What do you stand for? by Britney Lam

WHAT DO YOU STAND FOR? A S P E C T S O F A D E M O C R AT I C D I A L O G U E S I N H O N G K O N G

THE NEW DEMOCRACY IS GROUNDED IN THE POWER OF TRUE DIALOGUE The new democracy is grounded in the power of true dialogue among diverse people to help. The People (as a whole) transcend the limits of personal perspectives and resonate with each other and the world through the fact of their interconnectedness revealing bigger pictures and deeper wisdom than any individual or group could find alone, making it possible to create together solutions, visions, communities and societies that make sense and serve Life now and for generations to come.

"Wisdom, Democracy, and the Core Commons" in Earthlight, Fall/Winter 2002/2003

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN HONG KONG?

After 150 years of British rule, Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, but has operated semi-autonomously under what’s known as “one country, two systems,” outside of Beijing’s communist rule. The promise was that in 2017, Hong Kong would be allowed, for the first time, to elect its own leader (known as chief executive) in democratic elections, instead of having the slot filled by a committee from Beijing. But earlier this summer, China decided a committee was still necessary, and it would select the candidates for Hong Kong’s 2017 elections. Outrage has been building ever since. nymag

WHY SHOULD I PROTEST?

ENGAGE

Survey respond from a student who had joint the protest. What push you to stand up and want to start flighting? I think this is about the future of Hong Kong, I don’t want Hong Kong to become just a city in China (managed by Chinese). At first, I’m oppose of this action, but after that I found this as a peaceful protest. Very intellect and impersonal, this make me feel safe to join. I wish to tell the government to reject the decision from the Chinese government and fight for the fair election through this occupation.

什麼原因促使你站出來參與運動？我想到這是關乎香港的未來，不想香港沉淪，最終成為香港市（直豁市）最初我是支持罷課，反佔中的，但待發現佔中並不是想像中的激進派，反而是一個和平集會，且是一個理智，具有人情味的集會，這讓我很放心參與。希望藉集會，能向政府提出，徹回人大決定，爭取真普選。

Why do you think you should start to care about what’s happening in the society and think that’s affecting you?

為什麼你會開始關注社會上發生的事情並覺得是在影響你？

I’m not satisfy with the fake democracy of the government. Year gas is the main reason. I was worried of my classmate in the tear gas. So I start to care about it. When the government ignore the sound from us and their safety, but use excuse to cover their fault, pushing all the responsibilities to citizens, I’m worried they would get worse and we will lose the right to speak.

一直我也不滿政府的假民主，而濫用催淚彈事件是導火線。催淚彈事件中，身邊不少同學也在其中，我很擔心他們的安危，所以十分關注事件當發現政府一直漠視民意，並忽視市民的安危，並用種種藉口掩飾自己過錯，將一切藉口推卸於民，我擔心，將來的政府會變本加厲，到那時，市民連發聲的機會也沒有若失去自由及權利，自己及身邊的人也會像奴隸一般。

當你看到你的下一代／ What do you feel when you see next generations standing 你的同輩站出來抗爭，你有什麼感受？ up for the city and fight? Touching. We are comrade, fighting for future of Hong Kong.

很感動，覺得我們是站在同一條船的戰友，為香港的未來作戰。

What do you feel when you see these thing happening in your city/your living place?

當你看到抗爭事情發生時，你有什麼感受？

For the governor, who still think it’s citizens’ fault, I’m angry and helpless.

對於政府，仍認為錯在於人民，我感到憤怒及無奈。

For people who don’t care about politics, who still think protesters are vexations, affecting the safety of Hong Kong, I’m sorry and I wish they will wake up someday.

對於政治冷感的人，仍認為抗爭的人在無理取鬧，影響香港治安，我感到婉惜，並希望終有一天，他們會覺醒。

For the media in China, trying hard to hide the incident, I think they are shameful. For protesters, I appreciate their courages, and thank you for their contribution.

對於國內傳媒，嘗試將此抗爭事件掩飾，我認為很可恥。對於抗爭的人，我欣賞他們的勇氣，並很感謝他們的付出，同時也很讚賞他們的互助互勉的精神，喜歡他們的人情味。

PERSONAL VIEW

LISTEN

INTERVIWING HO YIN FUNG CY: Over the years there has not been much advancement some would even say it has taken a step backwards in the political movement, how do feel about this, do you feel disappointed?

