Border Management - March 2019 by Defsec New Zealand

BORDER M A N A GEMEN T MARCH 2019

www.bordermanagement.net

WWW.BEHAVIOURALANALYSIS.COM

HEADLINE SPONSOR

MALL OF AMERICA®

21 - 23 MAY 2019 | MALL OF AMERICA®, MINNEAPOLIS, USA

The 2nd International Conference on Tactical Risk Analysis and Non-racial Profiling Techniques

TOPICS WILL INCLUDE: Hostile Reconnaissance Indicators Lone Wolf Behaviour Suicide Bomber Intervention Recognising Mental Health Disorders Group Offenders Sexually Deviant Behaviour in Public Crowd Dynamics Non-Racial Profiling Techniques Addressing Religious & Ethnic Concerns Halo Effect & Stereotyping Spotlight Effect & Paranoia Forensic Linguistics Questioning Styles Intelligent CCTV Voice, Temperature and Gait Analysis Physiological Stress Indicators Training to Detect Behavioural Detection Officer Deployment Communicating Concerns

Court-siding & Fixated Threats

Online Behavioural Analytics

Insider Threat Identification

TOPICS WILL INCLUDE:

Case Studies Mall of America® Security Tour

International Legislation Montreal Protocol Update Post-Incident Litigation Recognising Potentially Unruly Behaviour

Communication Skills De-escalation Techniques Cross-cultural Challenges The Impact of Alcohol at Altitude Responsible Service of Alcohol Unruly Passenger Restraint Issues Football Hooliganism & Mob Behaviour Frotteurs & Sexually Deviant Behaviour Inflight Theft Bomb Threat Management Flight Attendant Uniforms Bodycams & Inflight CCTV Social Media Reporting Human Trafficking Impact of Emotional Support Animals Medication & Inflight Behaviour Airport Responsibility Aircrew Mental Health Airline Case Studies

The 3rd International Conference on Unruly Airline Passenger Behaviour

18 - 19 SEPTEMBER 2019 | RIVERSIDE VENUE, HEATHROW, UK

WWW.UNRULYPAX.COM

ENGAGING CO-CREATION TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE SECURITY THREATS 2 - 4 July 2019 Sands Expo & Convention Centre

•

Singapore

www.interpol-world.com

Global Safety Today • Improving Security for Tomorrow • Forecasting and Planning for the Future

INTERPOL World is a global co-creation opportunity which engages the public and private sectors in dialogue and fosters collaboration to counter future security and policing challenges. 30 strategic Co-creation Labs to discuss the challenges and solutions for combating the crimes of the future Exhibition that serves as a business and networking event for 250 manufacturers, distributors, and Research and Development organizations to offer innovative products and cutting-edge technologies

EVENT OWNER

SUPPORTED BY

INTERPOL Working Groups (by invitation only) including the chief innovation officers group, artificial intelligence, drones and the Darknet and cryptocurrency group

INDUSTRY INSIGHTS BY

visitor@interpol-world.com

HELD IN

MANAGED BY

In this issue... Features Page 8 Brexit: Taking back control of our borders? Tony Smith CBE, Chair of IBMATA.

Page 28 Slash resistant clothing protecting those who protect our borders Robert Kaiser, CEO of the PPSS Group.

Page 12 Air Borders â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Protected but porous Phillip Wood MBE, Head of Buckinghamshire New University School of Aviation and Security.

Page 16 Smart Borders for a Smart Future: Smarter, faster, safer and more predictable Lars Karlsson, MD Global Consulting and Senior Executive of KGH Customs Services.

Page 32 Ghost of Borders Past: Old borders present new challenges for Schengen Dr Roderick Parkes, Senior Researcher, EU Institute for Security Studies. Page 36 Destined to Repeat: Are the lessons of 9/11 being forgotten? Laura Hains CPP, owner of Hammerhead Security Services LLC.

Page 20 Will smartphones soon replace biometric application centres?

Page 40 Behavioural analysis and the role of the human in security

Bill Sillery, freelance writer and managed migration consultant.

Philip Baum, Managing Director of Green Light Limited.

Page 24 Migrant Smuggling: Concepts, complexities and current realities

Page 46 Division and differentiation: Insights for border management from Ireland and Aotearoa New Zealand

Marie McAuliffe, Head of IOM Migration Policy, Research Division. Prof. Anna Triandafyllidou, Robert Schuman Chair, EUI Global Governance Programme.

Dr Germana Nicklin, Deputy Director, Massey University Centre for Defence and Security Studies. Page 52 Border control, immigration policy, and economic performance Abul Rizvi PSM, former Deputy Secretary, Australian Department of Immigration.

News Page 58 AI and intuitive decision-making in irregular people movement Geoff Heath, founder of LabourPulse.

Page 62 From the frontier of border security Dr. Raj K Arora, Professor of International Affairs and Security Studies, Sadar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice.

Page 11 IATA CEO: Cooperation key to securing aviation amid evolving threats Page 19 Top ten issues for contracts and commercial Page 23 SITA Report: Passengers happier with self-scan passport checks Page 31 Gemalto awarded Uganda’s new e-immigration solution Schiphol Airport deploys Vision Box facial recognition platform Page 45 EU: Smart lie-detection system for EU borders

Page 66 Promoting the seamless traveller experience Helena Bononi, Director of Industry Relations, World Travel & Tourism Council.

Page 70 Computer Says No: Transparency needed in the rush towards automated decision making Nicholas Dynon, Chief Editor, Border Management Magazine.

Page 74 New Zealand’s Maritime Border – an opportunity for industry John Campbell MNZM, CEO of Ra Moana Consulting.

Page 51 WCO: Enhanced connectivity: Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China WCO supports MENA Region in Pre-arrival Processing System Page 57 DHS: Secretary breaks down national emergency funds DHS: Northern Triangle Security Ministers meet Page 65 IBMATA and WTTC strike partnership Page 77 BTI links Homeland security needs, academic expertise

Events Page 69 Identifying Hostile Intent: Behavioural Analysis 2019 Page 78 IBMATA Border Management & Technologies Summit Europe 2019 Page 81 Upcoming events

Welcome to the inaugural issue of Border I’m delighted that we’ve been joined in this first-ever issue by a such an eminent line-up of contributing authors and interviewees from such a wide range of border-interested disciplines. These pages are bristling with knowledge and insights tailored for members of the international border management community As Lars Karlsson (pages 16-18) eloquently points out, the borders we see today were designed decades ago for other purposes and under different circumstances. The nature and function of borders, and the expectations of their myriad stakeholders, are never static. In many ways, borders are weather veins, reflecting the ever-fluctuating climates of aspiration and paranoia, cosmopolitanism and xenophobia, cooperativeness and aggression of the polities they bound. They are, as Germana Nicklin (pages 46-50) usefully describes, symbols sometimes of differentiation, and sometimes of divisiveness. Thought of in this way, borders are not just locations where security is exercised, but – more broadly – they act as barometers of security within a society. Nowhere, perhaps, is this more dramatically played out on a daily basis than in the renowned flag ceremonies along the India-Pakistan border, where Raj Arora (pages 62-64) spent years on the front-line. Unsurprisingly, Raj talks of the importance of cooperation among all stakeholders within border areas, including the border population, civil society organizations, local leaders, and local administration. It is from within the eye of the Brexit storm that Tony Smith (pages 8-10) notes that “taking back our borders”

has been a political catch-cry throughout the Brexit saga. An irrational catch-cry it may well be, but it certainly does tell us something about the border as a barometer of security within UK society. Something similar could be said in relation to events across the Atlantic as President Donald Trump unlocks billions of dollars of national emergency funding to bolster the U.S.’ southern border. Laura Hains (pages 36-39), however, suggests that there’s more to the White House’s Mexico wall fixation than mere political hyperbolae. Chinks, it appears, are starting to appear in the U.S.’ post-9/11 border armour. Beyond the black and white of media coverage on such issues, the reality is usually less clear-cut. Anna Triandafyllidou and Marie McAuliffe (pages 2427) remind us that the drivers underpinning migrant decision-making in relation to irregular migration pathways and smuggling are complex, and that smugglers/traffickers can themselves be corrupt officials holding positions within law enforcement and border authorities. While walls and razor wire fences may well be the ultimate symbol of a nation-state’s right to delineate and protect its territorial integrity, they tend to be a pejorative for many, anathema to individuals’ right to mobility and to the ideal of a world without borders. As Philip Wood (pages 12-14) poetically puts it, the challenge for border authorities is that of balancing the ‘need to say no’ with the ‘need to flow’. As many of us well understand, for all their symbolism, borders are not the natural enemy of mobility.

Details

Media

Publisher Craig Flint

Website: http://bordermanagement.net

Chief Editor Nicholas Dynon Advertising enquiries craig@bordermanagement.net T: +64 (07) 868 2703 Editorial enquiries nick@bordermanagement.net M: +64 (0)22 366 3691

Linkedin: http://linkedin.com/company/border-management Twitter: https://twitter.com/bordermgmt Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/BorderManagement/

Management! In many contexts, and with the help of innovative technologies, they are becoming less visible than ever. Lars reminds us of this with his description of the ‘Smart Border’, as does Helena Bononi (pages 6668) in her account of the WTTC’s vision of ‘seamless travel’. Indeed, according to Abul Rizvi (pages 52 to 56), strong border control can be a necessary enabler for big, expansive migration programs. Control of borders, he says, gives a level of confidence to the public that migration can be managed in the national interest. In what is perhaps the most beautiful irony of the border symbol, we are also seeing the border itself becoming mobile. Bill Sillery (pages 20-22) tells us that governments and the private sector are rushing to unlock the benefits that self-service mobile solutions bring. WorldReach Software’s IDV solution, for example, is allowing EU nationals to apply for settlement ahead of Brexit (including a facial biometric check) on their smartphones. While biometrics-based technologies are proving themselves in confirming identities, writes Geoff Heath (pages 58-61), there is currently no substitute for human nous in the assessment of a visa applicant’s or traveller’s intentions, or ‘genuineness’. And as Roderick Parkes (pages 32-35) notes, the Schengen borders which held up best in the recent refugee crisis were the ones with large numbers of well-trained staff, able to differentiate regular travellers from irregular ones. It’s a point well noted by Philip Baum (pages 4044), who comments that the most effective detection

With thanks to

technology of all is the human brain. While technological solutions tend to be designed to detect specific threats – and then need updating when the threats change – the human approach relies on subjective assessment that considers factors beyond the bomb or the contraband itself. Disruptive tech, such as AI, will undoubtedly be an enabler for faster processing of ever-increasing numbers of international travellers, but its role in visa decision making, for example, is an area of fear and contention. To manage the potential for public fallout, I make the case (pages 70-73) that government innovators in this space need to change their disposition from one of opacity to one of transparency – and to up their game in terms of credible public consultation. These issues pose many challenging but ultimately worthwhile questions to us as border management professionals, whether we are tech developers, solutions providers, capacity builders, policy makers or front-line officers. I look forward to the magazine providing a platform for the type of thinking that John Campbell (pages 74-76) describes as ‘blue sky’; a space where government, industry and academia can engage, debate, and showcase, and ultimately experiment with, as he terms it, ‘the art of the possible’. Nicholas Dynon, Chief Editor

Next issue Supply chain; biometrics; Bali Process; supplier updates; surveilling borders.

Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher. Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate. However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

Brexit

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Brexit: Taking back control of our borders? Those hoping Brexit will provide the UK with greater ability to control its borders may be disappointed, writes IBMATA Chair Tony Smith CBE.

Tony Smith is a former Director General of the UK Border Force with over 40 years’ government experience in immigration and border control. He has the unique distinction of having served as Head of Borders in two countries: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2000 – 2003) and UK Immigration Service (2005 – 2007). He is now an independent border management consultant, Managing Director of Fortinus Global Ltd, and chairperson of the International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA). Tony was made a Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) in 2013 for his services to the safety and security of the London 2012 Olympics.

MARCH 2019

One of the standard political catchphrases in the ongoing saga of the UK’s exit from the European Union (BREXIT) is “Taking back control of our borders”. Along with “taking back control” of a few other things, such as our money, laws, fishing and farming. So, what do we mean by border “control” – and how will this really change after Brexit (assuming Brexit ever happens, that is)? In fact, the UK already has a pretty comprehensive border control in place. Every passenger arriving in the UK goes through passport control where identity is verified, and watch lists are checked. A great many of them are in fact checked before arrival, through the submission of Advanced Passenger Information (API) by the transportation company bringing them. Electronic exit checks are also in place. The only exception to this is at the UK / Irish border, where the Common Travel Area allows free movement of persons between the UK and Ireland. And the Channel Islands, for that matter. Unlike most of the other EU Member States, neither the UK nor Ireland is part of the “Schengen Acquis” which allows the free movement of people within the Schengen zone. In fact, both the UK and Ireland have a specific “opt out” of Schengen – something no longer available to other EU Member States. This means that all EU and EEA passports holders will still go through passport control upon entry to the UK or Ireland; and

may be refused entry in certain circumstances relating to public health, public security or public policy. Equally, “third country” nationals require a permission to enter the UK when arriving from another EU Member State; and this includes a visa if they are citizens of a country on the UK visa list. So, what is the additional element of “control” that Brexit will bring to the UK Border? The CTA will be preserved, so (contrary to some opinion) there will be no need for passport controls between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (although Customs controls are more problematic). Everybody arriving from elsewhere will still go through passport control. What difference will Brexit make? The key distinction will be the UK proposal to end “free movement” of people within the EU. This means in effect that EU and EEA (and Swiss) passport holders will in future need a “permission” to enter the UK. You might argue that they already need that now – and you might be right, to a point. But under current law there is an expectation that all EU / EEA / Swiss passport holders will be admitted at the UK Border, regardless of their purpose in coming to the UK or their proposed duration of stay. That is not the case for other “third country” nationals. They need “permission” (currently described in law as “leave”) to enter the UK; and this may be refused if they do not meet the requirements of the immigration rules. BORDER MANAGEMENT

So – at some point in the future – all EU / EEA / Swiss passport holders will require leave to enter the UK, in the same way that “third country” nationals require leave to enter now. And they will need permission to stay. Indeed the “EU registration scheme” is already underway, inviting those EU nationals wishing to stay in the UK post Brexit to register for a permission to so. So, we talk about “taking back control of our borders” what we really mean is “taking back control of EU migration”. This is beyond doubt a response to rising immigration figures from the EU; and the consequential impact upon UK population growth and pressure upon social services, accommodation and infrastructure in the UK to cope with this. Ironically, since the decision was taken by the British people to leave the EU in 2016, net migration from EU countries has dropped from a high of 180,00 in 2015 to 74,000 in 2018; suggesting that many EU citizens voted with their feet when they felt unwanted. Oddly, net migration from “third country” citizens rose to a record high of 248,000 in 2018; the highest figure since 2004. Yet this is an area over which the UK government already has control (or should have control)? So, you might say that the government could “take back control” of its borders (and by that they really mean immigration, which doesn’t have the same ring to it) without leaving the EU at all, but by issuing rather less visas and permits to stay than they do now. Something they vowed to do some years ago, with a policy intent to reduce overall net migration to less than 100,000 a year. Small wonder there has been a row in cabinet between the new Home Secretary (Sajid Javid) and the former Home Secretary and now Prime Minister (Theresa May) over this policy; and a change of tone to reduce immigration to “sustainable numbers” rather than a set figure. 10

BORDER MANAGEMENT

In fact, many politicians argue (with some justification) that leaving the EU will compromise UK border control. That is because UK membership enables access to several EU systems such as Europol, Eurojust and the Schengen Information System (SIS2) for background checks. But perhaps things are rather simple. People will always disagree on immigration and asylum policy, numbers and so on. But the majority still need to feel that they have “control”; and policy can be adjusted in tune with the elected government of the day. This becomes more difficult when the elected government of the day cedes power in contentious policy areas such as this to an unelected supra national authority such as the EU Commission. Which is itself wedded to fundamental freedoms of movement of goods, people, capital and services. And woe betide any Member State who dares to challenge that. The UK Border Force is one of the best in the world, training

border agencies across the globe on detection, intelligence, targeting and the like. To say that we don’t have control of our borders undermines them and the great work that they do both overseas, at our ports of entry, and inland. But like anyone else they need to understand who is calling the shots on immigration and asylum policy in the UK; and what tools will be provided to them to enable them to deliver their mission. There will never be complete agreement on Brexit. It is hard to imagine a topic that has created greater division in UK society than this. But endless squabbling in the UK parliament - and between the UK and the EU - is not helping, regardless of your position on leave or remain. The restoration of very clear powers to the UK parliament, coupled with consistent messaging and actions from our political leaders, is the most likely vehicle to satisfy people that the government is really in control of its borders – or anything else, for that matter. MARCH 2019

Cooperation key to securing aviation amid evolving threats IATA head calls for improved adherence to standards, information sharing and risk-based solutions to make aviation more secure. In a February 27 address to the AVSEC World conference in Miami, International Air Transport Association (IATA) Director General and CEO Alexandre de Juniac called on industry and governments to work together more closely to keep aviation secure. The call for greater cooperation acknowledged evolving security threats and a forecasted doubling of passenger demand to 8.2 billion by 2037. IATA urged stakeholders to focus on global standards, informationsharing, risk-based analysis and emerging threats to secure aviation for decades to come. Global Standards Global standards for aviation security were agreed by governments through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and are codified in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention, yet many struggle to meet the standards. “It’s been 45 years since Annex 17 was added to the Chicago Convention,” said de Juniac. “Still, far too many states are struggling to implement the Annex 17 baseline requirements. A weakness anywhere in the system affects everyone. “The goal is 100 percent implementation. There is an urgent need for developed countries to provide more comprehensive assistance to developing countries to ensure the baseline security measures are met. And innovation is key.”

MARCH 2019

Information Sharing Acknowledging the information sharing standard in Annex 17 as a “step in the right direction”, the IATA Director General stated that “it falls short of the true multilateral information provision of risk information that is needed.” “Threats will continue to evolve and become ever more complex,” said de Juniac. “Those wishing to do aviation harm have no state allegiance; they cross borders to share information and collaborate to refine their methods of causing chaos and destruction. “The focus of governments must be on protecting people. And that cannot be done with insular thinking. We must get better at sharing information.” Sustainable Risk-Based Solutions “In the years since 9/11 investment in aviation security has grown exponentially. There is no doubt that this has made flying more secure. But the efficiency of the system needs to be constantly challenged. Governments need to pursue riskbased security concepts that focus resources where the need is greatest,” said de Juniac. Critical areas to address include: • Securely vetting the millions of airport and airline staff who have access to aircraft • Ending extra-territorial measures that often require airlines to take on government responsibilities • Improving the security

IATA CEO Alexandre de Juniac. Source: IATA.

experience for passengers, even as the number of passengers is set to double over the next two decades. Adapting to New Security Threats The IATA Director General also called for greater government and industry attention on emerging threats, including cyber threats. “The digital transformation of the airline industry holds immense promise. But we must ensure that our aviation systems remain safe, secure and resilient against cyberattack. Constructive dialogue and timely information sharing among industry, technology providers and governments will be critical if we are to achieve this,” said de Juniac. According to IATA, the association is working with airlines, industry stakeholders and other sectors to deliver a strategy early next year that will be a step-change in how we as a sector address the cyber threat challenge.

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Aviation

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Air Borders – Protected but porous Although technology is a proven border control enabler, those who use it are its greatest disablers, writes Philip Wood MBE. While there will always be a moral argument about who is permitted and entitled to cross borders, what credentials they need and criteria that they need to fulfil, border control is a necessity. If we think about what ‘border control’ means to many, this definition is a good place to begin: ‘Border control means measures adopted by a country to regulate and monitor its borders. It depicts a country’s physical demonstration of territorial sovereignty. It regulates the entry and exit of people, animals and goods across a country’s border. It aims at fighting terrorism and detecting the movement of criminals across the borders. In addition, it also regulates both legal and illegal immigration, collects excise taxes, prevents smuggling of illegal and hazardous material such as weapons, drugs, or endangered species, and prevents the spread of human or animal diseases. The degree of strictness at a border control varies depending upon the country and the border concerned.’ (USlegal.com)

Phillip Wood is the Head of the School of Aviation and Security at Buckinghamshire New University. His background includes military service in various roles and the delivery and management of corporate resilience programmes to industry. His book “Resilient Thinking; Protecting Organisations in the 21st Century” (2012) addresses issues related to human behaviours and their effects on effective resilience planning and response. Phil holds an MSc in security and risk management from the University of Leicester and is a Chartered Security Professional and Senior Fellow of the Higher Education Academy. He was made a Member of the Order of the British Empire (MBE) in 2000.

