Eurasiatique Volume IV by CERES Graduate Student Journal

EURA SI A TI QUE VOLUME IV | SPRING 2016

THE CERES GRA DUA TE STUDENT JOURNA L

EDI TORI A L TEA M MANAGING EDITOR

ADVISOR

EMILY TRUDEAU

EDITH KLEIN

SENIOR EDITORS

PROGRAM ADVISOR, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN, RUSSIAN, AND EURASIAN STUDIES

CONNIE LO JOSH TAPPER JULIA WARREN

JUNIOR EDITORS DELILA BIKIC MADELAINA DEPACE SIOBHAN KIRKLAND ANASTASIA LESHCHYSHYN MARIA CARMELA POBLADOR CRISTINA STOICA

COPYRIGHT 2016 EURASIATIQUE No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopy, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the Eurasiatique Editorial Team. Permission for reproducing excerpts from this volume can be found at www.ceresgraduatejournal.com. Inquiries can also be directed to: the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, 1 Devonshire Place, Toronto ON, M5S 3K7, or by contacting ceresjournal@gmail.com. COVER IMAGE: Overseas by Petr Dosek - Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons. Journal design by Emily Trudeau. PHOTOS: Unless otherwise specified, all images published in Eurasiatique Vol. IV are licensed under Creative Commons [CC BY-SA 2.0 or 3.0], sourced via Wikimedia Commons. ISSN 2371-1302 Printed in Canada.

FOREWORD This year?s edition of Eurasiatique explores identity and belonging in contemporary Europe and Russia. Building on the 2016 CERES Graduate Student Conference, this year?s journal seeks ?to make sense of Europe? to know what, who, and for whom Europe is.?1 Featuring conference papers as well as related work by CERES students, the fourth volume of Eurasiatique demonstrates a keen desire by contributors to understand the mechanisms and structures that affect belonging at institutional and social levels. Articles in this year?s journal take multiple approaches to exploring the role of minority and majority identities in Europe. In our opinion section, Julia Warren makes a rousing call for European countries to accept refugees, ?no- holdsbarred.? Premised on the rule of law and the detrimental economic consequences of not accepting refugees, her argument envisions a more inclusive Europe. In her op-ed, Cristina Stoica addresses inclusiveness from the Hungarian perspective, examining the consequences of a new architectural plan in Budapest for Hungarian national identity. Stoica argues that these plans engage in selective remembrance, as they leave Hungary?s role in its fascist and communist past unacknowledged. The legacy of past events is also the focus of Katherine Kawalerczak?s essay, which investigates the commemoration of Roma persecution during the Holocaust (porraimos). She argues that until recently there has been a strong correlation between the prejudice that Roma in Europe continue to face and the lack of commemoration of porraimos. Bridging the gap between prejudice and state policies, Siobhan Kirkland?s contribution

discusses recent migration reforms in the Russian Federation. She claims that these reforms demonstrate an awareness on the part of Russian politicians that, in order to improve Russia?s future prospects, they must attract more highskilled workers. Nonetheless, the policies are restrictive and reminiscent of the Soviet propiska system, which heavily regulated internal and external migration. Attempts to implement these policies stall on multiple levels, since there is a disconnect between the federal and local levels, a proliferation of xenophobic attitudes, and a lack of legal literacy on the part of authorities. Kirkland ultimately claims that Russian migration reforms will be ineffective, as the relevant actors lack the political will to reform the system. Integration and inclusion are further explored by Maria Carmela Poblador, Delila Bikic, and Emily Koller. Poblador compares immigrant integration policies in Catalonia and Flanders to examine how foreign immigration impacts societies that are already divided. She elucidates the differences between the institutional context and centre-periphery dynamics of Spain and Belgium, in order to explain why Catalan nationalists use immigrant integration as a nation- building tool vis- Ă - vis the central state, while their Flemish counterparts do not. Bikic also takes a comparative approach to immigrant integration, addressing access to housing in Germany and Sweden as a means of labour market integration. While it is difficult to claim a direct relationship between housing and labour market integration, she demonstrates that both the distribution of housing allowances and residential segregation negatively affect first- generation migrant integration into the labour market. Koller, on the other hand, focuses on a single country, Switzerland; she

EUROPE M UST A CCEPT REFUGEES, NO-HOLDS-BA RRED JULIA WARREN IN 2014, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees declared, ?the Syria crisis has become the biggest humanitarian emergency of our era, yet the world is failing to meet the needs of refugees and the countries hosting them.?1 Since then, the refugee crisis has only escalated, yet many European countries have continued to tighten their borders to keep refugees out.2 What these states have forgotten, or chosen to ignore, is that asylum policies were originally instituted to legalize the presence of forced migrants who were arriving regardless of their status. Indeed, Europe?s first international refugee laws were created to deal with the presence of 1- 2 million refugees in the aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution. Repeated attempts to close borders and expel refugees in response merely resulted in an ?endless cycle of illegal entry, clandestine existence, expulsion, and yet further illegal entry.?3 To this day, immigration restrictions still do not prevent forced migrants from arriving, but merely force them to utilize ?remaining routes for entry,? including undocumented immigration.4 The problems of 1917 surfaced again after the Second World War, leading to the development of our current international refugee regime, instituted by the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol. The Convention and its Protocol were to be applied with a ?liberal and humanitarian spirit,?partly because liberal democratic states had to address the shame of their ?terrible failure? to admit Jewish refugees? fleeing the Holo-

caust.5 Political Scientist Joseph Carens asserts that ?no refugee policy is morally defensible if the same policy would have led to the exclusion of Jews fleeing Hitler,?and writes that rich democratic states??current policies fail that test.?6 Since the 1970s, those people with the greatest need of migrating to Europe have been the least welcome there. Africans and Asians are disproportionately accused of being ?bogus? refugees, ?flooding?Europe in overly-large

"refugeeswelcome" demonstration, vienna, austria by Franz Jachim - Flickr [CC].

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NOTES 1. ?Number of refugees from Syria tops 3 million: United Nations,?Global News, August 29, 2014, http://globalnews.ca/news/1533527/number -of-refugees-from-syria-tops-3-million-united -nations/. 2. ?Migrant crisis: Desperation on the Greek border,?BBC Online, February 25, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35 652424. 3. Niraj Nathwani, ?The Purpose of Asylum,? International Journal of Refugee Law 12, no. 3 (July 2000), 376. 4. Christina Boswell, ?European Values and the Asylum Crisis,?International Affairs76, no. 3 (July 2000), 537-557, 541. 5. Gary Gutting and Joseph Carens, ?When Immigrants Lose Their Human Rights,?The New York Times, November 25, 2014, opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/shouldimmigrants-lose-their-human-rights/; Danielle Joly, Refugees: Asylum in Europe? (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1992), 7. 6. Gutting and Carens, ?When Immigrants Lose Their Human Rights,?19. 7. Boswell, ?European Values and the Asylum Crisis,?542-3. 8. Carrens and Gutting, ?When Immigrants Lose Their Human Rights,?21. 9. Ariadna Estévez, Human Rights, Migration, and Social Conflict: Toward A Decolonized Global Justice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 6; Pankaj Mishra, ?The Western model is broken,?The Guardian, October 14, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/ 14/-sp-western-model-broken-pankaj-mishra. 10. Christopher Flood and Hugo Frey, ?Defending the Empire in Retrospect: the Discourse of the Extreme Right,?in Promoting the Colonial Idea: Propaganda and Visionsof Empire in France, ed. Tony Chafer and Amanda Sacker (London: Palgrave, 2002), 204. 11. Fleur Alink, Arjen Boin, and Paul ?t Hart,

?Institutional Crises and Reforms in Policy Sectors: the Case of Asylum Policy in Europe,? Journal of European Public Policy 8, no. 2 (April 2001), 286-306; Christina Boswell, European Migration Policiesin Flux: Changing Patternsof Inclusion and Exclusion (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2003), 53. 12. Mishra, ?The Western model is broken,?41. 13. Boswell, ?European Values and the Asylum Crisis,?554. 14. Joly, Refugees: Asylum in Europe?, 55. 15. Alink et al, ?Institutional crises and Reforms in Policy Sectors,?28. 16. Randall Hansen, ?The Poverty of Post-Nationalism: Citizenship, Immigration, and the New Europe,?Theory and Society 38, no. 1 (January 2004), 12; Nathwani, ?The Purpose of Asylum,?375. 17. Nathwani, ?The Purpose of Asylum,?372. 18. Estévez, Human Rights, Migration, and Social Conflict, 35-6; Matthew J. Goodwin, New British Fascism: Rise of the British National Party (London: Routledge, 2011), 4. 19. Boswell, ?European Values and the Asylum Crisis,?555-6. 20. Joly, Refugees: Asylum in Europe?, 138; Estévez, Human Rights, Migration, and Social Conflict, 5.

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Budapest. Those in favour of the project argue that the renovation is partly for economic reasons, with the goal of increasing the influx of tourists to Budapest. Government officials hope that the proposed project will establish Budapest as a ?museum city,?thereby attracting a broader range of tourists to the capital.4 On the other hand, critics claim that the project is politically motivated because it represents a physical manifestation of Orbán?s revisionist attempts to reconstruct the Hungarian national narrative. The project aims to restore Budapest to its grandeur prior to World War I, to that of the time of Greater Hungary.5

W HILE UNVEILING THE PROJECT AS AN ECONOMIC BOON, IN ACTUALITY ORBÁN IS ENGAGING IN A FORM OF HISTORICAL REVISIONISM ROOTED IN HISTORICAL AMNESIA. Ideologically, the project has two main intentions: to remove all traces of communism from the streets of Budapest and to further entrench a sentiment of nationalism among the population.6 While unveiling the project as an economic boon, in actuality Orbán is engaging in a form of historical revisionism rooted in historical amnesia. All traces of the Nazi and Soviet totalitarian regimes are erased from the Hungarian historical narrative and the grandeur of Greater Hungary is accentuated.

The process of the including and excluding of certain historical events over others is a method of selective remembrance. Orbán is utilizing selective remembrance and memorialization of certain historical events to reflect his rightwing political platform. The project expands upon several established sites, including the Fidesz sponsored Terror Háza (House of Terror), which reenforces and underlines the desired national narrative by erasing Hungarian responsibility for the crimes committed during the Nazi occupation and under Soviet puppet government. Simply, by engaging in selective remembrance of past events, Fidesz hopes to consolidate its identity as the leader of a modern, Greater Hungary. The Imperial Palace and City Park are victims of this political machinery. Orbán is utilizing the project to reestablish and embed a greater national Hungarian identity amongst the population. In a speech given at the founding meeting of the Hauszmann Committee, established to assist with the reconstruction of the Castle District, Orbán stated, ?What lies ahead of us is a great adventure, a mental and intellectual adventure ridden with responsibility.?7 Orbán has high expectations for the project, as he aspires to redefine the Hungarian national narrative. The project?s overarching vision is to place Budapest once again on the geo-political map and establish the city as a cultural capital. Although many Hungarian citizens hope that Hungary will one day reestablish itself as the leading actor in the region, they are also skeptical of the hidden implications of the project. Orbán could utilize the project to entrench himself as the political leader of Hungary in perpetuity. Moreover, by relocating his office to Castle District, Orbán is indirectly equivocating himself with former Hungarian royalty. The project is an embodiment of current

A RTI CLES

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Memorial to the Sinti and Roma victims of National Socialism [in Berlin] by Juan Cabanillas - Flickr [CC].

discussion.?6 Romani scholar Ian Hancock echoes this point, adding: ?our people are traditionally not disposed to keeping alive the terrible memories of our history ? nostalgia is a luxury for others.?7 While this line of thinking may exist among particular groups of Roma, it is misleading to apply it to the Roma as a whole, since even Roma groups such as the Sinti, who have ?cultural restrictions upon speaking about the dead,?8 participate in acts of porraimos commemoration and have been vital lobbyists for its continuation. For instance, in 1980 thirteen Sinti held a hunger strike at the Dachau concentration camp with the aim of establishing a Roma cultural and documentation centre there,9 and it was the ?unremitting efforts? of Roma and Sinti organizations that led to the construction of a permanent Roma exhibit at Auschwitz- Birkenau in 2001.10 It is clear that through efforts such as these, Roma have been active in the commemoration of the porraimos in the twentieth century, and that the argument that they display a ?lack of collective memory?is dismissive and inaccurate.

