Line of Defence Magazine - Summer (December) 2021 by Defsec New Zealand

Line of Defence

Issue 22 • Summer 2021

New Zealand’s Defence and National Security Magazine

Is democracy declining or being redefined?

Royal New Zealand Covid through Navy and the Grey a National Security Lens Zone Future

As the West laments an apparent global decline in its version of democracy, China suggests its version as a replacement, writes Nicholas Dynon.

Maritime conflict will be conducted in the grey zone, and it has implications for the next generation of naval capability, writes Andrew Watts.

Dr John Battersby argues that the consequences of the Covid response may generate risks we are less able to mitigate.

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CONTENTS Editor’s Note

CONTRIBUTORS & INTERVIEWEES

Kia ora and welcome to the Summer 2021-22 issue of Line of Defence Magazine! In this issue we round out the year with continued discussion on the future RNZN, AUKUS, the grey zone, and contemporary challenges to democracy and the international rules-based order. It’s been a tough year, and I’d like to take this opportunity to thank our readers and contributors for their continued support throughout 2021. A big thanks also to our wonderful advertisers who apart from providing capabilities, solutions, and services that LoD is proud to promote are also contributing to a vibrant and informed sector through their sponsorship of the magazine. In that regard, a special thanks to this issue’s sponsors, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Rheinmetall, Serco Defence, and PFG. In this issue, we also take great joy in reporting on the crowning of former NZDIA CEO and regular LoD contributor Jennie Vickers as the inaugural IFSEC Global Influencer of the Year! As you would likely know, Jennie has contributed to the broader security sector in Aotearoa though her advocacy for local private industry involvement in the Defence supply chain and for improved engagement between suppliers and their government customers. Most recently, Jennie has been shining a light on the Broader Outcomes component of the Government Procurement Rules and advocating buyer accountability to the new requirement. In global context, Jennie’s win is big security industry news and a massive win for New Zealand. To add to the silverware, Jennie has also just been named as co-winner of the 2021 Women in Security Awards Aotearoa (WiSAA) ‘Thought Leader’ category. Congratulations Jennie! Also in this issue, we feature two articles by former RNZN Captain Andrew Watts. Andrew’s article ‘Designing the Next Fleet’ published in the inaugural issue of the Professional Journal of the Royal New Zealand Navy in December 2020 has spawned a series of related articles that we are delighted to be featuring in LoD. Regular contributors Chris Penk MP and Wayne Mapp discuss the implications of the AUKUS pact for New Zealand, with Dr Mapp focusing squarely on the potential budgetary and capability implications and arguing for a maintenance of Defence spending at 1.5 percent of GDP. In Homeland Security, Dr John Battersby argues that a myopic focus on the Covid pandemic’s impact, as well the growing social and economic fault-lines it is opening up, will generate risks in an environment in which we are less able to mitigate them. Before you finish your read, make sure you flick through to Page 38 and the call for papers for the upcoming ‘National Security beyond Government’ special issue of the National Security Journal. Maybe it’s time you got published! Lastly, from the team here at Defsec New Zealand, have a very happy and safe festive season and a brilliant start to 2022! Here’s hoping it’s a good one! Nicholas Dynon, Auckland

Rob Inches Chris Penk MP Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Marty Donoghue Nicholas Dynon

Andrew Watts Matt Medley Dr John Battersby Jennie Vickers

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Dr Peter Greener Dr Bridgette-Sullivan Taylor Dr John Battersby Debbie Howarth Jennie Vickers Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO Ruth Currie DSD

Prof Rouben Azizian Dr Reuben Steff Paul Howard John Deal Douglas Pauling John Campbell MNZM Pat Cullen

SPONSORS & PARTNERS Rheinmetall Serco Defence General Atomics Aeronautical PFG New Zealand Defence Industry Association RiskNZ; Massey University Centre for Defence & Security Studies New Zealand Security Sector Network

UPCOMING ISSUE

Autumn – March Main themes: Spotlight on the UK, Indo Pacific, Defence Assessment, Cyber. Copy Deadline: 20 February 2022 Publication: 01 March 2022

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CONTACT DETAILS

DEFSEC Chief Editor: Nicholas Dynon M: +64 (0)22 366 3691 E: nick@defsec.net.nz

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Postal and delivery address: 27 West Cresent, Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand Social Media: www.linkedin.com/company/defsec-media-limited www.facebook.com/defsecmedia/ www.twitter.com/DefsecNZ

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ISSN 2463-5774 (Print) • ISSN 2463-6258 (Online)

DEFENCE

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Serving and protecting with the next generation watercraft.

Is democracy declining or just being redefined?

Sustained Presence: The Royal New Zealand Navy and the Grey Zone

Risk and Resilience New Zealand Summit

GA-ASI Completes European Maritime Demonstrations with MQ-9B SeaGuardian

Deeper Thinking Needed – AUKUS and Them

Modularity and the Shape of New Zealand’s Next Naval Fleet

Defence organisations concerned over inability to support disconnected operations

Does New Zealand spend enough on Defence?

World #1: Jennie Vickers named Global Security Influencer of the Year

Will 2022 be the Year New Zealand finally joins up the dots for our Veterans?

A Brief glimpse at COVID through a National Security Lens

Defence Priorities and Principles released

Nominations open for the OSPAs, but closing soon!

Call for papers: National Security Journal ‘Security beyond Government’

HOMELAND SECURITY

Defsec Media Limited publishes Line of Defence, FireNZ Magazine and New Zealand Security Magazine premier publications covering industry sectors that help keep Kiwis safe. Find us online www.defsec.net.nz Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher. Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate. However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.

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Serving and protecting with the next generation watercraft. Earlier this year the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) awarded a contract to Tasmanian company PFG to design and construct three 12.5-meter Littoral Maneuver Craft (LMC). This high-speed watercraft will be twin diesel / Hamilton jet-powered and will be assigned to the HMNZS Manawanui for Hydrographic duties and dive support. The LMC’s will provide the RNZN with an improved ability to detect and respond to underwater threats, support expeditionary reconnaissance and provide an agile platform for the transport of troops and material. The LMCs are capable of performing multiple roles and tasks and will in a forward command roles as required. Rob Inches, CEO of PFG, explains what this represents. It is often said that you can choose your friends but not your relations, however in the case of Australia and New Zealand, both categories apply equally. Australia and New Zealand are more than just good friends. We share the same systems and values, have a similar outlook on life, and in many cases, real and deep family relationships exist. The ties that bind us are profound and enduring. Australia and New Zealand’s mateship extends much deeper than fighting together in world wars, regional conflicts, and peace-keeping missions. The bonds that bind us are also based on the bedrock of trust. When British Major General Birdwood noticed mail coming across his desk in Cairo in World War 1 addressed to the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, legend is that he came up with the acronym, ANZAC. In 1921, Australia passed a law protecting the name. The ANZAC tradition is now embedded in both our nation’s soul. In Australia, we may think that we are pretty good at innovation, music, the arts, and sport, but we freely acknowledge there are some things Kiwis simply are better at. Take rugby for example. But you know what - as was the case with the recent America’s Cup, many Australians are delighted to be able to support New Zealand and the All Blacks when they are playing on the international stage against other nations, except Australia of course! When it comes to the Defence of our nations this mateship, is now more important than ever. In these times, the only thing there is certainty about is uncertainty. We now must be able to work even closer together, and know a mate is there to watch your back.

PFG is therefore proud to work with the New Zealand Defence Force in supplying these three 12.5m LMCs. In a real sense, this watercraft will have two main tasks - successfully complete the mission and bring home safely the men and women who serve. At PFG, this is what drives us – and it drives us every day. We understand trying to fight today’s conflicts with yesterday’s technology is difficult, so selecting a nextgeneration boat building material, high density polyethylene (HDPE) or engineered polymer as it’s known, ensure PFG’s Sentinel is at the cutting edge of tactical watercraft. From our somewhat humble beginnings supplying boats and pens to the aquaculture industry in Australia and New Zealand, PFG has tried and tested the durable qualities of HDPE for the harsh environments of the Southern Ocean. PFG has evolved its design and honed its craft over 30 plus years to become a leading supplier in tactical watercraft manufactured from this remarkable material, HDPE.

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Emerging from the Southern hemisphere, PFG along with our naval architects One2Three, have developed a tactical watercraft in The Sentinel, that can withstand everything that nature can throw at it. Developed in Tasmania, in a region steeped in maritime traditions and known for its harsh weather conditions, The Sentinel’s combination of design features, HDPE and craftsmanship, provides unmatched safety and handling characteristics with minimal impact for the crew, equipment, and delivering high performance in challenging sea states. Constructed with the crew’s safety front of mind, HDPE absorbs vibration reducing the transfer of impact to operators and lowering the risk of injuries associated with slamming and whole-body vibration, which occur with prolonged exposure. Designed for long range and increased operating envelope, The Sentinel provides a high level of crew comfort that results in reduced personnel fatigue. NZDF personnel will be mission-ready after long transits. The advanced hull design, combined with the properties of HDPE results in a level of performance that continues to astound. Partnering with highly respected Auckland-based General Marine Services (GMS), PFG provides specialist skills and knowledge including poly welding expertise, to support the Sentinel in situ. With no hot work involved, emergency repairs can be performed by the ship’s crew. The HDPE hull material doesn’t corrode or delaminate, resists fouling, and has a high level of UV protection. Vessels are manufactured using traditional construction methods ensuring a high-quality product, that’s virtually indestructible. The Sentinel is the tactical watercraft designed to serve and protect our mates. For more information visit go to: pfg-group.com.au/thesentinel

TACTICAL WATERCRAFT TO SERVE AND PROTECT

THE SENTINEL ADVANTAGE

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Sustained Presence: The Royal New Zealand Navy and the Grey Zone Future maritime conflict will be conducted in the grey zone. It’s a reality that New Zealand cannot ignore, and it has implications for the next generation of naval capability, writes maritime capability specialist and former Royal New Zealand Navy Officer Andrew Watts.

In an over three-decade career in the RNZN, CAPT Watts RNZNR commanded HMNZ Ships Pukaki, Wellington, Resolution and Te Mana, and served as Director, Capability Development and Programme Director Network Enabled Capability, and Captain, Fleet Personnel & Training. He is a Defence Adviser at KPMG based in Riyadh.