MARCH 2019

That seems to cover most aspects of border control and management. However, it gives a simplistic overview of what is a complicated issue, which becomes much more complicated when aviation, with its flexibility and multiple layers of activity and technology as well as the speed and pace of transit times and the diversity and sheer numbers of air travellers, are factored into the processes and concepts involved. Organisations such as ICAO are responsible for – and responsive to – this need to balance protection and permission, saying in their Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) Guide that the “flow of travellers overwhelmingly benefits States, and as such, Border Control Management (BCM) arrangements should facilitate timely and cost-efficient processing of genuine travellers while simultaneously identifying, managing and mitigating risks, and responding to threats.” This conflict of needs brings significant challenges, with the aviation sector (and its governance bodies, governments and political influencers) attempting to manage the balance whilst transporting legitimate passengers and freight alongside criminals, smuggled goods and organisms, and those who are not necessarily criminals but who do not meet country entry criteria. How can Aviation balance the ‘need to say no’ with the ‘need to flow’? Firstly, it is important to understand the diversity and scale of the problem and how airlines and airports can facilitate illicit movement and activity; also, how they can prevent it. We are all familiar with the physical barriers in place at both ends of the passenger journey; and with the varying levels of checks and pre-checks that are carried out to identify that we are who we say we are, and that what we are carrying is legitimate, or legitimately ours. We have scanning, biometrics, personnel detection and surveillance systems and chemical trace detection. Our passports are checked against databases, manifests and other waypoints, BORDER MANAGEMENT

ticketing and baggage movement are automated and supported by technology throughout; from passenger lists to our smart luggage tags. But still air borders can be porous. The problem that the US has recognised and dealt with in its own way is that despite the types of regulation and governance that do work being put in place at their airports; those in sending countries may be less reliable – so they push their border controls out to those countries and impose their own checks there. It’s a little ‘Roman Empire’; but if we want to travel to the US for work and leisure, that’s the arrangement in place. These hard measures are designed to manage the issue, and it is fair to say that by and large they are effective. In terms of other integrated approaches, the ICAO TRIP guidance offers potential solutions – or at least concepts for providing them, based on its five interlinked elements:

ICAO’s five interlinked elements. Note; MRTD = Machine Readable Travel Documents. Source: ICAO TRIP Guide.

These are well thought-out components of a strong identification management ‘ecosystem’, and ICAO’s guide explains them carefully and in detail. Importantly, ICAO also recognises and clearly emphasises the disparity in capabilities across national borders and infrastructures; and the need to factor that limitation into any assumptions or misconceptions about the security or otherwise of a border control system and workflow. Because of that, the ICAO TRIP Guide is a well thought out, detailed document and recommended for those who need to know more about the principles and limitations of air travel and border controls. Back in the US, where guides are translated into measures, layers of capability and detection are further imposed by the DHS, TSA and organisations such as the Orwellian sounding Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM), whose role (according to its website) is to: ‘protect the nation by providing biometric identification services that help federal, state, and local government decision makers accurately identify the people they encounter and determine 14

BORDER MANAGEMENT

whether those people pose a risk to the United States. OBIM supplies the technology for collecting and storing biometric data, provides analysis, updates its watchlist, and ensures the integrity of the data.’ However, the reality of security management in the context of border controls, despite the multiple technologies and processes that have been developed to manage the flexibility, reach and scale of the aviation challenge, differs from the concept. The main problem with any security system, regardless of its sector or application, is the people who interact with it. Poorly trained, lazy, overworked and overwhelmed staff who face never-ending cohorts of fast moving distracted, and sometimes aggressive legitimate passengers will always have the potential for failure – and security gaps will appear. In most cases, where legitimate passengers either purposely or by omission do get through, the consequences may be minimal. However, a determined and well-organised criminal, terrorist or illegal immigrant will scan, identify and bypass such touchpoints of human weakness – and the consequences have the potential to be quite significant. And the errors can be straightforward. The most effective measures cannot stop those overburdened airport staff from making occasional or repeated mistakes. As an example, according to a 2018 UK Home Office report (quoted in Airport Technolog y): ‘…over 11,000 travellers have unintentionally avoided UK border checks between 2013 and 2017 due to a lack of clear directions…there has been a 70% increase in the number of passengers who were misdirected, from 1,364 in 2016 to 2,328 in 2017. Further statistics from a Freedom of Information request show that the Border Force recorded 2,394, 2,665 and 2,278 misdirected passengers in 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively.’ Despite Home Office assurances of follow up and measures to deal with the problem, this was simply about people being sent in the wrong direction and bypassing security without even knowing about it. No ICAO guide can stop that. So, at first glance we can look at aviation and border control and consider that we have made significant strides and advances in the face of dynamic, emerging and smart threats in a changing world. Technology is the greatest single enabler of the basis for a multi-layered and wideranging security management system. Conversely, those who use it are the greatest disablers of its effectiveness. And, really, at this stage we are really only thinking about the ‘good guys’. Once we begin to factor in the legitimate issues of human rights and privacy and the sheer inventiveness and undoubted determination of those who wish to act illegally or do harm to society, the balance of power and advantage begins to shift, which on the balance of probabilities means that on occasion, real damage can be the result. MARCH 2019

THE FRONT DOOR TO SEAMLESS TRAVELLER JOURNEYS PERMISSION TO TRAVEL DTC

Digital Travel Credential

eVisa ePassport

Secure ETA/eVisa

READINESS TO TRAVEL

Cruise

Car Rental

Flight

Hotel

Booking

REMOTE IDENTITY AND DOCUMENT VERIFICATION (IDV)

STJ/IDV App

READINESS FOR TRAVELLER ARRIVAL Land

Marine

Air

Rail

Customs & Clearance

Boarding Security & Bags

STJ/IDV App OTTAWA, CANADA

LONDON, UK

WWW.WORLDREACH.COM

Smart borders

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Smart Borders for a Smart Future: Smarter, faster, safer and more predictable The borders of today serve purposes more complex to those of the past, writes Lars Karlsson. And the borders of tomorrow need to be even smarter.

Lars Karlsson is Managing Director Global Consulting and Senior Executive of KGH Customs Services, a customs and border capacity building provider and consultancy. Lars is also chair of the Advisory Board of the International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA). He previously pursued a career with Swedish Customs, rising to the rank of Acting Deputy Director General, after which he served five years as Director of the World Customs Organisation. Lars was awarded an honorary doctorate from Charles Sturt University in 2016 for “significant contribution to the public good through his outstanding input and influence in the professional practice of customs education and capacity building.”

MARCH 2019

Today we know that trade is one of the main drivers for global development and prosperity. We live in the age of globalization and we are starting to see what it can do for us in the future. Globalization drives harmonization and the need for standards. Over the past decade global supply chains and international value chains have changed dramatically. We are seeing more complicated and integrated global value chains where goods pass borders multiple times during a production process. This is a trend not only for complex industries but for all goods sectors. Goods and services are blending, e-commerce is booming and, as a result of global business developments, the movement of people is more and more interlinked with the movement of goods. At the same time, international cross-border crime syndicates have refined their methods and informal partnerships acting at a global level are becoming a serious threat to all nations and people. The changes described above pose enormous challenges to our international trading system, national borders and Customs. In addition, we see global challenges including migration crises, trade wars and protectionism. The borders we see today were designed decades ago for other purposes and under different circumstances. Customs gathered information at the border to collect revenue, to protect society from unwanted products and to determine

what controls were required to uphold legislation and regulations. Agencies didn’t have the information necessary to handle system-based controls, but instead conducted transaction-based controls and inspections at the border. This has changed. Today we have more information than we need to make international supply chains move with speed and predictability. Sometimes we don’t have the information at the right time, but this is also about to change. This new paradigm is supported by international standards such as the World Customs Organization’s (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). These standards and frameworks make it possible to use new techniques like blockchain to capture information across the supply chain and transform it into relevant data and then validate it using compliance management, systems-based controls and self-assessment. Our national borders used to be our first frontier, now they are our last. We are designing, developing and implementing trusted trade lanes through Smart Borders using Mutual Recognition Agreements signed between countries that have Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) or Trusted Trader Programmes (TTP). In this context, it is important to note that some countries have older legacy AEO/TTPs in place. These programmes that are ten years old BORDER MANAGEMENT

or more are often designed primarily for security purposes and are not modern and mature in relation to compliance and non-tariff barriers. This means that there are often high thresholds for entry into a programme and insufficient benefits to make a real difference to the bottom line of a company. In recent years, several countries have designed and implemented modern and holistic multi-tier Trusted Trader Programmes with new structures, more automation, more extensive benefit programmes and advanced performance indicators. All this is achieved while still meeting international standards. I have written about this new paradigm in the leading academic publication World Customs Journal (Vol 11, March 2017). Older AEO programmes will be replaced by updated versions in the years to come. It has already been demonstrated that a modern compliance management programme can create a win-win for all stakeholders in managing international supply chains. By adding the advanced exchange of risk data and new non-intrusive inspection and surveillance technologies, we will see a different model for our borders in the future. In fact, this is already happening as I write this article. At KGH we are involved in the design, development and implementation of Smart Borders and Trusted Trade Lanes across the world. When designing new borders, it is extremely important that we use the new paradigm and not older versions. Where is KGH designing new border processing? The most recent example is Brexit.

The United Kingdom is leaving the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most advanced and integrated Customs Union. By leaving the Customs Union and customs territory, a customs border will be created. It will be a new border with no infrastructure and no legacy systems in place. This is the biggest Customs change in our lifetime, but is it impossible? Nothing is impossible. Instead of trying to implement a traditional border set-up this is the moment to implement a Smart Border. However, this would not be a Smart Border as we know it from other locations, such as the SwedenNorway border or the USA-Canada border. No, in this case we need more. We need a Smart Border 2.0 or even 2.1. So, what is a Smart Border? Smart Borders operate using maximum facilitation through the optimal use of existing Customs techniques in combination with, and with support from, existing advanced technologies. But neither Customs techniques nor technology can do the job on their own. Smart Borders can be created by using Trusted Trade Lanes based on the introduction of a new modern Trusted Trader Programme (registration), electronic information exchange, risk management cooperation between Customs administrations (and other agencies), self-assessment by Trusted Traders, controls and inspections at the company premises or en-route, and technology identification/ surveillance at the border and enroute. Identification at the border can be done using existing

BORDER MANAGEMENT 18

BORDER MANAGEMENT

infrastructure such as GPS/GSM solutions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; which could be a solution for the Northern IrelandRepublic of Ireland land border - or with new technology identification solutions (number plate readers, RFID, Bluetooth, etc.) on other more goods-heavy borders (such as the Eurotunnel and the RO-RO traffic across the English Channel). The technology to do this exists today. It is time to move from old borders to Smart Borders. I have written a report about Smart Borders 2.0, and I have made remarks on how the proposed solutions can be used in a more generic way in a text called Smart Borders 2.1. Both these texts are available in the public domain if you want to study them more in detail. The fact is that we are moving quickly in to a new world where the movement of goods and people are interlinked. This demands another level of speed and predictability. All countries that want to be included in the international value chains of the future need to build Smart Borders as soon as possible. The International Border Management and Technology association (IBMATA), where I am the Chairperson of the International Advisory Board, is progressing a number of initiatives to support the development of Smart Borders, so there is a lot of things happening right now. We have only seen the start of a giant leap that will move border management forward to where it becomes the key to future prosperity. If we succeed in transforming our borders to Smart Borders, then the future is bright.

Got an idea or article to contribute? Submit a news or feature article to Border Management. Contact: nick@bordermanagement.net

MARCH 2019

Top ten issues for contracts and commercial International Association for Contract & Commercial Management (IACCM) President Tim Cummins sheds light on organisations’ contract management priorities for 2019. As we enter 2019, what are the key focus areas for improving contract and commercial management? IACCM gathered data from approximately 750 organizations to discover their plans and priorities. Number one on the list, being tackled by 61 percent, is contract management tools and systems. Many have yet to take the plunge on meaningful automation and others are back in the market either to replace or augment existing systems. But the range of tools now being considered is also becoming more diverse, as some organizations look at deploying ‘apps’, ‘bots’ and other enabling devices, such as dynamic playbooks and clause libraries, or more specialist applications, such as machine-based negotiation. In second place, scoring 59 percent, is the development of new terms and updated contract standards. This traditional housekeeping task is becoming much more frequent; the speed of change in markets means that some corporations are undertaking review as often as every quarter to ensure competitiveness. Others are recognizing the need to innovate their commercial offerings or to develop new contract templates, for example for cloud services or to support performance-based agreements. Coming third, at 49 percent, is contract simplification. There are several potential drivers and the perception of ‘simplification’ can take several forms. For some it is may be

MARCH 2019

about greater standardization. For others it may be increased alignment of contracts with RPA (robotic process automation) initiatives. But for the leaders, it is potentially much more than this; it is about fundamental re-assessment and redesign of the way their contracts are structured and worded. For these organizations, there is recognition that contracts should be designed for users because this reduces risk, cuts cycle times and increases ease of doing business. Given the changes that these focus areas indicate, it is perhaps not surprising that almost 50 percent highlight a priority for skills development. Contract and commercial management have tended to be overlooked areas for training investment and senior management is awakening to the issues this creates, both for their dedicated CCM staff and more broadly for those across the business with a need for greater commercial awareness. Looking down the list, it is interesting to note that 40 percent are seeing an expansion of their role (reinforcing IACCM’s view that automation is actually increasing the relevance and demand for contracting and commercial skills). For almost a third, this is accompanied by a change in reporting line – though interestingly there is no great consistency in the shift being made (IACCM has issued a more detailed report on this topic).

IACCM President Tim Cummins

Overall, the list illustrates the growing focus on raising contract and commercial competence and business contribution. While technology is an enabler of these improvements, there is increasing demand for talented individuals who can lead change and interpret trends and opportunities. This is why topics such as analytics and benchmarking now appear on the list – they were not in the Top 10 five years ago. It also indicates that the role is becoming steadily less transactional and more strategic. Over coming weeks, IACCM will be releasing more detailed data on the state of contract and commercial management, and continuing its work with members to assist them on this important journey. This article was originally posted on the IACCM Commitment Matters Blog on February 14 – https://blog.iaccm.com/ commitment-matters-tim-cummins-blog

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Biometrics

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Will smartphones soon replace biometric application centres? Smartphones may revolutionise the way biometrics are collected for visas and travel purposes, but there’s only so much we can trust a DIY biometric capture, writes Bill Sillery.

Bill Sillery is a freelance writer and consultant in identity management and managed migration. During his career as a consultant he has assisted in the design and delivery of major biometric identity management solutions for the UK and Canadian governments, and in research projects developing mobile solutions for biometric verification. His interests and work are in the grey area between biometrics as a security solution and a facilitation mechanism. He is a citizen of Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland, and lives in Montreal, Quebec.

MARCH 2019

The ICAO TRIP (Traveller Identification Programme) that takes place in Montreal each year is arguably the single most important conclave for the mechanics of managed migration in the current calendar. The buzz among the delegates and presenters for the past couple of years has been around smartphones. As little as five years ago the conference was firmly focussed on machine-readable passports, but now it is all about the potential unlocked by using smartphones as one of the machines. This isn’t just buzz. Governments and the private sector are rushing to unlock the benefits that self-service mobile solutions bring, particularly where these benefits include avoiding having customers make trips to expensive facilities to give their biometrics or validate documents. The UK Government is already using a Canadiandeveloped smartphone application, WorldReach Software’s IdentityReach, to allow EU nationals to apply for settlement ahead of Brexit. Unsurprisingly, uptake of IDV (as it is labelled in the UK) has been high given that the alternative to the tenminute DIY process is an in-person visit to a facility to have credentials and identity checked. The smartphone app – which has informally become known as the “chip-checker” – is typical of most planned offerings: the applicant downloads a trusted application and uses the phone’s NFC functionality to read the chip on the passport. This pulls in both the facial image

which is used to perform a 1:1 facial verification vs. a selfie, and data from the chip that is used to confirm its validity and authenticity. This replaces all the steps that might otherwise require inspection by an officer, all within an adaptive application process that can be followed wherever you are. The smartphone in this case short-cuts the need to invest in facilities and staff and offers a much more convenient experience to customers. The benefits are obvious, which is why the Canadian solution and similar are of great interest to governments and the industry. The uses and benefits beyond Brexit are manifold and obvious. The Brexit solution is being examined widely for use in any situation where someone needs to prove their biometric identity remotely. Examples include landborder scenarios where travellers use their phone to pre-register their journey and vehicle, or as a way of adding biometric checks to otherwise fully online ETA or VOA programs. With the smartphone collection of finger-scans very much on the way, it is attractive to look at the smartphone as the complete replacement for biometric facilities, but this is a trap to be careful to avoid. There are limits on the trust you can place in smartphone biometrics because you cannot control the collection environment in the way you can at a facility. Biometric collection has an intrinsically non-technical collection step. This allows a lot of BORDER MANAGEMENT

WorldReach Software’s IdentityReach solution.

opportunity for trickery, including submitting manipulated images to the more simple option of using someone else’s biometrics. There is a simple truth that if you can’t trust the way a biometric was collected, then you can’t trust the biometric, and trust is in effect binary. While there may be a spectrum of trust there is a cutoff point that boils down to the question “do I trust the biometric enough for what I want to use it for?”. In the case of the UK’s scheme the answer is yes. The biometrics collected from the chip and selfie simply replace those collected in the conduct of a 1:1 check in a facility. The images are neither being used as the basis for a biometric identity, nor to add a new mode to an identity that will be relied upon in any way after the leave to remain has been granted and linked to the passport. Consider for a moment the potential to use a similar application in the visa application space. For the past fifteen-years or so, most visa applications have required the applicant to visit a visa application centre where their fingerprints and facial image are collected

BORDER MANAGEMENT

in a controlled and monitored environment. Could a smartphone app replace this step? No, because you can’t trust the biometrics sufficiently. There are a couple of ways to look at this. In the special case of visas, fingerprints are collected from firsttime visa applicants because the receiving government doesn’t want to rely on the passport as the only means of identifying a person. A passport can be deliberately lost en route to conceal a person’s identity or point of origin. A person can have, or have had, past identities that are not necessarily revealed by the passport. Biometric collection is a way to independently fix a person’s identity, so that they could not conceal it at some later point. So the prints and facial image collected in this way are used to both check against past identities and lock that identity from that point onward. Being able to subvert either of these steps by submitting someone else’s prints or a doctored image is not acceptable. In a more general case, a smartphone biometric step can and should be examined in the

context of a chain of trust. While the biometrics can be used to verify identity in order to create a new link in the chain, they cannot become the basis of that new link. So, for example, it is okay to verify someone’s identity biometrically in order to attach an electronic visa to a passport, but it is not okay to trust that biometric to identify them in some passportless situation in the future. Similarly you can’t use a smartphone to add fingerprints to an existing identity solely on the basis that you’ve verified their face against their passport. Put simply, smartphones can be used to verify against existing biometrics, but not create or add new ones. The collection of a biometric for the first time – or the collection of biometrics to update old ones – needs to take pace in a controlled environment to prevent collection-side trickery. So, by this rule, smartphones could – and probably will – become the way you verify your identity against existing biometric records, but when you give a biometric for the first time, or replace an old one, you will still need to do it in a controlled and monitored setting.

MARCH 2019

Passengers happier with self-scan passport checks SITA’s 2019 Passenger IT Insights report notes passengers are pleased about airport selfscanning, and they’re wanting to go mobile. According to a February 26 SITA press release, airline passengers are using automated technology for passport checks at double the rate recorded in 2017 and are more satisfied when doing so too. Findings from the survey-based SITA 2019 Passenger IT Insights, co-sponsored by Air Transport World, showed that in 2018, 44 percent of passengers sailed through automated passport control, a jump from 21 percent in 2017. The report explores how technology is contributing to a smoother passenger experience at every step of the journey. At passport control, a traditional pain point of the journey, passengers were 3.85 percent more satisfied when they used self-scanning gates to verify their ID, compared to those using agent-assisted controls. The satisfaction rate of these technology users was a high 8.36 out of 10. “One of the standout findings of our report this year is that at every point in the journey, where passengers use technology, the rate of satisfaction is higher,” said Matthys Serfontein, SITA President, Air Travel Solutions. “Airlines and airports can see the benefit of their technology investments in making it easy for passengers, every step of the way. “Over the years, booking, check-in and bag drop have increasingly become automated and passengers like it. Interestingly, this year the report shows how introducing automated passport controls, in collaboration with government and border agencies, also increases passenger satisfaction.” Automated gates used at boarding was another focus area of the report, which found that self-scan boarding gates are another success for the industry and its passengers. According to SITA, the automated boarding gates speed up the processing of passengers while also supporting more efficient operations and faster turnarounds. The report found that satisfaction is 2.2 percent higher when passengers scan their own documents to board. “Today, we have our Smart Path™ solution at airports around the world, from Australia to the Americas, which uses biometrics to automate the journey, added MARCH 2019

Serfontein. “Across the board we have found that passengers are keen to use the biometric self-service process, when given a choice, over 90% of travellers typically opt in.” The report also found that 59 percent of passengers are ‘very willing’ to use their mobile phones for ID verification along the journey, with a further 33 percent open to the idea. SITA stated that while proving identity using a mobile device is not an option widely available today, “with nine out of ten passengers potentially welcoming this service, airlines and airports can be confident when moving to mobile services for ID identification. Passengers are looking to make their journey as easy as possible and mobile is top of the technologies they want to use.” SITA’s report incorporates findings based on a survey of passengers from 20 countries across the Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East and Africa, representing over 70 percent of global passenger traffic., and it is the 13th edition of the SITA Passenger IT Insights. BORDER MANAGEMENT

Challenges

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Migrant Smuggling: Concepts, complexities and current realities Anna Triandafyllidou and Marie McAuliffe explore the under-researched phenomenon of migrant smuggling.

Marie McAuliffe is the head of the Migration Policy Research Division at IOM in Geneva and has almost two decades of experience in migration research, policy and practice. She is a senior fellow at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, a visiting scholar at Hacettepe University in Ankara, an academic visitor at the ANU’s School of Demography. For three years (2012–2014) she directed the Australian irregular migration research programme.

