The Bowdoin Globalist – Issue 9 December 2014

Canada’s Maple Syrup Cartels – The Case For Divestment – Corruption In Mexico – ISIS, Turkey, and the Kurds – Hungarian Democracy – Inside Syria’s Jihad – Dr. Joseph Tulchin – The Fight Against Ebola – Ebola’s Lasting Scars – Tragedy and Corruption in Korea – Detroit’s Water Crisis – Brazil’s Olympic Folly – Shifts in Luxury Fashion – Lone Wolf Terrorism Volume IV, Issue 2, December 2014

The End of OPEC

1

2

Contents Volume IV, Issue 2, December 2014

Cartels: Canada Style

by Spencer Wuest

5 22

Diagnosing Culture Before Treating Disease: Challenges in Fighting Ebola in West Africa

by Hailey Blain

Divestment: Efficacy and Impact

by Haleigh Collins

6 23

Ebola Today. Ebola Tomorrow.

by Skylen C. Monaco

Mass Graves in Iguala: Why Corruption is Mexico’s Biggest Problem

by Sara Baronsky

7 24

The Politics of Disaster

by Michaelle Yeo

The One Thing ISIS is Good For: Answering 100-Year-Old Questions

by Camille Wasinger

8 26

Detroit’s Water Crisis

by Serena Taj

Democracy Slowly Slips Away in Hungary

by Dylan Devenyi

10 28

The Nearing Cliff

by Chase Savage

Syria Uncut

by Drew van Kuiken

14 29

From Street to Boutique

by Maeve Morse

An Interview with Dr. Joseph Tulchin

by Hannah Sherman

16 30

Addressing the Realities of Self-Radicalized Terrorism

by Derek Kang

The End of OPEC

by Griff Brewer

18 3

Letter from the Editors The Bowdoin Globalist Editors In Chief Kate Herman Mark Pizzi Nick Tonckens Associate Editors Camille Wasinger Dylan Devenyi Layout Kate Berkley Mark Pizzi Photography Editor Hannah Rafkin Staff Writers Sara Baronsky Hailey Blain Griff Brewer Haleigh Collins Liam Gunn Adam Hunt Derek Kang Skylen C. Monaco Maeve Morse Chase Savage Hannah Sherman Serena Taj Drew van Kuiken Spencer Wuest Michaelle Yeo

Dear Reader, As we follow the troubling events in Ferguson and New York, the Globalist editorial staff would like to reiterate its core belief about the search for truth: that real understanding requires us to constantly reexamine our own assumptions. As journalists, we believe not only in the value of an informed public, but of a public that consciously seeks out conflicting perspectives before reaching conclusions.

We are not the first to note that the proliferation of digital media has unexpectedly polarized political and social debate in this country. As Google filters our news sources by personal preference, and our Facebook feeds reinforce the views of our particular segments of society, we find it increasingly difficult to agree on the most basic premises - including what it means to be “informed.� Such an environment is hostile to the honest pursuit of truth. We must work harder than ever before to seek out arguments and narratives that challenge, confound, and provoke us. And yet that task has never been more necessary.

As we have said before, the Globalist does not maintain a single editorial line.

We have no particular agenda, and therefore do not select articles according to any ideological metric. Rather, we encourage our writers to pursue the stories that captivate them, and let the facts carry their arguments in whatever direction they see fit. So long as this produces a well-reasoned argument built upon a solid base of knowledge, we welcome any resulting opinions, whether or not we agree.

We hope that the perspectives within this issue challenge your own. Whether or not our writers convince you of anything, we expect that they may teach you something. Take it from us; we are always learning from them.

Sincerely, Kate, Mark, and Nick Editors in Chief

4

maple syrup are stacked six high in rows hundreds deep. When full, each barrel weighs over 600 pounds. With grade A syrup selling wholesale at about $32 per gallon, each barrel is worth nearly $2,000, approximately 13 times the price of crude oil. In total, the warehouse can hold about 16,000 barrels, equivalent to about one-tenth of Québec’s annual production.

In July 2012, sixty percent of the stock, or 6 million pounds of syrup worth about $18 million wholesale, suddenly vanished in the Great Canadian Maple Syrup Heist. The bold and baffling heist counts as one of the largest agricultural thefts ever accomplished. Siphoning off and transporting so much syrup was no mean feat. The thieves clearly were major players who knew the business well.

Lieutenant Guy Lapointe of the Sûreté du Québec, the police force that led the investigation, said that the thieves rented another portion of the warehouse for an unrelated business. This strategy enabled them to drive large trucks into the building without raising questions. “They were basically inside guys,” Lt. Lapointe said in an interview with the New York Times, “The leader wasn’t with the federation, but he had access to the warehouse that would not attract any suspicion.”

Like many other thieves, the maple syrup gang faced the problem of unloading a large quantity of a hot commodity that is not easily sold. But unlike most thieves, Lt. Lapointe said, they found a way to get full price on the open market. The thieves set themselves up as legitimate maple syrup dealers in neighboring New Brunswick, a Canadian province with an open, if much smaller, maple syrup industry. From there, they shipped the stolen syrup to buyers in that province as well as in Ontario, Vermont, and New Hampshire. Investigators believe that the buyers were unaware of the syrup’s illicit origins.

The theft cut the strategic reserve substantially but is not expected to put the global supply of maple syrup at risk. However, it poses a threat by allowing the thieves to undercut legitimate producers. The FPAQ represents about 10,000 maple syrup producers in Quebec. The legitimate companies that are working in this industry have to compete with a supplier that did not pay the normal market rate for its maple syrup.

Although the stolen syrup was insured, many of the federation’s 7,400 members were not happy that it 6 million pounds of syrup were allowed to disappear. Despite the displeasure of members, however, Pascal Thériault, professor of agriculture at McGill University in Montreal, said in an interview in Time that the future of the federation was secure. For most producers, maple syrup is either a hobby, a second career, or a source of retirement income, but the investment required and revenue generated are not trivial. Many maple syrup producers would not be where they are today without the help of the FPAQ, which literally took the industry out of the backwoods. While the closed market system restricts the ability of large, commercial syrup producers to expand, the federation’s voting structure means that it is dominated by part-time producers, many of whom are also dairy farmers. They have no interest, Mr. Thériault said, in returning to an open market.

And so the Canadian maple syrup cartel remains; the reserve took a hit from the heist, but the goods from the North won’t stop flowing anytime soon. n

Cartels, Canada Style Spencer Wuest

For Americans, the word “cartel” normally conjures unpleasant images, such as OPEC ministers manipulating the price of petroleum, or drug lords executing rivals. The words “global strategic reserve” make us nervous, too, and the combination of “cartels” and “global strategic reserve” in the same paragraph is likely to send us running for cover. The alarming truth is that a cartel has come to Canada, our normally benign northern neighbor.

Fortunately, it is a Canadian-style cartel: the commodity involved is maple syrup, and much of it is held in something called the global strategic maple syrup reserve.

With the lion’s share of the maple syrup market, Québec is the Saudi Arabia of the sweet, sticky stuff, and the Fédération des producteurs acéricoles du Québec (FPAQ) is its OPEC. Their goal? To keep prices relatively stable. FPAQ is a private organization created to unite maple syrup producers across Québec and support their interests. FPAQ regulates the production and marketing of maple syrup and focuses on organizing an effective sales process inside and outside the province. Basically, FPAQ is a legal cartel—Canadian style.

The supply management system of FPAQ sets strict quotas for producers and requires them to sell syrup through the federation. To maintain stable high prices, the federation stockpiles every drop of syrup its members produce beyond their quota. In lean years, the federation dips into the reserve.

Since 1989, FPAQ has succeeded in modulating the supply to keep prices stable, setting aside maple syrup in good years and releasing it in bad ones. Relatively little maple syrup was produced from 2005 through 2008, largely because of inclement weather. But from 2009 through 2012, the syrup flowed fast and sweet, filling warehouses with reserves. This promised to benefit consumers, but an unexpected event intervened: The Great Canadian Maple Syrup Heist.

FPAQ maintains a strategic reserve of maple syrup, officially known as the International Strategic Reserve (ISR). It is located in warehouses in a number of rural Québec towns. The first two such facilities were built in Saint-Antoine-de-Tilly (which holds 14 million pounds) and Plessisville (which holds 3 million pounds). In 2011, when the production of maple syrup was exceptionally high, FPAQ expanded the ISR to a third warehouse in Saint-Louis-de-Blandford, which holds 10 million pounds of syrup. In total, the warehouses contain enough maple syrup to bury almost 10 football fields in a foot-thick layer of stickiness.

Inside the warehouse in Saint-Louis-de-Blandford, baby-blue barrels of

5

Divestment: Efficacy and Impact Haleigh Collins The fossil fuel divestment movement emerged at Swarthmore College in 2012. In three short years, divestment has evolved from a small campaign among student activists into a mainstream movement with commitments from universities to churches to the $860 million Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Currently, over $50 billion has been divested from fossil fuels. The movement urges organizations, universities, and local governments to sell their stocks or bonds that are invested in the fossil fuel industry, with the overarching aim of stigmatizing fossil fuel companies’ disregard for the environment, and holding them responsible for their harmful effects on society. The fossil fuel divestment movement did not emerge because it is the most efficient way of stopping climate change. Rather, it was born because many have lost hope that world governments will succeed in implementing a more directly effective top-down climate change regulation. Divestment is financially wise and moral. While it may not be the quickest way to decrease greenhouse gases, if it becomes as widespread as it aims to be, it has the potential to break through the current political gridlock surrounding climate change.

The current and forthcoming climate crisis has been politicized despite the fact that the scientific community has formed a consensus about the immediacy of the threat since 1985. Climate change policy has been characterized by stagnation and partisanship in Congress and attempts to fund environmental programs are frequently tabled for national security issues. Ironically, the US military has considered climate change a national security threat for years, and has been working to reduce its massive carbon footprint by using alternative fuels. In its 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Roadmap released in October, the Pentagon declared, “Climate change will affect the Department of Defense’s ability to defend the nation and poses immediate risks to U.S. national security.” Similarly, according to a report by the United Nations, failure to reduce emissions threatens society with food shortages, refugee crises, flooding of major cities and entire island nations, and a climate so drastically altered it might become dangerous for people to work or play outside during the hottest times of the year. All of these crises have the potential to cause violent conflict. Despite the fact that even the Pentagon deems climate change a pressing threat to national security, Congress has been unable to pass any effective legislation that would prevent these catastrophes.

Supporters of divestment agree that the movement will be largely ineffective in a financial sense; that is, fossil fuel companies have such large profit margins that divestment is unlikely to have a dramatic impact on their pocketbooks. Rather, the divestment movement aims to make a moral statement and stigmatize making money off of the destruction of our planet. The divestment movement aims to shape public discourse by condemning the fossil fuel industry and reigniting public debate on climate change and energy security. Supporters often make comparisons to the successful South African divestment movement of the 1980’s and the tobacco divestment movement of the 1990’s. In the 1980’s, students around the United States protested South African Apartheid by urging their institutions to divest from companies with ties to the South African regime. Many feel that the boycott had a significant impact on the South African government, and pressured it to dismantle the apartheid system by building awareness about the immorality of apartheid. In the 1990’s,

universities such as Harvard and CUNY divested from the tobacco industry in order to build awareness about the dangers of smoking and hold the industry accountable for educating users about the risks. While divestment aims to denounce fossil fuels, it also is unlikely to cause organizations that choose to divest to lose money. In the past years, fossil fuel stocks have performed slightly lower than the market average.

Between 1988 and 2013 in the United States, the annual returns were 10.68% for carbon free stocks and 10.63% for the average stock index that included fossil fuel industries.