I once tried to explain to a very intelligent person what the Navy was for. I described how it protected our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Extended Continental Shelf (ECS), and that 90% of our trade by value and 99% by volume travelled in ships and thus needed to be protected, as did the 90% of our information traffic with the wider world that passes along undersea cables. I explained how the Navy helped protect the resources of our Pacific partners, and that it held itself in readiness for disaster relief, search and rescue, and sundry other missions conducive to the public good. Having listened patiently, she asked “Yes, but what do you do every day, like, all the time? Are you just practising?” Well, no, I said, not just practising. Some of the things we do we do all the time, like protecting our EEZ. “What about the frigates?” she asked, “what do they do? Are they protecting the EEZ too, or just getting ready to fight wars?” I replied yes, being ready is a large part of what they do, and our frigates give us the ability to play our part in defending the international rule of law at sea, our ability to exchange information with the wider world, and in the final analysis, protect our borders. I think she accepted this, but “what is the Navy for?” is a question which those of us who believe that an effective navy is essential to our country’s security had better be ready to answer if we expect our people to bear the cost

of the next generation of capability, and there is a field of maritime conflict for which we need to be ready “all the time”. That field of conflict is the grey zone. Gray zone conflict is best understood as activity that is coercive and aggressive in nature, but that is deliberately designed to remain below the threshold of conventional military conflict and open interstate war. Grey zone approaches are mostly the province of revisionist powers—those actors that seek to modify some aspect of the existing international environment— and the goal is to reap gains, whether territorial or otherwise, that are normally associated with victory in war. Yet grey zone approaches are meant to achieve those gains without escalating to overt warfare, without crossing established red-lines, and thus without exposing the practitioner to the penalties and risks that such escalation might bring… Gray zone challenges, in other words, are ambiguous and usually incremental aggression… they eat away at the status quo one nibble at a time. [Paradoxes of the Gray Zone, Hal Brands, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 05 February 2016; Paradoxes of the Gray Zone – Foreign Policy Research Institute (fpri. org)]. There are other, more academic definitions of the grey zone, but the quote above from an article on the Foreign Policy Research Institute website is the most useful I’ve found yet.

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HMNZS Aotearoa in the Philippine Sea, September 2021.

Grey zone strategies are being used in regions in which we have a critical economic stake, against countries and peoples whom we consider friends and partners, and with complete disregard for international law and for the courts that arbitrate disputes related to that law. As fisheries depletion continues and as technology makes seabed mineral extraction more practicable, the possibility that such strategies could be employed against our own resources and those of our Pacific partners must surely increase. This article argues that our navy is essential to the defence of New Zealand/Aotearoa and our partners against grey zone strategies, and that it must be ready to operate in the grey zone “all the time”. In May 2009, China presented a submission to the United Nations that in effect claimed sovereignty over almost the entire South China Sea, negating the claims of other littoral nations to EEZs and ECS (Extended Continental Shelf) rights under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – on which every EEZ and ECS claim, including New Zealand’s, is based. In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), in The Hague ruled in favour of most of the claims made

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by the Philippines in a case related to Chinese claims of sovereignty over islands within the so-called ‘nine dash line’ that delineates the Chinese claim. China’s nine dash line. Image: Natural Earth, ESRI, Global Security, Tufts University. China refused to take part in the arbitration, has ignored the ruling of the PCA, and has continued with a programme of artificial island construction in direct contravention of international norms – in addition to causing what the PCA describes as severe environmental harm. It has backed up its claims with classic grey zone techniques – using civilian fishing vessels to block access to other countries’ fishing fleets and paramilitary coast guard type vessels to harass and obstruct lawful users of the sea, including fishermen and Philippine naval vessels. Some might argue that events in the South China Sea are of no real concern to us, and that even if they were, our ability to influence those events is minimal. However, we should consider the long term impact should China be successful in using grey zone techniques. New Zealand has a very large EEZ, and an even larger ECS claim. It is increasingly recognised that our future economic and environmental health

is bound up in our ability to exercise good governance over this massive sea space. Let’s suppose that at some point in the future, rare earth nodules are discovered in an accessible part of our ECS, and that another nation determines that the economic benefits of exploiting those nodules outweigh the benefits of respecting our claim and thus adhering to international norms, which have in any event been seriously weakened by the successful use of grey zone techniques elsewhere. To whom might we turn for help, should that nation use grey zone techniques against us? Might a failure to support those friends affected by Chinese actions in the South China Sea tend to weigh against the likelihood of support being available to us? Might a willingness to support those friends strengthen the action taken to resist grey zone strategies by making it more multi-lateral, thus making it less likely that other actors will employ them in parts of the world much closer to home? Might that then reduce the likelihood of New Zealand/Aotearoa having to face grey zone incursions alone? I would argue that it is more likely than not that future maritime conf lict will be conducted, at least initially, in the grey zone, and that the

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international community must be able to operate effectively in the grey zone to deny advantage to an aggressor and prevent the outbreak of open conf lict. I also argue that New Zealand/ Aotearoa cannot ignore that reality. We must therefore consider what this means for the next generation of naval capability. Firstly, operating in the grey zone requires sustained presence. Grey zone actors seek to normalise their actions by making them continuous; responses to those actions must be as correspondingly continuous as possible. This level of presence requires a minimum of four platforms, which must have good seakeeping, range, and endurance. Our fleet must also have sufficient capacity to respond to other contingencies while grey zone deterrence is ongoing, suggesting a minimum fleet of five.

Responses to grey zone activity will be grounded in international law – as indeed are all actions undertaken by deployed elements of the New Zealand Defence Force. Naval platforms must have excellent multi-dimensional sensing capability, so they can detect and record any and all actions undertaken by grey zone adversaries to an evidential quality standard. Proportionality is critical. Our naval platforms must be able to respond to escalation with force, but in the court of instantaneous media courage it is important to avoid providing the aggressor with an excuse to deploy overt military strength. Platforms with armament proportionate to the grey zone threat are required. Nonetheless, escalation must be allowed for. Our force structure must contain platforms that

can be armed with systems that deter military aggression. The most important element of grey zone capability is already in place. Well trained, well educated, committed naval people able to form a nuanced view of highly charged situations are absolutely essential to any naval force, never more so than in situations where deterrence must be balanced with the avoidance of provocation (those who argue that Artificial Intelligence has already supplanted human judgment in naval operations have never planned the interception and arrest of a suspected terrorist support vessel or operated in the “Rules of Engagement” phase of a major naval exercise). New Zealand has these people in abundance, but more must be done to keep them in naval uniform. The modular naval force outlined in my earlier article could meet these

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criteria. A standard platform could be acquired in sufficient numbers to ensure that one vessel can be maintained on station indefinitely (with the support of HMNZS Aotearoa, an incredible capability and an inspired acquisition). It could be provided with a standing suite of non-invasive surveillance systems, allowing situational ground truth to be established and recorded. It could be deployed with defensive and law enforcement weapons only, while another platform is equipped with meaningful combat capability and held ready to deploy should the situation escalate. Finally, modular capability and the new crewing concepts alluded to in my earlier article could reduce the strain on naval people, thus improving retention. Grey zone conflict is happening all the time. In the South China Sea, it is

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affecting the rights under international law of nations whom we consider our friends and partners while creating significant environmental damage. There is a real risk that international norms based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea could break down to an extent that our own marine resources become vulnerable to grey zone exploitation. We need to be able to operate in the grey zone to support our friends and uphold the international norms on which we rely to protect our own seaborne trade and marine resources. Our future naval fleet must be designed with these requirements in mind; a fleet based on capability modularity may provide a solution. Author’s note: I have had the privilege of visiting China on five separate occasions, and on each visit my respect and admiration for

the Chinese people became more profound. I regard the treatment of China by Europe and Japan during the century between the 1840s and the 1940s as utterly disgraceful. If ever an act of aggression provided just cause for the world to intervene, it was the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, yet apart from imposing sanctions on Japan, the world that now calls on China to respect international law did not act. When viewed through this lens, China’s aspirations to be well armed in defence of its interests cannot be seen by a reasonable person as other than entirely justified. It is with reluctance that I single out China’s actions in the South China Sea as exemplars of grey zone aggression; nonetheless, the sad reality is that they must be recognised for what they are, and China persuaded to desist.

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GA-ASI Completes European Maritime Demonstrations with MQ-9B SeaGuardian Recent Flight Series with the Royal Air Force notches up multiple industry firsts. New Zealand’s vast area of strategic interest demands a highly capable layer of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) coverage, spanning both civilian and military tasking. The General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) MQ-9B SkyGuardian/SeaGuardian Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) system provides a cost-effective solution for multi-domain ISR operations that would ideally suit New Zealand’s demanding requirements by serving both civilian and military tasking, while offering significant potential for further role expansion. GA-ASI recently completed a series of flight demonstrations that featured a company-owned MQ-9B SeaGuardian RPA in partnership with the Royal Air Force (RAF). The demonstration series began on 25 Aug 2021 and ended with the completion of the UK’s Exercise Joint Warrior on 30 Sept. “The support of the RAF was key to the success of our demonstrations,” said GA-ASI Vice President of International Strategic Development Robert Schoeffling. “Our partnership allowed us to achieve a number of industry firsts as we showcased our innovative RPA to senior military officials from 16 countries.” The flights showcased the many operational capabilities of the MQ9B, including the platform’s advanced maritime ISR, Detect and Avoid System (DAAS), industry-leading endurance and interoperability with NATO partners. During Joint Warrior, a demonstration of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) took place using the SeaGuardian and a RAF P-8, showing SeaGuardian’s ability to

complement and support Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) tasking, which included detection, tracking, monitoring and reporting. Integrating UAS into Civil Airspace The demonstrations were initially based out of RAF Waddington before moving to RAF Lossiemouth to support Exercise Joint Warrior. While based at RAF Waddington, one flight saw SeaGuardian fly to Leeuwarden Air Base, taking the RPA into Netherlands airspace and proving a seamless transition between national air traffic regions, while testing airspace operational procedures. This multi-day demonstration, which took place 1-2 September, displayed SeaGuardian’s maritime surveillance capabilities in support of international allies. The Royal Netherlands Air Force has ordered four MQ-9A RPA and the first is expected to be delivered to Leeuwarden in late 2021. SeaGuardian returned to RAF Waddington at the conclusion of the event.