MARCH 2019

Professor Anna Triandafyllidou holds a Robert Schuman Chair at the Global Governance Programme of EUI in Florence, Italy, where she directs the research area on cultural pluralism. She is also a visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges and editor-in-chief of the Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies. Her recent books include: Multicultural Governance in a Mobile World (Edinburgh University Press, 2017) and Handbook of Migration and Globalisation (E. Elgar, 2018).

Globally, migrant smuggling receives a considerable amount of media, policy and public attention, and it is the focus of law enforcement activities and operations around the world. It has also become an increasingly significant focus of international cooperation between states as well as examination by academic researchers. So why is assessing the evidence base on migrant smuggling globally useful? First, migrant smuggling matters increasingly to migrants, enormously to states and is clearly critical to a great number of non-state actors, including unfortunately the smugglers and agents who operate in this illicit sector. It also matters to a range of others including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that support migrants, international organizations working on migration, transnational crime, development and human rights, as well as the media. Second, as with irregular migration processes and movements, there is currently no data available on the extent of migrant smuggling globally. The lack of global data on migrant smuggling hinders comparative analysis, as well as the ability to inform the development of effective responses. Third, recent media coverage of irregular migration highlights that the various conceptualizations of migrant smuggling, including in relation to its related form of irregular migration “human trafficking”, sometimes lead to confusion and misunderstandings of the nature and effects of the phenomenon. Concepts and definitions While there is no single agreed definition of migrant smuggling globally, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (the Protocol) sets out the international legal definition in the context of the overarching United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. With almost three quarters of all states being party to the Protocol, it provides the most widely recognized definition of migrant smuggling internationally. The Protocol defines migrant smuggling as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of BORDER MANAGEMENT

a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (Article 3). Notwithstanding its clandestine nature, the way in which migrant smuggling is conceptualized also contributes to the difficulties in understanding the nature and scope of this phenomenon. The first major academic work on migrant smuggling, published in 1997 (Salt and Stein), depicted smuggling as one aspect of the illicit side of international migration business. This model heavily favours the depiction of smugglers who are involved in delivering a service through the “exploit[ation of ] legal as well as illegal methods and channels of entry”. Financial motives are central to the business model concept. Some argue that a broader definition of smuggling incorporating those who operate without personal gain is required to adequately encompass refugee smuggling. Rather than a law enforcement framing or the business model concept, this broader definition also incorporates the altruistic smuggler who helps people to safety.

There is also increasing recognition of shifts in smuggling processes that further blur the line between human trafficking and migrant smuggling, acknowledging that it has never been clear cut (Carling, Gallagher and Horwood, 2015). While human trafficking involves coercion (whereas migrant smuggling does not), there is increasing awareness of the potential for coercion and exploitation of smuggled migrants who may find themselves in highly exploitative conditions during or after the event. What starts out as a simple transaction involving a person seeking the services of a smuggler may end up with the migrant being deceived, coerced and/or exploited somewhere along the line – a smuggled migrant may quickly and unwillingly become a trafficked person. Recent events in Libya have highlighted that migrants who intended to use smugglers to reach Europe by sea have been imprisoned against their will, with some reportedly being sold into slavery.

Broadly then, migrant smuggling can be conceptualized in a variety of ways, including: • Transnational criminal definition of smuggling for financial or other material benefit – this appears to be a commonly understood definition, and one that applies in international law as per the Protocol; • Altruistic smuggling that does not involve gaining financially or in other ways, and involves irregular migration social processes; • Smuggling for humanitarian reasons, including of refugees, which may or may not involve financial or material gain; and • “Self-smuggling”, whereby migrants smuggle themselves in order to enter a country without prior permission as a stowaway, for example, on a vessel or aircraft.

Complexities of smuggling Part of the difficulty in fully understanding migrant smuggling processes and practices, as well as how they are evolving, is due to the number of actors involved. From what we currently know, migrant smuggling involves considerable complexity: • Adaptability of smugglers and smuggling organizations is high, and organizers shift routes in response to law enforcement counter-measures; • Smuggling relies on corruption (in varying degrees) and a limited amount of information is currently available about the role of corrupt government officials in the smuggling process; • Vulnerable migrants (such as women and children) likely make up an ever-growing proportion of migrants smuggled worldwide;

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

• There is a striking lack of information on smugglermigrant relationships; access to information is particularly difficult since smugglers (and migrants) are often reluctant to be interviewed; and • Increasingly sophisticated networks have replaced small-scale businesses in regions where anti-smuggling law enforcement strategies are particularly robust. Despite the media’s tendency to portray smugglers as evil characters, it has become clearer over time – both from research and intelligence gathering – that it is more accurate and useful to think of individual agents or smugglers as being somewhere on a “smuggling spectrum”. At one end of the scale are the (irregular) migration agents, who may be legitimate travel or migration agents providing lawful services to travellers/migrants, with perhaps occasional assistance to those seeking to travel irregularly (such as fraudulent documents, contacts, information/advice). At the other end of the spectrum are the “apex” smugglers/traffickers, who oversee sophisticated transnational criminal syndicates and networks that deal with large-scale operations, often involving different types of smuggling and/or trafficking. Migrants are the primary non-state actors involved in the processes of irregular migration and smuggling. In many situations, they are able to exercise agency, although the extent to which this is possible is circumscribed by a range of structural, security, economic and social factors. There is also recognition, including from empirical studies, that the drivers underpinning migrant decisionmaking in relation to irregular migration pathways and smuggling are complex, and include protection, security, family, economic and other factors. Migrants (along with their families), however, bear much of the brunt of the negative consequences that irregular migration journeys involving smuggling can bring: increased risks of exploitation, significant physical and mental harm, and sometimes death. One of the more challenging issues for State actors is that of corrupt officials who can play critical roles in smuggling and trafficking networks. The UNODC (2011) has highlighted the significant role corruption plays in migrant smuggling, noting that: Migrant smuggling could not occur on the large scale that it so often does without collusion between corrupt officials and criminals. Corruption seriously undermines national and international efforts to prevent and control the smuggling of migrants … [it] may occur in countries of origin, transit, or destination. It may be systemic, institutional or individual. In some circumstances, the distinction between “corrupt officials” and “criminals” may in fact mask more dire and entrenched behaviour in which smugglers/ traffickers can themselves be corrupt officials holding positions within law enforcement, justice, immigration, customs, passport offices, border police and other related government agencies. MARCH 2019

In environments of endemic corruption, people movement is just one area of regulation that can be exploited for personal gain. In some societies, extracting a bribe in exchange for a fraudulent document, a stamp in a passport, entry to or exit from a country are likely to be commonplace. Conclusions Migrant smuggling is a dynamic and evolving phenomenon, and research and data collection are critical to informing more effective responses aimed at combating smuggling and protecting migrants. There is an emerging academic literature on migrant smuggling, particularly on the economic and social processes involved in smuggling, which has largely been based on small-scale qualitative research, mostly undertaken by early career researchers. There continues to be, however, a sizeable gap in research and data on changes in migration patterns and processes related to smuggling, most especially its impact on migrants (particularly vulnerability, abuse and exploitation). The current evidence points to considerable complexities underpinning migrant smuggling globally. Enhancing our understanding of migrant smuggling improves our ability to combat exploitation and abuse by helping craft effective responses aimed at supporting safe and orderly migration policies and practices. This article is an abridged excerpt of the overview of IOM’s Migrant Smuggling Data and Research Report, Volume 2, available at https://publications.iom.int/books/migrant-smugglingdata-and-research-global-review-emerging-evidence-base-volume-2 References

Carling, J., A. Gallagher and C. Horwood (2015), Beyond Definitions: Global migration and the smuggling–trafficking nexus. Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) Discussion Paper No. 2, RMMS, Nairobi. International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2017a), World Migration Report, IOM: Geneva. Available at https://www.iom.int/ wmr/world-migration-report-2018 IOM (2017b), IOM Learns of ‘Slave Market’ Conditions Endangering Migrants in North Africa, Press release, 11 April 2017. Available at https://www.iom.int/news/iom-learns-slave-market-conditionsendangering-migrants-north-africa Jayasuriya, D., M. McAuliffe and M. Iqbal (2016), The dynamic nature of migration aspirations: Findings from a longitudinal study of households in Sri Lanka. Research Programme, Occasional Paper Series no. 20. Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Government of Australia. Salt, J. and J. Stein (1997), Migration as a business: The case of trafficking. International Migration, 35(4):467–494. Triandafyllidou, A. (2017), Beyond irregular migration governance: Zooming in on migrants’ agency, in European Journal of Migration and Law, 19(1), pp.1−11. UNODC (2011), Smuggling of Migrants: A Global Review and Annotated Bibliography. UNODC, Vienna. van Liempt, I. and J. Doomernik (2006), Migrant’s agency in the smuggling process: The perspectives of smuggled migrants in the Netherlands. International Migration 44(4):165–190. BORDER MANAGEMENT

Protection

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Slash resistant clothing protecting those who protect our borders Robert Kaiser writes that knife crime is on the rise and that border security staff are vulnerable. Slash resistant clothing reduces the risk of injury.

Robert Kaiser is CEO of the UK-based PPSS Group, a global leader in high performance body armour and clothing offering exceptional levels of protection from edged weapon, blunt force trauma, hypodermic needles and human bites. A widely respected expert in body armour, and the protection of homeland security professionals from firearm and other attacks, Robert acts as consultant to several national governments and is widely respected for his passion for the personal safety of homeland security professionals. His written work has been published in several leading international homeland security, gang violence and safety publications.

MARCH 2019

Technology, not politics, has become one of the most important topics discussed by those charged with securing our nation’s borders, aiming to limit entry of illegal immigrants, drugs, and other sometimes countryspecific illegal substances and products. Border Security Agencies rely on a variety of technology from high-tech cameras, facial and gait recognition software, lasers, chemical detectors, explosive detector, x-rays, and other sensors. Many national borders and coastlines are under constant surveillance from satellites, UAVs, manned aircraft, boats, and ground vehicles, but human interaction, such as passenger/people profiling and simple engaging with – and questioning of a subject has in the past been a crucial part of controlling borders and will remain a critical part for many years to come. Direct human interaction with individuals whose history is unknown, however, comes with a certain risk. Engaging with someone who might simply be intoxicated or suffering from a mental illness carries a certain risk. Engaging with wanted criminals who will do anything to either avoid identification or arrest, or indeed unknowingly confronting a wanted terrorist carries a much higher risk. The question of appropriate PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) has hence always been a discussion point among frontline staff. But sourcing and issuing body armour

or garments that are (i) operationally sound, (ii) comfortable and wearable, and (c) not physically restrictive, is not an easy task. Slash Resistant Clothing has made a real difference in the last year or two. Comfortable garments offering tested, verifiable and reliable high levels of cut protection have now been issued to homeland security agencies in many countries around the world, significantly improving the personal safety of their operational teams. From the point of the employer, cut injuries can lead to severe legal and financial repercussions. From the point of the injured professional, and depending on the level of injury, it can also lead to long-lasting emotional scars, ongoing distress, physical pain, and in the very worstcase scenario, death. Common PPE used within border and homeland security contexts do not tend to offer adequate cut protection. They may well offer a high level of flame resistance, for example, but they do not protect the wearer from the potential of suffering severe laceration when engaging with a person armed with a knife. Many frontline professionals have long asked for better cut protection, and SlashPRO® Slash Resistant Clothing made from the high performance cut resistant fabric CutTex® PRO offers precisely that. This unique British-made fabric is solely responsible for the garment’s ability to reduce the risk of workplace violence-related cut injuries, BORDER MANAGEMENT

subsequent rapid blood loss, shock and potential consequent death. In terms of standards, Cut-Tex® PRO is certified at ISO 13997:1999 Blade Cut Resistance Level 5 (the highest possible), EN 388:2016 Blade Cut Resistance Level 5 (the highest possible) and ANSI/ISEA 2016 Cut Resistance Level A5. Last December, U.K. newspaper The Guardian reported that the number of banned knives seized at UK borders had doubled. Other headlines further highlight the operational risks faced by Border Force officers and other homeland security agencies. Typing the key phrases ‘officer slashed’ or ‘officer attacked by knife’ into a Google search, for example, will turn up countless headlines, such as: • Knifeman attacks police officer on Spain Morocco border • Man admits assaulting police and border force workers at Aberdeen airport • Police officer slashed by knifeman while on duty • Officer hospitalised with knife wounds after intervening in prison attack • Calgary police officer recovering 30

BORDER MANAGEMENT

•

• • •

from ‘severe’ injuries after machete attack New York gangster serving life in British prison for murder ‘slices wardens’ neck open with homemade knife’ A police officer was slashed in the neck, aggressor subsequently shot and killed Security guard slashed in face with large knife at Sunbury shopping precinct A female police officer was brutally slashed during Notting Hill Carnival in London

There are many more reports of frontline professionals being slashed or suffering from major cuts. Recent well-documented reports of this type of assault on police and military personnel across the world are also readily available on the internet or in security and law enforcement related publications. My own research on this topic features in the online article The Global Rise of Knife Crime – Why? Unless they’ve undergone extensive edged weapon training, many or most frontline professionals will, by instinct, lift their arms and

hands during a potential hostile situation, in order to protect the face and head. This is normal, and only highly trained operators would respond differently and more effectively. This very natural reaction, however, exposes an extremely vulnerable area under one’s arms. A rather simple cut injuring the auxiliary artery under the arms could easily lead to rapid blood loss, subsequent shock and even death. This is where slash resistant clothing can make real operational sense. Homeland security professionals, includes those charged with protecting borders, do receive cut wounds along the forearms or open hands. These wounds are the most common injuries and classed as ‘defensive wounds’, often seen as evidence in a court of law that the wearer was protecting him or herself, rather attacking a subject. Slash resistant clothing will reduce the risk of cut-related injuries or lacerations resulting from the violence that our frontline officers are potentially exposed to in the conduct of their work. MARCH 2019

Industry News Gemalto awarded Uganda’s new e-Immigration solution

Schiphol Airport deploys Vision Box facial recognition platform

JAN 14: Gemalto, in cooperation with local partner SCINTL, has been awarded the contract for the supply of a Border Management System (BMS) including airport self-service eKiosks at Entebbe, Uganda. The solution uses Gemalto’s fingerprint and facial recognition technology, combined with a passport scan to identify passengers leaving the country. It is built on the Gemalto Visa Management System (VMS) first deployed in 2014 by the Uganda Directorate of Citizenship and Immigration Control (DCIC). “The new ABC – Automated Border Control Solution marks the latest step forward in the modernization, enhancement of security of border control management in Uganda, delivering important benefits for visitors and citizens alike,” said General Jeje A. Odongo, Minister of Internal Affairs. Entebbe International Airport, servicing Uganda’s capital, Kampala, welcomed over 1.5 million travellers in 2017, and the new eKiosks will further boost its capacity to handle the growing numA Vision Box eGate ber of business and leisure visitors heading to Uganda. The existing Gemalto VMS combines applications, processing and issuance for all pre-paid visas and permits, and incorporates a secure and convenient online portal, and biometric enrolment facilities in foreign missions and on arrival in the country. “SCINTL will provide vital local support and knowhow for a solution that encompasses supply, installation and maintenance,” said Cephas T. Bushuyu, SCINTL Managing Director

FEB 18: Passengers flying Cathay Pacific can now participate in a facial recognition self-boarding trial at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, part of the first phase of Seamless Flow, a program that intends to make paperless travel possible. After checking in, passengers are invited to take part in the trial, and are escorted to a special registration kiosk. The passport and the boarding pass are scanned while a high-quality face image is captured in order to generate the traveller’s single token. This allows passengers to selfprocess through a boarding gate without having to show documents. At the departure gate, they use a dedicated biometric-enabled eGate, a camera scans their face, and the image is compared with the scan made during registration. When the face is verified, the gate opens and the passenger is boarded on the airline system. “We’re very excited to continue working with our partners in this landmark program, offering Cathay Pacific customers with a pioneering seamless travel platform that will absolutely reshape how we travel”, said Miguel Leitmann, Vision-Box CEO. “Cathay Pacific is always looking for ways to improve the experience of our customers at every stage of their journey with us, and the experience at the airport is an important and integral part of that journey,” said Will Kerr-Muir, Cathay Pacific Country Manager Benelux & France.

MARCH 2019

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Europe

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Ghost of Borders Past: Old borders present new challenges for Schengen The Schengen Agreement’s borderless ideals are rubbing up against some hard border realities, writes Roderick Parkes. Are they in danger of being relegated to history?

Dr Roderick Parkes is a senior researcher at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, where he works on issues of international home affairs cooperation. Previously, he was at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin (2005-2009) before moving to Brussels and establishing SWP’s liaison office to the EU and NATO (2009-2012). In 2012, he moved to the Polish Institute of International Affairs, PISM, in Warsaw, where he ran the Europe programme. From late 2014, he spent a year at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) to look into the EU’s refugee crisis. He is the author of the report ‘Nobody Move: Myths of the European Migration Crisis’. This article was written in a personal capacity

MARCH 2019

This year the ghost of Europe’s future crashes into the ghost of Europe’s past. The Schengen Project is Europe’s futuristic initiative to lift passport controls and allow people to travel the European continent freely. It is about to turn 35. But it reaches this landmark during the most savage crisis in its history, one which has seen massive numbers of refugees moving up through Greece and Italy, as well as terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels. European politicians are desperately trying to resuscitate the original sense of utopianism – the idealism which inspired an earlier generation of statesmen to launch this project. They are largely failing. 2019 marks the centennial of a very different kind of border management - one we Europeans thought to have left behind. The 1919 Paris Peace Conference was a well-meaning but misguided attempt to redraw national boundaries along rational lines, and it ended up pleasing nobody. The problems of that era are flooding back. Greece, Poland, Estonia - they each fear that their borders are under threat from revanchist states like Russia and Turkey. Centuryold border grievances in Syria and Iraq are at the root of the terrorist and refugee crises in France and Germany. Schengen was meant to have banished this border geopolitics. It has been a rude awakening for the countries which launched Schengen and nurtured it for the three decades. They had more or less

forgotten that border management could be difficult. The Schengen project, remember, was dreamt up by a small cluster of countries in the cosy north-west corner of Europe. West Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg began preparations to lift borders in 1985. In the decades since, these five states expanded border-free travel until it stretched right out to Poland and down to Malta. In the process, their own border controls largely disappeared. Or more precisely, their frontline border controls were now operating far from their territory. These north-western European governments distilled their recipe for border cooperation into 3,000 pages of technical standards. And they exported this rulebook to their neighbours. In effect, they were taking the familiar model of ‘prefrontier’ checks which works so well for major airports – FRA or CDG – and for globalised ports – Rotterdam or Antwerp - and they had supersized it. Poland exercised border controls for Germany. And it, in turn, coopted its neighbour Ukraine into carrying out border checks, with the promise that Ukraine could one day join Schengen. And so on and so forth. But Poland and Schengen’s other peripheral members had never lost their memory of border geopolitics. Take Greece: it insists German coast guards should patrol the Aegean, making them taste life BORDER MANAGEMENT

on Europe’s front line. Bulgaria and Romania have not yet been permitted to join Schengen. But they scrupulously adhere to its rules: they want to show that they are excluded from the club only because they provide it with a useful buffer to the Balkans and Middle East. Or Cyprus. It joined the European Union back in 2004, but it never joined Schengen, apparently for fear of attracting migrants from unstable Lebanon and Syria who might use the island as a stepping stone to mainland Europe. Ahead of its 35th birthday, there has been a political shift inside Schengen. Schengen’s futuristic vision is now tempered with some old-school wisdom. The original gang of five are no longer making the weather. The balance of political power in Schengen has tipped away from the founder countries and towards the peripheral ones – in particular to those which guard the eastern flank of Schengen and the EU. It is Poland, Hungary and Italy which draw most of the attention. In their hands European borer management is becoming ‘border protection’. But when it comes to positively shaping Schengen border standards, it is probably Finland, Estonia, Romania and Bulgaria which are most influential. For the world’s border professionals, it is worth keeping an eye on this shift. After all, Europeans still think of border management as something they excel in. The European Union sponsors borders projects in spots across Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. It offers logistical support to the Brussels-based World Customs Organisation. It dominates the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe. And it has put one of its former officials in charge of the International Organization for Migration. Moreover, the EU still exports Schengen rules world-wide as if these were the gold standard. These rules look set to change direction in at least three ways: 34

BORDER MANAGEMENT

A return to border professionalism is the first shift. Migrants, terrorists, smugglers have all succeeded in gaming Schengen and its tangled web of identity databases. Just google ‘Eurodac’ for a case-study. The EU initially tried to fix the problem by further automation. But it turns out that the Schengen borders which held up best in the crisis were the ones with large numbers of well-trained staff. These staff were able to differentiate regular travellers from

irregular ones. They spotted forged documents. They defused border tensions with a quick phone call to a counterpart in a neighbouring state. The EU has proposed setting up its own central border force with some 10,000 staff. But expect a backlash from its member governments: this proposal would siphon off around 10 percent of all Europe’s border officials, and states here have learnt the value of border guards with local knowledge. A sharpening of Europe’s border standards is the second trend. 15 MARCH 2019

years ago, the Schengen Project rolled out its model of “Integrated Border Management’. IBM boasts ambitious ways of getting neighbouring states to fuse their border checks and lighten controls. But it turns out that IBM is not so integrated after all. This model deals mostly with flows of people. After all, Schengen is a passport union. But the EU also comprises a customs and a military union. And all three of these border regimes have developed quite separately from each other. Given that migrants MARCH 2019

these days are being smuggled like any other contraband; and flows of goods and people are being ‘weaponised’ by Europe’s rivals, expect to see the customs and the military integrated into IBM. And finally – finally – the EU is showing a readiness to learn from other parts of the world. The original Schengen members were always keen to despatch their personnel to the Balkans or Middle East to teach them about borders. Their hosts welcomed them with polite bemusement: what could their regions, regions with a lot

of borders, learn from countries like Luxembourg which had almost none? This farce is now over. Schengen officials are still in demand abroad, but it is for a new reason. Countries are keen to host Schengen experts - not for their expertise so much as to teach them about the realities of border geopolitics in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. And Schengen members are, at long last, listening. The door is now open for IOM, WCO and OSCE to build a more equal relationship with the EU. BORDER MANAGEMENT

Border crisis

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Destined to Repeat: Are the lessons of 9/11 being forgotten? The border security lessons of 9/11 are being forgotten amid polarized debate over Trump immigration policies and the U.S.-Mexico border, writes Laura Hains.