Much of the logic behind divestment is grounded in in the fact that world governments have agreed not to burn all of the known reserves that the fossil fuel industry possesses. In 2009, world leaders met at Copenhagen and agreed to limit the emission of greenhouse gases to levels necessary to prevent the earth’s temperature from rising more than 2° Celsius. Currently, the fossil fuel industry has five times as much carbon in their reserves than will allow us to stay within the 2°C limit. Fossil fuel companies are also spending as much as a $1 trillion per year on capital expenditures, most of which goes towards further fossil fuel exploration and the development of new reserves. The predicted revenue from carbon stocks and bonds takes into account the expected revenue from burning these reserves, of which the world governments aim to burn no more than 20%. The industry’s plan for expansion and the governments’ plans for greenhouse gas reductions are completely incompatible. In response to this obvious contradiction, shareholders forced ExxonMobil to comment on how impending climate regulations might impact their profitability. The company responded by saying world climate policies are “highly unlikely” to actually prevent them from continuing to produce and sell fossil fuels.

That is, fossil fuel industry representatives doubt that the market for fossil fuels will shrink in the next twenty years.

In the past three years, 181 institutions and local governments and 656 individuals representing over $50 billion in assets have pledged to divest from fossil fuels. Colleges and universities such as Hampshire College, Stanford University, College of the Atlantic, and Pitzer College have divested from specific groups of fossil fuel companies. For example, Stanford chose to divest only from coal, which is the most environmentally harmful fossil fuel and is currently losing value in the stock market. By divesting, one is betting that we will succeed in not surpassing the 2°C limit, and therefore that the price of fossil fuel stocks will plummet in the future. Profiting from a harmful industry that is exempt from proper regulations is immoral. While it may not be the most direct, effective method to fight climate change, fossil fuel divestment has the potential to play a pivotal role in holding the fossil fuel industry accountable for the damage it wreaks on society and our planet. n

6

Mass Graves in Iguala: Why Corruption is Mexico’s Biggest Problem Sara Baronsky

know, however, that both the government and citizens were aware of the underlying problems and the extent to which the Guerreros Unidos were in control. In an interview with the Huffington Post, Alejandro Encinas, a senator from the mayor’s Democratic Revolution Party, said of the Mayor and his wife, “Everyone knew about their presumed connections to organized crime…. Nobody did anything, not the federal government, not the state government, not the party leadership.”

The Guerreros Unidos attack on the students could have been a response to the students’ refusal to pay the cartel or it could have been out of fear that the protests would disturb Pineda’s speech. Regardless, the massacre was not a proportionate response. Clashes between the teachers college and the local government have been occuring for years, but the involvement of the Guerreros Unidos has added another unpredictable element to the tension. The college is one of very few groups willing to stand up to drug cartel violence, and it tends to use aggressive methods of protest, such as hijacking buses, throwing rocks at police and stopping traffic along major roads to elicit donations. The group already operates under the assumption that the government will not do its job honestly and officials will always act selfishly. Following last month’s tragedy, government will only become more synonymous with corruption within the small indigenous communities whose youths make up the college’s student body.

As more details of the mass kidnappings bubble to the surface, it becomes more and more evident that parts of Mexico operate under the heavy political influence of drug cartels. A narco-state can certainly function in many day-to-day ways no differently than an ordinary government would, and as long as citizens tolerate the occasional beatings and tortures, ignoring drug cartels is the path of least resistance. But a government machine, controlled at the lowest level by drug cartels, means more than just corruption; it means that that anyone at any point is unsafe, and no one is accountable. It also means that though Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto can make reforms to combat drug trafficking, his efforts will not be visible at the level of the ordinary citizen. The conflation of drug cartels with government leaves deep scars on the attitude of citizens towards the state. Citizens become afraid to report crimes and apathetic to violence. And as corruption lingers, it has become, and will continue to be, a lasting expectation. n

On September 26th, a group of idealistic students from the leftist Raúl Isidro Burgos Rural Teachers College of Ayotzinapa, Mexico, traveled to Iguala to protest discriminatory hiring practices. The group had commandeered buses and blocked a road, so they expected a police reaction, possibly beatings or detention. They did not expect an all-out assault from municipal police officers and unidentified gunmen shooting imprecisely and indiscriminately. Though eyewitness accounts of details vary, in total six were killed and 43 more went missing.

Before their deaths, the students were turned over to a local drug cartel and gang with strong ties to Iguala’s government known as the Guerreros Unidos. About a week later on October 5th , investigators found a mass grave with 28 bodies, but upon consulting further forensic tests authorities could not match the bodies found with those of the student protesters.

According to state police, the bodies, charred beyond recognition, were burned alive. It was at this point that Mayor José Luis Abarca Velázquez and his wife María de los Ángeles Pineda Villa—accused of direct participation in the two mass murders— fled, only to be arrested in Mexico City a month later. Later, on November 7th, Mexico’s attorney general announced that three Geurreros Unidos suspects had confessed to burning the bodies of the students and dumping their ashes in a river. Meanwhile, the number of people implicated in the tragedy has continued to grow; 50 suspects and more than 20 police officers have now been arrested.

Shockingly, there is little unique about this tragedy. The method of killing and the lack of government action taken has become routine in the ongoing Mexican drug war; in December 2011, authorities did nothing about the killing of two Ayotzinapa students and the torture of 20 more, and in May of 2013, three social leaders were abducted and murdered.

Although the municipal president of Iguala was likely involved, federal authorities never intervened. The entire chain of events has lead to violent protests all over Mexico, especially in Mexico City, Guerrero state, and Iguala. The off-the-cuff phrase that Attorney General Jesús Murillo Karam spat out at the crowd following an unproductive press conference, “Ya me Canse” (meaning “Enough, I’m tired,”) has become the rallying cry of outraged citizens who are sick of drug cartel money and personnel illicitly infiltrating government.

More horrific details of the past month will likely surface, but it’s possible that we will never know all the details of what happened. We do

7

The One Thing ISIS is Good For: Answering 100-Year-Old Questions Camille Wasinger If made into a blockbuster drama, the history of the Kurds in Turkey would make a killing at the box office. It is a tale of betrayal and bloodshed, repression and revolution. Turkish Kurds have experienced a turbulent past of subjugation, violence, economic assistance, violence, peace talks, and more violence. Turkey’s uncertainty about how to manage its headstrong Kurdish population has plagued the state since its inception, coming to be infamously known as the “Kurdish Question.” Now, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) menaces Turkey’s southern border from predominantly Kurdish areas of northern Syria. Having forced nearly 200,000 Syrian-Kurdish refugees to flee into Turkey and enraged Turkish Kurds at what they perceive as an inadequate response from their government, the threat of ISIS has added an unprecedented twist to the Turkey-Kurd dynamic: Turkey and the Kurds now face a common enemy and, consequently, the century-old “Kurdish Question” is receiving novel attention from the international community.

Thus far, these sudden developments have had mixed impacts on the Turkish-Kurdish relationship—in some ways serving to further alienate the two groups and highlight the mistrust and difference between them; in others, engendering collaboration and creating human connection on the most basic level. Although ISIS’s threat to Kobani and Turkey’s paltry response has reinvigorated Kurdish resistance within Turkey, the international spotlight now cast upon the Turkish-Kurdish relationship must ultimately force Turkey to turn the tides towards reconciliation with the Kurds. If not, the Middle East’s only secular democracy risks both losing the friendship of the West and sacrificing what little progress has been made in the last five years towards peace with their rebellious Kurds.

Promised their own independent state in the Treaty of Sevres, the Kurds found themselves betrayed as the post-WWI status quo split Kurdishmajority territory among northern Syria, Iraq, and southeastern Turkey.

Within the borders of the infant, nationalistic Turkish state, the Kurds were severely repressed as Turkey tried to homogenize its population.

Forbidden to speak their own language and deprived of full citizenship rights, the Kurds’ tragic plight turned violent. In the 1980s the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) emerged, using guerilla tactics to fight against the Turkish government for an independent Kurdistan, and causing Turkey, the US, and the EU to label the PKK a terrorist organization. Years of

small-scale civil war ensued in Turkey’s southeast, claiming more than 50,000 lives and damaging both Turkey’s economy and the country’s EU aspirations. After PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured and jailed in 1999, the 21st century was heralded as a more conciliatory era. Though outbursts of violence were not uncommon in the early 2000s, there was more widespread recognition of the necessity for mutual cultural understanding and respect. In need of the Kurdish voter base to win the presidency in 2014, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan engaged in peace talks with the jailed PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in early 2013.

Leading up to the Kobani crisis, the peace talks were promising—with Erdoğan assuring constitutional reform and advocating for more freedom of Kurdish cultural expression in return for a retreat of PKK forces out of southeast Turkey into their strongholds in Kurdish northern Iraq.

Despite this progress, Turkey’s approach to the Kobani crisis better reflects old views and fears of the Kurds as a potential weakness of, and security threat to, the Turkish state than the more recent rhetoric of reconciliation. Turkey has refused to send its own troops into Syria to defend Kobani and, despite the close kinship ties between the Syrian Kurds of Kobani and the Turkish Kurds of villages just inside the Turkish border, is continuing to prevent civilian Turkish and Syrian Kurds and sympathizers from crossing to join the fight against ISIS. The Turks were also remarkably slow to sign on to a US-led coalition to fight against ISIS and only very recently began permitting US attacks against ISIS to come from bases inside Turkey.

Turkey’s reluctance to take a more hardline stance towards ISIS stems largely from a fear that outside help, or Turkey’s own support for the Kurds

8

standing on the same side of the battlefield with the PKK in any respect, goes against deeply ingrained Turkish instinct.

However, facing both internal and external pressure, Turkey will ultimately have to put its balancing act to an end and throw its full weight behind the Kurds in Kobani. The international stakes are simply too high.

While Turkey’s reluctance to fight alongside the Kurds, combined with concern for its internal Sunni popultion, may have kept Turkey’s reaction towards the terrorist group fairly subdued so far, ISIS is far too demonized by the international community at large for Turkey to continue to get away with such a neutral stance. Whispers of Turkey’s expulsion have already begun to reverberate throughout the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Turkey’s continued lack of commitment to the fight against ISIS also puts in peril its precious alliance with the United States and threatens its bid to the EU. Within Turkey’s border, PKK leaders have clearly articulated that the fall of Kobani is equivalent to a declaration of war

by Turkey against the Kurds. If Turkey continues its flaky opposition to ISIS, it risks a full-scale civil war within its borders. Given the substantial international sympathy that the Kobani crisis has granted the Kurdish plight, this would not be an appealing outcome for Turkey, Thus, at the risk of losing its hard-won friends both inside and outside its borders, Turkey must find a way to put the history of the Kurdish question aside and embrace a new era in which the two groups are united against a common enemy. If they are able to do so, the blight ISIS leaves on history’s landscape will be lightened ever so slightly by its role in bringing the Turks and Kurds together to finally answer the century-old “Kurdish Question” in Turkey. n

fighting against ISIS, in Kobani will bolster Kurdish identity in the region and strengthen the PKK’s push for an independent Kurdish state. This outcome appears particularly threatening to Turkey as Kurdish populations in both Iraq and Syria have been operating with more autonomy in recent years. Adding to Turkey’s apprehension is the fact that the group currently defending Kobani from ISIS, the Kurdish Peoples Protection Unit (YPG), has loose ties to the PKK. Underlying it all are ancient ethnic animosities and resentment of the pressure the hundreds of thousands of SyrianKurdish refugees are putting on Turkey’s economy and resources.

Although some Turkish actions, such as providing Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers passage across the border to fight ISIS, have been commended by the Kurdish community, Turkey’s overall approach to the crisis has lost the country much of what little progress its peace process made with the Kurds. President Erdoğan recently equated the PKK with ISIS, provoking Kurdish solidarity riots throughout Turkey and as far away as London. Some Kurds have even accused the Turkish state of clandestinely creating and supporting ISIS in order to undermine Kurdish resistance in the region. While there is no hard evidence to back up such claims, Turkey’s motivations in the conflict are indeed muddled. The majority of Turkish Muslims, including President Erdoğan himself, are Sunni, belonging to the same Muslim sect as ISIS. Though these sectoral ties certainly do not equate to Turkish support for ISIS, the Turkish state’s ambivalent stance toward the group may stem from a perceived need to temper its response to ISIS so as to avoid alienating moderate, or awakening more extreme, Sunni elements within its own population.

