by George Picker

Assessment: A meaningful Process?

Assessment is something we do every day as teachers. Whether that be formative judgements of pupil engagement on a specific task, observing progress in written work or summative assessments at the end of a topic, it is one of the foundations of pedagogy. As Keith Swanwick said: ‘To teach is to assess’ (1988, 149). But how far do we go to make assessment meaningful for us and our pupils?

Ever since I started researching assessment strategies, one question always seems to crop up: why do we all assess in the same way? Let’s look at it another way: what does 70% in a test mean for pupils and teachers? Does it mean the same for a Maths end of topic test and a Geography prep? Do pupils regard these as equal? What does this do to a pupil’s motivation towards a subject? I think you can start to see how troublesome assessment can be on a whole-school level and that one size certainly does not fit all. Yet, numerical grades, percentages and other similar methods are something we use regularly and without second thought. So, it begs the question ‘what can we do to make assessment more meaningful and to suit our subject areas whilst adhering to whole-school frameworks?’.

I’ll use music as an example, but I believe the principle can be shared by many different subjects. In music we broadly teach three main areas – composition, performance, and listening & appraising. Each one of these areas is very different in terms of the skills and knowledge needed to succeed. So, naturally, there is a need to adapt assessment to suit these different areas. From a poll I took of 53 music teachers across the UK earlier this year, there was a consensus that assessment criteria need to reflect the nature of the skill being learnt. Why is this important to making assessment meaningful? Well, this concept of adapting assessment to suit the skill is incredibly valuable for pupils, enabling them to understand how and why they are being assessed but also helping them identify strengths and weaknesses in areas of a subjects rather than the subject as a whole.

To this end, in 2019, Martin Fautley and Alison Daubney devised a framework that recognises these differences in music but also encourages teachers to visually demonstrate attainment to make it more meaningful (Fautley & Daubney, 2019). Different areas of musical learning such as singing, improvising and critical engagement are placed on a radar chart and a score (working towards (1), working at (2) and working beyond (3)) is given to each area for each pupil. The score is devised from formative judgements made over time by the teacher and is based on specific measurable criteria. For example, one criterion could be ‘Sings in tune with musical expression’ and it is up to the teacher to determine whether they are working towards, working at or working beyond what is expected of that pupil’s age rage. Over time and with more formative judgements made about different criteria, a comprehensive and visual representation of pupil learning is generated (See appendix 1). During the term, pupils will have access to their radar chart and see their progress in different areas of the subject.

We must adhere to whole-school assessment frameworks, but within those parameters, we can make the process of assessment more meaningful to us and our pupils by recognising that different skills and knowledge within our subjects require separate assessment criteria. Being a Grade 8 pianist does not automatically mean you are an innovative composer or an outstanding musical analyst. Similarly, if you are an innovative composer and an outstanding musical analyst but don’t play an instrument, does that mean you’re not good at music? I believe it is time to recognise that music, along with so many other subjects, is multifaceted and that we should be clearly explaining this to pupils through the assessment process. If time is taken to explain and model this to pupils, assessment becomes a mechanism within pedagogy rather than a potential bolt-on at the end of teaching cycles to be put into a spreadsheet and forgotten about.

Appendix 1 Taken from Fautley and Daubney's framework (Fautley & Daubney, 2019, 18) Singing 3 2 SMSC 1 0 Critical Engagement Playing Composing

Improvising

BIO Mr George Picker is Head of Upper School Music and Teacher of Music at Downe House School. 61

How Successful has Antitrust Law Been in Regulating 'Big Tech' in the USA?

This dissertation argued that Antitrust legislation is outdated and has failed in the regulation of ‘Big Technology’ companies in the U.S. and is in desperate need of reform. To achieve this, several reports from congress, academic journals and court proceedings were considered. My analysis focused on 5 of the top technology companies, under the acronym FAAMG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, and Google). I analysed the current state of antitrust and evaluated the effect it has had on these 5 companies. Each company was given a section in which I broke down whether they have any ongoing court cases, and what each case may be about. The crux of my paper lies in evaluating whether this area of jurisprudence really protects competition, or does it play a minor hindrance to Big Tech companies.

What is Anti-Trust? (and why do we even need it?)

The birth of technology companies dates to the early 20th century; now they are the cornerstone of society. Why is this? The answer lies in their ability to innovate at such a blistering pace. This unprecedented growth has completely transformed the face of the earth.

Anti-trust is a term mainly coined in the USA; its European counterpart is more widely known as competition law. Antitrust law are pieces of legislation designed by governments to protect consumers’ interests and ensure competitive business practices are followed. The premise for this legislation existing is to regulate monopolies. These firms have developed or inherited pricesetting ability, and without appropriate legislation would be free to maximise producer surplus. This surplus is the difference between the price a firm would be willing to supply a product, and the price they in-fact do supply this product. In theory, the benefit of this for producers is an increased supernormal profit, at the detriment of consumer welfare. With this first interpretation of the legislation, the question does arise: how can regulation be placed on a product that has not cost at point of consumption? Social media and internet services are great examples of this question coming to light. In my project, I focus on companies that encompass this issue. Another facet of this legislation is to ensure fair competition in the marketplace; this includes restricting predatory practices which aim to stop new firms from entering the market. This is often done through manufacturing artificial barriers to entry, and the government aim to keep barriers of entry low to allow for the most efficient firm to enter and prosper. Firms which may not charge the consumer with a monetary cost may still behave in anticompetitive manners through vertical integration and loss leading measures.

