Brooks School Advanced History Capstone Journal 2023-2024

Advanced History Capstone Journal

THE ZIONIST QUESTION: A VENICE OR A BOER STATE

By Adam Jin

COMING OUT OF DENIAL? THE INTERPLAY OF MORAL, LEGAL, AND MEDICAL DISCOURSES OF MALE SAME-SEX RELATIONS IN CHINA’S HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC AND ITS EFFECTS

By Zhaohan (Jasmine) Shi

Visit www.brooksschool.org/academics/departments/history to learn more about the history department at Brooks School.

THE ZIONIST QUESTION:

A VENICE OR A BOER STATE

Adam Jin

April 13, 2024

Advanced History Capstone

The U.S. House of Representatives Resolution 894, engrossed on December 5th, 2023 reads, “Now, therefore, be it resolved, That the House of Representatives - clearly and firmly states that anti-Zionism is antisemitism.”1 On the 31st of December that same year, Syed Zain Abbas Rizvi, a political and economic analyst wrote, in his article, “Anti-Zionism, Not Anti-Semitism,” that, “opposing the systemic massacre of a people does not constitute hatred for an entire religion or ethnicity.”2

The article written by Rizvi and the resolution given by the House of Representatives were responses to recent escalations in Israel and the Gaza strip. Although conflicts have been incessant and tension has remained high around the area for decades, an attack on southern and central Israel by Hamas militants on October 7, 2023 greatly intensified the dispute.3 In retaliation to Hamas’ assault which led to more than 1000 deaths and many taken as hostages, the Israeli government took actions that received widespread condemnation.4 Much of the public as well as organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch regarded Israeli military operations as war crimes, which involved constant bombardment of civilians, denying access to essential resources like food and water, and blockading that has prevented noncombatants from escaping.56 As a result of the ruthless actions taken by the Israeli government, anti-Zionist sentiments have surged, evident in both social media and scholarly writings. However, opinions on the

1 Strongly condemning and denouncing the drastic rise of antisemitism in the United States and around the world, H.R. 894, 118th Cong, (2023-2024)

2 Rizvi, Syed Zain Abbas, “Anti-Zionism, Not Anti-Semitism!” South Asia 27 (2023), Ac cessed March 2, 2024, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A775394206/GPS?u=m lin_n_brooks&sid=bookmark-GPS&xid=caad48dd

3 Bill Hutchinson, “Israel-Hamas War: Timeline and key developments,” ABC News, No vember 22, 2023, accessed December 2, 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/Internation al/timeline-surprise-rocket-attack-hamas-israel/story?id=103816006.

4 Bill Hutchinson, “Israel-Hamas War: Timeline and key developments,” ABC News, No vember 22, 2023, accessed December 2, 2023, https://abcnews.go.com/Internation al/timeline-surprise-rocket-attack-hamas-israel/story?id=103816006.

5 Amnesty International Editors, “Damning evidence of war crimes as Israeli attacks wipe out entire families in Gaza,” Amnesty International, October 20, 2023, accessed December 2, 2023. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/damning-evidence-of-warcrimes-as-israeli-attacks-wipe-out-entire-families-in-gaza/

6 Human Rights Watch Editors, “Israel: Starvation Used as Weapon of War in Gaza,” Hu man Rights Watch, December 18 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/12/18/israel-star vation-used-weapon-war-gaza

relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism remain varied among communities regardless of faith or political standings.

This conflicted portrayal and judgment of Zionism is not merely a result of recent events. In 2004, Professor Robert Wistrich, widely considered one of the world’s leading authorities on the subject of anti-Semitism published the article, “Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism.”7 He begins by stating, “Anti-Zionism has become the most dangerous and effective form of anti-Semitism in our time, through its systematic delegitimization, defamation, and demonization of Israel.”8

Almost twenty years earlier, Bernard Avishai, adjunct Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem published his book, The Tragedy of Zionism. 9 American writer, educator, and Zionist activist described Bernard Avishai’s intent in writing the book, as to, “dispose of Zionism--socialist, religious, and Revisionist--as a viable movement.”10

It is apparent that scholars with Jewish, and Non-Jewish backgrounds, with extensive knowledge and utmost authority on the topic have taken drastically different stances on Zionism. Despite the ample historical documentation available surrounding the question of Israel and Zionism, there has been little progress in mediating the polarity of this matter. A partial source of this dispute lies in the many different interpretations of Zionism. To the many that criticize the movement, Zionism is seen as the physical creation of the independent state of Israel. However, the Jewish state was not an independent nation at its birth, and was the result of years of effort and struggle.

In July 1922, the League of Nations granted the United Kingdom a mandate over the territory of Palestine, which was formerly part of the Ottoman Empire.11 As the British had promised through the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the Jewish people would be secured a national home within the territory that is now under English provision.12 Israel thus existed under the British Government until 1948, when David Ben-Gurion, the Executive Head of the World Zionist Organization and Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Palestine declared its independence after the termination of the mandate.13 Ben-Gurion became the first prime minister of Israel on May 14, 1948.14 However, far before the creation of either the mandate or the state, there had been efforts

7 Robert Wistrich. “Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism,” Jewish Political Studies Review 16 (2004), Accessed March 2, 2024, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25834602.

8 Robert Wistrich. “Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism,” Jewish Political Studies Review 16 (2004), Accessed March 2, 2024, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25834602.

9 Marie Syrkin, “The tragedy of Zionism: revolution and democracy in the land of Isra el,” The New Republic 193 (1985), Accessed February 26, 2024. https://link.gale. com/apps/doc/A3985908/GPS?u=mlin_n_brooks&sid=bookmark-GPS&xid=72b59175

10 Syrkin, “The tragedy of Zionism: revolution and democracy in the land of Israel.”

11 League of Nations, July 24, 1922, Mandate for Palestine, C.529.M.314.1922.VI, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-201057/.

12 Arthur Balfour, Arthur Balfour to Lionel Rothschild, November 2, 1917, In The Balfour Declaration, United Kingdom.

13 Dan Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict: a Beginner’s Guide, Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2001, 46.

14 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 46.

from numerous parties opposing as well as supporting the creation of this Jewish national home. The modern Zionist movement first gained popularity as a plausible solution to the age-old “Jewish question” which had intensified in Europe prior to the first World War.15 The desire and hope for the Jewish homeland, however, can be traced further back as it was promised in the Gospels that the messiah would bring the Jewish people back to their promised land one day.16 In the face of incessant and increased intolerance, some Jews turned to the idea of being proactive in catalyzing the arrival of the Messiah.17 They sought to do so by taking back the promised land.18 The initial development and growth of modern political Zionism is often credited to Theodore Herzl who is considered by many as the father of the movement. Aside from gathering public support, he spoke to Monarchs and religious leaders, organized several Zionist Congress meetings, the first of which took place in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland and wrote countless texts promoting his vision for the future of the Jewish people.19

While Herzl, his Zionist Organization, and the religious Zionists worked arduously to promote their movements to the Jewish public and secure support from world leaders, the local Arab population had also begun their effort to resist the migration into their homeland. A more organized effort can be seen in the publication of the first Palestinian anti-Zionist weekly newspaper in 1908 by a Christian Arab, Najib Nassar, four years after the death of Herzl.20

The Arab population in the area had been, prior to the establishment of the British Mandate, striving for independence from the Ottoman Empire and were under the impression during the first World War that their goal would be accomplished with the fall of their ruler. They had been convinced so by vague promises made by the British in what is known as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence: a series of letters between British high commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon and emir of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali.21 The former, representing the British government, promised the Arab leader independence over a large portion of land after the war, including the territory of Palestine, if the emir were to launch a revolt against the Ottoman Empire.22

However, with the Sykes-Picot agreement, signed in secrecy between France and the United Kingdom in 1916 which divided the Ottoman territories between the European powers, and the Balfour Declaration in 1917 which promised the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine, the natives realized that the promise had been broken despite having fulfilled their part of it.2324 They

15 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 3.

16 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 3.

17 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 3.

18 Michael Brenner, In Search of Israel: The History of an Idea, New Jersey: Princeton Un versity Press, 2018, 19.

19 Brenner, In Search of Israel

20 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict

21 “The Mcmahon Correspondence of 1915-16,” Bulletin of International News 16, no. 5 (1939): 6–13, Accessed April 2, 2024, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642429.

22 “The Mcmahon Correspondence of 1915-16,” Bulletin of International News 16, no. 5 (1939): 6–13, Accessed April 2, 2024, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642429.

23 Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot, The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916, Accessed April 2, 2024,https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/sykes.asp.

24 Balfour, Arthur, Arthur Balfour to Lionel Rothschild, November 2, 1917, In The Balfour

continued in their struggle for autonomy.

The 1930s and 40s saw continued Palestinian Arab revolt against the British administration along with increased Jewish immigration due to Nazi persecution in Europe.25 As millions were killed all over Europe, hundreds of thousands flooded out, in search of sanctuary, with many landing in the future Jewish homeland. The two sides struggled against each other, with the Palestinian population attempting to drive out and limit the Jews while the Jewish population continued to pour in and fought for control in the area.26 In 1937, The UK Peel Commision Report recognized the severity of the conflict between the two populations and suggested partition of Palestine.27 The recommendation was ultimately rejected by the British government as it became clear that the creation of a peaceful Jewish, Arab and neutral state in the territory was infeasible.28 After issuing the White Paper in 1937, limiting Jewish immigration and seeing little progress in resolving the conflict, the British proposed to relinquish the mandate and offered the question of Palestine to the United Nations.29 Finally, in May of 1948, the British mandate over Palestine was terminated and on May 14th, Israel declared its independence.30

Immediately following the event, five Arab nations, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq launched an attack on the newly established state, marking the start of the first Arab-Israeli war.31 As May 14th marked the Independence day of Israel to the Zionists, May 15th became the official day commemorating the Nakba, or “catastrophe” to the Arab world.32 However, the Nakba itself, referred to by some as the displacement of the Palestinains, and others an ethnic cleansing, took place over much more than a day’s time.33 In April of 1948, a Zionist paramilitary group killed hundreds of Palestinians in the village, Deir Yassin near Jerusalem, after which the massacre was named. 34Thousands of local Arabs were displaced and dislocated through violent means in other instances.35 The severity of the matter and the destitution brought upon the Palestinians is evidently reflected in the United Nations’ effort to provide aid, such as through the UNRPR

Declaration, United Kingdom.

25 Cohn-Sherbok, Dan, and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 128.

26 Cohn-Sherbok, Dan, and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 128.

27 United Kingdom, January 7, 1947, Palestine Royal Commision Report, Cmd. 5479, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-196150/.