Similarly (and likely more importantly), supporting armed Kurds, or

9

Viktor Orb Democracy

Slowly Slips Democrac Away in Slips Awa Hungary

in Hungar Dylan Devenyi

bรกn:

cy Slowly ay ry Dylan Devenyi

The date is March 29th, 2014. Around half a million supporters of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party gather in Hero’s Square, a massive plaza in Hungary’s capital, Budapest. The majestic space is resplendent under a clear spring sky as Hungary’s Prime Minister addresses his constituents with pride and optimism, saying “Teetering on the verge of bankruptcy, with no self-respect and no confidence, our country in decline was transformed into a nation that grows stronger day by day, transformed into a nation which has had its self-respect and confidence restored, a nation worthy of its old glory, a nation standing before a wonderful future.”

Red, white, and green flags fly in the crowd as the supportive masses express their enthusiasm for Orbán’s words. Earlier in the day day, many participated in a “peace march” event that triumphantly paraded down Budapest’s historic Andrassy Boulevard, an event which similarly conveyed an atmosphere of optimism and patriotism.

This clear March afternoon was not the first time Mr. Orbán spoke in Hero’s Square. Another rally was held there in 1989, one with a much more somber tone. That event commemorated the reburial of six coffins. Five held key leaders in Hungary’s 1956 anticommunist uprising, including Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Prime Minister who sought to free his country from the Warsaw Pact. Executed and placed in an unmarked grave, these men were to be reburied with honor, along with an empty coffin to symbolize the thousands of Hungarians who were killed when the uprising was brutally crushed. The event had several speakers, and all of them had participated in the attempted revolution, all except the young Viktor Orbán.

Mr. Orbán was a founding member and leader of a group called Fidesz, short for Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége or “Alliance of Young Democrats.”

He was invited to speak among some of Hungary’s great leaders as a representative of “Young Hungary” (Mr. Orbán himself was born in 1963 and so had a decidedly different perspective from those who had experienced the 1956 crackdown firsthand). All of the speakers sought the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but the opposition “round table” had agreed not to call for it at the rally, as negotiations were already underway and the leaders did not want to jeopardize their discussions with Mikhail Gorbachev.

Mr. Orbán chose to defy this agreement and openly call for the withdrawal of the Soviet military. While many of the speakers took the opportunity to eulogize for Hungary’s martyrs, Mr. Orbán was focused on Communism, which he stated was “irreconcilable” with democracy.

The Soviets are long gone from Hungary today, and although Mr. Orbán spoke this past March to a much happier audience than in March of 1989, many believe that Hungary is losing the freedom and democracy that Nagy died for. Mr. Orbán gained a lot of political influence at Hero’s Square in 1989 when he gave the impression that only he and his party were bold enough to seek the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and Fidesz was able to capture a few seats in the first free Hungarian parliaments in 1990 and 1994. Their electoral support was minimal, however, and the party began to change into a conservative party (a massive departure for a party that joined the Liberal International in 1992).

The decision was politically expedient for Orbán, who became prime minister of a coalition government with two smaller center-right parties.

Fidesz joined the European People’s Party (EPP), the European Union’s large center right coalition, and terminated their membership with the Liberal International.

Despite their success in 1998, Fidesz lost power in 2002 when they were narrowly defeated by the Hungarian Socialist party, known as Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP.) MSZP is not the radical Communist party that it succeeds; it advocates for free market liberalism and moderate social democracy with an emphasis on anti-nationalism and secularism. MSZP was able to hold on to power in the 2006 elections, but through the later

municipal elections and EU elections, Fidesz began to rise again. In 2010, Mr. Orbán’s party delivered a spectacular electoral victory, winning about 52% of the vote, compared to MSZP’s 24%.

This loss for MSZP was so crushing that the party fractured into several smaller groups as Fidesz emerged dominant. Fidesz gained over two thirds of the seats in the national parliament, effectively giving them unrestrained legislative power. Mr. Orbán quickly went to work consolidating that power for the long term. Fidesz began drafting a new constitution to replace the one in use, which was a heavily amended version of the Soviet era constitution.

When it came time to vote on the new constitution, only the far right Jobbik party stood in opposition; the socialists abstained due to their inability to influence the process, and Fidesz was effectively given unlimited power to mold the new constitution to their uses. The document they passed has been the target of significant criticism, both from within Hungary and from without. Many have argued that it goes too far enshrining Christianity within the Hungarian state, and large numbers have protested the perceived loss of checks on legislative power.

Hungary’s Jewish community (and others) have also expressed displeasure that the preamble of the document seems to describe Hungary as a victim of Nazi cruelty rather than acknowledging the role the Hungarian government played in the Holocaust. Neighboring governments, especially in Slovakia, expressed concern that the Constitution, which promoted dual citizenship rights and offered voting rights to Hungarians living abroad, was dangerously nationalist or even expansionist by nature.

None of this opposition was able to slow Fidesz down, which held a gala at the beginning of 2012 to celebrate the new constitution while thousands protested outside. Loud minorities in the country opposed their rule, but their massive electoral mandate gave them fairly unrestricted power. Mr. Orbán and his party pressed forward, in 2013 proposing a series of amendments to the constitution. The proposed changes curtailed

12

the power of the Constitutional Court, saying that it could not annul any law passed by a two-thirds majority. It also covered several social issues, mandating that students who received subsidized educations in Hungary work there for a time or pay back the state, empowering officials to ban homeless living in public space, and explicitly condemns the communist history of Hungary while including a provision for civil lawsuits against “hate speech.”

The opposition to the amendment series was tacit at best. The parliamentary vote was 256-11, with just over 30 socialists abstaining in anger at their inability to affect the constitutional process at all. They walked out of the halls of parliament and hung black flags from the windows in mourning of democracy.

When Viktor Orbán spoke to an audience of supporters in Hero’s square this past March, he spoke to many who attended a “peace march” run by an organization called Civil Unity Form (CÖF). Phone calls revealed, however, that Fidesz organized the event for CÖF, which bussed people in from the countryside for the event. As an NGO, the CÖF is exempt from various campaign finance restrictions, while not having to disclose the source of its funding. Through mechanisms such as this, Fidesz spent more than twice the legal limit on campaign funds for its 2014 re-election run. The government spent around 3.6 million USD on a series of pro-Fidesz billboards in the time leading up to the election, and the Fidesz government spent over 4 billion USD assuming municipal debts and on various construction projects in the time leading up to the election.

With the state by their side, it is no wonder that Fidesz have again won a two-thirds majority in a coalition with the small Christian Democratic Party. The “Unity” coalition, which consists of a variety of left wing parties including the former socialists, achieved less than 20 percent of the vote, only barely beating Jobbik. Once again, Fidesz has nearly unlimited legislative power, with the new constitution supporting their efforts.

Mr. Orbán may have been speaking in 2014 in the same place he

was when he called for freedom and democracy in 1989, but the state of Hungary today is less and less democratic. Fidesz sweeps control of all elections, from municipal elections to European parliament elections, with the state at their back. After the election, Orbán stated that he wanted to leave “liberal democracy” behind, following the example of Russia. He said regarding the 2008 financial crisis that he believed liberal democracies could not remain “globally competitive.”

Orbán’s admiration for the Russian model is evident through Hungary’s recent moves to regulate and monitor NGOs that receive foreign funding in line with Putin’s Foreign Agent Act. In an equally troubling move, Hungary stopped pumping gas to Ukraine in September as Mr. Orbán reaffirmed plans to build a pipeline for Russian gas that is opposed by the United States and the European Union. The Hungarian state gas company MOL is also currently planning to sell their 49% share in the Croatian gas company to Russia’s Gazprom Company.

As the relationship between Russia and Hungary grows closer, Hungary’s government looks more and more like Russia’s: elections may be free, but the ruling party uses its unfettered power to control public discourse and ensure its continued power. A key element of this control involves the management of opposition parties. Jobbik, Hungary’s rightwing anti-Semitic nationalist party, helps Fidesz deflect any criticism about their own relationship with Hungarian nationalism and racism by allowing them to point to the “real” nationalists. Their talk of extending citizenship rights to Hungarians in the territory of the old Hungarian half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire seems quite moderate when compared with Jobbik’s desire to actually restore those borders. Fidesz’s decision to erect a WWII monument that downplays the role of the Hungarian government and the Holocaust hardly seems anti-Semitic when Jobbik is protesting “Jewish attempts to buy up Hungary.”

Even as Mr. Orbán and Fidesz consolidate their power and marginalize internal criticism, figures outside Hungary have not hesitated to speak out against Hungary’s alarming slide into authoritarianism. Leaders such as European Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso and UN secretary general Ban Ki-Moon have indicated their alarm at the recent changes the Hungarian state as made. Even though Hungary may be moving in violation of EU human rights law, particularly as they enshrine religious belief, constrain abortion rights, and move to stifle free speech and open assembly rights, the EU has nonetheless been powerless to stop them so far. Mr. Orbán openly aligns himself with Putin’s Russia, yet the West has little power to slow him down.

Fidesz did hit their first “speed bump” recently. A few weeks ago, Mr. Orbán proposed a tax on internet traffic that could impose steep costs on the modest incomes of Hungarian citizens. For the first time in the history of the Fidesz government, the Hungarian populace made a concerted effort to protest this change, and Mr. Orbán has decided to not go forward with the tax for now. Some on the outside have hoped that this moment will be the beginning of a reversal of popular opinion, but Fidesz still holds the support of the majority of the country and has significant control over government funds and state media. It appears unlikely that this event will the beginning of a popular uprising against the illiberal reforms the Fidesz party has made.

On March 29th, 2014, Viktor Orbán spoke to an audience of supporters, many bussed into the city by a friendly NGO. They marched with Hungarian tricolors held high, past the Halls of Parliament where black flags had hung lamenting the death of democracy. Billboards littered the city and the countryside calling opposition party leaders “clowns,” and the Fidesz party was prepared to cruise to another massive electoral landslide. Just like 1989, Viktor Orbán spoke as his nation moved into an uncertain future. This time, however, it is Russian-style authoritarianism, not democracy, that Orbán is calling for. n

Syria Uncut Drew van Kuiken

Padnos could study Syrian society and the dividing lines underneath what had become a tragic, prolonged conflict: the Syrian Civil War. As he explained in a recent New York Times article about his experience, he did not yet realize the full magnitude of his choice.

Padnos spoke fluent Arabic and had lived in the Middle East since 2004, save for a few months spent in Vermont during the summer of 2012.

Although a Christian, he studied Islam and often worked as a freelance journalist.

Padnos’ latest idea came partially from desperation: he needed a bigger, bolder hook to get published. His search for that hook sent him spiraling through a 22 month long nightmare, every bit as painful and scary as it had earlier seemed unfathomable. Soon after sneaking through a barbedwire fence into Syria, he was taken captive.

Several of the different Syrian opposition groups shuffled Padnos around in the first few days of his imprisonment. He bounced from a smaller al-Qaeda affiliate to the Free Syrian Army, one of the largest opposition groups in the civil war, and finally ended up a captive of the al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s main Syrian affiliate.

Padnos could see the visceral, extensive hatred of the West from the very beginning of his ordeal. During his first week in captivity, he suffered at the foot of a particularly angry guard. The guard attacked Padnos with a heavy stick and a cattle prod, taking care to inflict as much pain as possible

A quick scan of Google Trends, Google’s worldwide search volume analysis tool, shows the predictably one-sided view of the combatants in Syria popularized by much of the Western media. ISIS, the ubiquitous upstart terrorist group responsible for out-radicalizing al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, the al-Nusra Front, dominates the search interest (which is calculated proportionally). The Free Syrian Army, one of the largest groups in the conflict, maxes out at around 14% of the search volume expressed in ISIS. The al-Nusra Front never manages to gain even 1% of ISIS’s search volume.