That important event was followed by the UK’s first Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)-approved point-topoint domestic flight of an unmanned aircraft using the UK’s airways structure, when SeaGuardian flew from Lincolnshire, England to Moray, Scotland on 12 Sept. The flight was controlled by NATS, the UK’s civilian Air Navigation Service Provider. “The MQ-9B is the first RPA to be allowed to fly so extensively in the demanding UK-controlled airspace,” said Mark Watson, Head of Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM) Service Integration for NATS. “This moves us a long way towards same day notification for ‘file

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and fly’ privileges as an Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC)capable platform.” A large set of airworthiness artifacts have been reviewed by the UK Civil Airworthiness Authority, which has approved MQ-9B for operations in unsegregated, uncontrolled airspace for the first time based on the suite of airspace deconfliction technologies and extensive documentation provided in the Safety Case. SeaGuardian is the maritime version of the MQ-9B SkyGuardian®. As the launch customer, the RAF has ordered 16 SkyGuardian aircraft in their configuration, which they have named the Protector RG Mk1 RPA systems. The Protector is a derivative of the SkyGuardian, featuring an array of customer modifications. “The coordination between GAASI and our RAF team was exciting to

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see,” said RAF Group Captain Shaun Gee, Director Air ISTAR Programmes (RPAS and TacISR), and SRO Shadow Programme. “It was great to see firsthand the game-changing capabilities of the RPA we’ve ordered for Protector. The ability of the aircraft to integrate into European airspace is key for the RAF as well as our international allies.” Joint Warrior Support The flights culminated with the RPA’s participation in the UKled Joint Warrior exercise, which showcased how the MQ-9B’s maritime capabilities can be integrated with other air, maritime and land assets. An international audience observed the RPA’s maritime capability which includes a multi-mode surface-search radar with Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) imaging mode, an Automatic Identification System (AIS)

receiver, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) along with the standard HighDefinition, Full-Motion Video sensor equipped with optical and infrared cameras. As a result of a visit from leadership from the UK Border Force during which they observed the capabilities of the system, a Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) demonstration flight was performed over the English Channel. In addition to the RAF, the SkyGuardian has been selected by the Australian Defence Force under Project Air 7003 and the Belgian Ministry of Defence. In support of the European Maritime Demonstrations, GAASI partnered with SES, the leading provider of global satellite communications (SATCOM) services operating the world’s only multiorbit constellation of satellites in Geostationary Orbit (GEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and offering a unique combination of global coverage and high performance. For the demonstrations, GA-ASI leveraged SES’s GEO connectivity in Ku-band as well as X-band reach back provided via the GovSat-1 satellite. The SATCOM service enabled the MQ-9 to operate securely with a high-capacity datalink, allowing real-time transmission of sensor data from the aircraft with data rates up to 70 Mbps in secure reach back. The multi-domain capability of the MQ-9B is now attracting a broad range of customer interest, particularly from those with significant maritime areas of interest. The very long range and endurance coupled with high data rate beyond line-of sight SATCOM, payload options, extensive communications options, cost-effectiveness when compared to manned ISR assets with similar capabilities, and ability to operate seamlessly in all classes of airspace and in adverse weather conditions are MQ-9B attributes which appear ideally suited to New Zealand’s civil and defence security applications. Whether for the Enhanced Maritime Awareness Capability (EMAC), Long Range Unmanned Aircraft System (LRUAS) or New Zealand’s other future security needs, the MQ-9B SkyGuardian/SeaGuardian is ready to perform.

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Deeper Thinking Needed – AUKUS and Them Opposition Spokesperson for Defence and Veterans Chris Penk MP writes that there’s been very little analysis on what the AUKUS announcement means for New Zealand’s defence and for decisions around maritime capability.

It’s now been some months since we heard the AUKUS alliance announced, including news of a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia. Almost all the commentary here focused on the activity of other nations in our region and guesswork as to geopolitical implications even further afield. But while we’ve heard much about the interests of AUKUS partners relative to those of China – and less direct, more hypothetical impacts, such as New Zealand’s trade prospects with France – there’s been relatively little analysis of what it all means for our defence. In military strategic terms, the change is potentially seismic. The big picture is that New Zealand is a maritime nation dangerously

dependent on the state of our surrounding seas. It’s not just our ideals in the Indo/Asia-Pacific region that are at stake but also our national interests. Our territorial waters (out to 12 nautical miles) and Exclusive Economic Zone (out to 200 nautical miles) are the stage on which our national fate will be decided in the rest of this century. We are surrounded by seas that are variously trade routes, fisheries, areas of maritime search and rescue responsibility and part of the worldwide “freedom of navigation” network. These are also places where piracy, modern slavery, people smuggling and drug running occur, among other unsavoury activities. Out of sight these may all be, but they should be front of mind.

Chris Penk MP is the Opposition Spokesperson for Defence and Veterans. He has served as an officer in both the Royal New Zealand Navy and Royal Australian Navy.

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From the perspective of NZ Inc generally – and certainly when it comes to issues of sovereignty – we should be intensely interested in what Australia’s moves underwater mean for our own defence On the face of it, Australia scaling up its capability is positive for Aotearoa. I should acknowledge at this point that I am somewhat biased in the matter, having been a submariner in the Australian Navy prior to becoming an MP. In that sense I suppose I declare a conflict of interest. Then again, I’d consider myself unusually well placed – as a policy maker on this side of the Tasman – to understand the implications of that particular “silent service”. So while most commentators have been focused elsewhere, I sincerely hope that these issues are being worked through in our Ministry of Defence and the NZDF itself. The Minister of Defence should certainly instruct them to do so, if he hasn’t already. It’s perfectly reasonable that government agencies not share their views on these matters of national security. As an Opposition MP, however, I have a responsibility for ensuring that key concerns are being addressed, so I raise them in any case. And let’s be clear: there are a number of factors that pose serious challenges for our defence.

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First, as the situation currently stands, New Zealand will not be allowing these vessels to visit our shores. That’s literally the law of our land – nuclear-free legislation made under David Lange – even if its prohibition on nuclear propulsion (as distinct from nuclear weapons) is rather quixotic. In the brave new world of AUKUS, however, it is troubling to think that a maritime nation with a relatively modest navy of its own would roll out the unwelcome mat to the key naval element of its nearest neighbour, firm friend and almost only ally. The second question is what AUKUS means for our own fleet, in particular the frigates’ replacement. While the Defence Minister has been silent on this subject, along with almost every other defence subject, presumably he intends that we will be replacing our only two warships proper with something roughly equivalent at some stage. A related question is what change to Australian’s naval doctrine will be brought about by its switch to submarines with considerably greater range and speed than its diesel-electric boats. Third, will we be called upon to help bridge any gap in the transition between the old and new submarine squadrons operating across the Tasman? There could be a number of years following the retirement of the

current class and the next generation coming of age. How could New Zealand contribute in the meantime? Perhaps our new P8 maritime patrol aircraft will be called upon to play a greater role in understanding the underwater environment than would otherwise have been the case, for example. We should be thinking proactively about this now. Finally, we should expect that Wellington will be asking Canberra, Washington and London very nicely to have access to as much intelligence collected by Australian submarines as possible. The auspices of AUKUS will technically be different from the Five Eyes arrangements. Simply stated, it’s imperative that we’re aware of who’s doing what to whom in our region. I sincerely hope that the government is taking these issues seriously. They have a number of other important issues to consider presently, of course. For one thing, the Defence Minister is also performing the role of an Associate Health Minister during a pandemic. Whether or not this was a wise dual appointment is another matter and one on which our friends may have a view. In any case, it would be a real mistake to consider such issues that a government deems non-urgent to be unimportant. When it comes to AUKUS and Australia’s nuclear submarines, we need some deeper thought.

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Modularity and the Shape of New Zealand’s Next Naval Fleet Emerging naval doctrine supports the idea of a future navy based on modularity, writes maritime capability specialist and former Royal New Zealand Navy Officer Andrew Watts.

In recent months, several highly regarded defence and security commentators have drawn attention to the geostrategic realities that New Zealand now faces in the AsiaPacific region. This commentary has included speculation about the level of naval capability needed to meet our commitments to collective security while at the same time performing the wide spectrum of other defence and security missions required of our navy. There have been some interesting social media exchanges, most of which have been constructive. Nonetheless, among the commentary there has been a disturbing tendency to assume that “high end” naval capability is beyond New Zealand’s reach, and to advocate a naval force structure based around patrol capabilities. This article discusses emerging technological and doctrinal opportunities that offer a much wider and potentially affordable range of naval capability choice.

In the past, warship platforms and the weapon and sensor systems that they carried were tightly coupled in design terms. Ships were designed around specific systems and they were seldom much larger than they had to be to carry those systems over a specific distance, within a specific speed range, and in a specific range of environmental conditions. When systems became obsolete and had to be replaced, ships had to be subjected to very expensive, time consuming, and technically (and thus financially) risky midlife upgrades, because the new systems placed an entirely different set of demands on the basic platform for space and weight and for power, cooling, data, and other services. In addition, acquisition and sustainment funds had to be spread over all the systems permanently fitted to the fleet – every frigate (for example) always carried all the systems that it might need for all possible missions, no matter how it was likely to actually be employed.

Offshore support vessel HMNZS Manawanui - one of ten ships and six ship classes in the RNZN fleet

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Flexibility for configuration: the Babcock Arrowhead 140. Image: Babcock.

These factors have led to the development of a technological strategy known as modularity. Broadly speaking, modularity decouples a warship’s mission systems (or payload) from the platform that carries them. A modular warship is designed with the range, endurance, speed, and seakeeping characteristics for the range of missions that it may be required to undertake, but it is fitted with capability “modules” tailored to the needs of specific missions. These modules are typically based on transportable containers with standard interfaces for services like power, cooling and data, and are installed in modular ships according to need. For example, a modular ship could be fitted with an anti-submarine warfare module and the people required to operate and maintain it and deployed to protect shipping in an area of tension. An identical platform could be fitted with modules to support Exclusive Economic Zone protection and deployable health services and deployed to support our Pacific partner nations. A third could be fitted with hydrographic survey capability and deployed to gather data for safe navigation. A fourth could be fitted with modules that support the protection of shipping passing through choke points from pirates and terrorist attack, while a fifth carried modules for