28 United Kingdom, January 7, 1947, Palestine Royal Commision Report, Cmd. 5479, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-196150/.

29 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I),” United Nations, Accessed March 29, 2024,

30 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

31 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

32 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

33 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

34 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

35 Greenstein, Ran, “Colonialism, Apartheid, and the Native Question: the Case of Israel/ Palestine,” In Racism After Apartheid: Challenges for Marxism and Anti-Racism, edited by Vishwas Satgar, 75-95, Johannesburg: Houghton Wits University Press, 2019.

special fund and the passing of resolution 194.3637 The latter states:

refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.38

In 1949 the Armistice Agreements were signed between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria that resulted in a demarcation line known as the Green Line.39 The agreement nominally ended the hostilities between the parties involved but Jewish-Arab tension remained high. Eventually, in 1967, the Six-Day War broke out in which Israel fought against the coalition of Arab states including Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and finally, on June, 10, 1967 the Golan Heights.40 The war came to an abrupt end on the same day through a ceasefire encouraged by the United Nations.41 The larger conflict however, evidently has not been resolved even to this day.

It can be seen under the context of the large-scale persecution of the Jewish population during the Second World War and recurrently throughout history why Zionism as an ideology has a strong moral root. It also explains why the establishment of Israel is a case of sensitivity and one that is quite difficult to judge. One way of gaining clarity on the matter is by separating the idea from the execution. One historian that has succeeded in doing so is Michael Brenner, Chair in Israel Studies and Director of Center for Israel Studies at American University, and Chair of Jewish History and Culture at the University of Munich. He covers the ideological evolution of Zionism which guided the establishment and development of the state of Israel in his book, In Search of Israel: The History of an Idea. 42 He focuses specifically on the history of the Zionist vision, from its initial ideation, the struggle of gathering support and maturation, to its complex implementation. Brenner dives into the intricacies of the multifaceted idea, which is contradicted externally as well as internally.43 These contradictions, which Brenner explores from the very germination of the movement to its pragmatic formation and imagined future, begins with the con-

36 United Nations, November 19, 1948, Assistance to Palestine refugees/Establishing UN RPR, special fund, 212 III. A/RES/212 (III), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/au to-insert-179872/.

37 United Nations Mediator on Palestine. November 12, 1948, Right of return of the Palestin ian People, 194 III. A/RES/194 (III), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/au to-insert-177019/.

38 United Nations Mediator on Palestine. November 12, 1948, Right of return of the Palestin ian People, 194 III. A/RES/194 (III), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/au to-insert-177019/.

39 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

40 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

41 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

42 Brenner, In Search of Israel.

43 Brenner, In Search of Israel.

flicting desires to create “a state like any other” and a “light unto other nations.”44 It is a conflict between hopes of normality and exemplary uniqueness.45 Historians, Dawoud El-Alami, a native of Palestine and lecturer on Islamic Studies at the University of Wales, and Dan Cohn-Sherbok, a Rabbi professor and scholar of Judaism, each with a drastically different perspective, collaborated in writing, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict which provides a comprehensive counterpart to Brenner’s focus.46 While covering the ideologies of Zionism, the two authors spend a substantial effort in debating the validity and process of the physical establishment of the Israeli state. El-Alami argues that the creation of the State of Israel was morally and legally unjustified as it was done at the expense of the native Palestinian population, who, as a result, experienced marginalization and displacement.47 Cohn-Sherbok defends the Zionist movement claiming that the Jews have suffered from hatred and violence across the world for centuries and that a national home, built on the land of Jewish origins, was not only justified but necessary.48 While both authors seem to maintain a convincing argument with historical accuracy, it is clear that their conclusions remain contradictory to one another. The question of Zionism remains obscure. Here, further distinctions must be made.

Although a fundamental Zionism, solely as the idea of creating a national home for the long persecuted Jewish people should not be blindly criticized as often happens today, it is equally unproductive to say that the Zionist movement and the creation of Israel should be exempt from any criticism and that the adversity faced by a people should justify all the actions of an organization or state attempting to represent and provide refuge for that people. The problem with the Zionist movement prior to the concrete formation of the state was that Theodore Herzl, along with other early influential Zionist leaders were perhaps blinded by their eagerness for a unique and exemplary state that they dismissed the many conflicts inherent in their hopes. As Michael Brenner focuses on the discrepancies between their desire for a state like any other and a “light unto other nations” on an ideological level49, I will argue that the naive hopes in creating an inclusive and peaceful nation but contradictorily upon settled territory, penetrated beyond just the hypothetical and had a profound, pragmatic effect on the implementation of the movement. Partially as a result of the negligence of and lack of consideration regarding the native population, the practical execution of the Zionist movement deviated significantly from its original ideals, without a coherent, realistic plan in accordance to the vision, to follow. The creation of the state was, at a time characterized by anti-Colonial movements, a case of settler colonialism despite some contemporary Zionist historians’ attempts to frame it as a legitimate, legal, political, and diplomatic undertaking.

To better understand this “fundamental Zionism,” it is important to understand that the hope of solving the “Jewish question” by creating a national home was not the sole proposal towards resolution.50 The Jewish people had been subject to persecution for centuries but towards

44 Brenner, In Search of Israel.

45 Brenner, In Search of Israel.

46 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict.

47 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict.

48 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict

49 Brenner, In Search of Israel.

50 Brenner, In Search of Israel.

the end of twentieth century, the threat to the safety of Jewish people saw an increase with several developments.51 Of these, Karl Luegar, a known anti-semitist, being elected and then appointed mayor of Vienna and the Dreyfus Affair in which French Army Captain Alfred Dreyfus was to sentenced life imprisonment after accused of treason, are notable.52 Although these events did not have a direct impact on the Jewish people in all of Europe, its occurrence startled many, creating a new urgency to act against antisemitism. 53

In 1897, several movements developed, or saw a sharp progress in development.54 Among these are calls of radical assimilation by Jewish writers and authorities such as Walther Rathenau, heir to Germany’s enormous General Electricity Company.55 He wrote, that year, in the well established German journal Die Zukunft, an article named, “Hear, O Israel.” In it he argues that the Jews of Germany must attempt to integrate themselves more fully into their society and avoid isolation in order to eradicate or lessen anti semitism.56 In his own words, the Jewish people needed, “conscious self education of a race to assimilate to outside demands.”57 This assimilation, according to him, required the Jews to cast off and replace, “tribal qualities - regardless of whether they are good or bad - that are demonstrably hateful to fellow Germans.”58 Finally, he argues, “the goal of the processes should not be imitation of Germans, but Jews who are German by nature and education.”59

To Rathenau and many others who shared his idea for solving anti semitism, radical assimilation into one’s nation would remove from the Jews their quality as an outsider, giving them a true national identity that supersedes their uniqueness as a category of people.60 It is important also to note that Rathenau, an aspiring Jewish intellectual, was himself opposed to the idea of creating a separate national home elsewhere, even in Palestine.61 He claimed that the middle east was nothing but ancient history to the German Jews, and that the majority felt a sense of national loyalty only to Germany. 62

Two other solutions had been popularized in 1987, aside from the Zionist movement. These were the Socialist Bundist movement and the Diaspora movement.63 According to the former, the future of the Jewish people should also remain in Europe or North America instead of Palestine.64 To them, the solution to the problems faced by the Jews can be found in the class

51 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 24.

52 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 24.

53 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 18.

54 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 18.

55 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 22.

56 Brenner, In Search of Israell, 22.

57 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 21.

58 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 21.

59 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 21.

60 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 22.

61 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 22.

62 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 48.

63 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 41.

64 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 40.

struggle. 65They too, like Rathenau, disagreed with Zionism. Brenner explains that the Bundists, “opposed the Zionists as bourgeois reactionaries.”66 The Bundist movement grew popular in the years to follow, and promoted socialism in Europe and North America alike.67

The Diaspora movement, heavily supported by historian Simon Dubnow, who lived in Oddessa among many other Jewish intellectuals towards the end of the twentieth century, encouraged Jewish nationalism dispersed across the world.68 Dubnow, who founded the Jewish People’s Party in 1906 rejected both the Bundist, and the Zionist approach to the “Jewish question.”69 Furthermore, he saw radical assimilation as both, in the words of Brenner, “undesirable and unrealistic.”70 In his vision for the future of the Jewish people, they would not be assimilated nor isolated but rather remain as a national minority in areas they inhabited without forfeiting their culture and traditions.71 His hopes are summed up in the following quote:

As a spiritual or historical-cultural nation, deprived of any possibility of aspiring to political triumphs, of seizing territory by force or of subjecting other nations to cultural domination . . . it is concerned with only one thing: protecting its national individuality and safeguarding its autonomous development in all states everywhere in the Diaspora.72

To him, the Jewish nation was one beyond the need for territory.

Finally, the movement that had eventually led to the establishment of Israel, Zionism, was another solution proposed for the same problem. Even within the Zionist movement itself, finer divisions and contradictions were widespread. Although popularized in the late 19th to early 20th century, and only saw significant concrete development under the leadership of Theodore Herzl, the root of the movement had sprouted more than half a century ago.73 According to Dan Cohn-Sherbok, an “advocacy of an active approach to Jewish messianism” had appeared in religious orthodox circles in the early nineteenth century.74 This desire had developed out of the thousands of years of anticipation of the coming of the Messiah who would bring the Jewish people back to their ancient homeland as a united people.75 To the religious Zionists, prominent among which was Yehuada hai Alkalai who lived in Palestine during his youth, the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine would be progress made towards the coming of the Messiah.76 However, religious Zionism had not been popular and was criticized by some as a movement

65 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 40.

66 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 41.

67 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 42.

68 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 48.

69 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 48.

70 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 48.

71 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 70.

72 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 49.

73 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict.

74 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict

75 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict.

76 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict.

against the will of God.77 Later, the Hovevei Zion, or Lovers of Zion, movement gained traction, which aimed to solve the spiritual disunity faced by the Jewish people in the diaspora.78

Eventually, modern political Zionism bloomed from the writings of German philosopher Moses Hess and Russian physician Leon Pinsker, both of whom focused on solving the secular problems of antisemitism rather than issues of religious and spiritual matters.79 In their works, Rome and Jerusalem written by the former, and Autoemancipation written by the latter, the two expressed that the Jews would not escape antisemitism until a separate national home was established.80 They believed that Jews will forever be alien and subjugated to antisemitism due to their uniqueness as a people, and thus a Jewish homeland was the way to avoid further persecution.81 Although the two intellectuals, among others, had contributed significantly to the theoretical development of this secular Zionism, it was Theodore Herzl who was deemed the father of modern political Zionism. He had taken concrete actions, despite strong opposition and criticism, to push for the Jewish state of his vision. However, this vision lacked practical consideration for a problem unresolved to this day: that the land upon which he was to build the Jewish state was inhabited. Partially as a result of this contradiction inherent in his goals, the establishment of Israel deviated significantly from the process he had imagined.