Google Trends certainly doesn’t explain everything about the situation, but it does speak to a larger truth about any foreign understanding of the conflict in Syria. As any foreign interest in the conflict becomes increasingly risky—the public kidnappings and beheadings of Western journalists come to mind—the news media has little choice but to rely on external signs of power (i.e. territory possessed) and the image each rebel group wants to show. Accordingly, people tend to know and care about ISIS. It’s the scariest, most powerful and most public rebel group in the Syrian conflict, and it gives the news media the sensationalist stories it craves so dearly. Unfortunately, the real picture of Syria lies in a much more complex, murky area.

In October 2012, Theo Padnos followed three young Syrian men over the Turkish-Syrian border. The men promised him a trip into Syria, where

14

public enemy number one and the next incarnation of the evil previously represented by Osama bin Laden.

The American media began frothing at the mouth at the chance to characterize such an important and easy target. Almost on queue, the most extreme interpretations began to gain footing. Bill O’Reilly announced a plan to manufacture a large group of highly skilled super assassins and send them traipsing about the Middle East in search of terrorists. Karl Rove actually wrote and published a speech he thought President Reagan would have given to confront ISIS. And while O’Reilly and Rove ultimately accomplished little apart from comic relief, the picture of ISIS they saw— one of limitless terror and incomprehensible evil—took a firm hold in the American consciousness.

In many ways, Rove and O’Reilly’s vision isn’t too far off base. By all accounts, al-Baghdadi is a veritable monster in the flesh, a danger to human decency everywhere. Armed with a knack for mega-fundraising, strategic prowess and a sociopathic disregard for the value of human life, al-Baghdadi probably should inspire fear among international viewers.

But in order to properly assess the situation in both Syria and extremism in the Arab world more broadly, any analysis has to go deeper than the name and face of an organization. Padnos’ story provides a rare look into the complex interplay between any of the groups involved in the Syrian conflict and the way in which the underlings—not those in charge, but the ones who guard prisoners, transport ammunitions, and do the actual fighting—treat Westerners, the civil war, and each other.

In one telling anecdote, Padnos recalls a conversation with several lowranking fighters from al-Nusra. The fighters fully acknowledged that they practiced the exact same Islam as those involved with ISIS and interpreted the Quran in the same way. For the underlings, the biggest difference in organization was simple: ISIS paid better.

The al-Nusra Front, which is technically at war with ISIS, has a strong interest in warding its soldiers away from the wide net ISIS recruiters cast, but as several accused defectors told Padnos, anyone actually wanting to make the switch wouldn’t find the process too difficult. This trend goes all the way to the top; almost all of ISIS’ leadership is comprised of former al-Nusra commanders. Again, despite the differences in organization, the same tenets of Islam drive each group. The overlap may stop there, since ISIS’s leadership clearly encourages more brutal governance than alQaeda, with even less regard for the value of human life.

During his time in captivity, Padnos saw a gradually changing attitude from his captors. The guards who watched over Padnos originally all acted similarly. Padnos endured beating after beating, his spirit slowly wearing down. But over time, it became clear that the worst had largely passed. As Padnos grew to know the guards, some stopped beating him. One even brought him tea and apples, as opposed to the standard olive paste and bread he had been forced to eat.

Later, in a different prison, Padnos would go on to find a homier cell with even gentler guards. He received adequate food, joked with his captors, and even —though blindfolded and handcuffed—sat outside in the desert sun. He and his captors never lost the understanding that they were at war, but some kind of common humanity came to drive their interaction. It became clear that the guards saw Padnos in a different way.

Whether they rationalized him as an exception to the rule of “ignorant American,” or internalized their experience with him to find a different way of looking at all Americans, is unclear. But in the ever-fluid world of radical Islam, Padnos’ captors clearly saw some commonality with him. And while it’s easy to dehumanize the enemy when faced with the hard-nosed rhetoric of those in charge, those who care about maintaining an honest view of the Syrian conflict would do well to look at Padnos’ experience as an important reminder of shared humanity, often ignored and inaccessible in an increasingly sensationalist media dialogue. n

and reinforcing Padnos’ lack of humanity. Towards the end of the beating, the guard made his motive clear. He bent down over the crippled Padnos and whispered, “I hate Americans. All of them. I hate you all.”

To many foreign observers, Padnos’ early experiences with an extremist Islamic group provide an expected, if not particularly gruesome, glimpse into a far away society. The West’s experience with the Middle East and the rise of extremism has proved something of a bad dream over the past several decades. Padnos’ captors, the al-Nusra Front, currently lie somewhere at the back of the public debate, pushed aside in the wake of ISIS’ rise. ISIS, to the media’s credit, wasted little time foisting its power upon the West and begging for a discussion to be had.

ISIS’s rise came a few short months after breaking off from al-Qaeda in April 2013. The group is known for its excruciatingly brutal treatment of prisoners and singular focus on the establishment of a global Islamic State.

The man behind the scenes, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, appears to be even “more violent, more virulent, [and] more anti-American” than al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, according to a senior US intelligence official.

ISIS is perhaps best known for the video it released in which one of its members beheaded American journalist James Foley on camera. The group ostensibly used the video as recruiting material for an increasingly global campaign to find jihadists, but it also served to enrage and instill a profound sense of fear in the American public. ISIS immediately became

15

16

The Legacy of History:

An Interview with Dr. Joseph Tulchin Hannah Sherman

which he did not quickly adjust. “The climate of fear that’s associated with a military dictatorship or a repressive regime is inconceivable to us,” admitted Tulchin. To illustrate his relative naiveté, Tulchin pointed to one afternoon, shortly after he first arrived in Buenos Aires, when he was having a cup of coffee with a friend. He heard a siren go off and ran out onto the sidewalk to see what was happening. All he had time to observe was a black four-door Ford Falcon driving by and a man with a gun leaning his arm on the open back-seat window, before his friend tackled him to the ground.

Unbeknownst to Tulchin, the Argentinian police charged with disappearing people during the “Dirty War” drove these “Black Falcons,” and since, according to Tulchin, “the streets of [Buenos Aires] are worse than the streets of Boston,” the guns would occasionally go off and accidentally kill innocent bystanders when the car hit a pothole.

And yet, despite multiple decades of travel through dangerous countries, Tulchin claims he has only once come close to experiencing real bodily harm. He was in Bogotá in the early 1980s, during the first years of the drug cartels. His colleague, the Dean of Architecture at the Jesuit School in Bogotá, was driving him to dinner along with a couple of friends from the US. One of Tulchin’s friends had broken her leg and was sitting with it propped up on the back seat. On the way to dinner, they were stopped by a young corporal on duty. The corporal asked to see the Dean’s license and registration, but he had neither and was driving his wife’s car.

Tulchin and his American friends showed the corporal their passports but unfortunately, according to Tulchin, “the kid was from the country and had never seen a passport, so he thought we were alien agents of some sort, probably guerrillas. We had documents he had never seen before, the driver of the car didn’t have identification, and there’s a lady in the back seat with her broken leg propped up.” So the soldier, who looked to be around 18 years old, took the safety off his rifle. After a significant amount of persuasion, Tulchin and the Dean finally convinced the soldier to contact his captain. They then walked the three blocks to find the captain, Tulchin and the Dean in front with the soldier pointing his rifle into their backs. They finally made it to the captain, “who it turned out, typical of the Colombian military, was from an elite family and knew the Dean’s brother,” said Tulchin. “At the moment it was scary, but in retrospect it was pure comedy.”

“What does it [really] mean to live in a military dictatorship?” asked Tulchin. “I could make you read ten books and then you’d go down [to Latin America] and be like a Martian looking around…You have trouble understanding what’s happening and you don’t know where the lines are.”

In a career that has spanned several countries over multiple decades, Tulchin has balanced precariously on these lines in a continuous attempt to encourage a debate about Latin American foreign policy, one which he believes it is imperative to have. “If you look at process, you want discussion,” said Tulchin. “It’s natural to have debate about foreign policy.

You have to have it.” n

In a world where technology has made travel much simpler, it is easy to live abroad and feel safe. Few Americans, however, have dared to reside in countries under military dictatorships. Fewer still have been in a state of siege even once, let alone five times. But Dr. Joseph Tulchin, a preeminent Latin Americanist, has: once each in Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay, and twice in Argentina. Dr. Tulchin –an expert on U.S. foreign policy, interAmerican relations, and contemporary Latin America – is currently teaching a seminar at Bowdoin on United States – Latin American relations, as well as finishing up his latest book on Latin American foreign policy.

Tulchin, who graduated from Amherst College, did not know he wanted to study Latin America until he began graduate school at Harvard University. During his first year, he took a research seminar which sought to examine global reactions after WWI when the United States refused to join the League of Nations. “The person in my seminar next to me said ‘I’ll do the United Kingdom,’” explained Tulchin. “The young lady down the table said ‘I’ll do France,’ and so I said ‘well I speak Spanish a little I’ll do Spain.’ But [the professor] said, ‘Spain’s not really that useful, why don’t you do Latin America?’, so I did. And I started with A, which is Argentina, and that was it.” Tulchin ended up writing his dissertation on US foreign policy toward Latin America during the First World War. Tulchin went on to teach US foreign policy and Latin American history, first at Yale University, and then at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. “Over time,” said Tulchin, “I began to sort of grope my way to a discussion of Latin American foreign policy.” He realized, however, that this debate did not actually exist, and began to search for a reason why.

“Part of it, of course, was the absence of democracy, but part of it was a historic tradition,” explained Tulchin. So he began to participate in public policy and activist work, with the goal of involving Latin Americans in the comparative study of their own countries and their own foreign policies.

This was his main focus during the 16 years he spent as the Director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Public Policy.

Tulchin recently completed the manuscript of his latest book, From Hegemony to Agency. The purpose of the book is to ask why there has not been any definite Latin American foreign policy. Tulchin presents two separate conclusions. The first, explained Tulchin, is that “the United States comes to hegemony in the region and has no idea, not even today, of how pernicious that hegemonic behavior has been.” The second is that within Latin American agency there are two things lacking. “Well, one thing lacking and one thing that I don’t know what to do about,” said Tulchin.

The former is that Latin America is afraid to take its place in the world. The latter refers to the residual anti-Americanism left over from US hegemony in the region. According to Tulchin, “the legacy of history is powerful,” and as the United States has proclaimed an end to its hegemony, the nations of Latin America must now find a way to exert their own agency.

In his search for Latin American foreign policy, Tulchin has spent a number of years living in countries under military rule, something to

17

The Plunging Price of Oil and the End of OPEC Griff Brewer 18

crude drilled domestically in the country. However, the rapid increase in LTO production since 2007 has outpaced domestic refinery capacity, leading to a new internal crude oil glut. Spurred on by tense relations with oil exporting countries— namely Russia and Iran— the Obama administration quietly reversed the 45-year-old restrictions.

On July 30, the tanker BW Zambesi left port for South Korea from Galveston, Texas with nearly 400,000 barrels of lightweight crude oil onboard— the first unrestricted oil export shipment since the Carter administration policy was put into place. Already, oil exports have nearly quadrupled from 67,000 barrels per day in 2012 to over 240,000 today.

Refined oil products, such as gasoline and petrochemicals, have too seen a 33% increase in exports since 2010 to over 3.4 million barrels per day.

Russia and Iran, in effect, have lost some of the bargaining power once held over European and Asian markets. Energy prices worldwide have been driven down by increased supply from America. Even OPEC has been forced to compete to retain market share.

This last point has had particular effect on market prices of West Texas Intermediate. Saudi Arabia, the largest player in the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), has adopted a strategy much different from the one they followed during the first oil glut. When prices began to drop in the early 80s, Saudi Arabia cut back production in an effort to keep prices artificially high. However, instead of halting the fall in prices, the policy simply reduced Saudi Arabia’s share in overseas markets, a loss that took decades to win back.

This time around, the Saudis are determined to not repeat the same mistakes. Instead of reducing output, Saudi oil minister Ali al-Naimi has taken the position to ride out what he sees as a temporary dip in prices.

This is not without good reason; the Saudis cannot afford to lose their position in the market again.

