© 2012 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without written permission from the Carnegie Endowment. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 202-483-7600, Fax 202-483-1840 www.ceip.org The Carnegie Endowment does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Endowment, its staff, or its trustees. To order, contact: Hopkins Fulfillment Service P.O. Box 50370, Baltimore, MD 21211-4370 1-800-537-5487 or 1-410-516-6956 Fax 1-410-516-6998 Cover design by Jocelyn Soly Composition by Oakland Street Publishing Printed by United Book Press Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mousavian, Seyyed Hossein, 1967The Iranian nuclear crisis : a memoir / Seyed Hossein Mousavian. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-87003-268-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) -- ISBN 978-0-87003-267-7 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Nuclear nonproliferation--Iran. 2. Nuclear weapons--Iran. 3. Iran--Politics and government--1997- 4. Iran--Foreign relations--1997- 5. Mousavian, Seyyed Hossein, 1967- I. Title. JZ5665.M68 2012 623.4’51190955--dc23 2012012698
cOnTenT s
ac k now le d gm ent s For ewor d In t r oduc t Ion cH a Pt e r on e
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The Origin and develOpmenT Of iran’s nuclear prOgram cH a Pt e r t wo
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The firsT crisis cH a Pt e r t Hr ee
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frOm Tehran TO paris cH a Pt e r Four
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frOm The paris agreemenT TO The 2005 presidenTial elecTiOns cH a Pt e r F IV e
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The larijani periOd cH a Pt e r sIx
TO The securiTy cOuncil
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c H a Pt e r seV e n
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Back TO The securiTy cOuncil and a new dOmesTic siTuaTiOn c H a Pt e r e Ig H t
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iran alOne: The jalili periOd c H a Pt e r n In e
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u.s. engagemenT c H a Pt e r t e n
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The crisis wOrsens c onc lusIon
431
not e s
471
Inde x
553
ab out t H e au t Hor
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c a rn eg Ie e n d owm ent For In t e r nat Iona l P e ac e
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ack nOw ledgmenT s
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would like to offer my sincere thanks to a number of individuals and institutions for their help in making this book possible. Professors Frank von Hippel of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and Zia Mian, a researcher in the program, were the principal investigators who read the manuscript, made valuable comments, and raised funding for the project. George Perkovich, vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a top global expert on weapons of mass destruction, made valuable comments on multiple drafts of the manuscript. The Program on Science and Global Security and its director, Christopher Chyba, steadfastly supported my work and provided me with a base of operations. I thank also the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, the Institute for the Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia, and Daniel Kurtzer, Abraham Chair in Middle East Policy of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. The Ploughshares Fund, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace all contributed generously with grants to Princeton University for this research. I am grateful to the reviewers, Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies program on nonproliferation and disarmament, and Pierre Goldschmidt, a nonresident senior associate at Carnegie Endowment and former deputy director general of the IAEA, for the use-
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ful comments they made on the manuscript, and to M. Mahdavi Emad Kiyaei, who helped on finding and translating some Persian sources. Lastly, I offer my thanks to my research assistant, Noah Arjomand. I dedicate this book to my beloved family, who endured great difficultly as a result of my unjust and illegal arrest in April 2007 because of the responsibilities tasked to me on Iran’s nuclear file. During this period, our negotiating team did the utmost to resolve the crisis through diplomacy while preserving the nation’s rights for peaceful nuclear technology and preventing referral to the UN Security Council that would pave the way for sanctions. My family and I paid a high price for such efforts and I am forever grateful for their unrelenting support, dedication, and belief in me.