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maritime mine counter measures and diving support operations. Every platform would employ the same navigational, propulsion, electrical generation, command and control, communications, and habitability systems, greatly simplifying in service sustainment. A larger number of identical platforms would enable serial production efficiencies to be realised, reducing acquisition costs in comparison to small numbers of unique platforms tailored to specific functions. Commentators have expressed justifiable concern that New Zealand’s contribution to collective security should be credible to our partners. Modularity supports that, in that investment could be focussed on acquiring only those modules needed to support likely missions. When we had a four frigate fleet, every one of those was permanently equipped for all likely missions. With modularity, we might be able to focus investment on two anti-submarine warfare modules installed in platforms as required for training and operational deployments. This would make it easier to acquire meaningful, credible capability. As indicated above, traditionally designed warships must be taken out of service for risky and lengthy midlife upgrades so as to remain viable. With a modular fleet, this would not be

necessary. A mine-counter measures module, for example, could be upgraded in workshops ashore while the fleet of host platforms remained available for other missions. Major technology upgrades could be achieved by replacing the module entirely. As new missions emerge and old missions disappear, new modules could be acquired, and old modules discarded, while the host platforms remained in service. Modularity thus removes the requirement for mid-life upgrades and supports a much more effective level of obsolescence management than has been possible until now. Emerging naval doctrine supports modularity. All liberal democracies are faced with the near certainty of numerical overmatch in relation to competitors, particularly China. The cost of acquiring exquisitely capable, multifunction naval combatants in sufficient numbers to address overmatch can no longer be borne, even by the United States. This has led to the emergence of a concept known as Distributed Maritime Operations, in which the capability of a naval force is spread over a large number of distributed, specialised platforms, albeit with multi-function combatants at its centre. As long as it was able to defend itself from the generic missile, torpedo, and small craft threat, a New Zealand platform fitted with a specialised

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HMNZS Te Kaha exercises alongside ships from partner navies in the Philippines Sea. Image: NZDF

capability module would fit well in such a force. Autonomous aerial, surface and underwater vehicles are now mainstream capabilities. They greatly extend surveillance coverage and reduce the need to expose crewed platforms to attack. Modularity is an excellent fit with autonomy. Autonomous vehicles are effectively capability modules in themselves and are designed to be moved from host platform to host platform according to need. New Zealand would not be going out on a limb in exploring the potential of modularity. The United States Navy is running an advanced modularity test programme, and the Royal Navy is exploring modularity concepts along the lines of those proposed above for its next generation Type 32 frigate, which is also intended to deploy a wide range of autonomous capability. All current naval acquisition programmes incorporate some level of modularity, including the very advanced Hunter class frigates being acquired by the Royal Australian Navy. Official module interface standards have already been issued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s standardisation agency. Our navy currently consists of ten ships of six different classes. This creates

an almost intolerable strain on our logistics and training organisations – supply chains, maintenance capability, and training systems have to be in place for several different types of system that perform identical functions in different ship classes. The fact that we have largely met fleet availability targets reflects great credit on the uniformed and civilian people that keep our fleet running. The next generation of fleet platforms must relieve this strain, and a fleet of common platforms with modularised capability could enable this. Common modular platforms also offer a means whereby the standards of design and production excellence that characterise the New Zealand marine industry could be brought to bear in the wider national interest. If our industry can produce the most technologically advanced racing and super yachts in the world, it stands to reason that it has something to offer the next generation of naval capability. It is not inconceivable that the platforms themselves could be built in New Zealand, perhaps with the aid of technology transfer from an overseas partner, but the real opportunity may lie in supply chain participation. There is also a real possibility that New Zealand industry could develop and supply some of the capability

modules themselves. This aspect of the modularity opportunity must be explored. With the exception of HMNZS Aotearoa, every ship in our existing fleet will reach the forecast end of its economical service life in a very short space of time – between 2032 and 2035. This presents both a major challenge and an opportunity to acquire a modular fleet tailored to New Zealand’s defence and security needs. In the space available it has not been possible to address the full implications of modular capability, and for the naval practitioner this article perhaps poses more questions than it answers. In particular, this article has not addressed the signature management and damage resistance features required for high end operations, and the cost implications that these would have for the common platform. Nonetheless, the technological opportunity is real, and it converges with doctrinal developments in the shape of Distributed Maritime Operations. Whatever direction New Zealand naval capability development takes, the fact of mass obsolescence over a very short time frame is also real. As has been said elsewhere, lead times are such that the thinking necessary to address this fact must start now.

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Defence organisations concerned over inability to support disconnected operations Recent research by IFS reveals growing concern among military and defence organisations around their ability to support increasing operations taking place in disconnected and limited bandwidth sc New research shows over half of respondents need better support for missions taking place in disconnected scenarios; many have concerns that software infrastructure is not keeping pace. In mid-November, IFS, the global cloud enterprise applications company, shared research revealing that military operators and defence in-service support providers consider disconnected operations a priority to effectively assist missions that take place with minimal or no information system connectivity. In a recent poll of military forces, in-service support providers and defence manufacturers, over two thirds agreed that the ability to operate in a disconnected, intermittent, and limited bandwidth (DIL) operational environment is essential to military operations. When asked what aspect of disconnected operations require the most improvement, 54.5 percent of respondents highlighted the need to maintain a single version of truth and keeping an asset’s status in sync. This was followed by keeping consistent connectivity between a main operating base (MOB) and distributed forward operating bases (FOBs) at 23 percent. Yet the findings exposed a stark gap between the need to perform missioncritical operations in ‘dark-mode’ and the ability of existing software to facilitate asset information in disconnected settings. Around one fifth of the respondents believe their current software infrastructure is incapable of aggregating, consolidating and storing

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data in a disconnected setting, while also providing physical and softwarebased hardening against attack. Respondents identified the three main driving forces behind the growth in disconnected operations. Unplanned connectivity interruptions ranked highest, cited by 41 percent of respondents, followed by planned instances of disconnected operations as

Matt Medley, IFS Defence Manufacturing Industry Director

part of the normal day-to-day business, and a shift to a more distributed operational model (both at 23 percent). “These findings show that disconnected operations is a nascent and growing field that is gaining more attention from all types of defence organisations—from military operators through to in-service support providers and manufacturers themselves,” said Matt Medley, IFS Defence Manufacturing Industry Director. “Re-syncing information such as engineering and maintenance data, technical records and more may sound simple, but this is a very difficult task to manage from a data architecture perspective. Supporting software must prove it is up the challenge to mitigate any outage and keep a single picture of the truth between operating bases during mission-critical disconnected operations.” To learn more about the emerging trends in distributed operations listen to the IFS webinar at https:// disconnected.ifs.com/.

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Does New Zealand spend enough on Defence? Dr Wayne Mapp writes that if New Zealand is to provide its Defence Force with modern platforms capable of interoperability with partners, it will need to maintain defence expenditure at 1.5 percent of GDP over the next decade.

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.

The new AUKUS security pact raises the question of whether New Zealand spends enough on defence. AUKUS proposes major new defence expenditure, particularly by Australia on the proposed fleet of eight nuclear powered submarines. The United Kingdom will also have to spend more to build up its naval fleet, if it is to have a serious presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The proposed Royal Navy fleet of eight Type 26 frigates and five Type 31 frigates is not nearly enough for such global aspirations. Similarly, with the seven Astute submarines, which is actually one less than the eight submarines Australia intends to acquire. The Defence Assessment released on 8 December reinforces the point. AUKUS was the signal that Australia recognises that it needs new capabilities for the Pacific. The Defence Assessment, which specifically states that China is driving a more competitive strategic environment in the Pacific, should serve the same purpose for New Zealand. The Defence Assessment reinforces that New Zealand must replace the ANZAC frigates no later than the early to mid 2030s. Australia and the United Kingdom have been increasing their defence expenditure for a number of years. In Australia’s case, defence expenditure has substantially increased from 1.6 percent of GDP in 2014 to 2.0 percent in 2020. The increase in the United Kingdom has come off a higher base, rising from 1.9 percent of GDP in 2017 to 2.2 percent in 2020. In both countries there has been a real increase in capability, particularly in air and naval assets. Both countries

have acquired the F35 fighter aircraft. The United Kingdom has two new aircraft carriers and Australia has three air warfare destroyers with some limited ABM capability. Australia and the United Kingdom are also in the middle of replacing their 25 year old frigates with new and much more capable Type 26 frigates. For many western countries, particularly in Europe, the last major expenditure programmes were toward the end of the Cold War. The major assets bought during this period are now thirty years old. As a consequence, most NATO nations are in the middle of acquiring major new equipment. The F35 aircraft is perhaps the most striking of these platforms, but it can also be seen in the push to renew naval fleets, both in submarines and new naval combat ships. Defence expenditure can be calculated in a number of ways. The usual international standard, used by NATO, combines both operational expenditure and capital expenditure. Therefore, a major capital spending plan will drive up expenditure, even if operating expenditure and personnel numbers remain the same. Major equipment programmes take decades to fulfil, and their capital cost is typically spread over many years. The standard NATO approach of assessing defence expenditure is to include capital expenditure as it is actually made. A period of substantial capital expenditure will drive up defence spending. Conversely when few capital items are purchased, overall defence expenditure will decrease. The New Zealand approach to assessing defence expenditure has modified over time. From 1992 to 2018,

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capital expenditure was accounted for using a capital charge on capital equipment. The capital charge, which was the sole recognition of capital expenditure, was included in the annual appropriation. The actual injection of capital to purchase the new equipment was little more than a footnote to the annual appropriation. The capital charge had the effect of allocating the cost of capital over the life of the equipment. The overall effect was to reduce the apparent level of expenditure when compared to the usual NATO measure, which accounts for capital as it is spent. For instance, using the capital charge system, $1 billion of capital expenditure would only result in a $70 million annual capital allocation, based on a 7 percent capital charge. Though over time, increased levels of capital expenditure would progressively increase the overall level of capital charge. The more recent approach, which conforms with the way that NATO accounts for defence expenditure, has been to include capital expenditure and capital injections as they occur within the overall calculation of annual defence expenditure. The ongoing cost of capital is still included as a capital charge. The effect is that large procurement programmes, with their substantial capital payments, will substantially increase defence expenditure in the year in which the payments are made. Nations with large and complex defence forces will always have major capital programmes in play and therefore will not have major variations of capital expenditure from year to year. Smaller defence forces, such as New

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Zealand’s, have much lumpier capital programmes. The NZDF has relatively few large and expensive platforms, which are typically in service for many decades. The P8 Poseidon and the C130J Hercules that are being now purchased are replacing aircraft that are over 60 years old, though these aircraft have been upgraded over that time. As a consequence of the both the increased capital required to purchase the new aircraft and the change in how to account for capital expenditure, there has been a rapid increase In New Zealand’s defence expenditure, up from 1.1 percent of GDP in 2017 when the only recognition of capital expenditure was through the capital charge, to 1.5 percent of GDP in the 2021 Budget which includes the actual capital expenditure as it occurs. The 1.5 percent figure conforms to the NATO system of assessing defence expenditure. On the pre 2017 system of assessing defence expenditure, defence expenditure would have been a little over 1.1 percent of GDP. Once these major purchases have been delivered and fully paid for, overall defence expenditure may decline as a percentage of GDP. However, the high cost of the new equipment will result in a higher depreciation allowance, so the defence budget may not fully reduce to pre-2017 levels, when assessed as a percentage of GDP. It is noteworthy that both Australia and the United Kingdom are keeping their defence expenditure at their new levels, enabling continuing substantial new purchases of advanced military capabilities, particularly in their air and naval assets. The question for New

