burnham report regarding organisational structure, record keeping and retrieval processes. Therefore, I have made several assumptions to come up with an estimated HQ NZDF plus HQ JFNZ headcount of 4,227 which is 28% of the total force of 15,236. About 25% (1,162) of these positions are vacant. This is comprised of the major staff groups shown in the graph below.
Structurally, this represents fifty major staff elements comprising five two-stars, 17 one-stars (including two civilian equivalents), ten Colonels (equivalent) and 17 senior management grade civilians. This rank line up should also be considered against the current total force size.
There are thirty uniformed positions of Colonel equivalent or above in the HQ which is a ratio of one for every 406 uniforms (fewer than an infantry battalion in numbers.) If civilians are added, there is one senior HQ role for every 311 people (roughly the full complement of our two frigates) in the NZDF.
Though likely misattributed to Joseph Stalin, I do not believe that “quantity has its own quality”.
What can be gleaned of the quality of the HQ structure? Quite a lot and deserving of a longer article. For example, in the NZDF there are 92 position titles with the word ‘strategy’ or ‘strategic’ in them. 39 are civilian roles. There are many more roles that have strategy as a component of the position description.
I am not setting out to criticise any individual but it is not possible to credibly argue for this many strategic roles when defence planning forms part of a much larger national security effort. Strategies are contested. Those who write uncontested strategies are planners, not strategists. Most of these supposedly strategic jobs relate to medium to long-term planning and analysis.
As at February, the Ministry of Defence had 175 staff. It had 18 Tier Two and Three managers, which is a ratio of approximately one for every ten staff. The Ministry was able to produce a detailed organisational chart which shows that 52% are project management and procurement professionals, 29% are policy advisors and analysts and 19% are corporate staff.
Is there a problem with the organisational design of the NZDF Headquarters? Probably, but more research is urgently needed. However, leaving any Defence Force to fix this sort of thing has rarely worked in the past.
Examples abound, from the resistance to the New Zealand Joint Force HQ discussed by Colin Robinson at Wavell Room (February 2022) through to Michael Shoebridge’s 19 June article in The Australian titled “Defence can’t fix itself and that matters for our security.”
Consequently, CDF has two choices. The first is to tell politicians that there is “nothing to see here” and stick it out to the election and his retirement. That leaves the incoming CDF and potentially a new Minister to decide the next move. Alternatively, he could take the tougher path and seek external help for headquarters reform while warning the government of the significant risk this carries in an already fragile organisation.
In Defence, there are never easy choices. A long-read version of this article is available on the author’s page at Patreon.com.