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r. Seyed Hossein Mousavian has written a unique book, a hybrid of four genres. As a contemporary history, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir is the first detailed Iranian account of the diplomatic struggle between Iran and its interlocutors during the nuclear crisis that began in 2002 when news emerged that Tehran was secretly constructing facilities to enrich uranium and produce plutonium. Drawing on extensive research and firsthand knowledge, Mousavian’s narrative adds much-needed Iranian material to the historical record. It is a treasure trove for scholars, journalists, and policy analysts. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis is also a memoir. From 1997 to 2005, Mousavian was the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. In 2003 he was named the spokesman of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team led by the secretary of Iran’s National Security Council, Hassan Rouhani. In this position, he gained an intimate knowledge of Iran’s dealings with the International Atomic Energy Agency, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, China, and, indirectly, the United States. Mousavian provides firsthand accounts of many of these interactions. Rarer still, he takes the reader into Iran’s internal deliberations, where Khamenei, Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and other leaders wrestle with their internal and external adversaries. The most vivid memoir sections of this volume recount his arrest and interrogations, beginning in 2007, on charges of committing espionage by
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allegedly providing classified information to the United Kingdom. Publicly accused by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Mousavian was tried two times on these charges and found not guilty, and then later was charged with criticizing the government of Iran, which he admitted. He was put on probation with the proviso that he not speak or write publicly against government policies. These dramatic episodes, and other insider accounts of diplomatic missions in the 1980s and 1990s, tell much about the author and the swirling dynamics of Iranian politics and diplomacy. This is also an analytical volume. Mousavian at times steps back to conceptualize the challenges Iran faced and the options it weighed in dealing with them. He analyzes the policies and diplomatic moves of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and other players in this drama. This analysis extends into the future, as Mousavian compares the potential costs and benefits of the options available to Iran and its counterparts to resolve the nuclear crisis and mend the broader relationship between Iran and the international community. He weighs the likely effects of American and/or Israeli military strikes, of covert action, sanctions, and containment, and of diplomatic engagement, concluding that there is still an opportunity for diplomacy to prevent Iran from deciding to produce nuclear weapons. The final genre is that of the polemic. In comparing and contrasting the approaches that Iran has taken under the Khatami and the Ahmadinejad administrations, Mousavian does not hide his fundamental and specific disagreements with the latter. Upon first taking office in 2005, Ahmadinejad interviewed Mousavian for the position of foreign minister, only to be told, as the book recounts, that Mousavian could not support the new president’s view of the world and the policies he was inclined to pursue. It would be unnatural for the author, after having been arrested and interrogated multiple times, not to have a certain animus toward Ahmadinejad and his administration. Nevertheless, the critiques in this volume are sufficiently analytical to be judged on their merits. Anything having to do with Iran since 1979 can be the subject of intense controversy in the United States. The current atmosphere of bellicosity—replete with assassinations of nuclear scientists in Iran and an alleged Iranian assassination plot against the Saudi ambassador in Washington—
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make it all the more difficult for Iranians and Americans to express the value of understanding the interests and perspectives of “the other side.” Thus, the question arises of why a Washington-based think tank would want to publish a book by an Iranian protagonist. The answer is that the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a global think tank. We believe that the most serious international conflicts cannot be resolved—or mitigated—if the antagonists do not understand each other’s perceptions, interests, and strategic cultures. Understanding does not necessarily lead to reconciliation; often, understanding clarifies differences. This is likely to be the case with the present volume. Nevertheless, we are convinced that serious, earnest studies such as Hossein Mousavian’s can be invaluable to historical knowledge and contemporary policymaking. The pedagogical value of this book extends to its “style.” Readers will notice that analytical points and presentations of costs and benefits of particular policy options are often conveyed in lists of “bulleted” text. If Western writers included such lists we would edit them into narrative paragraphs. However, Ambassador Mousavian has explained that Iranian rhetoric often relies on lists of arguments for and against particular propositions, with as much (or more) weight given to the quantity of points on each side as to quality. In order, then, to convey Iranian points of view and styles of thinking, we have chosen not to make the entire text conform to Western editorial style. A final editorial point: this is largely a book of contemporary history, and as such it strives for factual accuracy. Yet, even distant history is factually disputed. The causes of World War I are still debated, for example. Contemporary history is more uncertain or contested. And when the history involves subjects and relationships as fraught with conflict as those surrounding the Iranian nuclear crisis, agreement on facts is especially problematic. Therefore, Ambassador Mousavian graciously agreed that when his narrative treats as fact something that the editor thinks is in dispute, or in need of qualification, the editor can note that on the page. This does not mean that the author agrees with these notes, or that the editor agrees with passages that do not contain notes. Rather, the notes appear where the editor thinks a given statement is factually problematic enough to need to be qualified.