At the core of Herzl’s hopes for the future of the Jewish nation were the values of freedom and equality. He dreamed of a homeland that was not imbued with religious fervor; his future state would be tolerant to all religions, welcome to outsiders, and established through a legal and political process that did not have to bear the reputation of colonialism. Traces of these ideals could be seen throughout his early life.

Born in 1860 in Budapest, Hungary to a rich merchant, Herzl had an upbringing that was rather secular.82 Brenner states that Herzl, “neither had a circumcision nor a Bar Mitzvah for his son Hans.”83 He had also, while inviting Vienna’s Chief Rabbi, Moritz Güdemann to his house to discuss his idea of creating a Jewish State, lighted the candles on his Christmaas tree without noticing the effects it had on the Rabbi.84 His lack of association with the Jewish religion would later be seen throughout his writing.

He had realized early on in his life that the new antisemitism faced by the Jewish people was not religiously motivated, that it was rather a matter of race.85 His early encounter with this circumstance occurred while in University. His student fraternity at the University of Vienna, shortly after admitting him, altered their policies to welcome only students who could prove their

77 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 83.

78 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 6.

79 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 7.

80 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 7.

81 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 8.

82 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict.

83 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 28.

84 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 31.

85 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 32.

Aryan lineage.86 This idea developed further in him until after becoming a correspondent in Paris for his Vienna newspaper in the early and mid-1880s, and witnessing the Dreyfus Affair, when Herzl became convinced that the Jewish people would only be safe from persecution if they had their own separate nation.87 Brenner states,

What worried Herzl was not so much the fact that the Jewish officer Alfred Dreyfus was falsely accused and convicted of high treason, but that the Jews were held responsible for the alleged actions of one person. If anti-Jewish slogans were popular in the motherland of Jewish emancipation - then Jews were not safe anywhere, Herzl concluded.88

After returning to Vienna in 1895, Herzl determined that it was his purpose to find an answer to the “Jewish question.”89

Among all of Herzl’s works, The Jewish State (Der Judenstaat) and The Old New Land (Altneuland) may be the two that provide the most complete image of the vision Herzl imagined for the future of the Jewish state.9091 Herzl had referred to this future home as the Seven-Hour Land.92 It would not only be a safe haven for the Jewish people but a place welcome to all. The essence of Herzl’s dream state as seen in these two works was characterized by religious tolerance, freedom and equality regardless of ethnic background. It was also crucial that the state be created through legal and political means, to be free of the colonialist title.

In his Seven-Hour-Land from The Jewish State, “religion becomes an ornament”93 and “Jewish elements had no major significance.”94 Herzl did not want the power to lie in religion, neither did he want religion to be a source of conflict. He sought to restrict it by keeping rabbis in their synagogues.95 He hoped only to create a small professional army with which the “Jewish Company,” could maintain authority. It would, however, be subject to English jurisdiction.96

Another idea at the center of Herzl’s future state was inclusivity and equality. This encompassed faith as well as ethnicity. Aside from the low emphasis on Judaism and religion in general, Herzl was also insistent that tolerance would be granted to other faiths. In a letter written in 1896 to urge all Jews to participate in the creation of the new state, Herzl states, “I am in favor of absolute freedom of conscience. Everyone should believe in, or not believe in, whatever he wants.”97

86 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 27.

87 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 29.

88 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 29.

89 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 29.

90 Theodore Herzl, The Jewish State, Vienna: M. Breitenstein’s Verlags-Buchhandlung, 1896.

91 Theodore Herzl, The Old New Land, Germany: Seemann Nachf, 1902.

92 Brenner, In Search of Israel. 51.

93 Brenner, In Search of Israel. 53.

94 Brenner, In Search of Israel. 53.

95 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 53.

96 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 54.

97 Theordore Herzl to the New Free Press editorial department, May 4, 1896, Shapell, SMC

Although some Historians point to Herzl’s early diary entries which suggested a desire to expel or expropriate the local population, it is clear that his later vision of the state of Israel welcomed all.98 The same welcoming attitude was reflected also in his receptiveness to cultural and ethnic diversity. As Brenner states, “Herzl did not want to oppress the Arabs as second-class citizens in a Jewish state, but rather envisioned a multinational political entity like the Ottoman Empire, in which both Jews and Arabs would enjoy far-reaching autonomy.”99 This became a major point of focus in his later work, The Old New Land, in which Jews and Arabs prospered in harmony in his imagined future state.

The final aspiration crucial to Herzl’s vision for Israel, which some historians have cited as evidence for the legitimacy of Israel’s becoming, was to establish the nation through legal and political means. Brenner writes, “Although Herzl was not free of colonialist fantasies, he flatly refused to be identified with colonialist concepts, as practiced for example in South Africa: ‘after all, we don’t want a Boer state, but a Venice.’”100 His insistence on avoiding immoral and illegal means of achieving the Zionist dream was sharply demonstrated in his opposition towards those arriving in Palestine without going through the necessary legal process. He was, “Critical of Russian Jews who sought to smuggle settlers into Palestine, Herzl argued that a formal agreement must be reached with the Turkish authorities.”101

After meeting kings and church leaders, understanding the situation of Jews in countries across the world, and holding five congresses, Herzl wrote Old New Land which was even more universalist.102 In his “New Society,” a civilized people enjoy the newest technology, a diverse cultural scene, and as Brenner describes, a place where “Jews and Arabs live peacefully side by side, and there are no significant conflicts between ethnic or religious groups.”103 The villain of the story was an Orthodox rabbi by the name of Dr. Geyer.104 He advocated for exclusiveness in the Jewish state.105 Although many have dismissed the novel as an Utopian fantasy, others insist that the novel should not be taken literally as a political program. Rather, it is a demonstration of the ideals of Herzl’s Zionism. As the protagonist of his book, David Littwak exclaims, “Stand by the principles that have made us great: “Liberalism, Tolerance, Love of mankind! Only then will Zion truly be Zion.106

Herzl’s vision was shared by other leaders of Zionism as well. Jewish authors, including Menahem Eisler, Jacques Bachar, El-Chanan Leeb Lewinsky, and Sholem Aleichem, for example, each had their own visions for the Jewish state and all of these imagined futures differed in 73, https://www.shapell.org/manuscript/herzl-on-religion-freedom-and-first-zionist-con gress/.

98 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 54.

99 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 55.

100 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 54.

101 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict, 12.

102 Theodore Herzl, The Old New Land, Germany: Seemann Nachf, 1902.

103 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 61.

104 Theodore Herzl, The Old New Land, Germany: Seemann Nachf, 1902.

105 Theodore Herzl, The Old New Land, Germany: Seemann Nachf, 1902.

106 Theodore Herzl, The Old New Land, Germany: Seemann Nachf, 1902.

structure but one principle remained consistent throughout.107 Brenner writes, “The future state is tolerant toward non-Jews.”108

Some historians and Israeli foundations, adamant in their support for Zionism, attempt to frame the physical establishment of Israel after Herzl’s vision as a model. Others, while not depicting the historical forming of the state after these visions, often use the leniency and inclusivity found in the hopes of the early leaders as an argument for the moral legitimacy of Israel. The article, “Herzl’s dream” on The Israel Forever Foundation, for instance, attempts to conflate the Zionist leader’s vision with the practical formation of the state.109 The article constantly jumps from Herzl’s hope for a peaceful and consensual process in creating the Jewish homeland, to its eventual establishment, completely omitting the process through which it was achieved, and avoids even mentioning the contradiction between the two.110 Dawoud El-Alami mixes the two in a more subtle manner in The Palestine - Israeli Conflict. In his account of the development of the Zionist movement, he elaborates Herzl’s need for a legitimate and legal process, describes the complicated politics throughout the this process, yet while explaining the actual settling and migration into the designated homeland, he fails to accurately portray the displacement and violence experienced by the local Arabs.111 It is as if the founder’s dream was enough justification to breeze over reality.

Despite his wonderful hopes, Herzl had not sufficiently considered the possible reaction of a native people to an influx of outsiders looking to establish a state of their own. In Herzl’s novel of an imagined future, the land of Palestine was found to be desolate before transforming to the “New Society.”112 This reflects Herzl’s naivety and lack of deep consideration in regards to the population that inhabited the place. He had, prior to writing his fictional work, visited Palestine113, yet he failed to consider that the people who lived there would be reluctant to submit to his grand dream of a society.114 To him, the land just as well might have been unoccupied. It was natural to him that the local population would simply assimilate into the more advanced society. Partially as a result of this shortfall, the practical process of establishing Israel deviated significantly from the essence of Herzl’s vision, and little of the principles at the center of Altneuland, held dear by David Littwak, can be seen in the forming of the state. Religion became a major catalyst for violence and conflict throughout the development of the territory and has grown to become a strong factor in Israeli politics today; Arabs were driven out of their homes and displaced, and the state was created only under the guise of legality.

In 1904, Theodore Herzl died from a heart ailment at the age of 44, and Chaim Azri

107 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 63.

108 Brenner, In Search of Israel, 64.

109 David Matlow, “Herzl’s Dream,” The Israel Forever Foundation, 2023, Accessed March 22, 2024, https://israelforever.org/programs/myherzl/herzl_dream/.

110 Matlow, “Herzl’s Dream.”

111 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict.

112 Theodore Herzl, The Old New Land, Germany: Seemann Nachf, 1902.

113 Desmond Stewart, “Herzl’s Journeys in Palestine and Egypt,” In Journal of Palestine Stud ies 3, no. 3 (1974): 18–38, Accessed April 2, 2024, https://doi.org/10.2307/2535890.

114 Brenner, In Search of Israel.

el Weizmann, a Russian-born biochemist residing in England took on the role of fulfilling his predecessor’s dream, later becoming a crucial Zionist leader who served as the president of the Zionist Organization and the first president of Israel. Amidst World War 1, while the Zionists were striving to gather support and actualize their Jewish State, the Arab population began to revolt against the Ottoman Empire, and amongst their goals was to alleviate the Empire’s rule on the territory of Palestine.115 They did so under the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein bin Ali who had exchanged crucial letters with Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt.116 In these letters known as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, the British Commissioner, representing the United Kingdom, promised the Arab leader that a large territory of land, then under Ottoman rule, including Palestine, would be granted independence if he were to revolt against the Empire.117 However, shortly before the war had ended, in 1916 the Sykes-Picot agreement was signed in secrecy between Britain and France, splitting up the land promised to the revolting Arabs through the prior correspondence.118 This agreement had little legal and moral legitimacy in itself as it was established prior to the fall of the Ottoman Empire and in contradiction to the promises granted to the Arabs.119 What followed in 1917 held even less legitimacy, yet it is often cited as part of the legal process through which Israel was created. The Balfour declaration, which promised the Jewish people a homeland in Palestine, was signed by Earl Of Balfour, Arthur James Balfour, before the war had even ended and the British mandate established.120 It was once again issued in contradiction to Britain’s promise towards Arab independence.

The declaration makes a weak case in terms of legitimacy but even aside from its legal flaws, it was not adhered to in practice. The preamble to the Balfour declaration by the League of Nations states, “it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country” yet thousands of Arabs residing in Palestine were displaced and dispossessed under the British mandate due to the incoming settlers.121 This was yet another breach of Herzl’s values. The Jewish homeland at this point bore much more resemblance to a boer state than a Venice as Herzl had hoped.

In 1948, Israel proclaimed independence after the termination of the British mandate while Arabs in and around the territory continued striving for autonomy. Settler colonialism was deeply reflected in the socialist Zionists striving to replace the Arab workforce with Jewish majority and greater numbers of Arabs were pushed out and displaced.122 Ran Greenstein states in his

115 Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami, The Palestine - Israeli Conflict.

116 “The Mcmahon Correspondence of 1915-16,” Bulletin of International News 16, no. 5 (1939): 6–13, Accessed April 2, 2024, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642429.

117 “The Mcmahon Correspondence of 1915-16,” Bulletin of International News 16, no. 5 (1939): 6–13, Accessed April 2, 2024, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642429.

118 Sykes and Georges-Picot, The Sykes-Picot Agreement.

119 Sykes and Georges-Picot, The Sykes-Picot Agreement.

120 Balfour, Arthur, Arthur Balfour to Lionel Rothschild, November 2, 1917, In The Balfour Declaration, United Kingdom.

121 Balfour, Arthur, Arthur Balfour to Lionel Rothschild, November 2, 1917, In The Balfour Declaration, United Kingdom.

122 Greenstein, Ran, “Colonialism, Apartheid, and the Native Question: the Case of Israel/

article, Colonialism, Apartheid, and the Native Question: the Case of Israel/Palestine,

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Jewish settlement project in Palestine, led by the Zionist movement, embarked on building an ever-expanding zone of exclusion from which all local Arabs were barred. Tenants were not allowed to stay on land bought by settlement agencies, nor were Palestinians accepted as residents in new rural Jewish communities or urban neighborhoods.123

This ever-expanding zone was sharply demonstrated in the 1967 Six Days war, during which Israeli forces captured territories beyond the agreement formed at the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948.124 The Green Line established as part of the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria was broken when Israeli forces occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights during the war.

If the argument that the establishment of Israel was a legitimate and proper political undertaking is supported by the declarations, agreements and demarcation lines upon which Israel is built, what legitimacy can there be if the declarations are violated, agreements broken, and demarcation lines crossed? The settler colonialist nature of Israel is demonstrated further in the treatment of the local Arab population, deviating far from the preachings of Theodore Herzl, after the Six Days War in 1967. Julie Peteet, writes, in her article, The Work of Comparison: Israel/Palestine and Apartheid,

In the wake of the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian and Israeli interaction did not stray far beyond labor and the highly unequal economic relations it entailed. Palestinians’ encounter with the state revolved around its apparatus of bureaucratic management, violence, and mass incarceration. 125

What Peteet describes is indeed far from what Herzl had sought to create. From the first instances of non-Arab Jewish immigration to after the war of 1967, sometimes known as the second founding of Israel, millions of local Palestinians were displaced and dispossessed. With the call for security during World War 2 and shortly after, the Palestrinians rights to return guaranteed by Resolution 194 was denied by Israel.126 The Israeli government established numerous regulations that limited the movement and freedom of the Palestinians.127

Palestine,” In Racism After Apartheid: Challenges for Marxism and Anti-Racism, edited by Vishwas Satgar, 75-95, Johannesburg: Houghton Wits University Press, 2019.

123 Greenstein, “Colonialism, Apartheid, and the Native Question.”

124 UN Editors, “Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1947 (Part I).”

125 Peteet, Julie, “The Work of Comparison: Israel/Palestine and Apartheid,” Anthropological Quarterly 89 (2016): 247-28,. Accessed November 9, 2023, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/ A451409164/GPS?u=mlin_n_brooks&sid=bookmark-GPS&xid=7462d16e.

126 United Nations Mediator on Palestine. November 12, 1948, Right of return of the Palestin ian People, 194 III. A/RES/194 (III), https://www.un.org/unispal/document/au to-insert-177019/.

127 Greenstein, “Colonialism, Apartheid, and the Native Question: the Case of Israel/Pales tine.”

Despite the colonial nature of the forming and development of Israel, and various historians’ attempts to deny such association, rallies against Zionism in its totality are erroneous. Many today refer to themselves as anti-Zionist and hate is much more prevalent than the desire to understand when it comes to the ideology. To be completely against Zionism, is to deny the desire of the Jewish people to seek salvage from the thousands of years of persecution, especially during World War 2, through creating a homeland. However, one can certainly be critical of the execution of the movement.

The early modern political Zionist vision, largely based on Theodore Herzl’s ideals, was secular with little emphasis on religion, embraced cultural and ethnic diversity; it believed in the equal treatment of the local Arabs that inhabited the land prior to Jewish immigration, and imagined a peaceful and prosperous homeland achieved through a legitimate political process. However, it was a convenient vision with insufficient, realistic thought and preparation. Contradictions were inherent in creating a secular society upon a land sacred to multiple religions for a people tied in their origin by one of such religions, and the hopes of establishing an inclusive and peaceful community on a settled territory. Unforeseen circumstances certainly played a significant role in the implementation aspect of the movement. The widespread persecution of the Jews in Europe during the Holocaust led to an influx of refugees in Palestine. However, instead of recognising the settler colonialist nature of the establishment of Israel, both as a result of unexpected turn of events and lack of practical planning, some historians attempt to frame or distort the actual founding of the state after the original vision; to argue that the process was legitimate, legal, and political rather than forceful and violent. However, the legality of the documents and agreements supporting this argument do not stand as they were largely created in contradiction to prior accords or without the authority to do so at the time of ratifying. In addition, the documents and agreements were breached in almost all occasions, with the supposed legal process replaced by violent settler colonialism, involving the displacement of local Arabs, expanding zones of exclusion, the limiting of Arab mobility, and more.

Settler colonial states obviously are not unprecedented in the history of our world. As many similar societies are still in the process of reconciliation, it is important for Israelis and Palestinians to begin making progress towards peace. Although the actual process through which this shall be done may seem obscure and perhaps impossible, there is a vision of what it should be. It is now a matter of transforming what has for long resembled much more a boer state, into the Venice of Herzl’s dream. Although the early leader did not witness the majority of the process through which Israel was established and the conflicts between the Jewish and Arab populations in Palestine, his vision for the future of the territory still appears to be perhaps the only way that peace, Palestinians, and Jews can all exist at once in what is to become the Altneuland.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my capstone advisor, Mrs. Musto, and peer, Jasmine Shi for their indispensable help during my research and writing process.

Bibliography

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COMING OUT OF DENIAL?

THE INTERPLAY OF MORAL, LEGAL, AND MEDICAL DISCOURSES OF MALE SAME-SEX RELATIONS IN CHINA’S HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC AND ITS EFFECTS

Zhaohan (Jasmine) Shi April 9, 2024

Duanxiu (cut sleeve), a Chinese term originating from the History of the Former Han, tells the story of Emperor Ai and his male favorite Dong Xian. 1 Legend is that one night when Dong Xian was in bed with the Emperor, he fell asleep on the Emperor’s sleeve. The Emperor, not wanting to stir Dong Xian, chose to cut off his own sleeve instead of waking Dong Xian. Similar terms such as fentao from the story of fentao (sharing a peach),2 longyang from the story of Lord Longyang,3 and more modern terms such as nanfeng (southern wind), xianggong (young gentlemen or Peking opera actors who played female roles while working as male prostitutes), tuzi (rabbit), and many more evolved to be synonymous with male same-sex relations in China. The existence of a large vocabulary regarding same-sex relations suggests that the homosexual issue has never been a silent one in China, contrary to popular belief.

While it is no mistake that modern China may appear silent on homosexual issues given its many policies restricting homosexual behavior and content in the public sphere, there has long been a tradition of a hierarchical mode of male same-sex relations in imperial China.4 Bret Hinsch’s Passion of the Cut Sleeve: The Male Homosexual Tradition in China published at the end of the twentieth century first revealed the prevalence of male same-sex relations in Chinese dynasties, sourcing from writings by historians, love poetry, legal documentation, and even erotic novels.5 His work spurred a range of discoveries regarding the male homosexual tradition in China. Later scholars have pointed out that instead of the modern Western understanding of homosexuality as an aspect of personal identity, imperial China viewed male same-sex relations as purely sexual in which social hierarchy and power played a dominant role. Looking back at the stories of duanxiu and fentao, both involve an emperor with a male favorite, with the hierarchically superior and elder emperor being the dominant partner in the relationship. The emphasis on the quality of chong (favor) underlying the two relationships also highlights their sexual nature,

1 Written in the first century C.E.

2 The story of fentao originally appeared in “Shuinan Pian” (“The Difficulties of Persuasion”) of Han Fei Zi, the collected work of Han Fei, Legalist philosopher of the Warring States period (403-222 B.C.E.).

3 The term longyang originated from the story between Lord Longyang and King of Wei originally documented in “Wei Ce” (“The Book of Wei”) of Zhanguo Ce (“Intrigues of the Warring States”).

4 In this paper, “same-sex relations” and “homosexuality” are not used interchangeably. While both point to a type of relationship between people of the same gender, “same-sex relations” implies a largely sexual relationship and will be used largely when discussing imperial China, while “homosexuality” will be used when the relationship carries more meaning than simply a sexual relationship. More discussion of terminology can be found later in the paper.