CY: 過去多年，香港的民主都沒什麼

F: I think the movement this time has awaken the next generation. I don’t think this something (HK current affairs) can be achieved in 8-10 years. Your father has been at this for 30 years. I think this is a good opportunity to unite the second generation for the next movement in the future. Our organisation do not promote violence to raise awareness instead we take a more cultural and civilise approach, for example we print message t-shirts hand out flyers, make billboards. And recently the candle holder you have created for June 4. Our approach is to raise awareness through a non- direct and a more cultural and civilized approach.

F: 並沒有。我認為這次的事喚醒了

CY: What do you think about the current progress of the movement? It seems as though it’s starting to get out of hand.

CY: 你對於目前社會上的運動有什

F: I think most student is like when we were around 30 years ago, a bit naïve and impatience. Basically its about how long PROC will protect LCY. Its out of HK’s hand its about how much PROC wants to get out of it. In my opinion I think it’s going to end up as a violent disburse, because over the years this is how PROC had dealt with cultural movement. First they will use the opposing citizens to fight against the protesters. If and when that fails they sent in the army or police. In Hong Kong’s case it would be the police. I am unsure how neutral Hong Kong police is going to be I think that will depend of

F: 我覺得大部份同學或年輕人，都

進步，怎至有人說退步了，你有什麼感受？會否感到心灰意冷？

一理第二代。我認為這些事不是十年八年間便做到的。我跟你父親在爭取民主上努力了三十年，這次正好是一個機會將新一代帶入這個運動，或將他們團結起來，準備下一波運動。我們不使用暴力爭取民主，而是用比較文化性的方法。例如我們會製作文化T－shirt，設計海報單張和你最近幫忙做的燭光杯。我們都是以一些非直接或文化性比較強的手法去表達。我認為這是我們的宗旨。

麼看法？好像開始失控。

好像二三十年前的我們，比較浪漫主義，或者應該說是比較心急想有結果。但我認為現在最重要看的是，到底共產黨想保護梁振英到什麼時候，幾件事其實也不是香港可以控制，只是看共產黨覺得自己願意輸多少，或嬴多少。我認為這運動只會有一個結果，就是暴力清場，因為歷年來共產黨在處理民族運動上所採取的行動就是這樣。他們首先挑起群眾間的鬥爭。鬥輸了就出動軍隊和警察，當然在香港便是警察。至於香港警隊有多中立，或對為政治服務有多抗拒呢，就要看香港警隊的智慧了。我認為群眾

how disgusted they would feel towards being a political tool. I think that people can never win over the government and the government body unless it’s a violent protest, but our movement is non-violent. I think in the long term we will lose as the government has a lot more resources. For example like the other night the protesters had a break in the middle of the night to recuperate. In the long term, basically they are just waiting for an opportunity. Because the head of the movement cannot control100000+ people at once. When a small portion of protesters acts out and turns hostile against the police. The situation can go in a completely different direction over night or in two hours.

永遠都鬥不過政府或政府機器，除非是以暴力革命，但明顯地香港並不會這樣做。繼續鬥下去是一定嬴不了他們的，因為始終他們有更多資源。就像這次，看到昨晚或前晚，只不過中間給了些時間群眾休息，又因為剛好是星期五六，他們才有時間恢復，不然長時間跟他們拖延的話，群眾會很快變。因為你不能控制這麼多人，這數以十萬或以上的人，是不可能全部都聽從佔中三子或學聯的話。只要一小部份人沉不住氣，使用暴架，整件事就會在一晚內，怎至一兩小時內轉向。

CY: Have you occasionally talk about this with your students.