Ever since the Arab Spring of 2011, Middle Eastern countries have been forced to increase social spending and welfare programs in order to appease populations and prevent unrest. Though kingdoms like Saudi Arabia can afford to operate in the red for some time, it remains unclear how states that rely on oil profits will balance their budgets. The International Monetary Fund estimates the Saudis need market prices above $93 per barrel to break even on governmental spending. Of course, as oil prices projected to stabilize at or around $70 per barrel, the energy giant’s future now seems in question.

With North American production soaring and OPEC production projected to remain at the current cap of 30 million barrels per day for the foreseeable future, the global supply of crude is on the unequivocal uptrend. In the past, increased production had always been met with increased consumption. Though this remains the case, the 1.17% increase in demand worldwide in 2014 falls well below the historical average of over 3%. When increases in supply outpace increases in demand, a price drop is inevitable.

Slow growth in consumption over the past few years can be mostly attributed to the worldwide economic crisis in 2008 and subsequent slow recovery. Policies of austerity in Europe have stalled expansion and, as a result, energy consumption. A volatile Japanese economy has reduced oil consumption in economically developed Asia by 0.13 million barrels per day. Brazil, a developing economy, is struggling to reach even 1% growth in GDP. Even China, largely unaffected by the economic crisis, has lost momentum. The once bullish 14.7% growth in 2007 has fallen off, currently sitting at 7.2% and slowing. For months, economists have been pointing to warning signs of another economic crisis on the horizon if governments do not take a more proactive role in increasing growth. Crude oil futures, in turn, have dropped dramatically since June. Oil, undoubtedly, is losing its power as a commodity on the global marketplace.

The surge in American LTO production, a change in Saudi strategy,

Along the roadsides and off the highways of America, a quiet revolution is brewing.

With over 60% of gas stations across the country offering prices lower than $3.00/gallon, Americans are paying less for gas now than they have in the past 4 years.

The drop in prices would seem to come from nowhere; crude oil prices on the world market had been trending upward through normal seasonal tribulations since 2012. But since June of this year, West Texas Intermediate (WTI), a benchmark for world oil prices, has sunk over 25% from it’s high of $105.93 to under $80 per barrel, dipping as low as $75 in some brief intervals.

A freefall of this magnitude hadn’t been seen since 2008, when the global economic downturn sent oil speculators scrambling to recover losses by dumping amassed oil reserves for cheap. However, unlike the spike and subsequent crash of WTI prices triggered by the recession, the current shift in prices is poised to have much farther-reaching and longer lasting effects.

If projections hold true, the tumble in prices since June may represent a paradigm shift in energy similar to the “oil glut” of the early 1980s.

The “glut,” or a surplus of oil production from OPEC-defying producers matched with decreased worldwide consumption, standardized the cheap crude prices enjoyed by American consumers for nearly 20 years until 2003. Today, comparable conditions have set the stage for yet another energy shakeup.

Until recently, it was widely assumed oil production in the US had reached its peak in the 1970s. In 1972, 9.6 million barrels of oil were pumped out of the ground on a daily basis. Ever since that year, with the exception of a short plateau in the 1980s due to Alaskan oil investments, production steadily decreased. By 2008, domestic production had fallen to nearly half 1972 levels— a quota that hadn’t been seen since 1949.

Defying “peak oil” theorists, the seemingly unstoppable downward trend was broken by the following spring. Between 2008 and 2013, US production increased over 50% to an impressive 7.5 million barrels per day. With continually accelerating numbers already recorded in the first few quarters of 2014, the reversal seems nowhere near slowing down.

Though it’s true resumed off-shore drilling and increased investment in traditional drilling practices have certainly contributed to the surge in production, one factor stands above all as the driving force behind the turnaround: fracking. Fracking is a process that involves injecting pressurized chemical water into shale rock formations in order to create passageways for lightweight gas to escape and be captured. Originally thought to be only practical for producing natural gas, recent advances have allowed the capture of much heavier crude oil molecules known as “tight oil.”

Since 2007, tight oil (LTO) production domestically has risen from nearly nonexistent to almost 2 million barrels per day in 2013— a number expected by the International Energy Agency to double by 2018. In 2012 alone, LTO production increased by a record-breaking 1 million barrels per day. With total American consumption on the downtrend from the current 18 million barrels at an ever-increasing rate, some projections predict the elimination of oil imports to the US within 20 years. Others say even sooner.

This unprecedented surge in production did more than simply increase the world crude supply and contribute to depressed prices; it gave the US a considerable amount more freedom in relations with oil producing countries. Under the Carter administration, tight restrictions were placed on crude exports from the US to ensure the stability of strategic reserves in the face of the OPEC embargo. The policy affected little in reality when it was put into place; a decreasing US supply seemed to always keep the

19

the organizations very future appears at risk, or at least unclear.

OPEC assumed power in the energy market when it set a cap on total aggregate oil production within the organization and steeply raised prices in response to the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It’s production quota today of around 30 million barrels per day carries enough influence in the market— around 45% of total world supply— that changes in output ceiling can greatly influence prices by either constricting or flooding global supply.

Today, though, the organization is beginning to resemble more a paper tiger than a legitimate challenger to the low prices brought on by the oil glut. While the Saudis can stay afloat while running a deficit for at least the near future, members like Venezuela, where mismanagement and overspending have racked up billions of dollars in foreign debt, are demanding that OPEC make policy changes to drive prices up. In Iraq, low prices have become unacceptable to a government barely managing to hold off the Islamic State’s assault. Nigeria, too, faces pressure from within in the midst of an election year to raise oil prices. But as internal divisions continue to prevent consensus on strategy, Venezuela and its allies’ pleas for constricted supply remain unlikely to be answered.

Politics, as much as budget problems, are behind the divides within OPEC. The turmoil of the civil war in Syria lead to tension between Saudi Arabia, who backs the rebels, and Iran, who supports Bashar al-Assad’s regime. These two rivals represent the lion’s share of production within OPEC, pumping a combined 13 million barrels per day. The decision by Saudi Arabia to sell at lower prices rather than cut back production was made all the more easily knowing Iran was to lose from it. “Iran is very vulnerable in the oil sector, and it is there that more could be done to squeeze the current government to join the world efforts toward peace,” said Saudi prince Turki al-Faisal shortly after WTI prices began to plunge in June.

OPEC as an organization derives its strength from acting in unison.

Though countries have always cheated on production quotas, a group motivated by a similar goal of price control has kept production near set ceilings for decades. But when countries simply cannot afford to operate at OPEC approved production ceilings, they must defy them. If OPEC secretary general Abdallah el-Badri cannot persuade members to adhere to a unilateral strategy when members meet on November 27 in Vienna, defectors from the organization may begin to arise.

For some countries, this might be the only option.

It would be an understatement to call the collapse in crude oil prices since June a watershed moment in energy. What, just months ago, seemed like a world where Americans would be at the whim of the middle-east for as long as we relied upon oil now seems like one where American energy independence is a goal not for future generations but for the next decade.

Already, since the shale oil boom began in 2008, OPEC oil imports to the US have been halved. More American capital than ever is being reinvested in the country instead of flowing into foreign coffers, and growth in the energy sector is leading to a resurgence of American innovation.

Yet, with all these seemingly boundless benefits so close to home, it would be prudent to remain aware of their ultimate cost: the environment.

Although the International Energy Agency expects total oil consumption in economically developed countries to decrease at accelerating rates even with decreased prices, the transition to alternative energy isn’t happening fast enough. Fuel-efficient cars will only get us so far; a total shift away from fossil fuels is not just a recommendation. It’s a requirement to ensure our future.

When Republicans take control of both houses this January, a political agenda centered around strict oversight of the EPA will certainly push back against recent environmental strides. With cheap fossil fuels on our doorstep from now on, it may take more than economic necessity to drive renewable energy forward. We will need moral resolve – and lots of it. n

and slower-than-expected growth in consumption led to the reduction in WTI prices since June. These shifts—combined with the continued trend towards alternative energy and the growth of coal as an energy source in Asia—have shaken up oil’s place in the energy sector. Moreover, the geopolitical climate that has for decades revolved around energy is now changing at a pace no one could have anticipated.

Already, the diplomatic effects of the market shift are coming to fruition. Russia, whom Deutsche Bank estimates requires a price of $100 per barrel to break even on its governmental budget, is certainly feeling the pressure of faltering energy prices. Energy exports account for 25% of GDP and foots the bill for nearly half the government’s annual expenses.

The dramatic drop in prices, then, has been a wake up call to Putin, whose policies have led to a projected economic growth of only 0.4%.

As the Kremlin’s budget for 2015 was being planned out in October, expected increases on spending came under fire. “You know that energy prices have fallen as well as for some of our other traditional products,” admitted Putin to a government panel. “Due to that, would we not, on the contrary, reconsider the budget toward reducing some spending?”

Preferring to hope for the best, Russian parliament approved a budget draft keeping spending levels in-line with the $100 per barrel it had required before the price collapse. To this, finance minister Anton Siluanov responded that “the budget can not constantly have expenses that were made at different economic reality.” To make matters worse, the Russian government is already locked into spending over $50 billion hosting the World Cup in 2018.

Putin has already vowed no increase in taxes, citing the country’s reliance on the private sector for growth. Closing off this last resort to increase revenues, the Russians will be forced to decrease spending.

Defense expenditures may be the first to get cut back. A 10-year $770 billion rearmament program scheduled to begin in 2015 will almost certainly be shelved again as it was when the first sanctions over Ukraine were put into place last spring. Putin may also be made to retract his ambitions in Ukraine if oil prices stay below the $100 per barrel threshold, though many argue the Russian president is willing to bury the country in debt to save face and hold the line. In any case, an increasingly faltering Russian economy will make the removal of sanctions an attractive bargaining chip and strengthen the West’s hand in negotiations over Ukraine.

Iran, too, is seeing its diplomatic options narrow with dipping oil prices.

Even a month ago, it was widely thought the US had too liberally reduced sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program, eliminating any Iranian motivation for a deal to be struck this fall. This no longer appears to be the case.

Deutsche Bank has placed Iran’s particular budget-balancing price point well north of any other exporter’s estimate, claiming president Hassan Rouhani would need crude prices at $140 per barrel to operate in the black. If the $110 average in early summer was cause for concern, the drop to the current $80 per barrel is cataclysmic.

Where in the past officials could claim the Iranian economy would be able to survive even if a long-term sanction-relieving deal could not be reached, the current oil crisis has undermined the reality behind their assertions. Jamshid Edalatian, serving on the chamber of commerce in Tehran, is quoted as saying, “Oil prices are bound to go down even further, and already the government faces big financial shortcomings… We need this nuclear deal, or we will face very hard times.” When negotiators meet in November, American officials will again have the upper hand.

Iran and Russia are not the only crude exporters being forced to reexamine strategy for a world in which oil will play a smaller and lessexpensive role. Nigeria, Ecuador, Algeria, Iraq, Angola, and Libya are all being forced to sell crude at essentially bankrupting prices. On October 11, Venezuela called an emergency meeting for the organization that binds many of the major exporters together, OPEC. As oil prices continue to fall,

20

21

Diagnosing Culture Before Treating Disease: Challenges in Fighting Ebola in West Africa Hailey Blain

people of different races, ethnicities, socioeconomic statuses, sexual orientations, and education levels are present in the United States. These disparities stem, in part, from the inability of the health care system to account for individual personal backgrounds. Physicians struggle to give medical advice that takes into account various medical beliefs that differ from traditional Western medicine. Many doctors also are not well equipped to tailor medical advice to the living and working conditions, educational level, or English language abilities of their patients. These challenges are similarly evident in the American effort to contain the Ebola epidemic as these interventions as well are not being tailored to West African cultures and societies.

Western intervention efforts could also be improved by taking into account the breakdown of the West African health care systems. The international public health community has not fully addressed the issue of “significant declines in most public health measures” that the World Health Organization has identified. These declines are occurring because hospitals are closing, health care workers are wary of admitting patients who may or may not be infected with Ebola, and individuals do not want to go to the hospital for other health concerns for fear of contracting Ebola.