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Obviously, this procedure is severely limited by the editor’s knowledge or lack thereof. Some readers will no doubt find passages that they would dispute and wonder why they went unnoted. Other readers will disagree with the editor’s notes. Beyond acknowledging imperfection, we can only say that one of the values of The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir is to encourage further study and dialogue by and among its readers. —George Perkovich Vice President for Studies Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful
introduc tion
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ran’s nuclear crisis began in earnest in the summer of 2003, when a report from the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) triggered a resolution from the agency’s Board of Governors that laid out major points of dispute over Iran’s nuclear activities, some of which remain unresolved to this day. The case has had many ups and downs in the past few years and has intertwined with many domestic and international developments. The case has already engaged two presidents and three secretaries of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and has posed a challenge to world powers and international organizations, including the European Union (EU), NATO, the Non-Aligned Movement,1 and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Despite the significance of recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa, with political upheaval in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria, the Iran nuclear issue continues to occupy President Barack Obama’s agenda as a top foreign policy priority. The nuclear crisis has been the most important challenge facing the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy apparatus since the 1980–1988 war between Iran and Iraq. The issue’s serious political and economic consequences, such as the referral of Iran’s nuclear case to the UN Security Council and the imposition of harsh economic sanctions against Iran, are undeniable and have partly affected the political, economic, and even social and cultural realities of Iran.
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Hostilities between Iran and the United States date back more than three decades following the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The recent nuclear crisis is part of a broader set of issues—among them terrorism, human rights, the Middle East peace process, energy, and Persian Gulf security— that complicate the relationship between Iran and the West. From a U.S. perspective, the nuclear issue arguably is an opportunity to unite the international community against Iran, with the ultimate goal being regime change. From the Iranian perspective, the nuclear issue is an opportunity to resist U.S. hegemony and its regime change policy. The nuclear issue is a matter of national consensus and pride that enables the Iranian government to unite the nation around the flag and resist the West.2 A well-informed retired U.S. politician listed the U.S. security objectives in the region as follows: • • • • •
Iran without nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. To avoid a proliferation domino effect in the region. Iraq stability as U.S. troops withdraw and beyond. Afghanistan more self-sustaining and stable over the next two years. Israel achieving peace with neighbors and an agreement on the Palestinian issue. • No military conflict with Iran. • No accidental war in the region in which the United States might be drawn in. • Iran to cease its military support of Hizbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command. The fact is that any U.S. policy or set of policies that seeks to achieve these objectives will have to take into account Iran’s objectives, intentions, and interests. Iran’s approach to each of these seven U.S. security objectives varies in intensity. Some of the U.S. objectives are more amenable to Iran’s cooperation with the United States than others. But none of these U.S. objectives will be achieved without dealing with Iran’s interests. Iran’s security objectives are in conflict with U.S. objectives, though not in every case. Having been involved in Iran’s security and foreign policy issues for
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two decades, I believe some of the major Iranian security objectives in the region are as follows: • Iran with self-sufficiency on nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile technology consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. • U.S. troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan. • An end to the U.S. military presence in the region. The United States has significantly expanded its military presence in the region since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and today has military bases in countries surrounding Iran, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The fact is that Iran is virtually surrounded by U.S. military forces. • Iran as the key regional ally of Iraq and Afghanistan. • A stable political–economic system in Iran. • A regional cooperation system for security, stability, and peace in the Persian Gulf. • Israel weakened by increased pressure from the Islamic nations and the international community. • No military conflict with Israel or the United States, no accidental war, and an end to