A. Discovery and safe reporting

when integrating DVI operations into multidiscipline emergency so that confusion can be minimised and common objectives can be pursued.’63

A. Discovery and safe reporting

When there are reasonable grounds to presume enforced disappearances have occurred, then under international human rights law, this should trigger an investigation. But mass grave sites can remain hidden for a multitude of reasons. • Those responsible for its creation may have reasons to keep it secret, for protection purposes of the site itself or for fear of detection where the creation of the mass grave was illegal or was designed to conceal gross human rights violations. 64 • Similarly, survivors who may know about the mass graves may wish to keep the site secret for fear of reprisals, for lack of safe ability to alert the authorities or for lack of trust in the authorities. They may also not wish to report an individual as potentially dead. • Finally, authorities may wish to keep a site secret. This can be for legitimate security concerns and safeguarding of the site and potential survivors or it can be as a means to protect State interests or authorities that might lack the independence to investigate fully. • This refers back to the importance of having authoritative and legitimate institutions there to receive notification of mass graves, as spelled out in the

Protocol. Authorities that are also capable of keeping those who are reporting safe! Often it is the so-called first responders who know about a site before protective measures are put in place. Some States, such as Iraq, place a reporting duty on individuals. Crucially, ‘First responders should first and foremost know what not to do’65 and there was discussion at the first roundtable event of the need to deter inexpert exhumation, and instead to steer first responders towards the collection of relevant data, circumstantial evidence and information surrounding the mass grave and the identification of witnesses. It is important to refrain from invasive documentation as this may have adverse effects on the site and the evidence contained therein. The importance of reporting, even if then kept secret on behalf of the authorities, remains crucial. Technologies employed for the recording are best described by the overarching term geomatics, concerned with the collection, storage, analysis, processing and also presentation of geographic data. Specifically named are GPS and MGRS systems, but the importance of aerial imagery and LIDAR have also been well documented, as well as other noninvasive technologies.66 But technologies progress and present-day applications may not be future proof, therefore the Protocol refrains from mentioning any specifically. However, applications such as the eyewitness app were recognised as useful tools by practitioners for storing and transmitting verifiable photos and videos through a three step system: (1) allowing photos and videos to be embedded with metadata to ensure evidence authenticity; (2) transmission and storage of the recorded material via the app to safeguard the chain of custody; and (3) the application facilitates the cataloguing of the recorded material to assist further investigations.67 The increasingly utilised field of digital evidence gathering was acknowledged as important but also immensely challenging due to the sheer volume of information.68 Principles and guidelines for the good provenance and governance of such documentation efforts are starting to emerge with recommendations including ‘Do No Harm’ or ‘Do Good Science’ principles proffered.69 The point here is to report as accurate information as possible, for unreliable information, damage and disruption will create difficulties for subsequent processes.70

63Interpol (2018) supra note 23 at 9. 64Fear of detection of mass graves is what is believed to have caused the many secondary and tertiary mass graves that exist in and around the

Srebrenica events. In an attempt to hide the crimes, primary graves were dug up again and the human remains transported to different (secondary) graves resulting in commingled human remains. 65Global Rights Compliance (2016) supra note at 61. 66Blau, S. et al. ‘Exploring non-invasive approaches to assist in the detection of clandestine human burials: developing a way forward’, (2018) 3(2) Forensic

Science Research 304. See also Hanson, I., ‘Mass grave investigation and identifying missing persons: Challenges and innovations in archaeology and anthropology in the context of mass death environments’ in Morewitz, S. and Sturdy Colls, C. (eds.) Handbook of Missing Persons (Springer 2016) 491. 67EyeWitness (2021), ‘Welcome to eyeWitness’: www.eyewitness.global/welcome. 68A growing body of literature on Digital Evidence and documentation examines technological advances for human rights and criminal applications including the handling and use of such information: Dubberley, S., Koenig A. and Murray D. (eds), Digital Witness (Oxford University Press 2020); Van

Schaack, B., ‘Innovations in International Criminal Law Documentation, Methodologies and Institutions’ (2019 online); and Freeman L., ‘Digital Evidence and War Crimes Prosecutions: The Impact of Digital Technologies on International Investigations and Trials’ (2018) 41(2) Fordham International Law

Journal 283. 69Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Location-Based Data in Crisis Situations. Principles and Guidelines (March 2019) available at www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/2019-04/VGI%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines_FINAL%20%28002%29.pdf. The Berkeley Protocol on Digital

Open Source Investigations provides a practical guide on the handling and use of such information (UNOCHR/Human Rights Center (2020) available at www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/OHCHR_BerkeleyProtocol.pdf). 70Interpol (2018) supra note 23 at 9.