5 Hinsch, Bret, Passion of the Cut Sleeve: The Male Homosexual Tradition in China, 1992.

further supporting the interpretation that male same-sex relations were viewed through a sexual lens.6 Both stories, however, end rather tragically. In the story of fentao, Mizi Xia, the court official who gained the chong of Duke Ling, eventually loses his chong and is accused of treason. In the story of duanxiu, Emperor Ai eventually passes and leaves the kingdom to Dong Xian, who is later forced to commit suicide by enemies he made as a male favorite. Therefore, despite the existence of male same-sex relations in imperial China, the favoritism of male emperor-favorite relations has been linked to the survival of nations in Chinese history.7 This understanding of male same-sex relations as hierarchical and sexual, from as early as the Han dynasty, marks the beginning of a moral discourse that associates male same-sex relations with the fall of a nation. This will continue to be the underlying narrative of same-sex relations in the next century.

During China’s transition from imperial dynasties to a republic, male same-sex relations and gender identity took on a new level of meaning as China faced the daunting prospect of its culture and pride being eroded by the onset of Western infiltration. Beginning as early as the British attack on China in the First Opium War (1839-42) and the internal attack led by the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) operating under a Christian mission, China and its people felt a sense of urgency - China and its national identity were under crisis. Paradoxical responses to the West can be seen, with some embracing Western scientific values, some taking a nationalistic stance, and others embarking on full-scale iconoclasm.8 Amidst the confusion, the previous association of male same-sex relations with the character of a nation gained traction with the public; specifically, scholars argued that the feminization and “weakening” of Chinese men was the source of the national crisis.9 The accusation of feminization stems from the rising popularity of Peking Opera and the dan actors (male actors crossdressed as females). Male same-sex relations, traditionally viewed as a relationship of chong between emperors and their favorites, were criticized as a remnant of feudalism. This resulted in male same-sex relations being the target of attacks because it made men both feminized and feudalistic.10

6 Chong is used to describe the favor that a hierarchically subordinate person receives from a hierarchically superior patron. This favor also carries undertones of love (typically sexual) and admiration. Emperors are often described to chong a favorite of theirs.

7 In the story of fentao, Mizi Xia, the court official who gained the chong of Duke Ling eventually loses his chong and is accused of treason. In the story of duanxiu, Emperor Ai eventually passes and leaves the kingdom to Dong Xian, who is later forced to commit suicide by the enemies he made as a male favorite.

8 For more on this, please see my paper “The Confucian Cultural Fallacy: The Role of Culture and the Intellectuals in 20th Century China.”

9 Guomin xing (national character) discourse emerged in China in the first half of the twentieth century, growing from national leaders such as Chen Duxiu describing Chinese male youth as weak, to other scholars such as Zhang Jingsheng connecting sexuality with national character.

10 In Obsession, 1900-1950, Wenqing Kang addresses a problem with previous literature on same-sex relations in China. He notes that previous literature assumes, firstly, that there exists a uniform social attitude towards male same-sex relations, and secondly, that legal codes and literary writings directly reflect this attitude. While the true social attitudes towards same-sex relations in imperial China may never be known, in viewing the internal disorder of opinion of Western influence and traditional Chinese culture in the late 19th to early 20th century, it may be safer to assume that there lacked an uniform attitude towards male same-sex relations in early modern China.

Western sexology ideas began to take hold in China under the pretense of homosexuality being detrimental to national survival. This marks the beginning of a transition from understanding homosexuality as a purely moralistic concern to simultaneously a medical concern. Thus China’s medicalized homosexual narrative emerged.11 As China struggled to maintain its old isolationist pride at the height of Western imperialism in the late nineteenth century, the idea of homosexuality as an identity began to appear overseas in many Western discussions. A new understanding of human subjectivity, sexuality, and identity emerged with the birth of psychoanalysis in the 1890s and Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality that was published in 1905.12 Freud introduced “homosexuality” under the new name of “sexual inversion” and argued that it was a form of deviant gender behavior that stemmed from a stage of inhibited development.13 The identification of homosexuality in the medical realm permitted the psychotherapy of homosexual “patients” and, as a result, a pathologization of homosexuality. While the queer community in the United States responded to the pathologization with a rise in activism, the previous moral discourses led by cultural traditions or church authorities were displaced, and Foucault’s claim that sexuality had become a medical and medicalized object proved to be true. 14

A similar medicalized discourse of homosexuals spread throughout China during the twentieth century. Previous scholars have attempted to dissect male same-sex relations with this in mind. A salient example of this appears in Obsession, 1900-1950. In this book, Weiqing Kang introduced a conceptual framework for the study of male same-sex relations in the first half of twentieth century China. He argues that both Chinese and Western thought shared conceptual contradictions towards male same-sex relations and that such similarity provided a foundation for Western sexological ideas to take root in China. 15 Specifically, the notion of pi (obsession), or a “pathological fondness for something,” persisted throughout classical Chinese medical and literary writings.16 The pathological element of pi suggests that it was a minority and thus not normative, but late Ming Chinese writings seem to express an obsession for obsession - in the case of books, paintings, music, games, and even male love.17 The simultaneous existence of viewing male same-sex love as a pathological minority and as something the public obsesses over in imperial China mirrors how homosexuality continues to be viewed as a pathological minority but also a danger that risks spreading to other adolescents in modern China. This paradoxical view of obsession, and thus male love, as pathological and normative at the same time serves as a conceptual framework for same-sex relations between men. To construct such an argument, Kang’s work sourced primarily from tabloid newspapers published in the 1910s to 1940s, through which he documented the widespread employment of Western sexological concepts such as “perversion” and “disease” in the tabloids that diffused to the public. The new terminology contributed to the 11 “Sexology” here refers to the “science of sexuality” which emerged in the 19th century.

12 Van Haute, Philippe, and Herman Westerink, “Sexuality and Its Object in Freud’s 1905 Edition of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 563. https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-8315.12480.

13 Van Haute and Herman, “Sexuality and Its Object,” 564.

14 Wong, Day, and Leung, Pik Ki, “Modernization of Power in Legal and Medical Discourses: The Birth of the (Male) Homosexual in Hong Kong and Its Aftermath,” Journal of Homosexuality, 59:10, 1403-1423.

15 Kang, Weiqing, Obsession, 1900-1950, Hong Kong University Press.

16 Kang, Obsession, 30.

17 Kang, Obsession, 30.

continuation of a paradoxical attitude towards male same-sex relations but also medicalized the narrative from a simple sexual obsession to a scientific one.

The narrative of male same-sex relations in China, however, is not so simple. The medicalization of homosexuality was interrupted by the Maoist Era in 1949 where a return to a heterosexual, marital, reproductive sex model was witnessed.18 It was during this era that stringent control of same-sex relations arose, including the legal persecution of same-sex acts under “hooliganism,” and administrative punishments such as harassment, detainment, and persecution.19 While the Maoist Era can be seen as an anomaly both to the Chinese tradition of male same-sex relations and to the gradually medicalizing narrative, its changes to official legislation and establishment of regulatory measures drove the homosexuals underground, leaving little documentation regarding same-sex acts, and a future of prolonged monitoring of the homosexual community.20

The medicalized perspective on same-sex acts returned from 1978 onwards with remnants of Maoist strict regulatory measures. Shortly after China transitioned to a post-socialist model, unusual outbreaks in the United States in 1981 announced a new disease known as AIDS that claimed over a thousand lives by 1983. The disease spread across the ocean to China within the next two years, as evidenced by the small number of cases reported in coastal cities between 1985 and 1988.21 By the end of the decade, AIDS had been categorized as a Class B infectious disease by the Chinese government in the 1989 Law on Infectious Diseases Prevention and Control.22 Unlike the heightened anxiety and fear of the new disease their United States counterparts were experiencing, Chinese public health officials were initially confident that China would not experience an AIDS epidemic. As stated in a 1987 official Peking Review commentary, “AIDS, like alcoholism, prostitution, or homosexuality, came from the ideology of the ‘decadent’ American society.”23 Contrary to their confidence, epidemiological data from 1985 to 1998 suggested that it was not decadent lifestyles but IDUs (illicit drug users) and illegal blood transfusions that were the major causes of transmissions.24 This initial commentary exemplifies how the government shifted the blame to individual behavior instead of emphasizing pragmatic prevention measures such as condom use and access to antiretroviral drugs. Another fallacy, more crucial to this discussion, is that the official discourse also reemployed the moral narrative that blamed male same-sex relations for weakening national character in the first half of the century to frame them as the culprit, and eventually, the ultimate risk group for the spread of HIV/AIDS. Instead of simply displacing the legal-moral discourse with a psycho-medical one, it was 18 Zheng, Tiantian, “Contesting Heteronormality: Recasting Same-Sex Desire in China’s Past and Present,” 27.

19 Zheng, “Contesting Heternormality,” 28.

I refer to the Criminal Law of China prior to 1997 as legally persecuting same-sex acts here, because it was not explicitly criminalized under the law despite many referring to the Hooliganism Law as criminalizing homosexual behavior, and its revision in 1997 as the decriminalization of homosexual behavior.

20 Zheng, “Contesting Heternormality,” 28.

21 Zhang, Kong-lai, and Shao-Jun Ma, “Epidemiology of HIV in China: Intravenous Drug Users, Sex Workers, and Large Mobile Populations Are High Risk Groups,” The BMJ, 803.

22 Li, Huang, Rui Gao, and Chichen Zhang, “Evolution of HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Policies in China: A Grounded Theory Approach.” China CDC Weekly, 12.

23 Huang, Yanzhong, “The Politics of HIV/AIDS in China,” Asian Perspective, 30:1, 100.

24 Huang, “The Politics of HIV/AIDS in China,” 102

demonstrated in the Chinese government’s response and has been argued by Day Wong and Pik Ki Leung that there is a “complex interplay of medical, legal, and moral discourses in the construction of homosexuality.”25 The new medicalized discourse layers on top of the previous moral criticism of homosexuality. Wong and Leung argue in their 2012 paper “Modernization of Power in Legal and Medical Discourses: The Birth of the (Male) Homosexual in Hong Kong and Its Aftermath” that the decriminalization reforms of the 1980s in Hong Kong served as a double taxonomy of freedom and control, with its construction of the homosexual as both an at-risk group and a danger posed to society.26 Sexual dissidents are no longer simply treated as criminal or pathological; rather, legal and medical discourses have shifted to an increasing reliance on the notions of risk to put the mechanisms of social regulation in place.27 By analyzing the literature on legal and medical discourses related to same-sex relations in Hong Kong, the authors reveal the policing of homosexual culture in the name of safe sex.