threats from the United States and Israel that “all options are on the table.” • Preventing the militarization of the region. Since the Islamic Revolution, Western countries, especially the United States, have exported hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of sophisticated armaments to upgrade the military capabilities of regional countries against Iran, while working by all means to prevent Iran from obtaining weapons to build up its own military capabilities. This is viewed by Iranian security and political officials as a clear and serious threat and has stimulated Iran to upgrade its own military capabilities to the extent possible. • The end of U.S. policies to achieve “regime change” in Tehran. Iran believes that U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights in Iran mask covert efforts to foster a “velvet revolution” against
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the system. Iran seeks an end to U.S. support for violent antiregime groups (for example, the Mujahideen-e Khalq, or MEK, also known as the PMOI, Jundallah, People’s Free Life Party of Kurdistan, and others). • Iran relieved of the UN Security Council sanctions, with normalized relations with the IAEA, with access to foreign investment and trade, and developing a relationship of mutual respect with other countries in the region and beyond. By taking into account security objectives and identifying those areas in which some overlap might be found, Tehran and Washington should formulate a revised set of policies that would be more apt to achieve at least some of their security objectives. Neither country can expect full satisfaction in achieving all of its objectives. The challenge for both parties is to identify which objectives are most important and whether they will give some ground on other objectives in order to achieve their primary ones. A zero-sum approach will not work for either side. If Iran’s leader could be convinced that his country could achieve some of its objectives through dealing directly with the United States on the range of security issues that threaten its security in the region, the United States would have a better opportunity to address with Iran the major concerns it has with Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran will not seriously consider having a dialogue with the United States on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) questions unless and until the United States agrees to discuss Iran’s security objectives in addition to America’s security objectives. The obstacles to Washington and Tehran opening such a dialogue are serious but not insurmountable as each nation becomes more cognizant of the mounting threats to its security. The two negotiating counterparts—Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, Great Britain, France, China, and Russia) plus Germany (P5+1)—reiterate that diplomacy is the best avenue for resolving the dispute over Iran’s nuclear program. Diplomacy has failed thus far because the West has tried to force Iran to compromise on its policies by utilizing sanctions, pressure, sabotage, and threats. Some observers in the West argue that Iran’s actions, policies, and internal dysfunction during President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s term in office pro-
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voked the West to resort to these international pressures. Nevertheless, Iran has based its policy on resistance to threats, defending its independence, and perseverance in the face of tyranny. This is the main reason that the Iranians have responded to the P5+1 threats by accelerating their uranium enrichment program to reach a point of no return; it’s a way of forcing the West to negotiate with them on an equal basis. Five options generally have been discussed by international politicians and commentators as means to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis: 1. A preemptive strike 2. Behavior change through sanctions, paired with containment and deterrence 3. Espionage and covert action to sabotage the program 4. Learning to live with an Iranian bomb and relying on containment and deterrence to prevent threats from Iran to regional peace and security 5. A diplomatic solution. The first is seen by many as a last resort. The second and third have been the focus of efforts thus far. The fourth would cause damage to the nonproliferation regime. And the fifth has not worked despite eight years of attempts. One of the main purposes of this book is to explain first why engagement has failed thus far and then, with that background, how it might succeed. We start here with a review of the other options.
1. A preemptive strike WikiLeaks has provided a level of insight into U.S. foreign policy and positions taken by various actors that is deeper than any to date. Of 3,373 State Department cables released by the whistle-blowing website as of February 1, 2011, 323 are tagged as directly relating to Iran. The cables reflect a stereotypical U.S. fear-based view of Iran and contain very few, if any, positive statements toward normalizing relations or concrete mechanisms to reduce tension and misunderstanding. This perspective reflects more than thirty-two years of strained relations between the United States and Iran that is very much shaped by the regional actors’ views on Iran and how they relay this information to U.S. officials.