Zealand is whether we should do the same. In doing so, the implication is that the defence budget should be kept at or near 1.5 percent of GDP, using the NATO measure. Another way of looking at this is that it would mean that New Zealand would be able to spend around $1.8 billion on new capital equipment each year for the rest of this decade, or a total of $14 billion through to 2030. The Defence Capability Plan of 2019, when Ron Mark of New Zealand First was Minister, forecast an expenditure track very similar to this, with $20 billion of new capital expenditure from 2019 to 2030. This plan did not envisage replacing the ANZAC frigates before 2030, though it did plan for replacing the P3 Orions, the C130 Hercules, the maritime helicopters as well as acquiring a substantial ice capable patrol vessel. The first phase of this plan is well underway. The overall expenditure track of the Capability Plan, if extended through into the 2030s, is clearly sufficient to replace the ANZAC frigates with modern combat vessels, such as the Type 31 frigate currently being built for the United Kingdom. In order for frigates to be delivered by the early to mid 2030s, it will be necessary to actually place the orders in the mid to late 2020s. A more competitive strategic environment, as forecast in the Defence Assessment, would indicate that three such vessels are needed, to ensure that at least one frigate is always available. Over the last twenty years, with two ANZAC frigates, there have been many occasions when neither of them were available for deployment. If New Zealand wants a highly sophisticated Defence Force with modern equipment that is able to fully interoperate with our partners and allies, then the 2019 Capability Plan must be fully implemented. That means maintaining defence expenditure at 1.5 percent of GDP. The Defence Force will be essentially the same size as at present, but its equipment will be among the best of the small defence forces in the world. Anything less will mean an ongoing degradation of capabilities when compared to our partners and allies.

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Will 2022 be the Year New Zealand finally joins up the dots for our Veterans? Jennie Vickers sat down recently with RSA CEO Marty Donoghue to talk about the RSA’s ambitions for better industry engagement in 2022. A selection of questions and answers follows. JV: What are the moments of 2021 which make you excited about joining the dots in 2022? MD: Tough question because despite the challenging year, we have been progressing on a number of fronts. But… I want to start with exciting and very relevant news. Just last week we received an update about one of our Invictus family, Nu Filo. He has been competing and representing New Zealand at the World Para Powerlifting Championships held last week in Tbilisi Georgia. Nu messaged us to say: “Sunday went well with two PBs of 140kg and 150kg in the Para-Bench (Powerlifting PB is 166kg). I finished 16th from 20 in the World which is ok for the biggest competition I have been to. Today it’s

back to the gym again working towards another PB and the Commonwealth Games 2022.” Nu is a former New Zealand Army Soldier who lost a leg in a training accident in Waiouru in 2006. Nu retrained as an IT analyst, worked into an IT role with Government and has thrown himself into his sport. Nu got to Tbilisi with support from RSA, from the Auckland RSA and from KPMG. He is the embodiment of a 21st Century kiwi veteran, working through adversity, re-training for a new profession and then being ‘the change we want to see in the world’ as an Invictus medallist and now on a World sporting stage. When we join the dots in 2022, we will see more people like Nu transitioning from service to industry,

Marty Donoghue is Chief Executive of the Royal New Zealand Returned and Services Association (RNZRSA). He has a 35-year track record of building and managing teams and mobilising volunteers in New Zealand and internationally across defence, sport, science and in the not-for-profit sector.

New Zealand World Para Powerlifting Championships representative Nu Filo.

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rural communities, disabled people, prisoners, and children experiencing adverse childhood events, looked at, felt life is less worthwhile, and reported less security, poorer mental and overall health, and greater discrimination and barriers to wellbeing.” The men and women who served and continue to serve, our country and our global allies, should not still appear in lists of marginalised groups. Let 2022 be the year of shift. So making real progress in supporting veterans achieve good mental health, is a high priority. JV: Do you see 2022 as a year of progress in working more closely with other Nations?

wrapped around with support and allowing them to succeed in a second career and go on to achieve personal goals and satisfaction. As to the other projects for 2022, the first priority is vworking with, and receiving funding from Government to make our district support services available for all veterans and the best they can possibly be. This funding, has been a long time coming, but I believe making it happen will make perfect sense to the Minister of Veterans, Meka Whaitiri . RSA has a committed District support services Team but, like any other team they will deliver more, excel more and acheive more, in a shorter time, if they are given more resources, more training and more opportunities to join those dots. At the moment the

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RSA, as a combination of National Office and the branches, funds this work from donations, which makes no sense when we have a Government committed to resolving social and other inequalities for all Kiwis. On the same day that Nu announced his personal success, the Mental Health and Wellbeing Commission released their Te Rau Tira Welllbeing Outcomes Report 2021. Te Rau Tira introduces their vision to improve wellbeing for communities in Aotearoa New Zealand. Recognising the challenges faced by veterans (among others) their press release says in the opening paragraphs: “Most marginalised groups, such as young people, veterans, rainbow communities, Māori, Pacific peoples, former refugees and migrants, children in state care, older people,

MD: Absolutely. While lockdowns kept us locked up, we used Teams to reach out and start accelerating relationships with our network of veteran support agencies across the World. We are particularly excited to be engaging more with SoldierOn in Australia, for example, which makes perfect sense. All year we have been seeing the return to New Zealand of veterans who have spent time in Australia since leaving service. Often needing to re-establish or even build totally new networks, in the early months they need a lot of help and the RSA is, and should be, the place they come to for help. Once established they can take their place, carving their own way. Sadly this has not always been the case over the past years and we are working to change that. New Zealand is grappling with skills shortages so we should be seeing every single veteran returnee as one more quality addition to a different workforce. With a closer relationship with SoldierOn we can envision career pathways for New Zealand which start in Australia with training and other support, so coming home includes job opportunities and a lot more joining the dots. Looking further afield we have much to learn from the US, for example. The support by Government and by industry in the US for Veterans provides a model we should copy and which they are very keen to share. The Fortinet Fortivet Programme (which you have shown to us) is a perfect example of how support of

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industry for veterans, joins the dots. The Fortinet Academy Program give Veterans access to free training , mentoring and job opportunities and industry gets more skilled people to help towards the three million security professional deficit. This is just one of many examples, and with US large tech companies being major players in NZ we just need to copy, not re-invent. JV: What advice do you have for NZ businesses looking to improve their track record of delivering broader outcomes to their Government and private sector customers? MD: KPMG has recently published a useful report for their clients called “Social Procurement Tackling the practical realities”. They note in their report that Supply Nation Australia research, showed that for every $1 spent, the social return on Investment was an average of $4.41. KPMG’s support of Nu so he could go to the World Championships, is just one of many KPMG investments in our people who are needing a bit of help. These sorts of successful investments we are seeing from many companies, the length and breadth of new Zealand and we want to see more in 2022. RSA is chomping at the bit to work with more businesses to identify and fund projects, which will help them find more veteran talent, create opportunities to demonstrably bring broader outcomes to the table and then deliver the sorts of employee wellbeing uplifts beneficial for everyone in their organisation.

JV: In my work with the Defence Sector in New Zealand and Australia, the people I meet called veterans all seem more like you and me than my granddad. Are we going to see change in 2022 in the definition of veteran and the perception of whom the RSA should serve? MD: The reality still is that there are over 40,000 kiwi veterans who served in and around the 90s who are classified by the Veteran Support Act as veterans. But there are many others who served but by quirk of fate have been deemed to not have been in an operational area and therefore who fail to satisfy a definition put in place by bureaucrats. We have many examples including veterans who have served for 40 years, many at sea but who do not tick the definition box. This is mad and has to change. The work completed by the Veterans Advisory Board needs to be seen through to an end state, we can’t have legislation discriminate between cohorts of veterans the inequality will come back to haunt us all. Without a definition change Government is failing to deliver good policy outcomes, and we are sure that is not their intention. JV: Final question is back to the RSA and Industry. What can industry in New Zealand and beyond, do to help the RSA and what can the RSA do to help them? MD: We absolutely need to work together, and to work with the NZDF. We actually have similar goals and

if we work together well, we can get outcomes that deliver to everyone. Industry needs well skilled people (ideally with a clearance and relevant training), NZDF needs and wants to ensure that their people leave and go on to support themselves and NZ, and the RSA has the purpose, the connections and the mandate to support people’s transition out to fulfilling lives. The phone lines are open and we want to hear from industry with their ideas, with their requests for candidates and their offers of financial support. One practical example of an area where industry can jump in and provide support is with the on-base RSA Hubs. In 2022 we will bring the RSA Hubs based on the model seen at Linton, Burnham and Trentham, to Devonport, Ohakea and Whenuapai. I know from reading LoD that there are numerous projects underway at these bases and that many businesses are participating in supply chains and directly contributing to infrastructure builds. If every business got involved in some way at the Hub of the base they work in or into, we could transform the experiences of those thinking of transitioning out and those who have already done so. My niece loves Dad Jokes and this discussion reminds me of one cheesy one: Question: What do you call an apology written in dots and dashes? Answer: Re-Morse code! It really is time we sort out the ridiculous barriers to supporting veterans and focus on success and not remorse in 2022.