It was precisely this false belief in the Roma?s lack of memory - their supposed abnormality and ?asociality?? that led them to be seen not as victims of Nazi genocide, but as criminals who were justly persecuted under the Nazi regime. The consequence of this was that in postWorld War II Europe, the Roma had to first fight for acknowledgement as a persecuted race before they could even consider petitioning for public commemoration. The hardest battle they fought was against the courts, which maintained that Roma were not racial victims of the Nazis. For instance, on May 9, 1950, the Interior Ministry of Wuttemberg state in Germany stated that in terms of restitution claims made by Roma, ?it should be borne in mind that Gypsies had been persecuted under the Nazis not for any racial reasons but because of an asocial and criminal record.?11 As a result of this institutional prejudice, many Roma did not receive compensation for many decades, if at all. For instance, Berhardt Reinhard, a Sinti who survived Auschwitz and forced sterilization, only received full compensation for his ordeal after twenty years of court battles. It is telling that not one Roma or Sinti individual was called to testify at the Nuremberg Trials; only one Nazi has ever been convicted for crimes of genocide against the Roma.12 It was only in 1963 that the highest court of the Federal Republic of Germany ?broadened the legal responsibility of the state to the Gypsy victims by overturning a highly restrictive definition of the racial persecution of the Gypsies.?13 For as long as the Roma were denied compensation and status as victims of racial genocide, they could not lobby for commemoration: they first required the platform to do so. Unfortunately, the Roma found it difficult to reintegrate into society after the Holocaust;

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institutions to downplay the Roma Holocaust or outright deny its existence as a ?holocaust.? For instance, the US Holocaust Memorial Council held a conference in 1987 on the ?other victims? of Nazism, including Roma, but ?no [Roma] were invited to speak or even participate in its planning.?21 The US Holocaust Memorial Museum also, in 2000, held a symposium entitled ?Roma and Sinti: Under-studied Victims of Nazism.? As Ian Hancock points out, the significance of this symposium lies in the fact that the word ?holocaust?was entirely omitted.22 Additionally, it was not until Elie Wiesel, Nobel Peace Prize winner and opponent of Roma representation in the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, resigned from the US Holocaust Memorial and Museum Council in 1986 that Ian Hancock, the Council?s first Roma, was invited to join.23 One may wonder why such renowned scholars have obstinately refused to recognize the validity of the Roma Holocaust, especially since there is plenty of Nazi documentation of its existence.24 Certainly, in some cases, it is an attempt to ensure the singularity of the Jewish Holocaust and preserve its memory,25 but why must this preservation of Holocaust memory be carried out at the expense of the Roma? Yet another explanation for the lack of porraimos commemoration in the public sphere is the widespread ?invisibility? of the Roma in Europe. Unlike the Jewish victims of Nazi genocide, the Roma have not reached a level of social mobility that would allow for large-scale public commemoration or discourse on the porraimos. Despite being Europe?s largest minority, they are still forced to face neo- Nazi discrimination, ?rapes, beating and murders in Germany, Hungary and Slovakia,?along with ?anti-Romani pogroms in Romania and Bulgaria, including lynchings and home

burnings.?26 Combined with abject poverty and unemployment, these acts of violence often separate the Roma from the rest of society, either as a voluntary defense mechanism or as a result of the exclusionary attitudes and policies of municipal, regional, or national actors. A notable example of the latter is the French government?s wave of Roma deportations and evictions. In 2013, over 13,000 Roma were deported from France. Between 2011 and 2013, more than 37,239 Roma were forcibly evicted from their homes in France, most of which are temporary, often illegal slums on the edges of French towns.27 Many Roma live in these kinds of slums across Europe, which at a fundamental level are centres of invisibility. As Fabrizio Flovis deftly notes, social mobility is translated into spatial mobility, and slums are areas which allow for no social mobility within them. Furthermore, ?the territorial segregation of a group is always the expression of its social marginalization, and social marginalization is nothing but exclusion from centres of social life, from decision- making groups, and from centres of the dominant culture.?28 In other words, the living conditions of the Roma, which are largely dictated by their status in society, have an enormous impact on their ability to engage in the public sphere, and this certainly includes porraimos commemoration. Evidently, there is an extremely strong correlation between prejudice against the Roma and the relative lack of commemoration of the porraimos until recently. First of all, the Roma were not even initially seen as true victims of the Holocaust: it was believed that ?gypsies? were asocial criminals deserving of some sort of punishment. For this reason, decades were spent attempting to win compensation and restitution claims in courts across Europe; commemoration

LONG LI V E THE PROPI SK A ! CURRENT BA RRI ERS TO M I GRA TI ON REFORM I N RUSSI A SIOBHAN KIRKLAND RECENT CHANGES in global migration trends have necessitated a re-evaluation of countries?immigration policies and mechanisms. In this regard, much attention has been paid to the current refugee crisis in Europe as well as the relevant policy responses of European Union member states. Widely overlooked, however, have been the significant migration pressures faced by the Russian Federation. According to estimates of the UN Population Division, Russia is second only to the United States in the number of immigrants it receives.1 Moreover, such legal migration trends are accompanied by a substantial inflow of ?informal? migration, particularly from post- Soviet states, such that an estimated 4.3 million illegal immigrants resided in Russia in 2014.2 In light of such developments, it has become clear that the management of Russia?s current migration reality will have significant economic, political, and social ramifications that will reverberate far into the future.3

offs related to freedom of movement, economic demands, security, and identity. In order to do so, this essay is structured in the following way: first, to contextualize Russia?s contemporary migration control mechanisms, a brief overview of Soviet and early post- Soviet approaches to migration is provided; second, the objectives, development, and implementation of recent migration management strategies, such as the Concept of Migration Policy of the RF up to 2025 is examined; third, it outlines current barriers to the implementation of relevant legislative reforms, including the securitization of migration, the federal governance structure, and rampant corruption; finally, the irreconcilable priorities underlying the Russian authorities?desire to ?have it all,?and the implications of such inherent contradictions on the adoption of a practicable migration policy are discussed.

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This essay explores the evolution of the Russian migration system and the recent developments surrounding a renewed interest in migration policy among Russian authorities. I argue that attempts to liberalize and reform the migration system continue to be undermined by competing priorities, whereby Russian authorities are unwilling to reconcile necessary migration trade-

Russia?s contemporary migration system reflects a longstanding tradition of population management on behalf of government authorities by means of stringent documentation and migration regulation. Since the reign of Peter the Great, successive political regimes have mandated the use of internal passports for travel outside of one?s permanent place of residence.4 Later, during the Soviet period, the propiska (residence permit) was used to regulate and restrict internal migration.5 Throughout their evolutions, the internal

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migration management strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Concept contains a set of objectives and principles regarding the future direction of Russia?s migration policy and is an inclusive document developed in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, existing federal constitutional laws, and other regulations.19 The Concept is intended to help resolve the problems hindering the effective management of migration, and to reduce socioeconomic concerns associated with migration. Objectives include the maintenance of national security, the stabilization and increase of Russia?s resident population, the stimulation of the Russian economy and workforce, and the control of illegal migration.20 More specific aims presented in the migration strategy involve attracting highly skilled workers and temporary workers, combating illegal migration, and controlling internal migration.21

In light of demographic concerns, the immigration quota system has been abolished as it failed to represent demand in the labour market. Instead, a points- based system for permanent residency and citizenship has been proposed.25 The FMS has also indicated its intention to attract skilled workers by simplifying the process for foreign students to obtain higher education and to acquire a residence permit.26 Accordingly, an amendment to the law on ?the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation? in December 2012, allows foreign students the opportunity to extend their period of stay in Russia, and includes measures to create more favorable conditions for education in the Russian Federation.27 Under the FMS reforms, graduates of Russian institutions of higher education have the opportunity to stay in Russia for three years upon graduation, and are more likely to be granted Russian citizenship provided that they have sought- after qualifications.28 The Concept also offers incentives for resettlement in Russia for ethnic Russians living abroad.29 In relation to this, a law came into force in April 2014 that simplified procedures for ethnic Russians abroad and Russian speakers to obtain Russian citizenship.30

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The Concept also acknowledges the reality that Russia is not an attractive destination for highly skilled immigrants and that appropriate measures must be implemented to improve the country?s appeal.22 Furthermore, the Concept explicitly notes Russia?s intentions to increase labour immigration in response to evident demographic concerns.23 The urgency surrounding Russia?s demographic deficit was expressed by the head of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), Konstantin Romodanovsky, who warned in January 2013 that Russia urgently needs to attract immigrants to stabilize the population. He further relayed orders from the Kremlin to bring in 300,000 immigrants a year, including the repatriation of ethnic Russians living abroad, highly qualified foreign specialists, and promising youth.24

The Concept further addresses problems related to illegal migration.31 The FMS has been granted new powers to check migration documents as per recent legislative enhancements. These measures have been accompanied by the establishment of special holding centres for migrants awaiting deportation in eighty-one Russian cities with one centre in Moscow already in operation.32 Legislation has also been introduced to hold both employers of illegal immigrants and facilitators of illegal migration criminally and administratively liable.33 While Russia?s new migration policy considers both external and internal

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and expulsion.45 Moreover, contrary to one of the Concept?s objectives, namely the promotion of internal migration among citizens of the Russian Federation, the law creates different types of citizenship. Russian citizens will no longer have the freedom to live wherever they want. Access has become restricted in cities such as Moscow, as it was during the Soviet period, when Moscow residents required a special permit to reside in the city. This restriction extends to Russian citizens who lack proper registration documentation, as they can now be deported from cities in which they reside as well as be denied access to social services.46 Individuals seeking work in other cities will be subject to strict registration laws, which have already been prone to abuse and corruption. Furthermore, in an attempt to fight against socalled ?elastic apartments? (where many migrant workers can be registered in a single apartment), registration documents have been made more expensive, and migrating Russians will be increasingly subject to the will of often recalcitrant landlords.47

tion issues are being considered by both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Duma. Nevertheless, given the breadth and contradictory nature of Russia?s aims, it is doubtful that the policy will be successfully implemented, and future hopes for free migration are not as realistic as the policy would make them seem. Underlying contradictions, competing interests, and Soviet legacies of migration control demonstrate that there are many aspects of Russian society and societal attitudes that will need to change, as well as enforcement mechanisms for seriousness towards reform to transform into practicable reform. In order to understand the prospective failure of these reforms, it is necessary to broadenthe scope beyond the state to look at the conflicting forces within Russian law and politics.49 Migration policy is generally seen as consistent in its application and enforcement, however, this is not the case in Russia, as it is inconsistently applied and often undermined by informal practices at the regional level.50 The securitization of migration (through xenophobic discourses and nationalism) has encouraged migration crackdowns and informal practices, which has further hindered reform efforts.51 Migration laws are formulated on the federal level, but in practice are implemented at the local level. This gives regions significant control over the application and enforcement of legislation. Consequently, acting in their own interest, regions and municipalities frequently enforce their own migration legislation, leading to an inconsistent application of the law. Regional enforcement encourages corruption and abusive police practices. Ultimately, these practices, resulting from the disconnect between the centre and regions and the autonomy of regional