Laura Hains CPP is an independent security consultant and owner of Hammerhead Security Services LLC. Laura retired from US Customs & Border Protection (CBP) in 2008 after 31 years of federal service, during which she worked as a Special Agent for the Department of Defense, as a Security Manager for the Bureau of Engraving and Printing and as an Officer and Supervisor for CBP. She subsequently worked for two companies operating under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS), and was an Adjunct Professor at Keiser University (2011-15) lecturing in criminal justice and homeland security. Laura holds a Masters Degree from George Washington University and an ASIS Certified Protection Professional (CPP) board certification.

On September 11, 2001 the world was shaken by the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon and the crash on a field in Pennsylvania. There are several reasons why we should be discussing this now almost 19 years later: the saying “those who fail to learn from history are destined to repeat it”; the current political climate in the US concerning the wall; sanctuary policies; and lack of cooperation with law enforcement come to mind. On July 22, 2004 the 9/11 Commission Report was published, and on August 22, 2004 the supplemental 9/11 and Terrorist Travel report was published. Both described extensive research into questions concerning the attack and gave recommendations on solutions to prevent the repeat of such a horrendous occurrence. In the wake of 9/11, the government, historians, analysts and commissions, news outlets and everyday people hashed and rehashed information surrounding the attacks in an attempt to find the answers as to who, why, and how to prevent it from ever happening again. The 9/11 Report identified “Four Kinds of Failures: Imagination, Policy, Capabilities and Management”. These failures can be seen in the world today. An attack by other means Before 9/11 no one could imagine the 9/11 attack – planes as weapons attacking the homeland.

MARCH 2019

Thinking out of the box consider this: On January 31, 2019 a K-9 was alerted to a semi-trailer coming into the Mariposa commercial port of entry in Nogales, Arizona. On inspection, 254 pounds of fentanyl was discovered in a false floor compartment of the cucumbercarrying 18-wheeler. This was the largest seizure of fentanyl ever recorded at a U.S. Port of entry with an estimated street value of USD 3.5 million. With all the attention that’s being focused on the southern border, one would think this would be the last place to send in a load of this size and volume. Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid and is 80 to 100 times more potent than morphine. Contact with an amount as small as a few grains of salt can kill a person quickly. As the Washington Post reported, one kilogram of fentanyl can produce one million fatal doses. 254 pounds of fentanyl could kill more than 115 million people according to the U. S. Drug Enforcement Agency. Could this be the new means of attack that no one can imagine: disbursement of fentanyl into a water supply or by some other means? Cheap and driven 9/11 was carried out by small group of individuals not an army or foreign power. “Measured on a government scale,” states the 9/11 Report, “the resources behind it were trivial”. (Think of the money that the sale of fentanyl provided by drug cartels would provide for a criminal act). BORDER MANAGEMENT

It goes on to say, the organization behind the attack “recruited a mixture of young fanatics and highly educated zealots who could not find suitable places in their home societies or were driven from them.” A quick glance at the current state of the world shows the fighting in Syria and the displacement of millions of refugees around the world running from conflict, tyranny, social injustice, poverty and political unrest, of which the conditions and unrest in Central America are an example. These are all problems that could easily move individuals to become frustrated with their lives, become zealots for a cause, and turn that anger against those who they believe is the cause of their misery. The caravans moving to the southern border would be an excellent means of infiltrating the U.S. Tyranny of conventional wisdom “It is hard now to recapture the conventional wisdom before 9/11”, states the 9/11 Report. “For example, a New York Times article in April 1999 sought to debunk claims that Bin Laden was a terrorist leader with the headline “U.S. Hard Put to Find Proof Bin Laden Directed Attacks.” Sound familiar? Today, news agencies and government officials throughout the U.S. and the world consistently debunk the idea that terrorists or criminals could be crossing the border with illegal immigrants. Those streaming illegally into the U.S. and other nations around the world are for the most part individuals who only want a better life. But speaking to border officers on the U.S.-Mexico border, one learns that on a daily – sometimes hourly – basis they stop individuals from places of origin other than Mexico and Central America, some of whom are convicted criminals, gang members and even persons on terror watch lists. The majority of these come from conflict zones in the Middle East where their true identities and backgrounds cannot be determined 38

BORDER MANAGEMENT

because vetting is impossible due to the collapse of their homelands. Many people seeking to cross the border illegally carry no identification whatsoever. Prior to 9/11, intelligence agencies had been monitoring some of the 9/11 associates like Khalid Sheik Mohammed. There was intelligence and a belief there was a terror cell. We also had some records of the 9/11 Hijackers and other planners as they had visas and passports and had traveled in and out of the U.S. They were not totally unknown. If such a terrorist were to pose as an illegal immigrant, there may be no way of verifying their data through background investigations. Yet this has become a highly politicized issue, and law makers and news outlets refuse to acknowledge the possibility and continue to debunk such claims. Ease of passage The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) agreement allows the free movement of people, goods and services in the Caribbean region. So, for example, if a person from Syria arrives in the U.K., they can then travel without question to Jamaica, then travel freely without question in and around the Caribbean, including Belize in Central America. It is a quick trip through Central America and Mexico and then into the U.S. via the southern border. So, it is not impossible or far fetched to believe that persons with less than good intentions could be entering the U.S. by such a route. Authorities divided One of the main lessons that was discussed in the 9/11 Report was the importance of cooperation, intelligence sharing and – most importantly – communication between the federal agencies and state and local law enforcement. It was a major area of concern. “Many state and local enforcement agencies worked closely with federal immigration authorities

before 9/11,” states the 9/11 & Terrorist Travel supplement. “They contact INS when they arrested aliens on criminal charges and assisted in the investigations, arrests and detention of illegal aliens. In return, INS special agents (now ICE) with their specialized training and resources, assisted other law enforcement agencies fighting violent crime and drug trafficking.” This was one of the few positive entries in the 9/11 Report, acknowledging that it was being done well but that more needed to be done to ensure cooperation. Billions of dollars have thus been spent on upgrades and new communication equipment, fusion centers (defined by the DHS as “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity”), and other intelligence centers. However, today there are also ‘Sanctuary‘ states and cities. In these Sanctuary areas not only do local law enforcement agencies not share intelligence or cooperation, but in states such as California and cities like New York, law enforcement is not permitted – or refuse – to share vital information about violent criminals who in many cases are released back into the public and go on to commit other heinous crimes like child rape, and murder. The recent MS-13 gang murder in broad daylight in New York City is an example of the consequences of the reversal of inter agency information sharing and cooperation. The Report had argued that inter agency cooperation was in need of improvement and enhancement, not a complete reversal. Need for reform Border security and Immigration reform was a very important topic in the 9/11 Report. Because of these findings, new Departments MARCH 2019

“Good people who have worked in such jobs for a long time understand this phenomenon [the value of intuition over objective factors in the screening of passengers] well”, it states. “Other evidence we obtained confirmed the importance of letting experienced gate agents or security screeners ask questions and use their judgment.” While this relates specifically to the context of traveler screening, it’s worthwhile extrapolating it out and considering the value of the subjective judgement of well-trained and experienced individuals in relation to ‘the wall’. Border agents, experts with decades of experience, have testified before Congress, and have been on television and talk shows explaining the need for ‘the wall’ and enhanced border security, yet some Representatives, Senators, news media and celebrities (why their opinion is important is a puzzle) have roundly refused to accept these professionals’ expertise.

like the Department of Homeland Security were formed. New agencies arose like the Transportation Security Agency (TSA). Customs, Immigration and Border Patrol became U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It was determined that the immigration system needed a complete revamp. New Biometric systems like US VISIT, communication systems, intelligences units with cooperation from state and local, as described above, were developed costing MARCH 2019

billions of dollars. Numerous other immigration recommendations were made, including those concerning identification and fraud documents. That was 2004. It is now 2019 and many of the recommendations have either not been addressed, such as the completion of the entry-exit system, or reversed, such as the “catch and release” program. Celebrities know better? An interesting section in the Report relates to the importance of trusting subjective judgment.

Heeding the lessons of history That an attack is imminent is not the case, nor is it what is being suggested here. What is being suggested is that the 9/11 Commission worked diligently to complete a document that would make recommendations and answer questions in the hope of preventing another attack. The Commission, according to the Report “reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 individuals in ten countries. This included nearly every senior official from the current and previous administrations who had responsibility for topics covered in our mandate.” The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission reports are available for all to read and heed. Yet today in the U.S. and in many countries around the world the reverse is taking place due to social pressures and political correctness. The question to ask is “are we destined for another major attack because we did not heed the lessons that history has provided?” BORDER MANAGEMENT

Interview

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Behavioural analysis and the role of the human in security Editor Nicholas Dynon speaks with Philip Baum about the role of behavioural analysis – and the importance of the human – in increasingly technological borders. BMM: You spend a lot of your time conducting behavioural analysis training internationally. What is your take on behaviour detection/ analysis?

Philip Baum is Managing Director of Green Light Limited, a London-based training and consultancy company focussing on aviation security. An international authority on behavioural analysis and profiling techniques, he is also Editor-in-Chief of Aviation Security International and visiting professor of aviation security at Coventry University. Philip joined Trans World Airlines’ security subsidiary at London Heathrow in the 1980s and moved from Duty Manager Heathrow to TWA’s International HQ, where he became Manager Security Training and Auditing, until leaving in 1996 to establish Green Light. Philip has authored a book, ‘Violence in the Skies: a history of aircraft hijacking and bombing’, and co-authored and edited two other books on aviation security.

MARCH 2019

PB: I have long been an ardent proponent of behavioural analysis as a security solution – and what I believe to be the most important element of any facility’s security arsenal. There’s a tendency in all industries to rely on technologies rather than on human beings. Time and time again in security it’s proven that technologies have significant limitations either because they are only able to detect certain types of prohibited substances, such as metal if you walk through an archway metal detector, or certain types of explosives in certain quantities if you’re using explosive trace detection technology. The most effective technology of them all is the human brain, and it’s the one that’s hardest to regulate. Regulators find it very acceptable to have x-ray machines that can be subjected to government tests to see whether operators are able to identify specific threat images, but it’s very difficult for regulators to test subjective opinions. Yet I believe that subjective opinion is probably the most important thing for us to look at, not only because opinions address traditional threats, such as a bomb being placed on an aircraft, but it’s also a more future-proof approach.

For example, what are we doing worldwide to combat the threat of chemical or biological weapon incidents? Next to nothing. And yet the only thing we can use against these is human beings and their ability to identify when an individual does not meet baseline behaviour. BMM: The United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has copped continued criticism over the subjectivity of their behavioural indicators, which have included such indicators as ‘excessive throat clearing’, ‘gazing down’, and ‘appears to be in disguise’. Do they have it wrong? PB: In the United States the TSA program has come under significant criticism, but so has the traditional screening program. Only three or four years ago they had a 97 percent fail rate to detect items under x-ray examination that were supposed to be detectable. Those statics are now at 80 percent, but there are fallibilities with that system. The problem with the TSA’s Behaviour Detection Officer (BDO) program was that it wasn’t being shown to find terrorists. Fortunately, there aren’t that many terrorists walking through our airports, and I hope that remains the case, but behaviour detection programs around the world are known to be able to identify [a wider range of ] criminal activity. It might not be a terrorist. It might be the victim of human BORDER MANAGEMENT

trafficking, a human trafficker, a drug trafficker, or a person involved in money laundering. But what we’re proving is that behaviour detection identifies people doing things that are wrong. Everyday people getting off international flights are being inspected by immigration and customs officers. If you can find people doing things wrong when they get off an aircraft, why not try and find people doing things wrong before they get onto the aircraft, and use a more effective solution based on common sense? We’ve introduced so many ridiculous processes into the aviation system, such as the liquids, aerosols and gels restrictions. It was completely understandable in the immediate aftermath of the [9/11] plot to do so. But if you look at it from a logical point of view, all we are doing is focusing screeners’ attention on legitimate passengers who are inadvertently carrying tubes of toothpaste that are too large. It’s actually diverting people’s attention from the real threats. Other industries keep looking at what aviation is doing as if it’s best practice – and there is a lot of good about it, particularly its deterrent value, but by erecting checkpoints that create queues –chokepoints rather than checkpoints – we’re making targets for the terrorist or the fixated person. So much of our security effort globally is in a counter terrorism approach because of ISIS or al Qaeda incidents, but I think we should – partly to avoid racial profiling – recognise that actually the threat exists everywhere from anyone, and that an incident can take place anywhere, anytime. I’m in Australia at the moment, and I would say look at the 1996 incident involving Martin Bryant at Port Arthur in Tasmania. It’s an historic site, but not the most iconic site in Australia; not the number one target. Probably the last place in the world – certainly from a European perspective – where you would think you’d have what was at that time the 42

BORDER MANAGEMENT

largest loss of life by a lone gunman in modern history until what happened in Norway. But even in the case of Norway, look at where it happened; it wasn’t in Oslo Airport, it was on the Island of Utøya, and I think that’s a lesson that we can all learn. You may be working in Queenstown, New Zealand, and feel immune to international terrorism. Maybe you’re not the number one target – you’re protected a little bit by your geography – but that doesn’t mean you haven’t got some lunatic out there like the one we saw last week in Pittsburgh Synagogue. Who was it that carried out that attack? No, it wasn’t al Qaeda or Islamists; it was a right-wing extremist. BMM: A big criticism of behavioural detection in the airport context is that people in airports are often flustered and running late for flights, or emotional because they’re bidding farewell to their loved ones, and they’re not necessarily operating in a baseline type of way. Is BD less effective in this context? PB: There are certainly inherent stresses in air travel. There’s no question about that. But I actually think that people who work in the aviation environment can tell the difference between a potential terrorist and somebody who is stressed because they’re late for a flight. If you look at a stereotypical family heading off to the Gold Coast on a two-week bucket and spade holiday, you can tell the difference between that family that people and a group of people trying to look like a family. Why waste time getting them to take their shoes off and screening their laptops, and confiscating their liquids, aerosols and gels? Just get them through the process. I’m not saying don’t x-ray their bags, but let’s not detain people unnecessarily and slow the process down. After the Brussels Airport attack, I was hoping that authorities wouldn’t react by creating another checkpoint in the terminal building’s check-in zone. But what did they do?

They installed checkpoints outside, and they had queues outside. And who did they cite as their example for this? Istanbul. Three months later in Istanbul there was a terrorist attack where the checkpoint became the chokepoint and the first point to be targeted. We have to do security on the move. We need to be able to identify people who are potential problems as far away from their intended targets as possible. We need to be more intelligent. We need to be able to apply it in any environment. What does the typical visitor to the zoo look like? How do they behave? Who do they come with? What time do they arrive? What do they carry? And then look for the person who is doing hostile reconnaissance or potentially posing a threat today. BMM: Many layers of personnel are involved in the security continuum, from client-facing non-security staff to security officers to specialists like BDOs. Who needs to be engaged and equipped to identify suspicious behaviours? MARCH 2019

PB: To a certain extent it’s about making everybody a part of the security web that protects any given facility. One of the problems with BDO programs is that BDOs tend to be people who are recruited for a specific task that are deployed often in pairs in limited numbers. They might not even see the suspicious person as they enter the facility, whether it be a shopping centre or an airport terminal. My vision of behavioural analysis is that although you might have BDOs, it is actually everybody who are the eyes and ears. At an airport, everybody is asked to “see something, say something”, or to report unusual or suspicious behaviours. But often, bizarrely, although we tell the general public to report it, if a security guard reports it, he/ she is often seen to be slowing down the process, so there’s an inherent resistance to these people reporting things. In airports and other venues, such as sports facilities, the objective often is facilitation. It’s to keep the queue moving. MARCH 2019

If you’re the person loading bags onto the conveyer belt for the x-ray machine and you see something unusual, your observation may be unwelcome because you might slow down the throughput rate of the checkpoint and then people might not spend so much time airside and spending money in the duty-free store. People might complain, whereas actually we need to be encouraging everybody in the system to be reporting their concerns. We ought to be doing drills and tests on a regular basis of people encouraging them and making sure they do identify unusual activity and encouraging management to see that as important part of the process. It’s not a tick a box exercise. Effective security is about using common sense. BMM: You mentioned the limitations of technology earlier and the advantage of humans in making subjective assessments. AI technologies are allowing the development of automated checkin kiosks capable of videoing passengers, analysing their facial

expressions, identifying markers that are out of the norm and red-flagging them for a human assessment. What are your views on the use of AI in behaviour analysis? PB: I’m not against technology. I’m very pro-technology, but I’m pro it being used intelligently and knowing how to use the right technology in the right environment. I’m a little but concerned that we seem to be absolutely desperate to have a machine tell us who is okay and who is not. We seem hell-bent on having technology as part of the solution and we find the idea of human beings making subjective decisions abhorrent. I think that’s a mindset that has to change. Of course, you can use technology to assist, but ultimately it’s people that are the problem and people that are the solution. We can’t keep trying to default to a machine saying yes or no just because we are happier that an alarm went off and therefore gave us some ‘proof’ that there was a problem to address. The other problem with those technologies in airports is the fact BORDER MANAGEMENT

that we assume that if somebody has gone through a checkpoint and nothing wrong is found on them that they pose no threat. This doesn’t guard against the insider threat. Take an airport like Heathrow that’s got around 100,000 airport pass holders who are working airside. Like any environment where you’ve got 100,000 people working, you’ve got a number of bad eggs. What about the people who are working airside that access the restricted areas without going through the same intense screening processes as passengers? What about the person that goes through the checkpoint that hasn’t got something but goes to an airport duty-free shop and buys a bottle of alcohol and smashes it and turns it into a lethal weapon? We’re not using joined-up thinking. What we need is people to be assessed – whether they are customers, guests or passengers – and we need our staff to be assessed – whether they be pilots, flight attendants, people working in concessions, or members of our own security teams. And we need to encourage people to report when people’s behaviours do not meet our baseline expectations, and to treat that identification as an important element of the screening process. BMM: Much of what is done in airports is dictated by governments and international organisations upon which the public places a higher burden of responsibility for being

BORDER MANAGEMENT

open and transparent and to be using standards. Is some form of international standard missing from behaviour detection that may help justify the way in which it is used in the aviation context?

BMM: Should major public events have BDO-type people scanning crowds, should open public places and tourist destinations have security personnel who are specifically trained in behaviour analysis?

PB: From an aviation perspective, the International Civil Aviation Organisation in its latest amendment to Annex 17 has finally recognised that behavioural analysis is an important part of the process. It has become a recommendation, but not a standard. This is a major step in the right direction, and the only reason they struggle to make it a standard is because standards have to be tested and testable, and it’s very difficult to come up with a test for somebody’s subjective opinion. Ironically, we don’t argue about the use of subjective opinions when it comes to customs, quarantine or immigration controls. We don’t argue with the fact that the Police do it. We don’t argue with the fact that we all do it when we go to a social event and we decide who we want to interact with and who we don’t. So why is it that when it comes to airport security checkpoints does everybody get paranoid that you’re going to be racially profiling people, even though the best examples of profiling working have identified, for instance, young pregnant Catholic Irish people – rather than the stereotypical Islamist – as the threat. I think that is the fault of the media.

PB: Every facility to a certain extent should have a behavioural analysis program. Maybe we shouldn’t call them Behaviour Detection Officers solely employed for that purpose, but you certainly need to increase people’s awareness, encourage people to challenge suspicious behaviour and when suspicious behaviour is identified to take it as seriously as if you had found it using x-ray technology. What I would never do is if somebody had flagged somebody as being a possible threat then decide that the decision whether or not they can enter the facility or board the aircraft be determined on the basis of whether or not something prohibited is then found. That to me is utter nonsense. It is short-sighted tick-box security. I think every establishment should be doing behavioural analysis. We’ve done sports events and festivals in the UK, and we’ve identified all sorts of unusual behaviours, not only pickpockets, but up-skirt photographers, people involved in shoplifting of retail outlets, people involved in illegal gambling, courtsiding at tennis events – all things that can be identified by behavioural analysis.

MARCH 2019

Smart lie-detection system for EU borders An EU-funded project is looking to speed up border traffic using lie-detecting avatars, advanced analytics and automated risk assessment.

According to the European Commission, EU-funded project iBORDERCTRL is developing an ‘intelligent control system” that will facilitate border procedures for bona fide travellers and assist border guards identify illegal immigrants, criminals and persons of questionable intent. “We’re employing existing and proven technologies – as well as novel ones – to empower border agents to increase the accuracy and efficiency of border checks,” said project coordinator George Boultadakis of European Dynamics in Luxembourg. “iBORDERCTRL’s system will collect data that will move beyond biometrics and on to biomarkers of deceit.” Prior to making their trip, travellers will use an online application to upload pictures of their passport, visa and proof of funds, then utilise a webcam to answer questions from a computeranimated border guard, personalised to the traveller’s gender, ethnicity and language. “The Automatic Deception Detection System (ADDS) performs, controls and assesses the preregistration interview by sequencing a series of questions posed to travellers by an Avatar,” states the iBORDERCTRL website. “ADDS quantifies the probability of deceit in interviews by analysing interviewees non-verbal micro expressions.” “The avatar also allows for a consistent and controllable stimuli

MARCH 2019

across interviews in terms of both the verbal and non-verbal from the direction of the avatar agent to the traveller personalized to gender and language of the traveller, reducing variability compared to human interviewers and potentially improving the accuracy of the system.” At the border, travellers flagged as low risk during the pre-screening stage will go through a short reevaluation of their information for entry, while higher-risk passengers will undergo a more detailed check. Border officials will use a handheld device to automatically crosscheck information, comparing the facial images captured during the pre-screening stage to passports and photos taken on previous border crossings. The system’s Document Authenticity Analytics Tool (DAAT) module, used both at the pre-registration and at border control, will verify travel documents provided by the traveller during the pre-registration procedure and those scanned by border guards during the border control check. After the traveller’s documents have been reassessed, and fingerprinting, palm vein scanning and face matching have been undertaken, the potential risk posed by the traveller will be recalculated by the system’s Risk Based Assessment Tool (RBAT) module. The RBAT will implement a risk–assessment routine that

“aggregates and correlates the risk estimations received by the processing of the travellers’ data and documents supporting the decision-making of the border guard.” Following this, a border guard takes over from the automated system to complete the process. It is hoped that trials in Hungary, Greece and Latvia will demonstrate that the system supports border guards in reliably identifying non-bona fide travellers. Commencing with lab testing to familiarise border guards with the system, the trial will incorporate scenarios and tests in realistic conditions at the border. Visit http://ec.europa.eu/ research/infocentre/article_ en.cfm?artid=49726 and https:// www.iborderctrl.eu for more information.

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Border lessons

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Division and differentiation: Insights for border management from Ireland and Aotearoa New Zealand* Irish and New Zealand experiences show how borders can be places where the flare-up and resolution of conflicts are expressed, writes Dr Germana Nicklin.

Dr Germana Nicklin, is Senior Lecturer and Deputy Director at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS), Massey University, New Zealand. Germana has over 30 years operational and policy experience in the Australian and New Zealand public services, including over 17 years with the New Zealand Customs Service, where she held senior policy and strategic advisory positions.

*Aotearoa is the Māori name for New Zealand MARCH 2019

The practicalities of Brexit are creating a huge dilemma for the United Kingdom government, which cannot agree on what withdrawal from the European Union should encompass. Central to the debates is how to prevent a ‘hard’ Irish border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland; in other words, physical control points impeding passage from one sovereign state to the other. This is a land border issue, and one that states blessed with purely maritime borders can sit back and watch with interest, thankful that they don’t have a land border to manage. What is at stake with the Irish border question is not just trade and economics. It is maintaining the peace between the Republic of Ireland and the Northern Ireland – a hard-fought peace made possible by the 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement. An effect of that agreement was the opening of the land border between the two Irelands. From the 1970s to 1998, the border that divided two peoples politically and physically was the locus of significant violence and militarisation. Post-1998, the effect of the opening and the demilitarisation can be seen in the lives of the citizens of both states, particularly those that straddle the border. It has enabled them to intertwine their lives as if they were living in the same state. The extent of this intertwining is evident in the over 200 official road crossing points and many more informal ones; by the farms and villages that straddle the border;

by the over 100 million border crossings annually. A powerful symbol of the peace is the lack of a visible border between the two states, even though the border exists politically and cartographically. The Irish border at this point in time ‘differentiates’ between the two states; but doesn’t divide them. A desire to maintain this status and avoid a return to the divisive history that preceded the 1998 Good Friday Peace Agreement is evident in the UK negotiations with the EU. This article examines how the socio-political factors in two contested territories have and may continue to manifest at the border. More specifically, I am interested in how those conditions affecting the Irish border can inform our understanding of the territorial dynamics evident at Aotearoa New Zealand’s border, and of border management more generally. Modern border management is much more than the control points at the physical border. It both affects and is affected by the societies contained by the borders. This article highlights how political decisions can disrupt or can accommodate the different interests at the border, potentially resulting in different expressions of ‘divisiveness’ or ‘differentiation’. I will reflect on transitions from divisiveness to differentiation at the Irish border, and then apply these concepts to the history of contested territory in Aotearoa New Zealand since the signing of the Treaty of BORDER MANAGEMENT

Waitangi in 1840. In this context, I use the term divisiveness to mean the expression of different political worldviews that are unresolved and often involve discord and violence; and the term differentiation to mean a respectful accommodation of differences in political worldviews that enables the management and crossing of borders to occur without divisiveness. Brexit and the Irish border The UK’s withdrawal from its deep economic and political integration with the EU requires extraction from a wide range of EU systems, processes and policies, such as financial contributions, political representation, industry standards, external foreign policy and border policies and processes. Because Northern Ireland is part of the sovereign territory of the UK, it is subject to the terms of the UK withdrawal. However, it is also physically part of the island of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland became a member of the EU in 1973, the same year as the United Kingdom.

BORDER MANAGEMENT

The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will, unless a suitable agreement can be made, require the hard border between the two Irelands to be reinstated. In the event of a ‘no deal’, border checks and collection of customs duties would be required to manage the different rules for crossing between the two states. If the UK maintained the EU policies and standards for these crossings in order to keep the border open, it would be as if it had not exited the EU at all. This is the political conundrum facing the government of the UK with potentially significant social repercussions for both states, and particularly for borderland communities. The divisive border Common membership of the EU in 1973 was no guarantee of peace. Tensions between republicans and British loyalists existed from the creation of the Irish Republic in 1921. That agreement was meant to accommodate both republican and loyalist interests. However, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) did not

accept the division of the island and continued to push for unification of Ireland under a republic. They spearheaded violence that escalated in the 1970s, and continued until shortly before the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. This violence, known as The Troubles, was particularly evident at the physical border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. In an attempt to contain the violence, a deeply divisive physical barrier was constructed at the border. Many roads were made impassable with barriers such as huge concrete blocks and deep canals. Traffic was directed to official access points controlled by watchtowers, soldiers and police. The impact on the lives of peoples living in the borderlands was significant, not only interfering with their ability to move around, but also subjecting them to more bombings, deaths and injuries than any other place excepting Belfast. The violent action at the border can be seen as symbolising the divisive nature of the political environment.

MARCH 2019

The differentiating border In 1998, peace transformed the divisive border into a differentiating border. Road signs indicating a change from kilometres to miles or vice versa were a powerful symbol of this transition, marking not only the crossing from one state to the other, but also the transition from violence to peace. Even so, however powerful this symbolism might be, the Good Friday Peace Agreement did not lead to necessary processes of reconciliation. With the underlying conflicts remaining unresolved, the risk of a flare up of sectarian violence should a physical border be reinstated is very real. Until Brexit is resolved, the Irish border is a locus of uncertainty, caught in its violent history, hovering between differentiation and divisiveness. As discussed earlier, there is a relationship between borders and violence and borders and control. Borders are places that delineate a state’s authority and also where

it exercises its authority. The delineation is often gained through violence, and in the case of the Irish border in The Troubles, maintained by violence. The history of The Troubles is still fresh and not easy to forget. The status of ‘differentiation’ is therefore fragile and not assured. In other countries, the path from divisiveness to differentiation can be harder to see and therefore harder to remember. There is a good reason for this, from a state’s perspective. Adam McKeown in Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders put it thus: “For nearly two centuries, forgetting the past has been fundamental to the naturalization of border control.” As can be seen with the Irish border, remembering the violence and the source of the violence creates instability and divisiveness, but it also reminds people how precious the peace is. Maintaining a sense of differentiation is a peaceful

way to recognise transitions from one status to another and also to help keep the peace. Aotearoa New Zealand’s border history Unlike Ireland, Aotearoa New Zealand is an integral island state, with a natural and uncontested maritime border and no land borders. Nevertheless, the political border is as constructed as the Irish border – a fact that is largely obscured by assumptions about a border as a natural physical feature, like the sea. The notion of Aotearoa New Zealand as a sovereign state came about through a treaty, the Treaty of Waitangi, between the indigenous Māori tribes (iwi) and the British Sovereign (in Aotearoa New Zealand law, ‘the Crown’), similarly to the agreement between Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1921. Before the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, there was no ‘state’ and no particular divisiveness. British

Port of Auckland container terminal.

MARCH 2019

BORDER MANAGEMENT

newcomers were unruly and caused problems for Māori but there was no significant conflict over borders between settlers and Māori. However, the nature of the Treaty itself created internal divisiveness that affects the relationship between Māori and the Crown to this day, creating social divisions between Māori and non-Māori. In the Treaty, the parties agreed to a partnership. But the nature of the partnership was different to each, because there were two different versions of the Treaty. Māori chiefs signed a Māori version, and representatives of the Crown signed an English version, and they meant different things. Each party acted according to their version, which inevitably resulted in conflict. The British saw the Treaty as providing the authorising environment for British governmental institutions to govern the whole country, with law applying to all citizens, including Māori. Māori, on the other hand, expected the Treaty to guarantee them continued governance over their lands and collective ways of life. This did not happen. Instead, they lost most of their lands through illegal confiscation and military action, and suffered huge loss of life through war, illness and poverty. This history shows a fundamental divisiveness that affected and still affects social outcomes for Māori and their influence in government. However, in the 1980s, the Fourth Labour Government started to incorporate the principles of the Treaty into legislation. Since that time, government departments have been adopting differentiating practices that recognise Māori interest and rights in a wide range of areas, including border management. So far as border management is concerned, the Crown defined and controlled the border of Aotearoa New Zealand by exporting the customs legislation from Britain (the Customs Act 1841). This legislation had a detrimental effect on Māori economically and therefore socially. Prior to the Treaty, Māori were entrepreneurial traders with control 50

BORDER MANAGEMENT

over access routes for trade and thus economically independent. The Customs Act imposed customs duties, collected by a Comptroller of Customs. Māori could no longer levy their own fees, such as anchorage fees. Trade also diverted elsewhere to avoid the customs duties, ships choosing instead duty-free ports overseas. For the Māori, these and other rules introduced by the settler government became more and more intrusive and divisive, disrupting the Māori way of life. Māori did not contest the definition of the border in 1841, just the disruptive controls the British placed on it, recognisably similar to the divisive British controls at the Irish border. Today, effective management of goods, people and craft across Aotearoa New Zealand’s border benefits Māori generally and specifically. For example, the export of pounamu, a Māori taonga, is strictly controlled; effective processing of exports contributes to Māori economic wellbeing just as the Good Friday Peace Agreement enable Irish and United Kingdom citizens to reap the benefits of EU membership. Conclusions What conclusions can we make from this discussion? The Irish border reminds us that borders are often locations of contestation. That contestation can be violent and it can be discriminatory. People living close to the Irish border experienced both, through much greater violence and injury than in Northern Ireland as a whole. The violence in the history of Aotearoa New Zealand manifested through cultural divisiveness between the two Treaty partners, resulting in a violent suppression of Māori interests for over a century. Like the IRA, Māori activists never stopped protesting; unlike Ireland, successive governments of Aotearoa New Zealand have been working since the mid-1980s on righting past wrongs, and Māori interests are much more visible in

government policies, including those relating to managing the border. The shift to differentiation has been lower key than in Ireland, and it is still developing. While Māori interests can be said to be moving towards differentiation in a positive sense, there are some citizens who do not see it that way. However, while differentiation continues to evolve, it is difficult to imagine a violent socio-political flare-up affecting the New Zealand border in the way that could occur out of Brexit. Looking more broadly, beyond the specifics of these two situations, it is possible to see how borders can be places where the flare-up and resolution of conflicts are expressed, and that they can move between the two. The concepts of divisiveness and differentiation provide ‘coat hangers’ for examining any given situation. Being able to read the signs of movement from one status to the other could strengthen the effectiveness of border management. Questions such as: what is the status of a particular border – is it in divisiveness or differentiation? Who and what is making it so, and how? Are there signs of a shift of status? Who has a stake in keeping the status quo? Who has a stake in shifting the status from one to the other? These are very broad but important questions that reach beyond standard risk management questions of likelihood and impact. They start to transform border management from its operational function to a barometer for security. Using the concepts of divisiveness and differentiation to look at the status of the border and the way it is managed makes the political realities more visible – a divisive border signalling potentially unresolved social and political issues; a differentiated border reflecting a socio-politically secure society. These are bold claims that do not give adequate recognition to the nuances present within them. More reflection and research is needed to develop these ideas further. MARCH 2019

WCO News Enhanced connectivity: Hong Kong, Macau and mainland China

WCO supports MENA Region in Pre-arrival Processing System

MAR 01: At the invitation of the Director General of Macau Customs, Mr. Alex Vong, and the Commissioner of Hong Kong Customs, Mr. Hermes Tang, World Customs Organization Secretary General Kunio Mikuriya visited both Customs Administrations of the two Special Administrative Regions on 26 and 27 February. In Macau, the Secretary General visited the newly created passenger processing post built to facilitate the movement of passengers along the Hong Kong - Zhuhai - Macau Bridge, a 55 kilometre bridge-tunnel system opened in October 2018. The Secretary General then crossed the Bridge to Hong Kong, which previously was only connected to Macau by ferry. On the Hong Kong side of the bridge, Dr. Mikuriya visited the new facilities built to process passengers and cargo. The opening of the bridge, together with the inauguration in September 2018 of a railway station for high-speed trains linking Hong Kong and Beijing via Guangzhou and Shenzhen, is expected to further strengthen Hong Kong’s position as a financial and transportation hub. The development of these new transport infrastructures is part of the Guangdong-Hong KongMacau Greater Bay Area project, bringing together the two Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau and nine municipalities in Guangdong Province to form an economic development zone in South China. Dr. Mikuriya took the opportunity to pay a visit to Hong Kong Customs College, formerly known as the Customs and Excise Training School, which also serves as a WCO Regional Training Centre.

MAR 04: The WCO with support from the Japanese Customs Cooperation Fund and Jordanian Customs conducted a regional workshop on the ‘Development of Pre-arrival Processing System’ for the North Africa and Middle East (MENA) region in Amman, Jordan, from 25 to 28 February. Eighteen senior and middleranking officials from eleven countries of the Region, including Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria and Tunisia, participated in the workshop. The key building blocks of a PreArrival Processing System including Advance filing, risk management, e-payments and account-based processing were explained, as were relevant provisions of the Revised Kyoto Convention (RKC), the WTO Agreement on Trade Facilitation (TFA), the SAFE Framework of Standards and related instruments and tools. Participants learned about Digital Customs, Coordinated Border Management and Single Window in the context of pre-arrival processing system. The change in the legal position with regard to the implementation of Pre-Arrival Processing systems with the entry into force of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement was also emphasized. Participants developed a draft action plan along identifying possible ways forward on carrying out necessary amendments/adjustments in their national legislation for the adoption of pre-arrival processing system, developing IT and data analytics capabilities, and enhancing coordination with partner government agencies and other stakeholders.

MARCH 2019

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Interview

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Border control, immigration policy, and economic performance Abul Rizvi PSM talks to editor Nicholas Dynon about how strong border control underpinned big – and successful – increases in skilled migration to Australia. BMM: In terms of borders, the Howard government (1996-2007) is perhaps most widely remembered for polarising and politicising the migration debate – controversially played out in the ‘children overboard’ scandal. But is this a somewhat narrow reflection? Is there more to the border legacy of the Howard years?

Abul Rizvi PSM served in the Australian Department of Immigration from the early 1990s to 2007, including as First Assistant Secretary Migration and Temporary Entry Division and Deputy Secretary, prior to moving to the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy as Deputy Secretary. His public service career commenced in 1982 in the Department of Finance. Abul was awarded the Centenary Medal in 2001 and Public Service Medal (PSM) in 2004 for services to the development and implementation of immigration policy, including in particular the reshaping of Australia’s intake to focus on skilled migration. He is currently undertaking a PhD at the University of Melbourne on Australia’s immigration policies.

MARCH 2019

AR: It’s understandable that the Tampa affair and ‘children overboard’ is what people remember, but around the same time, independently to this, Howard very significantly changed immigration policy from 2001. He increased the skilled intake very significantly, and he did it through an innovative way of bringing in increasing numbers of long-term temporary entrants – 457 visa holders, overseas students and working holiday makers – and creating pathways for them to secure migration. For an old-time immigration officer that might sound like anathema: bringing in long-term temporary entrants and allowing them to change status was taboo for most of the 1990s. So the change that Howard brought about was quite dramatic, both in terms of border control philosophy as well as what appeared to be his approach to immigration up until then, which was to keep immigration very low and very tight. The extent to which he boosted it was unprecedented in Australian history, you’d have to go back to Menzies and Holt to find another

time when immigration levels were increased so quickly. Now people laugh, ‘well why did he do that?’ There are three main drivers that I think drove Howard down that path. The first was that in his 2001 immigration election policy document the bulk of the document actually doesn’t talk about Tampa, the bulk of the document talks about the success in increasing the labour force performance of skilled migrants to Australia. By using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia, he was able to contrast migrants arriving in Australia prior to the Howard Government changes of 1996-97 with migrants arriving after those changes, and he showed that their labour market performance was dramatically improved. As he boasted about that in his election policy document, it was inevitable that the business community would turn around and say ‘well why don’t you increase the migration program for these skilled migrants if they’re contributing so much to the budget and to the economy?’ The BCA in particular pushed this line hard. Secondly, it was a point at which the economy – both the global economy and the Australian economy – were taking off, partly driven by China but also driven by what economists call the demographic dividend - Australia was in the strongest part of our working age to population ratio, and that was also driving the economy. The strength of the economy was creating massive skills shortages, BORDER MANAGEMENT

and the Howard Government was getting belted from pillar to post by the business community, the Labor opposition and the universities for failing to invest adequately in the training of Australians and being criticised for allowing the skills shortages to emerge and not planning for them. But the third factor – and I believe this is the biggest factor – was that throughout the whole of the 1990s Australia’s fertility rate fell every year, year-after-year. By 1999, the Australian Bureau of Statistics was forecasting that our fertility rate would continue to fall and possibly reach 1.6 babies per woman possibly even as low as 1.5, with dramatic implications for the ageing of the population. The implications for the economy and the budget were quite frightening for Treasury. We had, in the immigration department in about 1999, commissioned a report by Professor Peter McDonald and Rebecca Kippen [The impact of immigration on the ageing of Australia’s population] that showed that if the fertility rate continued to decline, the rate of ageing would be quite severe, and a very steeply ageing society creates major challenges in terms of economic management and management of the budget. Those factors led the Howard Government to do a complete about face on immigration levels. Instead of cutting immigration, which he’d done for four years, his government suddenly started to increase it quite dramatically. BMM: What is the evidence slower ageing is beneficial from an economic and budgetary perspective? AR: There’s certainly an enormous amount of literature which highlights – usually through economic modelling – what the impacts of rapid ageing are. Now you may or may not believe that sort of economic modelling. A better way of looking at it is to compare Australia and Japan. 54

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Why compare these two countries? Well, because in many ways they are polar opposites from an immigration and population perspective. From 1990 onwards, Japan’s working age to population ratio in the next 25 years fell by 10 percentage points – a very steep decline. During the same period, Australia’s working age to population ratio initially increased until about 2009 and then declined only very gradually. In other words, Australia sustained a relatively high working age to population ratio throughout that period whereas Japan’s declined every year year-on-year throughout that period. As a result of that, the employment to population ratio in Japan fell from about 62 percent to about 57 percent, by contrast Australia’s increased from about 58 percent to over 62 percent. The contrasting impact on the two economies and budgets of the two countries was enormous. Australia’s budget debt to GDP increased but only increased marginally, whereas Japan’s shot ahead and is now more than 200 percent of GDP. In terms of per capita GDP, Australia’s per capita GDP continued to increase throughout that period very significantly, Japan’s slowed markedly. The most surprising one though is real wages. Real wages in Japan since 1990 have been just about flat, Australia’s real wages have increased by almost USD 20,000 per person over that period, a remarkable shift. Of course there were other factors involved, but in my view ageing was the big one there. BMM: How did the Howard government use strong border control to enable a more targeted and growing migration program? AR: There are two things that strong border control from an immigration perspective brings you. Firstly, it enables you to control the way immigration is managed, who is coming in and what contribution they are making.

If you are to contrast Australia with most of Europe or indeed the USA, for example, who have traditionally had very poor border control, the labour force impact of the people who migrated to those countries is quite different because of their labour force characteristics. Whereas in Australia we were able to tailor the labour force characteristics of the people we were recruiting to those who had the skills that met Australia’s needs, that had the right age profile, and that good English language skills – they were three big changes that Howard was able to make because we had control of the immigration program. Secondly, control of borders gives a level of confidence to the public that migration can indeed be managed in the national interest. If you don’t have good border control you lose that confidence and the ability to manage the immigration program in the national interest. BMM: The levers of border control that you’re talking about there are largely legislative and policy. AR: Yes, but other border control changes were also relevant over that period. During the mid-1990s we were under intense pressure to introduce visa waiver, which effectively meant people arrived at our borders and were assessed at the airport. That was the way Europe managed arrivals from most visa waiver countries, and that’s the way the U.S. did it in the mid-90s. We decided to go in a different direction. We, of course, had our universal visa system which was viewed as a bit odd by most other developed countries at that time, which meant everyone had to have a visa. We also introduced the electronic travel authority. At the time we introduced the ETA both North American and European countries laughed at us – ‘why would you do that, what a waste of money!’ Well, history shows us that we took the right path MARCH 2019

Permanent Visas Issued 140000 120000 100000 80000 60000 40000 20000 0

Skill

by introducing the ETA, and the countries in Europe and the USA in particular have eventually copied us and indeed gone further. The introduction of the ETA reflected in many ways our obsession with border control. And it’s been that obsession, I believe, that’s allowed us to manage the migration program in the way that we have. The U.S. and Europe started down this path after 9/11, and in many ways they are playing catch-up. The U.S. now, for example, has a very large illegal immigrant population and a very large population of failed asylum seekers – effectively an underclass in that country – and that makes immigration management so much more difficult. BMM: As many emerging economies transform countries of net emigration to countries of net immigration, what will be the impact on traditional immigration destinations such as Australia. AR: That is in many ways the most fascinating question. In Europe they worry about illegal immigration and how to manage it. Many of these MARCH 2019

Family

Humaniatrian

nations are taking enormous steps to reduce both legal and illegal immigration. But because they have fertility rates that are generally lower than Australia, and because they have populations that are substantially older than Australia, they inevitably face in the longer term much more rapid ageing and population decline. The same is faced by countries such as Japan which is already introducing new immigration programs – Japan in fact now has a points tested migration category similar to ours – some say they copied ours –countries like the Republic of Korea may go down the same path. But the big one in this space is of course China. China is now facing a very steep decline in its working age population. The most recent UN population projections suggest that China’s working age population will fall from around one billion presently to around 700 million in 40 to 50 years. That’s the largest decline in the working age population of any country ever in the history of the world – think about that, especially given Australia’s extraordinary reliance on strong economic growth in China.

We do not know what happens when a strong, powerful economy loses 300 million working age people who shift into the aged cohort because we’ve never been there. But we know from the experience of Japan and from economic modelling that the prospects are not good. I don’t believe the Chinese government will just sit back and say well that’s bad luck. They will act. I think China will no longer be a country of net emigration that it’s been for the last 30 years where around five million people per annum net have left China. I think China will switch to being a country of net immigration over the next decade. We could we see within 20 years China becoming a country where the net migration rate is actually a positive three to five million, not a negative three to five million per annum. The question then arises where will the young skilled people that China wants come from? And I think the Chinese government has already shown its hand on this. What it wants is people who left China many, many years ago or the children BORDER MANAGEMENT

of the people who left China or the grandchildren of the people who left China to come back. They will seek to attract their diaspora back to China. And they’ve already made an initial step in this regard by introducing a five year visa for people who no longer have Chinese citizenship but have Chinese ethnicity. It will be interesting to see what the impact for a country like Australia – with quite a sizeable portion of the population being of Chinese origin – will be. The second big challenge in that regard is that China wants to become involved in the international education business. We may no longer be seeing a net number of Chinese students leaving China but indeed a net number of students going to China. Given that China is our biggest source of overseas students what does that mean for our overseas student industry? BMM: Recent years have seen massive change to the architecture of Australia’s bureaucracy in relation to the handling of immigration policy, including the merging of immigration with customs and border protection and the subsequent establishment of a Department of Home Affairs. And then there’s the ongoing issues surrounding the offshore processing of irregular maritime arrivals. What issues arising from these changes will a new government face following the imminent federal elections? AR: The merging of immigration with a range of other law enforcement functions is Australia going down the pathway of

other nations who also have the immigration function incorporated with the law enforcement function. It could be argued that we’re just copying good practice from what other countries have done. I would contend that would be the wrong interpretation. I think what other people are doing is playing catch up because they lost control of their borders, and putting immigration into law enforcement is what that’s about. I believe Australia’s success has been combining good border control with good immigration management to give you a very successful socially cohesive society and a successful economy. We do the wrong thing by copying others on immigration. They should be copying us as they did with the ETA. I think merging immigration with all those law enforcement functions led to the visa processing function being downgraded. It is now a second class function within the Home Affairs portfolio. People who wear uniforms and carry guns are the important people. They are the people who attract the resources. Visa processing has become unimportant and is losing the battle for resources even though it’s the visa processing function that actually generates much of the revenue through application fees. Application fees to Australia are now massive and the revenue significantly exceeds the level of resources allocated to the function. I don’t know where the other revenue goes but its not going to the visa processing function. As a result we have a number of problems. Firstly, really poor morale in the visa processing areas. Secondly, as a result of a combination

BORDER MANAGEMENT 56

BORDER MANAGEMENT

of poor morale, poor visa design, and poor implementation, we have visa application backlogs growing to levels unheard of. If backlogs had grown to that level when I was running the migration and temporary entry programs, [the then Immigration Minister] Philip Ruddock would have had me sacked. We have a situation where for example, visitor arrivals changing status onshore are over 24 percent of net overseas migration. That is an astonishing number, and it reflects a visa system that is out of control. It reflects poor border control, not good border control to take forever to process visa applications. As a result, the number of bridging visas on-hand has grown enormously. In 2017-18 there were almost 200,000 bridging visas on hand, and a large backlog of bridging visas is just a honeypot for people smugglers. And that is what we are seeing. We’ve seen an incredible increase in asylum applications in the last two to three years to levels unheard of – well beyond anything that happened under [previous Prime Ministers] Rudd and Gillard. Those applications are being processed very slowly, they are then flowing on to the AAT. The big surge at the AAT hasn’t occurred yet even though in the last year and a half the backlog of asylum cases at the AAT has more than doubled from eight and a half thousand to almost 18,000. So what we’re seeing is a decline in the effectiveness of border control and simultaneously a reduction in the skilled stream of legal migration. In many ways the reverse of the Howard Government’s legacy.

Want to get your company’s message to the people who make the decisions? Talk to Border Management about advertising and sponsored content. Contact: craig@bordermanagement.net

MARCH 2019

DHS News Secretary breaks down national emergency funds

Northern Triangle Security Ministers meet

FEB 15: Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen FEB 21: U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen released a statement on the signing of legislation that Nielsen met Northern Triangle security ministers in San funds the DHS and on President Trump’s declaration of Salvador on February 20 to discuss the development of a a national emergency, outlining how the funds would be “regional compact” and action plan aimed at addressing used. the ongoing humanitarian “The legislation… increases and security crisis of irregular the DHS overall budget by $1.7 migration and the formation of billion, including $1.375 billion migrant caravans. to build new border barriers “Today, we have declared where our frontline personnel a historic commitment – our need it most, and contains no mutual intention to crack down restrictions on total barrier on smugglers and traffickers mileage,” stated Secretary who are profiting from human Nielsen. misery,” said Secretary Nielsen. “The legislation also includes “We cannot allow $415 million in humanitarian children to be used as pawns or assistance to address the serious women to be sexually assaulted crisis at our southern border, or migrants to become victims 4,754 additional beds for U.S. of violence on the terrible Immigration and Customs journey north,” she added. “We Enforcement to detain illegal must put an end to this crisis aliens humanely and keep our and help vulnerable migrants citizens safe, and $570 million closer to their point of origin.” for specialized screening The Joint Statement Detection technology on the U.S.-Mexico border. equipment at our Ports of Entry outlines a path toward a formal to detect illegal drugs and Memorandum of Cooperation— human smuggling,” she continued. or “regional compact”—between U.S. and Northern “Finally, the bill funds the Coast Guard’s Polar Triangle security ministries, which, states DHS, will Security Cutter, increases important funding for the address the challenges of irregular migration at their newly created Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security source. Agency (CISA), and provides funding for 200 computed The compact is intended to cover four areas of tomography machines that will help our dedicated TSA collaboration: (i) combatting human trafficking and employees keep our skies safe. migrant smuggling; (ii) countering organized crime “Time and again, Congress has failed to fully fund and gangs; (iii) expanding information and intelligence DHS to confront this situation and to handle the influx sharing; and (iv) strengthening border security. of aliens, drugs, and other illicit traffic into our country. Ministers agreed to complete the final agreement That is why I strongly support the President’s decision to in March and to engage in regular meetings—at the unlock additional funding for physical barriers, including senior and working levels—to help ensure these efforts resources from the Department of Treasury and the commence quickly and are effectively executed and Department of Defense.” sustained. MARCH 2019

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Visa fraud

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

AI and intuitive decision-making in irregular people movement Automating border management and visa processing makes good sense, writes Geoff Heath, but immigration practitioner â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;smartsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; remain more important than ever.

Geoff Heath is the founder of LabourPulse, a start-up developing migration integrity capability programs and related services. Geoff served as a detective in the Queensland Police Service followed by 26 years with Australiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s immigration and border protection portfolio, mostly in the risk, fraud and integrity space, including a number of overseas postings. He has led or been involved in numerous irregular migration management projects in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East and is recognised for his ability to negotiate positive outcomes in cross-cultural contexts, often where fraud and corruption is endemic. He is also an experienced cultural capability consultant with a focus on the law enforcement and compliance space.

MARCH 2019

Rapid advances in technology, and particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI), are re-shaping border management for most developed economies. Key drivers include cost reduction and a more seamless traveller experience at a time of rapid growth in air travel and competition for tourist markets, without compromising border integrity. These advances are crucial for the future of border management, but there is also a need for caution. To what extent can AI effectively replace human intuition in the people movement space without compromising integrity? This article explores the value of recognising and maintaining sufficient human intuitive decision-making capability to complement the advances in technology and AI. In the Australian context at least, maritime people smuggling and human trafficking tend to dominate dialogue around irregular migration. However, for experienced immigration practitioners there is an arguably more insidious aspect of irregular people movement that receives far less public attention. This is the independent visa applicant, usually arriving by air, with non-genuine intentions. It must be said that the vast majority of travellers are genuine, but the numbers of those who are not can easily spiral out of control when systems and policies are inadequate. The impact of inadequately addressing this cohort is easily underestimated.

Exploring the breadth and diversity of scams in this space is well beyond the scope of this article; suffice to say that they are constantly morphing to stay one step ahead of advances in technology and procedure designed to mitigate them. These non-genuine travellers are often guided, assisted and coached in how to obtain visas and clear into destination countries under the guise of having genuine intentions, when their real intention may be to overstay, work illegally, claim asylum, engage in criminal activity or simply to exploit the destination society for personal gain. Many are facilitated by racketeers, including a small number of unscrupulous migration agents who tarnish the reputation of the broader advice industry. Fraud may be as simple as fabricated claims, or include fraudulent documents, false identities and relationship fraud. The modus operandi can take a variety of different forms depending on visa category and source country. In my many years dealing with visa and immigration fraud, I have seen all manner of highly-sophisticated networks exclusively devoted to getting travellers through the latest systems. In some source societies, local cultural attitudes may not view visa fraud as unacceptable and may even condone the practice. The more pragmatic will argue that some non-genuine travellers are the price to pay for reducing border management costs and achieving more seamless travel. There is logic in this, and managing risk often BORDER MANAGEMENT

involves a degree of calculated losses. But if inadequately addressed, facilitators of non-genuine entry soon find and exploit the weaknesses in border processes, with the results of their efforts a difficult and costly issue to reverse. The stakes are in fact higher than many realise. An illegal worker, overstayer or failed asylum seeker can be very expensive to locate, manage and repatriate. A successful fraudulent migration application that slips through the cracks brings a lifetime of benefits, including eventually the right to citizenship, not to mention the place they have taken in limited migration intakes at the expense of someone more deserving. And if a fraudulent migration applicant succeeds in gaining unfair advantage, there is a high chance that their propensity to engage in fraud will extend to accessing other government benefits. Even shortterm illegal workers risk displacing local workers and diminishing safety standards and employment conditions. The stakes are especially high when dealing with cases involving children, where fraud can equally be found around parentage, custody, adoption or citizenship by descent. The numbers may be a small percentage, but any incorrect decision concerning a child is one too many. Experienced immigration practitioners are quick to point out that border management starts well before the actual border entry point. A long-term adage describes border management as a series of “onion rings”, the first being (in broad terms) the visa application process in

the source country, the second being the boarding process at the last port of embarkation, with the third being screening at the actual border entry point. Monitoring, compliance and removal make up some of the postarrival layers of border management. The transition to online visa applications sees less face-toface client contact and original documents. Despite these essential changes, with effective technology and AI correctly referring high-risk or suspect visa applicants offline for closer scrutiny, the first “onion ring” does not have to be a redundant concept.

BORDER MANAGEMENT 60

BORDER MANAGEMENT

There is no question that advances in biometrics in its various forms (facial recognition, fingerprints, gait, to name a few) are already playing a major role in reducing identity fraud. However, this is essentially limited to identifying identity changes occurring after the first biometrics are captured. Assessing baggage and cargo is a highly-specialised field in itself that is also benefitting from rapid advances in technology, but there are fundamental differences to assessing a person’s right of entry. Ultimately baggage either contains contraband – or it does not. When assessing genuine travellers and their right of entry at visa application or entry control point, the official

Want to get your company’s message to the people who make the decisions? Talk to Border Management about advertising and sponsored content. Contact: craig@bordermanagement.net

MARCH 2019

is generally faced with determining a person’s state of mind – a not so objective task. Their decision often relies on what the passenger intends to do after they are approved or cleared, not necessarily on what they have done. There may not always be tangible indicators. AI is very effective in identifying patterns or trends to suggest a person fits a known profile, but ultimately it is unlikely to be very intuitive where a more subjective assessment is required. Tourists and visitors tend to attract a disproportionate slice of the scrutiny. Longer-term entrants such as students or migrants often need even more subjective evaluation. These visa streams can be targeted by experienced scammers and opportunists because of the longer-term visa validity and associated benefits. How effective is technology and AI in assessing a “genuine partner relationship”, whether someone intends a genuine stay as a student, or weighing up a person’s character? MARCH 2019

There is an added dimension to assessing a visa applicant’s or traveller’s intention that separates it from other border management tasks. Their genuine intention or otherwise could change at any point in the continuum, from visa application to boarding the aircraft to entry clearance point, and well beyond if tied to visa conditions post-arrival. As one example, a genuine traveller may decide to make an asylum claim only after entering and being coached by others. Identifying and dealing with visa and migration fraud is by nature very intuitive. It is a skill that is not easy to teach. Good assessors often start out as quite gullible and begin to build their “smarts” only once they have been gypped by the first few fraudulent clients, with their skills enhanced over time. Even experienced immigration practitioners constantly encounter new scams designed to outsmart the latest systems, many extremely sophisticated.

There is a clear danger of failing to acknowledge the importance of immigration practitioner “smarts” in the rush towards automating border management. There is a risk that over time automation could even de-skill client-facing practitioners in the basic skills of assessing client integrity. Australia’s current government is in the process of outsourcing visa processing (as opposed to visa application lodgement that has been in place for some years). It remains to be seen how such an arrangement with the private sector will effectively incorporate the human intuitive capability needed to complement automation. Invariably, the latest technological advances in the border management space are the domain of developed economies. But even developed economies can have their borders weakened by neighbours with ineffective systems or processes, which is why many rightly invest in capacity building programs. Opportunists are increasingly taking advantage of small and emerging economies’ weaker border and process-driven visa assessment regimes to exploit their resources, people and accepting nature, with potential downstream detrimental effects on their society and economy. This may even be encouraged by some source countries as a way of spreading their influence. Developments in AI present incredible opportunities to manage large numbers of visa applicants and travellers more efficiently, but it is also inherently non-intuitive. There is clear danger in failing to acknowledge the continuing importance of practitioner skill, talent and ability in the process. Indeed, it is these very “smarts” that will always be needed to ensure that AI algorithms will be agile enough to anticipate scammers constantly shifting the goalposts. Recognising, maintaining and building on these skills so they can complement AI is crucial to effectively address irregular people movement into the future. BORDER MANAGEMENT

Interview

62 BORDER MANAGEMENT Indian- Border Security Force at the Wagah border crossing. Image: Wikipedia, appaji / Giridhar Appaji Nag Y.

MARCH 2019

From the frontier of border security Raj Arora shares his insights from a career on the front line in India’s Border Security Force with editor Nicholas Dynon. BMM: How do you define border security? What does a secure border look like?

Dr. Raj K Arora is Professor of International Affairs and Security Studies at the Sadar Patel University of Police, Security and Criminal Justice, and Commandant/Officer on Special Duty at the Sardar Patel Global Center for Security, Counter Terrorism and Anti-insurgency in Jaipur, Rajasthan. He has almost 25 years’ experience as a police officer in border security, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism in various parts of India. He has served in the highly sensitive and insurgency prone area of Kashmir, commanded battalions on the India-Pakistan border and in the Naxal insurgency-affected areas in Central India and has served as a UN peacekeeper in Kosovo (2002-03).

MARCH 2019

RA: I think how one defines border security is dependent on perspective, and as such it’s very difficult to settle on a standard definition. The dictionary meaning of border security refers to all the measures taken by a country – or bloc of countries – to monitor and protect its border, to prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons, drugs and contrabands and, in addition, promoting lawful travel and trade, all of which is crucial for national security, economic development and national sovereignty. There are two types of border security: unilateral and cooperative border security. Unilateral refers to all the ‘one sided’ efforts a country takes to secure its borders without cooperation from a neighboring country. Accordingly, active participation and sharing of resources by both countries to secure their borders is cooperative border security. Border security depends upon the capabilities of the stakeholders assigned to the border, including detection, identification and the ability to react. Nations that possess optimum levels of these capabilities have secure borders. We refer to this technically as ‘controlled borders’, which is the highest level of security but very difficult to achieve, and the next level of border security is managed and then monitored borders.

BMM: What, in your experience, are the critical components of border security, particularly in the context of land borders affected by conflict and tension? RA: I have developed a model of border security key components, which includes the following: 1. Border security infrastructure: all the physical resources like border outposts, observations towers, border fencing, roads and tracks along the border, etc. 2. Boots on the ground: border police professsionals and their support staff. 3. Technological solutions at the border: various types of technological solutions on the ground and the extent to which they are compatible with the local context. 4. Local environment at the border: the local environment is very important for border security, and includes the border population, civil society organizations, local leaders, local administration, and coordination and cooperation among all stakeholders. These four components are essential for the securing of borders. Border security is a big challenge, particularly in conflict zones, where simultaneous capacity building in these four elements is necessary. BMM: You’ve led teams on the front line of securing borders. What, in your mind, are the skills and attributes required of a contemporary border security professional? BORDER MANAGEMENT

: A Border Security Force Mi-17 helicopter operating in Uttarakhand, India

RA: With the changing border security scenario globally, challenges for border security professionals are increasing. As a border security professional, you must have all the qualities of a law enforcement professional. In addition to that, you must know how to engage the border population to seek their cooperation to secure the border and address their developmental needs; you must be aware of the humanitarian dimensions as well as being equipped with technological knowledge. You should also know how to use the technology. Technology is playing a vital role in new border security structures, but training on technical solutions needs to be addressed. I always say that smart gadgets require smart users.

the successful use of technology by the United States and Israel to secure their borders. Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s hightech security fence and integrated and sensor-packed unmanned aerial vehicles are two good examples of technological solutions for borders. However, some challenges are being faced by security professionals and authorities to implement technical solutions at the border, including cost, training, and changes and upgrades. The U.S., for example, is facing many of these challenges along its Mexico border.

BMM: How has the role of technology in border security changed over the course of your career, and how do you see technologies being most effectively applied to border security into the future?

RA: My doctoral thesis addresses various issues of border security, including the simultaneous development of the four components of border security, long term strategies to implement technological solutions aimed at improving border security, and addressing issues related to border populations. In addition to the above, my thesis also addresses issues relating to the training of border security professionals, and recommondations

RA: Technology is playing a significant role in all security solutions. However, the function of the technology for border security applications is crucial, as seen in

BORDER MANAGEMENT

BMM: You recently completed your PhD research into issues related to border security and transnational crimes. Can you tell us a little about the topic and your findings?

relating to the customisation of border security solutions for local topography, demography and weather conditions. BMM: Are countries learning enough from each other to improve border security? Are we talking enough to each other; are the mechanisms for international and regional cooperation adequate? RA: The border security scenario is changing very fast. Hence there is an urgent need to operate and share the various best practices being followed by different countries to secure their borders. Unfortunately, sharing of knowledge and exchanging the best practices are almost negligible. We donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t have a common platform from where all border security professionals across the world can share their experience and knowledge, and from where they can learn from each other. This is the best way for professionals to learn from each otherâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s experience. There is a long way to go to bring the border security institutions and security professionals together. A regional multilateral where border security professionals can share and exchange their views might be a place to start.