CY: 那麼你有沒有跟你地學生討論，

F: I have not talk about this in class, because I am not a politics teacher. What I have done though even before the recent event is I try to incorporate some of the ideas and knowledge into my teaching. For example I have a power point which talks about the evolution of posters in China, I would give them some brief history starting from republic of china or maybe even earlier, like the civil war, fight against the Japanese during WWII, the formation of the people republic of china and the “Big leap” Mao talked about. Really the political and public promotion is actually very closely related to design. So therefore I slowly integrate some of these ideas in my lessons. To give an example I would whiles teaching photography I would show them some photos from June 4 incident in 1989 and now since

F: 我不會直接在課上說。第一是因

或談及這方面的事？

為我不是教政治的。但我會，無論有沒有事發生，在講解關於設計的時候談及。例如我有一個簡報是關於中國海報的演變，我就會從民國或再前一點的時間開始講解，內戰、抗日、共產黨成立、民革、三反五反、大躍進、土伐亂國，這些政治宣傳或公共宣傳其實跟設計有關，因為設計是跟整個民生有很緊密的接觸。我就會在這些方面慢慢帶出有關的事。又例如在我教攝影的時候，當我說到報導攝影和記實攝影的時候，我會講一些八九六四的照片，當然現在會更多，今年我也會加上佔中的照片。我會間接地談及，亦不會討論整個政治事件，而是講解這個攝影師，或設計師在處理這個歷史背景或社會背景上，是怎麼反應的。對著大範圍的學生時我會這樣。但如果有些同學直接的問我，例如兩星期前，有同學跟

the central occupancy I will now incorporate this in it too. I don’t actually directly talk about the politics behind it I would discuss with the students about the photographer instead, like how this person has reacted under that particular historical and social background. If it’s just a small number of students, some of them would even ask me directly, like for example two weeks ago a student said to me that when the central occupancy dies down, when it loses momentum, he asked me then what? I only spoke to him for a few minutes. I don’t actually pick a topic to discuss with them, because politics is not my field of study. But as a person who’s cultural and as a designer, I believe we should have some involvement in the sociality.

我說他認為整事靜了下來，失去了動力時怎麼辨，我才會跟他討論幾分鐘，但我不會特別提出一個主提來講解。我只是認為作為一個文化人，應該要想一下怎麼在社會事件上參與。

CY: Do you have some students that feel disgusted to these movements?

CY: 你有沒有些同學是對政治或社

F: Most of them don’t agree, some of my students are hedge fund managers; most are already in sociality working for the rich.

F: 很多，有些是基金經理，為有錢

CY: How do you face them?

CY: 那麼你怎樣面對他們？

F: I will not face them, I would choose not to see them, as we have different ideas no need for quarrel.

F: 我不會面對他們，我會選擇不跟

CY: What if these individuals attend your class with theses sensitive subjects? What are their reactions?

CY: 但當這些人上你那些提及政治

F: In these situations in would not talk about politics, because these would lead to disagreement and lose friends. But they are your students, how do you conduct your lessons then? Students. No because my Facebook is inactive.

F: 在這些場合我不會講及政治，因

CY: But they attend your lessons, when you talk about these?

CY: 但他們是你的學生，你要跟他

F: My current students are few in numbers. I rarely reply.

F: 我現在的學生不多，所以我很少

會運動反感的？

人做事。

他們見面。道不同不相為同。

的課是，他們有什麼反應？

為這樣就會失去朋友。

們上課。

回應，知道就可以了。

CY: Where do you think you stand in terms of the over all situation, as in a messenger which relays these information.

CY: 你認為你在各方面上是處於一

F: Like I said before I have my boundaries. I agree with some academics. Living is resisting. Still being here provides opportunity for more actions, because we are not a major organization we have limited resources our greatest resistance is just to exist. Even if and when they rule and run things, if I still exist in the system, and with my background as a teacher I will use my knowledge and expertise as a designer to affect others around me. This is what I have been doing for the pass three decades.

F: 就像我剛才所說，我有我的底

CY: And for the next generation? Would you spent a lot of time to talk and explain this to them.

CY: 對於下一代呢？你會否花很多

F: Yes I will. I have already poisoned my sons and daughter. They’ve passed the point of turning back.

F: 會。我的子女已經給我們荼毒到

CY: What about the others.

CY: 那麼其他呢？

F: Because I’m not a politics teacher, I cannot force anyone. It’s more like enlightening them to find their own path. Hoping they would see or realize that they need to do something. I just provide them with some support. Because I can’t do too much as I’m not a leader or a political figure. What I can do is just provide some support and lend them a hand that’s all.