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It is too early to assess the fulfillment of the Concept?s various objectives. However, in March 2015, the head of FMS claimed that the number of illegal migrants entering Russia has decreased, and that more than 1.2 million people were denied entry because they had been blacklisted for previous migration law violations, such as overstaying their visas, the allowed entry period, or working illegally.48 While the reduction in illegal migration may reflect the effective enhancement of relevant legislative measures, it can be assumed that the recent economic downturn may also have had a negative impact on migration. The rapid development of legislation following the adoption of the Concept certainly demonstrates the seriousness with which migra-

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migration laws, judicial weakness and the refusal to implement the law on registration by sub-national governments has continued to prevent reform in practice.64 Matthew Light has suggested that because regional governments benefit from these restrictions and there are no incentives to follow the federal government?s migration initiatives, regional governments will continue to act in their best interest ? that is, ignore federal migration policies.65 At the regional level, the endemic nature of police corruption in Russia poses another challenge to enforcement. Along with other human rights activists, Pavel Chikov, head of Agora human rights organization, has argued that stricter registration rules are unlikely to prevent illegal migration and will only lead to increased corruption and higher bribes.66 Brad Blitz similarly argues that the arbitrariness of police enforcement reflects larger societal problems with law enforcementand police reform that hinder migration reform. Russia?s new registration laws depend on law enforcement for their application. Indeed, without adequate law enforcement mechanisms, discrimination is likely to continue alongside the unequal application of these laws. In spite of this reality, the law has been flexibly designed, suggesting that it has been created to allow for the arbitrary targeting of certain individuals or groups.67

ipalities that continue to act in their interest, and judicial weakness. Thus, in order to guarantee the successful implementation of the new migration laws, police reform and legal literacy are required.69 Russian authorities have been unable to balance the competing interests at stake in reforming migration policy. Questions of migration and citizenship encompass difficult trade-offs regarding national identity, the decision about who to let in and who to leave out, what rights to extend to immigrants, and how to protect the state from new security realities associated with migration. Lawmakers have to contend with balancing the right to freedom of movement and the use of migration as a tool of control; demographic problems and the economic need to attract migrants; and, security and the fear of migrants. It is based on these competing concerns that Russian authorities have been unwilling to take decisive steps to reform Russian migration law. The historical legacies of the Tsarist and Soviet institutions of migration control, such as the internal passport and the propiska, have evolved into contemporary restrictive tools, which have sought, and ultimately failed, to address current challenges of migration.

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A similar concern with the application of recent reforms is that the frequency of migration reforms and policy changes in Russia has led to confusion among police and government officials, who are themselves often ignorant concerning recent reforms, especially those pertaining to foreigners, registration, and the law.68 Problems with enforcement mechanisms include: unequal application of laws, subnational authorities and munic-

This paper has explored the evolution of such tools and Russian legislators?failed attempts to not only make necessary changes to legal instruments, but also to address more significant impediments to reform. Failures to address nationalist rhetoric and xenophobia, the decentralization of enforcement, and reformation of police enforcement encourage observers to question the seriousness of Russian claims regarding open migration policies and their desire to attract immigrants. In addition to restricting the movement of foreign citizens, the revival of internal migration

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NOTES 1. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division, International Migration Report 2013 (New York: United Nations, 2013), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/ population/publications/pdf/migration/migra tionreport2013/Full_Document_final.pdf. 2. ?FMS RF naschitala v Rossii 4.3 milion nelegal?nykh [FMS Russian Federation counted 4.3 million illegal immigrants in Russia],?RIA Novosti, 22 September, 2014, http://ria.ru/society/20140922/1025100 446.html (accessed November 15, 2015). 3. Timothy Heleniak, ?Migration Dilemmas Haunt Post-Soviet Russia,?Migration Information Source, Migration Policy Institute, October 2002. http://www.migrationinformation.org/. 4. John Randolph and Eugene M. Avrutin, eds., Russia in Motion: culturesof human mobility since 1850 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 7. 5. Mervyn Matthews, The passport society: controlling movement in Russia and the USSR (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1993); John Randolph and Eugene M. Avrutin, Russia in Motion; Simona Pipko and Albert J. Pucciarelli, ?The Soviet Internal Passport System,?The International Lawyer 19, no. 3 (1985), 915-19. 6. Matthews, The Passport Society. 7. Yana Streltsova, ?The Adaptation of Immigrants in Russia,?Russian Politics& Law, 52, no. 6 (2014), 25-26. 8. Migration Policy Centre CARIM EAST, ?The Integration of Migrants in Russia: Why Does Tension Continue to Grow??, January 2014, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/ policy_brief/Policy%20Brief_Russia%202014 -print%20(2).pdf. 9. Olga Chudinovskikh, ?SOPEMI International Migration Report 2012: The Russian Federation,?Higher School of Economics, http://www.hse.ru/data/2013/04/16/12979 19118/INTENATIONAL%20MIGRATION%2 0IN%20%20RUSSIA.SOPEMI%20REPORT% 202012.pdf. 10. Brad K. Blitz, Migration and freedom: mobility, citizenship and exclusion (Cheltenham, UK;

Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2014), 121. 11. Hilary Pilkington, Migration, Displacement, and Identity in Post-Soviet Russia (London; New York: Routledge,1998), 40-41. 12. Arkady Smolin, ?Russia?s new migration policy,?Russian Legal Information Agency (RAPSI) http://www.rapsinews.com/ legislation_publication/20130819/268590 432.html (accessed December 12, 2015); Tatiana Stanovaya, ?Movement Toward Catastrophe,?Institute of Modern Russia, http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/politics/529movement-toward-catastrophe. 13. Matthew Light, ?Policing Migration in Soviet and Post-Soviet Moscow,?Post Soviet Affairs 26, no. 4 (2010): 275-313; Brad K. Blitz, Migration and Freedom; Irina Gavrilova, ?Migration Policy in Modern Russia: To be Or Not to be,?Perspectiveson European Politics and Society 2, no. 2 (2001): 261-287. 14. Charles Steinwedel, ?Preface,?in Russia in Motion: Culturesof Human Mobility Since 1850, ed. John Randolph and Eugene Avrutin (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 19-20. 15. Light, ?Migration Controls in Soviet and post-Soviet Moscow: From ?Closed City?to ?Illegal City?,?in Russia in Motion: Culturesof Human Mobility Since 1850, ed. John Randolph and Eugene Avrutin, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012). 16. Stanovaya, ?Movement toward catastrophe.? 17. Vladimir Putin, ?Integration of Post-Soviet Space an Alternative to Uncontrolled Migration,?Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 23, 2012 http://rt.com/politics/official-word/ migration -national-question-putin-439/. 18. Kontseptsiia gosudarstvennoi migratsionnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2025 g (the Concept of Migration Policy of the Russian Federation up to 2025), June 13, 2012. 19. Government of the Russian Federation, ?Prezident utverdil kontseptsiiu gosudarstvennoi migratsionnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2025 g. (The President approved the concept of the state migration policy of the Russian

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38. Government of Russian Federation, ?O Kontseptsii gosudarstvennoi migratsionnoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2025 g (On the Concept of the state migration policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025),?June 13 2012, http://government.ru/info/20224/. 39. Federalnii zakon ot 25 iunya 1993 g. N 5242-I ?"? prave grazhdan Rossii skoi Federatsii na cvobodu peredvizheniia i zhitel?stva v predelakh Poccii skoi Federatsii? (On the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to freedom of movement and choice of place of residence within the Russian Federation) v red. ot 18 Dekabria 2013 g. // V dannom vide document opublikovan ne bil. Pervonachal?nii tekst dokumenta opublikovan v Sobranii zakonodatel?stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 1993. N 32. st. 1227. 40. Smolin, ?Russia?s new migration policy.? 41. Smolin, ?Russia?s new migration policy.? 42. Smolin, ?Russia?s new migration policy.? 43. Smolin, ?Russia?s new migration policy.? 44. Georgy Bovt, ?The Propiska Sends Russia Back to the USSR,?The Moscow Times, January 7, 2013, http://www.themoscow times.com/opinion/article/the-propiska-sends -russia-back-to-the -ussr/474085.html (accessed December 21, 2015). 45. Smolin, ?Russia?s new migration policy.? 46. Smolin, ?Russia?s new migration policy.? 47. Bovt, ?The Propiska Sends Russia Back to the USSR.? 48. Vladimir Vaschenko, ?Interview of the head of FMS of Russia Konstantin Romodanovsky of news agency ?TASS?,?TASS, March 18, 2015, http://www.en.fms.gov.ru/press/speeches_and _publications/item/15421/. 49. Blitz, Migration and freedom. 50. Blitz, Migration and freedom. 51. On the securitization of migration refer to Edwin Bacon, Bettina Renz, and Julian Cooper, Securitising Russia: The Domestic Politicsof Putin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006). 52. On police corruption , see Light, ?Migration Controls?and ?Policing Migration.? 53. Migration Policy Centre, ?The Integration of Migrants in Russia: Why Does Tension

Continue to Grow??,CARIM EAST http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/ policy_brief/Policy%20Brief_Russia%20201 4-print%20(2).pdf. 54. Yulia Latynina, ?Mutual Influence,?The Current Digest of the Russian Press, 21: 065 (Minneapolis, USA), May 20, 2013, 78. 55. Latynina, ?Mutual Influence,?78. 56. Stanovaya, ?Movement Toward Catastrophe.? 57. ?Russia Grapples with its Migration Policy.? 58. Bacon, Renz, and Cooper, Securitising Russia: The Domestic Politicsof Putin. 59. ?Russian Parliament Calls for Migration Policy Changes,?Sputnik International, November 20, 2015, http://sputniknews.com/russia/20151120/ 1030429241/russia-migration-policy-chan ges.html. 60. Gavrilova, ?Migration Policy,?265. 61. Stanovaya, ?Movement Toward Catastrophe.? 62. Light, ?Migration Controls,?284. 63. Light, ?Migration Controls,?284. ; Light, ?Policing Migration.? 64. Blitz, Migration and freedom, 122-124. 65. Blitz, Migration and freedom, 122-124. 66. Von Twickel, ?Russia Needs Immigrants, FMS Chief Says.? 67. Blitz, Migration and freedom, 126. 68. Blitz, Migration and freedom:, 128. 69. Light, ?Migration Controls." 70. Gavrilova, ?Migration Policy?283.