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In 2009, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak called Iranians “liars,” informing George Mitchell, the U.S. envoy to the Middle East, that he did not oppose the United States talking with Iran—as long as “you don’t believe a word they say.”3 In the same meeting, Mubarak expressed the belief that Iran seeks to destabilize Egypt and the region. Similarly, the King of Qatar, in discussions with U.S. Senator John Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, advised him in 2010 that “based on 30 years of experience with the Iranians, they will give you 100 words. Trust only one of the 100.”4 The king of Saudi Arabia was quoted in a 2008 cable as urging the United States to “cut off the head of the snake,”5 implicitly encouraging the United States to attack Iran. According to the cable, the king was adamant on the point of attacking Iran to put an end to the Iranian nuclear program, a request that he apparently made frequently. This view appears to have been understood well by the United States, with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates informing the French foreign minister in 2010 that the Saudis want to “fight the Iranians to the last American.”6 And there is more. The president of the Jordanian Senate, Zeid Rifai, warned a visiting U.S. official in a 2009 cable, “Bomb Iran, or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives won’t matter.”7 This was communicated despite his belief that a military strike would have a “catastrophic impact on the region.”8 In the same cable, the Jordanians are quoted as describing Iran as “an octopus whose tentacles reach out insidiously to manipulate, foment and undermine the best-laid plans of the west and regional moderates.”9 King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain appeared to have expressed similar views in 2009 to U.S. General David Petraeus, who had command of U.S. military operations in the region. The king pointed to Iran as a source of “trouble” in the region and discussed the rationale for strikes against Iran, with the U.S. diplomat who authored the cable noting that “he argued forcefully for taking action to terminate their nuclear program, by whatever means necessary. ‘The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping.’”10 A number of cables have also made clear the position taken by the United Arab Emirates. In a meeting in 2009 between U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Muhammad
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bin Zayed al Nahyan, and Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed al Nahyan were noted to have expressed their fear of the Iranian government and to have advocated military strikes. The crown prince is said to have viewed “a near term conventional war with Iran as clearly preferable to the long-term consequence of a nuclear armed Iran.”11 The crown prince also speculated that, within six months, Iran would be attacked by Israel and that an Israeli strike, by itself, would not be able to halt Iran’s nuclear program.12 The 2009 statement by the crown prince endorsing military action is consistent with his message in 2007 to General Michael Moseley, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, when he recommended, “Delay their program—by all means available,”13 as well as his comments in 2005 to U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Dunn. When Dunn voiced doubt regarding the chances of success in destroying “locations of concern” via aerial attack only,14 the crown prince exclaimed, “Then it will take ground forces!”15 The Israeli government has expressed its position clearly on many occasions. Ministry of Defense Director General Pinchas Buchris was quoted in a 2009 cable as stating that there should be a finite period of time for U.S.-Iran engagement and that “all options must remain on the table.”16 In a 2007 cable, the Mossad director, Meir Dagan, is quoted as informing Frances Fragos Townsend, assistant to the U.S. president for homeland security and counterterrorism, that “Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States all fear Iran, but want someone else to do the job for them.”17 The fear and resultant hostility shown toward Iran appear to have grown more intense in recent years. The cables show, for example, that the arrest of foreign citizens, as in the case of the British Embassy employees after the 2009 presidential election in Iran and the three U.S. hikers who crossed the border later in 2009, has added to the concerns of London and Washington and has exacerbated dealings with Iran.18 In a 2010 cable, Muhammad Omar Daudzai, Afghanistan’s former ambassador to Iran, was noted to have stated that the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, “had maintained excellent relations with Iran and Khatami [Muhammad Khatami, the former president of Iran] personally. . . . Relations had become more complicated with Ahmadinejad’s election.”19 Another indication of mistrust was provided in a 2009 cable documenting the exchange between U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman, chairman of the Senate
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Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and Gamal Mubarak, a high-ranking member of his father’s ruling party. When asked if the United States should reengage with Iran, Mubarak noted, “As long as Ahmadinejad is there, I am skeptical.”20 The cables indicate that there are conflicting assessments of Iran’s nuclear program and capability even among Israeli officials. A cable from 2005 notes that Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz “cautioned that Iran is ‘less than one year away,’ while the head of research in military intelligence estimated that Iran would reach this point by early 2007,” while the head of the strategic affairs division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “recalled that [Israeli government] assessments from 1993 predicted that Iran would possess an atomic bomb by 1998.”21 A cable from 2009 further illustrates the apparent lack of reliable intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stating that he did not know “for certain how close Iran was to developing a nuclear weapons capability, but that ‘our experts’ say Iran was probably only one or two years away.”22 Interestingly, another 2009 cable notes, “It is unclear if the Israelis firmly believe this or are using worst-case estimates to raise greater urgency from the United States.”23 This comment was made in reference to Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, the head of the Defense Ministry’s Intelligence Analysis Production, who stated that “it would take Iran one year to obtain a nuclear weapon and two and a half years to build an arsenal of three weapons. By 2012 Iran would be able to build one weapon within weeks and an arsenal within six months.”24 An analysis of the cables makes it reasonable to conclude that regional actors as well as the U.S. administration have deep concerns and fears in regard to Iran’s true nuclear intentions. The cables have also made it clear that, while the U.S. administration and regional actors publicly support engagement with Iran, in reality they are increasingly suspicious and concerned about Iran’s role in the region. In fact, they have opted to pursue a policy of increased pressure on Iran rather than options for dialogue and restoration of normal relations between Iran, its neighbors, and the United States. Although the Iranian media paid a good deal of attention to WikiLeaks, President Ahmadinejad publicly dismissed the leaks as a staged and “worthless” psychological warfare campaign meant to bring down further pressure on Iran and said that they would not affect Iran’s foreign relations.25
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I am confident that in reality, Iran’s strategists have analyzed the WikiLeaks cables closely as a means of better understanding U.S. foreign policy. According to a survey conducted between April 7 and May 8, 2010, the publics in 22 countries, 16 Western and some Arab, indicated their approval of military action against Iran. In this poll, 66 percent of Americans, 59 percent of French, 51 percent of Germans, 55 percent of Egyptians, and 53 percent of Jordanians favored military action against Iran.26 However, state media in Iran claim that according to another poll, 95 percent of people in Arab countries were in favor of Iran’s nuclear program and 70 percent even believed that Iran should acquire nuclear weapons.27 Some politicians and academics, both in the Middle East and the West,28 believe that, after eight years of negotiations without results, military strikes by the United States or Israel are the only remaining viable option to stop, or at least delay, Iran’s nuclear bomb program. They reiterate that any air strikes should be precision attacks, aimed only at nuclear facilities, to minimize the costs and risks. Air strikes would also serve to remind Iran of the reach of U.S. military strength, they point out, and that many other valuable sites could be bombed if Iran were foolish enough to retaliate.29 Some believe a nuclear Iran would transfer nuclear materials and technologies to terrorist groups and countries such as Syria, Sudan, or Lebanon and argue that such a threat can be contained only if Washington is prepared to use force against Iran’s enrichment facilities.30 Just days before the November 2010 congressional elections yielded major Republican gains, Senator Lieberman stated, “It is time to retire our ambiguous mantra about all options remaining on the table. Our message to our friends and enemies in the region needs to become clearer: namely, that we will prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability—by peaceful means if we possibly can, but with military force if we absolutely must.”31 After the election, Lieberman said that Congress would focus on pressing the administration on sanctions, but he also invited Congress to pass an “Iran War Resolution,” suggesting that Congress might decide to formally endorse the options of military action against Iran.32 He encouraged President Obama to forge a “bipartisan foreign policy” by cooperating with the new Republican leadership in the House of Representatives to thwart “anti-war Democrats and isolationist Republicans.”33
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he first detailed Iranian account of the diplomatic struggle between Iran and the international community, The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir begins in 2002, when news about Iran’s clandestine uranium enrichment and plutonium production facilities emerged, and takes the reader into Tehran’s deliberations as its leaders wrestle with internal and external adversaries. Seyed Hossein Mousavian, previously the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council and spokesman for Tehran’s nuclear negotiating team, provides readers with intimate knowledge of Iran’s interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency and global powers. Mousavian’s personal story comes alive as he vividly recounts his arrest in 2007 on charges of espionage. This and other dramatic episodes of diplomatic missions tell much about the author and the swirling dynamics of Iranian politics and diplomacy—undercurrents that must be understood now more than ever. As intense debate continues over the direction of Iran’s nuclear program, Mousavian weighs the likely effects of military strikes, covert action, sanctions, and diplomatic engagement, along with their potential to resolve the nuclear crisis. AMBASSADOR SEYED HOSSEIN MOUSAVIAN is an associate research scholar at Princeton University. He previously served as Iranian ambassador to Germany (1990–1997), head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (1997–2005), spokesman for Iran's nuclear negotiation team (2003–2005), and foreign policy adviser to the secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (2005–2007).
“A fascinating, insightful, and new treatment from the perspective of an intimately involved former Iranian senior official on Iran’s nuclear program.” —THOMAS R. PICKERING, FORMER U.S. UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE