Defence Capability Plan: Kicking the can down the road yet again?

Are the recent actions of the Chinese really the reason for the delay, or do the politics of the Coalition have a part to play? asks editor-at-large Dr Peter Greener.

Speaking to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee on 3 December during Scrutiny Week, Minister of Defence Judith Collins announced that China’s recent military activity had once again led to a delay in the publication of the Government’s Defence Capability Plan.

Thomas Manch of The Post reported that the latest explanation for the delay in the plan, which had originally been expected in mid2024, was a further “deterioration” in the security situation. The Minister added, “Everything’s been changing this year and, as you will know, we are living in a more difficult, strategic environment.”

Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, Minister Collins went on to comment that there had been concern about the visit of Chinese warships to Vanuatu in October, and that this had followed the testing of a Chinese ICBM in the South Pacific in September – the first launch in four decades. Manch highlighted that Collins then added, “People need to understand that if it can go to Kiribati, it can get to New Zealand.”

Perhaps not surprisingly, there was an immediate response from academic commentators to the delay.

Dr Jim Rolfe , Senior Fellow at the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, responded on LinkedIn saying “It’s just nonsense to assert that China’s 2024 military activity in the region is such a surprise that long-term plans need to be rethought. China has been militarily active for years. We just haven’t cared.”

Dr Reuben Steff, Senior Lecturer at the University of Waikato, agreed. “This makes little to no sense. We are kicking the can down the road again (and by again, I mean again, again, again) because of China’s escalatory actions in our region? So, are we thinking by delaying the DCP that things will get better for us? Given the speed of China’s military buildup and naval projection, isn’t it the case that time is of the essence and we need to start rejuvenating the NZDF now?”

Delay flagged previously However, a month before the beginnings of the Chinese activity noted by Judith Collins and almost four months prior to the Minister’s announcement, Prime Minister Christopher Luxon gave a foreign policy address at the Lowy Institute in Sydney on 15 August 2024 .

Whilst the speech focussed on the Australia-New Zealand relationship and strengthening interoperability with Australia, the Otago Daily Times added that ,“Mr Luxon also suggested the defence capability plan may surface later than expected” and, presaging Judith Collins’ announcement, added “Mr Luxon told the Lowy Institute ‘we expect that to be completed towards the end of this year, maybe early next year’.”

Three days after speaking to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, Judith Collins was in Auckland also discussing strengthening interoperability with Australia at the second ANZMIN meeting, attended also by Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles, Foreign Minister Winston Peters and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong.

Here New Zealand and Australia struck a new agreement to further integrate defence forces across military procurement, planning, and operations. Thomas Manch, reporting for Stuff , indicated that Judith Collins said she had decided with Marles earlier this year that “we should have something like an Anzac force”.

At the meeting Penny Wong said Peters had described the importance of being a “participant and not a spectator”.

Providing adequate capability

There are two issues to contend with here. Firstly is the issue of providing relevant, adequate capability. In the Winter issue of Line of Defence in 2023, former Defence Minister Wayne Mapp emphasised the following:

“Security relationships require a certain level of commitment, if they are to be taken seriously. Not slavishly, as New Zealand’s stand on Iraq showed, but at a sufficient level to be seen to be making a useful contribution .

“… the contribution to security partnerships has to be more than token, it must add something of real value.”

And here lie the dilemmas facing the current government. In my article in the Spring 2023 issue of Line of Defence , I made the point that prior to the election the National Party had made clear in their defence policy that they supported the then current defence procurement plan, and would ensure regular reviews (author’s emphasis).

The National-led coalition came into government with all of the parties having indicated a wish to support Defence and increase the funding commitment. In the event , we have seen a wholesale slashing of funding

Sam Sachdeva writing for Newsroom on 4 December noted that he had been told by a senior defence official that “New Zealand governments must stop “robbing Peter to pay Paul’” and no longer unduly delay making decisions on expensive capability acquisitions.”

A main topic for discussion at the meeting was the financial strain facing the NZDF, “with RNZ reporting the military had told staff it needed to find $360 million in operational savings for the next financial year.”

Nevertheless, the Chief of Defence Force, Air Marshal Tony Davies was able to say,

“We have not failed to deploy or do an operation that we’ve been asked to do – the issue really is it takes us longer to prepare to do those missions … and we might not be able to send the same number of people that we have previously sent.”

Interoperability or independence

Here is the link to the second issue, that of New Zealand’s foreign and defence policy. Strengthening interoperability with Australia has already been highlighted, and I have previously focussed on this in my article, New Zealand Defence Policy and Capability – A Rejoinder, published as a Line of Defence update on 2 August 2023. Interoperability is something of immense value.

However, so is the value of “a uniquely New Zealand relationship with the world” as was highlighted in the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 (p.7).

Also in the Statement is this provision, on page 9:

“Defence will act early and deliberately to shape our security environment, focusing in particular on supporting security in and for the Pacific.”

The development of an Anzac Force may have a number of advantages, but the ability to deploy an independent New Zealand force has many others.

There is a danger that focussing on the development of an Anzac Force might dilute the unique contribution Kiwi forces can offer in the Pacific. This was brought home to me forcefully some time ago, when I was researching for a book chapter on Kiwis on deployment, ‘New Zealand Military as Peacekeepers: International Perceptions .’

One of my field trips was to Timor-Leste, and comments from one participant, President José Ramos-Horta, are I think particularly worth noting:

“In 2006 when I wanted (rebel leader) Alfredo to surrender, he said he would only surrender to Kiwi troops – he trusted them. Even the rebel soldier trusted them. New Zealand is perceived as not taking sides, being neutral, being fair. Over all of these years I’ve never had a single complaint from the people, the police or the army about Kiwi troops.”

Ill supported to respond

Speaking at the Select Committee meeting, Secretary of Defence Brook Barrington highlighted that interoperability with the Australian Defence Force was important, but also acknowledged that “we still have our own interests and we need to pursue those”.

However, as noted earlier, Chief of Defence Air Marshal Tony Davies said, “… we might not be able to send the same number of people that we have previously sent.”

The implications of this statement are many. CDF observed that, “at some point we need to be prepared to make decisions which could see our sailors, our soldiers and aviators going into harm’s way, to protect our interests. That worries me”.

The DPSS is clear (p.22) that “New Zealand’s security requires that Pacific Island countries are secure, sovereign, and resilient, and that Pacific security challenges are met in ways that support our shared interests in Pacific regional security.”

Should New Zealand in the near future be called upon to respond to a situation similar to East Timor, the New Zealand Defence Force would do its best to respond, but at the moment it seems singularly illsupported to do so.

Addressing this further delay to the DCP, Judith Collins was reported by Thomas Manch as saying that the new defence secretary and chief of defence needed to be happy with the capability plan. Are there potentially significant changes to what has previously been well signalled? Are there some new, more advanced capabilities under consideration? Hardly likely when the necessary shopping list is already so long.

Are the recent actions of the Chinese really the reason for the delay? Or do the politics of the coalition have a part to play? (The non-announcement of the new ferries on Wednesday 11 December 2024 may be an indicator of how tough coalition decision-making can be).

We may never know the reason but my colleagues Jim Rolfe and Reuben Steff are absolutely correct; absent other evidence, the delay in the release of the DCP makes no sense. And the can is being kicked down the road yet again.