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examines the politics of immigration and integration in Catalonia over time, focusing particularly on the successive attempts by the Catalan government to challenge the centralized immigration policy regime in Spain. It finds that the overarching policy approach to immigrant integration has been driven by the centrality of the Catalan language to the region?s autonomy and nationbuilding goals. Overall, this paper shows that the institutional context and centre- periphery power dynamics in the multinational state play important roles in influencing sub-state policy approaches to immigrant integration. In Flanders, the politics of immigration is detached from the politics of nation- building, because the ?horizontal? and ?dyadic?context of Belgium allows sub-state leaders to be more powerful and their actions to be less shaped by, or made with reference to, the central state.4 The Belgian political structure in its current form is both ?horizontal and ?dyadic?because constitutional reforms since the 1960s have allowed the two main language communities (Flemish and Francophone) and their corresponding regional governments to ?carve up the centre? and divide the majority of essential governmental powers in the country among themselves.5 In contrast, the Spanish political structure is ?vertical? and ?multipolar,?because powers were not only devolved unevenly among the seventeen autonomous communities (ACs)? depending on their statutory agreements with the central government? but also in such a way as to preserve the ?indivisible? and ?indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation.?6 Thus, unlike their Flemish counterparts, sub- state nationalists in Catalonia actively use immigrant integration policy as a tool for competitive nation- building, because of the ?vertical? and ?multipolar? context that allows

Madrid to effect and influence policy at the substate level.7 It is therefore the activation of the centre- periphery dimension in constructing immigration discourses and policies that accounts for the variation between the two case studies. Early scholarship on nationalism conveyed an image of minority or sub- state nationalism as being inherently illiberal, exclusivist, and disintegrative.8 In contrast to modern states that base national membership on civic and universal values, such as allegiance to a set of rules and institutions, sub- state nationalists are seen to have identities that emphasize race, religion, and a collective past.9 From this perspective, sub-state nationalists will therefore view foreign immigration as a threat? particularly the strong tendency of newcomers to integrate both linguistically and culturally into the majority nation, because of the perceived economic benefits and the inability of immigrants to understand the mentality of la survivance that bolsters sub- state nationalism.10 As such, one would expect that the more power a sub-state nation acquires in the areas of immigration and integration, the greater the likelihood that it will use this power to construct an exclusionary and assimilationist policy, grounded in ethnic definitions of membership.11 Will Kymlicka challenges this cognitivestructural argument, and instead proposes the opposite: the more institutional and policy power a sub- state nation has, the more it will adopt an open, multicultural position toward immigrants.12 In particular, he argues that sub- state nationalisms could become ?postethnic?? inclusive of immigrants and supportive of other ethnic identities? so long as the sub- state government has control over the volume and terms of immigrant integration.13 He uses the example of Quebec nationalism, whose conversion from a defensive,

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socalled 'person- related' matters, including healthcare, social policy, education, and language use.23 The integration of immigrants is one such ?person-related? policy governed by the communities, while matters related to immigration admission, refugee and asylum policy, and nationality laws all remain federal competences.24 The overall effect of these constitutional reforms was to progressively weaken the centre, leading to centrifugal tendencies and strong ?dyadic? bipolarity in the Belgian political system.25 The first two decades after Belgium was divided along territorial and linguistic lines provide little evidence that Flemish elites considered foreign immigration to be an important issue, let alone an issue that could impact their sub-state national autonomy goals.26 Until 1989, immigrant integration enjoyed low political salience; migration factored neither into Flemish party debates nor the decision-making of the Flemish government.27 Indeed, most policy activity revolved not around an integration strategy as such, but around regulating immigrant associations and organizations, like the Federation of Moroccan Associations and the Belgian Union of Turkish Islamic Cultural Associations.28 The Flemish nationalist movement itself was the product of local Dutch-speaking social and cultural organizations that mobilized, at the grassroots level, to counter Francophone cultural domination in the nineteenth century.29 It could therefore be argued that recognizing and defending minority cultures are, in a way, fundamental to Flemish political identity.30 Thus, in constructing policies toward newcomers, the Flemish elites simply extended their historical group-based view of society to immigrants, resulting in a form of multiculturalism that was predicated on the funding and recognition of

different socio-cultural associations to assist migrant-origin residents in becoming full members of society.31 Overall, the Flemish government eschewed homogeneity in favor of ?multi-formity,? whereby the ?numerous units within [society would] be able to take their own shape.?32 At no point during their development were early Flemish immigrant integration policies linked to the Flemish nation-building project. The two ?demonstrated a curious case of detachment,? in that they were pursued by sub-state elites independently of the other.33 This was particularly notable in the area of language? an area traditionally considered central to sub-state national identity claims. For the most part, Flemish policy has not exhibited strategic concern for migrants? linguistic integration vis-Ă -vis the linguistic future of Flanders or the sub-state autonomy project.34 For example, during the first two decades after devolution, funding for Flemish language programs was marginal, and the Flemish government declined to take the lead in providing language services. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the average annual budget for all Flemish language teaching initiatives was approximately 72,000 euros? a meager amount considering it had to cover project organization, room rentals, teacher training, and language textbooks across the entire region.35 Instead, Flemish language learning was expected to be devised and implemented at the local grassroots level.36 The limited efforts to integrate immigrants into the Flemish language were a function of the state reforms of the 1960s and 1980s. These reforms effectively territorialized language in Belgium and paved the way for a federal structure with a primarily ?dyadic? character and a weak federal state.37 As a result, a horizontal power

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- based approach remained, but focus was turned to the individual immigrant as the unit of integration, and language became a relevant factor in policy debate.43 These developments came together most visibly in the Flemish civic integration policies implemented in 2003, known as inburgering.44 This program mandated that migrant newcomers undergo two phases of civic integration ? first, a ?primary? trajectory with 120?180 hours of Dutch language courses and approximately sixty hours of ?societal orientation? classes (i.e. how to access public services, how the political system works, how to use public transport, etc.); and second, a personalized ?secondary? orientation aimed at labour market integration, after which immigrants would be directed to either vocational training, specialized language training, or higher education.45 Although contemporary Flemish policy continues to target the inburgering of individual immigrants, there has not been an extensive shift in policy practice. The multicultural aspects of Flemish policy, which were dedicated to subsidizing migrant self- organization, have been left largely intact, thereby demonstrating that inburgering merely added another strand of policy to the group- oriented approach, rather than replace it altogether.46 Overall, this new approach to migrant integration was designed to increase the sense of responsibility among individual immigrants. It reflected the belief that successful participation in society implied learning the local language, espousing democratic values, and understanding how the labour market functions.47 In this sense, the political shift from a position of indifference toward the adoption of stricter policy instruments on immigrant integration was more a matter of general ?policymaking? than competitive ?nation-building.?

SUCCESSFUL PARTICIPATION IN SOCIETY IMPLIED LEARNING THE LOCAL LANGUAGE, ESPOUSING DEMOCRATIC VALUES, AND UNDERSTANDING HOW THE LABOUR MARKET FUNCTIONS. Whereas the Flemish approach toward newcomers has been characterized by a decoupling of the politics of immigration from the politics of sub- state nationalism, the Catalan approach has been to instrumentalize immigrant integration policy in order to pursue sub- state autonomy goals vis- Ă - vis the central state, Spain. There have been two major migration influxes into Catalonia. First, there was the internal migration of the 1950?1970s, during which nearly 1.4 million Castilian- speaking internal migrants from the poorer regions in the South, like Andalucia, Extremadura, and Aragon, arrived and settled in Catalonia.48 The second migration influx was decidedly more diverse. Foreign or external immigration to Catalonia began in the 1980s, when immigrants began to arrive from all over the globe? from the Maghreb to South America? bringing a new kind of linguistic and cultural diversity to the region.49 As a result, Catalonia went from having 6.1 million inhabitants in 1998 to 7.3 million in 2008.50 The intensity of foreign immigration to both Spain and Catalonia in such a short period of time has challenged the external relationship between the ACs and the central state, as well as the internal relationship between the sub-state

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committing the Generalitat to use its regional powers in health, education, and social services to redress immigrant exclusion and promote respect for diversity, Catalonia?s immigration plan has also, in a way, reinforced the supposed inclusiveness of the ?Catalan approach.?63 Alongside the CiU?s inclusive definition of citizenship, policies with assimilationist components have been implemented with the support of the other Catalan parties. A succession of ?Language Normalization? laws passed in the 1990s effectively made Catalan the language of instruction in compulsory (primary and secondary) education in the region.64 The objective was to ensure that there would be decreasing differences between the children of Castilian- speakers and the children of Catalan-speakers, that both would use Catalan as a native language.65 During a debate prior to the 2010 Catalan elections, the CiU and other nationalist parties hailed obligatory Catalan immersion as a model of immigrant integration that prevents society from fracturing into distinct language communities. In their view, immigrants choosing to learn only Spanish would undermine the 'Normalization' project of the Catalan language, which nationalists have been pursuing since the 1990s in order to prevent language endangerment.66 Despite being praised by the European Commission for successfully achieving true bilingualism among non- native Catalan speakers, these laws have been repeatedly attacked by Madrid and the Catalan branch of the PP, and, in many respects, remain an important point of contention in the centre-periphery conflict in Spain.67 Catalan nationalists have, in fact, fiercely criticized the reform recently announced by the current Spanish Education Minister JosĂŠ Ignacio Wert, which would effectively ?recentralize control over language policy in the realm of education

and spell the end of obligatory Catalan immersion in schools.?68 What this discussion of Catalonian language politics shows is that, like in Flanders, immigrant integration policy in Catalonia puts a strong emphasis on linguistic integration into the sub- state language; however, the origins of, and catalysts behind, their respective language policies are different. In Flanders, it was the electoral breakthrough of the anti-immigrant party VB, and the subsequent scramble by the other mainstream parties to compete for anti- immigrant votes, that politicized immigration and thus caused the issue of language to become a relevant factor in sub- state policy debates on immigrant integration.69 In contrast, in Catalonia, the language policies directed at foreign immigrants were both an extension of the post- Franco language normalization policies, and a means of averting the danger of Catalan being overtaken by the dominant Castilian language.70 Already, before the 2003 regional elections, the CiU proposed a policy favoring linguistic assimilation that was more clearly directed at 'new' immigrants. The campaign, nicknamed ?CAT,? favoured the everyday use of Catalan in all aspects of social and economic life in the region.71 As a result, participating businesses and institutions began to display posters declaring that their staff would speak only Catalan to customers? the rationale being that it would motivate newcomers to learn Catalan and therefore ensure Catalan?s position in society.72 Amidst claims that the project had racist undertones, Pujol responded that his party?s objective was to ?treat people humanely? but the key for Catalonia is successful integration.?73 This shift away from the concept of residence- based, multicultural citizenship was supported by all the other mainstream parties in

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integration to formulate policies on immigrant integration, this has not been pursued directly in opposition to the federal government. Even though the management of immigration in Belgium is, like in the case of Spain, decentralized ? in that competences are split between the federal and regional governments ? it has been decentralized in a way, unseen in the Spanish context, that precludes the immigration policies of the federal state from invariably affecting the integration policies and nation- building projects at the sub-state level. What the two case studies illustrate is that sub-state policy approaches to immigrant integration should not be evaluated solely through the lens of the multiculturalistassimilationist binary, but rather by how they can be used to strengthen sub- state nationalist projects.

NOTES 1. Fiona Barker, Nationalism, Identity and the Governance of Diversity: Old Politics, New Arrivals(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan Autonomy-Building Process in Immigration Policy: Conceptual, Institutional and Normative Dimensions,?in Political Autonomy and Divided Societies: Imagining Democratic Alternativesin Complex Settings, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and Michael Keating (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Gershon Shafir, Immigrantsand Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995). 2. Barker, Nationalism, 2. 3. Barker, Nationalism; Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan;?Sanjay Jeram, ?Sub-state Nationalism and Immigration in Spain: Diversity and Identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country,?Ethnopolitics13, no. 3 (2014), 225-244. 4. Wilfried Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A Comparative and Thematic Analysis(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 256. 5. Barker, Nationalism, 42. 6. Spanish Constitution, art. 1. http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/ Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/ const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf. 7. Christina I. Zuber, ?Comparing the Politics Behind the Immigrant Integration Laws of Catalonia and South Tyrol,?GRITIM-UPF Working Paper Series22 (2014), 16. 8. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nationsand Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeysinto the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1993); David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 9. Jeram, ?Sub-state Nationalism,?228. 10. Silvio Rendon, ?The Catalan Premium: Language and Employment in Catalonia,? Journal of Population Economics30, no. 3

1. Fiona Barker, Nationalism, Identity and the Governance of Diversity: Old Politics, New Arrivals(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Ricard Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan Autonomy-Building Process in Immigration Policy: Conceptual, Institutional and Normative Dimensions,?in Political Autonomy and Divided Societies: Imagining Democratic Alternativesin Complex Settings, ed. Alain-G. Gagnon and Michael Keating (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Gershon Shafir, Immigrantsand Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia, and Estonia (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995). 2. Barker, Nationalism, 2. 3. Barker, Nationalism; Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan;?Sanjay Jeram, ?Sub-state Nationalism and Immigration in Spain: Diversity and Identity in Catalonia and the Basque Country,?Ethnopolitics13, no. 3 (2014), 225-244. 4. Wilfried Swenden, Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A Comparative and Thematic Analysis(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 256. 5. Barker, Nationalism, 42. 6. Spanish Constitution, art. 1. http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/ Congreso/Congreso/Hist_Normas/Norm/ const_espa_texto_ingles_0.pdf. 7. Christina I. Zuber, ?Comparing the Politics Behind the Immigrant Integration Laws of Catalonia and South Tyrol,?GRITIM-UPF Working Paper Series22 (2014), 16. 8. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nationsand Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeysinto the New Nationalism (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1993); David A. Hollinger, Postethnic America: Beyond Multiculturalism (New York: Basic Books, 1995). 9. Jeram, ?Sub-state Nationalism,?228. 10. Silvio Rendon, ?The Catalan Premium: Language and Employment in Catalonia,? Journal of Population Economics30, no. 3

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46. Adam and Jacobs, ?Divided,?77; Barker, Nationalism, 107. 47. Barker, Nationalism, 104. 48. Eva Juarros-Daussa and Tilman Lanz, ?Re-Thinking Balanced Bilingualism: The Impact of Globalization in Catalonia,? Language Problems& Language Planning 33, no. 1 (2009), 3. 49. Juarros-Daussa and Lanz, ?Re-Thinking,?5. 50. Juarros-Daussa and Lanz, ?Re-Thinking,?5. 51. Amado Alarc贸n Alarc贸n and Luis Garz贸n, ?Children of Immigrants and Social Mobility in Officially Bilingual Societies,?Spanish in Context 10, no. 1 (2013), 94; Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan,?224. 52. Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan,?221. 53. Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan,?226. 54. Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan,?226.; Jeram, ?Sub-State,?231. 55. Jean-Thomas Arrighi de Casanova, ?Managing Immigration in a Multinational Context. Border Struggles and Nation-Building in Contemporary Scotland and Catalonia,?in The Politicsof Immigration in Multi-Level States, ed. Eve Hepburn and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 118. 56. Arrighi de Casanova, ?Managing Immigration in a Multinational Context,?118. 57. Arrighi de Casanova, ?Managing Immigration in a Multinational Context,?119. 58. Arrighi de Casanova, ?Managing Immigration in a Multinational Context,?122. 59. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?232. 60. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?232. 61. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?232. 62. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?232. 63. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?232. 64. Arel, ?Political;?Jeram, ?Sub-State,?232. 65. Arel, ?Political,?79. 66. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?232. 67. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?232. 68. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?233. 69. Barker, Nationalism, 97. 70. Arel, ?Political,?78. 71. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?233. 72. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?233. 73. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?233. 74. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?235.

75. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?235. 76. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?235. 77. Zuber, ?Comparing,?16. 78. Alonso, Challenging; Zuber, ?Comparing,?16. 79. Zuber, ?Comparing,?16. 80. Zuber, ?Comparing,?16. 81. Jeram, ?Sub-State,?254. 82. Zuber, ?Comparing,?16. 83. Zapata-Barrero, ?Catalan,?233.

"refugees welcome" demonstration, vienna, austria by Franz Jachim - Flickr [CC].

Sweden and Germany embody different European welfare state models. Representing the Nordic model, the Swedish welfare state adheres to such principles as social justice, equal opportunity, and ?social solidarity and security for all.?6 It is characterized by universal access to service provisions, generous benefits, and high levels of redistribution. When it comes to the inclusion of migrants, Sweden is known for its favourable stance toward multiculturalism, and its reputation for providing international protection to refugees and asylum seekers. On the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), Sweden ranks as the top country for ?improving equal opportunities in practice? under its ?mainstreaming approach.? This means that welfare state provision functions on the basis that all Swedish residents are entitled to equal rights and opportunities, such as fundamental protection from discrimination, the right

markets. Assessing employment and unemployment rates, as well as the risk of facing poverty, will provide an overview of how migrants perform economically alongside their native- born counterparts. Moreover, for a description of people who are at risk of poverty, this paper consults the Europe 2020 strategy, which evaluates an individual?s risk of falling below the poverty threshold on the basis of income and work intensity levels per household. Thus, persons who are at risk of poverty are those living with ?equivalised disposable income below the risk- of- poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income, after social transfers.?4 Ultimately, a comparative analysis of how immigrants perform at these labour market-related indicators is useful for understanding the extent to which the ?generous immigrant and refugee systems?of Sweden and Germany have responded to the demographic changes caused by migration.5 Sweden and Germany embody different European welfare state models. Representing the Nordic model, the Swedish welfare state adheres to such principles as social justice, equal opportunity, and ?social solidarity and security for all.?6 It is characterized by universal access to service provisions, generous benefits, and high levels of redistribution. When it comes to the inclusion of migrants, Sweden is known for its favourable stance toward multiculturalism, and its reputation for providing international protection to refugees and asylum seekers. On the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), Sweden ranks as the top country for ?improving equal opportunities in practice? under its ?mainstreaming approach.? This means that welfare state provision functions on the basis that all Swedish residents are entitled to equal rights and opportunities, such as fundamental protection from discrimination, the right

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Figure 1. Unemployment rates of migrant persons aged 15-74 by sex, age, and foreign-born nationality (%), 2004-2013.16 TIME

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

European Union (28 count ries)

9.2

9.0 (b)

8.2

7.2

8.9

9.6

10.5

10.8

European Union (27 count ries)

9.2

8.9 (b)

8.2

7.1

8.9

9.6

10.4

10.8

European Union (15 count ries)

8.3

8.2 (b)

7.7

7.1

9.5

9.6

10.6

Euro area (19 count ries)

9.3

9.0 (b)

8.3

7.4

7.5

9.6

10.2

11.4

11.9

Euro area (18 count ries)

9.3

9.0 (b)

8.3

7.5

9.5

10.1

11.3

11.9

Euro area (17 count ries)

9.3

9.0 (b)

8.4

7.5

9.5

10.1

11.3

11.9

Belgium

7.4

8.5 (b)

8.3

7.5

7.9

8.3

7.2 (b)

7.6

8.4

Bulgaria

12.1

10.1 (b)

6.9

5.6 (b)

6.8

10.2

11.3

12.3

Czech Republic

8.2

7.9 (b)

7.2

5.3

4.4

6.7

7.3

6.7 (b)

Denmark

5.2

4.8 (b)

3.9

3.8

3.4

7.5

7.6

7.5

Germany (unt il 1990 former t errit ory of t he FRG)

10.7

11.2 (b)

10.3

8.7

7.5

7.8

7.1

5.8 (b)

5.4

5.2

Sweden

6.7

7.8 (b)

7.1

6.2

8.4

8.6

7.8

8.1

market.17 As illustrated in a series of statistical measures below, both Sweden and Germany exhibit clear differences between immigrant and native-born experiences, with the former group at a disadvantage in labour market outcomes. There are three labour market segments that have to be addressed when comparing the two workforce groups: first, the difference in employment and unemployment rates, and second, the risk of living in poverty. The activity rates of Germany and Sweden?s immigrants fall into the broader trends shown by the rest of the European Union?s twenty- eight (EU- 28) member states. Data shows that in the last seven years, lower activity rates have been recorded for non- EU citizens in comparison to ?national population and mobile EU citizens.? This gap has increased from

2.9 percent in 2009 to 5.3 percent in 2013. As summarized in the Eurostat findings, ?the unemployment rate of non-EU citizens in 2013 was 10 percent higher than the national population.?18 In the case of Germany, the percentage of unemployed migrants aged fifteen to seventy- four years has decreased from 5.8 percent in 2011 to 5.2 percent in 2013. In Sweden, however, the immigrant unemployment rate has evolved in the opposite direction, with minor increases in rates from 7.8 percent in 2011 to 8.1 percent in 2013, as can be observed in Figure 1. At the same time, Figure 2 shows that there are some minimal differences in immigrant employment rates, with Sweden having a slightly higher rate of 74.4 percent compared to 73.5 percent in Germany.

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Figure 3. At-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate by country, 2011 and 2012.21

compared to both Swedish- born and Germanborn peoples.22 These difficulties in integrating immigrants into the labour market reveal a larger experience of social exclusion in the comprehensive welfare state systems of Sweden and Germany. A possible explanation is that there is an indirect link between housing policy and labour market integration. This link can be explained through two proxies: the use of housing allowance as a tool of income redistribution, and the degree of residential segregation. While housing subsidies in the form of cash allowances can shape an individual?s choice to participate in the labour market, the other side of housing policy, which deals with the physical organization of accommodation options, can dictate accessibility to job opportunities on the basis of location. Weese argues that housing is far more than just providing shelter, as it provides individuals with the means of cultivating a ?certain type of lifestyle.? For instance, the physical location of the residential environment can influence an immigrant?s opportunities for work and their access to social services.23 Furthermore, housing

is a significant measure of social equity. Housing programs, dealing with the initial settlement of social groups, are a strong indicator of whether or not 'spatial equity' occurs. This measure is relevant for long-term labour market integration, because it makes a clear distinction between those who can fully participate in the economy, those that can only do so marginally, and those who are excluded completely.24 For example, even when there are new job openings, those living in segregated residential areas, away from urban centres of industrial development, still face difficulties in seeking out employment opportunities. In this sense, housing conditions are not only a ?geographical expression of social relations,?they also have the power to dictate the nature of labour relations.25 It is first-generation immigrants in particular who are more likely to be vulnerable to 'spatial segregation,' and thus limited to labour market opportunities on the basis of their household?s geographic proximity.26 Since the 1990s, Sweden has recognized the negative implications of residential segregation on an individual?s prospect for inclusion at all

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Musterd and Andersson evaluate whether the composition of neighbourhoods and the degree of neighbourhood cohesion (homogeneous rather than socially mixed) has an impact on social opportunities.35 Even though their findings do not demonstrate that housing situations are directly affecting individual access to social opportunities, there is an association between housing mix and social mix, where high levels of residential segregation are facilitating social exclusion more broadly.36 However, barriers to labour market access and mobility are only one manifestation of social exclusion; that being said, living conditions, and the ways in which they make employment more accessible, ultimately impact immigrants? long- term labour performance and integration into the labour market.

#Ohlauer 02.07.2014 008 by mw238 - Flickr [CC].

While the physical location of housing has the potential to act as a structural barrier, isolating immigrants from labour market access and receiving housing allowances in the form of cash transfers can shape individual behaviour and undermine an individual?s willingness to establish self- sufficiency by participating in the labour market. In this context, self- sufficiency refers to an individual or family?s ability to guarantee an

adequate level of sustenance for themselves without any additional form of assistance from the government or a third- party. Shroder introduces a useful neoclassical theoretical framework that models the impacts of housing vouchers on income and total labour supply.37 Even though their primary purpose is to offset the costs and make way for affordable housing arrangements, housing subsidies also provide the recipient with an income guarantee. Nevertheless, the expectation that housing allowances will be sufficient to cover the costs of rent and additional living expenses, might deter the recipient from engaging with the market in search of additional income. This argument is applicable to Sweden and Germany, as both countries are providers of means-tested housing support in the form of cash allowances. In Sweden, housing allowance is given to households that have children living at home both permanently and temporarily.38 Under this system, the allowance amount is dependent on: ?housing costs, the size of the home, household income, and number of children per household.?39 For example, a migrant in Sweden is eligible to receive an immediate monthly allowance of up to 125 EUR.40 In Germany, housing allowance, known as Wohngeld, is a ?tied income transfer? for which an individual becomes eligible when his or her income amount is deemed insufficient to ?obtain accommodation that meets a minimum housing standard.?41 Thus, it is viewed as a subsidy that is available to all low- income groups who qualify.42 The amount received varies across the many L채nder because each offers different programs and funding schemes according to their housing market needs.43 Data shows that at the end of 2012, Germany?s expenditure on housing allowance was approximately 1.25 billion EUR, with 783,000 German households receiving

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NOTES 1. Migrant Integration Policy Index, ?Germany ? Overview,? http://www.mipex.eu/germany (accessed January 27, 2015). 2. European Commission, ?European Integration Network Country Factsheet: Sweden 2012,? http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/whatwedo/networks/european_migration_ network/reports/docs/country-factsheets/ sweden-emn-ountry-facthseet_en.pdf. 3. Statistical Office of the European Communities, Migration Integration Statistics? Employment, 2015 ed., http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat /statistics-explained/index.php/Migrant_inte gration_statistics_-_employment. 4. Statistical Office of the European Communities, People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion, 2015 ed., http://ec.europa. eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_ exclusion. 5. Sven Steinmo, The Evolution of Modern States: Sweden, Japan, and the United States(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 75. 6. Grete Brochmann and Anniken Hagelund, ?Migrants in the Scandanavian Welfare State: The Emergence of a Social Policy Problem,? The Nordic Journal Migration Research 1, no.1 (2011), 13. https://www.researchgate. net/publication/242469695_migrants_in_the _scandinavian_welfare_state_the_emergence _of_a_social_policy_problem. 7. Migrant Integration Policy Index, ?Sweden ? Overview,?http://www.mipex.eu/sweden. 8. Migrant Integration Policy Index, ?Sweden.? 9. Torbjorn Lundqvist, ?Organized Interests, Labour Market and Migration: The Swedish Model?(paper presented at the 2nd Stockholm Workshop on Global Migration Regimes, Stockholm, Sweden, June 2004), http://www.iffs.se/wp-content/uploads/2011 /01/20051201134135filEub2QOVAeakC4 RKQBnlo.pdf, 14-15. 10. Migrant Integration Policy Index, ?Germany.? 11. Migrant Integration Policy Index, ?Germany.? 12. Barry R. Chiswick, ?Are Immigrants Favourably Selected? An Economic Analysis,? in Migration Theory: Talking Acrossthe

Disciplines, ed. Caroline D. Brettel and James F. Hollifield (New York: Routledge, 2007), 66-67. 13. Chiswick, ?Are Immigrants Favourbly Selected??66-67. 14. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Economic Surveys: Sweden 2012, 2012 ed.. 15. Statistical Office of the European Communities, Migration. 16. Statistical Office of the European Communities, Migration. 17. OECD, Economic, 3. 18. Statistical Office of the European Communities, Migration. 19. Statistical Office of the European Communities, Migration. 20. Statistical Office of the European Communities, People. 21. Statistical Office of the European Communities, Migration, 23-24. 22. Statistical Office of the European Communities, Migration, 92-93. 23. Jan van Weese, ?Housing Policy ? The Link between Welfare and Economic Development,?Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 15, no. 2 (2000), 175. 24. Weese, ?Housing,?177. 25. Weese, ?Housing,?178. 26. Weese, ?Housing,?178-179. 27. Roger Andersson, ?Divided Cities as a Policy-Based Notion in Sweden,?Housing Studies14, no. 5 (1999), 602. 28. Steinmo, The Evolution, 75. 29. Andersson, ?Divided,?602. 30. Steinmo, The Evolution, 75. 31. Andersson, ?Divided,?601-607. 32. Andersson, ?Divided,?607. 33. Andersson, ?Divided,?620-621. 34. Michael Voigtlander, ?Why is the German Homeownership Rate so Low??Housing Studies24, no. 3 (2009), 355-356. 35. Sako Musterd and Roger Andersson, ?Housing Mix, Social Mix, and Social Opportunities,?Urban AffairsReview 40, no. 6 (2005), 762. 36. Musterd and Andersson, ?Housing,?Mix, Social Mix, and Social Opportunities,?786. Perversely Affect Self-Sufficiency? A Review

EU A SYLUM POLI CY & SWI TZ ERLA ND: V ENUE SHOPPI NG OR EU EX TERNA LI Z A TI ON? SWITZERLAND?S asylum policy has been the subject of increased scrutiny in the past decade, initially because of cuts to its refugee welfare programs and services,1 and even more recently as a result of attempts to segregate the population by banning refugees from certain public areas in an effort to ?protect Swiss children.?2 Switzerland has repeatedly insisted that the restrictive measures of its current refugee policies are strictly the result of asylum agreements that it has entered into with the European Union (EU).3 This paper examines the validity of Switzerland?s claim that it is merely complying with EU regulations, by investigating whether Switzerland?s asylum policies have followed the development of the EU?s asylum system from 1985 to 2010. A comparative analysis of the evolution of the two asylum systems highlights three areas of significant variance: the concept of safe countries, the application of the Dublin Convention, and expulsion tactics. This analysis demonstrates that Switzerland?s asylum policy evolved without regard to EU policies. The concluding section argues that venue shopping and EU externalization are the underlying reasons for Switzerland?s attribution of its asylum policies to the EU. The EU?s asylum and refugee regime developed over the past twenty-five years through a process of dialogue, cooperation, collaboration, and engagement between EU members and third

EMILY KOLLER

countries, before it was established in treaties and binding standards. The 1986 Single European Act (SEA) envisaged an EU free of internal borders, as reflected in the Schengen Agreement of 1985.4 The SEA and Schengen signaled the free movement of people as integral to the existence and functioning of the EU, but raised concerns over the mobility of non-EU citizens.5 The Dublin Convention, signed in 1990 and in force since 1997, represented the first significant step by EU states to coordinate their national asylum policies. It established that an asylum seeker?s country of entry was responsible for examining the individual?s request.6 This convention favours states which are surrounded by other EU states, such as Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands,7 because under the Dublin Convention asylum seekers are returned to their first point of entry, for example France or Italy; thus the sender states are alleviated of the burden of hosting refugees. One pillar of the 1992 Treaty of the EU (Maastricht) deals with justice and home affairs (JHA), which includes immigration and asylum policies, in order to delegate authority to the ministers responsible for the creation of an EU-wide Photo: 1 November 2015: Afghan refugee in Moria camp, Lesvosisland, Greece by ggia - Flickr [CC] / Cropped from original.

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the responsibility of that country vis- Ă - vis processing asylum claims. Switzerland became the first country to coin the term 'safe country of origin' and incorporate the concept into its asylum policies long before the EU; the concept has since been widely adopted.21 Switzerland has sent back asylum seekers it suspects of transiting through safe countries in Europe and northern Africa.22 In contrast, the EU asylum system did not adopt the 'safe country' concept until 2005, 15 years after Switzerland.23 A common EU list of safe countries was established and adopted by all member states;24 this is a restrictive tactic because it runs counter to the spirit of burden- sharing that the EU has strived for in its asylum policies.25 Adoption of the ?safe country? concept shows that Switzerland?s asylum system did not follow that of the EU, as it was first created and used by Switzerland and was not downloaded from the EU asylum system. Therefore, EU policy could not have influenced this Swiss policy. Since 1992, Switzerland has appealed to the Dublin Convention and the Schengen Agreement as its basis for refouling refugees to other European states.26 Switzerland?s use of the Dublin Convention?s provisions demonstrates that the EU has not directed the evolution of Switzerland?s asylum system. Switzerland was an early participant in the development of the Dublin Convention as an advocate for the creation of an efficient system to determine state responsibility for asylum applications.27 Although isolated and unable to sign onto Dublin, Switzerland proceeded to create and implement similar legislation of its own accord.28 Based on the safe country concept, the Swiss legislation pertains to EU and third party states that have signed onto Dublin.29 Since formally signing it in 2008, Switzerland references the Dublin Convention as its rationale for refoul-

ing asylum seekers to Italy or Greece, despite having adopted this policy long before it signed Dublin. The absence of EU direction over Switzerland?s asylum system is seen in the latter?s much more narrow interpretation and application of the Dublin Convention relative to other signatories. Citing the Dublin Convention, Switzerland has continued to return asylum seekers who have transited through Greece to reach Switzerland,30 even after the EC requested that asylum seekers not be refouled to Greece as it is no longer able to properly process and/or provide services to asylum seekers.31 The Swiss asylum system underwent further changes in 1999 when new laws were enacted with the stated purpose of conformity to the body of EU laws known as the acquis. Among these are provisions not found in the acquis which permit the rejection of asylum seekers who are unable and/or unwilling to produce proper documentation within the first 48 hours following arrival.32 Switzerland also proposed several bilateral agreements with the EU in 1999 which echoed the spirit of the Dublin Convention and Schengen Agreement. After its rejection by the EU, Switzerland declared its intent to conduct negotiations with the EU in order to reach an agreement on the JHA pillar, which led Switzerland to become a signatory to Dublin and Schengen in 2008. EU member state interest in Swiss participation is low owing to to a high number of asylum seekers in Switzerland; and the number of asylum applications per one thousand people is 3.5 for Switzerland and 1.2 for Germany.33 The hardline expulsion methods used by Switzerland also diverge from the EU as Swiss authorities have the right to reject asylum seekers who are uncooperative or fail to produce necessary documentation; this measure has not been

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policy changes to the EU despite the absence of binding obligations to the union. Venue shopping continues to be used by Switzerland when it cites the EU acquis as justification for controversial provisions in its asylum policy. In addition, the Dublin Convention is invoked in cases where NGOs and other interest groups express concerns with Swiss procedures for ensuring the welfare of asylum seekers.41 The concept of EU externalization, or more accurately, the shifting up and out of the EU, is a two- part concept.42 In ?shifting up,?responsibility for the policy moves upwards from national to international and supranational actors, whereas ?shifting out? refers to shifting the policy forum towards foreign policy. This shifting up and out relates to the discussion of EU asylum and migration policy, where control and policymaking authority is first shifted up to the EU level and then out towards EU foreign relations.43 The shift out to foreign relations is evident in the externalization of EU policy to third party states. This step is achieved through bilateral treaties and transgovernmental agencies working with or in, third countries on behalf of the EU.44 The role played by the concept of shifting up and out in Switzerland?s narrative is less clear as there is relatively little shift in Swiss asylum policy up to the EU level, only the coordination of their activities in similar policy areas. However, an increase in the presence of international actors and trans-governmental agencies working in both Switzerland and the EU indicates that Switzerland and the EU are shifting their asylum policies outwards through bilateral agreements and funding for projects in third party states.45This trend is reinforced by Switzerland?s role as the main donor for several aid and services programs for refugees and asylum seekers carried out abroad.46

Venue shopping and externalization are used as tools in Switzerland?s construction of its asylum system narrative, however venue shopping is less successful in Switzerland compared to the EU, because the former is a direct democracy that prevents the expediting of certain processes, which is not the case in EU member states.47 This difficulty also exists with externalization and shifting policy upwards in Switzerland. Nonetheless, Swiss citizens have voted several times to increase the restrictive provisions in Switzerland?s asylum system,48 indicating that venue shopping and externalization are superfluous instruments for Swiss policy makers on the domestic front, given the support of Swiss citizens for their polices. This paper demonstrates that the development of Switzerland?s restrictive asylum system preceded the provisions of the EU asylum system, since the former created policies which were only later incorporated into the EU?s asylum system. This paper highlights three key areas which weaken Switzerland?s claim that the development and current provisions of its asylum system simply mirror the EU?s system. Two concepts - venue shopping and externalization - are used by Swiss authorities to assert that Switzerland?s asylum system is ?imposed?by the EU in compliance with the acquis. Venue shopping is used when Switzerland cites its obligations to a supranational authority (the EU) through a supranational instrument (the Dublin Convention), although no treaties were signed at the time. To some extent, Switzerland also uses externalization as it shifts responsibility for some of its policies outwards onto international and transnational agencies and away from Swiss policy makers. Ultimately, this paper demonstrates that Switzerland?s asylum policies are restrictive not as a result of the EU

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15. / ?uri=uriserv%3Aai0033, 75; A. Geddes, ?The European Union: Supranational Governance and the Remaking of European Migration Policy and Politics,?445. 16. European Union, Lisbon Treaty, 2007, 75. 17. Sandra Lavenex,and E. Ucarer, Migration and the Externalitiesof European Integration (New York: Lexington Booksm, 2002), 64. 18. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 64-66. 19. Helene Lambert, The Global Reach of European Refugee Law (Edinburgh: Cambridge, 2013), 233; Thomas Liebig, ?Switzerland's Immigration Policy: Lessons for Germany?,? Forschunginstitut fur Arbeit und Arbeitsrecht, 2002, 13. 20. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 58; Sandra Lavenex, Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Between Human rightsand Human Security (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 76. 21. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 69. 22. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 69; Helene Lambert, The Global Reach of European Refugee Law, 234. 23. European Council. Directive on: minimum standardson proceduresin Member Statesfor granting and withdrawing refugee status. 2005/85/EC. 24. Shuster, Turning refugeesinto ?illegal migrants?: Afghan asylum seekersin Europe, 1395. 25. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 68. 26. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 69. 27. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 69. 28. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 69. 29. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 68. 30. Commissioner of Human Rights, National RapporteursReport on Switzerland (Bern: Council of Europe, 2012), 4. 31. Organisation Suisse d'aide aux Refugies, National Asylum procedure in Switzerland (Bern: Forum Refugies 2013), 10. 32. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 69. 33. E. Thieleman, ?The Future of the Common European Asylum System,?Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies(2008), 3. 34. Commissioner of Human Rights, National RapporteursReport on Switzerland, 4. 35. Commissioner of Human Rights, National RapporteursReport on Switzerland, 6.

36. Lillian Langford, ?The Other Euro Crisis: Rights Violations Under the Common European Asylum System and the Unraveling of EU Solidarity,?Harvard Human Rights Journal (2014), 258. 37. Langford, ?The Other Euro Crisis,?258. 38. Virgine Guiraudon, ?European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping,?Journal of Common Market Studies(2000): 251-271. 39. Guiraudon, ?European Integration and Migration Policy,?251-271. 40. Lavenex and Ucarer, European Integration, 65. 41. Geiser, ?Parliament moves to tighten asylum laws.? 42. Sandra Lavenex, ?Shifting up and out: The Foreign Policy of European immigration control,?West European Politics(2006): 329-350. 43. Lavenex, ?Shifting up and out,?329-350. 44. Lavenex, ?Shifting up and out,?329-350. 45. Lambert, The Global Reach of European Refugee Law, 234. 46. IOM, ?Movement and Resettlement: Donors,? http://southafrica.iom.int/programme/ movement-and-resettlement/#tab4. 47. Dimitri Toshkov and L. de Haan, ?The Europeanization of Asylum Policy: An assessment of the EU impact on asylum applications and recognitions rates,?European Public Policy (2013): 661-683. 48. Mary Gearin, ?Swiss vote for tougher asylum laws amid spike in refugee numbers,?ABC News, 2014. http://www.abc.net.au /news/2013-06-10/swiss-vote-for-tougher -asylum-laws/ 4743236; UNHCR ?Swiss vote could turn genuine refugees away,? November 5, 2006, http://www.unhcr. org/3dc7eb624.html; ?Europe Moves to Block Refugees Seeking Aslyum,?The New York Times, May 10, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/10/world /europe-moves-to-block-refugees-seekingasylum.html.

STA LI N: A NEW BI OGRA PHY OF A DI CTA TOR Ol eg K h l ev ni uk . Transl ated by Nora Sel i gman Fav orov New Hav en: Yal e Uni v ersi ty Press, 2015.

ANDRII DZHAGA IN Stalin: A New Biography of a Dictator, the Russian historian Oleg Khlevniuk tries to reveal the real Stalin hidden behind his propagandistic cult of personality. To a certain degree, the book is a reaction to a surge in popular interest and positive attitudes toward Stalin in Russia during Putin?s tenure. In 2001, 43 percent of Russians had a negative attitude towards Stalin. By 2016, this figure shrank to 17 percent.1 In recent years, publicists, writers, and ordinary Russians have tried to discover another Stalin, especially after the publication of Yuri Zhukov?s book Drugoi Stalin (Another Stalin), in 2003. Those supporting Stalin do not deny the dictator?s crimes against his own population. They justify his crimes by resorting to theories of modernizing Stalinism; the historical inevitability of cruel modernization in Russia for the sake of survival; or Scapegoat-Stalin, the hapless victim of a bureaucracy that initiated terror and was the main reason for the multiple economic and military failures of the Soviet Union. The book is of interest for those who want to learn more about Stalin?s persona and who seek answers to more general questions about the dictator?s decision- making processes, as well as domestic political struggles. Stalin?s biography shows us a path from a promising, industrious student to a cruel dictator who slaughtered millions of people: there is hardly a better prism through which to examine Russian history in the first half of the

twentieth century. In Stalin, Khlevniuk rejects those theories and demonstrates their weaknesses in the face of solid archival documents. The book offers a succinct analysis of Russian history: from rapid socioeconomic transformations in the late nineteenth century, to the victorious conquest of Central Europe after the Second World War. To this end, Khlevniuk focuses on the gradual development of Stalin?s persona and the general context within which the dictator?s worldview evolved. To get into the head of the dictator, the author used previously untapped materials from the archives: documents Stalin requested and read, complete with his margin notes, from the archive of the President of the Russian Federation; a collection of Stalin?s materials, as well as Stalin?s personal book collection with notes that were kept at the Party?s Central Archive; Stalin?s file at the Russian State Archive of Socio- Political History; a timetable of visits to Stalin?s cabinet, which Khlevniuk uses to exhibit the informal power structures of the Soviet regime; and memoirs by Stalin?s colleagues and servants. As in his previous works (Master of the House (2009), Stalin?s Letters to Molotov (2011)), Khlevniuk pays a lot of attention to Stalin?s personal correspondence with friends who happened to be influential figures in the party.

SECONDHA ND TI M E: THE LA ST OF THE SOV I ETS Sv etl ana A l ex i ev i ch Wol ow i ec: Wydaw ni ctw o Czarne, 2015.

MICHAEL DURLIK THE fall of the Soviet Union ended sixtynine years of one of the greatest social engineering projects of the twentieth century: the creation of the socalled ?Red Man.?Otherwise known as Homo Sovieticus, the Red Man was the product of persistent efforts to create a model citizen. In her latest book, Czasy Secondhand: Koniec czerwonego czlowieka (English translation scheduled for release May 24, 2016),1 Nobel Laureate Svetlana Alexievich employs the medium of oral history to present a portion of her lifetime of work documenting individual life stories and piecing them into one overarching theme? the post-Soviet life of the Homo Sovieticus. In Secondhand Time, she chronicles the lives of various figures, illustrating generational differences in their attitudes toward the Soviet project. Secondhand Time presents a compelling portrait of the effects of perestroika and glasnost on regular Soviet citizens, and what the decline of the empire meant for the average person. She demonstrates how Soviet citizens, conditioned by the powerful ideology of sacrifice and collective work, interpreted and experienced their new lives in an individualistic and capitalist post- Soviet world. In doing so, Alexievich successfully humanizes momentous historical events, particularly by continuous reference to the twinned themes of love and death as powerful motivators for selfsacrifice; the theme of suffering is also shown to

have been an important factor, particularly in shaping the attitudes of older generations. The use of suffering as a defining characteristic of life (and its worth) for older generations ultimately contributed to the negative framing of the democratization project in the early 1990s, as they viewed the failure of the Soviet Union as the squandering of their efforts. Narratives of collective suffering, particularly concerning collectivization and war, were omnipresent in the early years of the Soviet Union, and often excluded the individual. In her Nobel Lecture, Alexievich describes herself as an advocate for giving a voice back to the ?single individual,?contending that ?everyday life?is usually omitted by the ?big picture of history.?2 The big picture history of the Soviet Union was a collective experience, told not just within the country itself, but also to Westerners who viewed its unfolding on their television screens. However, the effects of change were individual and unique, and so by telling these ?little histories,??big history is told along the way.?3 Although the majority of the book deals with Russia in the first decade after the August Putsch, it also encompasses events in post- Soviet spaces such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, and others. By contrasting multiple individuals? perceptions of single events, both past and present, Alexievich creates a rich portrayal of each one.

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Belorussian, illustrates modern divisions in her country: where most youth aspire to a normalized Western lifestyle, others are pro- government perpetrators of violence. She effectively illustrates tensions such as this, between stability and a yearning for change within what is considered the last dictatorship in Europe. Ultimately, she demonstrates that the post- Soviet social transformation was marked by economic hardships, creating the sense that freedom and democracy did not bear the ?fruits?that ordinary citizens had hoped for. Using the voices of others, Alexievich accurately portrays how post- Soviet society is tugging in various directions, with many wanting true democracy while others are willing to settle for a ?illiberal?version, as long as the material situation is improving. Secondhand Time is a crucial read for anyone attempting to understand post- Soviet space and the attitudes of average citizens regarding Vladimir Putin?s undertakings in Syria and Ukraine. Today, the average citizen of Russia, once again yearning for greatness, is willing to sacrifice themselves for a greater cause. According to many, the Soviet Union was relinquished for the benefit of the United States, cronyism, and robber capitalism. Alexievich effectively portrays a society of individuals collectively pulling society in various directions as they continue to come to terms with the loss of superpower status and their positions in a post-Soviet reality.

NOTES 1. The quotes in this book review were translated by me from the Polish edition: Swietlana Aleksijewicz, Czasy Secondhand: Koniec czerwonego czlowieka (Wolowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne, 2014). 2. Alexievich, ?Nobel Lecture by Svetlana Alexievich,?Nobel Foundation (2015), 6. 3. Alexievich, ?Nobel Lecture by Svetlana Alexievich,?6. 4. Aleksijewicz, Czasy Secondhand, 105-106. 5. Aleksijewicz, Czasy Secondhand, 157. 6. Aleksijewicz, Czasy Secondhand, 273. 7. Aleksijewicz, Czasy Secondhand, 280.

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Nazis framed the murder of Jews as a way for locals? keen to preserve property expropriated from their Jewish neighbours? to absolve themselves of any guilt associated with Soviet collaboration. Actual Soviet collaborators were recruited to shoot Jews for allegedly being Soviet collaborators, which fuelled the Judeo- Bolshevik myth and blamed the Jews for the loss of their nation. The Germans could manipulate Ukrainian nationalism in Poland and pose as liberators in cases where Soviet rule eliminated statehood, such as in Lithuania and Latvia. Nazi- incited pogroms were far likelier in places where Germans had forced the Soviets from power regardless of local levels of anti- Semitism. Mass murder occurred outside German territories, where the fragmentation of national, local, and police authority was used to provoke violence against stateless Jews or those who had been deported. However, these reasons do not necessarily exclude anti-Semitism as a motivating factor for participation in mass murder, as human behaviour is rarely as rational as Snyder depicts. Unlike occupied, stateless, or puppet regimes, German allies such as Hungary, Romania, and Italy were sovereign states that could reorient their foreign policy toward the Allies as the tide of war turned against Germany. These states could reverse anti-Jewish measures and defect to the Allies, whereas Germany accelerated the killing of Jews in stateless zones as it suffered setbacks in the war?s later years. Since Nazi Germany considered Polish territory open for colonization, German lawyers argued that Poland did not exist as a polity and all Polish law was treated as if it had never existed. The deprivation of citizenship meant Jews lost state protections, while deportations of non- Polish Jews to Poland severed ties to their homelands and reinforced their

vulnerability, as many lacked connections or contacts in Poland which were crucial to survival. Snyder demonstrates the importance of sovereignty by contrasting two Western European cases. The Netherlands, whose political leadership fled the country, resembled the closest case of statelessness in Western Europe. Vichy France, on the other hand, preserved sufficient autonomy to act in the state?s interest as the war progressed. Indeed, the high survival rate of French Jews compared with Dutch Jews through resistance to Nazi deportation orders attests to the importance of state sovereignty in protecting local populations. In France, moreover, Jews without French citizenship were ten times more likely to be deported to Auschwitz. These examples illustrate that some states maintained the necessary autonomy to protect its citizens even while the legitimate use of force belonged to the Germans. Snyder?s didactic account of the Holocaust extends beyond an examination of the past as he delineates the numerous factors that threaten to undermine statehood in the modern era. By focusing on sovereignty, he presents a convincing account of the underlying reasons that explain variance in Jewish survival rates throughout Europe. However, Snyder does not elucidate sovereignty?s negative aspects to the same extent. Sovereignty allowed for the enactment of antiJewish policies, as in Hungary, and the refusal by the Allies to admit Jewish refugees. In addition, his attempt to rationalize Hitler?s actions through his 'zoological anarchism' provides a false sense of coherence and design to Nazi extermination policies. 'Zoological anarchism' entailed state destruction, as statehood represented a Jewish perversion of the earth?s natural state, but it did not represent a fully developed Final Solution, as the

THE SNYDER I NTERV I EW ON NOVEMBER 4, 2015, YALE HISTORIAN TIMOTHY SNYDER DELIVERED THE TORONTO ANNUAL HOLODOMOR LECTURE ENTITLED, "THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE AS WORLD HISTORY." THE FOLLOWING MORNING, SNYDER MET WITH EURASIATIQUE'SSENIOR EDITORS FOR AN INTERVIEW OVER BREAKFAST AT ST. VLADIMIR INSTITUTE, THE CONDENSED AND EDITED TRANSCRIPT OF WHICH FOLLOWS.

* EURASIATIQUE: You?ve often been criticized for focusing on transnational history at the expense of national history. Indeed, there are national historians who say that the study of transnational history diminishes their own national histories. Can you begin by offering a defence of transnational history? Can you speak to the value of this approach, and what it offers us that national history might not? TIMOTHY SNYDER: Let?s assume that the questions of national history? why did a nation come about, or why did a national tragedy occur? are good questions. How can you answer those questions? You cannot answer them with national history. You can try, but you will fail because the factors which have to do with the genesis of a nation, by definition, cannot come from the nation. The nation isn?t there, it doesn?t exist. For instance,

you cannot explain the origins of the Lithuanian nation by way of the Lithuanian nation, just like you can?t explain your origins by way of you. The argument that I make in The Reconstruction of Nations (2003) is that you start with some premodern notion of citizenship; you start with the political norms and political institutions that are there, and then you imagine modern nations as challenging them and as destroying them, as being, by their nature, inimical to them. In Reconstruction, I say that national history has to present itself as continuous, because that?s its narrative logic. But logically, in terms of interpretation or causality, for a nation to come into being, it can?t be continuous. There has to be a moment of breaking with something? the nation has to have broken with something in the past. In order to answer the basic questions of national history, you have to go beyond the nation. You have to find something international and transnational. As for national tragedies, I?ve spent a lot of time writing about the Holocaust lately so I?m going to talk about the Holocaust. You can narrate the Holocaust as Jewish history, or you can narrate it as experience? in doing so, you end up with museum exhibitions and you end up with this thing that we call ?memory,?this thing that we call ?commemoration.? But what you cannot have is explanation, for the very simple reason that Jews could not have known everything that is necessary to

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influence life beyond one nation. EURASIATIQUE: You mentioned that there?s an obvious difference between history and memory, and you?ve noted the possibility of commemorating through history rather than commemorating through memory. So if commemoration and memory are so intertwined, when should we rely on memory when talking about the Holocaust or the Holodomor? And how does history harness or appropriately treat memory, as opposed to dishonouring or undermining it? SNYDER: In a very elementary sense, history depends upon memory. But the word ?memory? in English has a whole range of meanings, and nowadays when we say ?memory? we often don't mean what we actually remember, like where I parked my car or what happened to me in 1946. What we mean is some kind of memory culture or some kind of politics of memory or the things that we?ve learned from other people. Memory gets to us before we can defend ourselves, so we are all in some ways prisoners of memory. Memory is a thing that sinks into you. In some sense, becoming an adult, and certainly becoming a scholar, is about recognizing that and cordoning off memory, seeing it as a subject. So as a historian, I take a very conservative line on this. I think that memory is a subject. If you?re going to talk about memory as a historian, you have to put quotations around it. Doing history involves asking the questions that allow you to get away from memory. The myths are out there. If you agree with them, that?s bad enough. And if you engage with them directly, you?re also not really doing history. If you oppose them directly, then in fact what you?re doing is supporting them in some way? the metaphor, which I used in The Reconstruction of Nations, is that you?re holding up a skeleton which

would otherwise fall down on its own. Memory helps you ask questions. You ask a question, then you ask a more distant question and a more distant question, and at some point you get to a question which is a historical question. You have to take seriously what your own vocation is: are you acting as a historian, or are you acting as a Ukrainian grandmother? Are you acting as a historian, or are you acting as a consciousnessraiser? These are different activities.

MEMORY GETS TO US BEFORE W E CAN DEFEND OURSELVES, SO W E ARE ALL IN SOME WAYS PRISONERS OF MEMORY. MEMORY IS A THING THAT SINKS INTO YOU. I didn?t write about the Holodomor because I was concerned about making everyone aware of it, or I thought it was forgotten, or because of some kind of memory motivation; I wrote about it because it was needed to make sense of the 1930s. The history can?t be written out of the frustration of thinking that no one understands ?our story.? Your ?story? is not what matters. For one thing, the story is not true. The things that you?re taught in school, the things that your parents taught you? those aren?t true. Generally, that story is just an introduction to the truth. It gives you some of the tools, some of the emotions that you need, but it?s an introduction. It?s like an antechamber, a porch, and the truth is inside; you?ve got to break down some doors, break some windows, and make some people unhappy before you get there.

EURASIATIQUE VOLUME IV

Germany generally have a narrow, convenient view of what happened in the Holocaust. They think: ?There were some Germans, Nazis took over the state, Nazis changed the state, and that?s how it happened.? That?s not how it happened! The Holocaust didn?t happen in Germany. It couldn?t have happened in Germany. It doesn?t matter how many bad Nazis you had in Germany, you couldn?t have the Holocaust in Germany because there weren?t Jews there. They were less than one percent of the population. As a matter of fact, most of them survived and when they were killed, they were killed outside of Germany. They were killed in places like Minsk and Riga and Lodz, which had been sites of bustling Jewish civilization until the Germans came and destroyed their states. This goes back to the transnational question; a lot of what passes for German history is, in fact, erinnerungskultur, it?s memory that defends itself as history and serves to minimize what?s going on. The Germans all think they remember the Holocaust. They remember something, but they don?t remember the Holocaust because they generally don?t have any idea what happened in the Holocaust. They think it was camps, they think it was German Jews. It wasn?t camps, and it mostly wasn?t German Jews. What I think is legitimate is to look at the past, and if you identify some causal factors you can say, with some hesitation, ?Okay, we see these causal factors in the present, we should perhaps pay attention to them.?I didn?t start the project by saying, ?Oh, it?s really warm today, I?ll write a book about the Holocaust.? What I did was I went back to Hitler, paid a lot of attention to lebensraum, and then when I was done with all of that I wrote a few pages about how I think there are some things to watch out for that the Holocaust can teach us, that we haven?t already learned to watch out for.

W HAT I?M TRYING TO SAY IS THAT IF THE IDEOLOGY FITS, RESONATES, AND FUNCTIONS IN CONJUNCTION W ITH OTHER THINGS, IT MEANS W E ALSO HAVE TO BE AWARE OF THE OTHER THINGS. EURASIATIQUE: Given the differences in current Russian and Ukrainian nation- building projects, can you envision a framework within which reconciliation, or even some sort of meaningful communication, is possible? SNYDER: Absolutely. But for there to be Ukrainian- Russian dialogue, there has to be Ukraine. Ukrainians can?t take care of Russia, but Ukrainians can take care of Ukraine. In order for there to be Ukrainian-Russian dialogue, there has to be a coherent Ukrainian society that has some view about its past. There are precedents. German-French reconciliation seemed as improbable, or more improbable, because they fought a whole series of wars. And there?s also Poland and Germany. The German occupation of Poland, whether or not you?re talking about the Holocaust, was extraordinarily brutal. The expulsion of the Germans from Poland was much worse thanPolish historians generally remember. I mean, tens of thousands of people killed, millions of people displaced, and yet in the 1960s the two countries were already talking about reconciliation, which seemed really improbable. The PolishUkrainian business of the 1990s was a pretty dramatic transformation. Reconciliation can therefore happen. More

ABOUT EURASIATIQUE The annual graduate student journal is a publication that is organized, designed, and implemented by graduate students from the Centre for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (CERES) at the University of Toronto. Each edition examines interdisciplinary themes in an attempt to bring together graduate work from CERES and its international partner institutions. Eurasiatique accepts submissions from various disciplines that create dialogue and understanding of the many polities that make up Europe, Russia, and Eurasia. For more information, please visit: www.ceresgraduatejournal.com. Inquiries and comments can be emailed to: ceresjournal@gmail.com.

ABOUT CERES CERES is one of North America's leading academic institutes for the study of the member states of the European Union, Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe, and post-Soviet countries. Part of the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, CERES promotes interdisciplinary scholarship and teaching in the social sciences and humanities. Photo: Wire fence by Steve Johnson - Flickr. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

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