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Defence Priorities and Principles released Defence Minister Peeni Henare announces new Defence Priorities and Principles aimed at guiding Defence through the ongoing COVID-19 response and a challenging broader strategic environment. Minister of Defence Peeni Henare recently announced a new set of Defence Priorities and Principles aimed at ensuring the Defence Force remains in the best position to continue serving New Zealanders as the region continues to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. “The Government priorities for Defence will put a stronger focus on our people, infrastructure, and the region in which we live - the Pacific,” Peeni Henare said. “People are our most important asset and capability and we need to ensure our personnel are welltrained, and effective at serving our communities here but also be ready for international commitments overseas.” Part of the People priority includes an increased focus on culture and diversity, to ensure the forces reflect New Zealand and the communities they serve. “Infrastructure will ensure members of the Defence Force can live and work in buildings that are healthy, safe and fit-for-purpose.” Peeni Henare said. “Investment in defence infrastructure will also help accelerate the economic recovery by providing opportunities for local businesses,” he said. “For example, at Base Ohakea in Manawatū- Whanganui, the new $250 million facility to house the P-8A Poseidon fleet represents a substantial economic boost for the region providing up to 400 jobs with 65% of workers coming from the local Manawatū - Whanganui region.” “In line with the Pacific Resilience focus of this Government, Pacific is the third focus and here Defence has a vital role to play in Te Moana-nuia-Kiwa; working together with our

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Peeni Henare, Defence Minister

Pacific partners to maintain peace and security in our region, and responding to Pacific priorities including: extreme weather events and climate change, transnational crime, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, and discrete incidents where required.” “A recent example of our Pacific focus is the deployment of Defence and Police personnel to the Solomon Islands, following a formal request for assistance. Maintaining Defence engagements and operations in the wider Indo-Pacific will continue to be an important part of New Zealand’s contributions to international security and peacekeeping,” Peeni Henare said. The four new Principles for Defence also reinforce the diversity and values of New Zealand’s defence agencies. “The Principles are: Angitu, which stands for success, effort and striving; Kotahitanga which speaks to unity, togetherness and collective action; Mana and Pono reflects the influence,

trust and integrity in Defence; and Kaitiakitanga speaks to their work as guardians and stewards for the future,” Peeni Henare said. “These Priorities and Principles have been set alongside and are informed by the Secretary of Defence’s Defence Assessment 2021: He moana pukepuke e ekengia e te waka: A rough sea can still be navigated.” “He moana pukepuke e ekengia e te waka: A rough sea can still be navigated continues to find the two principal challenges to New Zealand’s defence interests are the intensifying impacts of climate change and greater strategic competition,” Peeni Henare said. “This assessment has helped inform the new Defence Principles and Priorities and will be further taken into account, alongside other advice, when the Government conducts its next comprehensive defence policy review to ensure our policy settings are fit for purpose.”

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Is democracy declining or just being redefined?

As the West laments a global decline in its version of democracy, China suggests its own brand of democracy as a replacement. It’s part of an increasingly contested space, writes Nicholas Dynon, at the discursive end of great power competition.

Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence Magazine, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern participated recently in the virtual Summit for Democracy, a conclave hosted by US President Joe Biden of 100 invited representatives of countries boasting varying democratic credentials. In thanking the president for the invitation, the prime minister noted the challenges posed by Covid-19 and other events that “threaten to disconnect and divide us.” Indeed Biden himself warned that democratic erosion represents “the defining challenge of our time,” and a chorus of commentators and think-tanks agree with him. According to Stockholmbased International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2020 was the fifth consecutive year in which the

number of countries moving in the direction of authoritarianism outpaced those moving toward democracy. Washington-based Freedom House, asserts that authoritarianism has been on the rise while democracy has declined for the past 15 consecutive years. During this period, says Freedom House, more than twice as many countries (119) have experienced declines in political rights and civil liberties than have experienced improvements (55). The organisation calculates that less than 20 percent of the global population lives in what it regards a ‘free country’, the lowest percentage since 1995. Contributing to these figures, states International IDEA, is the fact that the number of ‘backsliding’ democracies has doubled in the past decade. Among

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Countries autocratising (red) or democratising (blue) substantially and significantly (2010–2020). Image: PJ Geest.

these backsliders are EU member states Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, and ‘established democracies’ such as the US. The view from Aotearoa “As one of the oldest democracies in the world New Zealand will always protect and defend the principles of democracy, pluralism, and partnership, underpinned by human rights and the rule of law, because they form our identity as a nation,” said Prime Minister Ardern in her delivery of New Zealand’s national statement to the democracy summit, which was held over 7-8 December. It couldn’t have been better timing for the 8 December release of the Defence Assessment 2021, a document detailing the New Zealand Ministry of Defence’s independent advice to the Government on the defence and security challenges facing New Zealand. Subtitled he moana pukepuke e ekengia e te waka / a rough sea can still be navigated, this assessment paints a turbulent picture of geostrategic competition, with democracy under threat. Identifying a “strong international rules-based system, centred on multilateralism and liberal democratic values” as one of Aotearoa’s four ‘Defence Interests’, the assessment charts a recent history in which decaying democracy is leading to a potential shift in the foundations of the

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international rules-based system. “After reaching a high-water mark in the early 2000s, overall global adherence to democratic norms has been declining. This ranges from increases in nationalist sentiment, through reversals in previous trends toward greater liberalism, to a narrowing of the civil society space. Globally, moves away from democracy within individual states contribute to weakening the basis and support for the values and norms that underpin the international rules-based system.” The trend of “liberal democracies sliding into illiberalism” had also been remarked upon as a major threat in other recent Ministry of Defence documents. the Statement of Intent Tauākī Whakamaunga Atu 20202024 and the Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018. “Challenges to open societies and Western liberalism, driven by increasing disillusionment with existing arrangements within these societies,” states the Strategic Defence Policy Statement, “threaten to reduce the willingness of open liberal states to champion the rules-based order.” Democracy Redefined Biden’s democracy summit did not, of course, go unnoticed by less democratic members of the global community who hadn’t received an invitation. Prominent among these

was the People’s Republic of China, which – not to be outdone – took the opportunity three days beforehand to release a white paper titled China: Democracy That Works. The 55-page State Council Information Office white paper extolling the virtues of China’s democracy was followed by a report the next day on the malaise of US democracy. “Democracy is a common value of humanity and an ideal that has always been cherished by the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people,” it stated. “Democracy is the right of the people in every country, rather than the prerogative of a few nations,” it noted. “Whether a country is democratic should be judged by its people, not dictated by a handful of outsiders. Whether a country is democratic should be acknowledged by the international community, not arbitrarily decided by a few self-appointed judges.” On the same day as the white paper’s release, China’s State Council reported on a telephone call between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Pakistani counterpart Shah Medmood Qureshi in which “Wang expounded on China’s position on the so-called ‘Summit for Democracy’.” “Many countries believe neither is the United States in a position to set tests and standards for others nor does

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it have the rights to ask others to only follow its way of democracy,” China’s top diplomat reportedly said, stressing that if democracy is to be discussed “it should be discussed on the platform of the United Nations in the spirit of mutual respect and on an equal footing.” Wangs comments highlight the fact that what democracy means in the US, or New Zealand, for instance, is not the same as what it means in China. Published in earlier this year by the Swedish Raoul Wallenberg Institute

of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, the Decoding China Dictionary is a resource that illustrates how key political words mean different things to Chinese and Western policy makers. It explains that in China, “democracy refers to the Marxist-Leninist system of democratic dictatorship and democratic centralism, in which the CCP is the ultimate representative of the peoples.” “This political system of ‘socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics’ is explicitly distinguished from Western liberal democracy, which is seen as

incompatible with China’s unique conditions. While citizens in China can vote for their local representatives, the CCP is constitutionally defined as the sole ruling party, preventing any transfer of power.” As the dictionary’s editors Malin Oud and Katja Drinhausen point out, Chinese officials are told to guard against constitutional democracy, universal values and civil society in their liberal sense, and that liberal or “Western” values are a threat to China’s unity and political stability.

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According to Oud and Drinhausen, China’s rise in a multipolar world means increasing competition over international values and standards. “The rules-based world order and multilateralism rely on a global consensus on what the norms underpinning the international system entail. When the meaning of terms like the rule of law, human rights, democracy and sovereignty become blurred, international norms are undermined.”

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Discourse Power While it might be easy – and indeed feel more comfortable – to put Beijing’s redefinition of democracy down to the self-serving actions of an undemocratic political regime, it would be analytically lazy – and detrimental – to do so. We only need consider the example of the term ‘communism’ to understand why this is the case. Today, communism is synonymous with China. Ask the person next to you to think of a (current) communist country, and in all likelihood their answer will be China.

This is despite communism’s beginnings as a Western political concept that was imported into China in the early 20th century. By the time the Chinese Communist Party established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, its brand of communism had become something quite different to what its European originators had envisaged. Fast-forward to today and the communist label China gives to its form of nationalistic authoritarian capitalism would no doubt cause Karl Marx to turn in his London grave.

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It’s an example that demonstrates the dynamism and contestability of political and ideological concepts such as democracy, communism, human rights, rule of law, governance, etc. These are concepts that defy singular definition – and over which scholars, law makers and diplomats perpetually wrangle. Back to democracy, it could be said after all that the democracy of classical Athens under Cleisthenes, bears little in common with 18th century British democracy, which, in turn, shares little with contemporary American democracy. Between and beyond these examples exist many other disparate flavours of democracy that would appear hardly recognisable to each other. Thus, on theoretical grounds alone it is reasonable for Beijing to question the notion that a US brand of democracy is more legitimate than any other. On practical grounds, the US and others have provided Beijing with much practical ammunition with which to discount the primacy of Western notions of democracy. The storming of the US Capitol earlier this

year by Trump supporters contesting the outcome of the 2020 election is an obvious example. The Beijing elite at the helm of a rising China are better placed than ever to influence international narratives around democracy and related concepts. They see this as achievable via the exercise of instruments of discourse (or discursive) power. According to Atlantic Council report Chinese Discourse Power: China’s Use of Information Manipulation in Regional and Global Competition, “discourse power is a country’s power to set agendas in the international arena by influencing the political order and realigning other countries’ ethics and values.” For China, discourse power is an effective strategy to achieve a more positive image internationally and to create an international environment more conducive to its national interests. The exercising of discourse power by a state falls within what is commonly described as the ‘grey zone’ – that area of the conf lict spectrum in which actions by a state to coerce or undermine another state are carried out in ways that fall short

of war. Neither kinetic nor decisive, information-based grey zone strategies are generally designed to work away slowly in the background according to a tempo not found on any military metronome. The report, published in December 2020, makes the point that Beijing’s discourse power efforts are closely linked to its geopolitical interests, including those relating to the South China Sea; Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet; and its projection of power further afield. “China’s “peaceful rise”, states the report, “will be proven successful when the superpower itself rewrites the rules and structure of international society, while at the same time the great powers adapt and adjust those rules to the new disposition.” While that possible eventuality may well be some distance over the horizon, grey zone activities such as the exercise of discourse power are – by principle – incrementalistic. China has not yet sold its definition of democracy to the world, but I would argue that 2021 marks the year that it started in earnest to achieve just that.

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Risk and Resilience New Zealand Summit Auckland will play host to the Risk & Resilience New Zealand Summit and Awards Gala Dinner over 30-31 March 2022 – two days of risk, resilience, and decision making in uncertain times.