The understanding of male same-sex relations being morally detrimental to the national character in the first half of the twentieth century became foundational for the later risk-oriented narrative surrounding same-sex relations. The public distrust of male same-sex love and policing of people’s public behavior in the name of repairing the image of Chinese people provided grounds for the discriminatory narrative of regulating male same-sex behavior for the safety of the people. With previous literature on same-sex relations oriented on the moral discourse in mainland China, and legal and medical discourses in Hong Kong, I seek to contribute to the scholarship by investigating the interplay of all three discourses in mainland China. This paper will address how China leveraged the traditional moral discourse while enforcing a new medical discourse on male same-sex relations, its effects during the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and its prolonged effects on modern day queer communities in China. For reasons such as the availability of sources, I will focus on male same-sex relations, acknowledging that the predominant scholarship on same-sex relations in China remains limited to the male perspective.

Throughout this paper, various terminologies referring to male same-sex relations are used, primarily “same-sex relations/love,” “tongxinglian” (homosexuality), and “MSM” (men who have sex with men). It is important to distinguish between these terms because each carries different connotations and is used in a specific context. “Same-sex relations/love” is used throughout the paper as a general umbrella term, whereas “tongxinglian” is used when referring to homosexuality as an identity. “MSM” has been used in both Western and Chinese HIV/AIDS literature and is used in this paper when discussing government policies regarding AIDS. Other terms such as “tongzhi” (comrade), “gay,” and “queer” will be used sparingly when discussing the social aspect of homosexuality and the LGBTQ+ movement. A transition from the usage of “same-sex relations/love” to “tongxinglian” and “MSM,” and later to “LGBTQ+” and “queer” can be witnessed throughout this paper, as vocabulary regarding homosexuality changes along with the change in the dominant narrative.

Over the next decade, HIV/AIDS policies reinforced an overwhelming emphasis on medical and legal discourses for male homosexuals in late twentieth century China. It not only stigmatized the male homosexual community as carriers of HIV/AIDS but also catalyzed the homonormative movement that further marginalized parts of the queer community. The decriminalization

25 Wong, Day, and Leung, Pik Ki, “Modernization of Power in Legal and Medical Discourses: The Birth of the (Male) Homosexual in Hong Kong and its Aftermath,” 1404.

26 Wong and Leung, “Modernization of Power,” 1410.

27 Wong and Leung, “Modernization of Power.”

and depathologization of homosexuality by the Chinese government present the government in a positive light, as it portrayed, and continues to portray an open attitude towards addressing LGBTQ+ issues, while realistically only diverting public attention from the lack of defined legislation protecting homosexuals and suppressing the advocacy efforts of queer groups, hindering their pursuit of social non-discrimination and equality.

The Chinese government’s address to the growing number of HIV/AIDS cases was untimely and ineffective at first.28 Its failure inadvertently allowed the spread of the disease but willfully advanced discrimination against male homosexuals. During the first phase of the epidemic, from 1985 to 1988, HIV was categorized as a “foreign disease” because all identified cases were overseas workers, returned seamen, or foreigners.29 The understanding that HIV is foreign was implicit in the first National Plan for the Prevention of HIV/AIDS issued by the Ministry of Health in 1987, as its goal was to prevent the introduction, occurrence, and spread of HIV/AIDS in China.30 The second phase of HIV infections from 1989 to 1993 was primarily found amongst drug users in Yunnan province in the southwest neighboring the “Golden Triangle.”31 The second corresponding national plan, the 1990 Plan, documented the government’s realization that AIDS is no longer a foreign disease.32 However, the 1990 Plan continued to conflate the concepts of safe versus morally acceptable sex, evaluating AIDS in a moral discourse.33 What is surprising about the 1990 Plan is that it definitively stated that homosexuality is illegal in China despite the lack of legislation explicitly criminalizing homosexual behavior. The Plan also labeled the homosexual population as one who engages in high-risk behavior despite it explicitly stating that Chinese authorities understand very little about the “circumstances of these people.”34 Beginning in 1994, the third phase saw infections being reported among drug users and plasma donors. These initial stages did not raise the alarm until infections were reported across the 31 provinces in 1998.35 By the end of the century, drug users accounted for 60-70% of reported infections, while sexual transmission accounted for the other 30-40%, with commercial sex workers representing 19.6% of infections, partners of HIV-infected individuals representing 16.7%, and men who have sex with men (MSM) representing 7.3% being the lowest of the cases of sexual transmission.36 All evidence indicated that the largest outbreak centers were either close to drug production and distribution centers or illegal commercial blood transfusion centers in rural areas of central China, which

28 See figure 1, reported HIV/AIDS cases by year in China, 1985-2005.

29 Wu, Zunyou, Sheena G Sullivan, Yu Wang, Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus, and Roger Detels, “Evolution of China’s Response to HIV/AIDS,” The Lancet, 692.

30 National Plan for the Prevention of AIDS 1987-1991. (Promulgated by the Ministry of Health, 1987.)

31 The Golden Triangle is a region including northeastern Myanmar, northwestern Thailand, and northern Laos centered on the confluence of the Ruak and Mekong rivers that is heavily engaged in opium and other drug related trades at the turn of the century.

32 Balzano, John, and Jia, Ping, “Coming out of Denial: An Analysis of AIDS Law and Policy in China (1987-2006).” The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review, 197.

33 Balzano and Jia, “Coming out of Denial,” The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review, 197.

34 Balzano, John, “Towards a Gay Friendly China? Legal Implications of Transition for Gays and Lesbians,” Law and Sexuality, 33.

35 Zhang, Kong-lai, “Epidemiology of HIV in China.”

36 Zhang and Shao-Jun, “Epidemiology of HIV in China,” The BMJ.

should have led to the conclusion that unsafe needle injection and blood transfusion practices were the main risk factors for HIV/AIDS. Nonetheless, the government prompted the public to follow the narrative that HIV/AIDS was a disease contracted due to unhealthy sexual practices, such as polygamy, prostitution, and later, male homosexual behavior. Even the official Guangming Daily published a statement in 1988 that said “AIDS can be controlled and even stamped out if we insist on monogamy and put an end to extra-marital sexual behavior.”37 The initial HIV/AIDS discourse hinging on a moral narrative condemned male homosexual behavior because of its previous association with the plight of the nation.

The stigmatization and discrimination of homosexual activities, along with HIV/AIDS infection, has been a major barrier against MSM seeking health services or treatment. While such stigmatization was directly brought about by the traditional moral narrative compounded with the HIV/AIDS discourse that construed male homosexuals as an at-risk group, the inability of male homosexuals to defend themselves from such accusations stems more fundamentally from the ambiguity of the legal status of LGBTQ+ people in China. Contrary to popular belief, there has never been legislation in China that explicitly criminalized homosexuality. Prior to 1997, homosexuality was categorized under the crime of liumangzui (crime of hooliganism), specifically referring to provoking fights, stirring up trouble, sexual assault on women, and other hooligan activities that pertain to the disruption of public order.38 Provision 79, otherwise known as the Analogy Clause, allowed the criminalization of homosexuality under “other hooligan activities.” The grounds for criminalization were provided by analogy to the 1957 case of consensual anal sex between two males from Heilongjiang Province (known as the Mudanjiang Case).39 While the Supreme People’s Court did not rule sex between two adult males as a crime, the lower provincial courts articulated its rationale that such behavior is a serious violation of social morals and should be punishable under criminal law, which later cases sourced for the prosecution of consensual anal sex in China.40 The revision of the Hooliganism Law in 1997 emphasized that all crimes must be explicitly prescribed by the law, which struck out the Analogy Clause and became hailed as a milestone in the journey towards achieving queer rights in China.41 However, certain legal scholars argue that the decriminalization of homosexuality was not an intended but rather a secondary consequence of reforms.42 Homosexuality was not “decriminalized;” it simply did not exist anymore within the criminal law system of China. To date, the term tongxinglian (homosexual) has never appeared in any official Chinese legal document, and homosexuality has never been recognized as an identity. The majority of references to male same-sex relations in official

37 Xinhua, December 1, 1988.

38 Ed. by Weston, Timothy B, and Lionel M Jensen, China in and beyond the Headlines, Chapter 11, Kang, Weiqing“The Decriminalization and Depathologization of Homosexuality in China,” 233.

Provision 79 is known as the analogy clause because it says that “crimes not clearly stipulated in the provisions of this law may be sentenced by using the most similar provisions in the law with the approval of the Supreme People’s Court.”

39 Kang, “The Decriminalization,” 235.

40 Kang, “The Decriminalization,” 235

41 While both public and private same-sex acts are no longer criminalized under China’s criminal law, there are still policies regulating the appearance of LGBTQ+ content on television and other forms of media. Censorship will be discussed more later in this paper.

42 Kang, “The Decriminalization,” 232.

policies and regulations are under the terminology of MSM (men who have sex with men). Therefore, following the 1997 revision, regardless of its intentions, while the legal status of homosexuality improved to non-criminalizable, its legal position did not.43 The uncertainty of homosexuals’ legal status and, therefore, position resulted in a lack of legal protection for homosexuals. Its ambiguity also incidentally led to a deviation of local practices from official orders during the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which continued to discriminate against homosexuals despite its decriminalization. As previously described, various AIDS regulations have identified MSM as a high-risk group and ordered local communities to reach out to these men. However, due to their unclear legal position and little direction in the types of outreach measures local governments should take, it is possible that local authorities interpreted these orders as a mandate to prosecute homosexuals for their sexual behavior.44 Chinese sexologist Pan Suiming pointed out that AIDS prevention became the reason for police and other authorities to harass and detain homosexuals.45 In 2004, The State Council issued a notice to local branches of the Chinese Center for Disease Control (CCDC), ordering the establishment of outreach groups for local members of high-risk groups in their areas.46 In April 2004, however, a group of eight HIV-positive people were detained after seeking economic aid that had been promised to HIV-positive persons by the Henan provincial government.47 Even today, the lack of a clear legal position remains; frequent police raids of gay bars, discos, and other homosexual-related establishments prolong harassment, detainment, and fining.48

A response seemingly contradictory to the discriminatory narrative against male homosexuals came from the Chinese government in 2001: CCDM-3 (Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders) removed homosexuality from a list of psychiatric disorders, legally depathologizing homosexuality in China.49 This action has been hailed as a major success and praised for advancing China’s LGBTQ+ movement. It would appear that depathologization refutes the claim that the government actively enforced a narrative that portrays male homosexuals as dangerous. Such positivity can be blinding. In reality, despite the removal of the legal pathologization of homosexuals, the official narrative for homosexuals remains centered in the medical field instead of the social sphere in China and continues to portray homosexuals as socially deviant.