F: 對於其他人，我認為我不太適

個什麼角色呢，例如在傳遞這些資訊上。

線。我十分同意一個學者的一句話，存在就是抵抗。只要他們不欺負你，那我還有更多機會去做現在我想做，或將來要做的事。因為我並不是什麼組織的人，沒什麼資源，我的能力就是存在於這個社會上。就算他們用他們的方法去統治這個社會的時候，只要我依然在這個系統裡，就可以了。尤其我現在的工作是教育工作者，我更可以培養或感染更多的人，我認為這就是我地底線。如果係在社會上有其他職位或角色的話，當然你可以做更多。但依我的情況的話，就是在文化上去影響別人，或用我的專業，就是設計的能力去影響的周圍的人，或作出溝通。這就是我這幾十年來的體驗。

時候去跟他們講解？

不能回頭了。

合，因為我不是教政治的，我不能強逼他們。但如果有段時間他們好像得到些啟蒙，他認為他看到，或覺悟到一些事，認為自己要作出行動的話，我會在適當的時間給予適當的支持。但我不能做太多，因為我不是一個領袖或在政治上有什麼研究，我只能在旁邊幫忙扶助一下。

IMPACT OF THE PROTEST

I N T E R R O G AT E

EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF THE “UMBRELLA MOVEMENT”

There has been a wide range of views in Hong Kong about the value of democratic elections. So far, the Chinese government has consistently chosen to engineer the Hong Kong electoral system so that no individual it mistrusts could be elected chief executive (CE) and no political coalition that it fears could win control of the Legislative Council (or LegCo). To elect the chief executive, it created an election committee composed mainly of people it trusts. For LegCo, it established functional constituencies that give special representation to establishment economic and social groups. These functional constituencies together pick half the members of LegCo. As a result, Hong Kong’s economic elite has dominated those institutions. Major economic interests in Hong Kong have been happy with the current set-up because it provides them with privileged access to decision-making and the ability to block initiatives proposed by the democratic camp. Within this establishment, there is long-standing belief that majority rule would create irresistible demands for a welfare state, which would raise taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals and sap Hong Kong’s competitiveness. The public, on the other hand, supports democratization. In the most representative election races (for some LegCo seats), candidates of the pro-democracy parties together get 55 to 60 percent of the vote. Those parties have tried for over twenty years to make the electoral system more representative and to eliminate the

ability of Beijing and the establishment to control political outcomes. But there are divisions within the pan-democratic camp between moderate and radical factions, based on the degree of mistrust of Beijing’s intentions. There is a working class party and a labor confederation that supports Beijing and is supported by it. On electoral reform, it has followed China’s lead. Of course, any electoral system requires the protection of political rights. The Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law protected those rights on paper, and the judiciary generally has upheld them. But there are serious concerns in Hong Kong that political rights are now being whittled away. The August 31st decision of the PRC National People’s Congress-Standing Committee on the 2017 Chief Executive election confirmed the fears of Hong Kong’s pan-democratic camp that Beijing does not intend to create a genuinely democratic electoral system. That decision almost guaranteed there would be with some kind of public protest. Before August 31st, there had been some hope in Hong Kong that China’s leaders would set flexible parameters for the 2017 election of the chief executive, flexible enough to allow an election in which candidates that represented the range of local opinions could compete on a level playing field. Instead, the rules the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress laid down were interpreted as ensuring that Beijing and the local Hong Kong establishment, by controlling the

nominating committee, could screen out candidates that they saw as a threat to their interests. I happen to believe that before August 31st there was available a compromise on the nomination process. The approach I have in mind would have liberalized the composition of the nominating committee so that it was more representative of Hong Kong society and set a reasonable threshold for placing someone in nomination. This would have been consistent with the Basic Law (a Chinese requirement) and likely ensured that a panDemocratic politician could have been nominated (the democrats’ minimum hope). Hong Kong voters would have had a genuine choice. There were Hong Kong proposals along these lines. Such an approach would have had a chance of gaining the support of moderate Democrats in Legislative Council, enough for reaching the two-thirds majority required for passage of the election plan. Reaching such a compromise was difficult because of the deep-seated mistrust between the Hong Kong democratic camp and Beijing, and within the democratic camp. If there was to be movement towards a deal Beijing would have had to signal that it was serious about such a compromise, in order to engage moderate democrats. It chose not to, and an opportunity was lost. Why Beijing spurned a compromise is unclear. Perhaps it interpreted its “universal suffrage” pledge narrowly, to mean