Risk is ubiquitous, but how an organisation understands and defines the risks they face and develops systems to manage them, can be the difference between success and failure. Change and uncertainty have also become a constant feature of the modern world, and nothing has heightened our awareness of this more than the ongoing global battle with Covid-19. However, Covid is just one of the major features of the current dynamic risk environment. Others that will be preoccupying many businesses right now include the climate crisis, challenges in the global supply chain, and workforce issues hampering their ability to access the talent they desperately need. RiskNZ, New Zealand’s leading association for risk professionals is working in partnership with Brightstar, New Zealand’s premier conference company to bring you the Risk and Resilience New Zealand Summit. Organisations prosper and are more effective when risk is well managed, and this new event has been developed to support organisations to embed awareness of the most effective mechanisms to manage and mitigate risk. The event was also created to support the further development of the risk profession, analyse the changing role of the risk professional within modern organisations and define the value they deliver to business by allowing them to identify blind spots, recognise weaknesses, and put in place systems to mitigate them. Ultimately, risk management is about supporting decision making, rather than a specific set of processes that needs to be followed. Risk professionals know that it’s not about eliminating risk entirely, but about effectively analysing the impact of uncertainties on your business and supporting it to create frameworks to make judgements around the right risks to take. As well as analysing the current risk environment and exploring in detail some of the major risks identified above. The Summit maps the connection between strategy and risk, recognising that strategy drives risk and that the inability to execute their strategy is the often the biggest risk an organisation faces. Effective risk management allows a strategic approach to planning, which identifies external and internal risks to strategy and focuses governance and monitoring in

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these areas. A key goal of modern risk management is to ensure that risk responsibility and accountability is not just compartmentalised in the risk function. Enterprise risk management is about managing an interdependency of operational risks distributed across the organisation and that simply isn’t possible without embedding accountability and ownership of risk at all levels and achieving organisational risk literacy. The end goal being the creation of a risk aware and resilient culture. The challenges and disruptions of recent times have brought to the fore an appreciation of the resilient organisation – able to confront and weather highly disruptive events, adapt to new environments, and keep ahead of risk. But resilience is about more than just good crisis management and effective business continuity planning. It’s about trust, which must be earned and comes from a consistency of approach built on solid systems and processes, this is what allows a culture of resilience to develop. The Risk and Resilience New Zealand Summit provides a unique opportunity for business leaders and risk professionals to come together and explore these strategic risk themes and some of the operational risks they face in a series of masterclasses and workshops. We hope you will be able to join them.

HOMELAND SECURITY World #1: Jennie Vickers named Global Security Influencer of the Year

Jennie Vickers, CEO of Zeopard Consulting and former New Zealand Defence Industry Association CEO, dominates a stellar international field to claim IFSEC Global’s inaugural supreme influencer award. It was all revealed at the prestigious Security & Fire Excellence Awards in London on the evening of 23 November. After a final judging process in which the category winners of the IFSEC Global Influencers – who had already been judged the most influential in their fields – were again put through their paces, New Zealand’s own Jennie Vickers was announced as the inaugural Global Influencer of the Year! Grant Lecky, co-founder of the Security Partners Forum and Lead Judge for the awards, commented that this new award will play an important role within the international community of security professionals. “Security affects our lives and communities more deeply and expansively than ever, and recognising global influencers helps to emphasise this,” he said. “This new award will help further recognise influencers who have made exceptional contributions throughout the year – not just over a career – which can help identify current and future trends and opportunities.” Editor of IFSEC Global, James Moore, commented that the new award was a ‘Primus inter pares’ – ‘First among Equals’ – award for the IFSEC Global Influencers in Security and Fire. It is an historic win for Aotearoa, having already claimed six IFSEC Global Influencers in Security and Fire 2021 awards earlier in the year. Constituting a record number of kiwi winners were New Zealand Security Association CEO Gary Morrison, ASIS International NZ Chapter Chair Ngaire Kelaher, Massey University academic Dr John Battersby, Atlas Gentech Enterprise Security & Risk Manager Andrew Thorburn, Security Lit Managing Director Ankita Dhakar, and eventual influencer-in-chief Jennie Vickers. The awards process The Global Influencer of the Year was chosen between the winners of the five security categories (excluding the ‘One to Watch’ category) that comprise the annual IFSEC Global Influencers awards. Judging was undertaken by an independent group of judges following the publication of the full list of IFSEC Global Influencers earlier in the year.

The five categories the winner will be chosen from are: • Security executives (the senior most official in an enterprise, whose primary duties encompass leading and managing security for the enterprise) • Security – end users (e.g. heads of security, directors of security) • Security – manufacturers/vendors/installers/integrators (those displaying exemplary work in the field of installation or specific projects, as well as technological innovation) • Security – thought leadership (e.g. thought leaders, association figures, academics) • Cyber security professionals and thought leaders

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In order to collect the top gong, Jennie finished in front of a star field, which included Brian Tuskan, Chief Security Officer (Physical), Microsoft; Christina Alexander Alexandropoulou, Director of Security, Four Seasons – Astir Palace Hotel Athens; Loredana Mancini, Vice Chair, OWASP WIA Diversity and Inclusion; and Andrew Lanning, Cofounder, Integrated Security Technologies. According to IFSEC Global, Jennie’s energetic efforts from her work at the New Zealand Defence Industry Association in building a base and creating momentum across the industry to connect New Zealand businesses with a large base of international experts “has been an inspiration in the field.” About the winner Jennie, a New Zealand security sector luminary and regular contributor to Line of Defence Magazine, was already delighted to have made it to the #1 Spot in the ‘Association Figures/Academics/Thought Leaders’ category in the IFSEC Global Influencers in Security and Fire 2021, which were announced in July 2021. Her winning nomination had highlighted her achievements as the CEO of the New Zealand Defence Industry Association (NZDIA). Jennie describes her expertise as connecting people, building relationships, influencing, problem solving and supporting better business outcomes. For the last eight years she has been focused on the Defence sector in Australasia and championing open conversations between government and industry to support better procurement outcomes and supporting more SMEs to participate in government supply chains. Of particular mention by awards organisers was Jennie’s role in significantly increasing the NZDIA’s membership and

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its links across other industry sectors and internationally, and her pioneering of the use of made-for-purpose virtual event platforms. The latter enabled the NZDIA to quickly pivot during Covid-19 to virtual events, which was critical in ensuring that engagement among stakeholders within New Zealand’s national security supply chain continued without missing a beat. It also supported the successful launch of New Zealand Defence’s Information Domain via an ambitious multi-event virtual programme. Since leaving her role in the Association in May this year, Jennie has continued to support the industry in an unofficial capacity by connecting people and ideas. Along with qualifications to practice law in New Zealand, Australia and the UK, Jennie is a WorldCC Fellow, an expert in SRM, and CCMP qualified in CCM. A lifelong learner, she is currently studying Disruptive Technologies at TechFuturesLab, Digital Transformation with Media Design School, and Art Appreciation. She’s also adding to her cyber skills portfolio on a daily basis In her consultant role to Fortinet, Jennie is focusing on helping businesses and non-tech public sector employees in ANZ understand what security-driven networking looks like and supporting Fortinet’s global initiatives around closing the cybersecurity professionals gap. It’s been a year for the trophy cabinet for Jennie. Apart from her IFSEC Global accolades, she was also in December named co-winner of the 2021 Women in Security Awards Aotearoa ‘Thought Leader’ category. In November, she earned a spot in the Superdiversity Institute and the Ministry for Ethnic Communities ‘Top Diverse Board-Ready Directors List 2021’.

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A Brief glimpse at COVID through a National Security Lens Dr John Battersby argues that a myopic focus on the pandemic’s impact, as well the growing social and economic fault-lines it is opening up, will generate risks in an environment in which we are less able to mitigate them.

Dr John Battersby is a Teaching Fellow at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies (CDSS), Massey University, specialising in terrorism and counter terrorism. He is also Managing Editor of the CDSS-published National Security Journal.

Covid-19 has produced an environment not anticipated when news of the Covid pandemic broke. Driven by fear of the unknown, predictions were for economic downturn, unemployment, and property market decline. While some sectors have been devastated and national debt has risen dramatically, the doomsayers were mistaken….at least for now. The question of the impact of Covid on New Zealand’s national security is not one that is easily answered. It is not known how long the pandemic will last, how many times the virus will mutate and how effective vaccination and treatment will be in the long term. It could be a mistake to presume there will be a ‘back to normal endpoint’, but historically – entirely without vaccination or treatments, global pandemics have always eventually ended. The question remains, if an endpoint is inevitable, how far away is it? New ways of thinking about human security as a national security concept means Covid is clearly a major consideration. The maintenance of the health and well-being of New Zealanders, the accessibility of vaccination and treatment, the information/mis-information clash, and the need for health infrastructure – not just for Covid – are all factors in the human security of New Zealanders. Can our business communities outlast the disruptions of lockdowns, the traffic-light system, closed borders and interruptions in commodity supply chains? These are big economic security questions and satisfactory answers are elusive. Has the government’s

approach been dominated by an illusory imminent ‘back to normal endpoint’ based on a hope that the globe gets the virus under control in the not too distant future? The Omicron variant suggests this could be an illusion, with subsequent variants a possibility. In the meantime, national security considered in the traditional sense of existential threat to the state, and the state’s ability to mitigate it, is a worthwhile question to ponder. New Zealanders have for a long time now considered their geographical isolation as an insulator from threat, and in closing our borders against Covid we have banked on it. Domestically, New Zealand was not in the best of shape before the pandemic struck. Lulled by long periods of low inflation, low interest and high employment levels we thought our ship was on a steady course. We could see a housing crisis looming, but we seemed unwilling or unable to positively address it. A parliament wellendowed with multi-house owners was insufficiently motivated to resolve it, and social housing, a short-term remedy at best, has seen the proliferation of crime, drug and gang activity. Our cost of living, especially food and fuel, were high despite us producing vastly more food than we needed. Covid’s sudden appearance in 2020 did not cause any of this to occur, but it has exponentially compounded its negative impacts. Interest rates and inflation are on the move, the cost of living is up; our attempts to construct houses are frustrated by shortages of building materials, while millions of logs are piled at our ports for export.

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Many of our businesses are eating into their savings or borrowing heavily to survive, while others seem to be profiting from the prevailing circumstances. Property prices have put houses out of reach of the average New Zealander. The rich are getting richer faster, the poor are poorer and there are now more of them. All of this could be put down to griping about the economy and thus hardly unusual. However, from an historical and global perspective, it’s a denied, aggrieved or dispossessed middle class that has often presented the greatest risk to a country’s political stability. Additionally, Covid has opened up social fault lines between the mainstream acceptance of the vaccination strategy and a minority who oppose it, or who individually just don’t want it. Emulating protests overseas, those opposed to vaccination, or believing in individual choice, or who don’t like being told what to do, who dislike the ‘ute tax’ or who follow Brian Tamaki, or who have developed a pathological dislike of the Prime Minister, or are gang members taking the opportunity to give the middle finger to police, all have found that their paths intersect now.