Depathologization began with the global shift from a behavioral-based HIV/AIDS re-

43 Here I follow the usage of legal position and legal status promoted by Tom Mountford in his 2009 research project “The Legal Status and Position of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the People’s Republic of China.” Legal position refers to “formal legal and official provisions that regulate the lives of LGBT people in China,” whereas legal status refers to “the practical situation of LGBT people in the country, and encompasses areas where the law is silent through to areas where applicable laws and regulations are not being applied.”

44 Balzano and Jia, “Coming out of Denial,” The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review, 203.

45 Wong and Leung, “Modernization of Power.”

46 Balzano, John, “Towards a Gay Friendly China? Legal Implications of Transition for Gays and Lesbians,” Law and Sexuality, 34.

47 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 19.

48 Wong, Day, “Sexual Minorities in China,” International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences.

49 Psychiatric department of Chinese Medical Association. Diagnostic criteria of mental disorders (CCMD-3). Jinan: Scientific and Technological Publishing House of Shandong, 2001: 1.

sponse approach to a biomedical approach.50 Mass HIV testing, the dominant strategy of the biomedical approach, requires populations to be willing to come forth to be tested.51 MSM have been identified as a group with low rates of HIV testing.52 Thus, the HIV status of MSM is ambiguous and has been identified as posing a potential risk of transmitting HIV to others.53 The underlying assumption held by public health professionals is that most MSM and gay men are already infected with AIDS. According to some scholars, even in regions where sexual transmission was not the dominant route of HIV/AIDS transmission and little evidence exists to prove that local MSM is a concern for AIDS, Chinese public health professionals insisted that most MSM were “almost always already infected.”54 The same study revealed a more shocking assumption through the words of a colleague of the author working for a local CCDC in Yunnan. The colleague explained that “there is a fear and assumption that there are many more infections out there especially among MSM” because “MSM are married to women,” and “even though the numbers don’t point to homosexuals, they are really just MSM who don’t admit to their identification.”55 The implicit argument is that the prevalence of heterosexual transmission numbers from heterosexual men who test positive for HIV should, in fact, go towards homosexual transmission because they present their identity as heterosexual when in reality they are homosexual.56 This line of reasoning is reminiscent of the paradoxical view China has long held towards same-sex love: viewing it as a pathological minority while believing that everyone is at risk of being infected by it. Not only do Chinese public health officials assume MSM to be already infected with AIDS, but they also assume MSM to have lied about their identification, pushing the blame for both MSM transmission and heterosexual transmission onto male homosexuals and framing them as deceptive. These assumptions suggest that the previous stigma elicited by official Chinese policies, including but not limited to legal persecution, pathologization, and pressure of societal expectations to enter a heterosexual marriage and bear children stemming from Confucian beliefs but also the One Child Policy enacted in 1980, are forgotten or neglected. Instead, the narrative construing male homosexuals and other MSM as a group in need of monitoring prevails. Recalling the vagueness of mandates for local governments to establish homosexual outreach groups and the legal ambiguity of homosexuals, it is not surprising when local authorities interpret these as orders to prosecute homosexuals for their sexual behavior as indeed, the intent displayed by the CCDC suggests so.

The same officials postulating male homosexuals as deceptive carriers of HIV understood that fear of legal repercussions from homosexuality being pathologized prevented MSM from testing for HIV. For that reason, the depathologization of homosexuality was promoted. Decriminalization and depathologization were theorized to make the monitoring of homosexuals easier as they would not hide due to fear. Their actions, however, do not justify their intentions as

50 Yang and Sun, “Are All Gay Men at Risk of Developing HIV/AIDS? Why China’s Mass HIV Testing Has Majorly Targeted Gay Men in the Era of Biomedicalization,” American Journal of Men’s Health.

51 Yang and Sun, “Are All Gay Men at Risk of Developing HIV/AIDS?”

52 Yang and Sun, “Are All Gay Men at Risk of Developing HIV/AIDS?”

53 Yang and Sun, “Are All Gay Men at Risk of Developing HIV/AIDS?”

54 Fan, L. Elsa, “HIV testing as prevention among MSM in China: The business of scaling-up,” Global Public Health, 86.

55 Fan, “HIV Testing,” 87.

56 Fan, “HIV Testing,” 87.

homosexuals continued to be framed as a risk group to the public. The facade of change worn by the Chinese government can be dangerous for queer activism in China - the lack of legal status of LGBTQ+ people prevents legal action to protect their rights, and the exchange of an openly discriminatory narrative for a risk-oriented one prevents the public from recognizing the underlying derogatory assumptions bound to the LGBTQ+ community. One may also fall into the trap of cultural fallacy, blaming traditional Chinese culture for being unwelcoming to any non-heterosexual relationship, unaware that it is the policies the leadership implemented that are truly to blame for widespread discrimination.57

The fallacy of depathologization does not stop there. Not only is homosexuality deemed a risk factor by both proponents and adversaries of depathologization, a careful look at the updated CCMD III reveals that homosexuality has not even been entirely eradicated from the list of mental disorders. In the Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders II (CCMD II), the previous classification, homosexuality was listed under the “Sexual Perversions” subsection “Sexual Orientation Disorders.” Although the criteria for homosexuality remain the same, the definition of “Sexual Orientation Disorder” underwent modifications in CCMD III. The revised definition in the updated manual, titled “Xing Biantai” (Sexual Perversions), has been listed under Sexual Psychological Disorders with the following criteria:

a) Meets the criteria in the sexual orientation disorder definition;58

b) Under normal life conditions, from an early age begins to manifest sexual desires towards members of the same sex, including thoughts, feelings, and sexual behavior;

c) Capable of having normal sexual relations with members of the opposite sex, but sexual desire is weak or lacking, so it is difficult to establish and maintain domestic relations with members of the opposite sex.59

The depathologization of homosexuality would, and should, be more accurately described as a redefining of homosexuality. People were led to believe that there was a depathologization by the description under the “Sexual Orientation Disorder” subsection: “It refers to a disorder caused by various kinds of sexual maturation and the development of sexual orientation, which is not nec-

57 The idea of “Confucian Cultural Fallacy” was initially brought up by Wen Haiming and Chen Denming, scholars of the 21st century. They argue that some scholars have attributed a leading, sometimes even deterministic role to ideas and culture. By placing Confucianism as a leading factor of culture, scholars have also placed it at fault for the arguably failures of China in the 20th century, thus problematically shielding individuals in power from blame. For more on this see my paper “‘The Confucian Cultural Fallacy:’ The Role of Culture and Intellectuals in 20th Century China.”

58 The definition of “sexual orientation disorder” can be found in the CCMD III as “Although originally one of different kinds of sexual development and sexual tendency disorders, in terms of sexual desire it is not per se an abnormality. However, some individuals’ sexual development and sexual tendencies may cause a psychological disorder. For example, if an individual does not wish to be that way or is unsure and, on account of this, may experience anxiety, depression, and mental anguish; some may experiment with treatment to try to change [their orientation]. This is the main reason why “homosexuality” and “bisexuality” are included in the CCMD III.” (Translation by Law and Sexuality).

59 Chinese Classification of Mental Disorders III 62.31 (translation by law and sexuality)

essarily abnormal from the perspective of sexual love per se.”60 This definition can be interpreted to mean that sexual orientation by itself is not a disorder, but nonetheless, the criteria for homosexuality still suggest some form of pathologization. In spite of the removal of legal repercussions for homosexuals who have contracted HIV to seek treatment, the social meaning of “depathologization” and decriminalization continues to construe homosexuals as a risk-group in need of monitoring.

The intentional discrimination of MSM within the Chinese government produces systematic obstruction of civil organizations whose goal is to help MSM and are proponents of equal rights for homosexuals. The obstruction exists in but is not limited to, the lack of transparency in HIV/AIDS surveillance data, harassment of homosexual support organizations, dilemmas in funding, and censoring of LGBTQ+ content. The removal of legal and medical prosecution that left the gaping hole of lack of legal protection acquiesced discrimination against homosexuals on the civil level. Despite the enactment of a passive surveillance system for HIV/AIDS in 1988 and an active surveillance system in 1995, researchers, public health practitioners, and the general public find it difficult to access national or provincial surveillance data.61 The lack of visibility of data prevents civil organizations from conducting programs. Any organization attempting to garner support for homosexuals is typically either harassed, censored, or shut down, and the distribution of any media distribution pertaining to homosexuals remains strictly regulated. Such restrictions prolong the stigmatization of homosexuality into the twenty-first century.

In 2004, Human Rights Watch conducted a study on restrictions imposed on AIDS activists in mainland China. The report included interviews with representatives of NGOs and grassroots organizations as well as information gathered via published reports, laws, policies and regulations, academic journals, news reports, and archives.62 In Henan Province, thousands or more people were infected with HIV due to a profit-driven blood-selling scheme that operated throughout the 1990s.63 What is even more concerning is that the local authorities were directly involved in the blood-selling enterprise; not only were the facilities poorly managed and under-regulated, local authorities also hampered AIDS activists who raised concerns.64 One such method of harassment - that occurred not just in Henan Province - is the detainment and penalization of AIDS activists under the pretense of violating the “State Secrets” law.65 The dissemination of any information deemed - even retroactively - to have been a “State Secret” can lead to serious criminal penalties.66 Wan Yanhai, the director of Aizhi Action, an AIDS organization based in Beijing, was detained by the police in 2002 on suspicion of circulating state secrets.67 Other Chinese and foreign journalists who attempted to visit Henan Province to document the epidemic in the late 1990s to early 2000s were often detained, interrogated, and expelled under similar allegations.68

60 CCMD

61 He and Detels, “The HIV Epidemic in China: History, Response, and Challenge,” Cell Research

62 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 19.

63 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 12.

64 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 13.

65 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 14.

66 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 14.

67 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 14.

68 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 15.

Paradoxically, several groups were able to register with the government and secure funding in the later years of the epidemic despite widespread harassment and censorship of same-sex related content. With the government’s narrative emphasizing the necessity to draw out MSM for HIV testing and treatment, there was a perception of political opportunity and funding availability if an organization pitched itself as targeting gay men.69 An example is the account of a bureaucrat from a Heilongjiang Province local Center for Disease Control who appointed his niece to create a gay activist group to attract funds.70 Other studies revealed the phenomenon of activist groups attracting funding under the pretense of being gay activist groups but lacking general interest or action in using the funding for gay advocacy or even the disease itself.71 While these groups only consisted of a fraction of all the activist groups, they nonetheless pointed out a loophole in the government’s management of organizations where the funding goes to unrelated groups, and the NGOs with intentions to help are restrained. Under the 1998 Chinese Regulations for the Administration and Registration of Social Organizations, “voluntary groups” are mandated to be registered with the state to not “harm the unity, security or ethnic harmony of the state.”72 The registration, while providing the NGOs with funding opportunities and connections with government institutions, also loses their autonomy and the scope of their activities. Therefore, any NGO that sincerely devotes itself to gay activism faces the dilemma of either being registered but limited and controlled by the government through funding, or being unregistered and struggling with funding, or unlawfully receiving funding from international donors since unregistered groups cannot be recipients of funds.73 NGOs not truly concerned with helping homosexuals do not have this concern as their primary goal is to secure funding. Ultimately this prevents timely and effective responses by civil organizations and creates the illusion of civil involvement in HIV/ AIDS activism for gay men.