As a result of not having access to health care, people are dying of malaria, diarrhea, pneumonia, and strokes. The extent of this problem is vast and deleterious, and thus needs to be addressed in the efforts to manage the Ebola outbreak. Recently a lack of vaccinations led to a small measles outbreak in Liberia.

Many officials have begun to take notice of this issue. As Sheldon Yett, the Liberian representative for UNICEF stated in an interview with the Washington Post, “If you stub your toe now in Monrovia, you’ll have a hard time getting care, let alone having a heart attack or malaria…It’s a tremendous threat to children and a tremendous threat to families.” In an interview with the Washington Post, Joanne Liu, the president of Doctors Without Borders gives the grim report that, “Mounting numbers are dying of other diseases, like malaria, because health systems have collapsed…

Today, Ebola is winning.” However these words have not been turned into actions. Western efforts must take into account the incredibly acute impact that the decline of the health care systems has had on West Africans.

The need for a containment strategy that is much more aligned with local culture is clear. Support from Western governments arrived too late and have focused on supporting West African health systems. While the support is having an impact on the quality of care for many Ebola patients, it is not effective in reaching the many West Africans who are distrustful of the health care system and believe in alternative methods of medicine such as witch doctors. Furthermore, many hospitals are shutting down because of Ebola, causing other health issues to go untreated. The lessons we are learning about tailoring health care delivery in the context of culture is a lesson that the United States is also learning at home. The United States must recognize and respond to these critical difference in beliefs and behaviors in order best contain the crisis of the Ebola epidemic as well as correcting endemic problems in its own healthcare system. n

As the Ebola epidemic becomes more widespread and deadly in West Africa, some of the flaws in the current containment strategies are more evident. While Western governments are directing billions of dollars in aid, those efforts often fail to take into account local attitudes and health behaviors. Increased sensitivity and understanding of West African cultures would improve the effectiveness of the efforts underway.

The outbreak originated right outside a village near Guéckédou, Guinea and quickly thereafter spread to Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Since March, over 10,000 people in West Africa have suffered from the disease and over 4,900 people have died. Even more alarming is that there is little indication that the epidemic will be stopped in the near future. The New York Times estimates that the outbreak will likely last for up to a year and a half and could infect hundreds of thousands more people.

The Center for Disease Control and Prevention and President Obama have been criticized in recent weeks for poorly handling the few cases of Ebola that occurred in the United States. However, it is illogical to focus the attention, as the media has done, on the American cases when the African cases are much more numerous, severe, and unable to be fully treated because of a lack of resources.

The efforts of the United States to help contain the outbreak in West Africa have included sending military personnel, bags to contain infected corpses, and money. While the support is generous and has been helpful in treating patients in hospital systems, the strategy has flaws that will prevent public health officials from effectively containing the outbreak. The current efforts do not take into account the cultures and societal structures of the West African countries where the outbreak is centered, a flaw that is present in the United States health care system as well.

Firstly, the current interventions fail to consider the distrust that many West Africans have of the health care system. Intervention efforts of Western countries, including the US, have mainly consisted of sending personnel and supplies to hospitals. This is not a completely effective strategy since many West Africans are suspicious of physicians and thus are unlikely to seek care from the hospitals. In fact, many individuals in Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone, where the disease is most prevalent, are blaming physicians for the spread of the virus. Therefore, focusing resources in hospitals and in supporting physicians is an incomplete solution.

Furthermore, interventions have not taken into consideration the trend of infected individuals going to witch doctors instead of health care professionals. Many West Africans believe that Ebola is a bad spirit, a manifestation of the devil, or poisoning. The distrust of and nonbelief in the health care system prevents health care workers from effectively dealing with the outbreak through the health care system, which is the standard and most straightforward method of intervention. In order to achieve the containment outcomes that they seek, international public health officials will have to create more tailored and effective containment strategies.

Insensitivity to cultural factors in considering health interventions is an issue within American society as well. Drastic health disparities between

22

EBOLA TODAY. EBOLA TOMORROW. Skylen C. Monaco

When a sickness exits the body, it generally departs with some good courtesy. The symptoms eventually fade, and after an adequate amount of rest and recovery, the body falls back into its old routine. Yet, once Ebola leaves Sierra Leone and fades from the headlines, what mark will it leave on the people it once affected?

The outlook is grim for Sierra Leone, a country still recovering from a brutal civil war that only ended in 2002 and took the lives of over 50,000 people. The combined impact of the recent war and controversial IMF budget restrictions has slowed overall development, leaving the country under-equipped for handling its current epidemic. The poorest of the poor are therefore the most disproportionately affected by Ebola, as they lack the necessary resources and knowledge to effectively combat the disease.

Those in developed countries who fear that Ebola will “make its way into their backyards” only distract from the more serious issue at hand.

The damage caused by Ebola today will be felt long after treatment for the disease ends, and will pose a serious threat to West Africa’s future prosperity.

Ebola currently threatens Sierra Leone on a number of fronts and will undoubtedly be the cause of various forms of long-term damage. For example, 40% of Sierra Leone’s economy is dependent on crops, and has been compromised by the effort to prevent Ebola from spreading. Strict barriers have been placed on major roads and communities and have made it nearly impossible for interstate travel and trade. Farmers are stuck behind strict quarantine barriers, and cannot sell what they have secured from an already diminished harvest. In addition, food is becoming increasingly scarce, as supplies brought in by the UN Food World Program fail to reach the mouths of those who desperately need it. Economists predict that economic growth will slow to 8% instead of the previously estimated 11% as a result of this. In addition, because of the limited supply of resources, inflation is estimated to rise to 10% rather than 7.5%. If these projections are accurate, the poor will struggle to afford essential food and commodities.

Those who cannot afford food have also found themselves unable to gain access to Sierra Leone’s already limited healthcare facilities. Even those who are not sick with Ebola are turned away from poorly equipped and overburdened local health clinics. Once they are turned away, poor people’s choices are strictly limited by their country’s lack of resources.

Access to clean water is not easily available for the poor to drink or, as health officials have urged people to do: “regularly wash hands.” To add to

the problem, many poor people believe that Ebola is a national conspiracy, and are reluctant to follow the government’s warnings. The nation’s trust with officials was severely damaged by the civil war, and has not been made better by how the outbreak is currently being handled. Sights of dead family members wrapped in biohazard bags and being thrown into the trunks of health workers’ vehicles add to this growing anger.

Frustration with the government continues as the spread of Ebola has caused many schools, churches, banks, and public facilities to close.

With communal activities now severely limited and the fear of exposure plaguing everyone, many are forced to stay at home. This is a cause for concern, especially given the lack of security provided to many quarantined communities. Domestic and sexual abuse is now on the rise, leading to an increase in unwanted pregnancies. Before the outbreak, Sierra Leone was ranked low on neonatal and maternal heath and is now even less prepared to deal with the future generation of Sierra Leoneans.

Most feel that the government is “not doing anything” to prevent these things from happening, and continue to grow restless as Ebola burns its way through the nation. What this foreshadows for the future social and political climate of Sierra Leone is grim, as the state, only eleven years after concluding a war, proves once again that it cannot protect its own people. Many in Sierra Leone are reminded of the old fear, suffering, and confusion once felt during the war. Yet, some consider those days relatively preferable to now, since at least then the enemy was visible.

Ebola has affected approximately 5,000 people in Sierra Leone. While this constitutes only .08% of the population, the effects that the disease has brought will reach far beyond this statistic. While developed countries focus on the imagined threat of Ebola entering their cozy communities, the slow destabilization of a region plagued by issues ranging from terrorism to military coups is happening now. Despite Sierra Leone being touted as one of the best examples of post-conflict recovery by UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon, the country was not yet adequately equipped to handle Ebola’s wrath. T he impact of this disease is exacerbating Sierra Leone’s already fragile state capacity and is demonstrating the limitations of governance there.

One day – hopefully in the relatively near future – Ebola will be a thing of the past. The dead will be remembered and the world will turn its eyes to a new issue. However, the damage Ebola leaves behind will compromise the future wellbeing of those lucky enough to survive for many years to come. n

23

The Politics of National Mourning Michaelle Yeo

24

On Tuesday, November 12, 60-year-old Lee Joon-Seok was sentenced to 36 years in prison. Upon hearing the verdict, outraged family members of the deceased demanded an appeal and a revision to the death sentence.

Lee was initially accused of murder for his conduct as captain during the sinking of the Sewol ferry, where over 300 lives were lost, one of the country’s worst peacetime disasters. Photos of Lee jumping into the arms of rescuers drew widespread accusations that the captain prioritized his safety over that of his passengers and failed to carry out an effective rescue mission. Throughout the five-month trial, those with loved ones among the deceased screamed profanities at the captain and his crew: one relative held up a sign that read, “You are not human. You are beneath animals.”

President Park Geun-Hye described the actions of the captain and his crew as “akin to murder.” Prosecutors demanded the death penalty, a sentence Korean courts have not handed down since 1997.

Attorney Kang Jung-min has questioned whether or not a fair trial was even possible, claiming that Sewol crewmembers were demonized by the Korean media. He told CNN, “The public and the court does not have a good impression of the crew members, so the crew are likely to become scapegoats”. Although at first glance, the case might seem to be one of fatal incompetence, further examination reveals that behind the South Korean media’s public vilification of the crew lies a sprawling system of bureaucratic and corporate corruption where basic safety regulations are ignored for profit. In the case of the ferry, for example, investigators pointed to evidence that the ferry was overloaded, the construction unsound, and the crew unqualified, suggesting an accident was inevitable.

The Yoo family that controlled the Cheonghaejin Marine Co, which ran the ferry, also faced a trial, albeit a much less publicized one, prefaced by President Park Geun Hye’s public denouncement of the family. The eldest son of the Yoo family, Yoo Dae-kyoon, was charged with embezzlement and sentenced to three years in prison (his father, Yoo Byung-eun faced similar charges but was found dead in July after several months of evading arrest). Although the Yoo family initially denied any involvement with the company, further investigation revealed that the family indirectly controlled and exploited Chonghaejin through an investment company.

Overall, the Yoo family, and the companies they controlled, received a total of at least $3.82 million from the ferry company in recent years, not including the $2.5 million the ferry company spent to buy stakes in other Yoo-affiliated companies. Meanwhile, the ferry company floundered, reporting losses of over $760,000 just last year. A New York Times article reports that the company spent just $2 last year on safety training for the Sewol ferry’s crewmembers. That money went towards buying a paper copy of a certificate.

Yoo’s family and supporters have lashed out, pointing fingers back at the government, claiming that President Park Geun-Hye has directed attention to them to deflect attention away from herself and the government. They claim it was the neglect of officials responsible for public safety and reliance on businesses to police themselves that allowed the ferry company to continue to operate. The general public has also protested against the government’s failure to prevent the disaster and find

Mr. Yoo Byung-eun and bring him to trial before his death. Park’s approval ratings have plummeted throughout the incident, and some have called for her resignation.

However, these accusations are simply two pieces of the same puzzle, and point to a larger issue of the endemic collusion between the private and public sectors in Korea, or the “gwanfia” – a combination of the word gwanryo (bureaucrat) and mafia. Public safety officials often with collaborate with chaebols, or family run conglomerates of immense size and power, such as the Yoo family. Implicit or explicit understandings that they or their family members will be rewarded after retirement from public service - by being placed in powerful positions in areas of the private sector they were supposed to be regulating - provide strong incentives for officials to shirk their duties. In a vicious cycle, these former bureaucrats in private enterprises are well placed to continue to press demands.

Furthermore, under the current system, bureaucrats are forced to retire if they cannot be promoted once they exceed the age of 50, and the highest level of office often only lasts a year. Thus, in the final term of any administration, officials compete fiercely for job security – this competition often ends with an arrangement, giving those that have to go powerful positions in private sector companies.

For example, Haewoon, the Korean Shipping Association, was contracted by the government to make sure ships were following safety regulations – the sinking of the ferry revealed Haewoon had not been properly overseeing these regulations. Further investigation revealed that of the twelve individuals who have served as chairman of the board of directors at Haewoon, ten had previously held positions in major government bodies, including the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries.

Despite Park’s tearful promises, prospects for real reform in the near future seem unlikely. The National Assembly attempted to begin drafting new legislation last summer. However, bickering over the details of legislation protracted the debate. Furthermore, the proposed legislation does not make provisions to ensure that public sector officials overseeing transparency will remain free from collusion with the private sector.

Indeed, this is one of several dilemmas facing reform: the lack of qualified replacements and the sheer expanse of Korean chaebol influence.

There is no guarantee that new candidates will not fall into the same system as their predecessors. Furthermore, bureaucratic reform cannot be accomplished with political will alone – the president would make thousands of enemies in public and private sectors in a fight against deep, long-standing ties. Such a war would be too extensive and costly for a single administration to handle, and chaebol reforms have been promised in the early stages of nearly every administration without results.

However, incremental change, backed by public support, is not impossible. The Sewol ferry incident has directed attention and ire towards bureaucratic corruption. The National Assembly, under public pressure, has continued to debate proposed regulation regarding bureaucratic reform. 300 lives have been given. Hopefully the lessons learned from the Sewol tragedy will not only prevent further loss of life, but also illuminate the path to progress. n

25

Detroit’s Water Crisis Serena Taj

“If you’re wealthy enough in Detroit, you can have water. If you’re not wealthy enough, you can’t have water.” This is how Dr. Peter Hammer, the director of the Center for Civil Rights at Wayne State University, characterizes the latest developments in Detroit’s financial crisis.

In what the United Nations has declared a violation of basic human rights, the city of Detroit has cut off water access to an estimated 130,000 people since the spring. Water advocacy experts estimate that this number could rise to 300,000 of the city’s poorest residents before the crisis is over.

In one of the world’s wealthiest countries and in a city that is surrounded by the largest supply of fresh water on the planet, the fact that such a significant portion of the population does not have access to clean water is indicative of a problem that goes beyond the availability of resources.

Since Detroit filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy in July of 2013, the privatization of the city’s water has become a tangible prospect. The Detroit Water and Sewage Department (DWSD) has been an attractive target for those who are looking to manage the city’s financial crisis—Detroit currently maintains a $5.7 billion water and sewage debt. Under emergency law, the city’s water has shifted from a public good to a private commodity that is only available to those who are able to pay for it.

This “pay your bills” rhetoric might not initially appear to be unreasonable. However, in a city in which 38 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, the unit-pricing scheme that is currently in place may not be the most realistic avenue toward reducing the city’s debt.

Detroit’s current water pricing plan involves a cost distinction between commercial and residential consumers. However, within those categories, the variations in cost allocation between high-income users and those of lower socio-economic status are nonexistent. Regardless of class, people need water to survive.

Yet under the current system, water expenditures constitute a lesser proportion of wealthier consumers’ incomes than they do for their lower-income counterparts, thereby placing a more substantial burden on those who cannot afford to pay. A national report on public water spending commented on the (in)efficacy of Detroit’s pricing scheme, saying, “Current public water cost allocation schemes that rely on uniform user class pricing place a tremendous burden on the lower median income households in a community. The financial burden is both substantial, and sometimes, widespread in a community.”

These problems have been further exacerbated by the migration out of the city since the beginning of the economic downturn. In the last decade, Detroit’s population has declined by 25 percent. Interestingly, The New York Times has reported that the demographic shift is not a case of white flight, in which white homeowners migrate to the suburbs as the city becomes more racially and ethnically diverse. Rather, those who have left Detroit have been primarily black—although The Times concluded that they were moving into primarily “second-hand” suburbs that are likely to shift to mostly black communities in the next few years. Nonetheless, whatever

the circumstances in the suburbs, water bills in Detroit have increased by 120 percent in the last decade as a result of this depopulation, shifting the burden of the city’s expenses to those who are financially unable to leave.

Since the water crisis has begun, poorer areas of Detroit have been disproportionately affected by the shut offs. Although the purported logic for the shut offs is to force able residents to pay their water bills, these shut offs are being imposed on Detroit’s most vulnerable citizens, likely those who need publicly funded water the most. Simultaneously, more than half of the city’s commercial assets are indebted to the municipal government but are not facing shut offs. The Red Wings Hockey Arena and Ford Football Stadium owe tens of thousands of dollars each, and Detroit’s commercial sector owes in total $30 million in water bills. Yet all of these businesses’ taps have continued to flow without interruption. Detroit’s water crisis is not merely a reflection of the inability of low-income residents to pay, but also of a poorly designed water policy’s disproportionate impact on those who cannot advocate for themselves.

Detroit is one of the most racially and socio-economically segregated metropolitan areas in the United States, and this standing informs the context of its current water crisis. Eighty-three percent of its residents are black, and, as previously mentioned, thirty-eight percent are living in poverty. There is a correlation between racial segregation and class segregation, and in Detroit’s case, perhaps most indicative of this state of affairs is Eight Mile Road. It separates the heart of the city from the northern suburbs, and has historically served as a divide between the city’s black and economically disenfranchised residents from the predominantly wealthier and white population of the suburbs to the north. The water crisis has reflected this segregation—while neighborhoods south of Eight Mile Road have been targeted by water shut-offs, areas north of the line have been relatively undisturbed.

Myths of urban development have served to exacerbate these realities of separate and unequal in Detroit. Practices of redlining and gentrification in the guise of urban development projects have contributed to the upward movement of the wealthy at the cost of the further disenfranchisement of those who were socioeconomically disadvantaged to begin with, and the racial implications of such pointed economic segregation are difficult to ignore.

In 1974, Detroit was the center of Miliken v. Bradley, in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that de facto segregation was permissible under the Constitution. The white population of the city lashed out at the influx of black migrants during the Great Migration both economically and through direct physical violence. Partly as a result of the economically discriminatory practice of redlining, the Detroit public school system was nearly two-thirds black by the early 1970s. The lawsuit filed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) argued that although Detroit’s public schools did not officially mandate racial segregation, the city’s residential policies had enabled ra-

26

cially segregated educational facilities. However, the Court held that unless racist intent could be proven, racial segregation as a result of neutral policies was constitutional.

The Court’s decision has made possible a surge in racial segregation through purportedly neutral residentially segregationist policies. By 1987, white flight and redlining resulted in a 90% black population in Detroit’s public schools, as compared as to the majority white population in the schools of the surrounding suburbs. The movement to privatize the city’s water services is another stage in this process of the racial and economic segregation of Detroit’s residents. Whether intentional or not, the outcome is the same: while the wealthy bathe and hydrate as usual, the city’s lower-income residents are forced to live without life’s critical resource.

Rights advocates around the world have condemned the misallocation of water in Detroit. In late October, representatives from the United Nations conducted an investigation into the situation. One senior advisor’s assessment: “This is the worst violation of the human right to water I have ever seen outside of the worst slums in the poorest countries in the failed states of the global South.”

Detroit residents have expressed similar sentiments. In an interview with Vice News, longtime Detroit resident Sonia Brown questions the mismanagement of the DWSD: “How dare you rob a city…that’s surrounded

with nothing but water, knowing that this is what’s needed? Are you kidding me? I mean, have we truly become a society where we’ll go build wells…in third world countries, but we’ll say ‘to hell with our own?’”

In 2008, the United Nations explicitly recognized the human right to water. The United States has a history of responding to water unavailability abroad by throwing money at the problem. Whether or not this is a viable solution, this country has not afforded the same consideration to its own citizens. When the case of Detroit’s water shut-offs was brought before a federal bankruptcy judge, the court ruled that residents did not have a right to free water and, more importantly, that the city needed revenue more than its residents needed water.

The language of the ruling demonstrates a fundamental problem in the American attitude toward the Detroit water crisis: because it is a symptom of our economic system, it is not viewed as the human rights emergency that it is. Water is a human right, but the DWSD has redefined humanity as being limited to those who are wealthy, and disproportionately white.

Fortunately for residents of Detroit, Canadians from across the border are supplying those who have been affected by the shut offs with truckloads of bottled water. But until action is taken within our own borders, Detroit’s refusal to provide water for its residents will go down as yet another crisis of inequality in our nation’s history. n

27

money-laundering schemes. It could severely undermine Ms. Rousseff ’s economic plans and further hinder her second term as president.

The world did not take kindly to the election results in Brazil. Immediately following Ms. Rousseff ’s victory, The Wall Street Journal reported that Brazil’s stock market fell to a six-month low. Investors are not buying Ms. Rousseff ’s claims that Brazil’s economic downturn is due in large part to the global downturn, as many see her policies as ill advised. The Economist, for one, took the stance that Ms. Rousseff ’s state-centered policies will do little to solve the issues at play. Many also are hesitant at the moment to invest in Brazil’s future until a new finance minister is appointed, as Ms. Rousseff ’s ambiguous plans for future growth have not found many receptive ears. Ms. Rousseff also may have to deal with an impending credit downgrade. In March of 2014, Standard & Poor’s rated Brazilian bonds as one grade above junk status, but they may be downgraded further in the coming weeks due to the market’s lack of faith in Ms. Rousseff ’s ability to lead Brazil out of recession. A downgrade to junk bond status would further scare foreign investment from Brazil. Brazil would be forced to borrow at a higher rate, cutting out domestic investment in capital stock, raising interest rates, and thereby reducing demand for goods. All of this could threaten the very unemployment rate that Ms. Rousseff and the PT claim as a sign of imminent growth and prosperity.

There is also another issue at play, one that will become more prevalent in the coming 18 months. The cost of hosting the 2016 Olympics in Rio will be astronomical. Brazil has already hosted a worldwide event this past summer. The 2014 World Cup was a stirring sporting success wrought with political unrest and exponentially large costs. The cost of refurbishing and building new stadiums ran well beyond what was initially estimated.

Bloomberg, for example, had stated as early as May 2013 that the cost of the World Cup would realistically amount to approximately $15 billion, well above the proposed limits. The new stadiums, for example, cost the Brazilian public an estimated $4.2 billion according to CNN. The amount of money thrown into putting on an event of this magnitude, one that furthered divided the haves and the have-nots in Brazil, created social and political unrest. Anarchist movements sprung up, in addition to peaceful protestors, all of whom wanted the money being raised to go towards public works that all could use, not just public works that only some would ever see the inside of. Protestors were calling at that point for Ms. Rousseff ’s resignation. Although the protests have died down for the time being, it is highly probably that these same protests will rise up again, as the costs for the Rio Olympics will surely rise beyond their estimates. Bloomberg reported in January that the estimated $2.3 billion in infrastructure costs were expected to increase, and reports in April of 2014

by The Guardian spoke to the growing fear that Rio would not be ready to host the event and that in its haste, costs would rise even further.

There is a misconception that the Olympics and large sporting events of its kind bring in massive amounts of revenue for the country hosting.

They tend to do the opposite. The New York Times wrote in August 2014 about this notion and found that in most cases that there was, “little evidence that such events increase tourism or draw new investment”. Furthermore, Olympics that have drawn in high revenues, such as the Los Angeles Olympics in 1984, did not have exponentially large infrastructure costs like Brazil will surely have. In short, Brazil’s hosting of the Rio Olympics may be a sign that it wants to be on the world stage, but it will not bring in large amounts of revenue or investment that Brazil so desperately needs.

It is vital that Ms. Rousseff establishes a strong economic plan for growth. Brazil sits precariously on the ledge of losing its standing as an emerging economy power. It has much potential but must curb rising inflation and improve its infrastructure, among other things. It has spent far too much money on white elephants that do not benefit the public. Brazil must also reduce its holding within Petrobras. Energy remains a large part of Brazil’s future, but the state’s heavy hand in Petrobras, one of the largest energy companies in the world, has made foreign investors wary, resulting in Petrobras’ continuously dropping stock price - nearly 15% over the past year – and a fall in profits. There are structural deficiencies that Ms. Rousseff and the PT must address. Theirs may be the party of the people, but the people will not support them for long if Brazil’s economy remains rudderless. n

The Nearing Cliff Chase Savage

Little American media attention was drawn to the recent October Brazilian presidential elections. The debate at hand was whether or not to continue with the left-leaning policies of the majority party, the Workers’ Party (PT), or support the slightly more business-oriented and conservative policies of the leading minority party, the Brazilian Social Democracy Party, a center-right leaning party. That battle was waged most clearly in the presidential race between Dilma Rousseff of the PT, Brazil’s president since 2011 and first female president, and Aecio Neves, leader of the Brazilian Social Democrats. In a heated election, one in which corruption allegations, mismanagement accusations, and personal attacks were common, President Rousseff and the Workers’ Party won the election in the second round ballot. With Ms. Rousseff winning 51.6 % of the vote to the 48.4% won by Mr. Neves, it was the closest election in Brazilian history and marked by a distinct divide in the voters.