one-person-one-vote, and not a competitive election. Perhaps it wished to defer a truly competitive contest until it was sure that oneperson-one-vote elections would not hurt its interests. Perhaps Beijing was overly frightened about the proposed civil disobedience campaign called “Occupy Central.” Perhaps it judged that radical democrats would block their moderate comrades from agreeing to a compromise. Perhaps China actually believed its own propaganda that “foreign forces” were behind the protests. Perhaps it never had any intention of allowing truly representative government and majority rule. But if Beijing believed that taking a hard line would ensure stability, it was badly mistaken. Whatever the case, the majority in Hong Kong saw the August 31st decision as a bait-and-switch way for Beijing to continue to control the outcome of the CE election and as a denial of the long-standing desire for genuine democracy. A coalition of student leaders, Occupy Central supporters, democratic politicians, radical activists, and middle class people resorted to the only political outlet they had: public protest. If the Chinese government had wished to empower Hong Kong radicals, it couldn’t have hit upon a better way. Although Beijing’s August 31st decision guaranteed a public response in Hong Kong, the form it took was unexpected. Student groups preempted the original Occupy Central plan, and the takeover of three separate downtown areas resulted, not from a plan but from the

flow of events. The Hong Kong Police did overreact in some instances, but each time it sought to reestablish control, there was a surge of public support for the core protester groups, mobilized by social and other media. The protests were fueled by more than a desire for democracy. Also at work were factors common in other advanced societies. Hong Kong’s level of income and wealth inequality is one of the highest in the world. Young people tend to believe that they will not be able to achieve a standard of living similar to that of their parents. Real wages have been flat for more than a decade. Buying a home is out of reach for young people, in part because a small group of real estate companies control the housing supply. Smart and ambitious individuals from China compete for good jobs. Hong Kong students have gotten the most attention in the current protests. Just as important however, are older cohorts who are pessimistic about their life chances. They believe that the Hong Kong elite, which controls both economic and political power, is to blame for these problems. They regard genuine democracy as the only remedy. The Hong Kong government’s response has been mixed but restrained on the whole. The Hong Kong police did commit excesses in their attempt to control the crowds. Teargas was used once early on, and pepper spray on a number of occasions since then. There was one particular incident where police officers beat a protester excessively (for which seven of the officers involved were arrested last week). It is worth noting that the scenario for which the police prepared was

not the one that occurred. What was expected was a civil disobedience action in a relatively restricted area with a moderate number of protesters who, following their leaders’ plan, would allow themselves to be arrested. What happened in late September was very different. There were three venues instead of one. Many more protesters took part, and they had no interest in quickly offering themselves for arrest. Instead, they sought to maintain control of public thoroughfares, a violation of law, until Beijing and the Hong Kong government made major concessions. Even when courts have ordered some streets cleared, those occupying have not always complied. After the initial clashes, the Hong Kong government chose not to mount a major crackdown but instead to wait out the protesters. It accepted the occupation for a number of weeks, and now seeks to clear some streets pursuant to court order. Moreover, the government undertook to engage at least one of the students in a dialogue over how to end the crisis. In the only session of the dialogue to occur, on October 21st, senior officials floated ideas to assuage some of the protesters’ concerns and to improve upon the electoral parameters laid down by Beijing. The dialogue has not progressed for two reasons. First of all, the Hong Kong government is not a free agent in resolving the crisis. Beijing is the ultimate decider here, and the Hong Kong government must stay within the guidelines it sets. Second, the student federation leaders who took part in the dialogue are not free agents either. They represent only one of the student groups, and other actors are involved. With its leadership fragmented, the movement has never figured out its minimum goals and therefore what it would accept in return for ending the protest. It underestimated Beijing’s