Not only is there detainment of AIDS activists and the predicament NGOs have to face, there is also heavy censoring of lesbian and gay websites and other forms of media under the pretense of a nationwide campaign against Internet pornography. Such censorship prevents information and education regarding AIDS from being effectively distributed and also continues to sexualize same-sex relations. Even in 2002, twelve years after the 1990 Plan and more than two decades after the first HIV case, the Chinese government still identifies HIV/AIDS as caused by “social evils.” The amended Constitution of the Communist Party of China declared in 2002 that “it is essential to [...] resist corrosion by decadent capitalist and feudal ideas, and wipe out all social evils.”74 The word choice of “decadent,” “feudal,” and “social evils,” is reminiscent of the 1987 Peking Review commentary and shows that despite the government having acknowledged AIDS to no longer be a foreign disease, the government believed that it remains the individuals’ immoral wrongdoings that spread the disease. Worse yet, the government prides itself on its criminal penalties that punished the infected individuals, stating in a 2000 government white

69 Chua, Lynette J., and Timothy Hildebrandt, “From Health Crisis to Rights Advocacy? HIV/AIDS and Gay Activism in China and Singapore.” VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations

70 Chua and Hildebrandt, “From Health Crisis to Rights Advocacy?” VOLUNTAS.

71 Chua and Hildebrandt, “From Health Crisis to Rights Advocacy?” VOLUNTAS.

72 Chua and Hildebrandt, “From Health Crisis to Rights Advocacy?” VOLUNTAS, 8.

73 Chua and Hildebrandt, “From Health Crisis to Rights Advocacy?” VOLUNTAS, 12.

74 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 28.

paper that “after two to three years of effort, these social plagues [...] were basically wiped out.”75 In 2000, case numbers remained on the rise, nowhere near being “wiped out.”76 The identification of HIV-positive individuals as “social plagues” again serves to emphasize that the government has not viewed these individuals as worthy of protection through more adequate access to HIV prevention measures, but as hostilities to be taken down to protect the general public.

The discourse of homosexuality in China, therefore, faces the confounded problem of being morally unacceptable, being medicalized, and lacking legalization that effectively protects homosexual activity. In 1992, a survey of 3000 college students across China reported that 82.0% of male students and 84.5% of female students believed that homosexual behavior was a psychopathic disorder.77 A similar study in 2002, ten years later, revealed similar results, with 78.6% of men and 66.4% of women disapproving of homosexuality.78 A later study conducted in 2006 reported high levels of stigma and social pressure for MSM to enter marriage and to protect their family reputation, along with fear of stigma and discrimination, resulting in MSM reluctance to seek HIV testing or treatment.79 The government policy addressing MSM as a high-risk group that stigmatized the male homosexual community in attempts to lower HIV infection rates proves to be counter-effective as the stigma produced through such policies and advertisements prevented those who contracted AIDS from seeking healthcare and thus furthering the spread of HIV.

The homosexual community in China is not oblivious to all the above. There is an overt understanding within the homosexual community that they have been construed as an at-risk group, and that they have been medicalized and sexualized. In a qualitative study of 30 male homosexuals in Shanghai from December 2003 to June 2004, interviewees responded to the question of how they identified primarily with the term “tongzhi” (comrade) instead of “MSM” or “tongxinglian” typically used in medical literature. Some mentioned that they preferred “tongzhi” because it did not carry overtly sexual connotations. Other respondents mentioned that they preferred the word “gay,” because it is associated with a less sexualized identity. One interviewee responds “I like to use the term ‘gay’ to describe myself because it is not so cold. Like being together and appreciating one another, enjoying this kind of life, not just having sex.”80 These men carry a clear understanding of how they find homosexuality as an identity and a lifestyle but feel uncomfortable from having been stigmatized with immoral sexual behaviors and HIV/AIDS, and mitigate their discomfort through the use of terminology that evades the negative association. This understanding prompted efforts to bring homosexuality to mainstream acceptance through dissociating themselves from AIDS, promiscuity, drag, and many more. The best strategy for mainstream inclusion and equal rights is increasingly viewed by many to be to show society that gay men and women are no different from anyone else.

Therefore, the intentional antagonization of homosexuals by the government cultivated a defamed image of homosexuals in society at large, but at the same time precipitated a homonor-

75 “Restrictions on AIDS Activists in China,” Human Rights Watch, 29.

76 Figure 1.

77 Feng, Yuji, Zunyou Wu, and Roger Detels, “Evolution of Men Who Have Sex with Men Community and Experienced Stigma among Men Who Have Sex with Men in Chengdu, China.” JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes.

78 Higgins LT, et al. Attitudes to Marriage and Sexual Behaviors: A Survey of Gender and Culture Differences in China and United Kingdom. Sex Roles. 2002;46(3-4):75–89.

79 Feng, Wu, Detels, “Evolution of Men Who Have Sex with Men,” JAIDS.

80 He, et al, “A Qualitative Study in China.”

mative movement where the larger gay community endeavors to combat the conflation of homosexuality with medical risk and immorality by presenting themselves as “normal” like other heterosexual men. The drawback of such a method lies in the fact that homonormativity is not an equality-based movement but an inclusion-based assimilation politics with exclusionary results.81 The movement, an inevitable result of ostracizing policies, further marginalizes male homosexuals who have already contracted AIDS, and other members of the queer community (for example, transgender and intersex people). A qualitative study conducted during 2015-2016 with in-depth interviews with 61 self-identified gay men in several provinces of China reveals the following quote from a 35 year old gay man from Harbin: “Oftentimes stigma is far worse within the gay circles than in general society. Gay guys are afraid that if their positive status is revealed, they’ll be marked as a pariah in the community.”82 What is demonstrated here is that the stigmatization of male same-sex relations sourced from the Chinese government and the public forced fracturing within the homosexual community itself.

The intertwining of moral, legal, and medical discourses in shaping the homosexual narrative in a modernizing China produced a complicated landscape for queer scholars and activists to navigate in the twenty-first century. In many countries, developments in the LGBTQ+ movement following decriminalization and depathologization have been commenced by gradually including LGBTQ+ elements in popular culture through reference to LGBTQ+ themes and the inclusion of queer characters. Yet it is difficult for China to follow a similar pattern when its traditional media remains under the control of the state. While there has been a rise in the popularity of danmei (boy-love) content in the form of novels and comics in recent years, the streaming of the Oscar-winning LGBTQ+ film Call Me by Your Name at 2018 Beijing International Film Festival was banned. Chinese directors produced documentaries on LGBTQ+ life and suffered from the same fate. In the same year, a female danmei author received a ten-year and six-month sentence for breaking China’s obscenity laws for “obscenely describing male and female homosexuals.”83

In the sphere of education, the aftermath of the government shifting the blame onto immoral behaviors and male homosexuals to cover up their untimely address of HIV/AIDS manifests in a lack of information and education on sexuality and homosexuality in the public education curriculum. The dangers of the fundamental ambiguity of the legal status of homosexuals are displayed through repeated acts of police detainment of LGBTQ+ people, the inability of male homosexuals to protect themselves from rape as there is no applicable rape law concerning male victims, and even the inability of homosexuals to protect themselves from domestic violence in both cases of violence from original families or their homosexual mates.84 This is all made more difficult in the political landscape of China where criticism of the leading political party is prohibited. As Lisa Duggan, Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis who first popularized the term “homonormativity” said, “homonormativity is a politics that does not contest dominant heter-

81 Queer Marxism pg 9 footnote 4 - Ferry “Rethinking the Mainstream Gay and Lesbian Movement Beyond the Classroom.”

82 He, Huijing, Fan Lv, Nanci Nanyi Zhang, Zunyou Wu, Qinghua Liao, Zhanjun Chang, Yi Li, et al, “Look into the HIV Epidemic of Gay Community with a Socio-Cultural Perspective: A Qualitative Study in China, 2015-2016,” PLoS ONE.

83 https://www.animenewsnetwork.com/interest/2018-11-23/woman-receives-10-year-prison-sentence-in-china-for-writing-boys-love-novels/.139808

84 Mountford, Tom, “The Legal Status and Position of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the People’s Republic of China.”

onormativity assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption.”85 The current popular approach to problems queer individuals face in China only contributes to the dominating narrative in the long term. The question is, how do we approach the issue of homosexuality in China? While I am in no position to give the solution, it is possible to draw on the experiences of other equality-oriented movements. The feminist movement in Taiwan faces a similar dilemma where the movement attempts to craft a respectable image of women by purging sexual issues from its agenda to secure popular support, yet desexualization is an example of how women internalize the requirements of patriarchy.86 While sharing a similar conundrum, the male homosexual community is oftentimes antagonized by feminist movements fighting against tongqi (women in marriage with a gay man). It is important, therefore, to remember that queer is not synonymous with homosexuality but is a reflection of the distance between genders and identities in the diversity of human culture. Those that are distanced and marginalized from the mainstream are not just homosexuals. The reason why this paper, and many others, focus on the male experience of same-sex relations is precisely because of the medicalized HIV/AIDS narrative that made MSM hypervisible and the traditional patriarchal model that limited the expression of females. The disproportionate voices of genders in Chinese society make the medical narrative more problematic. Thus, the target of any gender-related movement should be the dominant heteronormative narrative that compels those not embodying the heteronormative assumption to merge themselves into that narrative. Improving the situation of queer individuals in China remains a formidable task, but with decreased levels of homophobia and increased rates of tolerance in recent years, it is possible - even necessary - to remain hopeful. Persistence in securing legal recognition and protections may be the first step to untangling the web of moral, legal, and medical discourses for queer China.

85 Duggan, Lisa, The twilight of equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy. Beacon Press, 2003.

86 Liu, Petrus, Queer Marxism in Two Chinas, 2015.

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Advanced History Capstone students Adam Jin (left) and Zhaohan (Jasmine) Shi after their successful culminating presentations in Frank D. Ashburn Chapel at Brooks School.

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