MARCH 2019

IBMATA and WTTC strike partnership The peak travel & tourism and border management organisations look to collaboration to promote biometric technology for safe, secure and better travel. According to a February 12 press release, the World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC) and the International Border Management & Technologies Association (IBMATA) have struck a partnership to promote safe, secure and seamless travel across international borders “making best use of new and emerging technology, while enhancing border security.” The WTTC is the body that represents the travel and tourism private sector globally. Its members include over 170 CEOs, Chairpersons and Presidents of the world’s leading travel and tourism companies from all geographies covering all industries. Together, both organisations commit to making the best use of new and emerging technology and established border management principles with their respective members to deliver an improved international passenger experience globally across borders. WTTC’s Seamless Traveller Journey programme envisages

a future where the traveller won’t need to provide the same information or passport multiple times. Instead, their experience will be seamless, faster and more enjoyable throughout their entire journey. Biometrics will work at every touchpoint of the journey to make travelling easier for the passenger while providing border services with greater security. “Travel & Tourism employs one in ten people on the planet today and over the course of the next 20 years we will witness a doubling of the number of travellers and the creation of as many as 100 million jobs around the world,” said Gloria Guevara, President and CEO of WTTC. “We have a responsibility to prepare for the future by transforming the traveller experience while increasing security by working together and with governments. Our relationship with IBMATA will help to promote the concept of safe and secure travel across international borders and improved passenger experience.”

WTTC President & CEO Gloria Guevara and IBMATA Chairman Tony Smith.

MARCH 2019

Gloria Guevara. Source: WTTC.

“Border Agencies are dealing with more international passengers at their international borders than ever before, against a backdrop of static or declining resources,” commented Tony Smith CBE, Chairman of IBMATA. “It is important that they make best use of new and emerging technology to enable them to facilitate the traveller experience for the vast majority of low risk traffic, whilst at the same time maintain safe and secure borders. “Our relationship with WTTC will enable us to maximise collaboration between the travel industry, border agencies and technology providers to help us deliver this important function.” Also in this issue of Border Management Magazine we feature Q&A with Helena Bononi, WTTC’s Director of Industry Affairs, in relation to partnership with IBMATA, biometrics and the seamless traveller experience.

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Q&A

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Promoting the seamless traveller experience With partnership between the WTTC and IBMATA freshly inked, we gain insights from Helena Bononi into the Council’s border management priorities. BMM: As part of its Seamless Traveller Journey programme, WTTC wants to “bring the Travel & Tourism sector together to develop a single biometric identifier that can be used at all points in a traveller’s journey.” Biometrics protocols notoriously differ from country to country, how likely is the achievement of a single identifier, and what are the greatest obstacles to this?

Helena Bononi is Director of Industry Relations at the World Travel & Tourism Council, where she manages travel facilitation programmes, including the WTTC Seamless Traveller Journey, and interfaces with industry members and partners, including travel and tourism organizations, as well as business leaders from all sectors that participate or impact the traveller end to end process. During her over 20-year career in travel and tourism she has held positions within several organisations, including travel agencies, American Airlines and Sabre Travel Network, with experience in Latin America, North America, Europe and Asia. During six years with Sabre Corporation, she was Director Customer Experience (2012-2016) and Director Global Operations Service Design (2016- 2018).

MARCH 2019

HB: Recent developments in data privacy legislation, particularly the advent of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union (EU), are overwhelmingly shaping data management approaches and pose important implementation considerations for global biometric initiatives and solutions. An emerging opportunity is on decentralising data storage and ensuring data is stored on a “per trip” basis except for specific use cases (e.g. biometrics tied to “frequent flier” programs). In implementing biometric technology, it will be necessary to ensure “privacy by design” as well as proper management of traveller data that adheres to the principles for data privacy under GDPR. As such, data sharing is now focusing on an emerging notion of data exchange on a “need to know” or “authorised to know” basis. One method focuses on governments / other central stakeholders providing mandated traveller data to travel providers. Another method takes a more de-centralised approach, in which the traveller

dictates which travel providers are permitted to have access to their data (unless mandated by government). In this case, the digital wallet concept is emerging as a potential method to share a traveller’s documents, data, and biometrics in a secure, decentralised manner. Two main challenges continue to limit further abilities to share data more broadly across the traveller journey. First, disparate data and document requirements by geography and other regulatory constraints remain key inhibitors to the further sharing and reuse of data. Second, travel providers “downstream” in the traveller journey (e.g. hotels, car hires) underscored the ongoing challenge of accessing traveller data in advance due to the current non-existent data sharing frameworks between “upstream” and “downstream” travel providers; a digital wallet concept could help address this gap in creating a seamless traveller journey. BMM: The WTTC sees technology as an enabler for seamless travel. How will blockchain and Artificial Intelligence contribute to a more seamless traveller experience? HB: Technological advances offer us the opportunity to address both efficiency and security. Technological solutions such as biometrics, identification systems, and artificial intelligence will make travel more secure and increase efficiency, thereby creating jobs. BORDER MANAGEMENT

There are a number of biometric technologies in development that allow travellers to fast-track through lines at security checkpoints simply by confirming their identity with the touch of a finger or a photograph. This smart technology has been formally recognised and advocated for at the highest echelons of the industry. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2396 in December 2017, calling upon Member States to implement systems that collect biometric data in order to responsibly and properly identify high-risk travellers. Biometric-based systems also offer a more robust point of authentication, allowing governments to manage the flow of international travellers at their gates, to securely process travellers as they enter, and to better assess potential risks. WTTC, is currently working on its Seamless Traveller Journey programme, encouraging the use of this technology and of digital identification throughout the wider Travel and Tourism sector so that travellers can enjoy a seamless, secure and effortless end-to-end journey across airports, cruise, hotels and car rentals. BMM: Another priority area for the Council is Visa facilitation. What role has the private sector played in promoting visa facilitation, and what impact is government outsourcing of visa application processing services likely to have in future? HB: Visa facilitation is a priority for WTTC, as it enables the growth of Travel & Tourism and the creation of jobs among the many benefits derived from the sustainable growth of sector. We have produced three reports specifically which use detailed case studies to highlight the potential gains that visa policy reform can realise. We respect the sovereignty of individual countries as well as their legislation relating to privacy and 68

BORDER MANAGEMENT

data protection. At the same time, we believe that the private sector can support governments in achieving more secure and seamless crossborder travel using innovation and new technologies to develop simpler, quicker and cheaper processes. BMM: A number of tourism destination countries have moved away from facilitation arrangements, such as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;visa waiverâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; in favour of e-visa regimes. What is the WTTC view on this? HB: The US Visa Waiver Programme, ESTA, is an e-visa programme. The WTTC believes there is a need for a seamless and secure travel experience, and smart visas can facilitate both this experience and also enhance security. While eliminating visa requirements worldwide may be unrealistic in the short term, countries can continue facilitating the visa process by developing new relationships and building on the

trusted relationships they currently have. Different models for travel facilitation have been successful including e-visas (for instance in US, Australia, India), visa coordination (Mexico accepts travellers with a valid US visa) and regional visa agreements (Schengen) among others. BMM: Apart from IBMATA, what other organisations are the Council cooperating with in relation to furthering its border management related objectives? HB: Closer collaboration will be key to enhance security and to enhance processes. To this end, WTTC and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) have created a formal arrangement to work with all stakeholders involved to maximise the benefits of biometrics and deliver digital identity management throughout the Travel & Tourism sector for a truly seamless passenger experience. MARCH 2019

Identifying Hostile Intent: Behavioural Analysis 2019 From 21-23 May 2019 security practitioners, consultants and academics will be gathering at Mall of America, Minneapolis, USA for Behavioural Analysis 2019.

The three-day conference will explore how the observation of behavioural indicators and utilisation of tactical risk analysis and non-racial profiling techniques can help mitigate the threat posed by those with hostile or criminal intent. In the current socio-political climate, those tasked with securing sporting, music and other large-scale entertainment venues as well as mass transportation hubs, tourist attractions, shopping centres, public spaces, national borders and governmental institutions, are required to identify persons with negative intent and respond quickly to prevent an array of attacks or criminal activities from taking place. In order to do this, those in the security industry are under pressure to broaden their knowledge and skillset to deal with an array of threats that may be undetectable solely through technology or that may otherwise go unnoticed in large crowds. Behavioural Analysis 2019 will offer valuable, practical insight into behavioural analysis techniques used to identify individuals with negative intent and put behavioural analysis, as a security practice, under the microscope to analyse where, when, why and how behaviour detection can best be employed to prevent hostile activities. Following the success of Behavioural Analysis 2018, which took place in Cardiff, Wales and brought together almost 150 participants from 30 countries, the second edition of this conference offers an expansive programme comprising operational perspectives and academic insight from a range of industries. Delegates will benefit from listening to representatives from; the National Football League (NFL), Airports Council International (ACI), the Sports Ground Safety Authority, the Kinsey Institute, the UK Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, the Hungarian Police, Gatwick Airport, the City of Malmo, the Secure Community Network, Airline Ambassadors International, Super Recognisers International and, of course, Mall of America. Additionally, the programme includes academics from Portsmouth University, Edith Cowan University, MARCH 2019

San Diego State University, Iowa State University, Nova Southeastern University, the University of Technology Sydney and the University of California, Santa Barbara. Renowned international consultants include Michael Rozin, Amir Neeman, Ivor Terret and Sagit Yehoshua. The first of the event’s exciting keynotes will be delivered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation – the host nation’s lead federal agency for criminal investigations – and will present their overview of how behavioural analysis techniques can enhance security at the sites we visit. The second keynote will be delivered by representatives from INTERPOL and will discuss the role for behavioural analysis in securing mega-events, such as the FIFA World Cup, which bring additional security challenges. This comprehensive and exciting programme is not to be missed and Behavioural Analysis 2019 is a mustattend conference for those responsive for the security of sports stadia, entertainment venues, outdoor festivals and events, airports, mass transportation hubs, tourist attractions, shopping centres, national borders and governmental institutions. For more information about the event, to view the conference and register your place, please visit: www. behaviouralanalysis.com BORDER MANAGEMENT

Disruption

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Computer Says No: Transparency needed in the rush towards automated decision making Immigration New Zealand’s pilot data modelling programme was pulled last April amid allegations of racist profiling and ‘pre-crime’ potential, yet the use of IT-supported profiling in immigration is nothing new. What, asks Nicholas Dynon, is with all the negativity?

Nicholas Dynon is Chief Editor of Border Management Magazine. He previously served for 14 years with Australia’s Department of Immigration and Border Protection (now Home Affairs) in which he managed visa programs in several locations. Key roles included postings to Shanghai, Beijing and Suva, and secondment as a Departmental Liaison Officer to the offices of two successive Immigration Ministers. More recently he has worked in a number of private sector business development and marketing roles. A licensed security consultant and former military officer with postgraduate qualifications in international studies, his writing on defence and international, border, homeland and physical security have been featured in several publications.

MARCH 2019

‘Neutral’ discrimination Within public discourse, ‘discrimination’ is a problematic term referring, as it does, to “the unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of people, especially on the grounds of race, age, or sex.” So too in discourse on immigration and border management, where people are rightly sensitised to stories of officials conducting invasive checks or making adverse decisions at the border on the basis of racial profiling. Yet, in another sense, ‘discrimination’ refers to “recognition and understanding of the difference between one thing and another,” such as “discriminating between right and wrong.” It is in this sense that government immigration programs tend to be ‘discriminatory’ – and they ought to be. Territorial and border integrity is the sovereign right of a state and a responsibility of government. In order to manage their borders, a government enacts legislated structures that provide a basis for discrimination between non-citizens to whom it grants entry and those to whom entry is denied. In New Zealand, regulations and policy cascading from the Immigration Act 2009 provide the legislated basis to discriminate between visa applicants on the basis of various financial, character, health, skills, employment and credibility considerations, which vary according to the type of visa applied for.

Skilled visa categories, for example, discriminate against applicants who are insufficiently educated or experienced or too old or who work in an occupation not currently deemed to be ‘in demand’. Investment visas discriminate against those who are not fabulously wealthy; and working holiday visas discriminate against those from countries with whom New Zealand has no bilateral working holiday agreement. In determining whether an applicant is a ‘bona fide applicant’ for a visitor visa, for example, New Zealand’s Immigration Instructions require Immigration New Zealand (INZ) visa officers to take into account the personal circumstances of the applicant, including such things as the strength of any family ties in their home country and New Zealand; the nature of any personal, financial, employment or other commitments in either country; and any circumstances that may discourage the applicant from returning home when their visa expires. If their home country is in the grips of armed conflict, sustained civil unrest or cataclysmic economic disaster, I’m guessing that that particular applicant – and their fellow countrymen in general – may well have difficulty meeting the ‘bona fide applicant’ requirement due to the existence of “circumstances that may discourage the applicant from returning home when their BORDER MANAGEMENT

visa expires.” And with that, we have a ‘profile’ relating to people from ‘Country X’. According to Immigration Minister Iain Lees-Galloway the Immigration Act 2009 “recognises that immigration matters inherently involve different treatment on the basis of personal characteristics, but immigration policy development seeks to ensure that any changes are necessary and proportionate.” These legislative structures and associated review mechanisms give the public a degree of confidence that only the ‘right’ forms of discrimination are applied to visa applicants. But what happens when computers and algorithms start making the decisions? Technophobia and the Data Modelling Programme Dystopian science fiction plotlines have fashioned a public wary of a future in which computers are empowered to make decisions that affect people. No clearer example of this was last April when Mr LeesGalloway suspended an INZ pilot data modelling programme following an exposé by Radio New Zealand and subsequent public backlash. According to reports, the programme used a profiling tool that analysed the historical data of around 11,000 illegal immigrants, including their gender, age, country of origin, visa held upon entry to New Zealand, and whether they had been involved with the police, been illegally employed, or used health services to which they were not entitled. The data would forecast the negative impact individual illegal immigrants might be expected to have in future as a cost-effective basis upon which INZ might prioritise deportation action. The programme’s outing led to cacophony of criticism that the profiling tool involved racial profiling, that it utilised a predictive algorithm that would lead to prejudicial enforcement action, and that it breached privacy laws in terms of the use of individuals’ personal data. 72

BORDER MANAGEMENT

“This approach appears to be another way of reducing migrant numbers,” said New Zealand Association for Migration and Investment chair June Ranson. “An individual will be deported or refused entry due to their background being similar according to computer profiling rather than actual facts.” It is worthwhile noting that such criticisms tend to fail to acknowledge that the programme focused only on illegal immigrants already eligible for deportation (not visa applicants or migrants in general) and that it was designed to inform human decision making rather than supplant it… misconceptions that a good communications strategy perhaps could have more adequately dealt with. Nevertheless, and as Danyl Mclauchlan correctly pointed out in online publication The Spinoff, “humans aren’t actually very good at making evidence-based decisions – that’s why almost every

large company and government department in the world is moving towards decision-making processes incorporating computation and statistical modelling.” He continues, “if you remove statistical models and computational algorithms which reveal discriminatory assumptions or outcomes, you’re not removing discrimination: you’re just making it less transparent.” Future-present: Electronic processing platforms Although INZ’s data modelling programme did not involve the metering out of decisions by computers, there are plenty of examples in the immigration world where computers are doing just that – and increasingly so. A number of countries require the passport holders of certain countries to apply for and hold an Electronic Travel Authority (ETA) to enter, as opposed to a traditional visa or visa waiver arrangement MARCH 2019

(New Zealand is expected to roll out its first ETAs in 2019). With a streamlined online application process, ETAs can also involve automated business rules-based decisions to grant visas. Australia’s decades-old ETA system boasts an auto-grant facility that enables the automatic grant of visas to individuals that meet certain criteria without the need for manual processing. Where an application does not meet the business rules leading to auto-grant, the application is pushed to a human decision maker. Such systems are developed and often managed by private sector partners, with the government retaining ownership of policy, data, and the business rules that determine how an application is handled. In 2017, the Australian Government announced it would take this model a step further with a new privatised Global Digital Platform (GDP) designed to make receiving and processing visa MARCH 2019

applications ‘exclusively digital’. Starting with temporary visas, machine learning and robotic process automation are expected to increase the proportion of visa assessments that can be automated over time. IT News reported on 10 December that the bidding process for the billion-dollar project had narrowed to two contenders: Australian Visa Processing – a conglomerate consisting of Ellerston Capital, PwC, Qantas Ventures, NAB and Pacific Blue Capital – and Australia Post and Accenture. It is envisaged that the GDP will ultimately include handling visa health checks, and more complex and subjective assessments relating to character and bona fides. And it is in relation to the latter in particular that the project has courted some controversy. Echoing concerns expressed in New Zealand in relation to INZ’s data modelling programme, significant public unease exists

around the idea of computers or artificial intelligence making assessments or decisions that are deemed subjective – and where they may lead to an adverse decision (rather than a positive auto-grant) against a visa applicant. Unnecessarily exacerbating these concerns is the paucity of detail provided to the public about such projects, which tend to be shrouded under cover of commercial-inconfidence (as with the GDP) or a need-to-know (as may have been the case with the INZ programme). People don’t like the idea of a computer saying no, particularly if it leads to the refusal of a visa based on subjective genuineness grounds. It’s dystopian, and its dehumanising. Artificial Intelligence is a buzzword that has many people excited, but its utilisation by government authorities also has many people worried about the prospect of robotic administrative decisions that lack a nuanced, humane dimension. While the implementation of such technology appears intended – at this stage – to support decision making by human immigration officers rather than to replace it, there are the obvious concerns that the tech will not be immune to delivering poor information/recommendations based on inaccuracies and data gaps, and that it may lead to unconscious decision-maker bias and the loss of traditional immigration officer tradecraft. And, of course, there are those dystopian fears that this is just the first step in a process that will lead ultimately to the removal of the human altogether from visa decision making – decisions that affect the very futures of migrants, their families and – in many cases – their destination country sponsors. To avoid the costs associated with public fallout, government innovators in this space need to change their disposition from one of opacity to one of transparency – and to up their game in terms of credible public consultation, communication and stakeholder engagement planning. BORDER MANAGEMENT

Maritime

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

New Zealand’s Maritime Border – an opportunity for industry Fresh thinking is needed around New Zealand border surveillance and patrol capabilities, writes John Campbell MNZM.

John Campbell MNZM is CEO of Auckland-based Ra Moana Consulting. From December 2016 to August 2018, he was Group Manager Business Improvement and Innovation, New Zealand Customs Service. This followed a 27 year career in the Royal New Zealand Navy, in which John served in a broad range of operational, training, liaison and management roles. He was NZDF Maritime Component Commander between 2013 and 2016, retiring at the rank of Commodore. He was made a Member of the New Zealand Order of Merit (MNZM) in 1997 for work as Executive Officer of HMNZS Canterbury during operations in Bougainville and the Persian Gulf.

MARCH 2019

The last six months has seen a shift in the way we think about monitoring New Zealand’s sea border. It has been driven by changing circumstances, new technologies and a changing mindset. It started with the New Zealand Government’s announcement to procure the Boeing P8 Poseidon maritime surveillance system as a replacement for the capable but aging Lockheed P3K2 Orion. A sturdy and reliable workhorse for our region, the P3K2 has served us well both on military operations in the Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean and in our front yard – the South West Pacific. The P8 Poseidon is a more than capable replacement and one that will offer good interoperability with our partners, especially Australia, and our area of operations in the SW Pacific. However, as discussed at the New Zealand Defence Industry Association (NZDIA) Forum in November last year, we will need to complement the P8 Poseidon with a less complicated capability in order to meet non-military government agencies’ requirements for protecting our sea border and monitoring New Zealand’s maritime domain. The Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) Air Surveillance Complementary Capability (ASCC) project was borne out of a need to conduct maritime civilian surveillance activities that are deemed too expensive for the highend capability delivered by the P8 Poseidon.