HONG KONG’S LEVEL OF INCOME AND WEALTH INEQUALITY IS ONE OF THE HIGHEST IN THE WORLD

resolve and instead has insisted on the impossible, that Beijing withdraw the August 31st decision. Now, even though the Hong Kong public and the leaders of the original Occupy Central effort believe that the protesters should retire to contend another day, the occupation continues. For those who believe that the rule of law is a fundamental pillar of Hong Kong’s autonomy, the last two months have been worrisome. Once some members of a community decide for themselves which laws they will obey and which they won’t; once the authorities pick and choose which laws they will enforce and abide by, the rule of law begins to atrophy. The protesters’ commitment to democracy is commendable. The generally restrained and peaceable character of their protest has been widely praised. But something is lost when both the community and its government begin to abandon the idea that no-one is above the law. Regional views and implications Observers have believed that the implications of the Umbrella Movement are greatest for Taiwan, because Beijing has said that Taiwan will be reunified under the same formula that it used for Hong Kong (one-country, two systems). And there was momentary media attention in Taiwan when the Hong Kong protests began, but it quickly dissipated. The vast majority of Taiwan citizens have long since rejected one-country, two systems. China’s Hong Kong policies only reconfirm what Taiwan people already knew. Hong Kong events also send a signal to all of East Asia’s democracies, not just Taiwan. Anyone who studies Hong Kong’s politics and society comes to the conclusion that it has been as ready for democracy as any place in East Asia,

and that its instability in recent years is due more to the absence of democracy than because it is unready. The long-standing premise of U.S. policy is that Hong Kong people are ready for democracy. Since the protest movement began, the U.S. government has reiterated its support for the rule of law, Hong Kong’s autonomy, respect for the political freedoms of Hong Kong people, and a universal-suffrage election that would provide the people of Hong Kong “a genuine choice of candidates that are representative of the peoples and the voters’ will.” Washington has also called for restraint on all sides. Finally, the strategic question for East Asia is what the rise of China means for its neighbors. That question will be answered in part by China’s power relative to the United States and others. But it will also be answered by what happens between China and its neighbors in a series of specific encounters. Through those interactions, China will define what kind of great power it will become. North Korea, the East and South China Seas, and Taiwan are the most obvious of these specific encounters. But Hong Kong is as well. If the struggle there for a more democratic system ends well, it will tell us something positive about China’s future trajectory. If it ends badly, it will say something very different. Looking forward, several options exist for resolving the crisis and only one of them is good. One option is a harsh crackdown by China. Article 18 of the Basic Law gives Beijing the authority to declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong if “turmoil” there “endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control” of the Hong Kong government. In that case, Chinese national laws would be applied to

Hong Kong and could be enforced in the same way they are in China. We would then see crowd control, Chinese style. I believe this scenario is unlikely as long as Beijing has some confidence that the protest movement will become increasingly isolated and ultimately collapse. A second option is that the occupation ends but the unrepresentative electoral system that has been used up until now continues. That would happen because two-thirds of the Legislative Council is required to enact the one-personone-vote proposal of the Chinese and Hong Kong governments for electing the chief executive. Getting two-thirds requires the votes of a few democratic members. If all moderate democrats oppose the package for whatever reason, then the next CE will be elected by the 1,200-person election committee, not by Hong Kong voters. Protests are liable to resume. There is a danger that in response, Beijing will move quietly to restrict press freedom, the rule of law, and the scope for civil society beyond what it has already done. The third scenario is for a late compromise within the parameters of Beijingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s August 31st decision. The goal here would be to create a process within the nominating committee that would make it possible for a leader of the democratic camp to be nominated for the chief executive election, creating a truly competitive election. That requires two things. First, the nominating committee must be more representative of Hong Kong society. Second, the nominating committee, before it picks the two or three election nominees, should be able to review a greater number of potential nominees. Done properly, that could yield the nomination of a democratic politician whom Beijing does not mistrust but whose platform would reflect the aspirations of democratic voters.

Prominent individuals in Hong Kong have discussed this approach in print, and Hong Kong senior officials have hinted a willingness to consider it. For such a scenario to occur, Beijing would have to be willing to show more flexibility than demonstrated so far; the Hong Kong government should be forthcoming about what it has in mind; and some leaders of the democratic camp must be willing to engage both Beijing and the Hong Kong government. In the climate of mutual mistrust that has deepened since August 31st, that is a tall order. But at this point it appears to be the best way out of a bad situation.

On December 3, Richard Bush delivered testimony before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Source: www.brookings.edu

PROTEST ART

D E L I B E R AT E

PROTEST ART

Protest Art or Art Activism, both directly within movements and in the surrounding culture, has been a key element of social protest.

SOCIAL MEDIA VS. MASS MEDIA

C O M M U N I C AT E

IN THE MEDIA

Views projected in different medias that reflect how the protest has been portraid inside and outside Hong Kong.

I canâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t help crying. This is a new Hong Kong.

Please leave the computer, we need you here.

Very emotional today. Iâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;m here. Everyone is clam and have order. They are asking the government with peace. But when I see loads of police block the entrence and exit after sunset, I felt horror and anger. Very memorial this time. I hope everyone would be safe.

The Occupy Central is happening. I can feel the hop for the democratic movement in Hong Kong for the first time.

Who havenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t speak up for their right?

Please listen to your heart. Donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t feel comfortable to stay back from all the issue happening in Hong Kong.

Been there for 10 hours, I really want to ask Mr. Leung, Hong Kong people has use their action to tell you, they can do anything just for the democracy of Hong Kong. How about you?

The quality of Hong Kong people is, whatever you attack them, asking them to go away, attacking them with tear gas, they would fight back, they would only walk back with hands in the air. And for this quality, if they have made up their mind, whatever how much pressure you put on them, they would still find a way to live. Hong Kong people, you should be pround for yourself today.

There’s some elderly people said, “You should take care of your study first, don’t go for protest. What do you get from this kind of suffer?” This is my own decision, no one asked me to go there. We can just think of ourselves. All the people went out is the one who didn’t just think of their own benefit but protect everyone’s Hong Kong, for everyone’s benefits. Elderly people aging 70 don’t find it hard, as for me, 20 years old only, I got health, I really can’t find any reason not supporting. I didn’t give up my study. After the preparation for my final written exam, finished my responsibilities, I will go out again.

Everytime when people ask the people who oppose to the protest why they think it’s affecting their lifr, they just say its blocking the road so cars can’t go through, people can’t walk through, no business for shops. When the occupy happened, train are not here, bus can’t get there, the police blocked the road. So people walk from Central, from Admiralty and Causeway Bay. For today, it’s the big company which makes the local shop have no business and money. Even if you can open the shop today, remain slient to unfair situation, they couldn’t live for long. Please don’t say that how much suffer you’ve got. Whether you can get to certain place. All is depends on whether. you still want to walk.

THE END ?

WHAT IS NEXT? “There has been ‘solid growth’ in support for movement which has highlighted the need for change to democratic structure.” Benny Tai Co-founder of Occupy Central

According to China’s best known military theorist, Sun Tzu (writing two-and-a-half thousand years ago), the best kind of victory is won without fighting. Seeing the mainland stable throughout two-and-a-half months of street protest in Hong Kong is just such a victory. But provoking thousands of citizens onto the streets in the first place is, by the same token, no kind of victory at all. Beijing brought the umbrella movement on itself. With its white paper in June and electoral arrangements in August, it made clear that it would not only draw up a narrower political board game in Hong Kong but control the pieces too. Hong Kong citizens were already resentful of the scale of mainland tourism and immigration, and the young alienated by a growing list of frustrations including impossible property prices. In this combustible mix, Beijing’s announcements were the proverbial sparks that lit the prairie fire. The sobering fact in relation to the Umbrella Movement is that a generation of young people in Hong Kong is increasingly politicised and alienated from China. With their demand for democratic rights, the members of the umbrella movement effectively rebranded themselves “not China”. Hong Kong has seen a generation of young people devote energy, passion and sacrifice into a competing dream.

Each dialogue initiative has its own purpose, one that is tailored to a particular problem situation or need. The recent proliferation of dialogue processes, however, and the adoption and promotion of dialogue as an approach by an array of national and international institutions, indicate a sense of need that goes beyond the specifics of any one situation.

EACH DIALOGUE INITIATIVE HAS ITS OWN PURPOSE Democratic Dialogue

D I A L O G U E I S T H E W AY T O D E M O C R A C Y

A supportive video â&#x20AC;&#x153;What do you stand forâ&#x20AC;?

W H AT D O Y O U S TA N D F O R ? By Britney Lam Chin & Jaione Cerrato Printed in Hong Kong, 2014