My initial interest in this field was provoked by the increased media attention to these 'Big Technology' companies following congressional hearings in which CEO’s were subpoenaed to appear before a committee. In these televised and politicised hearings, Twitter and Facebook CEO’s were questioned on how their respective companies handle data internally, and how their company behaves in a global manner. An increased level of scrutiny for these technology firms was a target for the Biden Administration, and thus there were increased resources devoted to the FTC and DOJ (Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice) to investigate allegations brought to them. As these companies were now in the news more often with allegations of anticompetitive behaviour, I pondered the question why are they able to even be accused of monopolisation, isn’t there legislation designed to stop this dead in its tracks? Initially, my scope was on why monopolisation may be of detriment to the consumer, but this tied in closely to what the Year 13 Economics syllabus would cover. Upon revision, my focus was now firmly on researching and analysing what legislation was in place to regulate these firms, and how successful it has been in doing so.

In June 2019, it was reported that the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) agreed to divide responsibility over the investigations of the ‘Big Tech’ companies’ practices. These agencies are responsible for enforcing federal antitrust laws. Under this agreement, the DOJ reportedly have taken authority over investigations of Google and Apple, while the FTC will delve into Facebook and Amazon (Kendall & McKinnon, 2019).

Current state of Antitrust cases:

Google:

Google is no stranger to scrutiny in the form of antitrust. The Tech giant licenses the Android operating system (OS) and owns a major ad-brokering platform (AdSense). In 2013, the FTC concluded an intensive investigation into the company’s business practices, including its alleged involvement in discriminating against vertical rivals, restricting advertisers’ ability to do business, and brokering exclusivity agreements with websites that used AdSense (Freeman & Sykes, 2019). Congress and agency staff recommended the FTC to bring a lawsuit challenging some of these activities, but the commission unanimously declined further action against Google after pledges were made on the Google side to make changes to its business practices. The reason for the FTC dropping action is very contested in the media as nobody seems to have a concrete answer. Many critics are basing this on the FTC’s alleged worry that the case will get held up in litigation, and taxpayers’ money and worker hours will be wasted. The mere threat of a lawsuit seems to be the FTC’s weapon of choice for policing these tech firms. However, European authorities have pursued investigations in differing manners. European antitrust authorities have conducted three separate investigations that have all yielded in large fines. In June 2017, the European Commission (EC) fined Google 2.4 billion euros for violations relating to Google Search’s preferential treatment of ‘Google shopping’. Further to this, the EC later imposed an additional 4.3 billion euro fine for exclusive-dealing arrangements with Android. In March 2019, the EC imposed a further 1.49-billion-euro fine for exclusive

dealing arrangements involving AdSense (Commission, 2017). How the EC can levy fines surpassing 8.2 billion euros, but the FTC let Google off scot-free is a perfect embodiment of how weak and in desperate need of reform US antitrust law really is. If the EC can find Google guilty on three accounts but the FTC won’t even continue with their investigations, that illustrates eloquently how risk averse the US agencies really are.

Facebook:

Most of the commentary surrounding Facebook and antitrust is directed to their acquisitions (and for good reason). In particular, the acquisition of potential competitors: in 2012 Facebook’s acquisition of the photosharing service Instagram and its 2014 acquisition of the messaging service WhatsApp. In a letter to the FTC, the Chairman of the House Antitrust Subcommittee urged the FTC to examine whether these purchases violated section 7 of the Clayton Act. This section of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly (Federal Trade Commission, 2021). Some estimates now have Facebook owning three of the top four social media applications. Unlike Amazon, the FTC appear to be taking these allegations seriously. Perhaps their manpower has been directed at Facebook, and this can serve as justification to why Amazon hasn’t had a formalised lawsuit headed their way, yet. In 2019, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the FTC could also be evaluating Facebook’s 2013 purchase of Onavo Mobile LTD - an analytics company that allegedly allowed Facebook to identify fast growing companies and purchase them before they pose a threat. Again, there are significant problems when pursuing such a suit against Facebook, but for different reasons this time. Due to Facebook operating in a market that does not charge users for use of its social network, this would require agencies to confront difficult conceptual ideas when deciding how to define and quantify zero-price markets.

It becomes infinitely harder to prove that consumer welfare has been diminished when a company doesn’t price gouge or operate in predatory pricing. The emergence of these free services is something that antitrust legislation has caught up with as current legislation stipulates that there must be concrete evidence of consumer welfare being damaged by a monopoly. Consumer welfare due to the Chicago school has been focused on prices and not choice or quality of goods or services. Due to the emergence of the Chicago school of thinking, antitrust law was focussed on proving whether mathematically there had been manipulation of consumers going on. Unfortunately, technology just doesn’t fit this old archaic model, and therefore Facebook may be able to defend their acquisitions that gave them such market power. However, even though there are evident flaws with the legislation itself, Facebook may still have a leg to stand on in the eyes of the law even if antitrust law was airtight. Facebook have argued that its large post-acquisition investment in these companies have improved the company’s performance and benefited consumers.

Apple:

Like Google, Apple has faced antitrust claims related to its mobile software. Although there aren’t any government sanctioned investigations at this time, Apple have been met with a flurry of private lawsuits surrounding their design of IOS. In an ongoing trial against Fortnite’s maker Epic Games, a court in California has ruled that Apple cannot stop app developers directing users to third-party payment options (Clayton & Fox, 2021). This came after Epic Games tried to move their in-app purchases system to their own website rather than using the App store where Apple are subject to a 30% commission of all purchases. Epic games argued that the App store was monopolistic and that they had the right to communicate