Initially it was thought that the ASCC would be consumed by the ever-expanding funding requirement for the P8 Poseidon. However, the voices of the border agencies appear to have been heard and the ASCC is now a standalone funded project within MOD. At the NZDIA Forum MOD, Border Agencies (the customers) and industry were given an opportunity to pitch the outline of the project, the broad requirements of the capability from the customers and what industry had to offer to meet some of the intent. It was great to see that this was one of the best attended briefings during the Forum and I believe all came away with what the art of the possible could be. In my mind, the best outcome was a green fields / blue sky approach to how the capability could be delivered. All options are on the table: outright ownership; lease; partnerships; layered technologies and graduated response. No doubt industry is looking on with interest to see how MOD will develop the business case to deliver the capability. I am a firm believer that there is more than one way to do something, and true partnerships between Defence and a Supplier can deliver outstanding results for both parties. Industry is developing some outstanding technologies at present, and in our region, to provide for this capability. Is it time for Defence to look at lease or partnership options to BORDER MANAGEMENT

An Australian P8 Poseidon. Image: Australian Government.

provide the surveillance of New Zealandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s coastline and beyond? Given the right incentives I believe so, especially if it means that the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) does not have to introduce into service another aircraft or platform type into service at the same time as the P8 Poseidon is coming on line. The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) should have learnt that lesson from previous experience and the drain it takes on seconding personnel away to conduct this. In the meantime, there are some exciting, and not so exciting things happening in the marine space. The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) Inshore Patrol Craft have been a topic of debate since they were launched. When I was the Maritime Commander I would regularly defend questions about availability and supportability, both around crews and maintenance. Hindsight is a great thing and I guess if we could redo Project Protector (the purchase of HMNZS Canterbury, two Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) and four Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPV)) we would have done it differently. Arguably in 2001 the NZDF was still looking backwards at what we had and not looking forward at the opportunities that we would face. Hindsight tells us that an OPV is far more portable as a unit than an 76

BORDER MANAGEMENT

IPV; there is very little an IPV can do that an OPV cannot. Hindsight tells us that we should have recommended three or four OPVs and no IPVs. For a small increase in crew size, and marginal difference in specialist crew qualifications (where the real issues lie across the RNZN) the NZDF could have gotten far more bang for their buck. Wind the clock forward to 2019 and we see the IPV fleet being laid up with only one vessel operational for training purposes. How does this affect the support the RNZN provides to border agencies for maritime surveillance of the border? Arguably the demand from Agencies was decreasing. Having served in Customs, the argument was to not ask for Navy support because it was unable to supply it due to lack of crew and vessels. On the other side of the fence, Navy did not push crewing extra vessels because demand was being met with two operational IPVs. It was a double edge sword. At the start of February, NZ Customs advertised for one and possibly two Rigid Hull Inflatables (RHIB) to support their new launch HAWK and existing RHIB RAPUA. One could be a cynic and say this is because the NZDF cannot provide the support required by Customs to patrol the coastline, but no.

This project was part of the very successful budget bid by Customs last year for more intelligence led intervention at the border, along with roughly 10 percent increase in personnel. Although I see no Concept of Employment for the capability, we know that the RHIB will be moved by road to where it is required, operate locally and is COTS. It is about delivering the effect. An IPV with two RHIBS is a complicated MOTS solution for a relatively simple civilian effect. I believe the NZDF and Agencies have an opportunity to shift from complicated systems with long integrated support and supply chains behind them to more simple, robust solutions provided by industry to deliver the desired effect. That way when the outcome changes, maybe because the adversary has changed tactics, they are not left with an expensive asset unable to deliver the desired effect. With new platforms being delivered for the NZDF over the next five years in the maritime space, I believe now is an ideal time to relinquish the reigns of ownership and accept that for less up-front costs and a good partnership relationship the same if not better effect can be offered by industry for some of the more administrative or constabulary roles. MARCH 2019

BTI links Homeland security needs, academic expertise Kurt Berens, Executive Director and Philip Boedeker, Manager of Communications and Operations at Houston University’s Borders, Trade, and Immigration Institute, shed some light on BTI's research in securing and facilitating trade and travel. The Borders, Trade, and Immigration Institute is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of Excellence led by the University of Houston. DHS is currently funding nine DHS COEs. Six emeritus DHS COEs are continuing to operate without the need for active DHS funding. Each DHS COE has a unique and specialized function in serving as a resource for the federal government. DHS COEs develop multi-disciplinary, customer-driven, homeland security science and technology solutions and assist in the training of the next generation of homeland security professionals. The BTI Institute was established in 2015 by the award of a five-year, $20 million grant managed by the Office of University Programs in the Science and Technology Directorate of DHS. The Institute’s mission is to conduct and transition research, develop innovative solutions and provide education to enhance the United States’ ability to secure the borders, facilitate legitimate trade and travel and ensure the integrity of the immigration system. Since its inception, BTI has initiated 21 projects in collaboration with researchers from the following institutions: 1. University of Arizona 2. University of Minnesota 3. University of Houston 4. University of North Carolina at Charlotte 5. West Virginia University 6. Texas A & M University 7. Middlebury Institute of International Studies MARCH 2019

8. Rutgers University 9. University of Texas at El Paso 10. Migration Policy Institute 11. American University 12. Voir Dire International LLC 13. University of Virginia Secure and Facilitate Securing and facilitating the legitimate trade and travel is imperative for national security and for economic prosperity. There are three pillars required in order to accomplish this goal. Those pillars are physical infrastructure, trained personnel, and enabling technology. Under each of these pillars are various opportunities that the BTI Institute has a role in supporting. Meeting current needs The BTI Institute has conducted research involving sensor technologies, biometrics and modeling of movement of goods and people through Ports of Entry. The Institute has conducted workshops, symposia and lectures covering topics such as immigration, transnational criminal networks, narcotics and human trafficking. Institute projects have developed computer models and simulations of port of entry systems, international migration and patterns of human smuggling. There is current research being conducted in facial recognition in one on one authentication and in crowded environments. The BTI Institute, through the consortium of researchers, have met and continue to develop solutions to solve today’s security and facilitation challenges.

Meeting future needs The BTI Institute will continue to push the boundaries of scientific research to identify advanced solutions for operational challenges faced by Customs and Border Protection, US Border Patrol and the Homeland Security Investigations arm of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Several projects currently under consideration highlight the value that BTI research can offer. One proposal is an evaluation of novel sensors for unmanned aerial systems (drones) to identify narcotics and radioactive materials in maritime shipping containers. Additional proposals will utilize trace elemental analysis to assist CBP in the identification of country of origin for commodities such as crude oil, aluminum and steel to assure that countries remain in compliance with existing tariffs and duties. Educating the next generation In addition, BTI is developing curricula to provide continuing education opportunities for DHS personnel and university students by offering certificates and programs leading to bachelors, masters and doctoral degrees in border operations management. All classes will be offered online to allow the greatest possible access to students and DHS personnel. To find out more about the BTI Institute visit https://www.uh.edu/ bti/about/about-bti/. To find out more about DHS S&T OUP visit https://www.hsuniversityprograms. org/. BORDER MANAGEMENT

Events

BORDER MANAGEMENT & TECHNOLOGIES SUMMIT EUROPE 2019 Istanbul, Turkey 24th – 26th April 2019

CONFERENCE INFORMATION FEATURED SPEAKERS ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 78

Krum Garkov, Director, EU-LISA Abdullah Ayaz, Director General, Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM), Turkey Tony Smith CBE, Chairman, International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA) Elen McGuiness, Director, UK Visas and Immigration Future Services Supplier Engagement Programme Can Yildiz, Head of the Projects and Technical Systems Department, Ministry of Customs and Trade, Turkey Hakan Ozen, Deputy Director, Department of AntiSmuggling and Organised Crime, National Police Force, Turkey Alexander Fricke, Head of Section, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey Samy Gardemeister, Director of Enforcement, Finnish Customs Justin Ikura, Deputy Chair, ICAO NTW -

BORDER MANAGEMENT

■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

Claudio Kavrecic, Head of Centre of Excellence for combating Document Fraud, Operational Response Division, Frontex Zoran Lasica, Commander, Unit for Electronic Surveillance and Operational Support, Border Police, Montenegro Christopher Gilliland, Director, Innovative Travel Solutions, Vancouver Airport Authority, Canada Emrah Guler, National Immigration and Border Management (IBM) Officer, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) Michael Odgers, Co-Manager, Regional Support Office, The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime Samir Krasniqi, Coordinator, National Centre for Border Management, Kosovo Naim Hoxha, National Organised Crime Advisor, OSCE Mission in Kosovo Senior Representative, Director, MSAB MARCH 2019

Border Management & Technologies Summit Europe 2019 Istanbul, Turkey | 24th – 26th April 2019 EVENT PROGRAMME DAY 1 – 24th APRIL 2019 08.30

REGISTRATION AND NETWORKING

09.00

CHAIRMAN’S OPENING REMARKS Tony Smith CBE, Chairman, International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA) Latest developments in International Border Management and Technology; and how IBMATA is helping.

COMBATING CROSS-BORDER CRIMES IN THE REGION Human Trafficking across borders is an international problem which demands an international response. How can border agencies work more closely together to disrupt and deter international organised crime groups? Moderator: Michael Odgers

13.40

HOST NATION – TURKISH BORDER CHALLENGES

■ What the Bali Process is doing to assist governments in cross-border crimes ■ Cooperation with the Turkish Government ■ Case studies of recent attempted cross-border crimes ■ What is required for the future? Michael Odgers, Co-Manager, Regional Support Office, The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime

An opening address from the host nation: Turkey. What are the current threats and challenges to Turkey’s borders in the context of security, immigration and Customs? Moderator: Tony Smith

09.10

OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH BORDER ■ Current situation at our borders ■ Challenges faced at the Eastern Borders ■ Cooperation with the EU ■ Next steps Invited: Onder Bozkurt, Border Management Department, Directorate General of Provincial Administration (DGPA), Ministry of Interior, Turkey

09.40

10.10

COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND TURKEY TO MANAGE MIGRATION ■ Overview of the work the EU is doing in Turkey ■ Challenges faced with migration through the region ■ Cross-border cooperation and collaboration ■ What’s next Alexander Fricke, Head of Section, Delegation of the European Union to Turkey

10.40

14.10

14.40

15.10

One of the major stumbling blocks in the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU related to the “Customs Border” on the island of Ireland. Is it possible to run effective customs controls using technology and alternative processes, rather than traditional border checkpoints? Moderator: Lars Karlsson

15.40

IOM WORK ACROSS TURKEY – MANAGING THE INFLUX OF MIGRANTS ■ Overview of the work being conducted by the IOM in Turkey ■ Major challenges at the borders – case studies ■ Cooperation between agencies ■ What is needed to allow for a smoother process? Emrah Guler, National Immigration and Border Management (IBM) Officer, International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

12.10

OSCE EFFORTS ON PREVENTING THE VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION THAT LEAD TO TERRORISM ■ OSCE operations across Kosovo and regionally ■ OSCE cooperation with Kosovo authorities and neighbouring nations ■ Case studies of operations preventing violent extremism ■ What is needed? Naim Hoxha, National Organised Crime Advisor, OSCE Mission in Kosovo

12.40

CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT IN TURKEY ■ Developments made in Turkey’s PNR/API system Papis ■ Customs enforcement at the border ■ Technology used for customs inspections Can Yildiz, Head of the Projects and Technical Systems Department, Ministry of Customs and Trade, Turkey

Senior Representative, MSAB

11.40

SMART BORDERS AND CUSTOMS: MEETING THE BREXIT CHALLENGE ■ Trade facilitation and risk management best practice ■ Use of new and emerging technology in global Customs ■ Development of AEO and Trusted Trader Schemes ■ Single Window and Trade Information Portals ■ Delivering seamless customs borders post Brexit. Lars Karlsson, Chairman, Advisory Board, International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA)

16.10

MSAB PRESENTATION

COFFEE BREAK

CUSTOMS SMART BORDERS: THE WAY FORWARD

Turkey sits at the crossroads between Europe and Asia. As such it is a nexus point for the movement of people and goods across continents. What are regional and international organisations doing to help in the area? Moderator: Tony Smith

11.10

INTERPOL: COLLABORATION AND DATA SHARING ACROSS BORDERS ■ The role of Interpol in deterring international crime groups ■ How can Interpol improve collaboration between border agencies worldwide? ■ Case studies in data sharing and intelligence. Invited: Senior Representative, Interpol

COFFEE / NETWORKING BREAK

INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGES OF MANAGING MIGRATION THROUGH TURKEY

TRACKING ORGANISED CRIME THROUGH TURKISH BORDERS ■ Overview of the organised crimes conducted in Turkey ■ Case studies of smuggling operations at Turkish borders ■ Lessons learnt Hakan Ozen, Deputy Director, Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organised Crime, National Police Force, Turkey

HOW TURKEY DEALS WITH MIGRATION ■ Overview of the work of the Directorate General for Migration Management ■ Challenges faced with migration in Turkey ■ Cooperation with government agencies in the region ■ Current migration routes across Turkey Abdullah Ayaz, Director General, Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM), Turkey

BALI PROCESS COOPERATION IN THE REGION TO COMBAT CROSSBORDER CRIMES

16.40

INTEGRATED BORDER MANAGEMENT – FINLAND AND EU INSIGHT ■ Case study of the Finnish Customs model ■ IBM across the EU ■ What is happening next? Samy Gardemeister, Director of Enforcement, Finnish Customs

17.10

CHAIRMAN’S CLOSING REMARKS Tony Smith, Chairman, International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA)

NETWORKING LUNCH BREAK

Organised by:

MARCH 2019

The International Border Management and Technologies Summit is bought to you by International Border Management and Technologies Events Ltd (IBMATE) in association with the International Border Management and Technologies Association Ltd (IBMATA)

BORDER MANAGEMENT

Border Management & Technologies Summit Europe 2019 Istanbul, Turkey | 24th – 26th April 2019 EVENT PROGRAMME DAY 2 – 25th April 2019 08.30

REGISTRATION AND NETWORKING

09.00

CHAIRMAN’S OPENING REMARKS Tony Smith, Chairman, International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA)

13.20

FACILITATION OF PEOPLE: SMART BORDER TECHNOLOGY: WHAT NEXT?

■ Overview of Vancouver Airport ■ Making passenger travel easier ■ Next generation of passenger travel ■ What is next Christopher Gilliland, Director, Innovative Travel Solutions, Vancouver Airport Authority, Canada

The EU Smart Borders Programme aims to deliver a new high-tech solution for third country nationals entering and leaving the European Union, by 2021. This includes an automated entry / exit system (EES) and also a new electronic traveller information and authorisation system, similar to the US ESTA. How will this transform travel to and from the EU in future? Moderator: Tony Smith

09.10

EU SMART BORDERS ■ Delivering entry / exit systems at the EU Border ■ Use of biometrics for third country travellers ■ Introduction of European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) Krum Garkov, Director, EU-LISA

09.40

ICAO: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN PASSPORT AND IDENTITY TECHNOLOGY

13.50

COFFEE BREAK

10.40

TECHNOLOGY USED TO TRACK DOCUMENT FRAUD ■ Overview of Frontex efforts in developing technologies at EU borders ■ Challenges with document fraud across the EU ■ Current response techniques when document fraud is alerted at a border ■ What is needed? Claudio Kavrecic, Head of Centre of Excellence for combating Document Fraud, Operational Response Division, Frontex

11.10

MANAGING INTERNATIONAL THREATS: INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETING BEST PRACTICE 14.20

11.40

PANEL DISCUSSION – FUTURE BORDERS, PERMISSIONS & TECHNOLOGY Moderated by: ■ Tony Smith, Chairman, International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA) ■ Panellists: ■ Krum Garkov, Director, EU-LISA ■ Claudio Kavrecic, Head of Centre of Excellence for combating Document Fraud, Operational Response Division, Frontex ■ Elen McGuinness, Head of Future Services, UKVI, UK Home Office ■ Justin Ikura, Deputy Chair, ICAO NTW

12.20

BORDER MANAGEMENT & TECHNOLOGY: REGIONAL OVERVIEW: THE BALKANS The Balkan region has long been an area for migration, both directly or in transit. How are border agencies in the region making best use of technology to help them in their mission? Moderator: Michael Odgers

14.50

MIGRATION CHALLENGES ACROSS MONTENEGRO – USE OF SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS ■ Overview of the Montenegro border ■ Case studies of the use of surveillance to assist with managing the border ■ Migration issues faced in Montenegro ■ Regional cooperation with neighbouring nations Zoran Lasica, Commander, Unit for Electronic Surveillance and Operational Support, Border Police, Montenegro

15.20

COFFEE BREAK

15.50

MANAGING MOUNTAINOUS AND BORDERS ■ Challenges faced managing the Georgian borders ■ Threats faced at our borders ■ How we currently monitor land borders ■ Future developments for the Georgian border Invited: Temur Kekelidze, Head, Border Police, Ministry of Interior, Georgia

16.20

MANAGING THE ALBANIAN BORDERS ■ Overview of the Albanian border management situation ■ Challenges faced ■ Combating organised crimes at the borders ■ Cooperation with neighbouring nations Behar Tafa, Deputy Director, Border Police, Albania

LUNCH

FUTURE AIR TRAVEL: DIGITAL IDENTITIES, PASSENGER TRAVEL AND THE AIRPORT OF THE FUTURE

INTELLIGENCE AND TARGETING: BUILDING CAPACITY ■ Project Hunter – identifying threats ■ Intelligence & Targeting Best Practice ■ The value of international collaboration Invited: Allison Milburn, Head of Border Force International, UK Border Force

FUTURE BORDER – UKVI PERSPECTIVE ■ The Future UKVI / UKBF eco system ■ Public / private sector initiatives to facilitate travel ■ Digital permissions and state of the art visa systems ■ UKVI outreach and supplier engagement. Elen McGuinness, Head of UKVI Future Services, UK Home Office

SITA PRESENTATION Senior Representative, SITA

■ Latest developments in global e passport issuance ■ The work of the ICAO New Technologies Working Group ■ The Digital Travel Credential ■ Linking passport and border agencies together – a common goal. Justin Ikura, Deputy Chair, ICAO NTW

10.10

NEXT GENERATION OF PASSENGER TRAVEL – VANCOUVER AIRPORT

16.50

MANAGING THE KOSOVO BORDERS TO COMBAT CROSS-BORDER CRIMES ■ Current situation at the Kosovo borders ■ Challenges faced to the Border Police ■ Combating cross-border crimes ■ Case studies of recently failed cross-border crimes Samir Krasniqi, Coordinator, National Centre for Border Management, Kosovo

Technology continue to transform the air travel experience. Airlines and airports are turning to digital technology and self-service solutions to deliver an enhanced traveller end to end experience. Are border agencies able to keep up? Moderator: Tony Smith

17.20

CHAIRMAN’S CLOSING REMARKS & NEXT STEPS Tony Smith CBE, Chairman, International Border Management and Technologies Association (IBMATA)

Organised by:

BORDER MANAGEMENT

MARCH 2019

Upcoming events Security and Counter Terror Expo When: 5-6 March 2019 Where: Olympia, London www.counterterrorexpo.com

The Security Event When: 09-11 April 2019 Where: Birmingham, United Kingdom www.thesecurityevent.co.uk

A Conversation with the Director General of the IOM When: March 6, 2019 Where: Washington D.C. www.migrationpolicy.org/events

7th Border Security & Intelligence Summit When: 10-11 April 2019 Where: Alexandria, VA, USA www.bordersecuritysummit.dsigroup. org

IATA Legal Symposium 2019 When: 6-8 March 2019 Where: Rome Cavalieri, Rome, Italy www.iata.org/events/pages/legalsymposium.aspx

ISC West 2019 When: 10-12 April 2019 Where: Las Vegas, USA www.iscwest.com

IATA 13th World Cargo Symposium When: 12-14 March 2019 Where: Marina Bay Sands, Singapore www.iata.org/whatwedo/cargo/Pages/ index.aspx

Introducing Biometrics at the Border Training Course When: 11 April 2019 Where: Vienna, Austria www.biometricsinstitute.org

Tactical Risk Assessment of People Workshop When: 18-21 March 2019 Where: Mt Smart Stadium, Auckland www.trap@avsec.com

ID @ Borders & Future of Travel When: 11-12 April 2019 Where: Vienna, Austria www.biometricsinstitute.org

World Border Security Congress When: 19-21 March 2019 Where: Casablanca, Morocco www.world-border-congress.com Biometrics Institute US Conference When: 26 March 2019 Where: Alexandria VA, USA www.biometricsinstitute.org IATA/AACO MENA Aeropolitical Forum When: 26 March 2019 Where: Beirut, Lebanon www.iata.org/events/pages/ aeropolitical-forum.aspx Milipol Asia-Pacific 2019 When: 2-4 April 2019 Where: Marina Bay Sands, Singapore www.milipolasiapacific.com

MARCH 2019

Border Management and Tech Summit Europe When: 24-25 April 2019 Where: Istanbul, Turkey www.ibmata.org Conference on the future of the Harmonized System When: 2-3 May 2019 Where: WCO Headquarters, Brussels www.hsreview@wcoomd.org Secutech When: 8-10 May 2019 Where: Taipei, Taiwan www.secutech.tw.messefrankfurt. com/taipei/en/ Behavioural Analysis 2019 When: 21-23 May 2019 Where: Mall of America, Minneapolis www.behaviouralanalysis.com

Biometrics Institute Asia-Pacific Conference When: 22-23 May 2019 Where: Dockside Sydney Australia www.biometricsinstitute.org WCO IT/TI Conference & Exhibition When: 12-14 June 2019 Where: Baku, Azerbaijan www.eiseverywhere.com/ ehome/2019itticonference/ 2019 National Homeland Security Conference When: 17-20 June 2019 Where: Phoenix Convention Center, Phoenix, Arizona, USA www.nationalhomelandsecurity.org 15th Migration Policy Centre Summer School When: 24 June - 5th July 2019 Where: EUI, Florence, Italy www.migration@eui.eu Interpol World 2019 When: 2-4 July 2019 Where: Sands Expo & Convention Centre, Singapore www.interpol-world.com India Homeland Security Expo When: 19-20 July 2019 Where: New Delhi, India www.homelandsecurityexpo.in ASIS Global Security Exchange 2019 When: 8-12 September 2019 Where: Chicago, Illinois, USA www.gsx.org/event-info/future-dates/ Border Management & Tech Summit Asia 2019 When: 9-11 Oct 2019 Where: New Delhi www.ibmata.org Milipol Paris 2019 When: 19-22 November 2019 Where: Paris-Nord Villepinte www.en.milipol.com

BORDER MANAGEMENT

BORDER M A N A GEMEN T MARCH 2019