While much of the poor north and northeast of Brazil voted for Ms. Rousseff on the grounds of the PT’s popular social programs and the insistence that Mr. Neves would abolish these programs, the richer areas of the South and Southeast were won by the more business friendly policies of Mr. Neves. For example, in Sao Paulo, were approximately 20% of Brazilians hold residence and where about 33% of Brazil’s economy comes from, Mr. Neves won 64% of the vote compared to 36% won by Ms. Rousseff.

The less than resounding victory by the PT and Ms. Rousseff shows that that Brazil is not pleased with its politicians. In an area of the world where political machinery and patronage often carry the day and where only three Latin American presidents have lost reelection bids in the last thirty years, to have such a close result is a signal that change must come soon.

Much of the close result revolves around the struggling Brazilian economy. As the seventh largest economy in the world and the second largest in the Western Hemisphere, Brazil was pegged to emerge as a new great power. One of the BRIC nations, Brazil boasted an economy open to business, leading to strong foreign investment. While chronic poverty in Brazil has been reduced under Ms. Rousseff and unemployment throughout the country is approximately 5%, the economy has not grown since her election in 2011. For starters, The Economist reports that inflation currently runs barely even with growth in wages, running at approximately 6.7%.

Output also fell approximately 2.4% at an annual rate from April to June and the Brazilian economy has seen a retraction in growth over the past two quarters, signaling a recession.

Furthermore, Brazil is hampered by structural problems, such as poor infrastructure and excessive bureaucratic maneuvering that has caused many to believe that Brazilian politics are as convoluted as any. Ms. Rousseff and the PT, for example, have been accused of corruption for the government’s cozy relationship with Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company.

Petrobras, for example, has seen the recent corruption scandal widen in its scope, as the Wall Street Journal reported in November that many of Petrobras’ executives are under investigation on allegations of bribery and

28

From the Street to the Boutique Maeve Morse Chanel. Dior. Balenciaga. Dolce & Gabbana. Burberry. These names represent what most people in the fashion world regard to be the best of the best. They are the height of luxury retail, untouchable in regard to both their style and reputation.

For years, the names on the list of true luxury brands have remained stable. There have been no new major players competing for a spot. However, the fashion industry is seeing a huge change in the game as of late.

Over the past year, there has been a trend towards what most people consider to be mid-level fashion brands attempting to break into the luxury level.

This is not as simple as it seems. A company can’t just decide one day to be a luxury brand, and customers won’t suddenly be willing to pay $5,000 for one of their handbags. The process requires both good timing and the commitment to developing what experts call a “lifestyle brand.” In order to look at how companies go about this transition, and why this is a good time to make the transition, it is helpful to look closely at two such brands: Coach and Ralph Lauren.

Fashion is an incredibly cyclic industry. It fluctuates not only with trends, but with the economy as well. Brands have to respond to these cycles by adjusting what they are producing. After experiencing losses in recent quarters due to increased competition in the mid level fashion industry, both Coach and Ralph Lauren are taking significant steps to expand into the luxury market.

Economically speaking, this is a good time for brands to begin to expand into the luxury market. Generation Y is currently spending about 2.5 trillion dollars a year in retail. A significant portion of this is spent in the luxury level, as this younger generation that spent their young adult years in the throws of a major recession decides to spend their money on investment pieces. It is this return to “investment fashion,” as well as an uptick in the economy and spending patterns, that makes this the perfect time to expand into the luxury market. The typical consumer is no longer simply looking to buy clothes for practical purposes, but rather to invest in a lifestyle.

The fact that it is a good time to move into luxury fashion does not mean that any brand will be able to. Ralph Lauren and Coach provide an excellent look at brands that are trying to do the same thing, but will have very different results. Ralph Lauren is on the right track and is showing gains in the last quarter whereas many people believe that Coach is too far-gone to become a high luxury brand.

Breaking into the luxury market requires two things from a label; first increasing brand recognition, while at the same time creating an air of brand exclusivity. Coach is doing this by closing outlet stores all over the world, and discontinuing many of its less expensive lines. It is difficult to walk through a city and not see the Coach logo dangling from the arms of teenagers and printed over sneakers, wallets, key chains, headbands and umbrellas. These less expensive lines, making their “luxury” clientele less likely to buy their more expensive lines, have diluted the demand for their brand. Coach is having an extremely difficult time disassociating itself from this mid-level brand recognition.

Ralph Lauren, on the other hand, took a more clear approach in distinguishing themselves from their lesser brand, Polo, which has always been marketed as a less expensive off shoot of the Ralph Lauren brand. In 2011, the company dropped the word “Polo” from its corporate name. “It was a very clear statement to focus on Ralph Lauren as a luxury brand,” said

David Lauren in an interview with the New York Times.

The second thing that companies must do in order to become a luxury brand is creating a “lifestyle brand.” It is in this area that Coach and Ralph Lauren differ, indicating that it is this specification that seems to be the most important in launching a brand from mid level fashion to luxury.

What most people don’t realize is that profit for luxury brands don’t derive from the clothes they sell. Most profit for these higher-level companies comes from their accessories and “lifestyle” items. This includes bags, jewelry, perfume, shoes, or even makeup.

But how does a brand go about creating a lifestyle? What makes a young adult feel like a piece of clothing or an accessory can change how they are viewed in their own life? The answer is clear once you look at the brands that currently top the list of luxury labels. Chanel, Dior, Dolce & Gabanna, Valentino, Balenciaga. What do all these brands have in common? They all have a central figure in which the lifestyle they are trying to create is based. Chanel has the famous Mademoiselle, who not only revolutionized women’s fashion, but also became an icon in her own right.

Coach, despite its ascent from leather goods business run out of a loft in Soho to a $5 billion enterprise, has never had a central figure on which to be based. Its lines are seemingly directionless, based upon whatever style or trend is of the moment.

In comparison, Ralph Lauren is going about this by focusing on a new central figure to create its new lifestyle brand around. Ricky Lauren, the wife of Ralph Lauren, is the perfect candidate. The Ricky bag is the centerpiece of Ralph Lauren Corp’s push into luxury’s upper reaches. By using her as the face of their new luxury campaign, they are creating the woman that every other woman wants to be.

Whether it is feasible or not for either of these brands to reach the luxury level, this marks a larger trend in the fashion industry. The industry is moving away from trends and “of the moment pieces,” into a more economically stable era of investment pieces and using fashion to create a sustainable lifestyle. n

29

Lone Wolves or Stray Dogs?

Addressing the Realities of Self-Radicalized Terrorism Derek Kang

On October 20th 2014, Martin Couture Rouleau rammed his car into two Canadian soldiers exiting a veteran’s support center near Montreal, injuring one and killing Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent. Two days later, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau fatally shot Corporal Nathan Cirillo as the latter stood guard at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa. The next day, Zale Thompson attacked four NYPD officers with a hatchet, hospitalizing two of them before being shot and killed. The brazen and unprovoked nature of these attacks have triggered widespread fear throughout the international community, particularly in the West, as threat levels in the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, and now Canada have been raised to their highest points in four years.

Aside from being directed at law enforcement and military personnel, the most worrying characteristic of these attacks is the fact that their perpetrators operated independent of any organizational structure. From indoctrination to execution, all three assailants developed entirely on their own, radicalizing themselves with material available on the Internet and carrying out their attacks without external pressure or guidance. Labeled “lone wolves” by news outlets around the world, these attackers are feared to be the first of many created by the rise of increasingly influential organizations like the Islamic State (ISIS). However, before embarking on a campaign of fear-mongering and supporting the expansion of state surveillance powers, it is critical to first define “lone wolves,” examine the threat they pose, and question whether Martin, Michael, and Zale fall into this very select category of terrorist.

A premise initially popularized by white supremacist groups in the 1990s, “lone wolves” were romanticized as “warriors acting alone or in small groups who attacked the government or other targets in ‘daily, anonymous acts.’” These one-man cells of insurgency would prove virtually impossible to track and act as logistical nightmares for security personnel.

Classic examples of true “lone wolves” include Ted Kacyzinski, the infamous Unabomber, and Timothy McVeigh, the deadliest domestic terrorist in US history. These two men were the subject of some of the most extensive investigations in law enforcement history and were responsible for the deaths of over 170 people and hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.

Psychologically and behaviorally similar to high-functioning serial killers, these true “lone wolves” are also just as rare. “Organized and meticulous in the planning and preparation of his crimes,” this kind of terrorist is seen by intelligence analysts at the US National Counterterrorism Cen-

ter as “the doomsday scenario” second only to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Although they are seldom seen, the grave threat posed by a single actor is exemplified in Timothy McVeigh’s question to investigators, “Isn’t it kind of scary that one man could wreak this kind of hell?”

Fortunately, many of the purported lone wolves are only mere facades of the real thing, derisively referred to in law enforcement circles as “stray dogs.” According to senior RAND advisor, Brian Michael Jenkins, these men are oftentimes “estranged from but dependent on society, streetwise but lacking social skills, barking defiantly, and potentially dangerous but at the same time, suspicious, fearful, skittish.” Exhibiting histories of mental illness and engaging in criminal activity, these men are the disenfranchised few that slip through the cracks and into the hands of anti-establishment groups like ISIS. At their greatest utility, men like Martin, Michael, and Zale are simply pawns used to generate fear and while they undoubtedly cause harm, they serve as a distraction from the groups producing the radicalizing material in the first place.

Addressing either the stray dogs or their parent organizations will require a Herculean effort, but attempting the former and constantly monitoring potential lone wolves would be a futile allocation of resources. Even in the case of Martin Rouleau, Canadian law enforcement personnel had placed him on a no-fly list, confiscated his passport, and confronted him multiple times, but without the requisite evidence, they could not legally detain him.

Unless Western democracies like Canada wish to become the totalitarian societies George Orwell once foresaw, this misguided obsession with security would jeopardize their country’s founding values. The expansion of surveillance powers does not guarantee a decrease in successful attacks, but alienates communities perceived to be under greater scrutiny and creating information overload. Already, FBI agents see such theoretical manhunts as BFWATs or Big Fucking Wastes of Agent Time.

Instead, our efforts must be directed at the transnational organizations that launch international radicalization campaigns turning citizens into insurgents. The senseless acts of violence perpetrated against states will test their resilience, but states cannot afford to be distracted by these events however harmful. As Franklin Delano Roosevelt once said, “let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.” n

30

Follow us on twitter: @bowdoinglobal and on Facebook: www.facebook.com/bowdoinglobalist Email us with comments, concerns, and questions at: thebowdoinglobalist@gmail.com

Photography Credits Front Cover: Photo by Simon Fraser University Communications, Page 4: Photo by Freedom House, Page 5: Photo by Susy Morris, Page 6: Photo by flickr.com user Williamson, Page 7: Photo by flickr.com user MOD, Page 11: Photo by the European People’s Party, Page 12 - 13: Photo by the European People’s Party, Page 14-15: Photo by David Axe, Page 16: Photo by Hannah Rafkin, Page 22: Photo courtesy of USAID, Page 23: Photo courtesy of European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, Page 24-25: Photo by flickr.com user Republic of Korea, Page 27: Photo by flickr.com user SJ Carey, Page 28: Photo by flickr.com user Joyce Kelley Campos, Page 31: Photo by Alex Torres, Back Cover: Photo by flickr.com user SJ Carey.

31

32