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This creates a dilemma for intelligence analysts trying to interpret what this meeting of discontented minds in the streets, parks and in front of Parliament could all mean if it continues. In a worst-case scenario, Covid continues to mutate, governmentimposed restrictions continue medium to long term, and discontent ferments. Protests proliferate, but result in no softening of the government’s position. The decision by a few in the context of Vietnam War protests of the early 1970s was that protest wasn’t working so stronger measures were necessary. In 1970, politically motivated bombings averaged one a month in New Zealand aimed deliberately to change New Zealand foreign policy on the Vietnam War. This could be complicated by individuals who have lost their jobs, or have chosen to leave them, amid the clear housing crisis, and with costs of living increasing all the time. Personal perceptions of grievances and desperation could lead down the wellworn path toward lone-actor terrorism; the path is short, and the option to take it could be quick. It can safely be assumed individuals fitting this profile have already come to the attention

of police and intelligence services. Most will do no harm. As always, the challenge will be trying divine who will, before they do. New Zealand’s capacity to deal with domestic threats is possibly already compromised. The government’s previous border strategy, the need to staff MIQs, and the traffic light system’s spot checks, and the controversial Northland checkpoints’ – has seen an enormous additional workload onto police. The media use the term – extra police – but there is no such thing. The extra police have been withdrawn from other duties, leaving gaps elsewhere, and more gaps will be left if they have to move staff to deal with increasing disorder. To aid the demands of MIQs the New Zealand Defence Force has been called on to augment the personnel available. Unlike police who largely train their personnel for normal duties by constant exposure to daily risks, NZDF spend the vast bulk of their time training to maintain unusual skills that are only really needed in an emergency, such as major humanitarian disasters or a breakdown of constitutional authority, as has recently occurred in the Solomons. While military personnel are monitoring MIQs, these unusual skills are depleting and their ability to react

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to sudden and unusual circumstances depletes with it. Covid is almost certainly reducing New Zealand’s overall national security capacity, domestically and internationally. The longer Covid persists, the more likely a secondary risk will eventuate which will need to draw on that capacity – an earthquake, a volcanic eruption, a terrorist attack or an unforeseen event that has not occurred before. On the other hand, security professionals have a tendency for paranoia, and over-securitisation can create the very problems they seek to prevent by reacting to phantoms induced by what they fear. The protests so far have been overwhelmingly peaceful, and while the vast majority of New Zealanders do not subscribe to their views – this would not be unusual with protests generally. The complicating factor currently is that many of those opposed to vaccination, vaccination passports, or government restrictions under the

traffic light system emerge from across the political spectrum (or have no political views at all) and predetermined assumptions about them is likely to misconstrue their intent, or risk, or potential to be a national security threat. Covid-19 is a demonstration that New Zealand is not insulated from national security threats by virtue of our geographical location. The value of distance has fuelled our ability to endure the pandemic without the adversity that other countries have suffered. But the tyranny of distance is evident in the way it has caused us to look inward, the media and our political leaders risk becoming absorbed by our problems – we may not be looking at geostrategic shifts globally or regionally, or noticing the subtle moves by other powers, or non-powers (such as organised crime groups) to exploit the Covid distraction to increase their presence in our region. We have already been stung by an apparent neglect to anticipate

the implications of our Afghanistan withdrawal – so what will tension over Taiwan bring us? What are implications of AUKUS? What are the short and long term implications of Bougainville’s ongoing uncertainty and what about the instability in the Solomons? What about larger geo-strategic players inserting themselves into our region, or into Antarctica? The recently released 2021 Defence Assessment outlines an expected worsening threat environment in the Pacific. But have we borrowed too much money for COVID, leaving us unable to afford the measures needed to prevent outcomes we would rather avoid? New Zealand’s Covid distraction may not have dimmed our awareness of national security concerns beyond our borders, but our ability to project and plan for the future, and our ability to meet policing, military or aid demands that may well emerge in any of these areas in the near or intermediate term have all been compromised.

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Nominations open for the OSPAs, but closing soon! The Outstanding Security Performance Awards (OSPAs) have descended upon New Zealand. With 13 award categories up for grabs, the programme seeks to bring wider attention to excellence within the security sector.

The New Zealand OSPAs have arrived! An independent global awards scheme to recognise outstanding performance in the security sector, the awards are open to everyone. The OSPAs are designed to be both independent and inclusive, providing an opportunity for outstanding performers, whether buyers or suppliers, in-house or contractors, to be recognised and their success to be celebrated. The first OSPAs awards were held in Norway in 2015, and since then they’ve spread to 15 countries and are seen by many as the most prestigious accolade a company, team or individual in the security sector can be awarded. The OSPAs are based on extensive research on the key factors that contribute to and characterise outstanding performance. According to the 2014 Security Research Initiative report Aspiring to Excellence: The Case of Security Suppliers and Corporate Security, suppliers of security suppliers are accorded less status than other suppliers, and that they are generally “not expected to be excellent or to add value, as clients are not committed to buying the very best security.” “The security sector needs to find new ways of showcasing security excellence, of highlighting security practices that lead to outstanding performances and publicising them,” stated the report. The award scheme is run on strict ethical principles with core values being independence, credibility, transparency and respectability. Given their global

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dimension, the awards provide something of an international award benchmark for the sector. The judges are nominated by leading security associations and special interest groups to represent them – they all sign up to an ethics policy and agree to mark independently against set criteria and declare any conflict of interest on every mark sheet. For 2022, the awards are being offered in the following categories: • Outstanding In-House Security Manager/Director • Outstanding Contract Security Manager/Director • Outstanding Contract Security Company (Guarding) • Outstanding Security Consultant • Outstanding Security Installer/ Integrator • Outstanding New Security Product • Outstanding Security Partnership • Outstanding Investigator

• Outstanding Police/Law Enforcement Initiative • Outstanding Security Officer • Outstanding Female Security Professional • Outstanding Young Security Professional • Lifetime Achievement There is no charge to enter, and nominations must be submitted by 14th January 2022. Winners will be selected from a list of finalists and presented with their awards at a networking event to be held at the end of April in Auckland. The inaugural awards are supported by the New Zealand Security Sector Network, ASIS New Zealand Chapter, New Zealand Security Association (NZSA), Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies, and DEFSEC Media Limited – publishers of Line of Defence Magazine.

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Call for papers: National Security Journal ‘Security beyond Government’ On behalf of the Massey University-published National Security Journal, the New Zealand Security Sector Network calls for papers for an upcoming ‘National Security beyond Government’ special issue. The New Zealand Security Sector Network (NZSSN) is calling for papers for a ‘National Security beyond Government’ special issue of the National Security Journal (NSJ). Established in 2019 by Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies, the NSJ is Aotearoa’s leading security-focused scholarly journal. The special issue aims to elicit articles of 2,000 to 5,000 words in length from practitioners and scholars (academics and students) from within New Zealand’s security ecosystem. The Guest Editors are particularly interested in submissions from professionals working in the private security industry. Topic ideas potential authors may wish to consider include (but are not limited to): • Government procurement and supplier management in security and defence • Barriers to public-private partnership in national security • Public discourse and society narratives on security in New Zealand • Perspectives on government public consultation processes in national security • Public-private engagement in relation to Protecting Our Crowded Places from Attack: New Zealand’s Strategy • Private sector involvement in COVID-19 border security • Historical perspectives on New Zealand’s private security industry • Comparative research on private security regulation • Private sector development of the space sector The NSJ is focused broadly on national security. It invites academics and practitioners across the expanded national security working space to contribute their research, knowledge and experience. It is available to subscribers across the government, NGO, business and academic sectors and on request. It is intended that the ‘National Security beyond Government’ special issue will be published during 2022, with a submission deadline in May. Potential contributors should contact Managing Editor Dr John Battersby j.m.battersby@massey.ac.nz to discuss submission ideas.

National Security Journal New Zealand’s national security environment is hyperdynamic, involving constant changes in geo-political positioning, population movement, trade variations, information security, the impact of climate, food safety, biosecurity, and cyber security. The NSJ was established to provide a platform for the dissemination of high quality academic and professional research on national security topics relating to New Zealand and its regional environment; to foster a closer interaction between academic and professional communities; and to encourage various agencies and community groups to engage with each other in areas of mutual interest. New Zealand Security Sector Network The NZSSN is a community of industry and professional associations and academic research centres situated within or focused on Aotearoa New Zealand’s security and resilience sectors. Members of the community include (among others) the New Zealand Security Association, ASIS International New Zealand Chapter, and Massey University’s Centre for Defence and Security Studies. The NZSSN aims to (i) facilitate communication and collaboration across the sector; (ii) promote the sector within the broader community; and (iii) conduct/coordinate research into issues of relevance to the sector.

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30 - 31 March 2022 | Auckland

RISK & RESILIENCE NEW ZEALAND SUMMIT & AWARDS GALA DINNER

SUMMIT & MASTERCLASS SPEAKERS INCLUDE:

KEY SUMMIT THEMES: Assessing the current risk environment Decision making in uncertain times Developing the risk profession and the role of the risk professional

SIR PETER GLUCKMAN, University Distinguished Professor, Koi Tū; The Centre for Informed Futures and President, International Science Council

GRANT GILLINGHAM, GM - Group Risk Advisory, Fisher & Paykel Healthcare

Responsiveness to Māori - cultural risk in a bi-cultural Aotearoa Creating a risk culture and embedding organisation wide risk literacy The resilient organisation Mapping the connection between strategy and risk

FIONA CARRICK, General Manager Risk, Fonterra

HANS LÆSSØE, Founder, AKTUS

Risk, governance, and Boards

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Line of Defence Magazine - Summer (December) 2021

Articles inside

Call for papers: National Security Journal ‘Security beyond Government’

Is democracy declining or just being redefined?

Nominations open for the OSPAs, but closing soon!

World #1: Jennie Vickers named Global Security Influencer of the Year

A Brief glimpse at COVID through a National Security Lens

Defence Priorities and Principles released

Risk and Resilience New Zealand Summit

Serving and protecting with the next generation watercraft.

Sustained Presence: The Royal New Zealand Navy and the Grey Zone

Defence organisations concerned over inability to support disconnected operations

Does New Zealand spend enough on Defence?

Deeper Thinking Needed – AUKUS and Them

GA-ASI Completes European Maritime Demonstrations with MQ-9B SeaGuardian

Will 2022 be the Year New Zealand finally joins up the dots for our Veterans?

Modularity and the Shape of New Zealand’s Next Naval Fleet